G.R. No.

181704 December 6, 2011

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA) vs. HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES
FACTS:
RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage
BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for
the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any
incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their
contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
The petitioners averred that the republic act is tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation of
the fundamental rights of its members. On contrary, respondents contended that it provided a
reasonable and valid ground for the dismissal of an employee which is germane to the purpose of
the law.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT IS A BILL OF ATTAINDER AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
RULING:
No, the republic act is not a bill of attainder and unconstitutional.
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a
particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain
individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack
of judicial trial.
R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict
punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination
of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic
processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply
protected.
CASE DIGEST: METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by ROSELLA A.
SANTIAGO,Petitioner,
v. ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III, Respondent.
FACTS: Tobias opened a savings/current account for and in the name of Adam Merchandising, his
frozen meat business. Six months later, Tobias applied for a loan from METROBANK, which in due
course conducted trade and credit verification of Tobias that resulted in negative findings. The
property consisted of four parcels of land located in Malabon City, Metro Manila.
His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after two months, he again defaulted.
Thus, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold to METROBANK as the lone bidder.
When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds of Malabon, no
corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-16751 was found in the registry vault. Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax declarations
submitted by Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal
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complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315,
in relation to Articles 172(1) and 171(7) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa through
falsification of public documents. Tobias filed a motion for reinvestigation, which was granted.
Nonetheless, on December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Malabon still found probable cause
against Tobias, and recommended his being charged with estafa through falsification of public
document. Tobias appealed to the DOJ and then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez issued a resolution directing the withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias. On
November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez denied METROBANK's motion for
reconsideration. Hence, METROBANK challenged the adverse resolutions. METROBANK maintains
that what the Secretary of Justice did was to determine the innocence of the accused, which should
not be done during the preliminary investigation; and that the CA disregarded such lapse.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in dismissing METROBANK's petition?
HELD:
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government
The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable
cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse
of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence
of probable cause is not part of a trial. At a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or
the Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. Probable cause refers to facts and circumstances that engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. There is
no definitive standard by which probable cause is determined except to consider the attendant
conditions; the existence of probable cause depends upon the finding of the public prosecutor
conducting the examination, who is called upon not to disregard the facts presented, and to ensure
that his finding should not run counter to the clear dictates of reason.
We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in real property, had
the duty to observe due diligence to ascertain the existence and condition of the realty as well as the
validity and integrity of the documents bearing on the realty. Its duty included the responsibility of
dispatching its competent and experienced representatives to the realty to assess its actual location
and condition, and of investigating who was its real owner. Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did
not diligently perform a thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the realty he
had offered as collateral. As such, it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to
exercise greater care and prudence than others in their dealings because their business is impressed
with public interest. Their failure to do so constitutes negligence on its part.
DENIED
CASE DIGEST: RE COA OPINION ON COMPUTATION (A.M. NO. 11-7-10-SC; JULY 31, 2012)

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CASE DIGEST: IN RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE
PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
FACTS: In June 8, 2010, the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission
on Audit (COA) issued an opinion which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50
resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the
personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this
underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in
computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles.
ISSUE: Did the COA err when it issued its June 8, 2010 opinion?
HELD: The COA's authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal
autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This authority,
however, must be read not only in light of the Court's fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the
constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings
on these matters.
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal
autonomy. While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the
first instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the
Judiciary's fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If
the judicial branch is to perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command
adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of)
legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a violation of concepts
of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial
independence and is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy
under Section 3, Article VIII.
In Bengzon v. Drilon, we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in
the following manner: "as envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the
Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and
the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require."
Fort Bonifacio vs CIR
Case Digest GR 173425 Jan 22 2013
Facts:
In 1995, Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation purchased from the national government a portion
of the Fort Bonifacio reservation. On January 1, 1996, the enactment of RA 7716 extended the
coverage of VAT to real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the
ordinary course of trade or business. Thus, FBDC sought to register by submitting to BIR an inventory
of all its real properties, the book value of which aggregated to about P71 B.
In October 1996, FBDC started selling Global City lots to interested buyers. For the first quarter of
1997, it paid the output VAT by making cash payments to the BIR and credited its unutilized input tax
credit on purchases of goods and services. Realizing that its 8% transitional input tax credit was not
applied in computing its output VAT for the first quarter of 1997, FBDC filed with the BIR a claim for
refund of the amount erroneously paid as output VAT for the said period.

3
The CTA denied refund on the ground that “the benefit of transitional input tax credit comes with
the condition that business taxes should have been paid first.” It contends that since FBDC acquired
the Global City property under a VAT-free sale transaction, it cannot avail of the transitional input tax
credit. The CTA likewise pointed out that under RR 7-95, implementing Section 105 of the old NIRC,
the 8% transitional input tax credit should be based on the value of the improvements on land such
as buildings, roads, drainage system and other similar structures, constructed on or after January 1,
1998, and not on the book value of the real property.
Issue 1: W/N prior payment of taxes is required in availing of the transitional input tax credit
No. First, nothing in Sec 105 of the NIRC indicates that prior payment of taxes is necessary to avail of
the transitional input tax credit. Clearly, all it requires is for the taxpayer to file a beginning inventory
with the BIR. Courts cannot limit the application or coverage of a law nor can it impose conditions
not provided therein because to do so constitutes judicial legislation.

Second, prior payment of taxes is not required to avail of the transitional input tax credit because it
is not a tax refund per se but a tax credit. Tax credit is not synonymous to tax refund. Tax refund is
defined as the money that a taxpayer overpaid and is thus returned by the taxing authority. Tax
credit, on the other hand, is an amount subtracted directly from one’s total tax liability. It is any
amount given to a taxpayer as a subsidy, a refund, or an incentive to encourage investment. Thus,
unlike a tax refund, prior payment of taxes is not a prerequisite to avail of a tax credit.
Lastly, the fact that FBDC acquired the Global City property under a tax-free transaction makes no
difference as prior payment of taxes is not a pre-requisite.
Issue 2: W/N the transitional input tax credit applies only to the value of improvements
No. Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95, insofar as it limits the transitional input tax credit to the value of the
improvement of the real properties, is a nullity. The 8% transitional input tax credit should not be
limited to the value of the improvements on the real properties but should include the value of the
real properties as well.
Hence, since FBDC is entitled to the 8% transitional input tax credit which is more than sufficient to
cover its output tax for the first taxable quarter, the amount of VAT output taxes erroneously paid
must be refunded.
Issue 3: W/N the Tax Code allows either a cash refund or a tax credit for input VAT
Yes. First, a careful reading of Section 112 of the Tax Code shows that it does not prohibit cash refund
or tax credit of transitional input tax in the case of zero-rated or effectively zero-rated VAT registered
taxpayers, who do not have any output VAT.
The phrase “except transitional input tax” in Section 112 of the Tax Code was inserted to distinguish
creditable input tax from transitional input tax credit. Transitional input tax credits are input taxes on
a taxpayer’s beginning inventory of goods, materials, and supplies equivalent to 8% (then 2%) or the
actual VAT paid on such goods, materials and supplies, whichever is higher. It may only be availed of
once by first-time VAT taxpayers. Creditable input taxes, on the other hand, are input taxes of VAT
taxpayers in the course of their trade or business, which should be applied within two years after the
close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made.
As regards Section 110, while the law only provides for a tax credit, a taxpayer who erroneously or
excessively pays his output tax is still entitled to recover the payments he made either as a tax credit
or a tax refund.
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Here, since FBDC still has available transitional input tax credit, it filed a claim for refund to recover
the output VAT it erroneously or excessively paid for the 1st quarter of 1997. Thus, there is no reason
for denying its claim for tax refund/credit.
