VILLANUEVA vs.

PEOPLE
G.R. No. 199042 November
17, 2014 Warrantless Arrests
JUNE 4, 2018

A waiver of an illegal arrest is not a

waiver of an illegal search.

FACTS:

Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was

charged with violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165 or The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

A Complaint was filed by Brian

Resco against Danilo Villanueva for
allegedly shooting the former along
C-3 Road, Navotas City. After
recording the incident in the police
blotter, four police officers, together
with Resco, proceeded to the house
of Villanueva. They informed
Villanueva about the Complaint
lodged against him and invited him
to the police station where he was
subjected to a body search and, in
the process, a plastic sachet of
shabu was recovered from the left
pocket of his pants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless

arrest and search was legal.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays
down the basic rules on lawful
warrantless arrests either by a peace
officer or a private person, as
follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when

lawful. – A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the

person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) When an offense has just been

committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is

a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one
confinement to another.

The circumstances that transpired

between accused-appellant and the
arresting officer show none of the
above that would make the
warrantless arrest lawful.
Nevertheless, records reveal that
accused-appellant never objected to
the irregularity of his arrest before
his arraignment. He pleaded not
guilty upon arraignment. He actively
participated in the trial of the case.
Thus, he is considered as one who
had properly and voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the trial court and waived his
right to question the validity of his
arrest.

The warrantless search conducted is

not among those allowed by law.

A waiver of an illegal arrest,

however, is not a waiver of an illegal
search. Records have established
that both the arrest and the search
were made without a warrant. While
the accused has already waived his
right to contest the legality of his
arrest, he is not deemed to have
equally waived his right to contest
the legality of the search.

Jurisprudence is replete with

pronouncements on when a
warrantless search can be
conducted.

These searches include:

(1) search of a moving vehicle;

(2) seizure in plain view;

(3) customs search;

(4) waiver or consented search;

(5) stop-and-frisk situation;

(6) search incidental to a lawful

arrest and

(7) exigent and emergency

circumstance.

The search made was not among the

enumerated instances. Certainly, it
was not of a moving vehicle, a
customs search, or a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. There
could not have been a seizure in
plain view as the seized item was
allegedly found inside the left pocket
of accused-appellant’s pants.
Neither was it a stop-and-frisk
situation. While thistype may
seemingly fall under the consented
search exception, we reiterate that
“[c]onsent to a search is not to be
lightly inferred, but shown by clear
and convincing evidence.”

Consent must also be voluntary

inorder to validate an otherwise
illegal search; that is, the consent
mustbe unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given, and
uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion.
Lockheed vs. UP G.R. No. 18591 AprIL 18, 2012 Immunity from Suit
FACTS:
Petitioner Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. (Lockheed) entered into a contract for
security services with respondent UP. In 1998, several security guards assigned to UP filed separate
complaints against Lockheed and UP for payment of underpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium
pay for rest days and special holidays, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, night shift differentials,
13th month pay, refund of cash bond, refund of deductions for the Mutual Benefits Aids System
(MBAS), unpaid wages from December 16-31, 1998, and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:

Having a charter with which it can sue and be sued, can UP funds be garnished?

RULING:

We agree with UP that there was no point for Lockheed in discussing the doctrine of state immunity
from suit as this was never an issue in this case. Clearly, UP consented to be sued when it participated
in the proceedings below. What UP questions is the hasty garnishment of its funds in its PNB account.
This Court finds that the CA correctly applied the NEA case. Like NEA, UP is a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the government and has the capacity to sue and be sued. Thus, also like
NEA, it cannot evade execution, and its funds may be subject to garnishment or levy. However, before
execution may be had, a claim for payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA.

CASE DIGEST: JOSELITO R. MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROBERTO M.

PAGDANGANAN, Respondents. G.R. No. 191084; March 25, 2010.

FACTS: Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed the winner of the 2007 gubernatorial election
for the province of Bulacan, besting respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan by a margin of 15,732 votes.
Respondent filed the Election Protest which, anchored on the massive electoral fraud allegedly
perpetrated by petitioner.

