RENATO CAYETANO vs.

CHRISTIAN MONSOD [September 3, 1991]

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon Aquino to the position of Chairman of COMELEC
thru a letter to the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed Monsod’s nomination and on June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office and assumed office
as Chairman.

Renato Cayetano, as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and appointment be declared null and void.

ISSUE: W/N Monsod possess the qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.

HELD: YES. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the IBP since its inception in 1972-73.

After graduating from the UP College of Law and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his
father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two
years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he
worked with the Meralco Group, served as CEO of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate,
and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or CEO. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable
in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the COMELEC. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill.
Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman
of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission,
Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law, particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years .

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. [Luego v. CSC] PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. [J. Paras]

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."

“To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in
the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We
have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.”
Separate Opinions: 14-member Court, 5 believe Monsod is engaged in the practice of law; 4 stating
that he did not practice law; 2 believe there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one on official leave; and 2 abstaining.
J. PADILLA: I am convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries." The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC
Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden
duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished
from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated, or customary action. To "practice" law, or any
profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in
the "practice of medicine." A CPA who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same
way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law. Commission on
Appointments in a Memorandum enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice
of law."
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer. Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a
service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva). Hence, charging for services such
as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law". If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are
practicing law.
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is
within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but
involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer.
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did
perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least 10 years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to
the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated
transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of
law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts.
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active
and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
J. Cruz: I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable
feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the
application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the
definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation." It is conceded that
Monsod has been engaged in business and finance, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an
activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice
of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme
Court and all lower courts. The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental,
intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous.

MAURICIO ULEP vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. [June 17, 1993]

Mauricip Ulep prays that the respondent cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to the following 1 and to
perpetually prohibit them from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed
by law." Ulep submits that the subject advertisements are “champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar.”

TLC: claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with
the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed. [John Bates vs. State Bar of Arizona]

ISSUE: W/N the services offered by The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines: Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", the same are essentially without substantial distinction. The use of
the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent-corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it
renders legal services. While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt
in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

Also, the advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and
public policy. By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos
can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce.
This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business. There might be nothing
objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to
members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services.

Philippine Bar Association: From all indications, "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve
of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter
to look after their case in court

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit.

Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar is to subject the
members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who
act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be
assigned to another. It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice.

Philippine Lawyers' Association: As advertised, The Legal Clinic offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such
other related laws. Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and
experience.

1
ANNEX A: SECRET MARRIAGE? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
ANNEB B: An Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what
lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7

U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle: While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility
from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services.

Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases
for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, are illegal and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Federacion Internacional de Abogados: In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any
particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted
by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the
zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor
feature of his work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. A
person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training
and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of
legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity:
legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents
requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in
proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are
strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. It is engaged in the practice of law
by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an
obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a
different proceeding and forum. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be
subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor
General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing
or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor
and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO
CUNANAN, ET AL. [March 18, 1954]

Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953."
Sec 1.Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of 70% in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August 19, 1951 bar examinations; 71% in the 1952; 72% in
the 1953; 73% in the 1954; 74% in the 1955, without obtaining a grade below 50% in any subject, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar.
Sec 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject in any bar examination after July 4, 1946 shall be deemed
to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average
that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

The reason for relaxing the standard 75% passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the years
immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of
the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in
addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of
reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

ISSUE: W/N RA no. 972 is unconstitutional.

HELD: YES, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it
qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was
exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession
adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult.
To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of
those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social
danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated.
There were abundant materials.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary
immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the
disputed law. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a
judicial function and responsibility.

Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province of the
legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the
legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or
conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to
alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70%
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year
affecting the bar candidates concerned.
Although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that
only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of any of
these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the Constitution
recognizes continue to reside in this Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor
permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the
matter.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to
fix the minimum conditions for the license. The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been
found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable. The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a
classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded
and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions.

As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real
differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. In other words, there must be such a difference
between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all
other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural
cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class
only, and not generally on all.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated, were
not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not
justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955.
Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this
Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other
means his right to an equal consideration.

This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the
rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly
what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the
power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to
stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it
falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

RESOLUTION
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of
said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the
approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10,
article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive
are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5% or more, without having
a grade below 50% in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After
this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the
Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set.

IN RE: DISQUALIFICATION OF HARON MELING IN 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS [June 8, 2004]

1
In 2002, Atty. Froilan Melendrez filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant a Petition to disqualify Haron Meling from
taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that
he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the MTCC of Cotabato City, namely: 2 Criminal Cases for Grave Oral
Defamation, and a Criminal Case for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
In 2001, Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners
and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the
latter. Furthermore, Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
MELING: he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge Corocoy Moson advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled, Meling considered the
three cases as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral
turpitude. As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really contained
the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
OBC: Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases. Furthermore,
granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to
ascertain his good moral character. The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is
his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his
communications as "Atty. Haron Meling" knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. The unauthorized use of
the appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. OBC recommended that
Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar
Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended until further
orders from the Court. SC: CONCURED with the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the [2002] Bar Examinations.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice
of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the
applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation
before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal
of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her."
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT: imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good
moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court
in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of
such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
In Alawi v. Alauya, respondent therein used the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the
rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that persons who pass the
Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari’a courts.
While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both
be considered "counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is
an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Meling as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar. His membership in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from
the Court. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW; BENJAMIN DACANAY [December 17, 2007]
Benjamin Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s
free medical aid program and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
In 2006, pursuant to RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), Dacanay reacquired his
Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate
General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

ISSUE: W/N Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in 2004.

Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant
for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least 21 years of age, of good moral
character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
any court in the Philippines.

OBC: by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, Dacanay has again met all the qualifications and
has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the
practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar; SC: approved the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant with certain modifications.

Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

GENERAL RULE: Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words,
the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law
is a privilege denied to foreigners.
EXCEPTION: when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to
resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "he shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice." Before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice,
he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar. The petition of
Attorney Benjamin Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and
submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS vs. BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR CO. [November 29, 1971]

Petitioners were complainants in a case entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the
Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique
Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final.
Cipriano Cid & Associates: filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages; Atty. Atanacio
Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount.
COMPLAINANTS: filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their
backwages
Quentin Muning: filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages.
Muning’s petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
CIR: awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned
with Cipriano Cid & Associates receiving 10%, Quintin Muning receiving 10%, and Atty Pacis receiving 5%.

ISSUE: W/N QUENTIN MUNING, a non-lawyer, may recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered.

HELD: NO. As enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations, an agreement
providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees
with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court
of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.

Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875: “In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties
shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel.” The aforesaid provision is no justification for a ruling, that
the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to
attorney's fees: for the same section adds that “it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to
examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of
evidence,” thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of
the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-
litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. Section 24, Rule 138, of
the Rules of Court imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of
attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer.

Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and
Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands
that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications
and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public. The general rule above-stated (referring to
non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by
seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney.

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees should suffice to
refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should be
excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the
aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial
Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as
"representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective
action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this
matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. The orders under
review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent
Quintin Muning.

WILFREDO CATU vs. ATTY. VICENTE RELLOSA [February 19, 2008]

Wilfredo Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building in Manila. His mother and brother, Regina and Antonio Catu,
contested the possession of Elizabeth Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter
ignored demands to vacate the premises. Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against
Elizabeth and Pastor in MeTC-Manila. Atty. Vicente Rellosa entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in
that case. In turn, Wilfredo filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that Rellosa committed an act of
impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that
he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

RELLOSA: claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the
barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and
Pastor. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the
ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her
case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice
against her.

IBP-CBD: found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. Under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
“A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he intervened while in said service.”

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 which
stated that “Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not engage in the private practice of
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions.”

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one
month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. This
was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.

SC: Modified the FINDINGS and PENALTY of IBP. Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility because that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in
connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that
Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service." Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at
the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees. For elective local
government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 governs. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of
profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on
engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees.

While certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly
subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Since they are
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this
stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent
was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization
from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. A civil service officer or employee whose
responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private
practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned.
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to
do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their
paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance
of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that “A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR.”

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity
of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member
of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession.

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's
oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Vicente Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons
1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition
of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
JULIO ZETA vs. FELICISIMO MALINAO [December 20, 1978]

An administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao, court interpreter of the Court of First Instance of Catbalogan,
Samar, was filed by one [“Julio Zeta”] charging as follows:

l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR. Malinao has been appearing in the municipal court of
this town for parties like attorney when he is not an attorney..

2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being employed in the Court of First Instance he would
instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab land, rob, or coerce. He incites them telling them
not to be afraid as he is a court employee and has influence over the judges.

3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has it that he is unfaithfully filing his time record in
the CFI. Even if he has been out practicing in the municipal courts sometimes he would fill his time
record as present. He receives salary for those absent days.

4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW.- It is prohibited for a civil service
employee to engage in private practice any profession or business without permission from the
Department Head. Mr. Malinao has not secured that permission because he should not be allowed
to practice as he is not an attorney.

MALINAO: His participation for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by
reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality.

CFI: Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared that according to his docket books the respondent appeared
as counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in a criminal case in the Municipal Court of Sta. Rita, Samar, for grave threats and in
a criminal case for the same accused and Romulo Villagracia for illegal possession of firearm.

Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that the respondent appeared as counsel in a civil case in the
Municipal Court of Daram, Samar for forcible entry.

Judge Juanito Reyes declared the respondent appeared as counsel for the defendant in a civil case of the Municipal
Court of Zumarraga for forcible entry.

SC: Respondent, apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior permission of his
superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations, falsified his time record of service by making it appear
therein that he was present in his office on occasions when in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as
counsel, without being a member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. We, therefore,
adopt the above findings of fact of the Investigator.

The defense of respondent that "his participation for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the
services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality" cannot, even if true, carry the day for
him, considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so without permission from his superiors and, worse,
he falsified his time record of service to conceal his absence from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the
number of times that respondent acted as counsel under the above circumstances would indicate that he was doing
it as a regular practice obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice.

The offense committed by respondent warrants a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by
Judge Zosa. We find no alternative than to separate him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from
appearing in any court or investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to practice.

Thus, Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter in the Court of First Instance,
Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH [March 19, 1997]

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-
taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. The aforesaid criminal case
arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and
seven other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight accused later withdrew their
initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment imposing on each of the accused a sentence of
imprisonment of from 2 yrs, 4 mos. 1 day to 4 yrs. Afterwards, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application
for probation. In 1994, petitioner was discharge from probation. Petitioner then filed before this Court a petition to
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.

SC: Argosino was required to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.

ARGOSINO: submitted 15 certifications which contained letters from 2 senators, 5 trial court judges, and 6 members
of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in
honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the 8 accused.

Atty. Gilbert Camaligan: still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son
was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused
took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength
and treachery. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He
therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

SC: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of
this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of
equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of
lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required
for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for. However, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above. After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al
Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the
following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for
civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death
of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer
should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all
lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As
a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of
society.
Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll
of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

PATRICK CARONAN vs. RICHARD CARONAN a.k.a. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN" [March 19, 1997]

Patrick and Richard Caronan are siblings. Richard is older by one year. Patrick graduated from the University of
Makati with a degree in Business Administration; Richard enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila in
1991, transferred to the Philippine Military Academy in 1992, and was discharged from PMA in 1993.