Separation of Powers: Mendoza vs People G.R. No. 183891 October 19, 2011
Facts:
Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer convicted for violating a special law
known as the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 for non-remittance of the Social Security
Service (SSS) contributions to his employees. The offense is criminal in nature. Nevertheless,
Mendoza admitted his fault, as he said, he acted in good faith. But still, the Court has to render
judgment and apply the proper penalty how harsh it may be dura lex sed lex).
The Court sentenced Mendoza to an indeterminate prison term. Considering the circumstances, the
court the Court transmitted the case to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, and
RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the petitioner.
Issue:
Without violating the separation of powers, can the Supreme Court recommend to the President, the
grant of executive clemency to a convict?
Ruling:
The Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate but are beyond
its power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. It is clearly stated in the Revised Penal
Code which provides; “Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe
that said act should be made the subject of legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper,
without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of
this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the
degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.”
G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner VS. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON
GONZALES et.al, respondents
G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent
FACTS:
The case basically revolves around the series of events that happened prior and subsequent to the
event we know as EDSA II. During the 1998 elections, Joseph E. Estrada and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
were elected as president and vice-president respectively. The downfall of the Estrada administration
began when For. Gov. Luis Chavit Singson went to the media and released his exposé that petitioner
was part of the Jueteng scandal as having received large sums of money. After this expose, a lot of
different groups and many personalities had asked for the resignation of the petitioner. Some of
which are the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), Sen. Nene Pimentel, Archbishop
of Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin, For. Pres. Fidel Ramos, and For. Pres. Corazon Aquino who asked
petitioner to make the “supreme self-sacrifice”. Respondent also resigned as Secretary of the
Department of Social Welfare and Services and also asked petitioner for his resignation. 4 senior
5
economic advisers of the petitioner resigned and then Speaker Manny Villar, together with 47
representatives, defected from Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.
By November, an impeachment case was to be held as Speaker Manny Villar had transmitted the
Articles of Impeachment to the senate. On November 20, the 21 senators took oath as judges to the
impeachment trial with SC CJ Hilario Davide, Jr., presiding. The impeachment trial was one for the
ages. It was a battle royal of well known lawyers. But then came the fateful day, when by the vote of
11-10, the judges came to a decision to not open the second envelop allegedly containing evidence
showing that the petitioner had a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde” containing
P3.3 billion. The not opening of the 2nd envelop resulted to the people going to the streets and the
public prosecutors withdrawing from the trial. On January 19, AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes
marched to EDSA shrine and declared “on behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members
of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government.”
PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson together with some Cabinet members made the same
announcement.
June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20 AM, negotiations started for the peaceful
transition of power. But at around 12 noon, respondent took oath as the 14 th president of the
Philippines. At 2:30 PM, petitioner and his family left Malacanang. He issued the following Press
Statement:
“20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of
the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong
and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not
wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country,
for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of
our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk
from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit
of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:
“Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and
the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”
On January 22, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC.
The said resolution confirmed the authority given by the 12 SC justices to the CJ during the oath
taking that happened on January 20. Soon, other countries accepted the respondent as the new
6
president of the Philippines. The House then passed Resolution No. 175 “expressing the full support
of the House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Philippines.” It also approved Resolution No. 176 “expressing the support of the
House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its
support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation’s goals under the
Constitution.”
On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto Guingona to be the vice president. On February
7, the Senate adopted Resolution 82 which confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona. On the
same day, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus
officio and has been terminated. Several cases were filed against the petitioner which are as follows:
(1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft
and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption
on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious
misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-
00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder,
forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756
filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use
of public funds and property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et
al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD
46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4,
2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate
the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio
with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty.
Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the
petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting
documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No.
146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-
00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his
office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted.” Thru
another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for
judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have
taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution.” Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day,
February 6, required the respondents “to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring
on 12 February 2001.” On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15
and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents’ comments “on or before 8:00 a.m. of February
15.”

7
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press
statement for “Gag Order” on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No.
146738, the Court resolved:
“(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the
office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying
the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being
cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases
at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman
from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner
Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent
Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days
after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and
academic.”
ISSUES:
I Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a
President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal
prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still
President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial
publicity.
DECISION:
I No. The case is legal not political.
II No. He is not a president on leave.
III No. The impeachment proceedings was already aborted. As a non-sitting president, he is not
entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution
IV There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman.
RATIO/REASON:
1. I. Whether or not the case involves a political question
Respondents contend that the cases at bar pose a political question. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
became a President through the People power revolution. Her legitimacy as president was also
accepted by other nations. Thus, they conclude that the following shall serve as political thicket which
the Court cannot enter.
The Court rules otherwise. A political question has been defined by our Court as “those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure.”

8
Respondents allege that the legality of the Arroyo administration should be treated similarly with the
Aquino administration. Respondents propose that the situation of the Arroyo and Aquino
administrations are similar. However, the Court finds otherwise. The Court has made substantial
distinctions which are the following:
Aquino Arroyo
Government was a result of a successful Government was a result of a peaceful
revolution revolution
In the Freedom constitution, it was stated Arroyo took the oath of the 1987
that the Aquino government was instilled Constitution. She is discharging the
directly by the people in defiance of the authority of the president under the 1987
1973 Constitution as amended. constitution.
It is a well settled rule that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people
power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional
loop. But this would not apply as the Court finds substantial difference between the 2 EDSA
Revolutions. It would show that there are differences between the 2 governments set up by EDSA I
and II. This was further explained by the Court by comparing the 2 EDSA Revolutions.
EDSA I EDSA II
Extra-constitutional. Hence, “Xxx IN Intra-Constitutional. Hence, the oath of
DEFIANCE OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, the respondent as President includes the
AS AMENDED”—cannot be subject of protection and upholding of the 1987
judicial review Constitution.—resignation of the
President makes it subject to judicial
review
exercise of the people power of exercise of people power of freedom of
revolutionwhich overthrew the whole speech and freedom of assembly to
government petition the government for redress of
grievances which only affected the office
of the President
Political question Legal Question
In this issue, the Court holds that the issue is legal and not political.
1. II. Whether or not petitioner resigned as President
Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to
resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. There is no required form of
resignation. It can be expressed, implied, oral or written. It is true that respondent never wrote a
letter of resignation before he left Malacanang on June 20, 2001. In this issue, the Court would use
the totality test or the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this test, the Court rules that the petitioner had resigned. The Court knows the amount of stress
that the petitioner had suffered. With just a blink of an eye, he lost the support of the legislative
when then Manny Villar and other Representatives had defected. AFP Chief of Staff General Angelo
Reyes had already gone to EDSA. PNP Chief Director General Panfilo Lacson and other cabinet
secretaries had withdrawn as well. By looking into the Angara diaries, it was pointed out that the
petitioner had suggested a snap election at May on which he would not be a candidate. Proposing a
9
snap election in which he is not a candidate means that he had intent to resign. When the proposal
for a dignified exit or resignation was proposed, petitioner did not disagree but listened closely. This
is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was
already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
The negotiations that had happened were about a peaceful transfer of power. It was already implied
that petitioner would resign. The negotiations concentrated on the following: (1) the transition
period of five days after the petitioner’s resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner
and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the
petitioner. Also taken from the Angara diaries, The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko
na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t
want any more of this – it’s too painful. I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I
just want to clear my name, then I will go.” The quoted statement of the petitioner was a clear
evidence that he has resigned.
The second round of negotiations were about the consolidating of the clauses which were proposed
by both sides. The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has
resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the
petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures
to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
When everything was already signed by the side of the petitioner and ready to be faxed by Angara,
the negotiator for the respondent, Angelo Reyes, called to Angara saying that the SC would allow
respondent to have her oath taking. Before petitioner left Malacanang, he made a last statement.
The statement reads: ‘At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took
her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of
our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and
order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country,
for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of
our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shrik
from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit
of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!’”
