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SANTOS V.

ECC
FACTS:
Francisco Santos was employed as welder at Philippine Navy and its Naval Shipyard in 1955.
He spent the last 32 years of his life in the government service, the first year as a welder helper,
and the last two years as shipyard assistant.1986 - Francisco was admitted to Naval Station
Hospital in Cavite City, on complaint that he was having epigastric pain (upper abdomen)
and been vomiting blood 2 days prior; diagnosed as bleeding Peptic Ulcer disease (PUD),
cholelithiasis (presence of gallstones), and diabetesmellitus.1987 - Francisco died, the cause of
which was liver cirrhosis indicated on death certificate.

Carmen Santos, wife, filed claim for death benefit of her husband, per P.D. 626 (Employees
Compensation Act).

GSIS: denied claim on ground that upon proofs and evidence submitted, Francisco's ailment
cannot be considered an occupational disease.

She sought the help of the Commander of NASCOM who wrote a letter substantiating
The claim that the deceased’s welding jobs in
Compartments of naval vessels exposed him to heat and inhalation of burning chemical
substances and gas fumes from burning electrodes.

GSIS again denied her claim; said that welding jobs would cause lung disease and not cirrhosis.

On appeal to Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), Commission affirmed the denial of


GSIS on petitioner's claim relying that Francisco’s illness did not specify the type of cirrhosis
which caused his death. Nevertheless, ECC took cognizance that deceased did not have a
previous history of alcoholism, hepatitis which could have led to cirrhosis.
ISSUE:
WON liver cirrhosis is compensable in the case. --YES
RULING:

Compensable sickness is any illness definitely accepted as occupational diseases listed by the
commission or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the
same is increased by the working conditions. For it to be compensable, it must be shown that (1)
that it is a result of an
Occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation
with the conditions set
Therein satisfied; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions

Cirrhosis is not an occupational disease but in Librea v. ECC, it was declared compensable. In
Librea, a Division Physical Education Supervisor was declared entitled to the ECC upon death
due to liver cirrhosis. The untold sufferings in his inspection of the barrio schools and the
scarcity of food rendered him susceptible to malnutrition and hence, liver cirrhosis.

As a welder, Francisco was exposed to heat, gas, fumes and chemical substances from welding
electrodes which were inhaled by the welder due to work in enclosed compartments.
Research shows that ingestion or inhalation of small amounts of iron over a number of years may
lead tosiderosis. Acute poisoning brings about circulatory collapse which may occur rapidly or
be delayed to 48 hours with liver failure. Thirty-two years of exposure to these industrial hazards
would cause poisoning and malfunction of the liver.

Leading doctrine of compensability is Raro v. ECC.
“There is a widespread misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed against the
Might and power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable
presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if
benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins the
employee in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving
a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment.


The New Labor Code abolished the presumption of compensability of illness contracted by
a worker during employment. Now the worker must present evidence to prove that the sickness
a) was a result of or b) the risk of sickness was aggravated by his work.

However, the above has been abandoned, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man
still prevails. The Employee’s Compensation Act is a social legislation to offer reliefs for the
working man and the ECC, tasked with implementing the social justice mandate in
the Constitution, should be more liberal in resolving compensation claims.

This interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law
as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor
Code which states that “all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
Provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall
Be resolved in favor of labor.”


The policy is to extend the applicability of PD 626 to a greater number of employees who can
avail of the benefits under the law, which is inconsonance with the avowed policy of the state to
give maximum aid and protection to labor
DISPOSITION:
ECC Decision Reversed.
NOTES:
National Sugar Refineries Corp. v. NLRC
Facts:
On June 1, 1988, National Sugar Refineries Corporation, petitioner, implement a Job
evaluation (JE) program affecting all employees including the members of respondent union,
granted salary adjustments and increase in benefits, therefore the respondents were re-classified
as managerial staff. After two years the respondent union filed a complaint with the Executive
Labor Arbiter for non-payment of overtime and benefits, the Labor Arbiter render a decision to
pay the respondent overtime and benefits, that they are not managerial employee, as defined in
Art. 212(m), however, the petitioner claim that the respondent were not entitled to benefits and
should be considered as managerial staff as contemplated in Art. 82, therefore they are not
entitled to benefits.
Issue:
Whether or not the members of respondent union are entitled to overtime, rest day, and
holiday pay?
Ruling:
No, for the reason that they are considered as members of the managerial staff, as
mentions in Article 82 of the Labor Code, “persons who are not entitled to overtime pay and
other benefits under Article 83 through 86 are managers and members of the managerial staff”.

Bonifacio v. GSIS
The case:
Petition for review on
Certiorari
of the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission affirming the deniably the
Government Service Insurance System of petitioner's claim for benefits under PD No. 626, as
amended, for the death of his spouse, Lourdes Bonifacio.
The facts:
1.

