ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

and JOSE C. BATAUSA, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a private individual who is charged with
malversation of public funds as a principal after the said individual had been designated by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue as a custodian of distrained property? Did such accused become a
public officer and therefore subject to the graft courts jurisdiction as a consequence of such
designation by the BIR?
These are the main questions in the instant petition for review of respondent Sandiganbayans
Decision[1] in Criminal Case No. 14260 promulgated on March 8, 1994, convicting petitioner of
malversation of public funds and property, and Resolution[2] dated June 20, 1994, denying his
motion for new trial or reconsideration thereof.

The Facts

Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and
ore.[3] His services were contracted by the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines
(PICOP) at its concession in Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. Occasionally, he engaged the services
of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the formers premises.[4] From this
set of circumstances arose the present controversy.

x x x It appears that on May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by
the Main Office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) addressed to the Regional Director
(Jose Batausa) or his authorized representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City
commanding the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of
Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of
Garnishment was issued to accused Alfredo Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender,
transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla. The
Warrant of Garnishment was received by accused Azarcon on June 17, 1985.[5]

Petitioner Azarcon, in signing the Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under
Authority of the National Internal Revenue, assumed the undertakings specified in the receipt the
contents of which are reproduced as follows:

(I), the undersigned, hereby acknowledge to have received from Amadeo V. San Diego, an
Internal Revenue Officer, Bureau of Internal Revenue of the Philippines, the following described
goods, articles, and things:

Kind of property --- Isuzu dump truck

Motor number --- E120-229598
Chassis No. --- SPZU50-1772440
Number of CXL --- 6
Color --- Blue
Owned By --- Mr. Jaime Ancla

the same having been this day seized and left in (my) possession pending investigation by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative. (I) further promise that
(I) will faithfully keep, preserve, and, to the best of (my) ability, protect said goods, articles, and
things seized from defacement, demarcation, leakage, loss, or destruction in any manner; that
(I) will neither alter nor remove, nor permit others to alter or remove or dispose of the same in
any manner without the express authority of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and that (I)
will produce and deliver all of said goods, articles, and things upon the order of any court of the
Philippines, or upon demand of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or any authorized officer
or agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.[6]
 Subsequently, Alfredo Azarcon wrote a letter dated November 21, 1985 to the BIRs Regional
Director for Revenue Region 10 B, Butuan City stating that

x x x while I have made representations to retain possession of the property and signed a
receipt of the same, it appears now that Mr. Jaime Ancla intends to cease his operations with
us. This is evidenced by the fact that sometime in August, 1985 he surreptitiously withdrew his
equipment from my custody. x x x In this connection, may I therefore formally inform you that it
is my desire to immediately relinquish whatever responsibilities I have over the above-
mentioned property by virtue of the receipt I have signed. This cancellation shall take effect
immediately. x x x .[7]

Incidentally, the petitioner reported the taking of the truck to the security manager of PICOP, Mr.
Delfin Panelo, and requested him to prevent this truck from being taken out of the PICOP
concession. By the time the order to bar the trucks exit was given, however, it was too late.[8]
Regional Director Batausa responded in a letter dated May 27, 1986, to wit:

An analysis of the documents executed by you reveals that while you are (sic) in possession of
the dump truck owned by JAIME ANCLA, you voluntarily assumed the liabilities of safekeeping
and preserving the unit in behalf of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This is clearly indicated in
the provisions of the Warrant of Garnishment which you have signed, obliged and committed to
surrender and transfer to this office. Your failure therefore, to observe said provisions does not
relieve you of your responsibility.[9]

Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan found that

On 11 June 1986, Mrs. Marilyn T. Calo, Revenue Document Processor of Revenue Region 10
B, Butuan City, sent a progress report to the Chief of the Collection Branch of the surreptitious
taking of the dump truck and that Ancla was renting out the truck to a certain contractor by the
name of Oscar Cueva at PICOP (Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, the same
company which engaged petitioners earth moving services), Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. She
also suggested that if the report were true, a warrant of garnishment be reissued against Mr.
Cueva for whatever amount of rental is due from Ancla until such time as the latters tax liabilities
shall be deemed satisfied. x x x However, instead of doing so, Director Batausa filed a letter-
complaint against the (herein Petitioner) and Ancla on 22 January 1988, or after more than one
year had elapsed from the time of Mrs. Calos report.[10]

