GUARDIANSHIP

Caniza vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110427, February 24, 1997

 While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is
necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no
advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, a niece of Carmen Caniza, is one of the
latter’s only two surviving heirs, the other being Caniza’s nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On
their motion and by Resolution of this Court of June 20, 1994, they were in fact
substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in the place of the deceased, in accordance with
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
 To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caniza’s demise did not
extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian. That action, not
being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken place and now
represent her interest in the appeal at bar.

Goyena vs Ledesma-Gustilo, G.R. No. 147148, January 13, 2003

 In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals
directly with the parties. As this Court said: As a rule when it appears that the judge has
exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due consideration to
resolve for and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his action
should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.
 Petitioner can neither rely on certain letters of Julieta to establish her claim that there
existed a rift between the two which amounts to antagonistic interests.

ADOPTION

Cang vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998

 The written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its
validity.
 The requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the
child.
 Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to
abandonment

Republic vs Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996

 THIS DOCTRINE NO LONGER HOLDS!

 Petitions for adoption and change of name have no relation to each other, nor are they of
the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of fact or
law – in short, they do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity demanded
to sanction their joinder under the Rules.

Republic vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996

 The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an
indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the case be had. As he was
not impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the
trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence
of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to
the filing of the complaint including the judgment.
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, March
31, 2005

 The name of an individual has 2 parts – the given name or proper name and the surname
or family name; the given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but
the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
 Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father to use
as middle name her mother’s surname, the Court finds no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Ilusorio vs Bildner, G.R. No. 139789, May 12, 2000

 A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by

which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto – it is
devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as
the best and only sufficient defense of personal.
 The fact that a person is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily
render him mentally incapacitated; Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical
condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
 No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife;
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is
best left to the man and woman’s free choice.

Pulido vs Abu, G.R. No. 170924, July 4, 2007

 When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas
corpus was filed is effected, the petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and
academic.
 Where a party files a petition for habeas corpus despite the pendency of a petition for
certiorari that questioned the validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely
the very basis of the petition for habeas corpus, he is guilty of forum shopping.

Serapio vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003

 In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the
person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender; Writ
issued where the deprivation of liberty while initially valid under the law had later
become invalid.
 The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner.
The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had
jurisdiction to issue the same applies, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to
the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 21, 2001 after the filing by the
Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-
accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on April
25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.
Lacson vs Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001

 Petitions rendered moot and academic as the declaration of state of rebellion has been
ordered lifted.
 Not even the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus or the declaration of martial
law authorizes the President to order the arrest of any person.

Sangca vs City Prosecutor of Cebu City, G.R. No. 175864, June 8, 2007

 A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is to relieve a
person from it if such restraint is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas
corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty.
 In the instant case, records show that Adam has been released upon order of the trial
judge on January 26, 2007. Therefore, the petition has become moot.

WRIT OF AMPARO AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of Habeas Data in favor
of Melissa C. Roxas vs Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 189155, September 7,
2010

AMPARO

A.

Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from
any responsibility in her abduction and torture. Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the
part of Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings.

Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as
the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were
detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to
prove government involvement.

Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to
implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her
amparo petition. Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the respondents
as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings.

Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings

It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command
responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is
legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of
substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to
implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.

The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, which was the first to examine command responsibility in the
context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico
notes that:

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of
laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its
simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,
foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities
committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then
formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liabilit y,"
whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing
to prevent or punish the perpetrators 105 (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the
orginal, underscoring supplied)

Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual

liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a
summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address
specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.
While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an
enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does not, by
so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal,
civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law. The rationale underpinning this
peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo:

x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is
not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)

It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility
in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their
direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded—not actually on
the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis, the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and
accountability were given special and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding,
to wit:

x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence
to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on
the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the
level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.

Responsibility of Public Respondents

At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading
the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her
assumption that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture.
To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who
were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her
abduction and torture—i.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license
plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and
the infliction of physical abuse—which, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced
disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state forces.

Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysay—a
conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place where she
was actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard
while thereat.

We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire
reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was
detained at Fort Magsaysay.

First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with
those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry
sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar
as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of
the involvement of the government.

In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of
military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of
evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial
evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty
as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to
remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.

In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits, the
cartographic sketches of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind
of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner’s abductors. Unfortunately for the
petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such
sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or police
personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the
police chain of command.

Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately
established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained
and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to
take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its face—not only because
they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a
mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time
required to reach it is in itself doubtful. With nothing else but obscure observations to support it,
petitioner’s claim that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.

In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were
actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations.
Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp
Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it
virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact
committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in
evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore,
cannot be made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings

This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the
failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and
torture. We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason
used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her
belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public
respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.

In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of
the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is
a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been
fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not
determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding.

But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the
fact that a person’s right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general
rubric of property rights—which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo. Section 1 of the
Amparo Rule, which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of
property rights.

B.

The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an
inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.

Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in

petitioner’s ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an
inspection of the military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a
contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never
intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order. Contrary to
the explicit position espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing
expedition" for evidence.

An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a
petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. A basic
requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be
inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While
the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and
precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the
supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as
was shown above, petitioner failed to do.

Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a
prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp
cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in
themselves, unreliable and doubtful.

HABEAS DATA

As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to
the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the
petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture."
Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review
this particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error
infecting the grant.

For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege
of the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion of its decision:

Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on
the investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually
expunged from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Government’s Order of
Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against whom false criminal
charges were filed based on made up and perjured information.

Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army general
Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and
Democracy party-list held a press conference where they revealed that they received an
information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was a
communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of
Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises.

Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner’s denial that she was the person in said video, there were
records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to
privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one way or
another, to petitioner’s abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties and
dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged
membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made
available to the public, Petitioner’s security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being
violated or transgressed by persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against members of
this group. The unregulated dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioner’s
alleged ties with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available for public consumption without
evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioner’s right to privacy which must
be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).

The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy,
most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a
person’s right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended
is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to
do.

The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence
on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to
privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that
would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of
investigations and other reports about the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately
proven—considering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence,
clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by
Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even
shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph.

In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public
respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever
form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the
CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to
refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.

Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible
for the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports
being kept in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.

For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege
of the writ of habeas data.

CHANGE OF NAME AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

Eleosida vs Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, G.R. 130277, May 9, 2002

 Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation
or correction of an entry in the civil register are—(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing
of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to—(1) issue an order fixing the time and
place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition:--(1) the civil
registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as 'summary'. xxx"12

 It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely
clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the
marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son,
Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in
accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate
procedural requirements are complied with. The records show that upon receipt of the
petition, the trial court issued a notice of hearing setting the hearing on June 26, 1997 at
8:30 in the morning at Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City. The trial court likewise
ordered the publication of said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation and its posting in selected places in Metro Manila. The
notice stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition during said hearing and all other
persons having or claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show if there is any
reason why the petition should not be granted. Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon, the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Solicitor General were all furnished with a
copy of the notice of hearing together with a copy of the petition. On June 26, 1997, the
trial court issued a second order giving the petitioner an opportunity to show compliance
with the jurisdictional requirements and to present evidence during the hearing set on
July 23, 1997. The foregoing satisfy all the requirements of Rule 108 to make it an
adversary proceeding. It was therefore an error for the trial court to dismiss the petition
motu proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her petition
and all the other persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the same.

Republic vs Kho, G.R. No. 170340, June 29, 2007

 Substantial and controversial amendments in entries in the Civil Registry can only be
granted in an adversary proceeding.
  The enactment in March 2001 of R.A. No. 9048 has been considered to lend legislature
affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of
persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition
under Rule 108 – the obvious effect of R.A. No. 9048 is to make possible the
administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or
nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to rule 108 the correction of substantial
changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.

 Publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cures the failure to
implead an indispensable party.

Kilosbayan Foundation vs Ermita, G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007

 No substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a

judicial order, and, under the law, a change in the citizenship is a substantial change.
 Under R.A. 9048, a summary administrative proceeding to correct clerical or
typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality – the
same must be done through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Republic vs Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007

 The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the
proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and
complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and
the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s
petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is
entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has
always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he
was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his
mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not
stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
 A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Respondent gave notice of
the petition through publication as required by the rules. With this, all interested parties
were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In
addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it.
Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all
interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the
opportunity to contest the petition.

