1. Negligence
00 for
TISON v. Sps. POMASIN
Petitioner: Albert Tison and Claudio Jabon / Respondents: Sps. Gregorio Pomasin
et.al.
Doctrine:
However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a causal
connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic
regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.
Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence,
is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.
Facts:
· [August 12, 1994] Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a
vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay.
Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi
City while the tractor-trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the
opposite lane going towards Naga City
Gregorio Pomasin’s version
· Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarni's father, was on board the jitney and
seated on the passenger's side. He testified that while the jitney was passing through
a curve going downward, he saw a tractor-trailer coming from the opposite
direction and encroaching on the jitney's lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-
trailer and it was dragged further causing death and injuries to its passengers.
Jabon’s version
· Jabon recounted that while he was driving the tractor-trailer, he noticed a
jitney on the opposite lane falling off the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it began
running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the direction of the truck. To avoid
collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a
tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left fender of the
tractor- trailer before it was thrown a few meters away. The tractor-trailer was
likewise damaged.
· Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted.
· Gregorio was injured but his 2 daughter, sister and 2 granddaughter died. His
wife and others were injured. Jabon and one of the passenger was also injured.
· Albert Tison (owner of the truck) extended financial assistance to
respondents by giving them P1,000.00 each immediately after the accident and
P200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin (Cynthia), one of Gregorio' s daughters. Cynthia,
in turn, executed an Affidavit of Desistance.
· [November 14, 1994] respondents filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo. They alleged that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of
petitioners. Respondents prayed for indemnification for the heirs of those who
perished in the accident at P50,000.00 each; P500,000.00 for hospitalization,
medical and burial expenses; P350,000.00 for continuous hospitalization and
medical expenses of Spouses Pomasin; P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
P250,000.00 as exemplary damages; P30,000.00 for loss of income of Cynthia;
P100,000.00 as attorney's fees plus P1,000.00 per court appearance; P50,000.
litigation expenses; and cost of suit.
· In their Answer, petitioners countered that:
1. it was Laarni' s negligence which proximately caused the accident.
2. Cynthia was authorized by Spouses Pomasin to enter into an amicable
settlement by executing an Affidavit of Desistance.
3. Notwithstanding the affidavit, petitioners complained that respondents
led the instant complaint to harass them and profit from the recklessness of
Laarni.
- Counterclaim for damages
- Motion to Dismiss in view of the Affidavit of Desistance [DENIED]
RTC
- rendered judgment in favor of petitioners dismissing the complaint for
damages in view of the affidavit of desistance / that they authorized Cynthia
Pomasin to to settle the case for P200K
- proximate cause of the accident did not arise from the fault or negligence of
defendants' driver/employee but from plaintiff's driver
- trial court considered the testimony of Jabon regarding the incident more
convincing and reliable than that of Gregorio' s, a mere passenger, whose
observation and attention to the road is not as focused as that of the driver.
- Laarni caused the collision of the jitney and the tractor-trailer. The trial court
likewise upheld the Affidavit of Desistance as having been executed with the tacit
consent of respondents.
CA
· disagreed with the trial court and ruled that the reckless driving of Jabon
caused the vehicular collision
· relied heavily on Gregorio' s testimony that Jabon was driving the tractor-
trailer downward too fast and it encroached the lane of the jitney.
· Based on the gravity of the impact and the damage caused to the jitney
resulting in the death of some passengers, the Court of Appeals inferred that Jabon
must be speeding.
· It also noted the restriction in Jabon's driver's license was violated, thus,
giving rise to the presumption that he was negligent at the time of the accident.
· Tison was likewise held liable for damages for his failure to prove due
diligence in supervising Jabon after he was hired as driver of the truck.
· Finally, the appellate court disregarded the Affidavit of Desistance executed
by Cynthia because the latter had no written power of attorney from respondents
and that she was so confused at the time when she signed the affidavit that she did
not read its content.
· MR - denied
Issue: Who is the negligent party or the party at fault?
Held:
Ø To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur:
(a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c)
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the
damage incurred by the plaintiff
Ø These requisites must be proved by a preponderance of evidence. - evidence
which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to it.
Ø The trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent. We give weight to this
finding greater than the opposite conclusion reached by the appellate court that the
driver of the tractor-trailer caused the vehicular collision.
Ø One reason why the trial court found credible the version of Jabon was because
his concentration as driver is more focused than that of a mere passenger.
Ø [FROM TRIAL COURT DECISION] In the case of a running or travelling
vehicle, especially in highway travel which doubtless involves faster speed than in
ordinary roads, the driver is concentrated on his driving continuously from moment
to moment even in long trips. While in the case of a mere passenger, he does not
have to direct his attention to the safe conduct of the travelling vehicle, as in fact he
may converse with other passengers and pay no attention to the driving or safe
conduct of the travelling vehicle, as he may even doze off to sleep if he wants to,
rendering his opportunity for observation on the precise cause of the accident or
collision or immediately preceding thereto not as much as that of the driver whose
attention is continuously focused on his driving. So that as between the respective
versions of the plaintiffs thru their passenger and that of the defendants thru their
driver as to the cause or antecedent causes that led to the vehicular collision in this
case, the version of the driver of defendant should ordinarily be more reliable than
the version of a mere passenger of Plaintiffs' vehicle, simply because the attention
of the passenger is not as much concentrated on the driving as that of the driver,
consequently the capacity for observation of the latter of the latter on the matter
testi ed to which is the precise point of inquiry — the proximate cause of the
accident — is more reasonably reliable. Moreover, the passenger's vision is not as
good as that of the driver from the vantage point of the driver's seat especially in
nighttime, thus rendering a passenger's opportunity for observation on the
antecedent causes of the collision lesser than that of the driver. This being so, this
Court is more inclined to believe the story of defendant's driver Claudio Jabon that
the jitney driven by Laarni Pomasin fell off the shoulder of the curved road causing
it to run thereafter in a zigzag manner and in the process the two vehicles
approaching each other from opposite directions at highway speed came in contact
with each other, the zigzagging jeep hitting the left fender of the truck all the way to
the fuel tank, the violent impact resulting in the lighter vehicle, the jitney, being
thrown away due to the disparate size of the truck.
Ø appellate court labelled the trial court's rationalization as a "sweeping
conjecture" and countered that Gregorio was actually occupying the front seat of the
jitney and had actually a clear view of the incident despite the fact that he was not
driving.
Ø While it is logical that a driver's attention to the road travelled is keener than that
of a mere passenger, it should also be considered that the logic will hold only if the
two are similarly circumstanced, and only as a general rule, so that, it does not
necessarily follow that between the opposing testimonies of a driver and a
passenger, the former is more credible. The factual setting of the event testified on
must certainly be considered.
Ø Notably, aside from Jabon's alleged vantage point to clearly observe the incident,
the trial court also took into consideration Gregorio's admission that prior to the
accident, the jitney was running on the "curving and downward" portion of the
highway. The appellate court, however, took into account the other and opposite
testimony of Gregorio that it was their jitney that was going uphill and when it was
about to reach a curve, he saw the incoming truck running very fast and
encroaching the jitney's lane.
Ø We perused the transcript of stenographic notes and found that the truck was
actually ascending the highway when it collided with the descending jitney.
Ø Jabon narrated that the tractor-trailer was ascending at a speed of 35 to 40
kilometers per hour when he saw the jitney on the opposite lane running in a zigzag
manner
Ø Going downward, the jitney had the tendency to accelerate. The fall into the
shoulder of the road can result in the loss of control of the jitney, which explains
why it was running in a zigzag manner before it hit the tractor-trailer.
Ø There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. There is a
preponderance of evidence that the tractor-trailer was in fact ascending.
Considering its size and the weight of the tractor-trailer, its speed could not be more
than that of a fully loaded jitney which was running downhill in a zigzagging
manner.
Ø Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. In hindsight, it can be argued
that Jabon should have swerved to the right upon seeing the jitney zigzagging
before it collided with the tractor-trailer. Accidents, though, happen in an instant,
and, understandably in this case, leaving the driver without sufficient time and
space to maneuver a vehicle the size of a tractor-trailer uphill and away from
collision with the jitney oncoming downhill.
Ø Clearly, the negligence of Gregorio's daughter, Laarni was the proximate cause
of the accident.
Ø We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon was
prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed on his driver's
license. (RESTRICTION CODE 2-3 / tractor-trailer is 8.)
Ø Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation.
Ø Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises
if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation.
Ø However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a
causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the
traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was
the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.
Ø Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other
negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the
injury.
Ø in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that negligence per se,
arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in
establishing liability for damages. In said case, Añonuevo, who was driving a car,
did not attempt "to establish a causal connection between the safety violations
imputed to the injured cyclist, and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative
presumption that these violations in themselves sufficiently established negligence
appreciable against the cyclist. Since the onus on Añonuevo is to conclusively
prove the link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him as having
failed to discharge his necessary burden of proving the cyclist' s own liability."
Ø The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise
from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The
 doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial
guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from
the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal at.
But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when
in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the
injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable
so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in
spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose
interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of other.
Ø In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-
trailer driver's restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore,
Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation Office merely
erred in not including restriction code 8 in his license.
Ø Petitioners presented the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Cynthia to
exonerate them from any liability.
Ø GRANTED, CA decision set aside.
GAID v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 171636, April 7, 2009
DOCTRINE:
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man,
in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law
imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard
against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this
provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must
be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the
injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing
factor in the causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an injury.
Facts:
At around 12:00 noon on 25 October 2001, petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney
along a two-lane road where the Laguindingan National High School is located toward
the direction of Moog in Misamis Oriental. His jeepney was filled to seating capacity. At
that time several students were coming out of the school premises. Meanwhile, a 14-
year-old student, Michael Dayata, was seen by eyewitness Artman Bongolto sitting near
a store on the left side of the road. From where he was at the left side of the road, Dayata
raised his left hand to flag down petitioner’s jeepney which was traveling on the right
lane of the road. However, neither did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos, saw
anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at that point.
The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayata’s feet was pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney,
after which, he laid flat on the ground behind the jeepney. Another prosecution witness,
Usaffe Actub, who was also situated on the left side of the street but directly in front of
the school gate, heard a strong impact coming from the jeep sounding as if the driver
forced to accelerate in order to hurdle an obstacle. Dayata was then seen lying on the
ground and caught in between the rear tires. Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the
jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right side.
Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was run over, prompting him to jump off the jeepney to
help the victim. Petitioner stopped and saw Mellalos carrying the body of the victim.
Mellalos loaded the victim on a motorcycle and brought him to the hospital. Dayata was
first brought to the Laguindingan Health Center, but it was closed. Mellalos then
proceeded to the El Salvador Hospital. Upon advice of its doctors, however, Dayata was
brought to the Northern Mindanao Medical Center where he was pronounced dead on
arrival. Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio-cerebral injuries as the
cause of death. She testified that the head injuries of Dayata could have been caused by
having run over by the jeepney.
Petitioner Norman A. Gaid was charged with the crime of RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
RESULTING IN HOMICIDE.
MCTC: Petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The lower
court held petitioner negligent in his driving considering that the victim was dragged to a
distance of 5.70 meters from the point of impact. He was also scored for not stopping his
vehicle after noticing that the jeepney’s left rear tire jolted causing the vehicle to tilt
towards the right. Petitioner appealed to RTC.
RTC: Affirmed MCTC’s Decision in toto.
CA: Affirmed the trial courts judgment with modification that it found petitioner guilty
only of SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE RESULTING IN HOMICIDE. It exonerated petitioner
from the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide on the ground that he was
not driving recklessly at the time of the accident. However, the appellate court still found
him to be negligent when he failed to promptly stop his vehicle to check what caused the
sudden jotting of its rear tire. It likewise denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
1) CA erred in finding that there is absolutely lack of precaution on the part of the
petitioner when he continued even after he had noticed that the left rear tire and the
jeep tilted to its right side. Petitioner stressed that he, in fact, stopped his jeep when
its left rear tire bounced and upon hearing that somebody had been ran over.
2) CA committed a grave abuse of discretion in convicting him of the offense of
simple negligence resulting in homicide. Assuming arguendo that he failed to
promptly stop his vehicle, petitioner maintains that no prudent man placed in the
same situation could have foreseen the vehicular accident or could have stopped his
vehicle in time when its left rear tire bounced due to the following reasons: (1) the
victim was only a trespasser; (2) petitioners attention was focused on the road and
 the students outside the schools gate; and (3) the jeepney was fully loaded with
passengers and cargoes and it was impossible for the petitioner to promptly stop his
vehicle.
Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG): Maintained that petitioner was negligent when he
continued to run towards the direction of Moog, Laguindingan, dragging the victim a few
meters from the point of impact, despite hearing that a child had been run over.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner is guilty of Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide and thus, liable for in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person
damages.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner was acquitted on reasonable doubt, and the award of damages was deleted
pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code which states that when the plaintiff’s own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages.
The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is determined by the
operative events leading to the death of Dayata which actually comprised of two phases
or stages. The first stage began when Dayata flagged down the jeepney while positioned
on the left side of the road and ended when he was run over by the jeepney. The second
stage covered the span between the moment immediately after the victim was run over
and the point when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt.
proximate cause of the accident and the death of the victim was his own negligence in
trying to catch up with the moving jeepney to get a ride.
