Tañada vs.
Tuvera People vs Que Po Lay
FACTS: Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as
recognized by the 1973 constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its
enforcement.
RULING: Yes, publication is necessary.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Court has ruled that publication
in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself
does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day
following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when
it goes into effect. Article 2 does not dismiss with the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date
of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general
applicability” is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that
provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise
impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive
orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.
FACTS: The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of
US dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but
failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.
Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official
Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.
Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty
of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265
sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is
needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding
penalties.
HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a
rule, circular and regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a
penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This
is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such
contents including its penalties.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit
the appellant, with costs de oficio.
D.M. Consunji Inc. v Court of Appeals and Maria J. Juego
FACTS: Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction
worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower,
Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig
City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on
arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM.
Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their
work as carpenter at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D,
Renaissance Tower Building were on board a platform. Jose was crushed to
death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which
was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform
but without a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the
tragedy and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow
filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered
a favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amounting to
P644,000.
DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji
apart from the death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.
HELD: The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the
civil code. Maria Juergo was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she
filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She filed
the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police
investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the
criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel.
Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the
award decreed in its decision is more than that of the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC). Should the award decreed by the trial
court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to
private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom.
TITLE: Emetrio Cui v Arellano University
FACTS: Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano
University. He then enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-
1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was
awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of
P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student
at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed
his transcript of records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to
issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which
Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellano’s issuance of
his TOR.
On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum
No. 38 addressing all heads of private schools, colleges and
universities. Part of the memorandum states that “the amount in tuition and
other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently
charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to
transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to
attract and keep students in a school”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for
the scholarship grant provided by Arellano University.
HELD: The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law
where the provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in
nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to
pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary
to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine
the security of individual rights and hence, null and void.
The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with
interest thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of
this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendant’s counterclaim.
Civil Code Article 10: In case of doubt in the interpretation and
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail.
Spouses Bello Petitioners
Vs.
CA, Hon. Francisco Llamas, Judge of Pasay City Court and Republic of
the Philippines Respondents
Facts: On August 25, 1970, spouses Bello were charged with estafa for
allegedly having misappropriated a lady’s ring with a value of P1, 000.00
received from them from Atty. Prudencio De Guzman for sale on commission
basis. After trial, they were convicted and sentenced. They then filed an
appeal to the Court of First Instance and after that to the respondent city
court which was also dismissed and ordered for execution of judgment “for
having been erroneously addressed to this court”. Petitioner spouses then
filed for prohibition and mandamus against the People and respondent city
court to elevate their appeal to the Court of Appeals which was again
dismissed after finding that the city court’s judgment was directly appealable
to it. Still, the couple moved for reconsideration and stressing the merits of
their appeal and of their defense but was again denied “for lack of sufficient
merit”.
Miciano vs Brimo
FACTS: Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a
scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased
(Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance. Joseph
Brimo is a Turkish citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the
distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates.
HELD: Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said
that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible
conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus,
national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial
administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the
legatees.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case due
to wrong procedure.
Whether or not the execution of judgment will be issued a mandamus

Ruling: Decision of CA to dismiss petition is set aside. Mandamus is issued

for the execution of its judgment of conviction. And, said city court is
commanded to elevate petitioner’s appeal from its judgment to the Court of
Appeals for the disposition on the merits.

The Court of Appeals should have not dismissed the appeal but should have
certified the case to the proper court. It is of the essence of judicial duty to
construe statutes so as to avoid such deplorable result of injustice and
absurdity and that a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust
or lead to absurd results.
Case Digest: Roehr v. Rodriguez Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal effects
HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.

QUISUMBING, J.: Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married
private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in
Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in
Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and
Alexandra Kristine.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment,
such as the award of custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was
denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First
Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the
parental custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang.
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is
basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of
Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in
the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmen’s
participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain
unclear.

Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the
decree had already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to
Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga. determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful
of the best interests of the children.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case
proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and
the distribution of the properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge
Salonga partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the
issues of support and custody of their children.

1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for
reconsideration.

Ruling: Yes. A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has
not yet attained finality, as in the case at bar.

The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a
judgment even after the same has become executory whenever
circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as
where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and
executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or
when supervening events warrant it.