In 2004, their mother informed Patrick that Richard passed the Bar Examinations and that he used Patrick;’s name
and college records from the University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law in Nueva Vizcaya
and take the Bar Exams. Patrick brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him.

Sometime in 2009, after his promotion as Store Manager, Patrick was informed that the NBI was requesting his
presence in relation to an investigation involving Richard, who was using the name "Atty. Patrick Caronan." Patrick
later learned that Richard had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities. Patrick
then took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick Caronan" and that respondent's real
name is Richard Caronan. However, due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick
Caronan," complainant developed a fear for his own safety and security. He also became the subject of conversations
among his colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from his job at PSC. Hence, complainant filed the
present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice
of law.

RICHARD: denied all the allegations against him and invoked res judicata as a defense. He maintained that his
identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in a CBD Case where the IBP Board of
Governors dismissed the administrative case filed by Agtarap against him.

IBP: found respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic records.
Richard failed to controvert all the allegations against him and did not present any proof to prove his identity. On the
other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick Caronan."

ISSUE: W/N (a) the name "Patrick Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard Caronan"
be barred from being admitted to the Bar.

HELD: YES to BOTH. Respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and school records to gain admission to
the Bar. Since the real "Patrick Caronan" never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the
name "Patrick Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard Caronan," be barred from
admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar
Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course.

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he
has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in
an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school
course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subject as
major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history, and economics.

In the case at hand, Richard never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a
year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating. Clearly, respondent has not
completed the requisite pre-law degree. The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on
complete his college education and earn a law degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of his
brother's name, identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law,
after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a
privilege limited to citizens of good moral character. In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S.
Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari 'a Bar, Atty.
Froilan. Melendrez,59the Court explained the essence of good moral character:
Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is
not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good
moral character includes at least common honesty.

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he
assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which
eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral
character is essential in those who would be lawyers. This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the
trust relation which exists between him and his client, as well as between him and the court.

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary qualifications to
be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the
filing of several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal
profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely
assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law
degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal
cases, the Court hereby resolves that:

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" is ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the name "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such name
are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards of all courts
of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a
member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A.
Caronan."
IN RE: PETITION TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO MUNESES [July 24, 2012]

Epifanio Muneses became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in 1966. He lost his privilege to practice
law when he became a citizen of the US in 1981. In 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA
9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington. He intends to retire in the Philippines. Thus, in 2009, he filed
a petition with the Office of the Bar Confidant praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines.

SC: Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is a continuing requirement for the practice of
law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage
in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country
and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
However, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends
to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage
in such practice. The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of
the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for
the continued exercise of his professional privilege.

OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the following
documents in relation to his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of
Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of
annual membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.
In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship
issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter
attesting to his good moral character as well as his updated
payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance
period; and
8. Certification of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-
MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his
compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume
his practice of law.

THUS, the petition of Attorney Epifanio Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take
the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.
STEPHAN and VIRGINIA BRUNET vs. ATTY. RONALD GUAREN [March 10, 2014]

Spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet engaged the services of Atty. Ronald Guaren for the titling of a residential lot
they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres. Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of ₱10,000 including expenses relative to its
proceeding, where full payment shall be made after the delivery of the title. Atty. Guaren asked for and was given an
advance fee of Pl,000. Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lot. After, Atty.
Guaren asked for additional payment of ₱6,000. From 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the
case and each time he would say that the titling was in progress. The spouses became bothered by the slow progress
of the case so they demanded the return of the money they paid. Atty. Guaren agreed to return the same provided
that ₱5,000 be deducted to answer for his professional fees. Thus, in 2002, spouses Brunet filed a complaint against
Atty. Guaren before the Commission on Bar Discipline. Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an
attorney-client relationship between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending
before the MeTC of Cebu.

Atty. Guaren: admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee of ₱10,000, but denied that the
amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed that their agreement was that the case would
be filed in court after the complainants fully paid his acceptance fee.

Investigating Commissioner, CBD: found Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility when
he accepted the titling of complainants’ lot. Despite the acceptance of ₱7,000, he failed to perform his obligation and
allowed 5 years to elapse without any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be disciplined for
appearing in a case against complainants without a written consent from the latter. The CBD recommended that he
be suspended for 6 months; IBP Board of Governors: adopted and approved with modification the Report,
suspending Atty. Guaren from the practice of law for 3 months only.

SC: adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical conduct of Atty. Guaren, except as to the
penalty.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service
and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of ₱7,000 as partial payment of his
acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants' lot
despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when
he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald Guaren is found GUILTY of having violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6 MONTHS effective from receipt of this
Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
VICTOR LINGAN vs. ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY BALIGA [June 30, 2014]
In 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and of the Lawyer's Oath. Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize
documents in their stead, in violation of the Notarial Law. This court suspended respondents from the practice of
law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment as notaries public
for two years.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human Rights issued the
resolution suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the CHR Regional Office for Region II.
According to CHR, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law "prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his post [as
Regional Director] for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended."
ATTY. BALIGA: argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as CHR Regional
Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension from public
office.
LINGAN: claimed that the discharge of the functions of a CHR Regional Director necessarily required the practice of
law. A CHR Regional Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this court
suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non-lawyer”, disqualified to hold the
position of [Regional Director] [during the effectivity of the order of suspension]."
Office of the Bar Confidant: found that the period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga had already lapsed.
It recommended that respondents be required to file their respective motions to lift order of suspension with
certifications from the IBP and the Executive Judge of the court where they might appear as counsel and state that
they desisted from practicing law during the period of suspension. In compliance with this court's order, Attys.
Calubaquib and Baliga filed their respective motions to lift order of suspension. Atty. Baliga also filed his comment on
complainant Lingan's allegation that he continued performing his functions as Regional Director during his
suspension from the practice of law.
ATTY. BALIGA: alleged that as Regional Director, he "performed, generally, managerial functions." The Commission
allegedly has its own "legal services unit which takes care of the legal services matters of the Commission." Stating
that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice of law, Atty. Baliga claimed thaf he "faithfully
complied with this court's resolution suspending him from the practice of law."
CHR: argued that "the penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and distinct from any
penalty that may be imposed upon him as a public official for the same acts." Atty. Baliga's suspension from the
practice of law is a "bar matter"39 while the imposition of penalty upon a CHR official "is an entirely different thing,
falling as it does within the exclusive authority of the Commission as disciplining body." Nevertheless, the
Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's resolution of the issue and would "abide by whatever
ruling or decision of the court.
As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director and only
performed generally managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to defying the
order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a "lawyer-manager," 43 which under the
landmark case of Cayetano v. Monsod constituted practice of law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position
of Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the officer "to be a lawyer [in] good standing." 45 Moreover, as admitted by
Atty. Baliga, he had supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga
practiced law while he held his position as Regional Director.
Office of the Bar Confidant: Atty. Baliga "should not [have been] allowed to perform his functions, duties, and
responsibilities as Regional Director which [required acts constituting] practice .of law."
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension should be granted.
HELD: NO. Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. He is thus suspended further from the practice of law
for six months.
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal]
profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law. CHR is an independent
office created under the Constitution with power to investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights." Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights
Violations and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR Assistance, the Regional Director has the following powers and
functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission on Human Rights] matters;" 65
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices; 66
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights complaints in the absence of the
legal officer or investigator;67
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and discuss "immediate courses of action
and protection remedies and/or possible submission of the matter to an alternative dispute resolution"; 68
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-invitations, orders, or subpoenas
within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office; 69 and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer.
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually
performed by members of the judiciary and notaries public, officers who are necessarily members of the bar.
Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the Commission's legal officer. Discussing
immediate courses of action and protection remedies and reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights
cases prepared by the legal officer require the use of extensive legal knowledge.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a CHR Regional Director constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional
Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in good standing and authorized to practice law. When the
Regional Director loses this authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the
Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended
lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional Director.
In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission on Human Rights did not violate
Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was only suspended after: investigation by the Commission on Human
Rights Legal and Investigation Office. Second, the Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he
filed his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not supported by the record. It was also immaterial.
He held the position of CHR Regional Director because of his authority to practice law. Without this authority, Atty.
Baliga was disqualified to hold that position. All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director constituted practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding his position as Regional
Director.
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution in April, 2007. This resolution caused Atty. Baliga
to reassume his position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite lack of authority to practice law.
We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of
law.81 The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other issuances, modify or defy this court's orders of
suspension from the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human Rights has the power to appoint its
officers and employees,82 it can only retain those with the necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding.
As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege burdened with conditions." 83 To enjoy the
privileges of practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest
degree of morality[,] and [faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal profession." 84
WHEREFORE, we FURTHER SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy Baliga from the practice of law for 6 months. Atty. Baliga shall serve
a total of 1 year and 6 months of suspension from the practice of law.

DONNA MARIE AGUIRRE vs. EDWIN RANA [June 10, 2003]

Edwin Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On May 21, 2001, one day before the
scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees, Donna Marie Aguirre filed against Rana a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Aguirre charged Raba with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation
of law, and grave misrepresentation.
Aguirre alleges that Rana, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections
before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers, Masbate. Allegedly, Rana filed with the MBEC a pleading dated
May 19, 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of
Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, Rana represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan. Aguirre claims that Rana filed the pleading as
a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
Further, as a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate,
Rana is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body. The Court issued a
resolution allowing Rana to take the lawyer’s oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is
cleared of the charges against him.
RANA: admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him before the MBEC. Rana claims that "he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Rana admits signing the
May 19, 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing, but he did not sign the
pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the pleading. Rana also claims that he submitted his
resignation on May 11, 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. Rana further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
AGUIRRE: alleges that on May 19, 2001, Emily Estipona-Hao filed a petition for proclamation as the winning
candidate for mayor. Rana signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel
before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as
a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
OBC: found that Rana appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections and that Rana
actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings
even before he took the lawyer’s oath on May 22, 2001. The OBC believes that respondent’s misconduct casts a
serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s
unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law.
SC: Rana engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing.
Rana was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various
pleadings, without license to do so. Rana called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of
the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, Rana has shown
moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of
law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking
admission had practiced law without a license. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a candidate passed the bar examinations but
had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a
person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. 7
It is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent
passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely:
his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, Edwin Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL MEDADO [September 24, 2013]
Michael Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979 and
passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7. In 1980, he took the Attorney’s
Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on May 13,
1980, but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation.
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance
of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working.
Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of
Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer"; and "the matter of signing in the Roll of
Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten. In 2005, when Medado attended
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE
compliances to be credited but he was unable to provide his roll number. In 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition,
praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
OBC: recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter
lack of merit. Medado could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.
SC: We grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a
penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law. Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious
ethical transgressions of members of the Bar. In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
1. Medado demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in
the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission;
rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years.
2. For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law. This fact
demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he
has prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
3. Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner.
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the practice of
law is not a right but a privilege, this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have
shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession. That said, however, we cannot fully
exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without having
signed in the Roll of Attorneys. He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional
but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment." While an honest mistake of fact could be used to
excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot
be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides “A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.”
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the
unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9
is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical
standards of the legal profession.
As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to
impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one year after receipt
of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it
fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to
engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has
signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

VERLITA MERCULLO and RAYMOND VEDANO vs. ATTY. MARIE FRANCESE RAMON [July 19, 2016]

From 2002 to 2011, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation sent several demand letters to Carmelita
Vedaño regarding her unpaid obligations secured by the mortgage covering her residential property in Novaliches,
Caloocan City. To avoid the foreclosure of the mortgage, Carmelita authorized her children, Verlita and Raymond, to
inquire from the NHMFC about the status of the obligations. Verlita and Raymond learned that their mother's
arrears had amounted to P350,000, and that the matter of the mortgage was under the charge of Atty. Marie
Ramon, but who was not around at that time.