By making such statement, petitioner impliedly affirms the following: (1) he acknowledged the oath-
taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality;
(2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any
kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he
assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of
our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
10
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of
a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.
Petitioner however argues that he only took a temporary leave of absence. This is evidenced by a
letter which reads as follows:
“Sir
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and
the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada”
The Court was surprised that the petitioner did not use this letter during the week long crisis. It would
be very easy for him to say before he left Malacanang that he was temporarily unable to govern,
thus, he is leaving Malacanang. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot
negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner
clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later
act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal significance.
Petitioner also argues that he could not resign. His legal basis is RA 3019 which states:
“Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.”
During the amendments, another section was inserted which states that:
During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:
“Sec. 15. Termination of office — No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under
the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under
this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency.”
The original senate bill was rejected because of the 2nd paragraph of section 15. Nonetheless, another
similar bill was passed. Section 15 then became section 13. There is another reason why petitioner’s
contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned
on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-
1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the
respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner
for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the
said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on
them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates
of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the
immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under
section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. The Court holds otherwise. The impeachment
proceeding may be arguable. However, even if the impeachment proceeding is administrative, it
cannot be considered pending because the process had already broke down. There was also a

11
withdrawal by the prosecutors to partake in the impeachment case. In fact, the proceeding was
postponed indefinitely. In fact, there was no impeachment case pending when he resigned.
1. III. Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President
This issue arose from the January 20 letter which was addressed to then Speaker Fuentebella and
then Senate President Pimentel. Petitioner’s contention is that he is a president on leave and that
the respondent is an acting president. This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner’s stance that
he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
“SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and
duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the
powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene,
if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session within
twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and
duties of his office."
After studying in-depth the series of events that happened after petitioner left Malacanang, it is very
clear that the inability of the petitioner as president is not temporary. The question is whether this
Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and
thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines. The Court says that they cannot, for such is an example of a political
question, in which the matter has solely been left to the legislative,
1. IV. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. If yes, what is the extent of the
immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment
proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or
civil. The “immunity” the petitioner points to is the principle of non-liability.
The principle of non-liability simply states that a chief executive may not be personally mulcted in
civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. He is
liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he cannot be said to
12
have exercise discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is
that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his
authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgment,
that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he
is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still
protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified
for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain
that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination.
The Court rejects the petitioner’s argument that before he could be prosecuted, he should be first
convicted of impeachment proceedings. The impeachment proceeding was already aborted because
of the walking out of the prosecutors. This was then formalized by a Senate resolution (Resolution
#83) which declared the proceeding functus officio. According to the debates in the Constitutional
Convention, when an impeachment proceeding have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, proper civil and criminal cases may be filed against him.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that
immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. As for civil immunity, it
means immunity from civil damages only covers “official acts”.
1. V. Whether of not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting an
investigation of the cases filed against him for he has already developed a bias against the petitioner.
He submits that it is a violation of due process. There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical
schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and
trial of high profile cases. The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will
prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused
to fair trial suffers a threat. The American approach is different. US courts assume
a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a
fair trial. During cases like such, the test of actual prejudice shall be applied. The test shows that there
must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might
be, by the barrage of publicity. The Court rules that there is notenough evidence to warrant this Court
to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner
needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.
According to the records, it was the petitioner who assailed the biasness of the Ombudsman. The
petitioner alleges that there were news reports which said that the Ombudsman had already
prejudged the cases against him. The Court rules that the evidence presented is insufficient. The
Court also cannot adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of
respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. Investigating prosecutors should not be treated
like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases

13
against the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding of probable cause against him is the
result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
TAÑADA & MACAPAGAL VS. CUENCO ET.AL. Digested
TAÑADA & MACAPAGAL VS. CUENCO ET.AL.
G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957
FACTS:
On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the Nacionalista Party elected respondents Cuenco &
Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon the nomination of Senator Primicias, an
NP member. The two seats, originally for minority party nominees, were filled with NP members to
meet the Constitutional mandate under Sec.2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party Senator
Tañada. Consequently, the Chairman of the Tribunal appointed the rest of the respondents as staff
members of Cuenco & Delgado. Petitioner alleges that the nomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of
the Committee on Rules for the Senate, violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since 3 seats on the ETare
reserved for minority senators duly nominated by the minority party representatives. Furthermore,
as respondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate, the case at bar is a violation
not only of Tañada's right as CP member of ET, but respondent Macapagal's right to an impartial body
that will try his election protest. Petitioners pray for a writ of preliminary injunction against
respondents (cannot exercise duties), to be made permanent after a judgment to oust respondents
is passed. Respondents contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to try the appointment of ET
members, since it is a constitutional right granted to Senate. Moreover, the petition is without cause
of action since Tañada exhausted his right to nominate 2 more senators; he is in estoppel. They
contend that the present action is not the proper remedy, but an appeal to public opinion.
ISSUES:
1.WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter
2.WON Constitutional right of CP can be exercised by NP, or the Committee on Rules for the Senate
HELD:
1. Yes. The Court has jurisdiction. RATIO: The case at bar is not an action against the Senate
compelling them to allow petitioners to exercise duties as members of ET. The ET is part of neither
House, even if the Senate elects its members. The issue is not the power of the Senate to elect or
nominate, but the validity of the manner by which power was exercised (constitutionality).The Court
is concerned with the existence and extent of said discretionary powers.
2. No. RATIO: Although respondents allege that the Constitutional mandate of 6 Senate members in
the ET must be followed, this cannot be done without violating the spirit & philosophy of Art. 6, Sec.
2, which is to provide against partisan decisions. The respondents' practical interpretation of the law
(modifying law to fit the situation) cannot be accepted; although they followed mandate on number,
they disobeyed mandate on procedure. The contention that petitioner Tañada waived his rights or is
in estoppel is not tenable. When interests of public policy & morals are at issue, the power to waive
is inexistent. Tañada never led Primicias to believe that his nominations on behalf of the CP are valid.
WHEREFORE: The Senate cannot elect members of the ET not nominated by the proper party, nor
can the majority party elect more than 3 members of the ET. Furthermore, the CRS has no standing
to nominate, and the election of respondents Cuenco & Delgado void ab initio. The appointment of
the staff members are valid as it is a selection of personnel - a matter under the discretion of the
Chairman. PARAS DISSENTING: The procedure or manner of nomination cannot affect Consti
14
mandate that the Senate is entitled to 6 seats in the ET. The number of seats (9) must be held fixed,
since the Consti must have consistent application. There is no rule against the minority party
nominating a majority party member to the ET. Furthermore, the Senate, and not the parties, elect
on the ET members, brushing aside partisan concerns. LABRADOR DISSENTING: The petition itself is
unconstitutional under Art. 6 Sec. 2 because:1.9-member ET mandate violated2.right to elect of
Senate held in abeyance by refusal of minority party to nominate3.process of nomination effectively
superior to power to elect (party v. Senate power)4.SC arrogation of power in determining Con Con’s
proviso of <9 ET member sunder certain circumstances The refusal of Tañada to nominate mustbe
considered a waiver of privilege based on constitutionality and reason, in order to reconcile two
applications of Art. 6, Sec. 2.
COMELEC vs CONRADO CRUZ G.R. No. 186616 November 20, 2009
FACTS:
When RA 9164 entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan
Elections” was passed, questions of the constitutionality were raised against Section 2 which states
that “No barangay elective official s
hall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position: Provided however, that the term
of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official was elected. Before the 2007 Synchronized Barangay and SK
Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the
RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the said provision as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution in as much as the barangay officials were
singled out that there consecutive limit shall be counted retroactively.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Section 2 of RA 9164 is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
RULING:
The equal protection clause is under Sec 2 Art III of the Constitution which provides:
“Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
” This is however considering
equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. The law can treat barangay
officials differently from other local elective officials because the Constitution itself provides a
significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term and term
limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution
provides for a 3-year term and 3-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and
the application of the 3-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress
through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it
recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal protection
violation can exist under these conditions.