Upon the evidence adduced and the memoranda subsequently filed by the parties, the COMELEC
Second Division went on to render the 1 December 2009 Resolution, which annulled and set aside
petitioners proclamation as governor of Bulacan and proclaimed respondent duly elected to said
position. Coupled with a directive to the DILG to implement the same, the resolution ordered
petitioner to immediately vacate said office, to cease and desist from discharging the functions
pertaining thereto and to cause a peaceful turn-over thereof to respondent.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing resolution with the
COMELEC En Banc on the ground that lack of concurrence of the majority of the members of the
Commission pursuant to Section 5, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. However, the motion
was dismissed in a Resolution dated 8 Feb 2010. Petitioner filed before the COMELEC an Urgent
Motion to Recall the Resolution Promulgated on February 8, 2010. Anchored on the same ground,
petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

In their respective Comments thereto, both respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General argue
that, in addition to its premature filing, the petition at bench violated the rule against forum shopping.

ISSUE: Is the assailed COMELEC Resolution valid?

HELD: No, the assailed resolution is not valid. The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the
required majority vote even after the 15 February 2010 re-hearing should have caused the dismissal of
respondent's Election Protest.

Even before petitioners filing of his Urgent Motion to Recall the Resolution Promulgated on 8 February
2010 and the instant Petition for Certiorari with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the record shows that
the COMELEC En Banc issued the 10 February 2010 Resolution, ordering the re-hearing of the case on
the ground that "there was no majority vote of the members obtained in the Resolution of the
Commission En Banc promulgated on February 8, 2010." Having conceded one of the grounds
subsequently raised in petitioners Urgent Motion to Recall the Resolution Promulgated on February 8,
2010, the COMELEC En Banc significantly failed to obtain the votes required under Section 5(a), Rule 3
of its own Rules of Procedure for a second time.

The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote even after the 15 February
2010 re-hearing should have caused the dismissal of respondents Election Protest. Promulgated on 15
February 1993 pursuant to Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is clear on this matter. Without any trace of ambiguity, Section 6, Rule 18
of said Rule categorically provides as follows:

Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. When the Commission en banc is equally divided in
opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no
decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the
Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all
incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

The propriety of applying the foregoing provision according to its literal tenor cannot be gainsaid. As
one pertaining to the election of the provincial governor of Bulacan, respondents Election Protest was
originally commenced in the COMELEC, pursuant to its exclusive original jurisdiction over the case.
Although initially raffled to the COMELEC Second Division, the elevation of said election protest on
motion for reconsideration before the Commission En Banc cannot, by any stretch of the imagination,
be considered an appeal.
Tersely put, there is no appeal within the COMELEC itself. As aptly observed in the lone dissent penned
by COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, respondents Election Protest was filed with the
Commission "at the first instance" and should be, accordingly, considered an action or proceeding
"originally commenced in the Commission."

There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the COMELEC over election
contests. The difference inheres in the kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined by the
case brought before the COMELEC. When a decision of a trial court is brought before the COMELEC for
it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the division decides the appeal but, if there is a motion for
reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc where a majority is needed for a decision. If the
process ends without the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands affirmed.

Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant case, if what is brought before the
COMELEC is an original protest invoking the original jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as
one whole process, is first decided by the division, which process is continued in the banc if there is a
motion for reconsideration of the division ruling. If no majority decision is reached in the banc, the
protest, which is an original action, shall be dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be
deemed affirmed.

In a protest originally brought before the COMELEC, no completed process comes to the banc. It is the
banc which will complete the process. If, at that completion, no conclusive result in the form of a
majority vote is reached, the COMELEC has no other choice except to dismiss the protest. In a protest
placed before the Commission as an appeal, there has been a completed proceeding that has resulted
in a decision. So that when the COMELEC, as an appellate body, and after the appellate process is
completed, reaches an inconclusive result, the appeal is in effect dismissed and resultingly, the
decision appealed from is affirmed. GRANTED.
09228054546