In 2012, Carmelita received a letter from the sheriff of RTC-Caloocan City, stating that her property would be put up
for auction in July 2013. Verlita and Raymond thus went to the NHMFC to see the Atty. Ramon, who advised them
about their right to redeem the property within one year from the foreclosure. In August 2013, Verlita and
Raymond called up Atty. Ramon and expressed their intention to redeem the property by paying the redemption
price.

After Atty. Ramon had oriented them on the procedure for redemption, the complainants handed P350,000 to Atty.
Ramon, who signed an acknowledgment receipt. Two acknowledgment receipts were issued --for the redemption
price and for litigation expenses. Before leaving them, she promised to inform them as soon as the documents for
redemption were ready for their mother's signature.

Verlita and Raymond went to the NHMFC to follow up on the redemption, but discovered that Atty. Ramon had
already ceased to be connected with the NHMFC. When Verlita and Raymond went to see the Clerk of Court of RTC-
Caloocan City to inquire on the status of the redemption, they discovered that Atty. Ramon had not deposited the
redemption price and had not filed the letter of intent for redeeming the property.

Verlita and Raymond went to Atty. Ramon and handed her their demand letter requiring her to return the amount
she had received for the redemption. Atty. Ramon acknowledged the letter and promised to return the money on
December 16, 2013 by depositing the amount in Verlita's bank account. However, she did not fulfill her promise.
Thus, Verlita and Raymond brought their disbarment complaint in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

IBP: Atty. Ramon did not submit her answer when required to do so. She also did not attend the mandatory
conference set by the IBP despite notice. Hence, the investigation proceeded ex parte. IBP Commissioner found Atty.
Ramon to have violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for engaging in deceitful conduct, and
recommended her suspension from the practice of law for two years, and her return to the complainants of
P350,000; IBP Board of Governors adopted the Commissioner recommendation.

SC: The Court declares the respondent guilty of dishonesty and deceit.

The LAWYER'S OATH is a source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer. Any violation of the oath may be
punished with either disbarment, or suspension from the practice of law, or other commensurate disciplinary
action. Every lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent
to his admission to the Bar, but are also essential for his continued membership in the Law Profession. Any conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer constitutes a violation of his oath.

Atty. Ramon certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving money from the complainants after having
made them believe that she could assist them in ensuring the redemption in their mother's behalf. She was
convincing about her ability to work on the redemption because she had worked in the NHFMC. She did not inform
them soon enough, however, that she had ceased to be connected with the agency. It was her duty to have so
informed them. She further misled them about her ability to realize the redemption by falsely informing them about
having started the redemption process. She concealed from them the real story that she had not even initiated the
redemption proceedings that she had assured them she would do.

Everything she did was dishonest and deceitful in order to have them part with P350,000. She took advantage of the
complainants who had reposed their full trust and confidence in her ability to perform the task by virtue of her being
a lawyer. Surely, the totality of her actuations inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession.

As a lawyer, Atty. Ramon was proscribed from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in her
dealings with others, especially clients whom she should serve with competence and diligence. Her duty required her
to maintain fealty to them, binding her not to neglect the legal matter entrusted to her. Thus, her neglect in
connection therewith rendered her liable. Moreover, the unfulfilled promise of returning the money and her refusal
to communicate with the complainants on the matter of her engagement aggravated the neglect and dishonesty
attending her dealings with the complainants.

The respondent's conduct patently breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or omission of the respondent within the coverage
of Rule 1. 01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Code exacted from her not only a firm respect for the
law and legal processes but also the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys
entrusted by them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship.

Yet another dereliction of Atty. Ramon was her wanton disregard of the several notices sent to her by the IBP in this
case. Such disregard could only be wrong because it reflected her undisguised contempt of the proceedings of the
IBP, a body that the Court has invested with the authority to investigate the disbarment complaint against her. She
thus exhibited her irresponsibility as well as her utter disrespect for the Court and the rest of the Judiciary. A lawyer
in her shoes should comply with the orders of the Court and of the Court's duly constituted authorities, like the IBP,
the office that the Court has particularly tasked to carry out the specific function of investigating attorney
misconduct.

The recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the misconduct committed. Atty. Ramon merited a
heavier sanction of suspension from the practice of law for five years. Her professional misconduct warranted a
longer suspension from the practice of law because she had caused material prejudice to the clients' interest. She
should somehow be taught to be more ethical and professional in dealing with trusting clients like the complainants
and their mother, who were innocently too willing to repose their utmost trust in her abilities as a lawyer and in her
trustworthiness as a legal professional. The usual mitigation of the recommended penalty by virtue of the
misconduct being her first offense cannot be carried out in her favor considering that she had disregarded the several
notices sent to her by the IBP in this case.

As to the return of the P350,000 to the complainant, requiring Atty. Ramon to restitute with legal interest is only fair
and just because she did not comply in the least with her ethical undertaking to work on the redemption of the
property of the mother of the complainants. In addition, she is sternly warned against a similar infraction in the
future; otherwise, the Court will have her suffer a more severe penalty.

The Court FINDS and HOLDS ATTY. MARIE FRANCES RAMON guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath; SUSPENDS HER FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR 5 YEARS
EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely; ORDERS her to return to the complainants the sum of P350,000 within 30 days from notice, plus legal
interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS her to promptly
submit to this Court written proof of her compliance within the same period of 30 days from notice of this decision.
ALEX NULADA v. ATTY. ORLANDO PAULMA [April 12, 2016]

On September 30, 2005, Atty. Olando Paulma issued in favor of Alex Nulada a check in the amount of P650,000 as
payment for Atty. Paulma's debt. Because of Atty. Paulma’s standing as a respected member of the community and
his being a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Miagao, Nulada accepted the check without
question.

When Nulada presented the check for payment, it was dishonored due to insufficient fluids. Atty. Paulma failed to
make good the amount of the check despite notice of dishonor and repeated demands, prompting Nulada to file a
criminal complaint for violation of BP 22 against Atty. Paulma.

MTC: rendered its decision finding Atty. Paulma GUILTY of violation of BP 22 and ordering him to pay the amount of
P150,000 as fine, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay. Furthermore, he was ordered to pay: (1) th
P650,000, representing the amount of the check with interest of 12% per annum; RTC affirmed the MTC ruling.

Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision, Nulada filed the present administrative complaint before the Court,
through the Office of the Bar Confidant.

ATTY. PAULMA: denied that he committed dishonesty against Nulada as prior to September 30, 2005, he informed
the latter that there were insufficient funds to cover the amount of the check. Atty. Paulma claimed that he merely
issued the check in order to accommodate a friend in whose favor he obtained the loan, stressing that he did not
personally benefit from the proceeds thereof. Unfortunately, said friend had died and Atty. Paulma had no means by
which to pay for the amount of the check.

IBP: issued a recommendation that Atty. Paulma be suspended from the practice of law for 6 months for violation of
the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as for having been found guilty of a crime
involving moral turpitude. IBP-CBD found that the offense for which Atty. Paulma was found guilty of involved
moral turpitude, and that he violated his lawyer's oath and the CPR when he committed the said offense. Stressing
the importance of the lawyer's oath, the IBP held that by his conviction of the said crime, respondent has shown that
he is "unfit to protect the administration of justice or that he is no longer of good moral character" which justifies
either his suspension or disbarment.

IBP Board of Governors: adopted with modification IBP's Recommendation, suspending Atty. Paulma from the
practice of law for 2 years for having violated the lawyer's oath and the CPR, as well as for having been found
guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Paulma should be administratively disciplined for having been found guilty of a crime involving
moral turpitude.

SC: YES. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

By taking the lawyer's oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for the orderly
administration of justice. As such, he can be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity,
which renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.
BP 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking
account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check, or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation. The
law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with
insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to
be abated.

Being a lawyer, Atty. Paulma was well aware of the objectives and coverage of BP 22. If he did not, he was
nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the
unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated BP 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious
effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined
him to support the Constitution and obey the laws. Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP 22
indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good
moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.

In this case, respondent's conviction for violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude, had been indubitably
established. Such conviction has, in fact, already become final. Consequently, respondent violated the lawyer's oath,
as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, as aptly found by the IBP and, thus, must be subjected to disciplinary action.

In view of the instances when the erring lawyer was suspended for a period of two years for the same violation,
the Court finds it appropriate to mete the same penalty to Atty. Paulma in this case. It should be emphasized that
membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer is required to observe the law
and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or private capacity. Any transgression of this duty on
his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the legal
profession as a whole. In this case, Atty. Paulma’s conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
member of the bar, for which he must suffer the necessary consequences.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Orlando Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two years, effective upon his
receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
EMILIA HERNANDEZ vs. ATTY. VENANCIO PADILLA [June 20, 2012]

Emilia Hernandez and her husband were the respondents in an ejectment case filed against them with RTC-Manila. In
said case, the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of Emilia be cancelled and that she pay Elisa
Duigan attorney’s fees and moral damages. Emilia and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals ordered them to file their Appellants’ Brief. They chose Atty. Venancio Padilla to
represent them in the case. On their behalf, Atty. Padilla filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants’
Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal, which the CA granted. No Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed by the couple.

Emilia claims that because Atty. Padilla ignored the Resolution, he acted with "deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to
malpractice of law." Emilia and her husband failed to file an appeal, because Atty. Padilla never informed them of the
adverse decision. Emilia further claims that she asked Atty. Padilla "several times" about the status of the appeal, but
"despite inquiries he deliberately withheld response," to the damage and prejudice of the spouses. The Resolution
became final and executory on January 8, 2004. Emilia was informed of the Resolution sometime in July 2005,
when the Sheriff of the RTC came to her house and informed her of the Resolution. Thus, Emilia filed an Affidavit of
Complaint with IBP-CBD, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Padilla on the following grounds: deceit, malpractice, and
grave misconduct. Emilia also prays for moral damages in the amount of P350,000.

ATTY. PADILLA: explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. Prior to the mandatory conference set by the
IBP on December 13, 2005, he had never met complainant, because it was the husband who had personally
transacted with him. According to Atty. Padilla, the husband "despondently pleaded to me to prepare a
MEMORANDUM ON APPEAL because according to him the period given by the CA was to lapse within two or three
days." Thus, Atty. Padilla claims that he filed a Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly believed that "it is
this pleading which was required."