The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of
the offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the
danger is not clearly manifest.
The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man,
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law
imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard
against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this
provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must be shown that his
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that
which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. In
order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be
shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries
or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor
in the causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an injury.

During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent. The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of impact proved to be the immediate
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act cause of his death, as indicated in the post-mortem findings. His skull was crushed as a
from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on result of the accident. Had petitioner immediately stopped the jeepney, it would still not
the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. have saved the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered were fatal.

In the instant case, petitioner was driving slowly at the time of the accident, as testified to
by two eyewitnesses. Petitioner stated that he was driving at no more than 15 kilometers
per hour. It appears from the evidence that Dayata came from the left side of the street.
Petitioner, who was driving the jeepney on the right lane, did not see the victim flag him
down. He also failed to see him go near the jeepney at the left side. Understandably,
petitioner was focused on the road ahead. In the instant case, petitioner had exercised
extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of the school. He
cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who came from behind on the left side.
However, the Court of Appeals found petitioner guilty of simple negligence resulting in
homicide for failing to stop driving at the time when he noticed the bouncing of his
vehicle. Verily, the appellate court was referring to the second stage of the incident.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
With the foregoing facts, petitioner cannot be held liable during the first stage.
Specifically, he cannot be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The
The evidence on record do not show that the jeepney dragged the victim after he was hit
and run over by the jeepney. The evidence discloses that the victim was not dragged at
all. In fact, it is the other way around. Bongolto narrated that after the impact, he saw
Dayata left behind the jeepney. Actub saw Dayata in a prone position and bleeding
within seconds after impact. Right after the impact, Mellalos immediately jumped out of
the jeepney and saw the victim lying on the ground. The distance of 5.70 meters is the
length of space between the spot where the victim fell to the ground and the spot where
the jeepney stopped as observed by the trial judge during the ocular inspection at the
scene of the accident.
Moreover, mere suspicions and speculations that the victim could have lived had
petitioner stopped can never be the basis of a conviction in a criminal case. The Court
must be satisfied that the guilt of the accused had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Clearly then, the prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate cause of the
victim’s death was petitioners alleged negligence, if at all, even during the second stage
of the incident.
If at all again, petitioner’s failure to render assistance to the victim would constitute
abandonment of one’s victim punishable under Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the omission is not covered by the information. Thus, to hold petitioner
criminally liable under the provision would be tantamount to a denial of due process.
St. LUKE’S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE v. Sps. PEREZ
G.R. No. 222740, September 28, 2016
Petitioners: St. Luke's College of Medicine-William H. Quasha Memorial
Foundation, Dr. Brigido L. Carandang, and Dr. Alejandro P. Ortigas
Respondents: Spouses Manuel and Esmeralda Perez and Spouses Eric and Jurisita
Quintos
Doctrine: In Mendoza, et al. v. Sps. Gomez, we defined negligence as "the failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury." In Gaid v. People, we enumerated the elements of simple
negligence as follows: (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender, and
(2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly
manifest.
Summary: Fire broke out in the community clinic where 4 the respondents’ daughters
were having their clerkship as medical students. The NBI found out that the accident was
due to faulty electrical wiring and non-compliance with Fire Code. SC ruled that the
petitioner school is guilty of negligence for failure to take the necessary precautions to
guard their students against foreseeable harm.
Facts:
· In February 2010, St. Luke's sent 4 of its 4th year medical students to the Cabiao
Community Clinic (in Nueva Ecija), namely: Jessa Perez (daughter of plaintiffs-
appellants Spouses Perez) Cecille Quintos (daughter of plaintiffs-appellants Spouses
Quintos), Jerillie Ann Murillo, and Miguel Rafael Ramos. They were tasked to complete
a four-week clerkship rotation at the clinic and like the previous batches, they were
housed in the second floor of the clinic.
· The night prior the accident, they went out at 9 o'clock in the evening to buy
beverages (including vodka The Bar, which they did not consume entirely), cooking oil
and other items needed for their breakfast the next day and went to sleep sometime after
midnight.
· Ramos was awakened sometime between 3 o'clock and 3:30 in the morning of
February 9, 2010 when he heard Murillo shouting from the other side of the room that
there was a fire. He saw thick smoke coming from the left portion of the living room
where there was a glow. The girls, who had followed him to the bathroom, stayed behind.
When Ramos' attempt to put out the fire proved to be futile, he went back to the
bathroom and poured water on the girls in an attempt to alleviate the extreme heat
coming from the fire.
· By that time, Ramos had started losing consciousness due to smoke inhalation and
only remembered that he was being pulled out of the building through the window.
Unfortunately, the fire resulted in the deaths of the female medical students, including the
daughters of plaintiffs-appellants due to smoke inhalation resulting" to asphyxia.
· St. Luke's compensated the parents of the three deceased students in the amount of
PhP300,000.00 each from insurance proceeds.
· Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) conducted an investigation on the incident, and in
a Certification dated April 18, 2011, it certified that the fire was "purely accidental in
nature due to unattended cooking,"
· Spouses Perez and Spouses Quintos sought the help of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
o It is highly probable that the origin of fire is electrical based on the Electrical Report
No. 04-10-001 submitted by Engr. DAVID R. AOANAN, Chief, Electrical Section, NBI
o The community center is a virtual fire/death trap. During night time, medical students
were left alone inside the 2nd floor with the main gate locked from the outside and with
no apparent signs of fire alarms, fire sprinklers, fire exit plan, emergency lights,
provisions of confining the fire to its source, among others, for the occupants fire safety
and protection system.
o The ratio between the capacity of the circuit breaker and the electrical service wire is
out of proportion and became electrically insensitive to overload and wire short circuits;
thereby negating the very purpose the circuit breaker was designed.
o The Cabiao Bureau of Fire Protection failed to perform its mandate pursuant to RA
9514. FO3 ESQUIVEL has bungled the investigation of the fire by removing items from
the scene of the fire and his failure to explain the disappearance of other electrical debris.
· Thus, Respondents then filed a Complaint for damages against petitioners -
claiming that their negligence caused the deaths of respondents' daughters. Respondents
maintained that, as a learning institution which sends out its medical students to rural
areas to comply with its curriculum requirement, St. Luke's has the contractual duty and
legal responsibility to see to it that the premises to where it sends its students are safe and
that, in the case at bar, St. Luke's refused to recognize its obligations/liabilities.
· RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The RTC did not take into
consideration the NBI Report as it was allegedly not presented. The Clinic is owned by
the Municipality of Cabiao, and that the latter and/or its responsible officials should have
been impleaded as indispensable parties.
· CA - reversed the RTC Decision. Municipality of Cabiao was not an indispensable
party as the Complaint was one for damages based on the allegations in the enrollment
contract. Also, while the fire was beyond the control of petitioners, their decision to
house their students in a place where there are no means of escape in case of such an
emergency shows a blatant disregard for the students' welfare.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner school is guilty of negligence
HELD:
· Yes. Petitioners failed to take the necessary precautions to guard their students
against foreseeable harm. They were remiss in inspecting the premises of the Cabiao
Community Clinic and in ensuring that the necessary permits were in order. These
precautions could have minimized the risk to the safety of the victims.
· Standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man,
in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued?
· The students were complying with an obligation under the enrollment contract they
were rendering medical services in a community center as required by petitioners. It was
thus incumbent upon petitioners to comply with their own obligations under the
enrollment contract - to ensure that the community center where they would designate
their students is safe and secure, among others.
· The Clinic was unsafe and was constructed in violation of numerous provisions of
the Revised Fire Code of the Philippines. It had no emergency facilities, no fire exits, and
had no permits or clearances from the appropriate government offices.
· Culpa contractual and no liability for the Municipality
o The mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure, of its compliance
justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.
o The enrollment contract is between petitioners and the victims, and petitioners cannot
abdicate' on their contractual obligation to provide their students a safe learning
environment, nor can it pass or contract away such obligation to a third party.
o As held in Saludaga v. FEU, et al., a learning institution should not be allowed to
completely relinquish or abdicate matters of safety and security to a third party as to do
so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation of ensuring a safe learning
environment for its students.
o That petitioners and the victims were bound by the enrollment contracts, and that
petitioners were negligent in complying with their obligation under the said contracts to
ensure the safety and security of their students. For this contractual breach, petitioners
should be held liable.
2. Standard of Conduct
a. Ordinary Prudent Person
PNRC v. Vizcara
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
b. Children
Ylarde v. Aquino
G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988
DOCTRINE:
The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that
degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion,
knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances.
Facts:
In 1963, private respondent Mauro Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary
School, a public educational institution located in Tayug, Pangasinan. Private respondent
Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time, the school was fittered with several
concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World
War II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren, another
teacher by the name of Sergio Banez started burying them one by one as early as 1962. In
fact, he was able to bury ten of these blocks all by himself.
Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of
his male pupils, aged 10 to 11, after class dismissal on October 7, 1963. Being their
teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to
make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left unfinished. The
following day, also after classes, private respondent Aquino called 4 of the original 18
pupils to continue the digging. These 4 pupils — Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara,
Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one meter and forty
centimeters deep. At this point, private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while
the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by
the digging.
When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, private respondent
Aquino and his 4 pupils got out of the hole. Then, said private respondent left the
children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was
about 30 meters away. Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the
school workroom where he could get some rope. Before leaving, private respondent
Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone."
A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left, three of the four kids, Alonso,
Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning at all, the
remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards
the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time
but unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could get out,
pinning him to the wall in a standing position. As a result, thereof, Ylarde sustained
severe injuries. 3 days later, Novelito Ylarde died.
Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against both private
respondents Aquino and Soriano.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the
pupils is in line with their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to
his own reckless imprudence.
CA: Affirmed the Decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners base their action against private respondent Aquino on Article 2176 of the
Civil Code for his alleged negligence that caused their son's death while the complaint
against respondent Soriano as the head of school is founded on Article 2180 of the same
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not under the cited provisions, both private respondents can be held liable for
damages.
HELD:
Private respondent Mauro Soriano (Principal) cannot be made liable under 2180. Soriano
cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an
academic school and not a school of arts and trades. This is in line with SC’s ruling in
Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, wherein SC thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic
school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. SC went on to
say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held
liable.
Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, private respondent Soriano, as principal,
cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and
not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent
Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging.
Private respondent Edgardo Aquino (Teacher) can be held liable under Article 2180 as
the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and
his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons.
However, as earlier pointed out, petitioners base the alleged liability of private
respondent Aquino on Article 2176 which is separate and distinct from that provided for
in Article 2180.
The question we need to answer is this: Were there acts and omissions on the part of
private respondent Aquino amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal
relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde? YES. He is liable for damages.
From a review of the record of this case, it is very clear that private respondent Aquino
acted with fault and gross negligence when he:
1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized
his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone
which he knew to be a very hazardous task;
2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished
digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed
or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area;
3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent
that the huge stone was at the brink of falling;
4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety;
and
5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.
The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous
site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it
was but natural for the children to play around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they
just had to amuse themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their playful and
adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing three of them jumped
into the hole while the other one jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and
the soil was loose from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that the stone
would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate child caught by its
heavy weight. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of the
negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not
have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by private respondent Aquino which
exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger.
We cannot agree with the finding of the lower court that the injuries which resulted in the
death of the child Ylarde were caused by his own reckless imprudence, It should be
remembered that he was only 10 years old at the time of the incident, As such, he is
expected to be playful and daring. His actuations were natural to a boy his age. Going
back to the facts, it was not only him but the three of them who jumped into the hole
while the remaining boy jumped on the block. From this, it is clear that he only did what
any other 10-year old child would do in the same situation.
It is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. This should not be
the case. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the
person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of
care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of
persons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must
conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of
the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar
circumstances. Bearing this in mind, SC cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless
imprudence. A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure
that the children are protected from all harm in his company. Were it not for his gross
negligence, the unfortunate incident would not have occurred and the child Ylarde would
probably be alive today, a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to his failure to take the
necessary precautions to avoid the hazard, Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all
these years.
Private respondent Edagardo Aquino was ordered to pay petitioners the following: (1)
Indemnity for the death of Child Ylarde P30,000.00; Exemplary damages 10,000.00; and
(3) Moral damages 20,000.00.
Jarco Marketing Corp. v. Court of Appeals
GR NO. 129792 21 DECEMBER 1999
Petitioner: Jarco Marketing Corporation, Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope, and Elisa
Panelo
Defendant: Court of Appeals, Conrado Aguilar, Criselda Aguilar
Doctrine: In our jurisprudence, a person under nine years of age is conclusively
presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from
criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability
obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown
that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict
and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under
nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence;
and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case
of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is rebuttable one, under our law. The
rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed
incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

Facts:
Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati
City (Syvel's), while the private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth
Aguilar. While Criselda and her child Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's, a terrible
accident happened, which caused the life of the six-year old Zhieneth. She was pinned by
the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping counter structure which collapsed. Zhieneth was
crying and screaming for help. She was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center
where she was operated on. Fourteen days later, Zhieneth died at the hospital, which was
attributed to the injuries she sustained.
