Republic vs Quintero-Hamano
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004
FACTS: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the
ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter,
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then
gave birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month
of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by
Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for
two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote
him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her
friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their
child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to
him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte
motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion
was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was
published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file
his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from
publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for
investigation.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligation.
HELD: The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage.
Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never
alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although
as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly
helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified Toshio’s illness. This could have been done through an expert
witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital
obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio
was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
Leouel Santos vs CA
GR No. 112019, January 4, 1995
FACTS: Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo.
The two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julia’s parents at the
J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named
as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of
things aside from the interference of Julia’s parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to dissuade
her. Seven months after her departure, she called her husband and
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but
she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a
training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get
in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36
of the Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to
communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show
her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
HELD: The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personal disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate,
in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his
petition was denied.
Choa vs. Choa
GR No. 1473376, November 26, 2002
FACTS:
Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children
namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of
his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on psychological incapacity.
The case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso presented
quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case.
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and
deportation which shows latter’s psychological incapacity because according
to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but
also to banish outside the country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
HELD: The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of
the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion
bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about three
aspects of Leni’s personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity,
and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three,
singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal
or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute
psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to identify
and prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It just
established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that could
possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality of
evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or
psychological examination.
David Dedel vs Court of Appeals & Sharon Corpuz-Dedel
Art 46 compared with PI
In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. They’ve had four children
since then. David then found out that Sharon is irresponsible as a wife and
as a mother because during the marriage Sharon had extra-marital affairs
with various other guys particularly with one Mustafa Ibrahim, a Jordanian,
with whom she had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim. David averred that
Sharon is psychologically incapacitated and David submitted the findings of
Dr. Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed psychologically incapacitated.
Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality
Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed
several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her
the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity
and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity
and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality
Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI has been proven.
HELD: PI is not proven in court in this case. The evidence is not sufficient. PI
is intended to the most serious cases of personality disorders which make
one be incapable of performing the essential marital obligations. Sharon’s
sexual infidelity does not constitute PI nor does it constitute the other forms
of psychoses which if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during
the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity is not one of those contemplated in
law. Until further statutory or jurisprudential parameters are set or
established, SI cannot be appreciated in favor of the dissolution of marriage.
Republic of the Philippines vs Rodolfo De Gracia
G.R. No. 171557 – Civil Law – Persons and Family Relations – Family Code
– Article 36; Psychological Incapacity – Personal Evaluation by Psychologist
– Need for Independent Evidence to Prove Psychological Incapacity
In 1969, Rodolfo De Gracia and Natividad Rosalem married each other.
Their first child was born in the same year. In 1972, they begot a second
child. However, after giving birth, Natividad left their conjugal home, even
selling said house, and then had an affair with an engineer. She bore a child
with the said engineer. In 1991, she left the engineer and cohabited with
another man.
In 1998, Rodolfo filed a petition to have their marriage be declared void on
the ground that Natividad is psychologically incapacitated. Rodolfo engaged
the services of Dr. Cheryl Zalsos to evaluate both parties. In court, Zalsos
testified that both parties are psychologically incapacitated; that Rodolfo
failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired a son
with another woman; that Natividad lacked the willful cooperation of being a
wife and a mother to her two daughters; that both suffered from “utter
emotional immaturity which is unusual and unacceptable behavior
considered as deviant from persons who abide by established norms of
conduct”; that the mental condition of both parties already existed at the time
of the celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after.
The RTC gave weight to Zalsos testimony hence the marriage was declared
void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity was proven in this case.
HELD: No. The evidence presented failed to support a finding of
psychological incapacity. The psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos does
not explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be
characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters
of psychological incapacity jurisprudence (Molina Guidelines).
The Supreme Court also ruled: Although expert opinions furnished by
psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually
given considerable weight by the courts, the existence of psychological
incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence.
HOWARD’S NOTES:
1. It is interesting to note that the SC only discussed the insufficiency of
evidence as regards Natividad’s psychological incapacity but did not delve
on the findings of the psychologist as to Rodolfo’s.
2. In previous cases, i.e., Marcos vs Marcos, the SC noted that though
personal evaluation by a psychologist of the spouse sought to be declared
psychologically incapacitated is not mandatorily required, such personal
examination must be had if there are no other independent evidence
presented – especially if the only basis is the statements of the petitioning
spouse and/or his/her witnesses (Ochosa vs Alano). But in this case, even
though the spouse sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated was
personally examined by the psychologist, the SC still ruled that other
independent evidence must still be presented.
