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Ty vs CA Tenchavez vs Escano

27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor
a civil ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic
wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were declared null and void ab chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love
initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A
the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who
petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on April had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos
1982. The decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991, college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor
Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by
declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s
prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her
marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it
petitioner and of her children. was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for
divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty. Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the
annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married
Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten
children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a
HELD: complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have
dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be
awarded to the wife who sought damages against the husband for filing a
baseless complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and
the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid binding upon courts of the Philippines.
and subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate
wife. To grant her petition for damages would result to a situation where
the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To
do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine HELD:
laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts
wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation. cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such
declared valid and subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford
ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for as long divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with
as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed
by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are
still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is
not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to
validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid
divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of
legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-
appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys'
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto
Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by
way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby
degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the Representative of the First District of Leyte.
late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos Ayala Investments vs CA
when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there
as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation
when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security
registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978. severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to
pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay
of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed
candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the
in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses
that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement husband alone is considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”
to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte. and is it chargeable.

HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election HELD: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and
purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt
own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality
reasons: distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they
happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the
domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the
the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be conjugal partnership”. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the
deemed to continue. benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching
only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or
term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal
Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium clearly for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and the family may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige
her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, must be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, product or a spin off of the loan itself.
Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by
Agapay vs Palang 87 Matabuena v. Cervantes

FACTS: Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on FACTS:Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Mat
abuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the
1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child
death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of
Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957,
the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code “Every donation between the
Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972,
spouses during the marriage shall be void.”
he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the
Pangasinan. donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and
were simply cohabitating.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda
Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of ISSUE:
agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a
Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate their HELD:
conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia. Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the
spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason
Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent t
were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. 2 years later, Miguel he possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one
died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to
possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get back the land and common-law relationships.
the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the decease
cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA d to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the
reversed the decision. Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the
relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage.
ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be
awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay. BA Finance Corp vs. CA 94