Private respondents filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought the payment of
P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000.00 for moral damages, P20,000.00 for
attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss income and exemplary damages. They
asserted that Zhieneth should be entitled to the conclusive presumption that a child below
9 years is incapable of contributory negligence.
Petitioners, however, denied any liability for the injuries and consequent death of
Zhieneth. They sought the dismissal of the complaint and an award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in their favor. They claimed Criselda was
negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely
roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances. Zhieneth, too, was guilty of
contributory negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse on
her.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the preponderance of the evidence
favored petitioners. It ruled that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth
was her act of clinging to it, afterwhich the structure and the girl fell with the structure
falling on top of her, pinning her stomach.
The Court of Appeals decided in favor of private respondents and reversed the appealed
judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous
counter. The counter was defective, unstable and dangerous; a downward pressure on the
overhanging portion or a push from the front could cause the counter to fall. Two former
employees of petitioners had already previously brought to the attention of the
management the danger the counter could cause. It also declared Zhieneth, who was
below seven at the time, was absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort. The
appellate court then awarded private respondents P99,420.86 as actual damages,
representing hospitalization expenses. It denied the award for funeral expenses for lack of
proof. Instead, compensatory damages were awarded for the death of Zhieneth.
Petitioners sought the reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision and the reinstatement of
the judgment of the trial court.|||
Issue: Whether or not the negligence was attributable to private respondents for
maintaining a defective counter or to Criselda and Zhieneth for failing to exercise due
and reasonable care while inside the store premises.
Held:
NO.
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence
attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event
happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human
agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person
to whom it happens." On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of
the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."||
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with
the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which
is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any
means suggested by common prudence.
The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of
Picart v. Smith, (37 Phil. 809 [1918]) thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that
favors children below nine (9) years old incapable of contributory negligence. In his
book, (I Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 70-71 [1993]), former Judge Cezar S.
Sangco stated: In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively
presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from
criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability
obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown
that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict
and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under
nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence;
and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case
of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The
rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed
incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
c. Professionals
Li v. Sps. Soliman
DOCTRINE:
Medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to
redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm.
In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care
provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a
reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that that failure or action caused
injury to the patient.
This Court has recognized that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of
expert witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general
line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon.
Tort of “battery” (i.e., an unauthorized physical contact with a patient) if they had not
gained the consent of their patients prior to performing a surgery or procedure.

Doctrine of Informed Consent is a general principle of law that a physician has a duty
to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise
of reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might
be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary
care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment,
or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by
reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits.
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based
upon the doctrine of informed consent:
(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks;
(2) he failed to disclose/inadequately disclosed those risks;
(3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to
treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and
(4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment.
The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to “point to significant
undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision
to undergo it.
FACTS:
On July 7, 1993, respondent’s 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a
biopsy of the mass located in her lower extremity at the St. Luke’s Medical Center
(SLMC). Results showed that Angelica was suffering from osteosarcoma, a highly
malignant cancer of the bone which usually afflicts teenage children. Following this
diagnosis and as primary intervention, Angelica’s right leg was amputated by Dr. Jaime
Tamayo in order to remove the tumor. As adjuvant treatment to eliminate any remaining
cancer cells, and hence minimize the chances of recurrence and prevent the disease from
spreading to other parts of the patients body (metastasis), chemotherapy was suggested
by Dr. Tamayo. Dr. Tamayo referred Angelica to another doctor at SLMC, herein
petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.
On August 18, 1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC. However, she died on September
1, 1993, just eleven (11) days after the administration of the first cycle of the
chemotherapy regimen. Because SLMC refused to release a death certificate without full
payment of their hospital bill, respondents brought the cadaver of Angelica to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for post-mortem
examination. The Medico-Legal Report issued by said institution indicated the cause of
death as Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple organ hemorrhages and Disseminated
Intravascular Coagulation. On the other hand, the Certificate of Death issued by SLMC
stated the cause of death was Osteosarcoma.
On February 21, 1994, respondents filed a damage suit against petitioner, Dr. Leo
Marbella, Mr. Jose Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents charged them
with negligence and disregard of Angelica’s safety, health and welfare by their careless
administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the essential
precautions in detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping
early on the chemotherapy, which bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that caused
Angelicas untimely demise. Further, it was specifically averred that petitioner assured the
respondents that Angelica would recover in view of 95% chance of healing with
chemotherapy, and when asked regarding the side effects, petitioner mentioned only
slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness. Respondents thus claimed that they would not
have given their consent to chemotherapy had petitioner not falsely assured them of its
side effects.
Petitioner denied having been negligent in administering the chemotherapy drugs to
Angelica and asserted that she had fully explained to respondents how the chemotherapy
will affect not only the cancer cells but also the patients normal body parts, including the
lowering of white and red blood cells and platelets. She claimed that what happened to
Angelica can be attributed to malignant tumor cells possibly left behind after surgery.
Few as they may be, these have the capacity to compete for nutrients such that the body
becomes so weak structurally (cachexia) and functionally in the form of lower resistance
of the body to combat infection. Such infection becomes uncontrollable and triggers a
chain of events (sepsis or septicemia) that may lead to bleeding in the form of
Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC), as what the autopsy report showed in the
case of Angelica.
(The decision described what happened during the span of two weeks that Angelica was
confined. Feel ko naman di na siya relevant? so di ko na nilagay)
RTC: dismissed the complaint, and held that petitioner was not liable for damages as she
observed the best known procedures and employed her highest skill and knowledge in the
administration of chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all efforts said patient
died. It cited the testimony of Dr. Tamayo who testified that he considered petitioner one
of the most proficient in the treatment of cancer and that the patient in this case was
afflicted with a very aggressive type of cancer necessitating chemotherapy as adjuvant
treatment. Using the standard of negligence laid down in Picart v. Smith, the trial court
declared that petitioner has taken the necessary precaution against the adverse effect of
chemotherapy on the patient, adding that a wrong decision is not by itself negligence.
CA: while concurring with the RTC’s finding that there was no negligence committed by
the petitioner in the administration of chemotherapy treatment to Angelica, found that
petitioner as her attending physician failed to fully explain to the respondents all the
known side effects of chemotherapy. The appellate court stressed that since the
respondents have been told of only three side effects of chemotherapy, they readily
consented thereto. Had petitioner made known to respondents those other side effects
which gravely affected their child -- such as carpo-pedal spasm, sepsis, decrease in the
blood platelet count, bleeding, infections and eventual death -- respondents could have
decided differently or adopted a different course of action which could have delayed or
prevented the early death of their child.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner argues that it was foolhardy to imagine her to be all-
knowing/omnipotent. While the theoretical side effects of chemotherapy were explained
by her to the respondents, as these should be known to a competent doctor, petitioner
cannot possibly predict how a particular patient’s genetic make-up, state of mind, general
health and body constitution would respond to the treatment. These are obviously
dependent on too many known, unknown and immeasurable variables, thus requiring that
Angelica be, as she was, constantly and closely monitored during the treatment.
Petitioner asserts that she did everything within her professional competence to attend to
the medical needs of Angelica.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner can be held liable for failure to fully disclose serious side effects
to the parents of the child patient who died while undergoing chemotherapy, despite the
absence of finding that petitioner was negligent in administering the said treatment.
HELD:
No. Medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her
to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm.
In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care
provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a
reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that that failure or action caused
injury to the patient.
Cobbs v. Grant deemed it as integral part of physicians overall obligation to patient, the
duty of reasonable disclosure of available choices with respect to proposed therapy and of
dangers inherently and potentially involved in each. However, the physician is not
obliged to discuss relatively minor risks inherent in common procedures when it is
common knowledge that such risks inherent in procedure of very low incidence. Cited as
exceptions to the rule that the patient should not be denied the opportunity to weigh the
risks of surgery or treatment are emergency cases where it is evident he cannot evaluate
data, and where the patient is a child or incompetent. The court thus concluded that the
patients right of self-decision can only be effectively exercised if the patient possesses
adequate information to enable him in making an intelligent choice. The scope of the
physicians communications to the patient, then must be measured by the patients need,
and that need is whatever information is material to the decision. The test therefore for
determining whether a potential peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patients
decision.
Cobbs v. Grant further reiterated the pronouncement in Canterbury v. Spence that for
liability of the physician for failure to inform patient, there must be causal relationship
between physicians failure to inform and the injury to patient and such connection arises
only if it is established that, had revelation been made, consent to treatment would not
have been given.
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based
upon the doctrine of informed consent: (1) the physician had a duty to disclose material
risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and
proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she
otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed
treatment. The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to point to
significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered
her decision to undergo it.
SC held that there was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the chemotherapy
procedure performed with the consent of Angelicas parents. Respondents could not have
been unaware in the course of initial treatment and amputation of Angelicas lower
extremity, that her immune system was already weak on account of the malignant tumor
in her knee. When petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of the side effects of
chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells, decrease in
blood platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable
expectation on the part of the doctor that the respondents understood very well that the
severity of these side effects will not be the same for all patients undergoing the
procedure. In other words, by the nature of the disease itself, each patient’s reaction to the
chemical agents even with pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined
by the physician. That death can possibly result from complications of the treatment or
the underlying cancer itself, immediately or sometime after the administration of
chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that cannot be ruled out, as with most other major medical
procedures, but such conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the general side effects of
chemotherapy already disclosed.
As a physician, petitioner can reasonably expect the respondents to have considered the
variables in the recommended treatment for their daughter afflicted with a life-
threatening illness. On the other hand, it is difficult to give credence to respondents claim
that petitioner told them of 95% chance of recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely
for doctors like petitioner who were dealing with grave conditions such as cancer to have
falsely assured patients of chemotherapys success rate. Besides, informed consent laws in
other countries generally require only a reasonable explanation of potential harms, so
specific disclosures such as statistical data, may not be legally necessary.
The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in the proposed medical treatment
cannot thus be reduced to one simplistic formula applicable in all instances. Further, in a
medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent, the plaintiff must prove
both the duty and the breach of that duty through expert testimony. Such expert testimony
must show the customary standard of care of physicians in the same practice as that of the
defendant doctor.
Dr. Ninevetch Cruz v. CA and Lydia Umali
GR No. 122445, November 18, 1997.
Doctrine: In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing appellant’s negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there
must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as causal connection
of such breach and the resulting death of his patient.
FACTS
Private respondent Lydia Umali was examined by Petitioner Dr. Cruz who found a
myoma [benign tumor] in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation
[removal of uterus] on 23 Mar 1991. Rowena Umali de Ocampo accompanied her mother
to the hospital a day before the operation, and they spent the night there. Rowena noticed
that the clinic was untidy, so she tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the
operation. The following day, Rowena asked Dr. Cruz if the operation could be
postponed, but Lydia told her daughter that Dr. Cruz said that the operation must go on as
scheduled.
While private respondent’s relatives were waiting, Dr. Ercillo (anesthesiologist) told
them to buy tagamet ampules, and Rowena's sister went out to buy some. An hour later,
Dr. Ercillo asked them to buy blood for private respondent, so they did. A few hours
later, the operation was finished, but later, petitioner asked the family to buy additional
blood, but there was no more type A blood available in the blood bank. A person arrived
to donate blood which was later transfused to private respondent. Rowena noticed that
her mother was gasping for breath--apparently, the oxygen supply had run out, so the
family went out to buy oxygen. Later in the evening, she went into shock and her blood
pressure dropped. She was then transferred to another hospital so she could be connected
to a respirator and further examined. However, this transfer was without the consent of
the relatives, who only found out about it when an ambulance came to take private
respondent to the other hospital.

In the new hospital, she was re-operated upon by Petitioner and Dr. Ercillo because blood
was oozing out from her incision. They summoned Dr. Angeles, Ob-Gyne head of the
new hospital, but when he arrived, private respondent was already in shock and possibly
dead (BP: 0/0). Dr. Angeles told Drs. Cruz and Ercillo that there was nothing he could
do. Lydia died while petitioner was closing her abdominal wall. Immediate cause of
death is shock; disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) as antecedent cause.
Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo were charged with reckless imprudence and negligence resulting
in homicide of Lydia Umali. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) found Dr.
Ercillo not guilty for insufficiency of evidence against her, but held Dr. Cruz responsible
for Umali's death. RTC and CA affirmed MTCC.
ISSUE:
WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against Dr.
Cruz for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
HELD:
No, petitioner is acquitted, but is still civilly liable.
Elements of reckless imprudence
1. Offender does / fails to do an act
2. Doing / failure to do act is voluntary
3. Without malice
4. Material damage results from reckless imprudence
5. There is inexcusable lack of precaution, taking into consideration offender's
employment, degree of intelligence, physical condition, other circumstances re: persons,
time, place
Standard of care
The standard of care to be exhibited by medical practitioners is that observed by other
members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances, bearing in mind
the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of
medical science
When the physician's qualifications are admitted, there is an inevitable presumption
that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his
knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently
established by expert testimony.
Expert testimony
Expert testimony is essential to establish standard of care of the profession, as well as that
the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. It is also
usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. There is an absence of any
expert testimony re: standard of care in the case records. NBI doctors presented by the
prosecution only testified as to the possible cause of death.
