JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J.

BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.

Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982
by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City,
and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.

Facts:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon
City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and
784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were seized. A petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after
6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the
Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles
seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).

**PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS**

1. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the
disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
2. In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in
fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

3. It is contended by petitioners, however, that the questioned search warrants could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly
issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution

**RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS**

1. Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and
marked as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is
now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the
logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and
he can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used
them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the
search warrants assailed in this petition.
2. Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable
stress is laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982,
the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse
of a period of more than six [6] months.
3. At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use
the aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution
of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation,
the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.

Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be
searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was
evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the
case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature
becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so
when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless
such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be
the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the
case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property
susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.
Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos “is in possession or has in his control printing
equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and
are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable
under PD 885, as amended” is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford
vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched
and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent
judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The
prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all
articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ALDECOA AND COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
The Attorney-General filed a written complaint in the CFI of Surigao against the firm of Aldecoa
& Co., alleging that the defendant, a mercantile copartnership company with a branch officein
Surigao, continues to operate as such mercantile copartnership company under the name of Aldecoa & Co.,;
that the said defendant, knowing that it had no title or right whatever to two adjoiningparcels of
land has been occupying them illegally for the past seventeen years, more or less, havingconstructed on the land a
wharf, located along the railroad, and built warehouses of light material forthe storage of coal — all for its
exclusive use and benefit. These lands, situated in Surigao,belonged to the late Spanish Government in
the Philippines and are now the property of theGovernment of the United States and were placed under the control
of the Insular GovernmentSince the year 1901, the defendant has been requested repeatedly by the Attorney-
General, inrepresentation of the Insular Government, to recognize the latter's right of dominion over the sameand
to deliver to it the said property, and that, by reason of such demands, Aldecoa & Co. agreed toreturn the land,
but that later, after several delays, it concluded by persisting in its attempt illegally tocontinue
occupying the said land and refused to return it to the Insular Government. The defendantalleged that it held and
possessed, as owner, and had full and absolute dominion over, the landsclaimed by the plaintiff. CFI rendered
judgment and found that the land in question was public landand belonged to the State, and ordered the defendant
to return it to the plaintiff.

ISSUE: Whether the subject lands as claimed by the defendant is a part of the public dominion.

RULING: Yes. It is incontrovertible that the land in question is of the public domain and belongs tothe State,
inasmuch as at the present time it is partly shore land and in part, was such formerly, andnow is land formed by the
action of the sea. On the supposition that Aldecoa & Co. commenced tooccupy the land and shore herein
concerned, prior to the enforcement of the Civil Code in theseIslands, it is unquestionable that the issue must be
determined in accordance with the provisions ofthe Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, inasmuch as the shores, as
well as the lands united thereto bythe accretions and alluvium deposits produced by the action of the sea, are of the
public use anddomain. All this said land, together with the adjacent shore, belongs to the public domain and
isintended for public uses. Thus, the defendant, in construction on the two aforementioned parcels ofland a
retaining wall, a pier or wharf, a railway, and warehouses for the storage of coal, for itsexclusive use and benefit,
did all this without due and competent authority and has been illegallyoccupying the land since 1901. Aldecoa &
Co. endeavored to prove that the land, consisting of thetwo united parcels, belonged to them in fee simple, on
account of their having begun to occupy itthrough a verbal permit from the then politico-military governor of
Surigao. The said permit was averbal authorization to occupy the land on condition that the defendant should later
on prepare titledeeds thereto, and that this authorization was granted for the purpose of furnishing facilities to,
andbenefiting the merchants of Surigao, in view of the backward condition of things in those regions atthe time. It
is certain, however, that Aldecoa & Co. did not obtain or solicit permission from theGovernment to establish
themselves there and erect thereon their buildings and works, nor did theyendeavor to obtain any title of ownership
to the said land. Defendant has not proven that it obtainedfor itself, in conformity with the provisions of
the said Law of Waters. The Civil Code, which went intoeffect in these Islands on December 7, 1889,
confirms the provisions of the said Law of Waters. Theshores and the lands reclaimed from the sea, while they
continue to be devoted to public uses andno grant whatever has been made of any portion of them to private
persons, remain a part of thepublic domain and are for public uses, and, until they are converted into patrimonial
property of theState. Inasmuch as, being dedicated to the public uses, they are not subject of commerce
amongmen, in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code. The record does not disclose that Aldecoa &Co.
had obtained from the Spanish Government of the Philippines the requisite authorization legallyto occupy the said
two parcels of land of which they now claim to be the owners.

For the foregoing reasons, in the course of the explanation of which the errors attributed to the judgment
appealed from have been disposed of, it is our opinion that such judgment should be fully affirmed, as it is in
accordance with the law. The costs shall be assessed against the appellant. So ordered.