Valerio Kalaw vs Ma. Elena Fernandez (2015)
G.R. No. 166357 – Civil Law – Persons and Family Relations – Family Code – Article
36; Psychological Incapacity – Gambling in the Presence of One’s Children --
Testimonies of Expert Witnesses as Evaluated by the Trial Court Must Be Given Due
Consideration -- Burden of Proof in Proving Psychological Incapacity Does Not Solely
Lie on Plaintiff
In 1994, Valerio “Tyrone” Kalaw filed a petition to have his marriage with Ma. Elena
Fernandez be annulled on the ground that Elena is psychologically incapacitated. The
RTC, after hearing the expert witnesses testify in court, eventually granted the petition,
but on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision. Tyrone appealed to
the Supreme Court. In September 2011, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the CA. Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the September 2011 decision (657 SCRA 822) should be
reversed.
HELD: Yes. Trial court’s findings of facts should be given due weightx
The SC ruled that it misappreciated the findings made by the RTC when the SC
reviewed the case in September 2011. The SC ruled that the findings and evaluation
by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position
to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The
position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the
psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due
importance and respect. Therefore, it was not proper for the SC to brush aside the
opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates, a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the
ground that their conclusions were solely based on the Tyrone’s version of the events.
The conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely
drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after
the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the Tyrone’s factual premises.
Respondent could also establish the psychological incapacity of the plaintiff spouse
The plaintiff in an annulment case under Article 36 carries the burden to prove the
nullity of the marriage, however, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could also
establish the psychological incapacity of the plaintiff spouse if the respondent raised
the matter in her/his answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the
respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the
imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist
in one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
Elena’s excessive mahjong sessions is indicative of her psychological incapacity
In the September 2011 ruling, the SC noted that all the children of Tyrone and Elena
testified that although their parents have differences, both took good care of them.
However, upon closer look at the testimonies of the children, it was shown that Elena
was too addicted to mahjong that she would even bring her children to her mahjong
sessions which were so frequent and would last from early in the afternoon to past
midnight. The fact that the Elena brought her children with her to her mahjong
sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her
tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to
the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave
and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own
personal and escapist desires. This revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s
moral and mental development.
ABUNADO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 2004 Mar 30, G.R.
No. 159218 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Facts: On September 18, 1967, petitioner Salvador married Narcisa
Arceño. In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the
Philippines in 1992 when she learned that her husband was having
an extra-marital affair and has left their home. Narcisa found
Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also
discovered that on January 10, 1989 Salvador contracted a second
marriage with Zenaida Biñas. On January 19, 1995, an annulment
case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. On May 18, 1995, a case
for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida. On
May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado
of bigamy. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification
the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for annulment is a prejudicial
question to the proceedings in the bigamy case.
Held: No. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity,
the crime had already been consummated. Petitioner’s assertion
would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage
void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question
in the criminal case. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of
petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy. All that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that
the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted. A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this
case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first
marriage was void ab initio, the point is both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. The
petition is denied.
Morigo vs. People
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol.
They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete
and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They
got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in
1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was
granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there
was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy
and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case
pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo
pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab
initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good
faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of
his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be
free from the bigamy case.
HELD: Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering
that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a
marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of
the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage
with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in
the case filed.
Wiegel vs Sempio-Dy
143 SCRA 449
FACTS: Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia
was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a
petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latter’s
former marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital
union, she contents that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia
likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their
marriage.
ISSUE: Whether Karl’s marriage with Lilia is void.
HELD: It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage
was vitiated with force because it will not be void but merely voidable.
Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet
been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly
married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is
void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on the prior
marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a
judicial declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and
Lilia’s marriage are regarded void under the law.
Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572
FACTS: Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976,
filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation
of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously
married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the
previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her.
Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-
month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with
another woman and had been disposing some of her properties
which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because
their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is
unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists
the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of
remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only
be filed for purposes of remarriage.
HELD: The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for
purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the
protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that
his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With
this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final
judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings. Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply
be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for
their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly
provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of
which is the separation of property according to the regime of
property relations governing them.
Valdes vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221
FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971
and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a
declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on
the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and
Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other
3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding
the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions
without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children
filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-
ownership.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless
of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are
governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family.
People vs. Aragon
100 Phil 1033
FACTS: Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea. While
his marriage with the latter subsist, he contracted a canonical
marriage with Faicol. Gorrea is staying in Cebu while Faicol is in
Iloilo. He was a traveling salesman thus, he commuted between
Iloilo and Cebu. When Gorrea died, he brought Faicol to Cebu where
the latter worked as teacher-nurse. She later on suffered injuries in
her eyes caused by physical maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to
Iloilo to undergo treatment. While she was in Iloilo, Rosima
contracted a third marriage with Maglasang. CFI-Cebu found him
guilty of bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null and void.
HELD: The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second
wife whose marriage with Rosima was not renewed after the death of
the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence,
the last marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima for
contracting marriage cannot prosper.
Mercado vs. Tan
337 SCRA 122
FACTS: Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma
Oliva in 1976 before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in
1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy
against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993
declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.
ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the
declaration of nullity of the former marriage.
HELD: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is
necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One
who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies
even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as “void.”
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by
then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted
second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The
fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense
in a bigamy charge.
Republic vs. Nolasco
220 SCRA 20
FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a
British, in bar in England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco
in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco
expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got
married in January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the
province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother
informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet
left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janet’s
whereabouts. He did so by securing another seaman’s contract
going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they first
met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a
declaration of presumptive death of Janet.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his
wife, Janet, is already dead?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate
Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief
that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking
assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even
secured another contract. More so, while he was in London, he did
not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.
Lukban vs Republic
L-8492, February 29, 1956
FACTS: Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in
1933 and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been
heard of since then. She diligently looked for him asking the parents
and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that
husband is already dead since he was absent for more than 20 years
and because she intends to marry again, she desires to have her civil
status put in order to be relieved on any liability under the law.
ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive
death before she can remarry.
HELD: The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure
declaration of presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code
prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that “for the
purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the
former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of
absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code
has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For
the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that
the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not
know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse
is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Armas vs. Calisterio
GR No. 136467, April 6, 2000
FACTS: Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the
respondent, died intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel of land
estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second husband of
Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January
1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11
years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and
Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a
court declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a
petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that
marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly bigamous
is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be
appointed as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the
deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the
obligations of the estate would have been settled.
ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to
the absence of the declaration of presumptive death.
HELD: The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was
solemnized in May 1958 where the law in force at that time was the
Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in August
1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive
governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive
death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7
consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry
then Marrieta’s marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she
has a right can claim portion of the estate.
Anaya vs. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97
FACTS: Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in
1953. Palaroan filed an action for annulment of the marriage in 1954
on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of
the marriage and granting Aurora’s counterclaim. While the amount
of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that
several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship
with a close relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to
her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her
consent. She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with
Fernando on such ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of
his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for
annulment of marriage.
HELD: The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with
another woman was not one of those enumerated that would
constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by
the last paragraph providing that “no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to.. chastity” shall give ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and
therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage.
Buccat v Buccat (1941)
Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat
April 25, 1941
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio.
Facts: Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in
March 1938, became engaged in September, and got married in Nov
26. On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was
9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. After knowing this,
Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her.
On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the
grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she assured him that
she was a virgin. The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue: Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be
granted on the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy
before the marriage?
Held: No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a
marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested and
where society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was
concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student,
did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition considering that she
was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed
physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach) when they got married.
Decision: SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. Costs to plaintiff-
appellant
Aquino vs. Delizo
109 Phil 21
FACTS: Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on
the ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at the date of her
marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that
she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or
about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. During the
trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the
proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only
documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between
the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage,
which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the
decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by
Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage.
HELD: The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo
was allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time
of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her pregnancy
was readily apparent especially since she was “naturally plump” or
fat. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of
the woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making
the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new
trial and decision complained is set aside.
Menciano vs. Neri San Jose
Facts: Matilde Menciano, in her and her children s behalf, filed a motion for declaration of
heirs, alleging that she is the widow of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, to whom she
was married on September 28, 1944 before Rev. Father Isaias Edralin, S.J.; that they lived
together before the said marriage, hence, Carlo Magno Neri was born on March 9, 1940, the
child having enjoyed the status of a recognized natural child; that their second child Faustino
Neri, Jr., was born on April 25, 1945 and was legitimized by the subsequent matrimony of
his parents, thus he is a legitimate child in lawful wedlock. On the other hand, on an
amended answer, Paz Neri San Jose (the executrix of the deceased) and Rodolfo Pelaez
(designated universal heir in the will of the deceased dated December 19, 1940), denied the
substantial allegations of Menciano s motion for declaration of heirs and further alleged that
the deceased was suffering from senile dementia from 1943 which became worse a year
later; that the marriage between Menciano and the deceased was in violation of the legal
provisions and requisites because of the latters age, sickness, and bombardment; that
Menciano took advantage of the deceaseds condition, forced the latter to marry her by
means of deceit and threat; and that the deceased was congenitally sterile and impotent.
Moreover, the defendants also filed a counterclaim for the sum of 286,000 in cash, for jewels
and certain properties which, as presumed, were retained and illegally disposed of by
Matilde Menciano.
Issue:(1) Was the marriage between the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde
Menciano valid?
(2)Are the children Faustino Neri, Jr. and Carlo Magno Neri the legitimate children of the
deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano?
(3)Did Matilde Menciano have in her possession and illegally disposed of the cash, jewels,
and certain properties aforementioned?
Decision: (1)Yes. The marriage between the two is evidenced by: the 2 applications for a
marriage license, dated September 28, 1944, the first one, signed by the deceased to marry
Menciano and the other one, signed by Menciano to marry the deceased; the certificate
for immediate issuance of marriage license applied for, signed by the Acting Local Civil
Registrar and the deceased and Menciano; the marriage contract signed by the deceased
and Menciano as contracting parties, Rev. Isaias Edralin as solemnizing officer, and the
witnesses L. B. Castaños and Samson Pañgan. The 4 documents are official and
public; there validity can be successfully assailed only by strong, clear, and convincing oral
testimony. In this case, the oral evidence presented by the defendants is not convincing so
as to declare the said marriage invalid. A mere glance at the signatures of
the deceased in the aforesaid documents will convince anyone that they could not have
been written by a man who is almost unconscious and physically and intellectually
incapacitated, as the defendants witnesses represent him to have been. Also, the tests
pertaining to testamentary capacity were applied to show the capacity to contract marriage
of the deceased. Although the said doctrine relates to testamentary capacity, there is no
reason why is should not be applied to the capacity to contract marriage,
which requires the same mental condition. Thus, the court did not err in declaring valid the
marriage of the deceased and Menciano. (2)Yes. Faustino Neri, Jr. is a legitimate child of
the deceased and Menciano. The requisite for potency being met, the necessary conclusion
is that the child Faustino Neri, Jr., is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the
deceased with Menciano in lawful wedlock. No. The court declared that Carlo Magno Neri
has not been acknowledged as a natural child and, consequently, cannot be legitimized by
the subsequent marriage of his
parents. (3)No. After a careful and exhaustive review of evidence, the trial court correctly
reached the conclusion that such allegation has not been substantiated. The testimonies of
mother and son- Paz Neri San Jose and Rodolfo Pelaez regarding the sum of money are
contradictory. Moreover, Clotilde Galarrita de Labitads testimony is unbelievable. With
regard to the jewels, no satisfactory evidence was presented to prove that Menciano
misappropriated them.
Jimenez vs. Canizares
L-12790, August 31, 1960
FACTS: Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the
annulment of his marriage with Remedios Canizares on the ground
that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the
penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the time
of the marriage and continues to exist that led him to leave the
conjugal home two nights and one day after the marriage. The court
summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any
answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to physical
examination and to file a medical certificate within 10 days. She was
given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed lack of
interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of the
petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the
testimony of the husband.
HELD: The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did
not avail of the opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim
cannot be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known fact that
women in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and
unhesitatingly submit to a physical examination unless compelled by
competent authority. Such physical examination in this case is not
self-incriminating. She is not charged with any offense and likewise
is not compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence being an
abnormal condition should not be presumed. The case was
remanded to trial court.
De Ocampo vs. Florenciano
107 Phil 35
FACTS: Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in
1938. They begot several children who are not living with plaintiff. In
March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose
Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to
study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff
discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other
than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left
plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June 1955,
plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with
Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is
not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo
filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.
ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the
confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code.
HELD: Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she
committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other
than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed
by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession
of judgment, a confession done in court or through a
pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the
defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of
separation should be granted since it would not be based on the
confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What
the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant’s