In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction/Cancellation of Entry in the Civil
Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang vs Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966,
March 30, 2005

 In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle
name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration
into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the
continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not
constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his
petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be
left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of
tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name
and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
Ceruila vs Delantar, G.R. No. 140305, December 9, 2005

 Not only the civil registrar but also all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected by a proceeding concerning cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register must be made parties thereto.
 In spite of the publication of the order of the court setting the case for annulment or
cancellation of a birth certificate, summons must still be served in the person whose birth
certificate is in issue, not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to
comply with the requirements of fair play and due process.

Republic vs Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

 In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the
ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state
and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court's grant of
respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to
a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a
change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to
male.

Silverio vs Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

 Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal
capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground
of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for
his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the
public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he
will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show,
or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official
name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s
first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have
been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It
was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice
him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
  To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what
grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be
observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned
sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.

EVIDENCE

People vs Fetalino, G.R. No. 174472, June 19, 2007

 The insertion of one’s finger into the genital or anal orifice of another person constitutes
rape by sexual assault and not merely an act of lasciviousness.
 The evidence which should be considered by the court in criminal cases need not be
limited to the statements made in open court, rather it should include all documents,
affidavits or sworn statements of the witnesses and other supporting evidence.

 The rule is settled that against the positive identification by the private complainant, the
mere denials of an accused cannot prevail to overcome conviction by the trial court.

Ong Chia vs Republic, G.R. No. 127240, March 27, 2000

 The rule on formal offer of evidence is clearly not applicable to a petition for
naturalization; Decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res
judicata.

People vs Valdez

Zulueta vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, Februrary 20, 1996

 The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
 The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged.

People vs Yatar, 428 SCRA, May 19, 2004

 Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and
never on mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes
"something more than a minimum of probative value," suggesting that such
evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus value." This may be necessary to preclude
the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being
exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus value" may
be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial
court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that
would result from its admission.
 The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence
from which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in
order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces
and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt. This
requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no
one else, committed the offense charged. In view of the totality of evidence
appreciated thus far, we rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty.

However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt
as to the identity of the culprit.

 Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the
instant case. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is
established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused
before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may
express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.

People vs Sartagoda, G.R. No. 97525, April 7, 1993

 Negative findings in fingerprint examination do not necessarily lead to a conclusion

that accused were not at the scene of the crime.
 Positive identification of accused by rape victim; Police line-up not required.

 Non-flight does not prove innocence.

 Several accused in multiple rape cannot be required to recognize offspring.

Republic vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119288, August 18, 1997

 A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts
established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of
another case between the same parties, of the files related cases in the same court, and of
public records on file in the same court.
 Judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgments of a case in another
court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties as well as of the
record of another case between different parties in the same court.

 Matters of judicial notice must gave three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
Judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records of general notoriety.

People vs Kulais, G.R. No. 100901-08, July 16, 1998

 The court’s erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness’ testimony in another case,
also pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is
proven beyond reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence,
both testimonial and documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench
and the bar that reclusion perpetua is not synonymous with life imprisonment.

Laureano vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114776, February 2, 2000

  The party who claims the applicability of a foreign law has the burden of proof, and
where said party has failed to discharge the burden, Philippine law applies.
 In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the 10-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144
of the Civil Code may not be invoked, for the Civil Code is a law of general application,
while the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code is a special law
applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.

Landbank of the Philippines vs Banal, G.R. No. 143276, July 20, 2004

 Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court or before the same judge.
 It is error for the trial judge to apply the formula prescribed in EO 228 and RA 3844, in
determining the valuation of the land planted to coconut and rice in granting compounded
interest pursuant to DAR AO 13 series of 1994 – it should have applied DAR AO 6, as
amended by DAR AO 11.

 While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial discretion,
such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of law.

Republic Glass Corporation vs Qua, G.R. No. 144413, July 30, 2004

 Estoppel in pais
 A party may make judicial admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made though palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. A party may make judicial admissions in: (a) the pleadings filed by
the parties, (b) during the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations,
or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. The elements of judicial admissions are
absent in this case. Qua made conflicting statements in Collection Case No. 8364 and in
Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643, and not in the “same case” as required in Section 4 of
Rule 129. To constitute judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case
in which it is offered. If made in another case or in another court, the fact of such
admission must be proved as in the case of any other fact, although if made in a judicial
proceeding it is entitled to greater weight.