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101,
July 5, 2011
DECISION
15
VELASCO, JR., J.:
THE FACTS
In 1958, the Spanish owners of Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera) sold
Hacienda Luisita and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the sugar mill of the hacienda, to the Tarlac
Development Corporation (Tadeco), then owned and controlled by the Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group. The
Central Bank of the Philippines assisted Tadeco in obtaining a dollar loan from a US bank. Also, the
GSIS extended a PhP5.911 million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price component of the
sale, with the condition that “the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita be subdivided by the applicant-
corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any, and whenever conditions should exist
warranting such action under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act.” Tadeco however did not comply
with this condition.
On May 7, 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the Manila RTC against
Tadeco, et al., for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR)
so that the land can be distributed to farmers at cost. Responding, Tadeco alleged that Hacienda
Luisita does not have tenants, besides which sugar lands – of which the hacienda consisted – are not
covered by existing agrarian reform legislations. The Manila RTC rendered judgment ordering Tadeco
to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. Therefrom, Tadeco appealed to the CA.
On March 17, 1988, during the administration of President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, the
Office of the Solicitor General moved to withdraw the government’s case against Tadeco, et al. The
CA dismissed the case, subject to the PARC’s approval of Tadeco’s proposed stock distribution plan
(SDP) in favor of its farmworkers. [Under EO 229 and later RA 6657, Tadeco had the option of availing
stock distribution as an alternative modality to actual land transfer to the farmworkers.] On August
23, 1988, Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation, herein petitioner HLI, as vehicle to facilitate stock
acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose, Tadeco conveyed to HLI the agricultural land
portion (4,915.75 hectares) and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI
shares of stock.
On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of
Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLI’s Stock Distribution
Option Plan (SODP). On May 11, 1989, the SDOA was formally entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the
5,848 qualified FWBs. This attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA embodied the
basis and mechanics of HLI’s SDP, which was eventually approved by the PARC after a follow-up
referendum conducted by the DAR on October 14, 1989, in which 5,117 FWBs, out of 5,315 who
participated, opted to receive shares in HLI.
On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda
from agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657. The DAR approved the application
on August 14, 1996, subject to payment of three percent (3%) of the gross selling price to the FWBs
and to HLI’s continued compliance with its undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions.
On December 13, 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000 shares of stocks of
Centennary Holdings, Inc. (Centennary), ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to the latter.
Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300 hectares for PhP750 million to Luisita Industrial Park
Corporation (LIPCO), which used it in developing an industrial complex. From this area was carved
out 2 parcels, for which 2 separate titles were issued in the name of LIPCO. Later, LIPCO transferred
these 2 parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) in payment of LIPCO’s
16
 PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations to RCBC. LIPCO’s titles were cancelled and new ones were
issued to RCBC. Apart from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from
Hacienda Luisita and acquired by the government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway
(SCTEX) complex. Thus, 4,335.75 hectares remained of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to
HLI.
Such, was the state of things when two separate petitions reached the DAR in the latter part
of 2003. The first was filed by the Supervisory Group of HLI (Supervisory Group), praying for a
renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its revocation. The second petition, praying for the
revocation and nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of the lands in the hacienda, was filed
by Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA). The DAR then constituted
a Special Task Force (STF) to attend to issues relating to the SDP of HLI. After investigation and
evaluation, the STF found that HLI has not complied with its obligations under RA 6657 despite the
implementation of the SDP. On December 22, 2005, the PARC issued the assailed Resolution No.
2005-32-01, recalling/revoking the SDO plan of Tadeco/HLI. It further resolved that the subject lands
be forthwith placed under the compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition scheme of the
CARP.
From the foregoing resolution, HLI sought reconsideration. Its motion notwithstanding, HLI
also filed a petition before the Supreme Court in light of what it considers as the DAR’s hasty placing
of Hacienda Luisita under CARP even before PARC could rule or even read the motion for
reconsideration. PARC would eventually deny HLI’s motion for reconsideration via Resolution No.
2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006.
I. THE ISSUES
(1) Does the PARC possess jurisdiction to recall or revoke HLI’s SDP?
(2) [Issue raised by intervenor FARM (group of farmworkers)] Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock
transfer in lieu of outright land transfer, unconstitutional?
(3) Is the revocation of the HLI’s SDP valid? [Did PARC gravely abuse its discretion in revoking the subject
SDP and placing the hacienda under CARP’s compulsory acquisition and distribution scheme?]
(4) Should those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO acquired
by purchase be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution? [Did the PARC gravely
abuse its discretion when it included LIPCO’s and RCBC’s respective properties that once formed part
of Hacienda Luisita under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme via the assailed Notice of
Coverage?]
II. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition of HLI and AFFIRMED the PARC resolution placing the lands
subject of HLI’s SDP under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP,
with the MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 qualified FWBs were given the option to remain as
stockholders of HLI. It also excluded from the mandatory CARP coverage that part of Hacienda Luisita
that had been acquired by RCBC and LIPCO.]
(1) YES, the PARC has jurisdiction to revoke HLI’s SDP under the doctrine of necessary implication.
Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan for
stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. Contrary to petitioner HLI’s posture,
PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved. It may be, as urged, that
RA 6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARC with the
17
power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority, however, is deemed possessed
by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic postulate that what is implied in a
statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.
Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the conferment of
express power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners
necessarily includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of the plan. To deny PARC such
revocatory power would reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP, because the very same agency
tasked to ensure compliance by the corporate landowner with the approved SDP would be without
authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance with it.
(2) NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is not unconstitutional. [The Court actually refused to pass upon the
constitutional question because it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and because the
resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and
academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700.]
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review over, and pass upon the
constitutionality of, acts of the executive or legislative departments, it does so only when the
following essential requirements are first met, to wit: (1) there is an actual case or controversy; (2)
that the constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible opportunity by a proper party or one
with locus standi; and (3) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Not all the foregoing requirements are satisfied in the case at bar.
While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM, composed of a small
minority of 27 farmers, has yet to explain its failure to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657 as early as November 21, 1989 when PARC approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or at least
within a reasonable time thereafter, and why its members received benefits from the SDP without
so much of a protest. It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after approval of the SDP that said
plan and approving resolution were sought to be revoked, but not, to stress, by FARM or any of its
members, but by petitioner AMBALA. Furthermore, the AMBALA petition did NOT question the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but concentrated on the purported flaws and gaps in the
subsequent implementation of the SDP. Even the public respondents, as represented by the Solicitor
General, did not question the constitutionality of the provision. On the other hand, FARM, whose 27
members formerly belonged to AMBALA, raised the constitutionality of Sec. 31 only on May 3, 2007
when it filed its Supplemental Comment with the Court. Thus, it took FARM some eighteen (18) years
from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is
quite too late in the day. The FARM members slept on their rights and even accepted benefits from
the SDP with nary a complaint on the alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits
were derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into resolving a constitutional issue that FARM failed
to assail after the lapse of a long period of time and the occurrence of numerous events and activities
which resulted from the application of an alleged unconstitutional legal provision.
The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis
mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue
tendered not being critical to the resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid,
whenever plausible, an issue assailing the constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. If some
other grounds exist by which judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a law,
such recourse is favored.
18
 The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by AMBALA (to
which the FARM members previously belonged) and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged non-
compliance by HLI with the conditions of the SDP to support a plea for its revocation. And before the
Court, the lis mota is whether or not PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the
recall of the SDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented,
offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any of these key issues may be
resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Moreover, looking deeply
into the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said section per se that is invalid, but
rather it is the alleged application of the said provision in the SDP that is flawed.