FACTS: Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59
HELD: The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of
as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of
Miguel and Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of the A&L Industries. Augusto presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his
subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the business and under whose name the said business was
parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in registered, purportedly authorized the husband to procure the loan and sign the
proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be an promissory note. 2months prior the procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and their
children which in turn abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became due
actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-
and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same.
ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business were guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the
of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade rights, titles and interests over a construction contract executed by and between the
spouses and A. Soriano Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial
the court that she actually contributed money to but the subjected
court and not contented with the order, petitioner filed a motion for the examination of
riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old attachment debtor alleging that the properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient
compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the to secure the satisfaction of any judgment which was likewise granted by the court.
US Government. Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she
could have contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the
basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the husband.
Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal
HELD: A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily
partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
Yulo. The said proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were
also acquired during the same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for the obligations
conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation of property between contracted by the husband. However, for the property to be liable, the obligation
spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because
marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his family and
not specifically for separation of property and should not be so inferred. left their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized by
his wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly,
there must be the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of
With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the spouses.
the deed of conveyance for the property revealed the falshood of Erlinda’s
claim that she bought such property for P20,000 when she was 22 years Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by
old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase Augusto against his conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of
price and directed Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee. attachment cannot be issued against the said properties and that the petitioner is
ordered to pay Lily actual damages amouting to P660,000.00.
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and
which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law
because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage
at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code,
expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses
now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
Marmont Resort Hotel Enterprises v. Guiang, et al., 94 Uy vs. CA 96
FACTS: Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife
Facts: Under the agreement between Maris Trading and Marmont Resort Hotel, of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their
Maris Trading undertook to drill for water and to provide all equipment necessary to conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically
install and complete a water supply facility to service the hotel. In fulfillment of its incapacitated to discharge his functions. She further contest that such illness of the
contract, Maris Trading drilled a well and installed a water pump on a portion of a husband necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291
and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending
parcel of land, then occupied by the Guiang spouses. Five (5) months later, a
that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are
second agreement was executed between Maris Trading and Aurora Guiang, with
governed by the rules on summary proceedings.
Federico Guiang signing as witness whereby the Guiangs sell, transfer and cede all
possessory rights, interest and claims over the portion of the lot where the water
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
source is located in favor of Maris Trading. petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and
After some time, the water supply of the hotel became inadequate to properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the
meet the hotel's water requirements. It secured the services of another contractor, provisions on summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special
which suggested that in addition to the existing water pump, a submersible pump be proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly
installed to increase the pressure and improve the flow of water to the hotel. the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of
Accordingly, the hotel manager sought permission from the Guiang spouses to the FC comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife”
inspect the water pump which had been installed on the portion of the land contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued
previously occupied by the spouses and to make the necessary additional that this should not be applied in their case.
installations thereon. No such permission, however, was granted. For this refusal to
allow representatives of the hotel and its contractor to enter the water facility site, a During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in
complaint for Damages was filed against the Guiangs to which the spouses denied law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.
having knowledge of the first agreement and that the second agreement was invalid
for not having been executed in accordance with law. ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a
Trial Court's Ruling: The RTC dismissed the complaint finding that cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor and mental
while Aurora Guiang had validly alienated her rights over the disputed portion of the faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and
land to Maris Trading, no such transfer of rights was shown from Maris Trading to dispose a parcel of land with improvements.
Appellate Court's Ruling: The CA affirmed the RTC's decision and HELD: SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. The Memoranda of Agreement could not be apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to
legally considered as the documents were not formally offered in evidence by either give consent. In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent
party. who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence,
the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of
Issue: Whether the Memoranda of Agreement should be considered as they were Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has
already admitted in the pre-trial order; and the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to
Whether the ownership of rights belongs to Maris Trading; hence, Guiang can sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the
prohibit Marmont Resort from entering the land procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians, and not
the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity of
Supreme Court's Ruling: The Memoranda of Agreement should be considered the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the
because these have been admiued during the pretrial. This constitutes judicial ground of lack of due process.
admission, the veracity of which requires no further proof.
While the wife solely contracted the agreement, it was also signed by Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz 101 135
FACTS: Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and
the husband as a witness, indicating that the husband gave consent to the
begotten 6 children. During their coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and
execution of the agreement by his wife. Even if the land in dispute is public land, the
were engage in various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for
Guiang spouses chose to transfer such rights to Maris Trading, and in the same
the separation of their properties. She further alleged that her husband aside from
agreement, the Guiang spouses therein had acknowledged the earlier agreement
abandoning her, also mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the other hand,
and the obligations. The courts below failed to take account of the fact that the sole Severino contended that he had always visited the conjugal home and had provided
purpose of Maris Trading in acquiring possessory rights over that specific portion of support for the family despite his frequent absences when he was in Manila to supervise
the land where well and pump and piping had been installed, was to supply the the expansion of their business. Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling
water requirements of Marmont Hotel. instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory although he paid short visits in the
Said stipulations in the agreements appear to have been designed conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected that her husband
precisely to benefit the hotel and, thus, partake of the nature of stipulations pour had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of
autrui, contemplated in Article 131 I of the Civil Code. A stipulation pour autrui is a property for the fear that her husband might squander and dispose the conjugal assets in
stipulation in favor of a third person conferring a clear and deliberate favor upon favor of the concubine.
him, which stipulation is found in a contract entered into by parties neither of whom
acted as agent of the beneficiary ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON
there has been an abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal

HELD: The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations
and support of the family. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the
conjugal home, one must have willfully and with intention of not coming back and
perpetual separation. There must be real abandonment and not mere
separation. In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly financial support as
admitted by the wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the conjugal
abode. The plaintiff even testified that the husband “paid short visits” implying more
than one visit. Likewise, as testified by the manager of one of their businesses, the
wife has been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500 that was given
personally by the defendant or the witness himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of
the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the
progress of the business constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to
exist, there must be a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership
evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.
DEL MUNDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 109 Villanueva vs. IAC 109
FACTS: The Spouses Francisco are the owners of a parcel of land. Del Mundo, on GR No. 67582, October 29, 1987
the other hand, is the operator of a dive camp resort adjacent to the property.
Sometime in June of 1980, Del Mundo proposed a corporate joint FACTS: Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land from his
venture with the Franciscos for the development of the latter's property. The father. Dorothea and Teodoro, Modesto’s illegitimate children, borrowed money
corporation (to be named the "Anilao Development Corporation") would have a from private respondent Jesus Bernas, mortgaging as collateral their father’s
capital stock of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos to be subscribed equally
property. In the loan agreement, Aranas described themselves as the absolute co-
between Del Mundo and the Franciscos. To cover the proposed subscription of the
Franciscos, Del Mundo assured the couple that he could get from them a owners. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay the loan resulting to extrajudicial
P125,000.00 loan secured by the realty. foreclosure of mortgage in 1977 and thereafter Bernas acquired the land as the
The Franciscos executed a special power of attorney ("SPA"), dated 25
highest bidder. Aftewards, the Aranases executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
July 1980, 4 in favor of Del Mundo authorizing him to obtain a bank loan.
Only the duplicate copy of the SPA was given to Del Mundo by the in 1978, in which they adjudicated the same land unto themselves in equal share
Francisco. The latter kept the original copy but agreed to have it delivered to Del pro-indiviso. Bernas then consolidated his ownership over the lot when the
Mundo once he would have been able to firm up the P125,000.00 financing to cover
mortgagors failed to redeem it withn the reglementary period, and had the title in the
their (the Franciscos) proposed subscription. Aside from the special power of
attorney, the Franciscos, who were then about to depart for abroad, turned over to name of Modesto cancelled and another TCT issued in his name.
Del Mundo the physical possession of the real property along with its existing In 1978, petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed
facilities and equipment. a complaint against respondents spouses Jesus and Remedios Bernas, for the
Del Mundo proceeded to the Republic Planters Bank ("RPB") to apply
for the loan. After the loan application was approved, Del Mundo executed a deed cancellation of the TCT under the name of the Bernases, and they be declared co-
of real estate mortgage over the Franciscos' property to secure a P265,000.00 loan. owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that spouses Modesto and Victoria in 1987
The mortgage, however, could not be annotated on the owner's copy of OCT NO. 0- and 1958 executed 2 separate wills: first bequeathing to Consolacion and
3267 (lot of Franciscos), then in the possession of the Development Bank of the
Raymundo and to Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of said
Philippines ("DBP") which had a previous mortgage lien on it. To obtain said
owner's copy, the RPB agreed to assume, and thereafter paid, Franciscos' Victoria’s shares from the conjugal partnership property; and second Modesto’s
outstanding indebtedness to the DBP. The latter, despite the payment, refused to interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his separate properties
release the owner's copy of the certificate of title due to Franciscos' objection. In
bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the complaint,
order to allow the release of the loan proceeds, Del Mundo submitted additional
collaterals. The RPB then withdrew its previous payment to the DBP of P22,621.75, declaring herein respondents as the legal owners of the disputed property. IAC
and the P265,000.00 loan was forthwith released to Del Mundo. likewise affirmed the lower court’s decision.
The joint venture did not materialize. The Franciscos wrote a demand
letter addressed to Del Mundo for the payment of rentals for the use of their
property at the rate of P3,000.00 a month (totalling P42,000.00) and for the return of ISSUE: WON Villanueva had a right over the land and the improvements thereon
the equipment taken by Del Mundo from the bodega of the Franciscos valued at made by Victoria who rendered the lot as conjugal property.
Since Del Mundo failed to settle with the Franciscos, the latter sued Del
HELD:The land was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria and Modesto. It
Mundo, along with the RPB, for annulment of the mortgage, as well as for damages,
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. was Modesto’s exclusive property since he inherited it from his parents. Moreover,
RTC- ordered Del Mundo and RPB to pay jointly and severally the Franciscos the since Victoria died ahead of Modesto, Victoria did not inherit said lot from him and
sum of 200k by way of actual and moral damages.
therefore had nothing of the land to bequeath by will of otherwise to Consolacion.
CA- Affirmed trial court’s decision with certain modifications
Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements, whether for utility
ISSUE: W/N the award of moral and actual damages is correct. or adornment made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements
from the partnership or through the industry of either spouse belong to the conjugal
HELD: NO, the court modified the decision of the CA by DELETING actual and partnership, and buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the
moral damages. marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership,
Actual Damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. We have There was no proof presented by Villanueva. Such proof is needed at the time of
emphasized that these damages cannot be presumed, and courts, in making an the making or construction of the improvements and the source of the funds used
award must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring thereof in order to determine the character of the improvements as belonging to the
whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately. What is certain is that the land
In this case, it fails to show that substantial legal basis was shown to on which the improvements stand was the exclusive property of Modesto and that
support the herein questioned collective award for the questioned damages. We where the property is registered in the name of one spouse only and there is no
are, therefore, constrained to disregard them. showing of when precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is that is
As regards the other issues raised by petitioner, the findings of the belongs exclusively to said spouse. It is not therefore possible to declare the
appellate court, involving such as they do mainly factual matters that are not entirely improvements to be conjugal in character.
bereft of substantial basis, must be respected and held binding on this Court. Furthermore, Bernas’ mode of acquisition of ownership over the
In passing, we have taken note of the fact that the RPB, itself a property appears in all respect to be regular, untainted by any defect
judgment co-debtor in solidum with Del Mundo, did not join the latter in this appeal. whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed to have acquired indefeasible and
The Court, accordingly, cannot here and now make any pronouncement on the clear title to the lot which cannot be defeated or negated by claims subsequently
effects of said bank's payment to Del Mundo under and by virtue of the appellate arising and of which he had no knowledge or means of knowing prior to their
court's appealed decision. assertion and ventilation.
BPI vs. Posadas 115 JOCSON v. COURT OF APPEALS 116