While it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the lower courts constitute
reckless imprudence, this conclusion is still best arrived not through the educated
surmises nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the unquestionable
knowledge of expert witnesses. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified
physicians stems from the realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which
laymen are incapable of intelligently evaluating.
Burden of establishing medical negligence on plaintiff
Plaintiff has the burden to establish this, and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence,
there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon, as well as a causal
connection of such breach and the resulting death of patient. Negligence cannot create a
right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of (Chan Lugay
v. St. Luke's Hospital, Inc.). In this case, no cogent proof exists that the circumstances
caused Lydia's death, so the 4th element of reckless imprudence is missing.
The testimonies of the doctors presented by the prosecution establish hemorrhage /
hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death, which may be caused by several different
factors. Autopsy did not reveal any untied cut blood vessel, nor was there a tie of a cut
blood vessel that became loose. The findings of the doctors do not preclude the
probability that a clotting defect (DIC) caused the hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia's
death.
The Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies that substantiate Dr. Cruz'
allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC, which cannot be attributed to Dr.
Cruz' fault or negligence. This probability was unrebutted during trial.
Borromeo v. Family Care Hospital
Petitioner: Carlos Borromeo / Respondents: Family Care Hospital Inc. and Ramon
Inso M.D.
[DISCLAIMER: This case has a lot of the qualifications of the doctors … di ko na
sinama kasi hahaba and di pa relevant like legit curriculum vitae]
Doctrine:
Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in cases such as the present one where the defendant's
alleged failure to observe due care is not immediately apparent to a layman.
Facts:
· Carlos Borromeo, was the husband of the late Lilian V. Borromeo (Lilian).
Lilian was a patient of the respondent Family Care Hospital, Inc. (Family Care)
under the care of respondent Dr. Ramon Inso (Dr. Inso).
· [July 13, 1999] the petitioner brought his wife to the Family Care Hospital
because she had been complaining of acute pain at the lower stomach area and fever
for two days. She was admitted at the hospital and placed under the care of Dr. Inso.
· Dr. Inso suspected that Lilian might be suffering from acute appendicitis.
However, there was insufficient data to rule out other possible causes and to
proceed with an appendectomy. Thus, he ordered Lilian's confinement for testing
and evaluation.
· Over the next 48 hours, Lilian underwent multiple tests such as complete
blood count, urinalysis, stool exam, pelvic ultrasound, and a pregnancy test.
However, the tests were not conclusive enough to confirm that she had appendicitis.
 · Lilian's condition did not improve. Lilian abruptly developed an acute
surgical abdomen.
· [July 15, 1999] Dr. Inso decided to conduct an exploratory laparotomy on
Lilian because of the findings on her abdomen and his fear that she might have a
ruptured appendix. Exploratory laparotomy is a surgical procedure involving a large
incision on the abdominal wall that would enable Dr. Inso to examine the
abdominal cavity and identify the cause of Lilian's symptoms. After explaining the
situation, Dr. Inso obtained the patient's consent to the laparotomy.
· [At around 3:45 P.M.] Lilian was brought to the operating room where Dr.
Inso conducted the surgery. During the operation, Dr. Inso confirmed that Lilian
was suffering from acute appendicitis. He proceeded to remove her appendix which
was already infected and congested with pus.
· The operation was successful. Lilian's appearance and vital signs improved.
At around 7:30 P.M., Lilian was brought back to her private room from the
recovery room.
· [At around 1:30 A.M. on July 16, 1999, roughly six hours] after Lilian was
brought back to her room, Dr. Inso was informed that her blood pressure was low.
After assessing her condition, he ordered the infusion of more intravenous (IV)
fluids which somehow raised her blood pressure.
· Despite the late hour, Dr. Inso remained in the hospital to monitor Lilian's
condition. Subsequently, a nurse informed him that Lilian was becoming restless.
Dr. Inso immediately went to Lilian and saw that she was quite pale. He
immediately requested a blood transfusion. Then subsequently administered
medicine. Her condition continued to deteriorate.
· Dr. Inso observed that Lilian was developing petechiae in various parts of her
body. Petechiae are small bruises caused by bleeding under the skin whose presence
indicates a blood-coagulation problem — a defect in the ability of blood to clot. At
this point, Dr. Inso suspected that Lilian had Disseminated Intravascular
Coagulation (DIC), a blood disorder characterized by bleeding in many parts of her
body caused by the consumption or the loss of the clotting factors in the blood.
However, Dr. Inso did not have the luxury to conduct further tests because the
immediate need was to resuscitate Lilian.
· Dr. Inso informed the family there might be a need for surgery, then ICU, but
there was no ICU in the hospital so he informed the need to transfer hospitals. Inso
called Perpetual Help Medical Center but no beds for ICU, then Muntinlupa
Medical Center.
· 4AM she was taken by ambulance. In MMC, Lilian was resuscitated but she
died at 10AM.
· At the request of the petitioner, Lilian's body was autopsied at the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Camp Crame Crime Laboratory. Dr. Emmanuel Reyes (Dr.
Reyes), the medico-legal cause of Lilian's death was hemorrhage due to bleeding
petechial blood vessels: internal bleeding. He further concluded that the internal
bleeding was caused by the 0.5 x 0.5 cm opening in the repair site. He opined that
the bleeding could have been avoided if the site was repaired with double suturing
instead of the single continuous suture repair that he found.
· Based on the autopsy, the petitioner led a complaint for damages against
Family Care and against Dr. Inso for medical negligence.
Petitioner’s testimony and witness:
· Dr Reyes testified at trial of that stated above, but admitted that:
he had very little experience in the field of pathology and his only experience was
an on-the-job training at the V. Luna Hospital where he was only on observer status.
He further admitted that he had no experience in appendicitis or appendectomy and
that Lilian's case was his first autopsy involving a death from appendectomy.
He likewise admitted that an appendical stump is initially swollen when sutured and
that the stitches may loosen during the healing process when the initial swelling
subside.
Respondent’s side:
Dr. Ramos is a practicing pathologist with over 20 years of experience.
· Dr. Ramos discredited Dr. Reyes' theory that the 0.5 x 0.5 cm opening at the
repair site caused Lilian's internal bleeding. According to Dr. Ramos, appendical
vessels measure only 0.1 to 0.15 cm, a claim that was not refuted by the petitioner.
If the 0.5 x 0.5 cm opening had caused Lilian's hemorrhage, she would not have
survived for over 16 hours; she would have died immediately, within 20 to 30
minutes, after surgery.
· Dr. Ramos submitted that the cause of Lilian's death was hemorrhage due to
DIC, a blood disorder that leads to the failure of the blood to coagulate. Dr. Ramos
considered the abundant petechial hemorrhage in the myocardic sections and the
hemorrhagic right lung; the multiple bleeding points indicate that Lilian was
afflicted with DIC.
Dr. Hernandez, a general surgeon and a hospital administrator who had been practicing
surgery for twenty years as of the date of his testimony:
· Lilian's death could not be attributed to the alleged wrong suturing. He
submitted that the presence of blood in the lungs, in the stomach, and in the entire
length of the bowels cannot be reconciled with Dr. Reyes' theory that the
hemorrhage resulted from a single-sutured appendix.
· Lilian had uncontrollable bleeding in the microcirculation as a result of DIC.
In DIC, blood oozes from very small blood vessels because of a problem in the
clotting factors of the blood vessels. The microcirculation is too small to be seen by
the naked eye; the red cell is even smaller than the tip of a needle. Therefore, the
alleged wrong suturing could not have caused the amount of hemorrhaging that
cause Lilian's death.
· That Dr. Inso performed the surgery in the usual procedure.
· Dr. Rudyard Avila III (Dr. Avila) as a rebuttal witness. Dr. Avila, also a
lawyer, was presented as an expert in medical jurisprudence. He opined that
between Dr. Reyes (autopsied) and Dr. Ramos (based on medical records), Dr.
Reyes should be given more weight.
· RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, and relied on Dr. Avila's opinion and gave
more weight to Dr. Reyes' findings regarding the cause of Lilian's death. It held that
Dr. Inso was negligent in using a single suture on the repair site causing Lilian's
death by internal hemorrhage. It applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, holding
that a patient's death does not ordinarily occur during an appendectomy.
· CA reversed. It gave more weight to Dr. Hernandez and Ramos because Dr.
Reyes was not an expert in pathology, appendectomy, nor in surgery. It disregarded
Dr. Avila's opinion because the basic premise of his testimony was that the doctor
who conducted the autopsy is a pathologist of equal or of greater expertise than Dr.
Ramos or Dr. Hernandez. There is no causal connection between the alleged
omission of Dr. Inso to use a double suture and the cause of Lilian's death.
 · CA denied the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because the
element of causation between the instrumentality under the control and management
of Dr. Inso and the injury that caused Lilian's death was absent; the respondents
sufficiently established that the cause of Lilian's death was DIC.
Issue:
1. WON Dr. Inso and Family Care were negligent in caring for Lilian before, during and
after her appendectomy and hence liable for her death
2. WON res ipsa loquitur applies in this case
Held:
1. NO. In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff has the duty of proving its elements,
namely:
(1) a duty of the defendant to his patient;
(2) the defendant's breach of this duty;
(3) injury to the patient; and
(4) proximate causation between the breach and the injury suffered.
Ø In civil cases, the plaintiff must prove these elements by a preponderance of
evidence.
Ø A medical professional has the duty to observe the standard of care and exercise
the degree of skill, knowledge, and training ordinarily expected of other similarly
trained medical professionals acting under the same circumstances.
Ø A breach of the accepted standard of care constitutes negligence or malpractice
and renders the defendant liable for the resulting injury to his patient.
Ø The standard is based on the norm observed by other reasonably competent
members of the profession practicing the same field of medicine.
Ø Because medical malpractice cases are often highly technical, expert testimony
is usually essential to establish:
(1) the standard of care that the defendant was bound to observe under the
circumstances;
(2) that the defendant's conduct fell below the acceptable standard; and
(3) that the defendant's failure to observe the industry standard caused injury
to his patient.
The expert witness must be a similarly trained and experienced physician.
Ø Thus, a pulmonologist is not qualified to testify as to the standard of care
required of an anesthesiologist and an autopsy expert is not qualified to testify as a
specialist in infectious diseases.
Ø After having conducted over a thousand traumatic autopsies, Dr. Reyes can be
considered an expert in traumatic autopsies or autopsies involving violent deaths.
However, his expertise in traumatic autopsies does not necessarily make him an
expert in clinical and pathological autopsies or in surgery.
Ø Atty. Reyes appears to have inflated his qualifications during his direct
testimony. This misled the trial court into believing that he was more qualified to
give his opinion on the matter than he actually was.
Ø Dr. Reyes is not an expert witness who could prove Dr. Inso's alleged
negligence. His testimony could not have established the standard of care that Dr.
Inso was expected to observe nor assessed Dr. Inso's failure to observe this
standard. His testimony cannot be relied upon to determine if Dr. Inso committed
errors during the operation, the severity of these errors, their impact on Lilian's
probability of survival, and the existence of other diseases/conditions that might or
might not have caused or contributed to Lilian's death.
Ø The testimony of Dr. Avila also has no probative value in determining whether
Dr. Inso was at fault. Dr. Avila testified in his capacity as an expert in medical
jurisprudence, not as an expert in medicine, surgery, or pathology. His testimony
fails to shed any light on the actual cause of Lilian's death.
Ø Dr. Hernandez affirmed that Dr. Inso did not deviate from the usual surgical
procedure. Both experts agreed that Lilian could not have died from bleeding of the
appendical vessel. They identified Lilian's cause of death as massive blood loss
resulting from DIC.
Ø o our mind, the testimonies of expert witnesses Dr. Hernandez and Dr. Ramos
carry far greater weight than that of Dr. Reyes. The petitioner's failure to present
expert witnesses resulted in his failure to prove the respondents' negligence. The
preponderance of evidence clearly tilts in favor of the respondents.
2. Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable when the failure to observe due care is not
immediately apparent to the layman.
Ø The petitioner cannot invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to shift the burden
of evidence onto the respondent. Res ipsa loquitur, literally, "the thing speaks for
itself;" is a rule of evidence that presumes negligence from the very nature of the
accident itself using common human knowledge or experience.
Ø The application of this rule requires:
(1) that the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent;
(2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and
(3) that the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution from the injured person.
The concurrence of these elements creates a presumption of negligence that, if
unrebutted, overcomes the plaintiff's burden of proof.
Ø This doctrine is used in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
We have applied this doctrine in the following cases involving medical
practitioners:
4 Where a patient who was scheduled for a cholecystectomy (removal of gall stones) but
was otherwise healthy suffered irreparable brain damage after being administered
anesthesia prior to the operation.
4 Where after giving birth, a woman woke up with a gaping burn wound close to her left
armpit; 

4 The removal of the wrong body part during the operation; and 

4 Where an operating surgeon left a foreign object (i.e., rubber gloves) inside 
 the body
of the patient.
Ø The rule is not applicable in cases such as the present one where the defendant's
alleged failure to observe due care is not immediately apparent to a layman.
Ø These instances require expert opinion to establish the culpability of the
defendant doctor. It is also not applicable to cases where the actual cause of the
injury had been identified or established.
