CEBU OXYGEN v. DRILON
The Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
DOCTRINE: It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or
detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. More so, an
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. Administrative
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must
be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.
FACTS: Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6640 prohibits
the employer from crediting the anniversary wage increases provided in
collective bargaining agreements. But the provisions of Republic Act No. 6640,
do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases but merely
provide increased minimum wage.
As a result, Section 8 of the implementing rules prohibits the employer from
crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under a collective bargaining
agreement against such wage increases mandated by Republic Act No. 6640.
ISSUE: Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law
it seeks to implement.
RULING: YES. The implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition
not contemplated by the law. Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic
6640, is hereby declared null and void in so far as it excludes the anniversary
wage increases negotiated under collective bargaining agreements from being
credited to the wage increase provided for under Republic Act No. 6440. This
decision is immediately executory.
MARIANO v. COMELEC
DOCTRINE: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a
special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly
provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
(250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law.
FACTS: Two (2) petitions assailing section 52, Article X of Republic Act No.
7854 "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized
City to be known as the City of Makati.” as unconstitutional.
They contend that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment cannot made by a special law, and
Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000).
ISSUE: Whether or not the said addition of another legislative district in Makati
is unconstitutional.
RULING: NO.
membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the
law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854
and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold
that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law,
with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government
unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people
of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati
is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at
least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the
1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative
district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population
has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be
entitled to at least one congressional representative. Finally, we do not find
merit in petitioners’ contention that the creation of an additional legislative
district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. Thus,
it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and
all the provisions are germane to such general subject.
CO V. HRET
DOCTRINE: The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship;
it was also held that the citizenship of an individual cannot be attacked in a
collateral proceeding, but only through a direct action.
FACTS: The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and
reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) which declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino
citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised
on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines since his father
was only naturalized Fil citizen; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
RULING: NO. The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a
collateral approach. This cannot be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a
person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.
This notwithstanding, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship
through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of
the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose"
to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both
mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any
other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in
favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of
election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly
have chosen.
Furthermore, In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the
Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He
has established his life here in the Philippines. For those in the peculiar
situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship
as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having
committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born
citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971
and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution
drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was
declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
OSMENA v. PENDATUN
DOCTRINE: The determination of the acts which constitute disorderly
behavior is within the full discretionary authority of the House concerned, and
the Court will not review such determination, the same being a political
question.
FACTS: Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified
petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created
by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on
the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked,
principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from
proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to
require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the
admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House
should not punish him.
The respondents filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to
entertain the petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its
members with suspension.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition
RULING: NO. In Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for
any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of
Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was
taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United
States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that
although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in
Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in
Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other place"
than Congress.
We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon
it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of
which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white
for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court
assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted
disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction,
which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of
the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by
this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each
department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
LAZATIN v. HRET
DOCTRINE: The Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislative body (Senate and HR) in their respective Electoral Tribunal. The
inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of
the HRET to prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it.
This is founded not only on historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more
importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself.
FACTS: Resolution of the instant controversy hinges on which provision
governs the period for filing protests in the HRET. Should Sec. 250 of the
Omnibus Election Code be held applicable, private respondent’s election
protest would have been filed out of time. On the other hand, if Section 9 of
the HRET Rules is applicable, the filing of the protest would be timely.
Succinctly stated, the basic issue is whether or not private respondent’s protest
had been seasonably filed. This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/ or
restraining order seeks the annulment and setting aside of the resolution of
the HRET, which had held that the election protest filed by private respondent
had been filed on time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET Rules prevail over the Omnibus Election
Code as regards the prescriptive period of filing an election protest? Whether
or not orders or decisions by the HRET may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court?
RULING: Because the petitioner had already been proclaimed (on orders of
the Comelec), had taken his oath and had assumed his duties as Member,
House of Representatives, the issue of invalidity of his proclamation and
irregularities connected therewith, is a matter properly addressed to the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (which is the sole judge of all contests
relating to election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives). Also, the Supreme Court said that for purposes of election
contests cognizable by the Electoral Tribunal, the HRET rules of procedure
shall prevail over the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.
Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been filed within
the period prescribed by the HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of
jurisdiction to hear the case.