Habagat Grill vs DMC-Urban Property Developer Inc., G.R. No. 155110, March 31, 2005

 Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.
 Among the facts and circumstances to be considered by the court in determining which of
the presented evidence has superior weight is the witnesses’ means and opportunity to
know the facts to which they testify. The extent of such means and opportunity are
determined by the following considerations:

1. Actor Rule: This rule maintains that a person’s recollection of his own acts and of the
attendant circumstances is more definite and trustworthy than another person’s
recollection of it, especially if it was an act done in the performance of a duty, or if
the other person’s testimony is little more than an expression of opinion or judgment.
 2. The witness who had greater interest in noticing and remembering the facts is to be
believed in preference to the one that had a slighter interest to observe or wholly
indifferent.

3. The witness who gives reasons for the accuracy of his observations is preferred to
him who merely states the fact to be so, without adverting to any circumstances
showing that his attention was particularly called to it.

4. The witness in a state of excitement, fear, or terror is generally incapable of observing

accurately.

5. Intoxication tends to impair accuracy both of observation and memory of a witness.

 Relationship will not by itself determine the true worth of one’s testimony – the essential
test is whether such testimony is disencumbered, credible, and in accord with human
experience.

 Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act
on without proof because they already know them. Municipal courts may take judicial
notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality in which they sit but such
notice is limited to what the law is and what it states.

 A court may take discretionary judicial notice where the boundaries of the lot covered by
the law are not a matter of public knowledge capable of unquestionable demonstration.
The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the exact metes and bounds of the
property.

Clarion Printing House Inc. vs NLRC, G.R. No. 148372, June 27, 2005

 That judicial notice can be taken of the above-said case of Nikon Industrial Corp vs PNB,
there should be no doubt. A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in
the same case, of fact established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the
authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of
related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same court.

Republic vs Rullepa, G.R. No. 131516, March 5, 2003

 Accused’s suggestion that the 3-year old complainant merely imagined the things which
he is accused perhaps getting the idea from television programs is preposterous.
 While several cases suggest that courts may take judicial notice of the appearance of the
victim in determining her age, a handful of cases holds that courts, without the requisite
hearing prescribed by Section 3 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, cannot take judicial
notice of the victim’s age.

 A person’s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being
addressed to the senses of the court.

People vs Ulzoron, G.R. No. 121979, March 2, 1998

 It is not necessary for the commission of rape that there be marks of physical violence on
the victim’s body.
 Intimidation may be of the moral kind, e.g. the fear caused by threatening a woman with
a knife.

 The circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision did not hear the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses does not taint or disturb his decisions.
  The conduct of the complaining witness immediately following the assault clearly
established the truth of her charge that she was raped by accused appellant.

Macarrubo vs Macarrubo

De Vera vs Aguilar, G.R. No. 83377, February 9, 1988

 Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or
destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must
establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows:
Existence; execution; loss; contents although this order may be changed if necessary in
the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the
admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under
all the circumstances of the particular case. 2
 A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled on the existence and
due execution of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. It failed to look into the
facts and circumstances surrounding the loss or destruction of the original copies of the
alleged deed of sale.

 In the case at bar, the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel of land was proved by the
presentation of a xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale.

 In establishing the execution of a document the same may be established by the person or
persons who executed it, by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or
by any person who was present and saw it executed or who, after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had
previously confessed the execution thereof.

 We agree with the trial court's findings that petitioners have sufficiently established the
due execution of the alleged deed of sale through the testimony of the notary public to
wit:

Preponderance of evidence clearly disclosed the facts that Atty. Ismael Estela prepared Exhibit A. Atty.
Emiliano Ibasco, Jr. positively identified the signatures appearing therein to be that (sic) of the spouses and
witnesses Luis de Vera and Ismael Estela, in his capacity as Notary Public who ratified the document. 4

 After the due execution of the document has been established, it must next be proved that
said document has been lost or destroyed. The destruction of the instrument may be
proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew
the fact of its loss, or by any one who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are
usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable
to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court
that the instrument is indeed lost.
 However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies. For,
since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no
excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be regarded as established until it
appears that all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by a third
person or the like).

Citibank NA Mastercard vs Teodoro, G.R. No. 150905, September 23, 2003

 The burden of proof rests upon petitioner, as plaintiff, to establish its case based on
preponderance of evidence. It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner failed to prove that respondent had an
 obligation in the principal amount of P24,388.36, because the photocopies of the original
sales invoices it had presented in court were inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, had
they been admissible, they would still have had little probative value.
 The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged
obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are
inadmissible because petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the exceptions
provided under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well as the conditions of
their admissibility. Because of the inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of the
originals, respondent’s obligation was not established.