Provincial Fiscal Pretextato Montenegro forwarded the records of the complaint x x x to the
Office of the Tanodbayan on May 18, 1988. He was deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor and
granted authority to conduct preliminary investigation on August 22, 1988, in a letter by Special
Prosecutor Raul Gonzales approved by Ombudsman (Tanodbayan) Conrado Vasquez.[11]
Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla, petitioner Azarcon was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 in
relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in the following Information[12]filed on
January 12, 1990, by Special Prosecution Officer Victor Pascual:

That on or about June 17, 1985, in the Municipality of Bislig, Province of Surigao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Alfredo L. Azarcon, a
private individual but who, in his capacity as depository/administrator of property seized or
deposited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, having voluntarily offered himself to act as
custodian of one Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with Motor No. E120-22958, Chasis No. SPZU 50-
1772440, and number CXL-6 and was authorized to be such under the authority of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, has become a responsible and accountable officer and said motor vehicle
having been seized from Jaime C. Ancla in satisfaction of his tax liability in the total sum of
EIGHTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS and 59/100 (P80,831.59)
became a public property and the value thereof as public fund, with grave abuse of confidence
and conspiring and confederating with said Jaime C. Ancla, likewise, a private individual, did
then and there wilfully, (sic) unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to
his personal use and benefit the aforementioned motor vehicle or the value thereof in the
aforestated amount, by then and there allowing accused Jaime C. Ancla to remove, retrieve,
withdraw and tow away the said Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with the authority, consent and
knowledge of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Butuan City, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the amount of P80,831.59 in a form of unsatisfied tax liability.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan on May 14, 1991,
alleging that: (1) the petitioner never appeared in the preliminary investigation; and (2) the
petitioner was not a public officer, hence a doubt exists as to why he was being charged with
malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.[13] The Sandiganbayan granted the
motion for reinvestigation on May 22, 1991.[14] After the reinvestigation, Special Prosecution
Officer Roger Berbano, Sr., recommended the withdrawal of the information[15] but was overruled
by the Ombudsman.[16]
A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on March 25, 1992 on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner since he was not a public
officer.[17] On May 18, 1992, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion.[18]
When the prosecution finished presenting its evidence, the petitioner then filed a motion for
leave to file demurrer to evidence which was denied on November 16, 1992, for being without
merit.[19] The petitioner then commenced and finished presenting his evidence on February 15,
1993.

The Respondent Courts Decision

On March 8, 1994, respondent Sandiganbayan[20] rendered a Decision,[21] the dispositive

portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alfredo Azarcon y Leva GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized under Article 217 in
relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, and in view of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Court hereby
sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its maximum period to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal.To indemnify the Bureau of Internal
Revenue the amount of P80,831.59; to pay a fine in the same amount without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer special perpetual disqualification; and, to pay the
costs.

Considering that accused Jaime Ancla has not yet been brought within the jurisdiction of this
Court up to this date, let this case be archived as against him without prejudice to its revival in
the event of his arrest or voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, through new counsel,[22] filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration on March
23, 1994, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution[23] dated December 2, 1994.
Hence, this petition.

The Issues

The petitioner submits the following reasons for the reversal of the Sandiganbayans assailed
Decision and Resolution:

I. The Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed solely by
private individuals.

II. In any event, even assuming arguendo that the appointment of a private individual
as a custodian or a depositary of distrained property is sufficient to convert such
 individual into a public officer, the petitioner cannot still be considered a public officer
because:

[A]

There is no provision in the National Internal Revenue Code which authorizes the Bureau of
Internal Revenue to constitute private individuals as depositaries of distrained properties.

[B]

His appointment as a depositary was not by virtue of a direct provision of law, or by election or
by appointment by a competent authority.

III. No proof was presented during trial to prove that the distrained vehicle was actually owned
by the accused Jaime Ancla; consequently, the governments right to the subject property has
not been established.

IV. The procedure provided for in the National Internal Revenue Code concerning the
disposition of distrained property was not followed by the B.I.R., hence the distraint of personal
property belonging to Jaime C. Ancla and found allegedly to be in the possession of the
petitioner is therefore invalid.

V. The B.I.R. has only itself to blame for not promptly selling the distrained property of accused
Jaime C. Ancla in order to realize the amount of back taxes owed by Jaime C. Ancla to the
Bureau.[24]

In fine, the fundamental issue is whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the controversy. Corollary to this is the question of whether petitioner can be considered
a public officer by reason of his being designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a
depositary of distrained property.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

It is hornbook doctrine that in order (to) ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the
provisions of the law should be inquired into.[25] Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must
appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or
implied.[26] And for this purpose in criminal cases, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
law at the time of commencement of the action.[27]
In this case, the action was instituted with the filing of this information on January 12, 1990;
hence, the applicable statutory provisions are those of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No.
1861 on March 23, 1983, but prior to their amendment by R.A. No. 7975 on May 16, 1995. At that
time, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 provided that:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed
by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine
of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

xxxxxxxxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees.

x x x x x x x x x.
The foregoing provisions unequivocally specify the only instances when the Sandiganbayan
will have jurisdiction over a private individual, i.e. when the complaint charges the private
individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who
has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.