FACTS: BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased Adolphe Schuetze, FACTS: Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife. The wife died
appealed to CFI Manila absolving defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from first intestate then the husband followed. Moises and Agustina are their
the complaint filed against him in recovering the inheritance tax amounting to P1209 children. Ernesto Vasquesz is the husband of Agustina.
paid by the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda de Schuetze, under protest, and sum of
P20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance policy of the deceased. The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by
Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale,
Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The wife was actually residing to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties,
and living in Germany when Adolphe died in December 1927. The latter while in including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson
Germany, executed a will in March 1926, pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the
named his universal heir. The deceased possessed not only real property situated properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the
in the Philippines but also personal property consisting of shares of stocks in 19 only heirs of their deceased parents.
domestic corporations. Included in the personal property is a life insurance policy
issued at Manila on January 1913 for the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the
Assurance Company of Canada, Manila Branch. In the insurance policy, the estate unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the
of the deceased was named the beneficiary without any qualification. Rosario is the former, therefore, cannot validly sell. They say it is conjugal properties of Emilio
sole and only heir of the deceased. BPI, as administrator of the decedent’s estate Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were registered in the name of “Emilio
and attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having been demanded by Posadas to pay the Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete”.
inheritance tax, paid under protest. Notwithstanding various demands made by
plaintiff, Posadas refused to refund such amount.
ISSUE: WON the property registered under the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete” is conjugal property or exclusive property.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance.

HELD: Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC proveides that All property of the marriage is
HELD: SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership,
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The party who invokes this presumption
constitute community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other
must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage.
half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal
In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non
and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal
for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
in part and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable
to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under
administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate
Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired
administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter,
during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title,
if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was
however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the
domiciled in these Islands or outside.
properties were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff one-half of the tax
Poblete” is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses’
collected upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already
corresponding to the first premium.
existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute
were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered
only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described
in the certificates of title as married to the latter.

Contrary to petitioner’s position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the
properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson’s, the registered owner. This is so
because the words “married to’ preceding “Alejandra Poblete’ are merely
descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same
having been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra
Wong vs. IAC 116 Zulueta Vs. Pan American 117

FACTS: Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children Facts:
however, even during the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most  Zulueta and his family were passengers of Pan American World
Airways travelling from Honolulu to Manila.
of the time living separately. During the marriage or on about January 1971, the
 In one stopover, they were advised that they could disembark for
husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the money
about 30 minutes.
borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an  However, Zulueta almost missed the flight because he came late
agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the former pieces of jewelry (due to the defective announcing system).
valued at P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the same within the 20 day period  He was asked to open his bags but the employees of the airlines
thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in September 1972, found nothing. Later on, he was asked to go out of the plane.
check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds. The spouses Anita  He was left at Wake Island and was able to return to the Philippines
2 days after.
Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against
 He filed an action for damages.
Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in
behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution Issue: WON there must be an award for damages. YES
was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico
Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to Held: Award for exemplary damages:
It is urged by the defendant that exemplary damages are not recoverable in quasi-
Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such
delicts, pursuant to Article 2231 of our Civil Code, except when the defendant has
redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision including the writ acted with "gross negligence," and that there is no specific finding that it had so
and levy of execution. acted. It is obvious, however, that in off-loading plaintiff at Wake Island, under the
circumstances heretofore adverted to, defendant's agents had acted with malice
aforethought and evident bad faith. If "gross negligence" warrants the award of
ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be
exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act
satisfied through the conjugal property. performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith.