After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, Atty. Padilla never saw or heard from him
again and thus assumed that the husband heeded his advice and settled the case. Thus, when complainant’s
husband went to the office of Atty. Padilla to tell the latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had informed complainant of
the CA’s Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just as surprised.

IBP Commissioner: found that Atty. Padilla violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and recommended that Atty. Padilla be suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6 months; IBP Board of Governors
adopted the recommendation of the IBP Commissioner and suspended Atty. Padilla from the practice of law for six
months. ATTY. PADILLA prayed for the relaxation of the application of the Canons of the Code. IBP board of governors
passed a Resolution partly granting his Motion and reducing the penalty to one-month suspension from the practice
of law.

SC: adopted the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court, however, disagrees with its Decision
to reduce the penalty to one-month suspension. We thus affirm the six-month suspension the Board originally
imposed.

A perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed that Atty. Padilla had signed as counsel
for the defendant-appellants therein, including complainant and her husband. The pleading starts with the following
sentence: "DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court submit the Memorandum and further
allege that: x x x." Nowhere does the document say that it was filed only on behalf of complainant’s husband.
It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and complainant’s husband cannot be
treated as a "CLIENT-LAWYER" relationship. However, Emilia pointed out in her Reply that respondent was her
lawyer, because he accepted her case and an acceptance fee in the amount of P7,000.

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity
to the client’s cause. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to serve the client with
competence and diligence. Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.

Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have believed to be necessary, it was Atty. Padilla’s duty to know
the proper pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions.

Having seen the Decision of the trial court, Atty. Padilla should have known that the mode of appeal to the Court of
Appeals for said Decision is by ORDINARY APPEAL. When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they
filed a Notice of Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellant’s brief be filed after the records of the case have been
elevated to the CA. Atty. Padilla, as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure.

CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support
efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating
information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule
of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently
their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

Atty. Padilla’s plea for leniency should not have been granted. The supposed lack of time given to respondent to
acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not excuse his negligence.

Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. While
it is true that respondent was not complainant’s lawyer from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not
excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to
study the pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by complainant’s husband only two days before the
expiration of the period for filing the Appellant’s Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time
to file the proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to "beat the deadline”.

First of all, there were several remedies that Atty. Padilla could have availed himself of, from the moment he
received the Notice from the CA to the moment he received the disbarment Complaint filed against him. But because
of his negligence, he chose to sit on the case and do nothing.

Second, as counsel, Atty. Padilla had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His failure to do so
amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads that “A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.”

If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have done was to
inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he was
no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court that he could no longer
contact them. His failure to take this measure proves his negligence.

Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigan’s Motion to Dismiss is
negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the client’s case. A
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable. Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his client, he
engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should be held accountable.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

FIDELA AND TERESITA BENGCO vs. ATTY. PABLO BERNARDO [June 13, 2012]

From April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo Bernardo with the help of Andres Magat committed fraudulent act
with intent to defraud Fidela and Teresita Bengco by using false pretenses, deceitful words to the effect that he
would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City, an acquaintance of the
Bengcos.

Atty. Bernardo and Magat convinced the Bengcos that if they will pay him P495,000 as advance money, he would
expedite the titling of the subject land. Atty. Bernardo also represented himself to be the lawyer of William
Gatchalian, the alleged buyer of the subject land once it has been titled, and that they have contacts at NAMREA,
DENR, CENRO and the Register of Deeds. Said representation were made to induce the Bengcos to pay thre aforesaid
P495,000. Once in possession of the said amount, Atty. Bernardo and Magat misappropriated the said amount to
their personal use and benefit. Despite demand upon them to return the said amount, they failed and refused to
do so.

In view of the deceit committed by Atty. Bernardo and Magat, the Bengcos filed a complaint for Estafa against the
former before MCTC-Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In the preliminary investigation, the Court found sufficient grounds to
hold respondent and Magat for trial for the crime of Estafa defined under Art. 315(2a) of the Revised Penal Code.
During the re-investigation of the case by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Magat was willing to reimburse to
complainants P200,000, because according to him, the P295,000 should be reimbursed by Atty. Bernardo
considering that the said amount was turned over to Atty. Bernardo for expenses incurred in the documentation
prior to the titling of the subject land. Both Atty. Bernardo and Magat requested for several extensions for time to
pay back their obligations, but despite extensions of time granted to them, Atty. Bernardo and Magat failed to fulfill
their promise. Thus, the offer of compromise was construed to be an implied admission of guilt and an Information
for Estafa was filed against Atty. Bernardo and Magat before RTC-San Fernando, Pampanga.

The Bengcos also filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Bernardo for deceit, malpractice, conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer.

IBP ordered Atty. Bernardo to submit a verified comment as it appeared that his undated comment filed with the
Court was not verified. However, Atty. Bernardo requested for an additional 15 days from March 17, 2005, or until
April 1, 2005, within which to comply due to his medical confinement. Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, Atty. Bernardo
filed a second motion for extension praying for another 20 days, or until April 22, 2005, alleging that he was still
recovering from his illness. On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference. Atty. Bernardo failed to
appear and thus, he was held to be in default.

INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER: recommended that Atty. Bernardo be SUSPENDED for two years from the
practice of law. The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on several
occasions and appear on the scheduled hearings shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer which deserves disciplinary sanction. Atty. Bernardo
committed a crime that import deceit and violation of his attorney’s oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, under both of which, he was bound to ‘obey the laws of the land.’ The commission of unlawful acts,
especially crimes involving moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty in violation of the attorney’s oath, grossly immoral
conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138, Section 27, RRC).

The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants filed the case only on April 16, 2004. As provided
for by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission of Bar Discipline, "A complaint for disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys prescribes in two years from the date of the professional misconduct" (Section 1, Rule VIII).
IBP Board of Governors: adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Atty. Bernardo is ordered
the restitution of the amount of P200,000 within 60 days from receipt of notice with Warning that if he fails to do so,
he will be meted the penalty of Suspension from the practice of law for one year.

ATTY. BERNARDO: filed a Motion for Reconsideration and averred that: (1) the IBP resolution is not in accord with the
rules considering that the complaint was filed more than two years from the alleged misconduct and therefore, must
have been dismissed outright; (2) he did not commit any misrepresentation in convincing Fidela to give him money to
finance the titling of the land; (3) he was hired as a lawyer through Magat who transacted with Teresita as evidenced
by a Memorandum of Agreement signed by the latter; (4) he was denied due process when the Investigating
Commissioner considered him as in default after having ignored the representative he sent during the hearing; and
(5) he long restituted the amount of ₱225,000 not as an offer of compromise but based on his moral obligation as a
lawyer due to Teresita’s declaration that he had to stop acting as her legal counsel sometime in 1997.

FIDELA: explained that it took them quite some time in filing the administrative case because they took into
consideration the possibility of an amicable settlement instead of a judicial proceeding. Atty. Bernardo went into
hiding which prompted them to seek the assistance of CIDG agents to trace Atty. Bernardo whereabouts. Also, no
restitution of the P200,000 has yet been made by Atty. Bernardo.

RTC rendered a decision in the criminal case for Estafa finding Atty. Bernardo and Magat "guilty of conspiracy in
the commission of Estafa under Article 315(2a) of the Revised Penal Code. Fidela sought the resolution of the
present action as she was already 86 years of age. Two years later, Fidela, being 88 years old, sought for Atty.
Bernardo’s restitution of the amount of ₱200,000 so she can use the money to buy her medicine and other needs.

SC: adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.

Atty. Bernardo’s defense of prescription is untenable. Administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The
lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative
complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer.

Further, as a lawyer, Atty. Bernardo is considered as an officer of the court who is called upon to obey and respect
court processes. Such acts of Atty. Bernardo of failing to appear at hearings are a deliberate and contemptuous
affront on the court’s authority which cannot be countenanced. Lawyers are instruments in the administration of
justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined – whether in their professional or in their private capacity – for any
conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service
and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same
facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to
await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this
Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and continuing membership in, the legal
profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two
proceedings are vastly disparate. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law. The attorney is called to answer to the court
for his conduct as an officer of the court.
THUS, Atty. Pablo Bernardo is found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective upon notice hereof. Further, Atty. Bernardo is ordered
to RETURN the amount of ₱200,000 to Fidela and Teresita Bengco within 10 DAYS from receipt of this Decision and
to SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the Court. Failure to do so shall merit him the additional penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one year.

SPOUSES MANUEL, JR. and LOLITA RAFOLS vs. ATTY. RICARDO BARRIOS, JR. [March 15, 2010]

Spouses Manuel, Jr. and Lolita Rafols were the plaintiffs in a Civil Case before the RTC-General Santos City, wherein
they sought the cancellation of a deed of sale. The Civil Case was assigned to the RTC branch presided by Judge
Dizon, Jr. The complainants were represented by Atty. Ricardo Barrios, Jr. for an acceptance fee of P15,000.

On December 22, 1997, Atty. Barrios visited the spouses Rafols at their residence and informed Manuel that the
judge handling their case wanted to talk to him. Judge Dizon said that he would resolve the case in their favor,
assuring their success up to the Court of Appeals, if they could deliver ₱150,000 to him. The complaints, through
various loans, were able to come up with P130,000 which they paid to the judge. Thereafter, when the judge
demanded the balance of ₱30,000, Manuel clarified that his balance was only ₱20,000. The judge informed him that
the amount that the Atty. Barrios handed was short and the judge insisted on ₱30,000. When Judge Dizon, Jr. picked
up the ₱30,000 from Manuel, the judge told Manuel that the RTC judge in Iloilo City before whom the testimony of
Soledad Elevencionado-Provido was made should still testify as a witness during the trial in his sala in order for the
complainants to win. The judge persuaded the complainants to give money also to that judge. Otherwise, they
should not blame him for the outcome of the case.

The complainants were forced to give money to the judge, because they feared that the judge would be biased
against them unless they gave in to his demands. When they ultimately sensed that they were being fooled about
their case, they consulted Larry Sevilla, their mediamen friend, and narrated to Sevilla all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case. They agreed that the details should be released to the media. The exposẻ was published in the
Newsmaker, a local newspaper. Thereafter, Atty. Barrios and Judge Dizon, Jr. made attempts to appease the
complainants through gifts and offering to return a portion of the money, but the complainants declined the offers.

According to the complainants, Atty. Barrios demanded ₱25,000 as his expenses in securing the testimony of Soledad
Elevencionado-Provido in Iloilo City to be used as evidence in their civil case. In addition, Atty. Barrios requested the
complainants to borrow ₱60,000 from the bank because he wanted to redeem his foreclosed Isuzu Elf, and because
he needed to give ₱11,000 to his nephew who was due to leave for work abroad.

ATTY. BARRIOS confirmed that the complainants engaged him as their counsel in the aforesaid Civil Case. Atty.
Barrios alleged that he introduced Manuel to Judge Dizon, Jr. Later, Manuel approached the respondent and gave
him P2,000, in appreciation of the former’s introducing the latter to the judge. Atty. Barrios stated that Manuel did
not mention what transpired between him and the judge; and that the judge did not tell Atty. Barrios what transpired
in that conversation.