Sison vs People, G.R. No. 108280-83, November 16, 1995

 The mistake of a witness in identifying another person as one of the accused does not
make him an entirely untrustworthy witness – an honest mistake is not inconsistent with a
truthful testimony.
 The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be
identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances
under which they were produced.

 The photographer is not the only witness who can testify to their exactness and accuracy.

 Even if the person who took the photographs was not presented to identify them, the use
of said photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the
crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof.

 Even if the pictures did not record two of the accused hitting the victim, they were
equivocally identified by witnesses – their denials and alibis cannot overcome their
eyeball identification.

Garvida vs Sales, G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997

 Jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC
sitting in Division, not en banc.
 Pleadings must be filed directly with the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or,
by registered mail, not by facsimile transmission.

 Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanction by the COMELEC Rules of

Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic
pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of the original. Without the
original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is
genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in
fact, be a sham pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading
should have restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and issuing the
questioned order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received the
petition by registered mail.

Cuevas vs Munoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000

 For the provisional arrest of an accused to continue, the formal request for extradition is
not required to be filed in court – it only needs to be received by the requested state
within the period provided by PD 1069 and the RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement.
 There is no requirement for the authentication of a request for provisional arrest and it
accompanying documents.

 Authentication is required for the request for surrender or extradition but not for the
provisional arrest.
  The process of preparing for a formal request for extradition and its accompanying
documents, and transmitting them through diplomatic channels, is not only time-
consuming but also leakage-prone – thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting
state to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable, the practicality of the
use of which is conceded. In the advent of modern technology, the telegraph or cable
have been conveniently replaces by the facsimile machine, therefore, the transmission of
the request for an extraditee’s provisional arrest and the accompanying documents by fax
machine more than serves the purpose.

 A judge issuing a warrant for the provisional arrest of an extradite may rely on the request
for provisional arrest accompanied by facsimile copies of the outstanding warrant of
arrest issued by the requesting government, a summary of the facts of the case against the
extradite, particulars of his birth and address, an intention to request his provisional arrest
and the reason therefor.

Heirs of Sabanpan vs Comorposa, G.R. No. 152807, August 12, 2003

 Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies.
As such, they not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether thet
are genuine or authentic.
 The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value. Just
because a piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively
proves the fact in dispute.

Ortanez vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107372, January 23, 1997

 Under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of
an agreement were reduced in writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon
and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof.
 The parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid instrument.

 Parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract but cannot incorporate
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing
unless there has been fraud of mistake.

 Private respondents did not expressly plead that the deed of sale were incomplete or that
it did not reflect the intention of the buyer and the seller.

Lapulapu Foundation Inc. vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126006, January 29, 2004

 No other evidence to be received other than the contents of the written agreement.
 Parol evidence cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing.

 If a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers to act within the scope of an
apparent authority, it holds him out to the public as possessing the power to do those acts.

Borillo vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 55691, May 21, 1992

  In order to admit parol evidence to aid in the description of the subject matter of a deed or
other writing, there must be a description that will serve as a foundation for such
evidence. Parol evidence is not permitted to supply a description but only to apply it.

Cruz vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79962, December 10, 1990

 Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of
an agreement. Exhibit D does not contain such an agreement, hence the rule will not
apply, and parol evidence may be introduced to explain the real agreement between the
parties.
 A deed is not conclusive evidence of everything it may contain.

 Failure to object to the introduction of evidence varying the terms of a written agreement
is deemed a waiver of the benefit of the parol evidence rule.

People vs Golimlim, G.R. No. 145225, April 2, 2004

 That a person is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her
testimony bereft of truth.
 It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes,
is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a
fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.

 To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to

disqualify a witness – the remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only
person available who knows the facts, seem inept and primitive.

People vs Castaneda Jr., G.R. No. L-46306, February 27, 1979

 Wife may testify against husband for crime of falsification of a deed of sale of conjugal
house and lot where wife was made to appear as having given her consent to the sale.

Bordalba vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112443, January 25, 2002

 The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter
of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the
deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.
 Admissions againt interest: where one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration or omission of the latter; while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former.