Ø While this Court sympathizes with the petitioner's loss, the petitioner failed to
present sufficient convincing evidence to establish: (1) the standard of care
expected of the respondent and (2) the fact that Dr. Inso fell short of this expected
 standard. Considering further that the respondents established that the cause of
Lilian's uncontrollable bleeding (and, ultimately, her death) was a medical disorder
— Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation — we find no reversible errors in the
CA's dismissal of the complaint on appeal.
Ø DENIED
3. Degrees of Negligence
GSIS v. Pacific Airways Corp
G.R. No. 170414, August 25, 2010
DOCTRINE:
Gross negligence is one that is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons
may be affected.
If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the
aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the
loss or injury.
Facts:
On April 2, 1996, at around 6:45 p.m., the Twin Otter aircraft of Philippine Airways
Corporation (PAC) arrived at the Manila International Airport from El Nido, Palawan. In
command of the aircraft was Ely B. Bungabong. With Bungabong in the cockpit was
Michael F. Galvez as co-pilot.
Upon touchdown, the Twin Otter taxied along the runway and proceeded to the Soriano
Hangar to disembark its passengers. After the last passenger disembarked, PAC’s pilots
started the engine of the Twin Otter in order to proceed to the PAC Hangar located at the
other end of the airport. At around 7:18 p.m., Galvez contacted ground control to ask for
clearance to taxi to taxiway delta. Rogelio Lim, ground traffic controller on duty at the
Air Transportation Office (ATO), issued the clearance on condition that he be contacted
again upon reaching taxiway delta intersection.
PAC’s pilots then proceeded to taxi to taxiway delta at about 7:19 and 19 seconds. Upon
reaching the intersection of taxiway delta, Galvez repeated the request to taxi to taxiway
delta, which request was granted. Upon reaching fox 1, Galvez requested clearance to
make a right turn to fox 1 and to cross runway 13 in order to proceed to fox 1 bravo.
ATO granted the request. At this point, the Twin Otter was still 350 meters away from
runway 13. Upon reaching runway 13, PAC’s pilots did not make a full stop at the
holding point to request clearance right before crossing runway 13. Without such
clearance, PAC’s pilots proceeded to cross runway 13.
Meanwhile, the Philippine Airlines (PAL) Boeing 737, manned by pilots Rogelio Casio
and Ruel Isaac, was preparing for take-off along runway 13. The PAL pilots requested
clearance to push and start on runway 13. Ernesto Linog, Jr., air traffic controller on duty
at the ATO issued the clearance. Subsequently, at 7:20 and 18 seconds, Linog, Jr. gave
PALs Boeing 737 clearance to take off. Pilots Casio and Isaac then proceeded with the
take-off procedure. While already on take-off roll, Casio caught a glimpse of the Twin
Otter on the left side of the Boeing 737 about to cross runway 13.
While the Twin Otter was halfway through runway 13, Galvez noticed the Boeing 737
and told Bungabong that an airplane was approaching them from the right side.
Bungabong then said, Diyos ko po and gave full power to the Twin Otter. The PAL pilots
attempted to abort the take-off by reversing the thrust of the aircraft. However, the
Boeing 737 still collided with the Twin Otter.
The Boeing 737 dragged the Twin Otter about 100 meters away. When the Twin Otter
stopped, PACs pilots ran away from the aircraft for fear it might explode. While
observing the Twin Otter from a safe distance, they saw passengers running down from
the Boeing 737. When PACs pilots returned to the aircraft to get their personal
belongings, they saw that the Twin Otter was a total wreck.
At 7:21 and 2 seconds on that fateful evening, the PAL pilots informed ATOs control
tower that they had hit another aircraft, referring to the Twin Otter. Bungabong suffered
sprain on his shoulder while Galvez had laceration on his left thumb. An ambulance
brought the two pilots to Makati Medical Center where they were treated for serious and
slight physical injuries.
May 7, 1996 - PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez filed in the RTC-Br. 112 of Pasay City a
complaint for sum of money and damages against PAL, Casio, Isaac, ATO, Lim, Linog,
Jr., and ATOs traffic control supervisor, Danilo Alzola. The Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), as insurer of the Boeing 737 that figured in the collision,
intervened.
RTC: Ordered defendants Philippine Air Lines and its pilots, Rogelio Casio and Ruel
Isaac, and Air Transportation Office and its comptrollers, Danilo Alzola, Rogelio Lim
and Ernesto Linog, Jr., jointly and severally, to pay:
a) Plaintiff Pacific Airways Corporation the amount of Php15,000,000.00 and the further
amount of Php100,000.00 a day from April 2, 1996 until it is fully reimbursed for the
value of its RP-C1154 plane, as actual damages, and the amount of Php3,000,000.00, as
exemplary damages, and the amount of Php1,000,000.00, as and for attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation;
b) Plaintiffs Ely B. Bongabong[36] and Michael F. Galvez, the amount of Php5,000.00
each, as actual damages; the amount of Php500,000.00, as and for moral damages;
Php500,000.00 as and for exemplary damages, and the amount of Php50,000.00, as and
for attorneys fees;
c) Defendants are, likewise, ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to plaintiffs the costs
of this suit.
Trial court ruled that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Alzola,
Lim, and Linog, Jr., as ATOs traffic control supervisor, ground traffic controller, and air
traffic controller, respectively, at the time of the collision. The trial court further held that
the direct cause of the collision was the negligence of Casio and Isaac, as the pilots of the
Boeing 737 that collided with the Twin Otter.
CA: Affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. PAL, Casio, Isaac, GSIS, ATO,
Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr., filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The
appellate court denied for lack of merit all the motions for reconsideration except the one
filed by Linog, Jr. The Court of Appeals gave weight to the Decision on appeal of the
RTC-Br. 108 of Pasay City in a Criminal Case acquitting Linog, Jr., who was convicted
in the original Decision together with Alzola and Lim, of reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property with serious and slight physical injuries in connection with the
collision. Since Alzola and Lim did not appeal, the judgment of conviction against them
became final. The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the trial court in the criminal
case has ruled that Linog, Jr. was not negligent, then the act from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions for review.
In G.R. No. 170418, petitioners PAL, Casio, and Isaac argue that the CA should have
applied the emergency rule instead of the last clear chance doctrine. Petitioners claim that
even if the PAL pilots were negligent, PAL had exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its pilots. Petitioners contend that the CA awarded damages without
any specific supporting proof as required by law. Petitioners also claim that the CA
should have awarded their counterclaim for damages.
In G.R. No. 170414, petitioner GSIS points out that PACs pilots were the ones guilty of
negligence as they violated the Rules of the Air, which provide that right of way belongs
to the aircraft on take-off roll and the aircraft on the right side of another. GSIS stresses
that such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. GSIS posits that PAC,
Bungabong, and Galvez should be held solidarily liable to pay GSIS the cost of repairing
the insured aircraft.
In G.R. No. 170460, petitioners ATO, Alzola, and Lim call our attention to the fact that
PAC was a mere lessee, not the owner of the Twin Otter. They argue that PAC, as mere
lessee, was not the real party-in-interest in the complaint seeking recovery for damages
sustained by the Twin Otter. Petitioners maintain that ground and air traffic clearances
were the joint responsibility of ATO and the pilots-in-command. Petitioners aver that
Bungabong and Galvez were negligent in asking for clearance to cross an active runway
while still 350 meters away from the runway. Petitioners claim that PAL had the right of
way and that PACs pilots had the last clear chance to prevent the collision.
ISSUE:
Who among the parties is liable for negligence under the circumstances?
HELD:
Pacific Airways Corporation, Ely B. Bungabong, and Michael F. Galvez are the ones
liable for negligence. they were ordered to solidarily pay:
(1) Philippine Airlines, Inc. actual or compensatory damages in the amount of
US$548,819.93;
(2) Rogelio Casio and Ruel Isaac individually moral damages in the amount of
P100,000, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000, and attorney’s fees in the
amount of P50,000; and
(3) the Government Service Insurance System, as insurer subrogee of
Philippine Airlines, actual or compensatory damages in the amount of
US$2,775,366.84.
To ascertain who among the parties is liable for negligence, the court refer to the
applicable rules governing the specific traffic management of aircrafts at an airport. The
Rules of the Air of the Air Transportation Office apply to all aircrafts registered in the
Philippines. The Boeing 737 and the Twin Otter in this case were both registered in the
Philippines. both are thus subject to the Rules of the Air. In case of danger of collision
between two aircrafts, the Rules of the Air state:
2.2.4.7 Surface Movement of Aircraft. In case of danger of
collision between two aircrafts taxiing on the maneuvering area of
an aerodrome, the following shall apply:
a) When two aircrafts are approaching head on, or approximately
so, each shall stop or where practicable, alter its course to the right
so as to keep well clear.
b) When two aircrafts are on a converging course, the one which
has the other on its right shall give way.
In this case, however, the Boeing 737 and the Twin Otter were not both taxiing at the
time of the collision. Only the Twin Otter was taxiing. The Boeing 737 was already on
take-off roll. The Rules of the Air provide:
2.2.4.6 Taking Off. An aircraft taxiing on the maneuvering area of
an aerodrome shall give way to aircraft taking off or about to take
off.
Therefore, PAL’s aircraft had the right of way at the time of collision, not simply because
it was on the right side of PACs aircraft, but more significantly, because it was taking off
or about to take off.
For disregarding PALs right of way, PACs pilots were grossly negligent. Gross
negligence is one that is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may
be affected.
It was a clear summer evening in April and the Boeing 737, only 200 meters away, had
its inboard lights, outboard lights, taxi lights, and logo lights on before and during the
actual take-off roll. The only plausible explanation why PACs pilots did not see the
Boeing 737 was that they did not really look to the left and to the right before crossing
the active runway. PACs pilots, while still 350 meters away, prematurely requested
clearance to cross the active runway.
As for ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr., even if ATO gave both PALs pilots and PACs
pilots premature clearance to take off and clearance to cross runway 13, respectively, it
remained the primary responsibility of the pilots-in-command to see to it that the
respective clearances given were suitable. Since the pilots-in-command have the final
authority as to the disposition of the aircraft, they cannot, in case a collision occurs, pass
the blame to ATO for issuing clearances that turn out to be unsuitable. It was wrong for
PACs pilots to have relied on a prematurely requested clearance which was issued while
they were still 350 meters away. Their defense, that it did not matter whether the
clearance was premature or not as long as the clearance was actually granted, only
reveals their poor judgment and gross negligence in the performance of their duties.
As for PALs pilots, PALs pilots timely requested clearance to take off. Linog, Jr., ATOs
air traffic controller, duly issued the clearance to take off. Thus, even if Casio noticed
from the corner of his eye a small airplane taxiing on the left side it was fairly reasonable
for PALs pilots to assume that they may proceed with the take-off because the taxiing
aircraft would naturally respect their right of way and not venture to cross the active
runway while the Boeing 737 was on take-off roll.
The immediate and proximate case of the collision is the gross negligence of PACs pilots.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. In this case, the fact that PACs pilots disregarded PALs
right of way and did not ask for updated clearance right before crossing an active runway
was the proximate cause of the collision. Were it not for such gross negligence on the
part of PACs pilots, the collision would not have happened.
The Civil Code provides that when a plaintiff’s own negligence is the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs
own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages,
but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, PAC and its pilots, whose own gross
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of their own injuries, must bear the
cost of such injuries. They cannot recover damages. Civil Case No. 96-0565 for sum of
money and damages, which PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez filed against PAL, Casio,
Isaac, ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr. should have been dismissed for lack of legal
basis.
PALs Counterclaims - We find supported by law and evidence on record PALs
counterclaim for actual or compensatory damages but only in the amount of
US$548,819.93 representing lease charges during the period the Boeing 737 was not
flying.
The said amount cannot be claimed against the insurance policy covering the Boeing 737.
In this connection, the Civil Code provides: Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been
insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss
arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company
shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who
has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully
cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency
from the person causing the loss or injury.
Under the law, GSIS, as insurer subrogee of PALs right to claim actual or compensatory
damages in connection with the repair of the damaged Boeing 737, is entitled to
reimbursement for the amount it advanced. GSIS claims reimbursement for the amount of
US$2,775,366.84. In support of its claim, GSIS presented statements of account, check
vouchers, and invoices proving payment for the repair of the Boeing 737 in the total
amount of US$2,775,366.84. We find the claim fully supported by evidence on record
and thus we resolve to grant the same.
With regard to PALs other counterclaims, settled is the rule that the award of moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees is discretionary based on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The actual losses sustained by the aggrieved parties and the
gravity of the injuries must be considered in arriving at reasonable levels.
Understandably, Casio and Isaac suffered sleepless nights and were temporarily unable to
work after the collision. They are thus entitled to moral damages as well as exemplary
damages considering that PACs pilots acted with gross negligence. Attorney’s fees are
generally not recoverable except when exemplary damages are awarded as in this case.
We thus deem the amounts of P100,000 in moral damages, P100,000 in exemplary
damages, and P50,000 in attorney’s fees to be in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence and appropriate given the circumstances.
Bano v. Bachelor Express, Inc.
GR No. 191703, Mar 12, 2012
Petitioners: Cresencio Baño and Heirs of the Deceased Amancio Asumbrado
(Rosalinda, Vicente, Roel, Annalyn, Arnel, Alfie, Rubelyn)
Respondents: Bachelor Express, Inc./ Ceres Liner, Inc. and Wenifredo Salvaña
Doctrine: In the case of GSIS v. Pacific Airways Corporation, the Court has defined
gross negligence as one that is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons
may be affected.