Azarcon: A Public Officer or A Private Individual?

The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of being a co-principal, accomplice or
accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.Thus,
unless petitioner be proven a public officer, the Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the
crime charged. Article 203 of the RPC determines who are public officers:

Who are public officers. -- For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the preceding
titles of the book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, popular
election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public
functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in
any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or
classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer.

Thus,

(to) be a public officer, one must be --

(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government, or

Performing in said Government or any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or
subordinate official, of any rank or class; and

(2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform public
duties must be --

a. by direct provision of the law, or

b. by popular election, or

c. by appointment by competent authority.[28]

Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively
distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he
obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. The next logical query is whether
petitioners designation by the BIR as a custodian of distrained property qualifies as appointment
by direct provision of law, or by competent authority.[29] We answer in the negative.
 The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in effecting constructive distraint over the truck
allegedly owned by Jaime Ancla, and in requiring the petitioner Alfredo Azarcon who was in
possession thereof to sign a pro forma receipt for it, effectively designated petitioner a depositary
and, hence, citing U.S. vs. Rastrollo,[30] a public officer.[31] This is based on the theory that

(t)he power to designate a private person who has actual possession of a distrained property as
a depository of distrained property is necessarily implied in the BIRs power to place the property
of a delinquent tax payer (sic) in distraint as provided for under Sections 206, 207 and 208
(formerly Sections 303, 304 and 305) of the National Internal Revenue Code, (NIRC) x x x. [32]

We disagree. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not applicable to the case before us simply
because the facts therein are not identical, similar or analogous to those obtaining here. While
the cited case involved a judicial deposit of the proceeds of the sale of attached property in the
hands of the debtor, the case at bench dealt with the BIRs administrative act of effecting
constructive distraint over alleged property of taxpayer Ancla in relation to his back taxes, property
which was received by petitioner Azarcon. In the cited case, it was clearly within the scope of that
courts jurisdiction and judicial power to constitute the judicial deposit and give the depositary a
character equivalent to that of a public official.[33] However, in the instant case, while the BIR had
authority to require petitioner Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did not
grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer.
It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework, which mandates a limited government, that its
branches and administrative agencies exercise only that power delegated to them as defined
either in the Constitution or in legislation or in both.[34] Thus, although the appointing power is the
exclusive prerogative of the President, x x x[35] the quantum of powers possessed by an
administrative agency forming part of the executive branch will still be limited to that conferred
expressly or by necessary or fair implication in its enabling act. Hence, (a)n administrative officer,
it has been held, has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof.[36] Corollarily, implied powers are those which are necessarily
included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to other
matters not embraced therein, nor are not incidental thereto.[37] For to so extend the statutory
grant of power would be an encroachment on powers expressly lodged in Congress by our
Constitution.[38] It is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution, authorizes
the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring any person to preserve a distrained property,
thus:
xxxxxxxxx

The constructive distraint of personal property shall be effected by requiring the taxpayer or
any person having possession or control of such property to sign a receipt covering the
property distrained and obligate himself to preserve the same intact and unaltered and not
to dispose of the same in any manner whatever without the express authority of the
Commissioner.

xxxxxxxxx
However, we find no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason
of such requirement. The BIRs power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot
be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. The prosecution argues that
Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code x x x defines the individuals covered by the term officers
under Article 217[39] x x x of the same Code.[40] And accordingly, since Azarcon became a
depository of the truck seized by the BIR he also became a public officer who can be prosecuted
under Article 217 x x x.[41]
The Court is not persuaded. Article 222 of the RPC reads:

Officers included in the preceding provisions. -- The provisions of this chapter shall apply to
private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or
municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or depository of funds or
property attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a
private individual.
 Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms,
and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.[42] This is particularly observed in the
interpretation of penal statutes which must be construed with such strictness as to carefully
safeguard the rights of the defendant x x x.[43] The language of the foregoing provision is clear. A
private individual who has in his charge any of the public funds or property enumerated therein
and commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the
RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere
in this provision is it expressed or implied that a private individual falling under said Article 222 is
to be deemed a public officer.
After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court thus finds petitioner Alfredo Azarcon
and his co-accused Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals erroneously charged before and
convicted by Respondent Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction over them. The
Sandiganbayans taking cognizance of this case is of no moment since (j)urisdiction cannot be
conferred by x x x erroneous belief of the court that it had jurisdiction.[44] As aptly and correctly
stated by the petitioner in his memorandum:

From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the petitioner did not cease to be a private
individual when he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished dump truck. Therefore, when
the information charged him and Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for malversation of
public funds or property, the prosecution was in fact charging two private individuals without
any public officer being similarly charged as a co-conspirator. Consequently, the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore all the proceedings taken
below as well as the Decision rendered by Respondent Sandiganbayan, are null and void for
lack of jurisdiction.[45]

WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution and Decision of the Sandiganbayan are

hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, G.R. No. 162059
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

SANDIGANBAYAN and Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. January 22, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholar** accused, along with her brother, of
swindling government funds?

MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang
kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolutions[1] of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the
information and her motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-
Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by
then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-
year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of
Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.[2] On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and
relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student
Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).[3]

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. [4] President
Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the
proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the
President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.[5] The succeeding student regent,
Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa
U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a
complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.[6]

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819
of the Sandiganbayan.[7] The Information reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special

Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D.
SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a),
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:

That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in

Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-
ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her official functions,
committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her
position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University of the
Philippines will be renovated and renamed as President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Student Hall, and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA
requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine
Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on
said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused
Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN
MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently encashed by
accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their
personal use and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the accused
for them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do
so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not
have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student
regent.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,
enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.[8]It has no
jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.[9] It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII,
Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is
not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even
assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the
coffers of the government.[10]
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a
student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast
to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She added that she was a
simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power
was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the
information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was
committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.[11]

The Ombudsman opposed the motion.[12] It disputed petitioners interpretation of the law. Section
4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch-all phrase in relation to
office, thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same
breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should
be threshed out during a full-blown trial.[13]

According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, was a public officer. As a
member of the BOR, she had the general powers of administration and exercised the corporate
powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public office, petitioners stance that she was
not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part
of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this
definition, petitioner was compensated.[14]

Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack
of merit.[15] It ratiocinated:

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this
case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of
this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249
provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses
committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office. From this
provision, there is no single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense
of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.
Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the
student body, she was never a public officer since she never received any
compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view
of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(A) x x x
 (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or

controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. (Italics supplied)

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original
exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in
subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial
consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities
and functions.

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?

A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines

reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively
exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the
university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law
such sums as may be provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To
prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for the government of the
university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are
consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on
recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors,
lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours
of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant
to them in its discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may
promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to
remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through
its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock
corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body
of the corporation.

It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of

the Philippines is performing functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of
a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of
such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public
officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction,
regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position classified as Salary
Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.

Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same of P15
Million was received from former President Estrada and not from the coffers of the
government, is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during the
trial on the merits of this case.[16]

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.[17] The motion was
denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.[18]

Issue

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that THE RESPONDENT COURT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACKAND/OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN
THE INFORMATION.[19]

In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she
paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the
funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.

Our Ruling

The petition cannot be granted.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to

quash is not correctible by certiorari.

We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural

grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied,
the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.[20]Remedial measures as
regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often
dismissed.[21] The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
action.[22]

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[23] the Court clearly explained and
illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:

As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely

interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is
rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a
case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the
issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying
a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no
appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying

the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is
that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal
and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or
offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss
or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal
cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions
to the general rule.

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to

dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the
petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed
the respondent court to dismiss the case.
 In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to
quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition
for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the
case.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to

dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition
and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to
dismiss the same.

In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss
based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and
directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.

In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to

dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.

In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition
for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was denied by
respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal case
except to dismiss the same.

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash
based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was
dismissed by this Court.[24]
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.[25]She repeats the
reference in the instant petition for certiorari[26] and in her memorandum of authorities.[27]

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It
bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the
Sandiganbayan.[28]

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of
the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No.
1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable
to the people.[29]

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on
December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[30]

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now
stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused
are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;

(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city

treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or

controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations.

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution; and
 (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a
of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with

Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to

Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final

judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or
that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions
shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the

implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter
promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall
apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases
elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme
Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall
represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or

accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.

Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all
times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the
criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action,
and no right to reserve the filing such civil action separately from the criminal action
shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore
been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination
with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed
abandoned.