It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has
all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA 6657 vis-à-vis the stock distribution component of said Sec. 31. In its
pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides: “[T]hat after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall
be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition.” Thus, for all intents and purposes,
the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available option under existing
law. The question of whether or not it is unconstitutional should be a moot issue.
(3) YES, the revocation of the HLI’s SDP valid. [NO, the PARC did NOT gravely abuse its discretion
in revoking the subject SDP and placing the hacienda under CARP’s compulsory acquisition and
distribution scheme.]
The revocation of the approval of the SDP is valid: (1) the mechanics and timelines of HLI’s
stock distribution violate DAO 10 because the minimum individual allocation of each original FWB of
18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use of “man days” and the hiring of additional
farmworkers; (2) the 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is contrary to what Sec. 11 of
DAO 10 prescribes.
In our review and analysis of par. 3 of the SDOA on the mechanics and timelines of stock
distribution, We find that it violates two (2) provisions of DAO 10. Par. 3 of the SDOA states:
3. At the end of each fiscal year, for a period of 30 years, the SECOND PARTY [HLI] shall arrange
with the FIRST PARTY [TDC] the acquisition and distribution to the THIRD PARTY [FWBs] on the basis
of number of days worked and at no cost to them of one-thirtieth (1/30) of 118,391,976.85 shares of
the capital stock of the SECOND PARTY that are presently owned and held by the FIRST PARTY, until
such time as the entire block of 118,391,976.85 shares shall have been completely acquired and
distributed to the THIRD PARTY.
[I]t is clear as day that the original 6,296 FWBs, who were qualified beneficiaries at the time of
the approval of the SDP, suffered from watering down of shares. As determined earlier, each original
FWB is entitled to 18,804.32 HLI shares. The original FWBs got less than the guaranteed 18,804.32
HLI shares per beneficiary, because the acquisition and distribution of the HLI shares were based on
“man days” or “number of days worked” by the FWB in a year’s time. As explained by HLI, a
beneficiary needs to work for at least 37 days in a fiscal year before he or she becomes entitled to
HLI shares. If it falls below 37 days, the FWB, unfortunately, does not get any share at year end. The
number of HLI shares distributed varies depending on the number of days the FWBs were allowed to
work in one year. Worse, HLI hired farmworkers in addition to the original 6,296 FWBs, such that, as
indicated in the Compliance dated August 2, 2010 submitted by HLI to the Court, the total number of
farmworkers of HLI as of said date stood at 10,502. All these farmworkers, which include the original
19
6,296 FWBs, were given shares out of the 118,931,976.85 HLI shares representing the 33.296% of the
total outstanding capital stock of HLI. Clearly, the minimum individual allocation of each original FWB
of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use of “man days” and the hiring of additional
farmworkers.
Going into another but related matter, par. 3 of the SDOA expressly providing for a 30-year
timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is an arrangement contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10
prescribes. Said Sec. 11 provides for the implementation of the approved stock distribution plan
within three (3) months from receipt by the corporate landowner of the approval of the plan by PARC.
In fact, based on the said provision, the transfer of the shares of stock in the names of the qualified
FWBs should be recorded in the stock and transfer books and must be submitted to the SEC within
sixty (60) days from implementation.
To the Court, there is a purpose, which is at once discernible as it is practical, for the three-
month threshold. Remove this timeline and the corporate landowner can veritably evade compliance
with agrarian reform by simply deferring to absurd limits the implementation of the stock distribution
scheme.
Evidently, the land transfer beneficiaries are given thirty (30) years within which to pay the
cost of the land thus awarded them to make it less cumbersome for them to pay the government. To
be sure, the reason underpinning the 30-year accommodation does not apply to corporate
landowners in distributing shares of stock to the qualified beneficiaries, as the shares may be issued
in a much shorter period of time.
Taking into account the above discussion, the revocation of the SDP by PARC should be upheld
[because of violations of] DAO 10. It bears stressing that under Sec. 49 of RA 6657, the PARC and the
DAR have the power to issue rules and regulations, substantive or procedural. Being a product of
such rule-making power, DAO 10 has the force and effect of law and must be duly complied with. The
PARC is, therefore, correct in revoking the SDP. Consequently, the PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated
November 21, l989 approving the HLI’s SDP is nullified and voided.
(4) YES, those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO
acquired by purchase should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution.
[T]here are two (2) requirements before one may be considered a purchaser in good faith,
namely: (1) that the purchaser buys the property of another without notice that some other person
has a right to or interest in such property; and (2) that the purchaser pays a full and fair price for the
property at the time of such purchase or before he or she has notice of the claim of another.
It can rightfully be said that both LIPCO and RCBC are––based on the above requirements and
with respect to the adverted transactions of the converted land in question––purchasers in good
faith for value entitled to the benefits arising from such status.
First, at the time LIPCO purchased the entire three hundred (300) hectares of industrial land,
there was no notice of any supposed defect in the title of its transferor, Centennary, or that any other
person has a right to or interest in such property. In fact, at the time LIPCO acquired said parcels of
land, only the following annotations appeared on the TCT in the name of Centennary: the Secretary’s
Certificate in favor of Teresita Lopa, the Secretary’s Certificate in favor of Shintaro Murai, and the
conversion of the property from agricultural to industrial and residential use.
The same is true with respect to RCBC. At the time it acquired portions of Hacienda Luisita,
only the following general annotations appeared on the TCTs of LIPCO: the Deed of Restrictions,
20
limiting its use solely as an industrial estate; the Secretary’s Certificate in favor of Koji Komai and
Kyosuke Hori; and the Real Estate Mortgage in favor of RCBC to guarantee the payment of PhP 300
million.
To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots they bought were subjected to CARP
coverage by means of a stock distribution plan, as the DAR conversion order was annotated at the
back of the titles of the lots they acquired. However, they are of the honest belief that the subject
lots were validly converted to commercial or industrial purposes and for which said lots were taken
out of the CARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 and, hence, can be legally and
validly acquired by them. After all, Sec. 65 of RA 6657 explicitly allows conversion and disposition of
agricultural lands previously covered by CARP land acquisition “after the lapse of five (5) years from
its award when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes or
the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes.” Moreover, DAR notified all the affected parties, more
particularly the FWBs, and gave them the opportunity to comment or oppose the proposed
conversion. DAR, after going through the necessary processes, granted the conversion of 500
hectares of Hacienda Luisita pursuant to its primary jurisdiction under Sec. 50 of RA 6657 to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and its original exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. The DAR conversion order became final
and executory after none of the FWBs interposed an appeal to the CA. In this factual setting, RCBC
and LIPCO purchased the lots in question on their honest and well-founded belief that the previous
registered owners could legally sell and convey the lots though these were previously subject of CARP
coverage. Ergo, RCBC and LIPCO acted in good faith in acquiring the subject lots.
And second, both LIPCO and RCBC purchased portions of Hacienda Luisita for value.
Undeniably, LIPCO acquired 300 hectares of land from Centennary for the amount of PhP750 million
pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated July 30, 1998. On the other hand, in a Deed of Absolute Assignment
dated November 25, 2004, LIPCO conveyed portions of Hacienda Luisita in favor of RCBC by way
of dacion en pago to pay for a loan of PhP431,695,732.10.
In relying upon the above-mentioned approvals, proclamation and conversion order, both
RCBC and LIPCO cannot be considered at fault for believing that certain portions of Hacienda Luisita
are industrial/commercial lands and are, thus, outside the ambit of CARP. The PARC, and
consequently DAR, gravely abused its discretion when it placed LIPCO’s and RCBC’s property which
once formed part of Hacienda Luisita under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme via the assailed
Notice of Coverage.
[The Court went on to apply the operative fact doctrine to determine what should be done in
the aftermath of its disposition of the above-enumerated issues:
While We affirm the revocation of the SDP on Hacienda Luisita subject of PARC Resolution Nos.