Summary: Bus (driver Salvaña of Bachelor Express) and Hino dump truck (driver
Cresencio Baño) collision along Tagum City. Bus driver overtook a jeepney while
passing through a blind curve then hit the dump truck which was running uphill. The SC
ruled that the bus driver is guilty of gross negligence.
FACTS:
· In the early afternoon of November 6, 1993, respondent Wenifredo Salvaña was
driving the bus owned by respondent Bachelor Express, Inc./Ceres Liner, Inc. with plate
number LVD-273 and body number 4042 along the national highway at Magdum, Tagum
City bound for Davao City.
· At about 1:20 in the afternoon, he overtook a Lawin PUJ jeepney while negotiating
a blind curve in a descending road at Km. 60, causing him to intrude into the opposite
lane and bump the 10-wheeler Hino dump truck of petitioner Cresencio Baño running
uphill from the opposite direction. The collision resulted in damage to both vehicles, the
subsequent death of the truck driver, Amancio Asumbrado and serious physical injuries
to bus driver Salvaña.
· Respondents denied liability, claiming that prior to the collision, Bus 4042 was
running out of control because of a problem in the steering wheel system which could not
have been avoided despite their maintenance efforts. Instead, they claimed that
Asumbrado had the last clear chance to avoid the collision had he not driven the dump
truck at a very fast speed.
· RTC - found that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the
reckless negligence of the bus driver, Salvaña, in attempting to overtake a jeepney along
a descending blind curve and completely invading the opposite lane. Having established
the negligence of its employee, the presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the
employer, respondent Bachelor Express, Inc./Ceres Liner, Inc., arose, which it failed to
rebut by evidence that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
bus driver Salvaña.
· CA - affirmed the RTC's findings on respondents' negligence and liability for
damages, but deleted the separate awards of exemplary damages in favor of petitioners
for their failure to prove that respondents acted with gross negligence.CA also deleted the
awards for the value of and lost income from the dump truck for lack of sufficient basis,
awarding in their stead temperate damages in the sums of P100,000.00 and P200,000.00,
respectively. The CA also deleted the award of moral damages to Bao for the damage to
his property.
ISSUE: WON the bus driver Salvaña is guilty of gross negligence
HELD:
· Yes.
· In the present case, records show that when bus driver Salvaña overtook the
jeepney in front of him, he was rounding a blind curve along a descending road.
Considering the road condition, and that there was only one lane on each side of the
center line for the movement of traffic in opposite directions, it would have been more
prudent for him to confine his bus to its proper place.
· Having thus encroached on the opposite lane in the process of overtaking the
jeepney, without ascertaining that it was clear of oncoming traffic that resulted in the
collision with the approaching dump truck driven by deceased Asumbrado, Salvaña was
grossly negligent in driving his bus. He was remiss in his duty to determine that the road
was clear and not to proceed if he could not do so in safety.
· Damages
o CA erred in deleting the awards of exemplary damages, which the law grants to serve
as a warning to the public and as a deterrent against the repetition of similar deleterious
actions. However, the award should be tempered as it is not intended to enrich one party
or to impoverish another. Thus, the Court reinstates the separate awards of exemplary
damages to petitioners in the amount of P50,000.00.
o The award of moral damages for the loss of his dump truck was correctly deleted since
the damage to his vehicle was not shown to have been made willfully or deliberately.
o However, the Court finds the grant of P100,000.00 as temperate damages for the
damaged vehicle to be insufficient considering its type as a 10-wheeler dump truck and
its good running condition at the time of the incident. Instead, the Court finds the amount
of P400,000.00 as fair and reasonable under the circumstances. With respect to the
adjudged lost income from the dump truck, the Court sustains, for being just and
equitable, the award of temperate damages in the sum of P200,000.00.
Sps. Carbonell v. MBTC
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
4. Proof of Negligence
Standard Insurance, Co., Inc. v. Cuaresma
G.R. No. 200055, September 10, 2014
Petitioners: Standard Insurance Co., Inc.,
Respondents: Jerry Cuaresma, Arnold Cuaresma
Doctrine: Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.
Summary: Vehicular accident along North Ave., Quezon City. Vehicle 1 driven Cham
and insured with Standard Insurance. Vehicle 2 driven by Jerry Cuaresma and owned by
Arnold Cuaresma The insurance company failed to establish by preponderance of
evidence the negligence on the part of the respondents.
FACTS:
· On March 20, 2004, two vehicles, one driven by Jefferson Cham and insured with
petitioner Standard Insurance Co., Inc., and the other owned by respondent Arnold
Cuaresma and driven by respondent Jerry B. Cuaresma, figured in an accident at North
Avenue, Quezon City.
· Consequently, the damage on the vehicle driven by Cham was repaired, the cost of
which was borne by petitioner. Cham then executed a Release of Claim in favor of
petitioner company subrogating the latter to all his rights to recover on all claims,
demands, and rights of action on account of the loss, damage, or injury sustained as a
consequence of the accident from any person liable thereto.
· Based on said document, petitioner, in its letter dated April 15, 2004 addressed to
respondents, demanded the payment of the sum spent on repairing the vehicle driven by
Cham.
· August 10, 2004, an Information was filed with the MeTC of Quezon City
charging Cham of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
· During the pendency thereof, petitioner company, claiming that respondents
collided with Cham's vehicle in a reckless and imprudent manner, filed a Complaint for
Sum of Money with the MeTC of Manila against respondents, demanding payment of the
sum of P256,643.26 representing the cost of repairs on Cham's vehicle.
· Respondents were declared in default for failure to file their responsive pleading to
petitioner's Complaint despite several opportunities granted by the MeTC of Manila.
Thus, MeTC ruled in favor of the petitioner finding that petitioner sufficiently proved its
claims by preponderance of evidence.
· RTC - reversed the ruling of the MeTC. Not only were there inconsistencies in the
evidence presented by petitioner as to its corporate identity as well as the amount of the
supposed cost of indemnification, but petitioner also failed to sufficiently prove that the
proximate cause of the damage incurred by Cham's vehicle was respondents' fault or
negligence.
· CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner sufficiently proved by preponderance of evidence the
negligence of the respondent
HELD:
· No. The petitioner fell short in proving that the damage caused on said vehicle was
due to the fault of the respondents.
· In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of
proving them by a preponderance of evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by his opponent. This
principle equally holds true, even if the defendant had not been given the opportunity to
present evidence because of a default order.
· The reason for this is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof. Mere allegations, therefore, cannot be deemed as evidence.
· Evidence presented by petitioner: (1) testimonies of its assured and its Assistant
Vice-President, (2) the Traffic Accident Investigation Report, and (3) documents
evidencing the assured's insurance policy with petitioner as well as the payment of repair
expenses.
· Elements for the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible as prima
facie evidence:
a. that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined
by law to do so;
b. that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
c. that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information
· Petitioner failed to prove the third requisite cited above. The investigating officer
who prepared the same was not presented in court to testify that he had sufficient
knowledge of the facts therein stated, and that he acquired them personally or through
official information. Neither was there any explanation as to why such officer was not
presented. We cannot simply assume, in the absence of proof, that the account of the
incident stated in the report was based on the personal knowledge of the investigating
officer who prepared it.
· We can sustain petitioner's argument that its right to be reimbursed for the repair is
by operation of law upon mere proof of payment of the insurance claim. However, the
insufficiency of preponderant evidence attributing negligence on respondents resulting in
the damage sustained by the assured's vehicle, it will be unfair to hold respondents liable
for the same, payment by petitioner of its costs, notwithstanding.
· Issue on Forum Shopping
· As the RTC already mentioned, there exists no forum shopping herein for the filing
of the instant suit is expressly allowed to proceed independently of the criminal action
filed by respondents.
· It is the act of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment.
· The petitioner, who is subrogated to the rights of Cham, the accused in the criminal
case instituted by respondents, cannot be guilty of forum shopping for its separate civil
action is expressly allowed to proceed independently of the criminal action involved
herein.
Josefa v. MERALCO
GR NO. 182705 18 JULY 2014
Petitioner: Vicente Josefa
Defendant: Manila Electric Company
Doctrine: The procedural effect of res ipsa loquitor in quasi-delict cases is that the
defendant’s negligence is presumed. The burden of evidence shifts to the defendant to
prove that he did not act with negligence. For this doctrine to apply, the plaintiff must
show that: a) the accident is of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not
have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; b) the accident must have been
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of
the person charged with the negligence complained of, and c) the accident must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Facts:
At around 1:45 pm on April 21, 1991, a dump truck, a jeepney and a car figured in a
vehicular accident along Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. As a result of the accident, a 45-
foot wooden electricity post, three 75 KVA transformers, and other electrical line
attachments were damaged. Upon investigation, respondent Meralco discovered that it
was the truck with plate number PAK874 and registered in Josefa’s name that hit the
electricity post.
In a letter dated April 19, 1993, Meralco demanded from Josefa reimbursement
for the replacement cost of the electricity post and its attachments, but Josefa refused to
pay. Thus, on September 28, 1993, Meralco used Josefa and Pablo Manoco, the truck
driver, for damages for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
In a decision dated April 10, 2006, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence. The RTC held that Meralco failed to establish that it was the truck that hit the
electricity post.
The CA reversed the RTC ruling and held that the RTC erred in disregarding the parties’
stipulation at the pre-trial that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The CA also
found that Bautista was Josefa’s employee when the accident occurred since Josefa did
not specifically deny this material allegation in the amended complaint. It likewise noted
that the sheriff’s return stated that Bautista was under Josefa’s employ until 1993.
The CA concluded that the fact that the truck hit the electricity post was sufficient to hold
Josefa vicariously liable regardless of whether Bautista was negligent in driving the
truck. In the same breath, the CA also stated that the employer’s presumptive liability in
quasi-delicts was anchored on injuries caused by the employee’s negligence. It further
ruled that Josefa failed to rebut the presumption that he negligently selected and
supervised Bautista in employment since he did not present his evidence-inchief during
trial.
Issue:
1. Whether the truck with plate number PAK-874 hit the electricity post
2. Whether Bautista exercised due diligence in driving when the truck hit the electricity
post;
3. Whether Josefa is vicariously liable for Bautista’s negligence under paragraph 5,
Article 2180 of the Civil Code;
(a) Whether there is an employer-employee relationship between Bautista and Josefa;
(b) Whether Josefa exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of Bautista
Held:
II. Bautista’s negligence was the
proximate cause of the property
damage caused to Meralco
A. The truck hit the electricity post
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. This fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict. Thus, for a quasi-delict
case to prosper, the complainant must establish: (1) damages to the complainant; (2)
negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the
defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between
such negligence and the damages.With respect to the third element, the negligent act or
omission must be the proximate cause of the injury.
Meralco has sufficiently established the direct causal link between the truck and the
electricity post through Abio’s testimony. Abio categorically stated during trial that he
saw the truck hit the electricity post. We find his first-hand account of the incident during
the directexamination frank and straightforward. More importantly, Josefa failed to
impeach the veracity of Abio’s testimony during the cross-examination. Abio even
reiterated that it was Josefa’s truck that rammed the electricity post.We thus give full
faith and credence to his positive, unrebutted, and categorical declaration on the witness
stand, made under solemn oath, that it was the truck that caused damage to Meralco’s
property.
Even without Abio’s testimony, it does not escape this Court’s attention that Josefa
judicially admitted in his motions and pleading that his truck hit the electricity post.
Judicial admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or
other proceedingsin the same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence to
prove them. These admissions cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have
been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
B. Bautista is presumed to be
negligent in driving the truck
under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur
Contrary to the CA’s opinion, the finding that it was the truck that hit the electricity post
would not immediately result in Josefa’s liability. It is a basic rule that it is essentially the
wrongful or negligent act or omission that creates the vinculum jurisin extra-contractual
obligations.
Nonetheless, in some cases where negligence is difficult to prove, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur permits an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant or some other
person who is charged with negligence where the thing or transaction speaks for itself. 48
This doctrine postulates that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience and in
the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence, the
very nature of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the
person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury. In other words, res ipsa
loquitur is grounded on the superior logic of ordinary human experience that negligence
may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
The procedural effect of res ipsa loquiturin quasi-delict cases is that the defendant’s
negligence is presumed. In other words, the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant to
prove that he did not act with negligence. For this doctrine to apply, the complainant
must show that: (1) the accident is of such character as to warrant an inference that it
would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must
have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or
control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured.
The present case satisfies all the elements of res ipsa loquitur. It is very unusual and
extraordinary for the truck to hit an electricity post, an immovable and stationary object,
unless Bautista, who had the exclusive management and control of the truck, acted with
fault or negligence. We cannot also conclude that Meralco contributed to the injury since
it safely and permanently installed the electricity post beside the street.
III. Josefa is vicariously liable under
paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the
Civil Code
A. There is an employer-
employee relations between
Bautista and Josefa
Josefa cannot evade his responsibility by mere denial of his employment relations with
Bautista in the absence of proof that his truck was used without authorization or that it
was stolen when the accident occurred.53 In quasi-delict cases, the registered owner of a
motor vehicle is the employer of its driver in contemplation of law. 54 The registered
owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible
to the public or to third persons for injuries caused while the vehicle was being driven on
highways or streets. The purpose of motor vehicle registration is precisely to identify the
owner so that if any injury is caused by the vehicle, responsibility canbe imputed to the
registered owner.