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The
said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft
or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.[31] Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all
prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.[32]

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner,
deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We
quote:

Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any

person having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize
or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or
indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary
advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application,
request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to
intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or
affinity in the third civil degree. The word close personal relation shall include close
personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional
employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public
officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any
public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and
provides for their penalties.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the offense of estafa.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those
crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner
isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding
paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible
construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.[33] Interpretatio talis in ambiguis
semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong
kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each
other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. [34] The intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be
taken into view.[35] In other words, petitioners interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that
a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute
is the statute itself.[36] Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay
marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang
pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a
of this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in
relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafaas one of the
offenses included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other
felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

In Perlas, Jr. v. People,[37] the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development
Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an

Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon
Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later
designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February
7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro
F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No.
3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation
No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has
remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a

regular government agency under the Office of the President and allotments for its
maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A,
Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness
in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.[38] Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in Bondoc read:

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to the

Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not have
jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the
Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the government
employees separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of
the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00,
committed by government employees in conspiracy with private persons, including
Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts,
 apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would
nonetheless not be possible.

Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary
or remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be
called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is
difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.[39] The 1987 Constitution does not define who
are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and
jurisprudence.

In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law,
by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public
([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office
under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at
all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest
or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42
Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,[41] the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law,
by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public. The individual so invested is a public officer.[42]

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a
regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade
that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction
over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,[43] We held that while
the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by
express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.[44]

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this
category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a
board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.[45] By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed,
a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office.[46] At
most, it is merely incidental to the public office.[47]

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an

individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.[48]

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the
Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced instruction
in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical
training.[49] Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is
not a corporation created for profit.[50]

The offense charged was committed

in relation to public office, according
to the Information.

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan
would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to her
office.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the
BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract
with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the state
university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. [51] More than
that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in
an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.[52] Otherwise, jurisdiction would become
dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.[53]

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being
then a student regent of U.P., while in the performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring
with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud the government x x x. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not
quash the information based on this ground.

Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds and not from
the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President
and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred
that petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine
Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false
pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No.
91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00).

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is
a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case. [54]

A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference
to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his
motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the
misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that a lawyer shall not misquote or
misrepresent.

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,[55] where Atty Dionisio
D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled
that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from that with which he was
authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant
suspension or disbarment.[56]

We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyers
conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness.[57]The administration of
justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty before the
courts.[58]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. Nos. 147026-27

CAROLINA R. JAVIER,
Petitioner, Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF
Promulgated:
THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. September 11, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Carolina R. Javier in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898, entitled People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff versus Carolina R. Javier, Accused, seeking to nullify respondent Sandiganbayan's: (1)
Order[2] dated November 14, 2000 in Criminal Case No. 25867, which denied her Motion to Quash
Information; (2) Resolution[3] dated January 17,
2001 in Criminal Case No. 25898, which denied her Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to
Quash Information; and (3) Order[4] dated February 12, 2001, declaring that a motion for
reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 25898 would be superfluous as the issues are fairly simple
and straightforward.

The factual antecedents follow.

On June 7, 1995, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047,[5] or otherwise known as the Book Publishing
Industry Development Act, was enacted into law. Foremost in its policy is the State's goal in
promoting the continuing development of the book publishing industry, through the active
participation of the private sector, to ensure an adequate supply of affordable, quality-produced
books for the domestic and export market.

To achieve this purpose, the law provided for the creation of the National Book Development
Board (NBDB or the Governing Board, for brevity), which shall be under the administration and
supervision of the Office of the President. The Governing Board shall be composed of eleven (11)
members who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, five (5) of whom shall come
from the government, while the remaining six (6) shall be chosen from the nominees of
organizations of private book publishers, printers, writers, book industry related activities, students
and the private education sector.

On February 26, 1996, petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board as a private sector
representative for a term of one (1) year.[6] During that time, she was also the President of the
Book Suppliers Association of the Philippines (BSAP). She was on a hold-over capacity in the
following year. On September 14, 1998, she was again appointed to the same position and for
the same period of one (1) year.[7] Part of her functions as a member of the Governing Board is
to attend book fairs to establish linkages with international book publishing bodies. On September
29, 1997, she was issued by the Office of the President a travel authority to attend the Madrid
International Book Fair in Spain on October 8-12, 1997.[8] Based on her itinerary of travel,[9] she
was paid P139,199.00[10] as her travelling expenses.
Unfortunately, petitioner was not able to attend the scheduled international book fair.