2005-32-01 and 2006-34-01, the Court cannot close its eyes to certain “operative facts” that had
occurred in the interim. Pertinently, the “operative fact” doctrine realizes that, in declaring
a law or executive action null and void, or, by extension, no longer without force and effect, undue
harshness and resulting unfairness must be avoided. This is as it should realistically be, since rights
might have accrued in favor of natural or juridical persons and obligations justly incurred in the
meantime. The actual existence of a statute or executive act is, prior to such a determination, an

21
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored; the past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration.
While the assailed PARC resolutions effectively nullifying the Hacienda Luisita SDP are
upheld, the revocation must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the
original 6,296 qualified FWBs to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or not. The
Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that in 1989, 93% of the FWBs agreed to the SDOA (or the
MOA), which became the basis of the SDP approved by PARC per its Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated
November 21, 1989. From 1989 to 2005, the FWBs were said to have received from HLI salaries and
cash benefits, hospital and medical benefits, 240-square meter homelots, 3% of the gross produce
from agricultural lands, and 3% of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and the
80.51-hectare lot sold to SCTEX. HLI shares totaling 118,391,976.85 were distributed as of April 22,
2005. On August 6, 20l0, HLI and private respondents submitted a Compromise Agreement, in which
HLI gave the FWBs the option of acquiring a piece of agricultural land or remain as HLI stockholders,
and as a matter of fact, most FWBs indicated their choice of remaining as stockholders. These facts
and circumstances tend to indicate that some, if not all, of the FWBs may actually desire to continue
as HLI shareholders. A matter best left to their own discretion.]
[WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated
December 22, 2005 and Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006, placing the lands subject of
HLI’s SDP under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 qualified FWBs shall have the
option to remain as stockholders of HLI. DAR shall immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296
FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice,
after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing
their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.
AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY v. THOMAS G. AQUINO, GR No. 170516, 2008-07-16
Facts:
calling for an inquiry into the bilateral trade agreements then being negotiated by the Philippine
government, particularly the JPEPA... but Usec. Aquino, by letter of November 2, 2005, replied that
the Congressman shall be provided with a copy thereof "once the negotiations are completed and as
soon as a thorough legal review of the proposed agreement has... been conducted."... he
Committee's request to be furnished all documents on the JPEPA may be difficult to accomplish at
this time, since the proposed Agreement has been a work... in progress for about three years.
the House Committee resolved to issue a subpoena for the most recent draft of the JPEPA, but the
same was not pursued because by Committee Chairman Congressman Teves' information, then
House Speaker Jose de Venecia had requested... him to hold in abeyance the issuance of the
subpoena until the President gives her consent to the disclosure of the documents.[3]
The agreement was to be later signed on September 9, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Helsinki, Finland, following which the President
endorsed it to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution...
first,... contravenes other constitutional provisions on... transparency, such as that on the policy of
full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.

22
Second... ctive and reasonable participation in... all levels of social, political, and economic decision-
making
Lastly... hey proffer that divulging the contents of the JPEPA only after the agreement has been
concluded will effectively make the Senate into a mere rubber stamp of the Executive,... in violation
of the principle of separation of powers.
he first two grounds relied upon by petitioners which bear on the merits of respondents' claim of
privilege shall be discussed.
the privileged character of the diplomatic negotiations has been categorically... invoked and clearly
explained by respondents particularly respondent DTI Senior Undersecretary.
Furthermore, the negotiations of the representatives of the Philippines as well as of Japan... must be
allowed to explore alternatives in the course of the negotiations in the same manner as judicial
deliberations and working drafts of opinions are accorded strict confidentiality
Issues:
To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold
requirement that it be a matter of public concern.
Ruling:
The JPEPA is a matter of public concern... it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern
The ground relied upon by respondents is thus not simply that the information sought involves a
diplomatic matter, but that it pertains to diplomatic negotiations then in progress.
"secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of
freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information."
, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential - since there
should be "ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved" - the offers exchanged...
by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is publishe
Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with
other foreign governments in future negotiations.
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to public scrutiny would
discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations.
the Court recognizes that the information sought by petitioners includes documents produced and
communicated by a party external to the Philippine government, namely, the Japanese
representatives in the JPEPA negotiations,... his Court echoes the principle articulated in Fulbright
that the public policy underlying the deliberative process privilege requires that diplomatic
negotiations should also be accorded privileged status,... it would be incorrect to claim that the
doctrine laid down therein has no bearing on a controversy such as the present, where the demand
for information has come from members of Congress, not only from private citizens.
he privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not only against citizens' demands for
information, but also in the context of legislative investigations.
the Court notes that the ruling in PMPF v. Manglapus is grounded more on the nature of treaty
negotiations as such than on a particular socio-political school of thought.
Petitioners have failed to present the strong and "sufficient showing of need" referred to in the
immediately cited cases.

23
The case for petitioners has, of course, been immensely weakened by the disclosure of the full text
of the JPEPA to the public since September 11, 2006, even as it is still being deliberated upon by the
Senate and, therefore, not yet binding on the Philippines.
The Court observes, however, that the claim of privilege appearing in respondents' Comment to this
petition fails to satisfy in full the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the claim should be
invoked by the President or through the Executive Secretary "by... order of the President."
The Court, however, in its endeavor to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be
careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid
even a legitimate exercise thereof.
Principles:
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only
presumptive.
the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one significant qualification
being that "the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general
confidentiality privilege to... shield its officials and employees from investigations by the proper
governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing."... the treaty-making power is exclusive
to the President, being the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, was echoed in BAYAN v.
Executive Secretary[56]where the Court held
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the
same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the members
of the Senate... his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself
Into the field of negotiation the
Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.
the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign
nations... the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments,
extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and... otherwise
transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states.
the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by... him.
Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty
negotiations.
Constitutional Law Case: RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL. G.R.
No. 171396
RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL. G.R. No. 171396, 171409,
171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424 May 3, 2006
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power
I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts
24
 of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the
cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People
Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal
of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his
companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily
Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS,
GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006,
President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to
exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions
impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that
it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU
and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?
3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the
proclamation?
5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to
Martial Law are used?
Ruling:
1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by
the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as
prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous
provisions giving the President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence
as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism"
may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra
vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution,
the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility
and private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly
unconstitutional.
2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless
arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof
that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and
25
violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as
well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for
publication and other materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that
the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled
that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest”
and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest only if there is congressional authority or
approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions
under which the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due
process of law would be observed.
Divinagracia v. Consolidate Broadcasting System, Inc.
, G.R. No.162272 (April 7, 2009) Facts:
1. Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and People’s
Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS) were incorporated in 1961 and 1965, respectively. Both are involved
in the operation of radio broadcasting services in the Philippines, they being the grantees of
legislative franchises by virtue of two laws, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582. > both for
25 years > two of the three networks that comprise the well-known "Bombo Radyo Philippines." >
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7477 and Section 3 of R.A. No. 7582 contain a common provision predicated on
the "constitutional mandate to democratize ownership of public utilities."
The common provision states:
SEC. 9. Democratization of ownership.― In compliance with the
constitutional mandate to democratize ownership of public utilities, the herein grantee shall make
public offering through the stock exchanges of at least thirty percent (30%) of its common stocks
within a period of three (3) years from the date of effectivity of this Act: Provided, That no single
person or entity shall be allowed to own more than five percent (5%) of the stock offerings 2. NTC
issued four (4) Provisional Authorities to PBS and six (6) Provisional Authorities to CBS, allowing them
to install, operate and maintain various AM and FM broadcast stations in various locations
throughout the nation 3. Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia filed two complaints both dated 1 March
1999 with the NTC, respectively lodged against PBS7 and CBS. He alleged that he was "the actual and
beneficial owner of Twelve percent (12%) of the shares of stock" of PBS and CBS separately, and that
despite the provisions in R.A. No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582 mandating the public offering of at least
30% of the common stocks of PBS and CBS, both entities had failed to make such offering. >
commonly argued in his complaints that the failure on the part of PBS and CBS "to comply with the
mandate of their legislative franchise is a misuse of the franchise conferred upon it by law and it
continues to exercise its franchise in contravention of the law to the detriment of the general public
26
and of complainant who are unable to enjoy the benefits being offered by a publicly listed company."