Two days later, Atty. Barrios visited the complainants at their house in General Santos City on board the judge’s
Nissan pick-up driven by the judge’s driver, in order to receive the P80,000 from the complainants, which was being
borrowed by the judge for his swimming pool. Later on, the judge told Atty. Barrios to keep P30,000 as a token of
their friendship. Afterwards, they redeemed the judge’s wristwatch for P15,000 from a pawnshop, and the driver
brought the remaining P35,000 back to the judge.

Later, Judge Dizon, Jr. visited Atty. Barrios at the latter’s house to ask him to execute an affidavit wherein Atty. Barrios
denied that Judge Dizon, Jr. asked money from the complainants. Atty. Barrios also stated that he did not see the
complainants handing the money to the judge. He admitted that he was the one who had requested the judge to
personally collect his unpaid attorney’s fees from the complainants with respect to their previous and terminated
case; and that the judge did not ask money from the complainants in exchange for a favorable decision in their case.

OBC: opined that the administrative case against Atty. Barrios could not be dismissed on the ground of failure to
prosecute due to the complainants’ failure to appear in the scheduled hearing despite due notice. OBC rejected Atty.
Barrios’ denial of any knowledge of the transaction between his clients and the judge and recommended that ATTY.
BARRIOS, Jr. be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years with a stern warning that a repetition of
similar act in the future will be dealt more severely.

SC: adopted the report of the OBC, but imposed the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT as the proper penalty.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for:
1. any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office;
2. grossly immoral conduct;
3. by reason of his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude;
4. for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice;
5. for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
6. for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so .
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers
constitute malpractice.

The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the complainant.
The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant
evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that
he is innocent of the charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further presumed as an
officer of the Court to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. Here, the complainants successfully
overcame the respondent’s presumed innocence and the presumed regularity in the performance of his duties as an
attorney of the complainants. The evidence against him was substantial, and was not contradicted.

Atty. Barrios’ denials were worthless and unavailing in the face of the uncontradicted evidence showing that he
had not only personally arranged the meeting between Manuel and Judge Dizon, Jr., but had also communicated
to the complainants the judge’s illegal reason for the meeting. It is axiomatic that any denial, to be accepted as a
viable defense in any proceeding, must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. This need derives from
the nature of a denial as evidence of a negative and self-serving character, weightless in law and insufficient to
overcome the testimony of credible witnesses on affirmative matters.

The practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions. The attorney is a vanguard of our legal system,
and, as such, is expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a very high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing in order that the people’s faith and confidence in the legal system are ensured. Thus, he
must conduct himself, whether in dealing with his clients or with the public at large, as to be beyond reproach at all
times. Any violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition on the attorney of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. 27

The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins an attorney from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful
conduct. Corollary to this injunction is the rule that an attorney shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the Legal Profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Aty. Barrios did not measure up to the exacting standards of the Law Profession, which demanded of him as an
attorney the absolute abdication of any personal advantage that conflicted in any way, directly or indirectly, with the
interest of his clients. For monetary gain, he disregarded the vow to "delay no man for money or malice" and to
"conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients" that he made when he took the Lawyer’s Oath. He also disobeyed the explicit command
to him as an attorney "to accept no compensation in connection with his client’s business except from him or with
his knowledge and approval." He conveniently ignored that the relation between him and his clients was highly
fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character.

Verily, the respondent was guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT, which is "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment." Any gross misconduct of an attorney in his professional or private
capacity shows him unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of
suspension or disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney
and for the continuance of such privilege.

The conclusion that the respondent and the disgraced Judge Dizon, Jr. were conspirators against the former’s own
clients, whom he was sworn to protect and to serve with utmost fidelity and morality, is inevitable for the Court to
make in this administrative case. Being conspirators, they both deserve the highest penalty. The DISBARMENT of
the respondent is in order, because such sanction is on par with the dismissal of Judge Dizon, Jr.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [April 12, 2005]

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its
current account with the Central Bank. 1 It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various
loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as
doubtful and ₱0.505 million as uncollectible. 2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK
which reached a total of ₱310 million.3 Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes.
On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation.4 A public bidding
of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
bid.5 Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petitionwith the then Court of First
Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by Section 29
of Republic Act No. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C.
Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten
wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July
17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua,
Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng
Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William
T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and
Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation,
Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc.,
Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant,
Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively
referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O.
Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on
properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and
influence with former President Marcos.

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify,
among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. 7 After the filing of the parties’ comments, this Court
referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-
0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et
al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions alleged that
respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General 10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation
of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his
capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank’s officials on the procedureto bring about GENBANK’s
liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. 11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the
Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the
Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. 12 It further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s appearance as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713
since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or
employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within
one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office. 13 The PCGG did not seek any
reconsideration of the ruling.14

It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division to the Fifth
Division.15 In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991,
and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005.
The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001. 17

Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of
the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.18 The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in
which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the
objection to respondent Mendoza’s appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005
was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.19

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and
forthwith resolve the substantive issue.

I. Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again,
the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other
parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not
detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the
standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and
fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times
intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore
settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality,
reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application
to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from those
in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern
attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The
standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation
fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some
standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the
traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-
revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. 20

The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century,
American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly
influential New York "Field Code," introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise
statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the
same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to
flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail
and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and
statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations – e.g., the "do no
falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or
indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of
competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the
attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely
exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary
periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The
reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a
new era in American legal ethics.21

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice
— the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for
lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic
discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike
the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes
and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding rules
of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar
associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In
the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had
left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar
Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members. 22

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama
Code of Ethics was the model for several states’ codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's
(ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.23

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of
public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its
own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. 24

As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns
was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from
private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and
influence garnered in government service." 25 These concerns were classified as adverse-interest
conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the
former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer
dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse. 26 On the other
hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former
government lawyers.27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons,
individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new
canons.28 To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified
them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest representation conflicts." 29 The rationale for
disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions would be influenced
by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties
who might later become private practice clients. 30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously
acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement,
accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933
and 1937, respectively.31

In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics.32

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful
revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the "adequacy
and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in
part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the proscriptive" and were thus
unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in
matters during their employment with the government.

The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by
Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. 34 In the case of Canon
9, DR 9-101(b)35 became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved
the Model Code.36

Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set
forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA
adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where
the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to
give better guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable standards were the black letter
Rules." The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion,
by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The
Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests. 37 In
particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the
subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm’s indefinite nature. 38

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local
customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court
promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals
particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the
word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
conflicts."

The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded,
has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of
respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan.
Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict"sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and, second,
the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter." The American
Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable
transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing
or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza
while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting
the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:40

The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed
Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the
closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing
the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the
Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then
Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P.
Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and
Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the
Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The
pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following
procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had
been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be
reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank
and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had
been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that
Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with
the court the petition for assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director,
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March
25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March
24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of
insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at
bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for
its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank
on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The
procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or
examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that
its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the
department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may,
upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the
Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or
finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and
gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for
these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court
of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims
against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement
the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central
Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of
the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient
speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect
and recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and
the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if
there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction
shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which
the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The
restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a
bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond
of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by
the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they
are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the
restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business.
Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial
panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions in the banking or financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section
shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary
notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
"matter"contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear
as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and
cannot disqualify.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within
the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza
which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case
No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with
the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the
same nor is related to but is different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves
the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are
ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied
Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the
dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the
alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is
not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene" means,
viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between
points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur
or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .) 41

On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others. 42

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first interpretation,
"intervene" includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little
influence.43 Under the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the power to
influence the subject proceedings.44 We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word
"intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be
remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous
such as "x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing
abstract principles of law."

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former
government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he
has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase
"which he has investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The
1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the
lawyer, while in the government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules further constricted
the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a
matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee."

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and
substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be
signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville
for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition
filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this
type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of
the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court
litigator protecting the interest of government.

II. Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the
IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts
especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is
still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.

In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took account
of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its
end without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause
a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to
match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that
situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is
have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher
income in private practice.45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would
be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical
specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be
disqualified.46 Indeed, "to make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter." 47
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as
well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an
opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted "the tactical
use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its
choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so prevalent in large civil cases in
recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary." 48 Even the United States Supreme Court
found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals’ description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous game." 49 In the
case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of
respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after
PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for
disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in
the case at bar were refiled put petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be
caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose
not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. 51 The client with
a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter. 52 The effects of this
prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official
independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the security
of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge
official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee
who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom." 53 He adds: "Any system that affects
the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official
independence."54 The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent
Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree
of independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it
is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any
undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise
his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to
all members of his law firm.55 Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal
profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well
observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best 56 which can lead to
untoward results.57 No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government
attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its
attorneys which the canons seek to protect. 58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in
the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct59 and some courts have abandoned per sedisqualification based
on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the
defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public. 60

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers
who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that former government employee
may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the
case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how
to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the
sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential
official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent "sides" to be
bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent
Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of
the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead
of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in
Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a
government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. 61 The example
given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or she is
currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously. 62 In the cautionary words of the
Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government
policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably excessive." 64 He opines "x x x it is hard to
imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client – the
government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the ‘best’ government lawyers – the
ones who were hardest to beat – not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates." 65 But again, this particular
concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central
Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he
continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence of former
officials" or their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale
for his warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be an employee’s influence may actually be the power or authority of
his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x." 67 More, he contends that
the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: "x x x The idea that, present
officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the present officials
than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not
seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to
avoid even the appearance of favoritism." 68

III. The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the
rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that
(1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by
this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot,
by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied
without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially
addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.
OMAR ALI vs. ATTY. MOSIB BUBONG [March 8, 2005]

This disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by Omar Ali against Atty. Mosib
Bubong. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority, Ali charged Atty. Bubong
with illegal exaction, indiscriminate issuance of a TCT in the names of Atty. Bubong’s relatives (Bauduli Datu), and
manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-
Squatting Law. The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of Atty. Bubong, absolving him of all the charges for
lack of merit and evidence.

When the case was forwarded to DOJ for review, then Secretary Franklin Drilon exonerated Atty. Bubong of the
charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents, but found Atty. Bubong guilty of grave
misconduct for his imprudent issuance of the aforesaid TCT and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu As a result of this finding, Secretary Drilon
recommended Atty. Bubong’s dismissal from his position as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. Former President Fidel
V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41 adopting the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering
Atty. Bubong’s dismissal from government service.

On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, Ali now seeks the disbarment of Atty. Bubong and claims that
it has become obvious that respondent had "proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an
attorney" and that he poses a "serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession."

ATTY. BUBONG: maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of the subject TCT in the name of the
Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the
Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis only of the documents
presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office
warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue the TCT in their favor. ATTY. BUBONG also insists that he
had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly
committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latter's co-defendants. He claims that the dismissal of said criminal case
by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by the parties.

In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter informed the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline that the investigating panel had sent notices to both complainant and respondent for a series of
hearings but respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by
recommending that Atty. Bubong be suspended from the practice of law for five years.