On February 16, 1998, Resident Auditor Rosario T. Martin advised petitioner to immediately
return/refund her cash advance considering that her trip was canceled.[11]Petitioner, however,
failed to do so. On July 6, 1998, she was issued a Summary of Disallowances[12] from which the
balance for settlement amounted to P220,349.00. Despite said notice, no action was forthcoming
from the petitioner.

On September 23, 1999, Dr. Nellie R. Apolonio, then the Executive Director of the NBDB, filed
with the Ombudsman a complaint against petitioner for malversation of public funds and
properties. She averred that despite the cancellation of the foreign trip, petitioner failed to liquidate
or return to the NBDB her cash advance within sixty (60) days from date of arrival, or in this case
from the date of cancellation of the trip, in accordance with government accounting and auditing
rules and regulations. Dr. Apolonio further charged petitioner with violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6713[13] for failure to file her Statement of Assets and Liabilities.

The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019,[14] as amended, and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. [15] It,
however, dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, the charge for violation of R.A. No. 6713.

In an Information dated February 18, 2000, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

That on or about October 8, 1997, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in

the City of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the aforenamed accused, a public officer, being then a member of the governing
Board of the National Book Development Board (NBDB), while in the performance
of her official and administrative functions, and acting with evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, without any justifiable cause, and despite due demand by the Resident
Auditor and the Executive Director of NBDB, fail and refuse to return and/or
liquidate her cash advances intended for official travel abroad which did not
materialize, in the total amount of P139,199.00 as of September 23, 1999, as
required under EO No. 248 and Sec. 5 of COA Circular No. 97-002 thereby causing
damage and undue injury to the Government.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.[16]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25867 and raffled to the First Division.

Meanwhile, the Commission on Audit charged petitioner with Malversation of Public Funds, as
defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for not liquidating the cash
advance granted to her in connection with her supposed trip to Spain. During the conduct of the
preliminary investigation, petitioner was required to submit her counter-affidavit but she failed to
do so. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for the crime charged and
recommended the filing of the corresponding information against her. [17]
Thus, an Information dated February 29, 2000 was filed before the Sandiganbayan, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 25898, and raffled to the Third Division, the accusatory portion of
which reads:

That on or about and during the period from October 8, 1997 to February 16, 1999,
or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a high ranking
officer, being a member of the Governing Board of the National Book Development
Board and as such, is accountable for the public funds she received as cash
advance in connection with her trip to Spain from October 8-12, 1997, per LBP
Check No. 10188 in the amount of P139,199.00, which trip did not materialize, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, malverse, misappropriate,
embezzle and convert to her own personal use and benefit the aforementioned
amount of P139,199.00, Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[18]

During her arraignment in Criminal Case No. 25867, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,
petitioner delivered to the First Division the money subject of the criminal cases, which amount
was deposited in a special trust account during the pendency of the criminal cases.

Meanwhile, the Third Division set a clarificatory hearing in Criminal Case No. 25898 on May 16,
2000 in order to determine jurisdictional issues. On June 3, 2000, petitioner filed with the same
Division a Motion for Consolidation[19] of Criminal Case No. 25898 with Criminal Case No. 25867,
pending before the First Division. On July 6, 2000, the People filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Admit Amended Information[20] in Criminal Case No. 25898, which was granted. Accordingly, the
Amended Information dated June 28, 2000 reads as follows:

That on or about and during the period from October 8, 1997 to February 16, 1999,
or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a high ranking
officer, being a member of the Governing Board of the National Book Development
Board equated to Board Member II with a salary grade 28 and as such, is
accountable for the public funds she received as case advance in connection with
her trip to Spain from October 8-12, 1997, per LBP Check No. 10188 in the amount
of P139,199.00, which trip did not materialize, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, malverse, misappropriate, embezzle and convert
to her own personal use and benefit the aforementioned amount of P139,199.00,
 Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[21]

In its Resolution dated October 5, 2000, the Third Division ordered the consolidation of Criminal
Case No. 25898 with Criminal Case No. 25867. [22]

On October 10, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Information,[23] averring that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to hear Criminal Case No. 25867 as the information did not
allege that she is a public official who is classified as Grade 27 or higher. Neither did the
information charge her as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing
an offense under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a public officer
or employee and that she belongs to the Governing Board only as a private sector representative
under R.A. No. 8047, hence, she may not be charged under R.A. No. 3019 before the
Sandiganbayan or under any statute which covers public officials. Moreover, she claimed that she
does not perform public functions and is without any administrative or political power to speak of
that she is serving the private book publishing industry by advancing their interest as participant
in the government's book development policy.
In an Order[24] dated November 14, 2000, the First Division[25] denied the motion to quash
with the following disquisition:

The fact that the accused does not receive any compensation in terms of salaries
and allowances, if that indeed be the case, is not the sole qualification for being in
the government service or a public official. The National Book Development Board
is a statutory government agency and the persons who participated therein even
if they are from the private sector, are public officers to the extent that they are
performing their duty therein as such.