2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and
retained jurisdiction as regards child custody and support.
Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes
FACTS: Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision
of the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA
held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka “Amang Bisaya”, an
entertainment artist.
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while
having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart,
a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to
join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General
Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him
and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He He lined up at the buffet
table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave
in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was
asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-
out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and
humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party
but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several
people including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite
him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s
group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was
talking over the phone and doesn’t want to interrupt her. She asked Mr.
Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party
should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even
asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.
During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close
was Ms. Lim when she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes
answered “very close because we nearly kissed each other”. Considering
the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only be
heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to
know what happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to
leave the party.
HELD: Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking
Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-
motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to
ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the
party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms.
Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence,
petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and
20 of the Civil Code.
TITLE: Sps. Quisumbing vs. MERALCO
FACTS: The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the
owners of a house located at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon
City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendant’s inspectors headed by
Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot
inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed as standard
operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the plaintiff’s
secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had been
tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the
information to the owners of the house. The inspectors advised that the
meter be brought in their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that
the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect the
electric services of the couple. After an hour, inspectors returned and
informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless they
pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric
supply will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the
immediate reconnection.
ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner
done without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBING’s rights, feelings,
social and business reputation and therefore held them accountable and
plaintiff be entitled for damages.
HELD: Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay
respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to
pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including attorney’s
fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including
right against the deprivation of property without due process of law are
violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of
example or correction for public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in
preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any action must be done in
strict observance of the rights of the people. “Under the law, the Manila
Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on
the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause
is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly
authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board”. During the
inspection, no government official or ERB representative was present.
Petitioner’s claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply
proof and was premised only upon Lorna’s testimony. These are
compensation for an injury that will put the injure position where it was before
it was injured.
TITLE: Gasheem Shookat Baksh vs. CA
FACTS: Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated
October 27, 1987 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach
of their agreement to get married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan where
the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later courted her
and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilou’s house to
secure approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to
leave with him in his apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with
him. After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner started
maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the
apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time
became pregnant but the petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live
with him since he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that
he never proposed marriage or agreed to be married neither sought consent
and approval of Marliou’s parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay
out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his
passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements
of actual expenses.
ISSUE: Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for
damages.
HELD: The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. The court held that when a man uses his promise of
marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his malicious desires, he
commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court
found that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender
her virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive
ploy to have carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should
be paid for the wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed
deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country.
Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the
respondent.
ALBENSON v CA
FACTS: Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A
Pacific Banking Corporation Check was paid and drawn against the account of EL
Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason “Account Closed.” Company
traced source of check and later discovered that the signature belonged to one
Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao but latter denied
that he issued the check or that the signature was his. Company filed a complaint
against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent
had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business establishment, EL
Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform Albenson of such information. Rather
the father filed complaint for damages against Albenson.
ISSUE: Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.
RATIO: Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didn’t have the intent to
cause damage to the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due
to them.
There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22.
Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check
based on ff inquiries:
SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao
Bank said signature belonged to EB
EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the III.
There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof
that: the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person
and that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges
were false and groundless
Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:
there is a legal right or duty exercised in bad faith for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another
Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:
there is an act which is legal but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order
or public policy it is done with intent to injure
A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to
compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the
issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or
omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that the
adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the
actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.
TITLE: University of the East vs. Jader
FACTS: Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-88. During
his last year, 1stsemester, he failed to take the regular final examination in
Practical Court 1where he was given an incomplete grade remarks. He filed
an application for removal of the incomplete grade given by Prof. Carlos
Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio
Tiongson after the payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28
and on May 30, the professor gave him a grade of 5.
The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16, 1988,
3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam,
he took a leave of absence from work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He had
his pre-bar class review in FEU. Upon learning of such deficiency, he
dropped his review classes and was not able to take the bar exam.
Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights
due to UE’s negligence.
ISSUE: Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into
believing JADER satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is
not the case. Can he claim moral damages?
HELD: SC held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to
respondent for the latter’s actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-
bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the
latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent should not have been
awarded moral damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain
when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to
take the bar examinations as what CA held because it’s also respondent’s
duty to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary
requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law
student, he should have been responsible in ensuring that all his affairs
specifically those in relation with his academic achievement are in
order. Before taking the bar examinations, it doesn’t only entail a mental
preparation on the subjects but there are other prerequisites such as
documentation and submission of requirements which prospective examinee
must meet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of
Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal
interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint
until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's
fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELETED.
Tenchavez vs Escano
FACTS:27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of
Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32
years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises
Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was
duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their
match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez
as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are
studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a
church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said
letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued
leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was
approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against
Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of
the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the
Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in
Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8,
1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he
alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon
courts of the Philippines.
HELD: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts
cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise
to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign
countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is
enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of
Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce
between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the
marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion
and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for
damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal
separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño
and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of
damages and attorneys' fees.