Razon vs Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74306, March 16, 1992

 Dead Man’s Statute

 The preponderance of evidence supports the appellate court’s factual findings that the
shares of stock were given to Juan T. Chuidian for value. Juan T. Chuidian was the legal
counsel who handled the legal affairs of the corporation. We give credence to the
testimony of private respondent that the shares of stock were given to Juan T. Chuidian in
payment of his legal services to the corporation. Petitioner failed to overcome this
testimony.

Sunga-Chan vs Chua, G.R. No. 143340, August 15, 2001

  The Dead Man’s Statute provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not
entitled to undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of
the transaction.
 When it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the
counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death
of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.

People vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 115439-41, July 16, 1997

 The fact a lawyer was called to witness the preparation of falsified documents by his
client and a third person was as eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal
statements being made to the lawyer by his client as to the fact and purpose of such
falsification – the evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to “any
communication” without distinction or qualification.
 For the application of the attorney-client privilege, the period to be considered is the date
when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to
either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed
in the future.

 The unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between
attorney and client having to do with the client’s contemplated criminal acts, or aid in
furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in
reference to communications between attorney and client.

Lim vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91114, September 25, 1992

 Physician-patient privilege requisites: (1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case, (2) the
person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics, (3) such person acquired the information, while he was attending to
the patient in his professional capacity, (4) the information was necessary to enable him
to act in that capacity, and (5) the information was confidential, and if disclosed, would
blacken the reputation of the patient.
 Privilege not violated by permitting physician to give expert opinion in testimony.

Almonte vs Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

 At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to

state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters.
 In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by
the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB.

 Neither is there any law or regulation which considers personnel records of the EIIB as
classified information.

 The statutes and regulations invoked by petitioners do not exempt the EIIB from the duty
to account for the funds to the proper authorities.

Ching vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110844, April 27, 2000

 Naked statements must be entitled to little weight when the parties hold better evidence
behind the scenes.
 Of equal importance is the fact that in his complaint in Civil Case No. 92-60600, dated
March 1992, petitioner alleged that the trust receipts were executed and intended as
 collateral or security. Pursuant to the rules, such particular allegation in the complaint is
tantamount to a judicial admission on the part of petitioner Ching to which he must be
bound.

People vs Gaudia, G.R. No. 146111, February 23, 2004

 Res Inter Alios Acta Prinicple: A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his
personal knowledge or perception.
 Following the res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions of the accused’s
parents in offering to compromise cannot prejudice the accused, since he was not a party
to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise
made by them to the mother of the victim.

Doldol vs People, G.R. No. 164481, September 20, 2005

 Except for his bare testimony, petitioner offered no competent and credible evidence to
prove that the missing funds were actually cash advances of employees in the
municipality.
 Partial restitution of the cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation of
missing funds.

People vs Cui

 Since the extrajudicial admissions were made after the supposed conspiracy, they are
binding only upon the confessant and are not admissible against his co-accused.

People vs Garcia, G.R. No. 138470, April 1, 2003

 The constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous

statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the suspect orally admitted having committed the crime.
 Admissions by silence: an act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing
or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as
naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him
to do so, may be given in evidence against him.

Ladiana vs People, G.R. No. 144293, December 4, 2002

 In confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in admission, there is merely a

statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal
intent to commit the offense with which one is charged.
 In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they
were made by mistake.

 The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police
from the accused without the assistance of competent and independent counsel during
custodial investigation. However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily presented by the accused
during the preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel, may
be used as evidence against him.

People vs Flores, G.R. No. 71980, March 18, 1991

  Confessions, both extrajudicial and judicial, cannot be taken lightly as they are
usually not self-serving declarations but admissions against interest.
 The extrajudicial admission of a co-conspirator is admissible against the declarant
alone, while the testimony given by a co-accused during trial is perfectly admissible
against his co-accused.

People vs Sabayoc, G.R. No. 147201, January 15, 2004

 Even if the confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did
not file charges against his alleged intimidation for maltreatment, the failure to properly
inform a suspect of his rights during custodial investigation renders the confession
valueless and inadmissible.
 The right should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver
he might make of these rights.

 If the advice given (by the counsel) is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is

impaired.

 The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the
right to present evidence for the accused.

People vs Ulit, G.R. No. 131799-801, February 23, 2004

 The barangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying
Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution – a suspect’s uncounselled
statement before the barangay chairman is admissible (not under arrest or custodial
investigation).