Insofar as the accusation is concerned herein, it would appear that monies were
advanced to the accused in her capacity as Director of the National Book
Development Board for purposes of official travel. While indeed under ordinary
circumstances a member of the board remains a private individual, still when that
individual is performing her functions as a member of the board or when that
person receives benefits or when the person is supposed to travel abroad and is
given government money to effect that travel, to that extent the private sector
representative is a public official performing public functions; if only for that reason,
and not even considering situation of her being in possession of public funds even
as a private individual for which she would also covered by provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, she is properly charged before this Court.

On November 15, 2000, the First Division accepted the consolidation of the criminal cases
against petitioner and scheduled her arraignment on November 17, 2000, for Criminal Case No.
25898. On said date, petitioner manifested that she is not prepared to accept the propriety of the
accusation since it refers to the same subject matter as that covered in Criminal Case No. 25867
for which the Sandiganbayan gave her time to file a motion to quash. On November 22, 2000,
petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information[26] in Criminal Case No. 25898, by invoking her
right against double jeopardy. However, her motion was denied in open court. She then filed a
motion for reconsideration.
 On January 17, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution[27] denying petitioners
motion with the following disquisition:

The accused is under the jurisdiction of this Court because Sec. 4 (g) of
P.D. 1606 as amended so provides, thus:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive

original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-

owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;

xxxx

The offense is office-related because the money for her travel abroad was
given to her because of her Directorship in the National Book Development Board.

Furthermore, there are also allegations to hold the accused liable under
Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:

Art. 222. Officers included in the preceding provisions. The

provisions of this chapter shall apply to private individuals who, in
any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or
municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or
depository of funds or property attached , seized or deposited by
public authority, even if such property belongs to a private
individual.

Likewise, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 25898
on the ground of litis pendencia is denied since in this instance, these two
Informations speak of offenses under different statutes, i.e., R.A. No. 3019 and the
Revised Penal Code, neither of which precludes prosecution of the other.
Petitioner hinges the present petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two informations charging
her with violation of the Anti-Graft Law and the Revised Penal Code on malversation of public
funds. She advanced the following arguments in support of her petition, to wit: first, she is not a
public officer, and second, she was being charged under two (2) informations, which is in violation
of her right against double jeopardy.

A motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects
which are apparent in the face of the Information.[28]

Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy
is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the
special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory
orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. The evident reason
for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.[29]
The above general rule, however admits of several exceptions, one of which is when the court, in
denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair
to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the
denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a
whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal
cannot be plain and adequate.[30]

To substantiate her claim, petitioner maintained that she is not a public officer and only a private
sector representative, stressing that her only function among the eleven (11) basic purposes and
objectives provided for in Section 4, R.A. No. 8047, is to obtain priority status for the book
publishing industry. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD Board, she was the President
of the BSAP, a book publishers association. As such, she could not be held liable for the crimes
imputed against her, and in turn, she is outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support the Philippine book
publishing industry. It is a statutory government agency created by R.A. No. 8047, which was
enacted into law to ensure the full development of the book publishing industry as well as for the
creation of organization structures to implement the said policy. To achieve this end, the
Governing Board of the NBDB was created to supervise the implementation. The Governing
Board was vested with powers and functions, to wit:
a) assume responsibility for carrying out and implementing the policies, purposes
and objectives provided for in this Act;
b) formulate plans and programs as well as operational policies and guidelines for
undertaking activities relative to promoting book development, production and
distribution as well as an incentive scheme for individual authors and writers;
c) formulate policies, guidelines and mechanisms to ensure that editors, compilers
and especially authors are paid justly and promptly royalties due them for
reproduction of their works in any form and number and for whatever purpose;
d) conduct or contract research on the book publishing industry including
monitoring, compiling and providing data and information of book production;
e) provide a forum for interaction among private publishers, and, for the purpose,
establish and maintain liaison will all the segments of the book publishing industry;
f) ask the appropriate government authority to ensure effective implementation of
the National Book Development Plan;
g) promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation of this Act in
consultation with other agencies concerned, except for Section 9 hereof on
incentives for book development, which shall be the concern of appropriate
agencies involved;
h) approve, with the concurrence of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM), the annual and supplemental budgets submitted to it by the Executive
director;
i) own, lease, mortgage, encumber or otherwise real and personal property for the
attainment of its purposes and objectives;
j) enter into any obligation or contract essential to the proper administration of its
affairs, the conduct of its operations or the accomplishment of its purposes and
objectives;
 k) receive donations, grants, legacies, devices and similar acquisitions which shall
form a trust fund of the Board to accomplish its development plans on book
publishing;
l) import books or raw materials used in book publishing which are exempt from all
taxes, customs duties and other charges in behalf of persons and enterprises
engaged in book publishing and its related activities duly registered with the board;
m) promulgate rules and regulations governing the matter in which the general
affairs of the Board are to be exercised and amend, repeal, and modify such rules
and regulations whenever necessary;
n) recommend to the President of the Philippines nominees for the positions of the
Executive Officer and Deputy Executive Officer of the Board;
o) adopt rules and procedures and fix the time and place for holding meetings:
Provided, That at least one (1) regular meeting shall be held monthly;
p) conduct studies, seminars, workshops, lectures, conferences, exhibits, and
other related activities on book development such as indigenous authorship,
intellectual property rights, use of alternative materials for printing, distribution and
others; and
q) exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be required
by the law.[31]