confession. The petition should be granted based on the second
adultery, which has not yet prescribed.
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio
FACTS: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September
21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as
husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their
marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the
issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order
that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go
Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective
evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already
scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular
accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her
death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June
1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year
period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen
abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for
legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved
property rights.
HELD: An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff,
even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree
of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree,
these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a
more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights
and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and
there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise,
that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights
acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for
partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
Gandionco vs Penaranda
GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987
FACTS: Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against
herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of
concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of
concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the
provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved and ordered
by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for
pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against
him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied
with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will
have to be suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending
the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.
HELD: Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were
incorrect. A civil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage
may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for
concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability
arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from
or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to
obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof
including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the
children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent
spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is
necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an
action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in
case, the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too
onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
Bugayong vs. Ginez
GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956
FACTS: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with
Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough
leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived with the sisters of
Bugayong in said municipality before he went back to duty. The couple
came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who later
moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-
in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to Pangasinan
to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a local
college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiff’s
sister-in-law) and some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at
the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He
admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed
her. All these communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the
advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal
department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They
met in the house of the defendant’s godmother. They proceeded to the
house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1
night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in their own
house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information he received
but instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal
separation.
ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that
may serve as a ground for dismissal of the action.
HELD: Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a
ground for legal separation. A single voluntary act of marital intercourse
between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and
where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on
terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may
be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.
Pacete vs Carriaga
FACTS: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and
separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete
on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently
contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of
such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which
to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding,
particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set
by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default,
which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the
hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a
decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s
motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and
in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of
Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
HELD: The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-
appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the
plaintiff is not fabricated.”
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under
Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that
an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a
“cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the
parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or
underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which
provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal
separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is
not fabricated.”
Macadangdang vs CA
GR No. 38287, October 23, 1981

FACTS: Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio

Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had
6 children. They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao
City. Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into
merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping,
real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in
extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when
private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she
learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the
initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation
has effect on the legal separation.

HELD: The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on
the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is
complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if
the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor
terminated.

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the
conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the
effects of such final decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the
disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased
spouse.

Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree.
Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of
the decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows,
as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of
determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.
Sin vs Sin
Sin vs. Sin
GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001

FACTS:

Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January
1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary
and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and
throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal
Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he
found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other
than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of
the participation of the State in the proceedings.

HELD:

Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for
his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are
bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus,
the case is remanded for proper trial.