Thus, in Lopez v. PANAM, We held:

HELD: The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to
business deal with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business provide an example or correction for public good. Defendant having breached its
transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into such. The properties in contracts in bad faith, the court, as stated earlier, may award exemplary damages in
addition to moral damages (Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil Code.)
Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where the husband
obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the Award for moral damages:
conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the In fact, Article 2217 of the Civil Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that
husband and even though they had been living separately. A wife may bind the "(t)hough incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." Hence,
conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support of the "(n)o proof pecuniary loss necessary" — pursuant to Article 2216 of the same Code
family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution — "in order that moral ... damages may be adjudicated." And "(t)he assessment of
of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The such damages ... is left to the discretion of the court" - said article adds - "according
to the circumstances of each case."
conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrina’s obligations as she exclusively
incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the From the 1972 case:
benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that the administration The records amply establish plaintiffs' right to recover both moral and exemplary
damages. Indeed, the rude and rough reception plaintiff received at the hands of
of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said
Sitton or Captain Zentner when the latter met him at the ramp ("what in the hell do
obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as you think you are? Get on that plane"); the menacing attitude of Zentner or Sitton
Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute and the supercilious manner in which he had asked plaintiff to open his bags ("open
your bag," and when told that a fourth bag was missing, "I don't give a damn"); the
the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.
abusive language and highly scornful reference to plaintiffs as monkeys by one of
PANAM's employees (who turning to Mrs. Zulueta and Miss Zulueta remarked, "will
you pull these three monkeys out of here?"); the unfriendly attitude, the ugly stares
and unkind remarks to which plaintiffs were subjected, and their being cordoned by
men in uniform as if they were criminals, while plaintiff was arguing with Sitton; the
airline officials' refusal to allow plaintiff to board the plane on the pretext that he was
hiding a bomb in his luggage and their arbitrary and high-handed decision to leave
him in Wake; Mrs. Zulueta's having suffered a nervous breakdown for which she
was hospitalized as a result of the embarrassment, insults and humiliations to which
plaintiffs were exposed by the conduct of PANAM's employees; Miss Zulueta's
having suffered shame, humiliation and embarrassment for the treatment received
by her parents at the airport — all these justify an award for moral damages
resulting from mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, and
social humiliation thereby suffered by plaintiffs.
JOVELLANOS vs. CA – 210 SCRA 126 (Art. 1164) 118
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone
Facts: Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional is considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable.
sale agreement over a house and lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to
Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners. HELD: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM
Leonor Dizon died consequently. Then Daniel married private and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC
respondent Annette with whom he begot two children. The daughter from the 1st failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal
marriage Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and at the behest of Daniel partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of
Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of the premises. Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate
With the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as
Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow
thereon. In 1985, Daniel died. Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money or
Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as
that the aforestated property was acquired by her deceased husband while their a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling
marriage was still subsisting and which forms part of the conjugal partnership of within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership”. The
the second marriage. Petitioners contend that the property, were acquired by their contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not
parents during the existence of the first marriage under their lease and conditional for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted
sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955. with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal
Issue: WON the house and lot pertains to the second marriage? YES partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly
for the benefit of PBM.
Held: The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the
nature of a contract to sell, as contradistinguished from a contract of sale. In a The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family
contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s employment
the property but upon full payment of the purchase price. Generally, ownership is (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the
transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting
seller until full payment of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. The from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself.
stipulation is usually known as a pactum reservati dominii, or contractual
reservation of title, and is common in sales on the installment plan. Compliance with Johnson & Johnson vs CA 121
the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition. The failure of which prevents the GR No. 102692, September 23, 1996
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said
amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since Delilah Vinluan purchased products from petitioner for her retail business under the
September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the name of “Vinluan Enterprises” incurring an obligation of P235,880.89 for which she
deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor. issued seven checks of varying amounts and due dates that bounced and were
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Partial payments were
Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of made after several demands. When no further payments were made to settle the
the deed of sale in his favor. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and obligation, J&J filed a complaint against the spouses for collection of the principal
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law, 19 and, obligation plus interest with damages. RTC rendered decision in favor of J&J and
under the contract, Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not possess or enjoy such rights found that there was no “privity of contract between J&J and defendant husband
of ownership. Alejo Vinluan regarding the obligations incurred by the wife”. Husband was made a
co-owner of the enterprise afer the obligation involved in this action has been
Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in incurred. The court then issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to execute
Daniel Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H. judgment on the properties of the wife. However, the 2 notices of levy on execution
Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his covered not only her exclusive paraphernal properties but also the properties of the
said second wife. conjugal partnership of the spouses. This led the husband to file a third-party claim
seeking the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties. Trial court denied the third-
NB: But since it pertained to the second wife, she is still liable to pay the party claim since Alejo’s consent became evident when he did not seek the
corresponding reimbursements to the petitioners who helped pay for the intervention of the Court to air his objections in his wife’s engaging business
amortization of the house and lot. Remember Article 118 of the Family Code on coupled by the fact that he made several representations for the settlement of his
property bought on installments, where ownership is vested during the marriage, wife’s account. Thus, even his own capital may be liable aside from the conjugal
such property shall belong to the conjugal partnership. and paraphernal property. Private respondent elevated the matter to CA, charging
the trial court with grave abuse of discretion for effectively reversing its own final
Ayala Investments vs CA 121 judgment. CA upheld private respondent. Hence this petition by J&J.

