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Comment on Terry Pinkard’s ‘Virtues, Morality, and

Sittlichkeit’*

Ardis B. Collins

In 1986, in an interview published under the title Disturbing the Peace, Václav
Havel spoke of our time as a time of crisis, a crisis common to both East and
West, Communism and Capitalism. Human work, he said, has been absorbed
into the automatic functioning of an impersonal and irresponsible system. As
a result, it has lost its orientation toward a purpose, and the worker has lost all
sense of responsibility for its consequences. According to Havel, another crisis
lurks behind this crisis in the workplace. Humanity has become fixed on its
own ability to know the world and control it, so that this alone is the source of
meaning. No wonder, then, that the system in which this knowledge and
control operate now controls the humans who created it. Humankind, Havel
warns, must rediscover its responsibility to something higher than itself. There
must be ‘a change in human consciousness, in the very humanness of modern
man.’1
In my comment on Terry Pinkard’s paper, I will accept Havel’s warning as one
of the important challenges presented to us by the spirit of our times; and I will
ask whether Pinkard’s Hegel, or perhaps some other Hegel, can help us appreci-
ate and respond to the challenge. Pinkard’s paper shows us how Hegel trans-
forms Kant’s morality of rules and maxims into a morality of practices and moral
skills situated within a society of like-minded persons. This transformation of
Kant has three major strengths. It provides a norm that determines which socially
accepted moral practices are legitimate – only those oriented to the realization of
freedom (§§I, III). It preserves the right of individuals to realize their freedom in
ways that are particular and personal to each (§§II–III). It acknowledges a dialec-
tical relation between individuals and the social context in which they are situ-
ated. Individuals ‘build up’ the orientation of the whole from within their moral
reasoning; and in the process they presuppose and call upon this same orienta-
tion established within the whole (§III). Pinkard calls this interpretation of Hegel
a return to the ‘abstract absolute’, by which he means ‘an intersubjective unity of
mutually recognizing subjects within a world’ (229). The recognition takes a
particular form. We recognize others by developing with them a shared point of
view about how to determine the ‘moves we are entitled or forbidden to make’ in
our shared social space (220). How does this post-Kantian Hegel respond to
Havel’s concerns?
It provides one way of addressing the concern about loss of purpose. Pinkard
insists that the social whole must be understood teleologically. Persons within the
social world are engaged together in a project, something they are trying to

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OX4 1JF, UK, and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
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240 Ardis B. Collins

accomplish. What is this project? It is the task of ‘securing the conditions under
which we can be free’ (221). A world committed to such a project cannot tolerate
the kind of alienation in the workplace that Havel describes as the crisis of our
times. Free persons have a right to know the structure of the workplace as a
system in service to and determined by their co-operatively determined will. But
this calls human persons to nothing more than the task of devising a workable
arrangement for being free in the same world. Any system of moral practices will
do, if only it is co-operatively developed and provides for the free determination
of each and all.2
Pinkard recommends that we leave behind another Hegel, the Hegel of the
concrete absolute which is the object of systematic Wissenschaft. But perhaps this
other Hegel, or some version of it, has more to say about Havel’s concerns.3
According to Hegel, philosophy and phenomenology are science (Wissenschaft)
because they follow a rigorous procedure. Philosophy begins with a concept or
definition that has been justifed by a prior demonstration. It proceeds by articu-
lating the necessary implications of this concept. Hegel describes a pattern that
we will observe in this development. The concept turns out to be necessarily
connected to its opposite. This justifies the move to a new concept in which the
necessary connection is explicitly acknowledged. But it does not justify shifting to
a concept that holds the opposites together without the opposition. This kind of
move would involve hidden, unexamined premisses: that a concept opposed to
itself must be false; that harmonious relations are true and conflict relations are
not; that unity and harmony take priority over diversity and opposition. A
concept necessarily connected to its own opposite proves that the opposite
belongs to the definition of the concept, nothing more.4
Of course, Hegel does move from the conflict of opposites to a dynamic which
seems to be less conflictual. In the Philosophy of Right, he redefines the conflicts of
property, crime, and revenge as the dynamics of action governed by a universal,
unifying principle, the good. But unlike Kant, Hegel must show how this princi-
ple both exists in and grounds the conflict relations carried over from abstract
right.5 These conflicts belong to the very concept of a rational will, derived from
the philosophy of subjective spirit. As rational, the will makes universal claims on
the world. It wills its freedom as the essence and truth of the objective world, and
it demands recognition from other wills. Yet it asserts itself as the will of this
person.6 The dynamics of crime and revenge make explicit what is implicit in the
individuality of this will, namely that it is an exclusive will, my will and not
yours. As such it imposes on other wills a will that is not their own, which they
must oppose and negate in order to maintain their own freedom and right.7
Hegel’s analysis of rational action in the Phenomenology makes a similar point, but
it brings out more explicitly just how radical this opposition is. Individuality
asserting the claims of universal reason does not just take to itself a part of the
world shared with others. It absorbs other persons and their projects into the
world’s orientation to its own exclusive self. It appropriates for itself what is
fundamental to the freedom and rationality of other persons.8
When Hegel shifts from the empty indeterminacy of the good to the subjectivity