ATTY. BUBONG: insists that the investigating panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to
conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner Fernandez's Order of 23
February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he
was never notified of any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his
right to due process.
Meanwhile, Bainar Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar Ali, complainant in this case.
According to her, in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was requesting the withdrawal of this case.

IBP Board of Governors: adopted and approved, with modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation
However, whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year
suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Bubong may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the
government.

SC: YES. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. In fact, under Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to
lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a
government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then
he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.

GENERAL RULE: While a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct
constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.

A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities.
He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts
in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid
discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline
is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer are expected those
qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of
fiduciary responsibility – all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral
character.

A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust
and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper
of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in
private practice.

In the case at bar, Atty. Bubong’s grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and subsequently
affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of
Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his
relatives, Atty. Bubong had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but
also to retain his membership in the bar.

Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter
to interfere with his public duties.

Atty. Bubong’s conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the public office he used to occupy and
cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law
calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on
the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the
court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except
as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice. 39

THUS, Atty. Mosib Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

EDUARDO ABELLA vs. RICARDO BARRIOS, JR. [June 18, 2013]

On January 21, 1999, Eduardo Abella filed an illegal dismissal case against PT&T before the Cebu City Regional
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Labor Arbiter Ernesto Carreon ordered PT&T to pay Abella ₱113,100 as separation
pay and ₱73,608 as backwages. NLRC set aside LA Carreon’s ruling and instead ordered PT&T to reinstate Abella to
his former position and pay him backwages, as well as 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the NLRC’s ruling with modification, ordering PT&T to pay Abella separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. Abella moved for partial reconsideration, claiming that all his years of service were not taken into
account in the computation of his separation pay and backwages. The CA granted the motion and remanded the
case to the LA for the same purpose.

Abella filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Cebu City RAB. At this point, the case had already
been assigned to the new LA, Ricardo Barrios, Jr. After the lapse of five months, Abella’s motion remained unacted,
prompting him to file a Second Motion for Execution. Eight months thereafter, there was no action on Abella’s
motion. Thus, Abella proceeded to Barrios’ office to personally follow-up the matter. In the process, the two
exchanged notes on how much the former’s monetary awards should be, but their computations differed.

Barrios then told Abella that the matter could be "easily fixed" and thereafter, asked "how much is mine?" Abella
offered P20,000, but Barrios replied: "make it P30,000. Abella acceded on the condition that Barrios would have to
wait until he had already collected from PT&T. Before Abella could leave, Barrios asked him for some cash,
compelling him to give the latter P1,500.

Barrios then issued a writ of execution, directing the sheriff to proceed to the premises of PT&T and collect the
amount of ₱1,470,082.60, inclusive of execution and deposit fees. PT&T moved to quashthe said writ which was
denied. Upon a Supplemental Motion to Quash by PT&T, Barrios recalled the first writ of execution he issued. Barrios
eventually, issued a new writ of execution wherein Abella’s monetary awards were reduced from P1,470,082.60 to
P114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees. NLRC annulled Barrios’ order, stating that he had no authority
to modify the CA Decision which was already final and executory. Thereafter, Abella filed the instant disbarment
complaint before the IBP, averring that Barrios violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for (a) soliciting
money from complainant in exchange for a favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give benefit
and advantage to PT&T.

BARRIOS: maintained that he merely implemented the CA Decision which did not provide for the payment of
backwages. He also claimed that he never demanded a single centavo from complainant as it was in fact the latter
who offered him the amount of P50,000.

IBP Investigating Commissioner: found that respondent tried to twist the meaning of the CA Decision out of all
logical, reasonable and grammatical context in order to favor PT&T. Also, the confluence of events in this case shows
that Barrios deliberately left complainant’s efforts to execute the CA Decision unacted upon until the latter agreed to
give him a portion of the monetary award thereof. Barrios went as far as turning the proceedings into some bidding
war which eventually resulted into a resolution in favor of PT&T. In this regard, Barrios was found to be guilty of
gross immorality and therefore, it is recommended that he be disbarred.

IBP Board of Governors: adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. For violation of the provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, Atty. Ricardo Barrios, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED.

ISSUE: W/N Barrios is guilty of gross immorality for violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon
6 of the Code.

HELD: YES.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with
his public duties.

The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the lawyer’s responsibility to
society: Rule 1.01 engraves the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying any
man’s cause for any corrupt motive or interest;

Meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in government service, enjoining them from using one’s
public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to
interfere with public duties. It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a government office may be disciplined as a
member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. In this light, a
lawyer’s compliance with and observance of the above-mentioned rules should be taken into consideration in
determining his moral fitness to continue in the practice of law.

The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession." This proceeds from the lawyer’s duty to
observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar’s integrity. Consequently, any errant behavior on
the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.

In this case, Barrios was merely tasked to recompute the monetary awards due to the complainant who sought to
execute the CA Decision which had already been final and executory. When complainant moved for execution – twice
at that – Barrios slept on the same for more than a year. It was only when complainant paid Barrios a personal visit
that the latter speedily issued a writ of execution three days after. Based on these incidents, the Court observes that
the sudden dispatch in respondent’s action after the aforesaid visit casts doubt on the legitimacy of his denial. This
is further bolstered by Barrios’ complete turnaround on the quashal of the writ of execution.

Noticeably, the CA affirmed with modification the NLRC’s rulings which both explicitly awarded backwages and other
unpaid monetary benefits to complainant. The only modification was with respect to the order of reinstatement as
pronounced in both NLRC’s rulings which was changed by the CA to separation pay in view of the strained relations
between the parties. In other words, the portion of the NLRC’s rulings which awarded backwages and other
monetary benefits subsisted and the modification pertained only to the CA’s award of separation pay in lieu of the
NLRC’s previous order of reinstatement.

Barrios tried to distort the findings of the CA by quoting portions of its decision, propounding that the CA’s award of
separation pay denied complainant’s entitlement to any backwages and other consequential benefits altogether.
Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the rule that backwages are separate and distinct from separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement and are awarded conjunctively to an employee who has been illegally dismissed. Being a
labor arbiter, it is hardly believable that Barrios could overlook the fact that complainant was entitled to backwages
in view of the standing pronouncement of illegal dismissal.
Jurisprudence illumines that IMMORAL CONDUCT involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show
a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. It treads the line of
grossness when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of
decency. On the other hand, GROSS MISCONDUCT constitutes "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment."

Thus, as Barrios’ violations clearly constitute gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct, his disbarment should
come as a matter of course. However, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already been disbarred in
a previous administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., which therefore precludes the Court
from duplicitously decreeing the same. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine
of P40,000 in order to penalize Barrios’ transgressions as discussed herein and to equally deter the commission of
the same or similar acts in the future. Ricardo Barrios, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross immoral conduct and gross
misconduct in violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of P40,000.

MIGUEL VILLATUYA vs. ATTY. BEDE TABALINGCOS [July 10, 2012]

Miguel Villatuya averred that on February 2002, he was employed by Atty. Bede Tabalingcos as a financial consultant
to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latter’s numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation
filed with different courts. Villatuya claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to
P50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to 10% of the fees paid
by their clients. He alleged that, from February to December 2002, Atty. Tabalingcos was able to rake in millions of
pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Villatuya also claimed that he was
entitled to P900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with Atty. Tabalingcos, and a
total of P4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients.

Villatuya also alleged that Atty. Tabalingcos engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section 27 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly, Atty. Tabalingcos set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit
cases. Villatuya supported his allegations by attaching Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane, letter-proposals to
clients signed by Atty. Tabalingcos, and proofs of payment made to Atty. Tabalingcos by their clients.

Lastly, on the charge of gross immorality, Villatuya accused Atty. Tabalingcos of committing two counts of bigamy
for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted a Certification issued by
the Office of the Civil Registrar General-NSO certifying that Bede Tabalingcos contracted marriage thrice: first, on July
15, 1980 with Pilar Lozano; the second time on September 28, 1987 with Ma. Rowena Piñon; and the third on
September 7, 1989 with Mary Jane Paraiso

Atty. Tabalingcos: denied the charges against him and asserted that Villatuya was not an employee of his law firm –
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office– but of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a major
stockholder. Atty. Tabalingcos alleged that Villatuya was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a
financial consultant, resulting in the latter’s dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court cases.
Atty. Tabalingcos also alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and
the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients.

As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, Atty. Tabalingcos contended that his law firm had an agreement with Jesi
and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case,
and that the latter would attend to the financial aspect of the case, such as the preparation of the rehabilitation
plans to be presented in court.

On the charge of gross immorality, Atty. Tabalingcos assailed the Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a dismissed
messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant
himself. Atty. Tabalingcos did not specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with
two other women.
Villatuya filed a Motion to Admit Copies of THREE Marriage Contracts. The appended Marriage Contracts matched
the dates, places and names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the
three marriages entered into by Atty. Tabalingcos. Atty. Tabalingcos submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit
filed by complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory conference. Thus, Atty.
Tabalingcos was supposedly deprived of the opportunity to controvert those documents. He disclosed that criminal
cases for bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Atty.
Tabalingcos also alleged that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena
Piñon at the RTC-Biñan, Laguna. He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Contract with
Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba. In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were
Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar
Lozano on different occasions. They were purportedly null and void.

IBP: The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit.
The charge should have been filed with the proper courts since it was only empowered to determine respondent’s
administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.

On the second charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for
having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the
violation. It failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he violated.

As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01
and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It found that
complainant was able to prove through documentary evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying
two other women while the latter’s first marriage was subsisting. Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the
Commission recommended that he be disbarred; IBP Board: adopted the recommendation.

ATTY. TABALINGCOS: contends that the Commission should have suspended the disbarment proceedings pending
the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his name as
having entered into those contracts with other women.

SC: The FIRST CHARGE of dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees, if proven to be true, is based on an
agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the
Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law.
Based on the allegations, Atty. Tabalingcos had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients that
complainant solicited for Atty. Tabalingcos. Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the
existence of that agreement.

On the SECOND CHARGE of unlawful solicitation of clients, records reveals that Atty. Tabalingcos indeed used the
business entities mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be
specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code,
which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when
the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a
member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement
of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s
behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which
purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure
professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.

Rule 15.08of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as a
lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is
that certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and not in the
other. In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal
services. Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by
respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.

On the THIRD CHARGE of BIGAMY, the court has consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is
on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities
in filing the case.

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial
questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant — do
not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.

First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public
interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the
continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards
for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this
Court.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof.

We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the authenticity or
impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to
prove the former’s marriages to two other women aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding,
these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he
committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified by the
NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a person.
Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much evidentiary weight and carries
with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any competent evidence to rebut
those documents.

Respondent’s regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the
sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the
old Civil Code provisions. What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage
twice while his first marriage was still subsisting.

No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity
or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and
a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot
apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead
others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and
dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer
of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients
may rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made
a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His acts of committing bigamy twice
constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court.

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede Tabalingcos as follows:

1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.

3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.