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from ISSUE: WON a husband may be held liable for the debts incurred by his wife
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent without his consent and did not benefit the conjugal partnership?
Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and
March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness HELD:
to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and
Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and SC held that respondent court correctly ruled that the trial court cannot, in the guise
severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the of deciding the third-party claim, reverse its final decision. Only the wife and her
judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy paraphernal property can be held liable. And since the pwer of the execution of
sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of judgment extends only to properties belonging to the judgment debtor alone, the
sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses conjugal property and the capital of the husband cannot be levied upon. In any
filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to event that Delilah’s paraphernal properties are insufficient, in order to bind the
the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court conjugal partnership properties, the debts and obligations contracted by either the
from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent husband or the wife must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and that the
spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the husband must consent to his wife’s engaging in business. The respondent court
only bidder and was registered on July 1982. already found that the husband did not give his consent neither did the obligation
incurred by the wife redound to the benefit of the family.
Lacson vs. Diaz (Group 12) 122 Manzano, Jr. (P) vs. Garcia ® 134

Facts: In connection with a final decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of FACTS: This case involves a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 5790 (Soledad L. Lacson, et al. v s . Abelardo (TCT) No. T-25464, issued in the name of respondent Marcelino D. Garcia (Garcia).
G. Diaz), sentencing defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P97, 532.93 with The property was the subject of a deed of pacto de retro sale dated May 26, 1992
legal interest thereon from July 1, 1960 until fully paid, plus a sum equivalent to allegedly executed by Garcia in favor of Constancio Manzano, the predecessor-in-
25% of the total amount as attorney's fees, the court issued a writ of execution on interest and brother of petitioner Vicente Manzano, Jr. (Vicente) for the amount of
August 1, 1961. On August 7, 1961, the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental sent eighty thousand five hundred pesos (P80,500.00). Under said contract, Garcia
to the manager of Talisay- Silay Milling Company, wherein defendant Diaz was purportedly reserved the right to repurchase the subject property for the same price
employed, a notice to garnish one- third of his monthly salary and of any other within three months from the date of the instrument.
personal properties belonging to said defendant, to cover the total amount of P132, On July 12, 1992, Constancio Manzano passed away. His properties,
718.30. Diaz filed with the court a motion to quash the writ of execution and to lift including the subject of this case, were adjudicated to his heirs by virtue of a deed
the notice of garnishment (of his salary), on the ground that the same are not of extrajudicial partition with special power of attorney executed by them. Vicente
enforceable against his present family. It was claimed that since the money- was named the administrator of the intestate estate of Constancio Manzano.
judgment arose out of a contract entered into by him during his first marriage, said
judgment cannot be enforced against his salaries which form part of the conjugal Garcia did not redeem the subject property within the three-month period.
properties of the second marriage. Consequently, Vicente instituted a petition for consolidation of ownership over the
property, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-610. Garcia filed an opposition and
Issue: Whether or not the debt procured by the petitioner prior to the second answer, alleging that the document evidencing the pacto de retro sale was a
forgery. He claimed that he and his wife were in the United States of America (USA)
marriage may be enforced on the properties of her second marriage
from June 1, 1988 to November 14, 1992, and therefore could not have possibly
executed the said pacto de retro sale on May 26, 1992.
Ruling: Yes, the court ruled that as the conjugal partnership resulting of the second
During the trial, Vicente presented TCT No. T-25464 and Tax Declaration No.
marriage is different from that of the first marriage, during which existence the
41672 to prove the due execution of the pacto de retro sale, which was recorded in
obligation arose, such obligation, as far as the second conjugal partnership is the office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City.
concerned, is personal to the husband and cannot be charged against the
On the other hand, Garcia testified that he went to the USA on November 7, 1987.