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Comment on Pinkard 241

of conscience, this opposition becomes explicit within the good itself.9 The very
structure of rational action focuses it on the exclusive individuality and particu-
lar personality of the agent. Hence, the universality of the action becomes real not
in the action itself but in the speech that interprets the action as an act of
conscience. The agent says, ‘I am convinced that this is the right thing for me to
do in this situation.’ This speech acknowledges to others that their freedom must
be willed in the action.10 But the action itself realizes the freedom of others only
as something that excludes them, something that satisfies the agent as it does no
other. If, however, a person’s only conscientious act consists in condemning the
self-interestedness of action, then this person represents as good, as a way of
affirming the freedom of all, a judgement that opposes every way in which indi-
vidual persons might give reality to their freedom.11
The move from moral principle to socially established moral practices cannot
save morality from this fundamental conflict. In the Phenomenology, conscience
represents the way a society knows and wills the freedom of its members. Hegel
makes his way to this form of socially established moral understanding by unset-
tling the whole domain of established structures, institutions, and moral prac-
tices. Once the Phenomenology reaches the French Revolution, it has shown that
nothing has legitimacy in society except the free will of individuals. When, there-
fore, social structures reappear in the Moral View of the World, they have author-
ity only as the particulars in which the members of society know and will their
own freedom. In the morality of conscience, these structures become the battle-
ground for two opposed forms of conscientiousness.12
In the Phenomenology, this conflict justifies the move to absolute spirit. Absolute
spirit in its final form imitates a language structure introduced in Hegel’s earlier
account of feudalism. This account distinguishes between language in a subordi-
nate role and language ‘authoritative as language.’ In a subordinate role,
language represents something other than itself. It articulates the laws and
customs of a society; or it gives advice about the good of the kingdom. In this
form, it says too much and too little. Too much, because it expresses both the self
of the speaker and the subject-matter of the talk. Too little, because it expresses
the self only as related to this subject-matter. But language ‘authoritative as
language’ does what is proper to language as such. It expresses the very self of
the speaker to the one who hears what is spoken; and nothing more than this is
involved. If, for example, I say to another person ‘I am your friend’, I do not give
the other person my thoughts about something. I give the other person me. In this
form of language, the expression disappears into the one who hears, and this is
the only objectivity it has. The lord says to the king, ‘I am your vassal, you are my
king’, and by doing so, he makes the king his king. The vassal’s self-giving word
creates the king’s kingly self. Thus, the self of the speaker loses its isolation within
itself and passes over into the self of the one who hears. The self becomes a shared
self.13
This is the way Hegel describes the life of absolute spirit. Absolute spirit is the
speech that gives its very self and in being heard becomes the self of the other.14
In absolute spirit, this self-giving structure has two opposite forms. In the form of