B. Josefa failed to show that he
exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of
Bautista
Josefa failed to overcome the presumption of negligence against him since he waived his
right to present evidence during trial. We are thus left with no other conclusion other than
to rule that Josefa is primarily liable for all natural and probable consequences of
Bautista’s negligence.
BJDC Construction v. Lanuzo
DOCTRINE:
*Preponderance of evidence
Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence cannot be fairly ascribed
to the company considering that it has shown its installation of the necessary warning
signs and lights in the project site. In that context, the fatal accident was not caused by
any instrumentality within the exclusive control of the company. Res ipsa loquitur did not
apply. The cause of death of Balbino was the fatal depressed fracture at the back of his
head, an injury that Dr. Abilay opined to be attributable to his head landing on the
cemented road after being thrown off his motorcycle. Considering that it was shown that
Balbino was not wearing any protective head gear or helmet at the time of the accident,
he was guilty of negligence in that respect. Had he worn the protective head gear or
helmet, his untimely death would not have occurred.
Facts:
On January 5, 1998, Nena E. Lanuzo (Nena) filed a complaint for damages against BJDC
Construction (company), a single proprietorship engaged in the construction business
under its Manager/Proprietor Janet S. de la Cruz. The company was the contractor of the
re-blocking project to repair the damaged portion of one lane of the national highway at
San Agustin, Pili, Camarines Sur from September 1997 to November 1997.
Nena alleged that she was the surviving spouse of the late Balbino Los Baños Lanuzo
(Balbino) who figured in the accident that transpired at the site of the re-blocking work at
about 6:30 p.m. on October 30, 1997; that Balbino's Honda motorcycle sideswiped the
road barricade placed by the company in the right lane portion of the road, causing him to
lose control of his motorcycle and to crash on the newly cemented road, resulting in his
instant death; and that the company's failure to place illuminated warning signs on the
site of the project, especially during night time, was the proximate cause of the death of
Balbino.
The company denied Nena's allegations of negligence, insisting that it had installed
warning signs and lights along the highway and on the barricades of the project; that at
the time of the incident, the lights were working and switched on; that its project was
duly inspected by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the Office of
the Mayor of Pili, and the Pili Municipal Police Station; and that it was found to have
satisfactorily taken measures to ensure the safety of motorists.
The company further alleged that since the start of the project in September 1997, it
installed several warning signs. The company insisted that the death of Balbino was an
accident brought about by his own negligence, as confirmed by the police investigation
report that stated, among others, that Balbino was not wearing any helmet at that time,
and the accident occurred while Balbino was overtaking another motorcycle; and that the
police report also stated that the road sign/barricade installed on the road had a light.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the company, ruling that the flagman of
defendant was present when the accident occurred, which was caused by the decedent
having overtaken a motorcycle ahead of [him] and on swerving, to avoid the barricade,
hit it, instead, breaking the lighted electric bulb on top of the barricade, resulting in the
fall of the decedent about 18 paces from where his motorcycle fell on the reblocked
pavement;
The CA reversed RTC’s judgment and held that the following elements for the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were present, namely: (1) the accident was
of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for
the defendant's negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with
the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
The CA ruled that the placing of road signs and streamers alone did not prove that the
electric bulbs were in fact switched on at the time of the accident as to sufficiently light
up the newly re-blocked portion of the highway. It concluded that the negligence of the
company was the proximate cause of Balbino's death; hence, the company was liable for
damages.
Issue: W/N the company was negligent (NO)
Held:
Upon a review of the records, the Court affirms the findings of the RTC, and rules that
the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, did not establish by
preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the part of the company was the
proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino.
Negligence is "the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do, [18] or as Judge
Cooley defines it, '(t)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.'" [19] In order that a party may be held
liable for damages for any injury brought about by the negligence of another, the
claimant must prove that the negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury. Proximate cause is defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred."[20]
The test by which the existence of negligence in a particular case is determined is aptly
stated in the leading case of Picart v. Smith,[21] as follows:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias
of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
First of all, we note that the Lanuzo heirs argued in the trial and appellate courts that
there was a total omission on the part of the company to place illuminated warning signs
on the site of the project, especially during night time, in order to warn motorists of the
project. They claim that the omission was the proximate cause of the death of Balbino. [22]
In this appeal, however, they contend that the negligence of the company consisted in its
omission to put up adequate lighting and the required signs to warn motorists of the
project, abandoning their previous argument of a total omission to illuminate the project
site.
During the trial, the Lanuzo heirs attempted to prove inadequacy of illumination instead
of the total omission of illumination. Their first witness was Cesar Palmero, who recalled
that lights had been actually installed in the site of the project. The next witness was
Ernesto Alto, who stated that he had seen three light bulbs installed in the site, placed at
intervals along the stretch of the road covered by the project. Alto further stated that he
had passed the site on board his tricycle on October 30, 1997 prior to the accident, and
had seen only a gas lamp, not light bulbs, on his approach. Another witness of the
plaintiffs, Asuncion Sandia, claimed that she had also passed the site on board a bus on
the night just prior to the accident, and had seen the site to be dark, with only one lane
open to traffic, with no light at all. Obviously, the witnesses of the plaintiffs were not
consistent on their recollections of the significant detail of the illumination of the site.
In contrast, the company credibly refuted the allegation of inadequate illumination.
Zamora, its flagman in the project, rendered an eyewitness account of the accident by
stating that the site had been illuminated by light bulbs and gas lamps, and that Balbino
had been in the process of overtaking another motorcycle rider at a fast speed when he hit
the barricade placed on the newly cemented road. On his part, SPO1 Corporal, the police
investigator who arrived at the scene of the accident on October 30, 1997, recalled that
there were light bulbs on the other side of the barricade on the lane coming from Naga
City; and that the light bulb on the lane where the accident had occurred was broken
because it had been hit by the victim's motorcycle. Witnesses Gerry Alejo and Engr.
Victorino del Socorro remembered that light bulbs and gas lamps had been installed in
the area of the project.
Secondly, the company presented as its documentary evidence the investigation report
dated December 3, 1997 of SPO1 Corporal (Annex 1), the relevant portions of which
indicated the finding of the police investigator on the presence of illumination at the
project site
Additionally, the company submitted the application for lighting permit covering the
project site (Annex 7) to prove the fact of installation of the electric light bulbs in the
project site.
In our view, the RTC properly gave more weight to the testimonies of Zamora and SPO1
Corporal than to those of the witnesses for the Lanuzo heirs. There was justification for
doing so, because the greater probability pertained to the former. Moreover, the trial
court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and of their testimonies is preferred
to that of the appellate court's because of the trial court's unique first-hand opportunity to
observe the witnesses and their demeanor as such. The Court said in Cang v. Cullen:[24]
The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight
and respect - even considered as conclusive and binding on this Court - since the trial
judge had the unique opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and note his demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grueling examination. Only the trial judge can observe the
furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness,
sigh of a witness, or his scant or full realization of an oath - all of which are useful aids
for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. He can thus be expected
to determine with reasonable discretion which testimony is acceptable and which witness
is worthy of belief.
Absent any showing that the trial court's calibration of the credibility of the witnesses
was flawed, we are bound by its assessment. This Court will sustain such findings unless
it can be shown that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misunderstood, misappreciated,
or misapplied substantial facts and circumstances, which, if considered, would materially
affect the result of the case.[25]
The Court observes, too, that SPO1 Corporal, a veteran police officer detailed for more
than 17 years at the Pili Police Station, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties.[26] The presumption, although rebuttable, stands
because the Lanuzo heirs did not adduce evidence to show any deficiency or irregularity
in the performance of his official duty as the police investigator of the accident. They also
did not show that he was impelled by any ill motive or bias to testify falsely.
Thirdly, the CA unreasonably branded the testimonies of Zamora and SPO1 Corporal as
"self-serving." They were not.
There is no question that Zamora and SPO1 Corporal were thoroughly cross-examined by
the counsel for the Lanuzo heirs. Their recollections remained unchallenged by superior
contrary evidence from the Lanuzo heirs.
Fourthly, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had no application here. In Tan v. JAM Transit,
Inc.,[29] the Court has discussed the doctrine thusly:
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase that literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks
for itself." It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken
with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing that caused the injury complained
of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the
accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had
management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of
a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant that the accident arose from
or was caused by the defendant's want of care. This rule is grounded on the superior logic
of ordinary human experience, and it is on the basis of such experience or common
knowledge that negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident
itself. Hence, the rule is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
For the doctrine to apply, the following requirements must be shown to exist, namely: (a)
the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct that would make
the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.[30]
The Court has warned in Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy Hospital,[31] however, that "res ipsa
loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be
cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case."
Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence cannot be fairly ascribed
to the company considering that it has shown its installation of the necessary warning
signs and lights in the project site. In that context, the fatal accident was not caused by
any instrumentality within the exclusive control of the company. In contrast, Balbino had
the exclusive control of how he operated and managed his motorcycle. The records
disclose that he himself did not take the necessary precautions. As Zamora declared,
Balbino overtook another motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in the process could not
avoid hitting a barricade at the site, causing him to be thrown off his motorcycle onto the
newly cemented road. SPO1 Corporal's investigation report corroborated Zamora's
declaration. This causation of the fatal injury went uncontroverted by the Lanuzo heirs.
Moreover, by the time of the accident, the project, which had commenced in September
1997, had been going on for more than a month and was already in the completion stage.
Balbino, who had passed there on a daily basis in going to and from his residence and the
school where he then worked as the principal, was thus very familiar with the risks at the
project site. Nor could the Lanuzo heirs justly posit that the illumination was not
adequate, for it cannot be denied that Balbino's motorcycle was equipped with headlights
that would have enabled him at dusk or night time to see the condition of the road ahead.
That the accident still occurred surely indicated that he himself did not exercise the
degree of care expected of him as a prudent motorist.
According to Dr. Abilay, the cause of death of Balbino was the fatal depressed fracture at
the back of his head, an injury that Dr. Abilay opined to be attributable to his head
landing on the cemented road after being thrown off his motorcycle. Considering that it
was shown that Balbino was not wearing any protective head gear or helmet at the time
of the accident, he was guilty of negligence in that respect. Had he worn the protective
head gear or helmet, his untimely death would not have occurred.
The RTC was correct on its conclusions and findings that the company was not negligent
in ensuring safety at the project site. All the established circumstances showed that the
proximate and immediate cause of the death of Balbino was his own negligence. Hence,
the Lanuzo heirs could not recover damages.[32]
Del Carmen vs. CA
GR No. 173870, 25 April 2012
Doctrine: Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, [w]here the thing that caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and
the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had
management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of
a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant that the accident arose from
or was caused by the defendants want of care.
Facts: At dawn on New Years Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud (Emilia), along
with her spouse Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on
their way home from a Christmas party they attended in Zamboanga Del Sur. Upon
reaching Purok Paglaom in Sominot, they were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep driven
by Allan Maglasang (Allan). The jeep was registered in the name of petitioner Oscar del
Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used as a public utility vehicle plying Zamboanga del Sur.
A criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide was instituted.
Allan was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
During the pendency of the criminal case, Emilias father, Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo),
in behalf of the 6 minor children of the Monsaluds, filed a civil case, an independent civil
action for damages based on culpa aquiliana. Aside from Allan, also impleaded therein
were his alleged employers, namely, the spouses Oscar del Carmen, Sr. (Oscar Sr.) and
Norma del Carmen (Spouses del Carmen) and the registered owner of the jeep, their son
Oscar Jr.
Petitioners refused to assume civil liability for the victims deaths. Oscar Sr. averred that
the Monsaluds have no cause of action against them because he and his wife do not own
the jeep and that they were never the employers of Allan. For his part, Oscar Jr. claimed
to be a victim himself. He alleged that Allan and his friends stole his jeep while it was
parked beside his drivers rented house to take it for a joyride. Both he and a vehicle
mechanic testified that the subject jeep can easily be started by mere pushing sans the
ignition key. The vehicles engine shall then run but without any headlights on. Because
of this allegation, Oscar Jr. even filed before the same trial court a carnapping case
against Allan and his companions. The case was, however, dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
Oscar Jr. clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it was the latters brother,
Rodrigo Maglasang (Rodrigo), who was employed as the driver. In any event, Allans
employment as conductor was already severed before the mishap occurred on January 1,
1993 since he served as such conductor only from the first week of December until
December 14, 1992.
RTC Decision: Citing Art. 103 of RPC which provides that for an employer to be
subsidiarily liable for the criminal acts of his employee, the latter should have committed
the same in the discharge of his duties. The court agreed with Oscar Jr. that this condition
is wanting in Allans case as he was not acting in the discharge of his duties as a
conductor when he drove the jeep. The court also declared the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur inapplicable since the property owner cannot be made responsible for the
damages caused by his property by reason of the criminal acts of another. It then
adjudged that only Allan should bear the consequences of his criminal acts.