> He thus prayed for the cancellation of all the Provisional Authorities or CPCs of PBS and CBS on
account of the alleged violation of the conditions set therein, as well as in its legislative franchises. 4.
NTC issued a consolidated decision dismissing both complaints 5. CA: agreed with the earlier
conclusion that the complaints were indeed a collateral attack on the legislative franchises of CBS
and PBS and that a quo warranto action was the proper mode to thresh out the issues raised in the
complaints. 6. Issue: Whether the NTC has the power to cancel Provisional Authorities and
Certificates of Public Convenience it issued to legislative franchise-holders. Held: NO. Since legislative
franchises are extended through statutes, they should receive recognition as the ultimate expression
of State policy.
What the legislative franchises of respondents express is that the Congress, after due debate and
deliberation, declares it as State policy that respondents should have the right to operate broadcast
stations.
The President of the Philippines, by affixing his signature to the law, concurs in such State policy.
Allowing the NTC to countermand State policy by revoking respondent’s vested
legal right to operate broadcast stations unduly gives to a mere administrative agency veto power
over the implementation of the law and the enforcement of especially vested legal rights.
That concern would not arise if Congress had
similarly empowered the NTC with the power to revoke a franchisee’s right to operate
broadcast stations. But as earlier stated, there is no such expression in the law, and by presuming
such right the Court will be acting contrary to the stated State interest
as expressed in respondents’ legislative franchises.
If we examine the particular franchises of respondents, it is readily apparent that Congress has
especially invested the NTC with certain powers with respect to their broadcast operations. Both R.A.
No. 747759 and R.A. No. 758260 require the grantee "to secure from the [NTC] the appropriate
permits and licenses for its stations," barring the private respondents from "using any frequency in
the radio spectrum without having been authorized by the [NTC]." At the same time, both laws
provided that "[the NTC], however, shall not unreasonably withhold or delay the grant of any such
authority." It should be further noted that even the aforequoted provision does not authorize the
President or the government to cancel the licenses of the respondents. The temporary nature of the
takeover or closure of the station is emphasized in the provision. That fact further disengages the
provision from any sense that such delegated authority can be the source of a broad ruling affirming
the right of the NTC to cancel the licenses of franchisees.
With the legislated state policy strongly favoring the unimpeded operation of the
franchisee’s stations, it becomes even more difficu
lt to discern what compelling State interest may be fulfilled in ceding to the NTC the general power
to cancel the
franchisee’s CPC’s or licenses absent explicit statutory authorization. This absence of
a compelling state interest strongly disfavors petiti
oner’s cause.
The case is super long, I focused on the revocation part only. This is how the Court ended the
decision: We wish to make clear that the only aspect of the regulatory jurisdiction of the NTC that we
are ruling upon is its presumed power to cancel provisional authorities, CPCs or CPCNs and other such
27
licenses required of franchisees before they can engage in broadcast operations. Moreover, our
conclusion that the NTC has no such power is borne not simply from the statutory language of E.O.
No. 546 or the respective
stipulations in private respondents’ franchises, but moreso, from the application of the
strict scrutiny standard which, despite its weight towards free speech, still involves the analysis of
the competing interests of the regulator and the regulated. In resolving the present questions, it was
of marked impact to the Court that the presumed power to cancel would lead to utterly fatal
consequences to the constitutional right to expression, as well as the legislated right of these
franchisees to broadcast. Other regulatory measures of less drastic impact will have to be assessed
on their own terms in the proper cases, and our decision today should not be
accepted or cited as a blanket shearing of the NTC’s regulatory jurisdiction. In
addition, considering our own present recognition of legislative authority to regulate broadcast
media on terms more cumbersome than print media, it should not be discounted that Congress may
enact amendments to the organic law of the NTC that would alter the legal milieu from which we
adjudicated today. Still, the Court sees all benefit and no detriment in striking this blow in favor of
free expression and of the press. While the ability of the State to broadly regulate broadcast media
is ultimately dictated by physics, regulation with a light touch evokes a democracy mature enough to
withstand competing viewpoints and tastes. Perhaps unwittingly, the position advocated by
petitioner curdles a most vital sector of the press- broadcast media –
within the heavy hand of the State. The argument is not warranted by law, and it betrays the
constitutional expectations on this Court to assert lines not drawn and connect the dots around
throats that are free to speak.
Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector of the Port of Subic, Petitioners vs. Hypermix
Feeds Corp., Respondent (G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012)
Facts: At the center of controversy in this case is Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-2003
issued by the Commissioner of Customs on November 7, 2003. Said issuance provided that, for tariff
purposes, wheat shall be classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country
of origin; (3) port of discharge. The same likewise made an exclusive list of corporations, ports of
discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. On these factors would depend whether
wheat would be classified as food grade (3%) or feed grade (7%). The CMO also placed the procedure
for protest or Valuation and Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases.
In anticipation of the implementation of CMO 27-2003, respondent filed on December 19, 2003, a
Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Hypermix claims that said CMO:
(1) was issued without observing the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code; (2) declared it
to be a feed grade supplier sans the benefit of prior assessment and examination; (3) violated the
equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution; and (4) was confiscatory in nature since it had a
retroactive application.
The RTC issued a twenty (20) day Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on January 24, 2004.
Subsequently the Commissioner of Customs filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the ensuing grounds:
(1) that RTC is without jurisdiction because Hypermix was seeking for a judicial determination of the
classification of wheat; (2) action for Declaratory Relief is improper; (3) The CMO was an internal
administrative rule and not legislative in character; (4) Hypermix’ assertions were speculative and
premature. Finally, petitioner “X x x likewise opposed the application for a writ of preliminary
28
injunction on the ground that they had not inflicted any injury through the issuance x x x; and that
the action would be contrary to the rule that administrative issuances are assumed valid until
declared otherwise.”
The RTC and Court of Appeals (CA) decided in favor of respondent Hypermix Feeds Corporation.
Issues:
1. Did the CA decide a question of substance?
2. Did the CA make a mistake in pronouncing that the RTC acted within its jurisdiction?
Held: The Supreme Court (SC) denied the petition and decided in favor of Hypermix Feeds
Corporation, the respondent herein.
The SC first tackled the issue regarding Declaratory Relief. The court mentioned that for an action for
Declaratory Relief to prosper, these requisites must be present: (1) justiciable controversy; (2)
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) legal interest of the party seeking the action; and (4) issue
must be ripe for judicial determination. The court ruled that the petition filed by respondent in the
lower court meets the requirements.
The SC said: “Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial
power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity
of the acts of the political departments.”
The court also ruled that the controversy is between two parties who have adverse interest, i.e., the
Commissioner of Customs is imposing the tariff rate that Hypermix is refusing to pay. On the third
requirement, the SC declared: “X x x. Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular importer
of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has actually made shipments of wheat from China to Subic. The
shipment was set to arrive in December 2003. Upon its arrival, it would be subjected to the conditions
of CMO 27-2003. The regulation calls for the imposition of different tariff rates, depending on the
factors enumerated therein. Thus, respondent alleged that it would be made to pay 7% tariff applied
to feed grade wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on food grade wheat. In addition, respondent would
have to go through the procedure under CMO 27-2003, which would undoubtedly toll its time and
resources.”