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242 Ardis B. Collins

thought, the self recognizes in the other nothing but its own pure thought. But
precisely because pure thought focuses exclusively on itself, this form of spirit lets
what is alien to it go free, releases it into an independent life of its own. Thus,
spirit exists as a world divided by opposition. Thought takes the form of a finite
human spirit confronted by a natural world which is indifferent, threatening, and
full of unaccountable particulars. Yet this finite spirit can neither withdraw from
this alien other nor completely overcome its alien character. Finite spirit gives its
rationality to the otherness of natural existence, and by doing so becomes entan-
gled in the irrational contingencies, independent orientations, and mutually
exclusive dynamics of nature. Absolute spirit holds within itself both forms of
self-giving spirit: the tranquility of thought speaking a word that brings the other
before it as nothing but its own pure thought; and the word that lets the other go
free as a world tainted by contingent forces, unexplainable associations of partic-
ulars, and a spiritual life divided against itself by the conflicting interests of each
individual’s natural existence.15
According to Hegel, absolute spirit gives to conscience a content for its action.
Conscience left to itself wills nothing more than the form of personal conviction
that makes whatever it does or wills its own. Similarly, in Pinkard’s post-Kantian
world of moral practices, moral persons will nothing more than the form of being
co-operatively self-determined. Absolute spirit gives moral self-consciousness a
calling to will as its own. Our true self calls us to the task of producing the
dynamics of absolute spirit as our own act.16 How does this change the very
humanness of the post-Kantian self?
Kantian morality focused only on itself, even in its post-Kantian social form,
wills a world in which rational thought remains at one with itself. Thus, persons
acknowledge other persons by working out a shared view of entitlements and
prohibitions, which gives concrete expression to the rationality they have in
common. Free persons treat nature as nothing more than material for the embod-
iment and expression of their own rational will. But this leaves out an important
part of our self and our world. No matter how like-minded we may be about the
fundamental moral orientation of our world, you cannot appropriate that world
without absorbing my life into a world focused on you and not me; and this is an
affront to my freedom. Moreover, nature challenges the whole domain of reason
by retaining an irrational element – the superfluous multiplicity of natural forms,
the unaccountable way in which they are associated, the arbitrary circumstances
of geography, genetics, assignment to a certain time, the diversity of natural
talents, desires, passions, sensitivities, the non-conformity of personal style,
genius, eccentricity. A will embedded in this superfluity finds itself carried away
in directions not of its own devising.17
Absolute spirit challenges us to recognize in what stands opposed to our free-
dom another self. It asks us to see in the concrete stuff of nature – in the content
and potential of the natural world, in natural talents and eccentric genius – the
fuller, richer range of possibilities that are open to us.18 It challenges us to build
a fellowship in which we let the other go free and let our self live in them, so that
when they challenge and oppose us, when they appropriate our life and our

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Comment on Pinkard 243

world, they do not take us away from ourselves.19 Reason requires that we do all
this freely, deliberately, according to a self-determined commitment and plan.
But freedom is not all there is to it. Freedom itself is called to grow, to become
educated, about its other self in the nature I did not will and in the self who is not
me. This, then, is our responsibility to something higher than ourselves: to will as
our own a spirit that carries us out of ourselves into the larger world of nature
and into a fellowship with others that does not lose their genius, eccentricity, and
recalcitrance in the quest for like-mindedness. Whatever Hegel might say, I think
this calling cannot be contained within national boundaries or particular times in
history. Once spirit recognizes itself as something absolute, its vision must take in
its responsibility to other nations and other times in history.

Ardis B. Collins
Department of Philosophy
Loyola University Chicago
Chicago, Illinois 60626
U.S.A.
acollin@luc.edu

NOTES

* Pinkard’s paper is published in this issue, pp. 217–238.