MA. CECILIA CLARISSA ADVINCULA v. ATTY. LEONARDO ADVINCULA [June 14, 2016]

In a complaint for disbarment, Dr. Cecilia Advincula has averred that her husband, Atty. Leonardo Advincula,
committed unlawful and immoral acts. While Atty. Advincula was still married to her, he had extra-marital sexual
relations with Ma. Judith Gonzaga. The extra-marital relations bore a child in the name of Ma. Alexandria Advincula.
Atty. Advincula failed to give financial support to their own children, namely: Ma. Samantha Paulina, Ma. Andrea
Lana, and Jose Leandro, despite his having sufficient financial resources. He admitted in the affidavit of late
registration of birth of Alexandria that he had contracted another marriage with Gonzaga.

Siring a child with a woman other than his lawful wife was conduct way below the standards of morality required of
every lawyer. Contracting a subsequent marriage while the first marriage had not been dissolved was also an
unlawful conduct. Further, making a false declaration before a notary public was an unlawful conduct punishable
under the Revised Penal Code, and that the failure of Atty. Advincula to provide proper support to his children
showed his moral character to be below the standards set by law for every lawyer.

ATTY. ADVINCULA: asserted that during the subsistence of his marriage with Dr. Advincula but prior to the birth of
their youngest Jose Leandro, their marital relationship had deteriorated. They could not agree on various matters
concerning their family, religion, friends, and respective careers. Dr. Advincula abandoned the rented family home
with the two children to live with her parents. Despite their separation, he regularly gave financial support to Dr.
Advincula and their children. During their separation, he got into a brief relationship with Ms. Gonzaga; and he did
not contract a second marriage with Ms. Gonzaga. Atty. Advincula further acknowledged that as a result of the
relationship with Ms. Gonzaga, a child was born and named Alexandra.

In consideration of his moral obligation as a father, he gave support to Alexandra. He only learned that the birth of
Alexandra had been subsequently registered after the child was already enrolled in school. It was Ms. Gonzaga who
informed him that she had the birth certificate of Alexandria altered by a fixer in order to enroll the child. He strived
to reunite his legitimate family, resulting in a reconciliation that begot their third child, Jose Leandro. However, Dr.
Advincula once again decided to live with her parents, bringing all of their children along. Nevertheless, he continued
to provide financial support to his family and visited the children regularly.

Allegedly, the disbarment suit against him was in order to force him to allow Dr. Advincula to bring their children to
the USA. Atty. Advincula prayed that the disbarment case be dismissed for utter lack of merit.

IBP-CBD: Based on Rule 1.01, Canon 1: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." No doubt, Leanardo Advincula, probably due to the weakness of the flesh, had a romance outside of
marriage with Ma. Judith Gonzaga. IMMORAL CONDUCT: "that conduct which is willful, flagrant or shameless and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.”
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, having, in effect, Respondent's own admission of having committed an
extra-marital affair and fathering a child, it is respectfully recommended that he be suspended from the practice of
law for at least one month with the additional admonition that should he repeat the same, a more severe penalty
would be imposed. It would be unjust to impose upon him the extreme penalty of disbarment. What he did was not
grossly immoral.

IBP Board of Governors: unanimously adopted the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner
with slight modification of the penalty. Considering respondent's admission of engaging in a simple immorality and
also taking into account the condonation of his extra-marital affair by his wife, Atty. Advincula is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two months, thereby refraining himself from the practice of law as
Legal Officer on the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

SC: The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their application for admission
to the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the practice of law.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in fact of good moral
character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not
only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.

Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

On different occasions, we have disbarred or suspended lawyers for immorality based on the surrounding
circumstances of each case. Yet, we cannot sanction Atty. Advincula with the same gravity. Although his siring the
child with a woman other than his legitimate wife constituted immorality, he committed the immoral conduct when
he was not yet a lawyer. The degree of his immoral conduct was not as grave than if he had committed the
immorality when already a member of the Philippine Bar. Even so, he cannot escape administrative liability. Taking
all the circumstances of this case into proper context, the Court considers suspension from the practice of law for
three months to be condign and appropriate.

As a last note, Atty. Advincula manifested in his compliance dated February 26, 2013 that he had immediately
accepted the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors suspending him from the practice of law for two months as
final and executory; that he had then gone on leave from work in the NBI for two months starting in November and
lasting until the end of December, 2012; and that such leave from work involved refraining from performing his
duties as a Legal Officer of the NBI.

The manifestation of compliance is unacceptable. A lawyer like him ought to know that it is only the Court that
wields the power to discipline lawyers. The IBP Board of Governors did not possess such power, rendering its
recommendation against him incapable of finality. It is the Court's final determination of his liability as a lawyer that
is the reckoning point for the service of sanctions and penalties. As such, his supposed compliance with the
recommended two-month suspension could not be satisfied by his going on leave from his work at the NBI.

Moreover, his being a government employee necessitates that his suspension from the practice of law should include
his suspension from office. A leave of absence will not suffice. This is so considering that his position mandated him
to be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing. The suspension from the practice of law will not be a penalty
if it does not negate his continuance in office for the period of the suspension. If the rule is different, this exercise of
reprobation of an erring lawyer by the Court is rendered inutile and becomes a mockery because he can continue to
receive his salaries and other benefits by simply going on leave for the duration of his suspension from the practice of
law.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS ATTY. LEONARDO ADVINCULA GUILTY of immorality; and SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for a period of THREE MONTHS EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE HEREOF, with a STERN WARNING that a
more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same offense or a similar offense; DIRECTS ATTY.
ADVINCULA to report the date of his receipt of the Decision to this Court; and ORDERS the Chief of the Personnel
Division of the National Bureau of Investigation to implement the suspension from office of ATTY. ADVINCULA and to
report on his compliance in order to determine the date of commencement of his suspension from the practice of
law.
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account
with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a
resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general
public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning
bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged
ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan
a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former
Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza.
PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged
that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to
disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of
an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio
Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A
lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service.”

HELD: The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no
adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan.
However there is still the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent
Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of
“intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen
involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the
petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify.
Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate
in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention
on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”.
The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to
influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does
not act which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and
substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a
court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of
the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government. Petition assailing the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan is denied.

Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:

Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held public office or having
been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private
interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction
specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer
who once served in the government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in the service.
VIOLETA FLORES ALITAGTAG vs. ATTY. VIRGILIO GARCIA [Grave Misconduct-DISBARMENT -> 3-year SUSPENSION]
[June 10, 2003]
On February 6, 2002, the SC found Atty. Virgilio Garcia "guilty of grave misconduct rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession" and ordered his disbarment "from the practice of law and his name
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys."
Atty. Garcia allegedly participated in the falsification of a deed of donation. Atty. Garcia, however, denies such.
Nonetheless, he admits his negligence and expresses remorse for his failure to diligently perform his duties as notary
public with respect to the notarization of the said deed of donation. Atty. Garcia pleads for compassion and mercy
and asks that the Court be more lenient in imposing penalty for the infractions he has committed.
Santos vs. Dichoso:
"In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment
or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition
of the administrative penalty."

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Garcia is guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and should be disbarred.
Atty. Garcia was remiss in the performance of his duties as a notary public. There is preponderance of evidence
showing that he subverted the clear provisions of Section 1 of Public Act 2103, otherwise known as "An Act
Providing for the Acknowledgement and Authentication of Instruments and Documents within the Philippine Islands"
and Section 246 of Act 2711, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
Atty. Garcia is found guilty of harassing the occupants of the property subject of the donation by asking Meralco to
disconnect its services to the property and by posting security guards to intimidate the said occupants. These acts do
not speak well of his standing as a member of the bar.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all time uphold the integrity and dignity of the LEGAL PROFESSION and support the activities of the integrated bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession
By engaging in acts that undermine recognition of and respect for legal processes, Atty. Garcia has clearly
committed conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. HOWEVER, as to the
issue of falsification of the subject deed of donation, a review of the records at hand shows that there is no clear and
convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Garcia is the author of the forged signature of the donor or that he actively
participated or conspired with any party in forging the said signature as it appears in the questioned deed of
donation. The only proven link Atty. Garcia has to the falsified deed is the fact that he notarized it.
SC: NO. There is no PROOF that Atty. Garcia knew that the signature of Cesar Flores appearing on the deed of donation was
falsified. Violeta Alitagtag never disputed Atty. Garcia’s claim that the deed of donation was already signed when personally
handed to him by Cesar Flores, Sr. There is no reason shown why Atty. Garcia should have doubted that the donor’s signature
was forged. Moreover, the fact that Atty. Garcia was later on given a special power of attorney to administer and sell the property
covered by the forged deed of donation does not prove his participation in the falsification of the said deed. Records reveal that
there is a gap of more than five years between the date of notarization of the subject deed of donation on September 19, 1991
and the execution of the special power of attorney in favor of respondent on November 7, 1996. If Atty. Garcia was indeed part
of a scheme to defraud the other children of Cesar Flores, we find it illogical that he and his cohorts would wait that long for
him to be given the power of attorney to dispose of the subject property.
In sum, complainant failed to discharge her burden of proving the liability of Atty. Garcia with respect to the falsification of the
questioned deed of donation. Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough to warrant the disbarment of Atty. Garcia. The
power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should
never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. Without doubt, a violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.
However, the said penalties are imposed with great caution, because they are the most severe forms of disciplinary action and
their consequences are beyond repair.

The Court finds it proper to reconsider the penalty imposed. Nonetheless, the Court reiterates the principle that where the
notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to
do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The penalty of suspension, both from respondent’s practice of law and from his
commission as a notary public is apropos to the offenses he committed. [3 years]
 ATTY. IRENEO TORRES and NATIVIDAD CELESTINO vs. ATTY. JOSE JAVIER [Malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of the
lawyer’s oath -> 1-month SUSPENSION] [September 21, 2005]

The charges stemmed from the statements/remarks made by Atty. Jose Javier in the pleadings he filed in a petition
for audit of all funds of the University of the East Faculty Association as counsel for UEFA then Treasurer Rosamarie
Laman and former UEFA President Eleonor Javier, before the Bureau of Labor Relations, DOLE against herein
complainants, and from the pleadings filed by Atty. Javier in another labor case as counsel for the 176 faculty
members of the University of the East against herein complainant. The complaint sets forth three causes of action
against Atty. Javier.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Motion to Expedite filed in the audit case which complainants allege contained statements
which are absolutely false, unsubstantiated, and with malicious imputation of crimes of robbery, theft of UEFFA’s
funds, destruction or concealment of UEFA’s documents and some other acts tending to cause dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon their persons. [From the undersigned’s standpoint, the alleged "robbery" of "still undetermined documents/papers" was
an inside job as investigation has shown that there is no evidence of forced entry.]

Complainants aver that respondent violated the attorney’s oath that he "obey the laws" and "do no falsehood," the
Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 10.01 thereof, and Rule 138, specifically paragraph 20 (f) of the
Rules of Court for directly pointing to them as the persons who intentionally committed the robbery at the UEFA
office, and for citing the Andersen/Enron case which is irrelevant, impertinent, and immaterial to the subject of
quasi-judicial inquiry.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: In the attorney’s fees case, Atty. Javier, in his "Reply to Respondents (Torres and
Marquez) Answer/Comment" filed before the DOLE, used language that was clearly abusive, offensive, and
improper, inconsistent with the character of an attorney as a quasi-judicial officer. [Rule 8.01, CPR] “What kind of a lawyer
is this Atty. Torres? The undersigned feels that Atty. Torres just cannot kick the habit of injecting immaterial, irrelevant, and impertinent matters
in his pleadings. More than that, he lies through his teeth.The undersigned thinks that if he has any common sense at all he should shut up
about his accusation that Prof. Javier spent more than half a million pesos for negotiation expenses…she obtained only ₱2-increase in union
members salary, etc. because of the pendency of the damage suit against him on this score. He easily forgets the sad chapter of his life as a
practitioner when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the petition for audit which he filed to gain "pogi" points prior to the UEFA election in 1994.”