The SC likewise mentioned that issue is ripe for judicial determination because litigation is
forthcoming for the reason that Hypermix is not included in the list of flour millers grouped as food
grade wheat importers. The court struck down CMO 27-2003 for violating the Revised Administrative
Code rules on Filing and Public Participation. Furthermore, it ruled that the provision of the
Memorandum is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause of the 1987
Constitution. There must be a valid classification. Moreover, the SC declared that petitioner
Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers when CMO 27-2003 limited the customs officer’s
duties mandated under Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP)[Duties
of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify, and Appraise Imported Articles].
CASE TITLE: ROBOSA v NLRC
GR NO.: G.R. No. 176085
DATE: February 8, 2012
PETITIONER: FREDERICO ROBOSA et al.- rank and file employees of respondent, officers of the union
RESPONDENT: Chemo-Technische Manufacturing, Inc. (CTMI) – acquired by Proctor and Gamble
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FACTS:
CTMI Employees Union-DFA, led by the petitioners filed a petition for certification election at CTMI
to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the company. It failed to garner the votes required.
Later on, respondent issued a memorandum demobilizing its sales territories and abolishing its
system of truck-sales representatives while simultaneously informing the sales group of a new
system(Salon Business Groups). Petitioner union asked for the withdrawal of respondent’s directives
but the latter ignored it. Instead it issued a notice of termination of employment of sales drivers due
to the abolition of their position.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practices against CTMI, it also moved
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO. During the compulsory arbitration
proceedings, the union was prompted to file it to the NLRC which then issued a TRO. It was upgraded
to a writ of preliminary injunction when the respondent refused to comply. Respondent moved for
consideration but was denied by the NLRC who then directed Labor Arbiter Cristeta Tamayo to hear
the motion for contempt as urged by the union.
The NLRC heard the contempt charge but issued its dismissal. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
and subsequently sought relief from the CA. However, the CA opined that the dismissal is not subject
to review by an appellate court. Hence this petition raising the issues.
ISSUE:
(1) whether the NLRC has contempt powers;
(2) whether the dismissal of a contempt charge is appealable; and
(3) whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the contempt charge against
the respondents
HELD:
1.) Under Article 218 of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any offending
party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with law.
The Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the Commission to deal with indirect
contempt in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate indirect
contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mode is to be observed only when there is no law
granting them contempt powers. Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter or the
Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party or parties in direct or
indirect contempt. The petitioners, therefore, have not improperly brought the indirect contempt
charges against the respondents before the NLRC.
2.) The CA held that the NLRCs dismissal of the contempt charges against the respondents amounts
to an acquittal in a criminal case and is not subject to appeal. This ruling is grounded on prevailing
jurisprudence.
The case cited Mison jr. v. Subido where Justice Reyes stressed “the contempt proceeding far from
being a civil action is of a criminal nature and of summary character in which the court exercises but
limited jurisdiction. It was then explicitly held: Hence, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal would
not lie from the order of dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of contempt of court.”
3.) No. The assailed NLRC ruling did not commit grave abuse of discretion. It rightly avoided probing
into issues which would clearly be in excess of its jurisdiction for they are issues involving the merits
of the case which are by law within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. The
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NLRC can inquire into them only on appeal after the merits of the case shall have been adjudicated
by the labor arbiter. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse
of discretion when it was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
43 Phil. 1 – Political Law – Delegation of Power – Administrative Bodies
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868
entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under
extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the
GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the
price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice
to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that
prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged
for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the
publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot
be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and
the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what
the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take
the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters
involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the
act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it
leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the
electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law
in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
People vs Vera
undue delagation of power; equal protection of the law
G.R. No. L-45685 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG, respondents.
Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four
motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed
for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the
Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application.
However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing.
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The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation
because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting
provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the
law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that
only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because
Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute
discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said
probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because
providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Discussions:
1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its
provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of
their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of
Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary
discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend
the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the
various provincial boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification of equal
protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
Rulings:
1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional
and void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in
carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is
violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegation of power. Further, it is a
violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in
section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower
than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does
not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the
needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
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2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which
prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality
may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this
is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for
the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary
fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do
so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the
latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable
to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in
another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination.
Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for
the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality
would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every
province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.
YNOT v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987 (CASE DIGEST)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
POLICE POWER
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and the REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on
January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo for the violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the slaughter of carabaos except under
certain conditions. Petitioner sued for recovery, and the trial Court of Iloilo issued a writ of replevin
upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of twelve thousand pesos (P 12, 000.00). After considering the
merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the said carabaos and, since they could no
longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the E.O, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes, though police power was invoked by the government in this case for the reason that
the present condition demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of
the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs, it does not however, comply with the second
requisite for a valid exercise of the said power which is, "that there be a lawful method." The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing.
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. To justify the State in the imposition of its authority in behalf of the public, it must be:

33
1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference;
2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Pelaez vs Auditor General
undue delegation of legislative power
G.R. No. L-23825 15 SCRA 569 December 24, 1965
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Facts:
The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-
three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President
of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition
with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation
of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68
has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370,
reads: “Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under
the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.”
Issues:
Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.
Discussions:
Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the
laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise
of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by
the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the
latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether
said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or
its officers act within the scope of their authority.
Rulings:
Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the President to
create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even
greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other
words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that
34
 vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does
the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which
he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
G.R. Nos. 177857-58. January 24, 2012
Philippine Coconut, Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), Manuel V. Del Rosario, Domingo P.
Espina, Salvador P. Ballares, Joselito A. Moraleda, Paz M. Yason, Vicente A. Cadiz, Cesaria De Luna
Titular, and Raymundo C. De Villa, Petitioners, vs. Republic of the Philippines, respondent.
Facts: In 1971, R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company to administer
the Coconut Investment Fund. The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the issuance of
several presidential decrees purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry through the
collection and use of the coconut levy fund. In G.R. Nos. 177857-58, class action petitioners COCOFED
and a group of purported coconut farmers and COCOFED members, hereinafter “COCOFED et al.”
collectively seek the reversal of the judgments and resolutions of the anti-graft court insofar as these
issuances are adverse to their interests. As a procedural issue, COCOFED, et al. and Ursua contends
that in the course of almost 20 years that the cases have been with the anti-graft court, they have
repeatedly sought leave to adduce evidence (prior to respondent’s complete presentation of
evidence) to prove the coco farmers’ actual and beneficial ownership of the sequestered shares. The
Sandiganbayan, however, had repeatedly and continuously disallowed such requests, thus depriving
them of their constitutional right to be heard.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners COCOFED et al. were not deprived of their right to be heard; and (2)
whether or not the right to speedy trial was violated.
Ruling:
(1) No, petitioner COCOFED’s right to be heard had not been violated by the mere issuance of PSJ-A and
PSJ-F before they can adduce their evidence. As it were, petitioners COCOFED et al. were able to
present documentary evidence in conjunction with its “Class Action Omnibus Motion”
dated February 23, 2001 where they appended around four hundred (400) documents including
affidavits of alleged farmers. These petitioners manifested that said documents comprise their
evidence to prove the farmers’ ownership of the UCPB shares, which were distributed in accordance
with valid and existing laws. Lastly, COCOFED et al. even filed their own Motion for Separate
Summary Judgment, an event reflective of their admission that there are no more factual issues left
to be determined at the level of the Sandiganbayan. This act of filing a motion for summary judgment
is a judicial admission against COCOFED under Section 26, Rule 130 which declares that the “act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.”
(2) No. As a matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled exception, an issue not raised
before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The sporting idea forbidding one
from pulling surprises underpins this rule. For these reasons, the instant case cannot be dismissed
for the alleged violation of petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of the case. It must be clarified
right off that the right to a speedy disposition of case and the accused’s right to a speedy trial are
distinct, albeit kindred, guarantees, the most obvious difference being that a speedy disposition of
cases, as provided in Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution. In fine, the right to a speedy trial is
available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while the broader right to a
speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies.
35