A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to conclude that they partake of the nature
of public functions. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law,
by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested
is a public officer.[32]

Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the
law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the
purpose of the government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance the book
publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the fact that
she was appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies of the
government does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office. She was appointed
to the Governing Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which the law was enacted are
achieved. The Governing Board acts collectively and carries out its mandate as one body. The
purpose of the law for appointing members from the private sector is to ensure that they are also
properly represented in the implementation of government objectives to cultivate the book
publishing industry.

Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-Graft
Law, which provides that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government.[33]

Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or appointed
to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of the
NDBD. Though her term is only for a year that does not make her private person exercising a
public function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no moment. Section
7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall receive per diem and such
allowances as may be authorized for every meeting actually attended and subject to pertinent
laws, rules and regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of one's appointment, and
whether the compensation one receives from the government is only nominal, is immaterial
because the person so elected or appointed is still considered a public officer.
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by direct
provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority,
shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands,
or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent,
or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer. [34]
Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of the objectives of R.A.
No. 8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the performance of public functions in
the government whether as an employee, agent, subordinate official, of any rank or classes. In
fact, during her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and promulgation of several rules and
regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to represent the country in the
canceled book fair in Spain.

In fine, We hold that petitioner is a public officer. The next question for the Court to resolve is
whether, as a public officer, petitioner is within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Presently,[35] the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other

known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional

director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
xxxx

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade Grade '27' and
up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade Grade '27' and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

xxxx

Notably, the Director of Organization, Position Classification and Compensation Bureau, of the
Department of Budget and management provided the following information regarding the
compensation and position classification and/or rank equivalence of the member of the Governing
Board of the NBDB, thus:

Per FY 1999 Personal Services Itemization, the Governing Board of NDBD is

composed of one (1) Chairman (ex-officio), one (1) Vice-Chairman (ex-officio), and
nine (9) Members, four (4) of whom are ex-officio and the remaining five (5)
members represent the private sector. The said five members of the Board do not
receive any salary and as such their position are not classified and are not assigned
any salary grade.

For purposes however of determining the rank equivalence of said positions,

notwithstanding that they do not have any salary grade assignment, the same may
be equated to Board Member II, SG-28.[36]
Thus, based on the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 25898, petitioner belongs to the
employees classified as SG-28, included in the phrase all other national and local officials
classified as Grade 27' and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.

Anent the issue of double jeopardy, We can not likewise give in to the contentions advanced by
petitioner. She argued that her right against double jeopardy was violated when the
Sandiganbayan denied her motion to quash the two informations filed against her.

We believe otherwise. Records show that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and
25898 refer to offenses penalized by different statues, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC, respectively. It is
elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused must have been
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon valid information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to
the charge.[37] In the instant case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the Information for violation of
the Anti-Graft Law. She was not yet arraigned in the criminal case for malversation of public funds
because she had filed a motion to quash the latter information. Double jeopardy could not,
therefore, attach considering that the two cases remain pending before the Sandiganbayan and
that herein petitioner had pleaded to only one in the criminal cases against her.

It is well settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or
acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.[38] The
third and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.

In view of the foregoing, We hold that the present petition does not fall under the exceptions
wherein the remedy of certiorari may be resorted to after the denial of one's motion to quash the
information. And even assuming that petitioner may avail of such remedy, We still hold that
the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions and Order of the
Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.