properties of the second union in pursuance to Article 163 of the Civil Code. And,
A few months later, he returned to the Philippines. He went back to the USA on
since his salaries form part of the conjugal assets, the same cannot be garnished to June 1, 1988. His three children were left in the Philippines, while the titles to his
satisfy his personal obligations. However, such obligations may be enforced properties were left in the office of his business establishment in Tablon, Cagayan
against the conjugal assets if the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the de Oro City with two of their children. Garcia testified that the signatures appearing
in the pacto de retro sale were not his and his wifes. He presented his passport and
new Civil Code have already been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive drivers license, both of which bear an entirely different signature than what
property or the same is insufficient. In the instant case, although it is not appeared in the pacto de retro sale document.
controverted that there is due and owing the plaintiffs-appellees a certain sum of
Atty. Demosthenes Mediante, Jr. (Atty. Mediante), the person who notarized the
money from the appellant debtor — a personal obligation — yet, it has not been
deed of conveyance in question, and Perla Babano, one of the witnesses to the
established that the latter does not have properties of his own or that the same are execution of the pacto de retro sale, testified that the Marcelino Garcia who
not adequate to satisfy appellees' claim. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING appeared in his office and who executed the pacto de retro sale is not the same
Marcelino Garcia who was in court during the trial of the case.
CONSIDERATIONS, this case is hereby remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings, in accordance with the aforestated observation. ISSUE: I. Whether the pacto de retro sale between the parties was valid
HELD: From an assiduous examination of the records of the case, it is plainly
1. "ART. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the husband or the
apparent to this Court that the alleged signature of Garcia in the pacto de retro sale
wife before the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
is utterly dissimilar from his customary signature appearing in the evidence on
partnership. "Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
record, as well as in the verifications of the pleadings before this Court and the
upon them be charged to the partnership. "However, the payment of
courts a quo. From this circumstance alone, we are constrained to affirm the ruling
debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, and
of the Court of Appeals finding that the pacto de retro sale was forged and,
that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, may be enforced
therefore, void ab initio.
against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in
article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have
the variance in the alleged signature of Garcia in the pacto de retro sale, on one
no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the
hand, and in the evidence on record and in the verifications of the pleadings before
liquidation of the partnership such spouse shall be charged for what
this Court and the courts a quo, on the other hand, was enormous and obvious,
has been paid for the purposes above- mentioned."
such that this Court can readily conclude that the pacto de retro sale was in all
2. "ART. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts
likelihood made by someone who has not even seen the customary signature of
and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
Garcia. Furthermore, the falsity of the signature on the pacto de retro sale was
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the
affirmed by two persons present when the instrument was signed, one of which is
same purpose, . . ., (2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage,
the very person who notarized the same.
from obligations which constitute a charged upon property of either
spouse or of the partnership; (3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation
Petitioner likewise argues that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to appreciate
made during the marriage upon the separate property of either the
that the notarized deed of pacto de retro sale was entitled to the presumption of
husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the
regularity and should be given great weight. It is settled that while a notarized
partnership; (4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership
document enjoys this presumption, "the fact that a deed is notarized is not a
property; (5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the
guarantee of the validity of its contents." The "presumption of regularity of notarized
children of both husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of
documents is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence
the spouses; (6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a
to the contrary."
professional, vocational or other course."

Irregularities in the notarization of the document may be established by oral

evidence of persons present in said proceeding. Here, the presumption of
regularity of the notarized deed of pacto de retro sale was sufficiently
overcome by the testimony of Atty. Mediante.