1 Havel 1990: 11. For the whole discussion, see pp. 10–18. According to Havel, theatre of

the absurd holds a mirror up to this spirit of the times. It shows us man waiting for something
(Beckett’s Godot), trying to communicate something (Ionesco’s The Chairs), trying to remem-
ber something (Beckett’s Happy Days); and all the while he does not know that he waits in
vain, that he has nothing to communicate or remember. We see characters who do not speak,
and hear characters running off at the mouth in stupid ways. In banal, even comic, situations,
Absurdist theatre raises the question of meaning by showing us its absence (pp. 53–4, 200).
2 The word ‘co-operatively’, as I am using it here, does not refer to social contract

arrangements, which presuppose the independent will of each individual freely and sepa-
rately committing itself to a shared set of principles or norms. This interpretation would
be a misrepresentation of Pinkard’s position. I use the word ‘co-operatively’ here in a
Marxist sense. It represents a shared project, one that presupposes individuals working
together from the beginning (See Marx 1939/1941: 73–5, 88–9; 1973: 156–7, 171–2). Of
course, Pinkard’s project is the determination of the social will, not the Marxist project of
producing social resources.
3 Since Pinkard’s treatment of Hegel focuses primarily on the Philosophy of Right and

the Phenomenology of Spirit, I shall do the same. Moreover, although I shall stay close to
Hegel himself when I interpret particular parts of his position, I will use these to develop
a response to Havel that is more my own than Hegel’s. I have not quarrelled with
Pinkard’s reference to Hegel as having a philosophy of ‘the absolute’, although this way of
representing Hegel has been forcefully challenged by John Burbidge 1997. According to
Burbidge, Hegel does not often use ‘absolute’ as a noun; and when he does, he is usually
dealing with Schelling or Spinoza. In the articulation of his own position, ‘absolute’ is

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244 Ardis B. Collins

usually an adjective and closer to Kant’s use of it than to Schelling’s. Without entering a
debate about this issue, I have implicitly endorsed Burbidge’s approach by talking only
about absolute spirit, not about the absolute.
4 PhR Preface IV–VII, 1955: 4–6, 1991: 10–11; §2 with Remark; §3 Remark, 1955: 22–4,

1991: 28–30; §31 with Remark. Logik I, Preface to the First Edition, 1985: 7–8, 1990: 6–7, 1969:
27–8; Preface to the Second Edition, 1985: 18, 1990: 19–20, 1969: 40; Introduction, 1985: 27,
1990: 25, 1969: 43; 1985: 37–9, 1990: 37–9, 1969: 53–5. It is important to note that Hegel does
not assume the legitimacy of this inferential structure and then impose it on the subject-
matter he is examining. His preliminary descriptions give us only a preview of what we
will find developing as we follow the implications of the concept itself.
5 PhR §§102–4, 112 with Remark, 114, 129.
6 EG §§436–9, 465–9.
7 Hegel introduces the exclusiveness of the will’s embodiment when he argues for the

necessity of private property (PhR §46). When he has developed the concept of right into
the contract structure, he refers to being an owner of property as ‘having being for myself
and excluding the will of another …’ (§72). See also PhR §§73, 75, 81, 82, 102.
8 PhG 1988: 213–17/259–62, 1977: §§394–9; 1988: 217–19/263–5, 1977: §401; 1988:

220–3/266–70, 1977: §§405–9; 1988: 226–8/274–7, 1977: §§417–18.

9 Hegel develops the account of conscience articulated here in the Spirit section of the

Phenomenology of Spirit. In the Philosophy of Right, however, he asks us to compare the

account of moral subjectivity and conscience to the Phenomenology’s account of conscience
and the beautiful soul, especially for the purpose of explaining the move from morality to
ethical life (PhR §140 Remark, 1955: 139, 1991: 182–3). Hence, the tensions in the
Phenomenology account belong both to the morality position of the Philosophy of Right and
to the last socio-historical form of consciousness in the Phenomenology. Pinkard refers to
this in note 25.
10 PhG 1988: 347/424–5, 1977: §645; 1988: 349–50/426, 1977: §647; 1988: 350–3/427–30,

1977: §§650–4.
11 PhG 1988: 354–6/433–4, 1977: §§659–60; 1988: 357–8/435–8, 1977: §§663–5.
12 PhG 1988: 239–40/290–1, 1977: §§441–2; 1988: 316–19/386–9, 1977: §§584–9; 1988:

321–3/392–4, 1977: §§594–5; 1988: 324–5/395, 1977: §598; 1988: 348–9/424–5, 1977: §645.
13 PhG 1988: 276/335, 1977: §508; 1988: 277–8/337–8, 1977: §511.
14 ‘[This externalization of itself] is the word which, when uttered, leaves behind,

externalized and emptied, him who uttered it, but which is as immediately heard, and
only this hearing of its own self is the existence (Dasein) of the Word’ (PhG 1988:
410–11/501, 1977: §770). See also Logik II, Section Three, Chapter 3, 1981: 236–7, 1994:
284–5, 1969: 825.
15 PhG 1988: 410/501, 1977: §770; 1988: 411–12/502–3, 1977: §§772–4; 1988:

414–17/506–9, 1977: §§778–80; 1988: 427–8/523, 1977: §799; 1988: 430–1/527–8, 1977: §804;
1988: 432–3/529–30, 1977: §§806–7.
16 PhG 1988: 424–8/519–23, 1977: §§793–9. See also 1988: 351–4/429–31, 1977: §§654–6.

For a debate on the question of otherness within absolute spirit, see The Owl of Minerva,
30:1 (Fall 1998).
17 PhG 1988: 136–7/162–3, 1977: §§238–9; 1988: 154/185, 1977: §275; 1988:

325–9/396–400, 1977: §§599–603; 1988: 330–1/403, 1977: §611; 1988: 410–11/501, 1977: §770;
1988: 411–12/502–3, 1977: §§772–4. See also Logik II, Section One, Chapter 1 (B), 1981: 38–9,
1994: 40–1, 1969: 607–8; Section Three, Chapter 3, 1981: 235–7, 1994: 283–5, 1969: 824–5;
1981: 252–3, 1994: 304–6, 1969: 842–4.
18 Hegel calls the irrational element a pure, abstract ‘not’, which gives the impression

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Comment on Pinkard 245

that it is an empty form whose only determination is its not being the rationality it
opposes. I have interpreted it as something with its own positive possibilities and orienta-
tion in which reason finds itself expanded, educated into a richer, fuller, more universal
self. Although this more positive and concrete way of defining it does not fit easily with
Hegel’s choice of words, it nevertheless seems justified by Hegel’s principles. Hegel distin-
guishes between two ways in which thought knows itself in the other: the tranquil, trans-
parent way in which it meets nothing but itself; and the confrontation with ‘otherness as
such’, which sets itself against thought, fights it, refuses to fall in with it. If thought cannot
be complete without finding itself in this stubborn, resistant other, then the other adds
something that thought does not have and cannot do without. Nor can the otherness be
explained away as something that thought must conquer and transform into itself. This is
the way nature belongs to Kantian morality, which Hegel says is unlike the absolute
concept because it does not comprehend its opposite (PhG 1988: 330–1/403, 1977: §611).
For a debate of these issues concentrating on the relation between Hegel’s Logik and the
Encyclopädie Philosophy of Nature, see the following: Braun 1968: 51–64; Wandschneider
& Hösle 1983: 173–99; Wandschneider 1985/86: 331–51; Wandschneider 1992: 30–51;
Fleischhacker 1990: 35–41; Maker 1998. See also Mure 1950: 320–31.
19 PhG 1988: 360–2/440–2, 1977: §§669–71. Hegel analyzes the opposition between

persons in terms of the tensions that arise in the morality of conscientiousness. Conscience
immersed in the self-absorption of individual action represents itself as dutiful and hence
universal. Conscience passing judgement on this kind of conscientiousness negates this claim
by calling for a universality that remains undisturbed by the divisiveness of individual self-
concern. In the speech of mutual forgiveness, each conscience acknowledges the other’s
opposition as another dimension of itself. Conscientious individuals acknowledge that their
union with each other cannot be reduced to what they accomplish in the particularities of
action and work, that their commitment to each other sets aside the divisions and self-satis-
faction of each one’s individual projects. But they acknowledge, too, that this communal
spirit must make its appearance in real projects and the speech that identifies them as
conscience-driven so that the spirit of community and fellowship can become one with the
reality of objective existence. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Williams 1992.

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