Lourdes Bonifacio was a classroom teacher assigned to the district of Bagamanoc, Division of
Catanduanes, Ministry of Education and Culture from August, 1965 until she contracted
carcinoma of the breast with metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs which caused her
death on October 5, 1978.2.

a claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, was filed by petitioner with the
GSIS3.
The claim was denied on the ground that the decedent's principal ailment, carcinoma of the
breast with metastases to gastrointestinal tract and lungs, is not an occupational disease for her
particular work as a teacher, nor is the risk of contracting said disease increased by her working
conditions4.

The Employees Compensation Commission, on appeal affirmed the decision of the respondent
System.
Issue:
Whether or not the disease of Bonifacio is an occupational disease, subject to death benefits for
the heir.
Held:
No. carcinoma of the breast with metastases to gastrointestinal tract and lungs is not an
occupational disease listed by the Employees Compensation Commission. Which is not subject
for death benefits under PD No. 626.
Rationale:
1.

Jurisprudence: It is "not necessary to prove that employment was the sole cause of the death or
injury suffered by the employee. It is sufficient to show that the employment had contributed to
the aggravation or acceleration of such death or ailment."2.

Workmen's Compensation Law, it is not necessary for the claimant to carry the burden of proof
to establish his case to the point of demonstration3.

Under the present Labor Code, the "latitudinarian or expansive application of the Workmen’s
Compensation Law in favor of the employee or worker" no longer prevails as the burden of
showing proof of causation has shifted back to the employee particularly in cases of sickness or
injuries which are not accepted or listed as occupational by the Employees Compensation
Commission.4.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the decisions of the GSIS and the Employees
Compensation Commission denying the claim are affirmed
PAL v Santos

Facts: This was an instant petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of NLRC setting aside the
suspension of the complaints and directing Philippine Airline to pay complainants their salaries.

Individual respondents were port stewards of catering sub-department on the passenger services
department of petitioner. Their salaries were deducted due to the mishandling of company’s properties
which the respondents resented. On August 27, 1984, represented by the union, individual respondents
made a formal notice regarding the deductions thru Mr. Abad, Manager for care taking who was on
vacation leave but no action was taken. They then filed a formal grievance pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement.

On his return, Mr. Abad on December 7, 1984, he informed the grievant and scheduled meeting.
Thereafter, the individual respondents refused to do ramp inventory thinking that since there was no
action taken by Mr. Abad five days after they filed the petition, it shall be resolved in their favor. But Mr.
Abad denied the petition and suspended individual respondents. He also pointed out that it was only
proper that employees were charged for the mishandling of company’s property.

Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal suspension to the labor arbiter. The decision was ruled in
favor of the petitioner and the complaint was set aside. The labor arbiter’s decision was appealed to the
respondent commission who rendered decision setting aside the labor arbiter’s order of dismissal.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issue: Whether public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction on resolving in favor of individual respondents who believed that inaction on the petition they
filed for grievance would be resolved in their favor in accordance to their collective bargaining
agreement?

Held: The petition hinges on the interpretation of Sec. 2, Art. IV of the PAL-PALEA Collective Bargaining
Agreement about the processing of grievances. Petitioner submits that since the grievance machinery
was made for both labor and management, employees are duty-bound to thresh out first all the remedies
before the management and give them opportunity to act on it. But due to the absence of Mr. Abad the
grievance was not acted upon.

The court held that the employees should not bear the dire effects of Mr. Abad’s absence. The
management should had someone else to look after the grievance during his absence. Under the policy of
social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the
humane justification that those with less privileges in life should have more privileges in law.

Ruling: Petition was denied and the assailed decision of NLRC was affirmed.
Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal
Facts: On August 31, 1982 Teresita Payawal filed a complaint against Solid Homes Inc., before
the Regional Trial Court alleging that they contracted to sell her subdivision lot in Marikina on
June 9, 1975.Subsequently Solid Homes Inc. executed a deed of sale but failed to deliver the
corresponding certificate title despite of repeated demands by Payawal because defendant had
mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. Thereafter, Solid Homes Inc. moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction this being rested in the
National Housing Authority under PD no. 597. The motion was denied, hence, the petition to
reverse said decision of the Court of Appeals in sustaining the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court was submitted by Solid Homes Inc. to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over cases involving claims, refund and any
other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the applicable law is PD No. 957. The National Housing
Authority has the jurisdiction. As amended by PD No 1344 entitled “Empowering the National
Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions under
Presidential Decree No 957” Section 1 provides, in the exercise of its function to regulate the
real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in PD No 957 that the
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
following nature: a) unsound real estate business practices, b) claims involving refund and any
other claims filed by subdivision lot owners or condo unit buyers against project owner,
developer, dealer, broker, or salesman and, c) cases involving specific performance of
contractual statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against
the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. The challenged decision of the respondent
court was reversed and the decision of RTC is Set Aside without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate complaint before the HLURB.

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