League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v COMELEC

December 21, 2009 | Velasco, Jr.

Facts: MR of the first Decision (Nov 18, 2008). The case is a petition for prohibition against the COMELEC
seeking to enjoin it from conducting plebiscites in the 16 municipalities converted into cities by Congress
thru the cityhood laws on the ground that the cityhood laws are unconstitutional.
The Nov 18, 2008 Decision granted the original petition and nullified the cityhood laws. The respondent
LGUs moved to reconsider the Decision, raising as issue the validity of the factual premises not contained
or established in the pleadings which became the basis of the Decision.
On March 31, 2009, the MR was denied. A second MR was filed, which was also denied in a
Resolution with a 6-6 vote on April 28, 2009. On May 14, 2009, a Motion to Amend the Resolution was
filed by the respondent which was expunged in a June 2, 2009 resolution. An MR of the June 2, 2009
Resolution was filed, the propriety of which is subject of this case.

Issues: 1. (Procedural) WON the MR of the June 2, 2009 Resolution should be granted? YES
2. (Substantive) WON the cityhood laws are unconstitutional? NO
a. WON the cityhood laws violate Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and the equal
protection clause. NO

Held: 1. The MR of the June 2, 2009 Resolution is, in effect, a MR of the April 28, 2009 MR of the Nov 18,
2008 Decision. The Nov 18, 2008 Decision is a decision concerning the validity of a law and the Constitution
(Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII) provides that “all cases involving the constitutionality of a law shall be heard by the
Court en banc and decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.”
Since the Resolution on April 28, 2009 is, in effect, a decision concerning the validity of the
cityhood laws (because it is an MR of the Decision), then it follows that the last decision concerning the
constitutionality of a law ended in a tie of 6-6, which cannot be had because the constitution provides
that the constitutionality of a law must be decided by a majority vote. As such, the issue remains
undecided. Hence the present MR should be granted.

2. The cityhood laws are constitutional.

They do not violate Sec. 10 Art X of the Constitution. The said section provides
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.
The Court basically said that the “local government code” referred to in the provision does not
specifically refer to the LGC of 1991 or to any specific Local Government Code whatsoever. What it refers
to is (bear with me) the capacity of Congress to enact legislation setting guidelines in the creation, division,
merger, abolition, and alteration of boundary of local government units.
The Court argues that the LGC of 1991 is just the convenient repository of the guidelines created
by Congress. Other enactments of the Congress may therefore be considered as part of the “local
government code” referred to in the Constitution. As such, the cityhood laws may be considered part of
this “local government code” as specific enactments since the power to create cities is within the powers
of the Congress anyway. Hence, the cityhood laws are not violative of the Constitution.
The cityhood laws are also not violative of the equal protection clause.
Petitioner cannot invoke this clause because the enactment of the cityhood laws does not result to
deprivation of property. Also, it is presumptuous of the petitioners to stake a claim on the IRA.
 There is a substantial distinction for the favorable treatment of the 16 municipalities. Years before
RA 9009, they already met the income criteria of P20M. However, extraneous circumstances prevented
Congress from acting upon the pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009, such as President
Estrada’s impeachment, May 2001 elections, etc. (as enumerated in Sen. Lim’s sponsorship speech of the
cityhood bills).
The classification is also germane to the law’s purpose. The exemption was meant to reduce the inequality
brought about by the passage of RA 9009 and also to insure that fairness and justice would be accorded
to the LGUs.
The common exemption clause is an application of the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 on the
cityhood bills. It’s not a declaration of rights, but mere declaration of prior qualification. The said clause
would also apply equally to all similarly situated (the municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before
RA 9009.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their Motion to Amend
the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further
Proceedings, dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated
November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be
RECALLED.