CA Decision: Oscar Jr. is liable to the heirs of the victims based on the principle that the
registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the injuries or death
of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.s defense
that the jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping case filed against Allan and his
companions was dismissed but also because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is
deemed to have given Allan the implied permission to use the subject vehicle.
Issue: W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable here?
Held: Yes. Petitioners own evidence casts doubt on his claim that his jeep was stolen by
Allan and his alleged cohorts. Negligence is presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, [w]here the thing that caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and
the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had
management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of
a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant that the accident arose from
or was caused by the defendants want of care. Res ipsa loquitur is merely evidentiary, a
mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and
relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of negligence. It
recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it
allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff
to present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to
invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place
on the defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part. The
doctrine is based partly on the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality
which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity
of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to
allege negligence in general terms.
The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as
follows:
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured.
The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just walking along the
road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one
in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the
ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct him with regard to the specific
restrictions of the jeeps use, including who or who may not drive it. As he is aware that
the jeep may run without the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it safely
and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same precaution. Lastly,
there was no showing that the death of the victims was due to any voluntary action or
contribution on their part.
The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a presumption of
negligence against Oscar Jr. which he could have overcome by evidence that he exercised
due care and diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he
failed to do so.
What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CAs conclusion that Oscar Jr.
gave his implied permission for Allan to use the jeep. This is in view of Oscar Jr.s failure
to provide solid proof that he ensured that the parking area is well secured and that he had
expressly imposed restrictions as to the use of the jeep when he entrusted the same to his
driver Rodrigo. As fittingly inferred by the CA, the jeep could have been endorsed to
Allan by his brother Rodrigo since as already mentioned, Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo
any specific and strict instructions on matters regarding its use. Rodrigo therefore is
deemed to have been given the absolute discretion as to the vehicles operation, including
the discretion to allow his brother Allan to use it.
Macalinao v. Ong
Petitioner: Marcelo Macalinao sub by Esperanza and Antonio Macalinao /
Respondents: Eddie Ong and Genoveno Sebastian
Doctrine:
Facts:
· Macalinao [utility man] and Ong [driver] were employed at the Genetron
International Marketing (Genetron), a single proprietorship owned and operated by
Sebastian.
· [25 April 1992] Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and two truck helpers to
deliver a heavy piece of machinery — a reactor/motor for mixing chemicals, to
Sebastian's manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan.
· While in the process of complying with the order, the vehicle driven by Ong,
Genetron's Isuzu Elf truck with plate no. PMP-106 hit and bumped the front
portion of a private jeepney with plate no. DAF-922 along Caypombo, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan at around 11:20 in the morning.
· Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers sustained
physical injuries as a consequence of the collision.
· Macalinao incurred the most serious injuries among the passengers of
the truck. He was initially brought to the Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid
treatment but in view of the severity of his condition, he was transferred to the
Philippine Orthopedic Center at the instance of Sebastian. He was again moved to
the Capitol Medical Center by his parents, petitioners herein, for medical reasons
and later to the Philippine General Hospital for financial considerations.
 · Macalinao's body was paralyzed and immobilized from the neck down as
a result of the accident and per doctor's advice, his foot was amputated. He also
suffered from bed sores and infection. His immedicable condition, coupled with the
doctor's recommendation, led his family to bring him home where he died on 7
November 1992.
· Before he died, Macalinao was able to file an action for damages against
both Ong and Sebastian before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City.
· After his death, Macalinao was substituted by his parents in the action.
· A criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries
had also been instituted earlier against Ong but for reasons which do not appear in
the records of this case, trial thereon did not ensue.
RTC:
· Ong drove the truck in a reckless and imprudent manner thereby causing
the same to hit the private jeepney. It observed that while respondents claimed
that Ong was driving cautiously and prudently at the time of the mishap, no
evidence was presented to substantiate the claim.
· declared Ong negligent and at the same time, it held that Sebastian failed
to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Ong.
· jointly liable to pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as civil
indemnity for Macalinao's death.
CA:
· reversed - evidence presented by petitioners was woefully scant to support a
verdict of negligence against Ong. And since respondents' liability hinged
squarely on proof of Ong's negligence, neither of them could be held liable for
damages to petitioners
Issues and Held:
1.WON the CA was right in upholding insufficiency of evidence No.
Ø The issue of negligence is factual and, in quasi-delicts, crucial in the award of
damages. In the case at bar, the crux of the controversy is the sufficiency of the
evidence presented to support a finding of negligence against Ong. Given the
contradictory conclusions of the trial court and the appellate court on this issue, this
Court is impelled to ascertain for itself which court made the correct determination.
Ø Contrary to the above conclusion of the appellate court, the evidence on
record coupled with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur sufficiently establishes
Ong's negligence.
Ø [sorry this is impt kasi sa res ipsa loquitur /// decision of CA] The evidence
presented is woefully scant. The pictures of the collision afford no basis for
concluding that it was the fault of the defendant driver, or that he was driving
recklessly. The police report contains no findings as to the road conditions,
estimates of the relative speed of the vehicles, or their exact position at the
time of the accident. And even so, entries in the police blotter should not be
given significance or probative value as they do not constitute conclusive
proof of the truth thereof. Nor were eyewitnesses presented, not even a davits
or statements to give any indication as to what actually happened. The police
investigator's findings are sketchy at best, with only the phrase "Isuzu lost
control" as his opinion, with no explanation how he reached it. Civil cases
require evidence of a lesser degree than criminal cases, but one sentence by
one who did not even witness an event, is not conclusive proof.
Ø We focus first on the evidence presented before the trial court.
Ø An examination of said photographs clearly shows that the road where the
mishap occurred is marked by a line at the center separating the right from the left
lane. Based on the motorist's right of way rule, the Isuzu truck which was headed
towards Norzagaray, Bulacan should have been occupying the left lane while the
private jeepney which was traversing the road to the town proper of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan should have been in the right lane. Exhibits "L" and "L-4" among the
photographs, however, reveal that in the aftermath of the collision, the Isuzu truck
usurped the opposite lane to such an extent that only its right rear wheel remained in
the left lane, a few inches from the demarcation line. Its two front wheels and left
rear wheel were planted squarely on the private jeepney's lane and the Isuzu truck
had rotated such that its front no longer pointed towards Norzagaray but partially
faced the town proper of Sta. Maria instead.
Ø While ending up at the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in
automobile collisions, the position of the two vehicles gives rise to the
conclusion that it was the Isuzu truck which hit the private jeepney rather than the
other way around. The smashed front of the Isuzu truck is pressed against the
private jeepney's left front portion near the driver's side. The private jeepney is
positioned diagonally in the right lane; its front at the rightmost corner of the road
while its rear remained a few feet from the demarcation line. Based on the angle at
which it stopped, the private jeepney obviously swerved to the right in an
unsuccessful effort to avoid the Isuzu truck. This would support the statement of the
police investigator that the Isuzu truck lost control and hit the left front portion of
the private jeepney. It would also explain why the driver of the private jeepney died
immediately after being brought to the hospital, since in such a scenario, the brunt
of the collision logically bore down on him.
Ø Moreover, the unequal size and weight of the two vehicles would make it
improbable for the relatively lighter private jeepney to have stricken the
heavier truck with such force as to push the latter to the former's side of the
road. Had that been the case, the two vehicles would have ended up crushed
together at the center of the road or at the Isuzu truck's lane instead of rolling to a
stop at the private jeepney's lane.
Ø Another piece of evidence which supports a nding of negligence against Ong is
the police report of the incident which states that the Isuzu truck was the one which
hit the left front portion of the private jeepney.
Ø Since respondents failed to refute the contents of the police blotter, the statement
therein that the Isuzu truck hit the private jeepney and not the other way around is
deemed established. The prima facie nature of the police report ensures that if it
remains unexplained or uncontradicted, it will be sufficient to establish the facts
posited therein.
Ø While not constituting direct proof of Ong's negligence, the foregoing pieces of
evidence justify the application of res ipsa loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally
means "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.
Ø Res ipsa loquitur recognizes that parties may establish prima facie
negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the principle to substitute for
specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present along with proof
of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine,
 create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the
defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part.
Ø The doctrine can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct
evidence is absent and not readily available. This is based in part upon the
theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the
injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and rely upon the proof of the
happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which
the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the
true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the
defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
Ø In this case, Macalinao could no longer testify as to the cause of the accident
since he is dead. Petitioners, while substituting their son as plaintiff, have no actual
knowledge about the event since they were not present at the crucial moment. The
driver of the private jeepney who could have shed light on the circumstances is
likewise dead. The only ones left with knowledge about the cause of the mishap
are the two truck helpers who survived, both employees of Sebastian, and Ong,
who is not only Sebastian's previous employee but his co-respondent in this case as
well. In the circumstances, evidence as to the true cause of the accident is, for all
intents and purposes, accessible to respondents but not to petitioners. The witnesses
left are unlikely to divulge to petitioners what they knew about the cause of the
accident if the same militates against the interest of their employer. This
justifies the invocation of the doctrine.
Ø requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant
or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible is eliminated.
Ø ALL ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE:
1. No two motor vehicles traversing opposite lanes will collide as a
matter of course unless someone is negligent, thus, the first requisite for
the application of the doctrine is present.
2. Ong was driving the Isuzu truck which, from the evidence adduced,
appears to have precipitated the collision with the private jeepney. Driving
the Isuzu truck gave Ong exclusive management and control over it, a fact
which shows that the second requisite is also present.
3. No contributory negligence could be attributed to Macalinao relative
to the happening of the accident since he was merely a passenger in the
Isuzu truck. Respondents' allegation that Macalinao was guilty of
contributory negligence for failing to take the necessary precautions to
ensure his safety while onboard the truck is too specious for belief
particularly as respondents did not even present any evidence to prove
such allegation. The last requisite is, therefore, likewise present.
Ø [FOURTH REQUISITE FROM AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE] that is, that
the defendant fails to offer any explanation tending to show that the injury was
caused by his or her want of due care - In this case, while respondents claimed
that Ong drove cautiously and prudently during the time in question, no evidence
was proffered to substantiate the same. In fact, Ong did not bother to testify to
explain his actuations and to show that he exercised due care when the accident
happened, so even this requisite is fulfilled.
Ø All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present,
thus a reasonable presumption or inference of Ong's negligence arises. In
consonance with the effect of the doctrine, the burden of proving due care at the
time in question shifts to respondents.
Ø Unfortunately, as previously discussed, aside from blanket allegations that Ong
exercised prudence and due care while driving on the day of the accident,
respondents proffered no other proof. As a consequence, the prima facie finding of
negligence against Ong, remaining unexplained and/or uncontradicted, is deemed
established. This in turn warrants a finding that Ong is liable for damages to
petitioners.
2. WON Sebastian (employer) is liable
YES. Such liability of Ong is solidary with Sebastian pursuant to Art. 2176 in
relation to Art. 2180 of the Civil Code
Ø Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another,
there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris familias in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or
supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-
delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.
Ø Sebastian claimed that before he hired Ong, he allegedly required him to produce
police and NBI clearances and he took into account the recommendations of Ong's
previous employer and friends. Sebastian also stressed that he instructed Ong to
drive slowly and carefully and to take necessary precautions. He likewise
admonished Ong to be careful after the latter had some minor accidents in the
parking area.
Ø SC ruled that the testimony is self serving and devoid of corroboration because
he did not bother to support with document evidence.
Ø due diligence in supervision requires the formulation of rules and regulations for
the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well as actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules.
Admonitions to drive carefully without the corresponding guidelines and
monitoring of the employee do not satisfy the due diligence required by law either.
3. WON Macalino as employee can claim damages against his employer? YES
Sebastian contends: Art. 2180 apply only when the injured party is a third person but it
has no application to an employee like Macalinao. He likewise postulated that recovery
from the Social Security System, State Insurance Fund, Employee's Compensation
Commission, and the Philippine Medical Care Act, the government agencies with which
petitioners led a claim in view of Macalinao's injury and subsequent death, preclude
pursuing alternate recourse or recovering from other sources until the former claims have
been rejected.
 Ø Art. 2180 makes no distinction whatsoever whether the claimant is an employee
or a third person relative to the employer. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
Ø Moreover, petitioner's claim against Sebastian is not based upon the fact of
Macalinao's previous employment with him but on the solidary liability of the latter
for the negligent act of one of his employees. Such is not precluded by prior
claims with the government agencies enumerated. One is based on compulsory
coverage of government benefits while the other is based on a cause of action
provided by law.

4. WON petitioners are entitled to moral damages because Macalino is dead? YES.
The relatives of the victim who incurred physical injuries in a quasi-delict are not
proscribed from recovering moral damages in meritorious cases. To hold otherwise
would give rise to the ridiculous scenario where a defendant may be compelled to pay
moral damages in a quasi-delict causing physical injuries but will be relieved from doing
so should those same injuries cause the victim's death.

5. WON petitioners are entitled to exemplary damages? YES

Ø Under the law, exemplary damages may be granted in quasi-delicts if the
defendant acted with gross negligence.
Ø Gross negligence has been defined as negligence characterized by the want
of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty
to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
Ø Ong's gross negligence in driving the Isuzu truck precipitated the accident. This
is lucidly portrayed in the photographs on record and it justifies the award of
exemplary damages in petitioners' favor.
Ø GRANTED.