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: Atty. Javier’s statement in the aforesaid Reply: “It is not uncommon for us trial lawyers to hear
notaries public asking their sons, wives, girlfriends, nephews, etc. to operate a notarial office and sign for them. These girlfriends,
nephews, etc. take affidavits, administer oaths and certify documents.” Complainants allege that the statement is
demeaning to the integrity of the legal profession, uncalled for and deserves censure, as the same might shrink the
degree of confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession
and the solemnity of a notarial document.

ATTY. JAVIER: stresses that he felt that it was his duty to inform the BLR of the loss of the vital documents so that the
resolution of the pending motion for reconsideration filed by complainants would be expedited. That the information
regarding the burglary and his use of the Andersen/Enron case as a figure of speech were relevant in drawing a link
between the burglary and the audit – the burglary having rendered the complete implementation of the audit
unattainable.

IBP INVESTIGATING COMMISIONER: found Atty. Javier guilty of violating the CPR for using inappropriate and
offensive remarks in his pleadings. Atty. Javier’s primordial reason for the offensive remark stated in his pleadings was
his emotional reaction in view of the fact that herein Complainant was in a legal dispute with his wife. This excuse
cannot be sustained. Indeed, the remarks quoted above are offensive and inappropriate. That the Respondent is
representing his wife is not at all an excuse. [REPRIMAND]

IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS: adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. [REPRIMAND]

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Javier is guilty of violating the CPR for using inappropriate and offensive remarks in his pleadings,
despite its privileged nature. [A lawyer’s statements, if relevant, pertinent or material to the subject of judicial inquiry are absolutely
privileged regardless of their defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice.]
SC: It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course
of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, are ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED so long
as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however false or malicious they may be. The requirements
of materiality and relevancy are imposed so that the protection given to individuals in the interest of an efficient
administration of justice may not be abused as a cloak from beneath which private malice may be gratified. If the
pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute and alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his
privilege.

The FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION of complainants is based on respondent’s allegation in his "Motion to Expedite" that a
burglary of the UEFA office took place, and his imputation to complainants of a plausible motive for carrying out the
burglary – the concealment and destruction of vital documents relating to the audit. The imputation may be false
but it could indeed possibly prompt the BLR to speed up the resolution of the audit case. In that light, this Court
finds that the first cause of action may not lie.

As regards the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, it appears that Atty. Javier was irked by Atty. Torres’ Answer to the
complaint in the attorney’s fees case wherein he criticized his wife’s performance as past President of UEFA. This
Court does not countenance Atty. Torres’ incorporating in his Answer statements such as "the assembly . . . was
apparently irked by Mrs. Eleonor Javier when she was booed while talking on the floor like a confused gabble." But
neither does it countenance Atty. Javier’s retaliating statements.

The issue in the attorney’s fees case was whether the 10% attorney’s fees "checked off" from the initial
backwages/salaries of UEFA members is legal. Clearly, the above-quoted statements of Atty. Javier cannot be said to
be relevant or pertinent to the issue. That Atty. Torres may have conducted himself improperly is not a justification
for respondent to be relieved from observing professional conduct in his relations with Atty. Torres. Clients, not
lawyers, are the litigants, so whatever may be the ill-feeling existing between clients should not be allowed to
influence counsel in their conduct toward each other or toward suitors in the case. Although it is understandable, if
not justifiable, that in the defense of one’s clients - especially of one’s wife or of one’s self, the zeal in so doing may
be carried out to the point of undue skepticism and doubts as to the motives of opposing counsel, the spectacle
presented by two members of the bar engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from edifying, and detract
from the dignity of the legal profession.

In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language must be dignified and choice of language is
important in the preparation of pleadings. In the assertion of his client’s rights, a lawyer – even one gifted with
superior intellect –is enjoined to rein up his temper. As reflected above, the inclusion of the derogatory statements
by respondent was actuated by his giving vent to his ill-feelings towards Atty. Torres, a purpose to which the mantle
of absolute immunity does not extend. If indeed Atty. Torres filed criminal complaints for falsification of public
documents against respondent’s clients as a scheme to harass them, they are not without adequate recourse in law,
for if they plead for a righteous cause, the course of justice will surely tilt in their favor, the courts being ever vigilant
in the protection of a party’s rights.
CANON 8 – A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESSS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND
SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Atty. Javier’s arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the court and opposing counsel and be of such
words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another. The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

As to the reference by Atty. Javier to the unfortunate and contemptible practice of notaries public – basis of the last
cause of action, while it may detract from the dignity that should characterize the legal profession and the
solemnity of a notarial document, Atty. Javier who justifies the same as legitimate defense of his client who was
being accused by Atty. Torres of forgery may, given the relevance of the statement to the subject matter of the
pleading, be given the benefit of the doubt.

WHEREFORE, for employing offensive and improper language in his pleadings, Atty. Jose Javier is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE MONTH.
CERINA LIKONG vs. ATTY. ALEXANDER LIM [Malpractice and grave misconduct ->1-year SUSPENSION] [August 17, 1994]
Sometime in September 1984, Cerina Likong obtained a loan of P92,100 from a certain Geesnell Yap. Likong executed
a promissory note in favor of Yap and a deed of assignment, assigning to Yap pension checks which she regularly
receives from the US government as a widow of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed of assignment states that
the same shall be irrevocable until the loan is fully paid. Likong also executed a special power of attorney authorizing
Yap to get, demand, collect and receive her pension checks from the post office at Tagbilaran City. The above
documents were apparently prepared and notarized by Alexander Lim, Yap's counsel.
Three months after the execution of the special power of attorney, Likong informed the Tagbilaran City post office
that she was revoking the special power of attorney. As a consequence, Yap filed a complaint for injunction with
damages against Likong. Alexander Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Atty. Roland Inting and Atty. Erico
Aumentado appeared for Likong. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court, preventing Likong
from getting her pension checks from the Tagbilaran City post office.
In 1985, Likong and Yap filed a joint motion to allow Yap to withdraw the pension checks. This motion does not
bear the signatures of Likong’s counsel of record but only the signatures of both parties, "assisted by" Attorney
Lim. Thereafter, Likong and Yap entered into a compromise agreement again without the participation of Likong’s
counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was stated that Likong admitted an obligation to Yap of P150,000, and that
the amount would be paid in monthly installments for 54 months at an interest of 40% per annum. The
compromise agreement was approved by the trial court.
In 1987, Likong filed the present complaint for disbarment, alleging that in all the motions, Likong was prevented
from seeking assistance, advise and signature of any of her two lawyers. Likong was even advised by respondent
that it was not necessary for her to consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the
settlement; (b) she would only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was
assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the documents foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant
need not come to court afterwards to save her time; and in any event, Atty. Lim already took care of everything.
LIKONG stated that Atty. Lim never furnished her lawyers with copies of the compromise agreement and a motion
to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by Yap.
ATTY. LIM: stated that Atty. Inting had abandoned Likong and, Atty. Aumentado did not actively participate in the
case. Further, it was upon the request of Likong that he made the compromise agreement.
ISSUE: W/N Atty Lim is guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct when he assisted Likong in making the
compromise agreement.
SC: YES. It is of record that complainant was represented by two lawyers, Attys. Inting and Aumentado. LIKONG states
that Atty. Lim prevented her from informing her lawyers. There is no showing that Atty. Lim even tried to inform
opposing counsel of the compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing that Atty. Lim informed the trial court
of the alleged abandonment of the complainant by her counsel. Instead, even assuming that Likong was really
abandoned by her counsel, Atty. Lim saw an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was the
execution of the compromise agreement which is grossly and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial to
complainant.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states that in negotiations with opposite party, “A lawyer should not in
any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent
upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel
and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law.”
ALSO, the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of
any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.

ACCORDINGLY, Atty. Alexander Lim is hereby imposed the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a
period of ONE YEAR.
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT" [March 8, 2011]
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary was
promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Vinuya decision. Thereafter, counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Atty. Harry Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel Bagares ,
filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where they posited for the first time their charge of PLAGIARISM 2
as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. [It is highly improper for this Court’s judgment to plagiarize at least
three sources – an article published in 2009 in the Yale Law Journal of International Law, a book published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005 and an
article published in 2006 in the case Western Reserve Journal of International Law – and make it appear that these sources support the judgment’s arguments for
dismissing the instant petition when in truth, the plagiarized sources even make a strong case for the petition’s claims – Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s
article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;" (2) Christian Tams’ book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law; and (3) Mark Ellis’ article "Breaking
the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime."] “This would be ironic since the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal
remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.” - Ellis

On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion, journalists Aries Rufo and Purple Romero posted an
article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website. The same
article appeared on the GMA News TV website. In a Memorandum Order, the Court formed the Ethics Committee,
and referred the letter of Justice Del Castillo to said Committee. The Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and
Bagares to comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo.
UP COLLEGE OF LAW: "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" was a Statement signed by 38[37] members of the faculty.
Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato Corona.
“An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they
courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any
meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the government of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse
in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.”xxx The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the individual scholars
whose work have been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine
Judicial System.
“A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, to
allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete perversion and
falsification of the ends of justice. xxx A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente merely
copied select portions of other legal writers’ works and interspersed them into the decision as if they were his own, original work.”
The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral
conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court, Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and
credibility of the entire Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of
cases and the establishment of legal precedents through dubious means.
In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’ exhibits in the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that the copy of the statement was not signed but merely reflected the names
of certain faculty members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee directed Atty. Roque
to present the signed copy of the said Statement within three days. It was upon compliance with this directive that
the Ethics Committee was given a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature pages
the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Only 37 of the 81 faculty members
appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did not include former
Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente Mendoza as represented in the previous copies of the Statement submitted
by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel Armovit signed the Statement although his name
was not included among the signatories in the previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total number of
ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.
SC: Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they
expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted
portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence
alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act
of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The insult to the members of the Court

2
PLAGIARISM - the appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s own.
was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of
"polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of the Malaya Lolas, as well as the supposed
alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there
is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary
cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism
can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and
tending to embarrass the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to
discredit the Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing
the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP
Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said
decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys , and
not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.
Thus, the Court directed the faculty members to show cause, within ten days from receipt of the copy of the
Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting
through his letter a dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement.
35 UP LAW PROFESSORS[SATISFACTORY -> reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the CPR ]: stressed that "they
issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in the discharge of the ‘solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as
teachers in the profession of law,’ and as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of public concern and one
that is of vital interest to them." They likewise alleged that "they acted with the purest of intentions" and pointed
out that "none of them was involved either as party or counsel" in the Vinuya case. Further, respondents "note with
concern" that the Show Cause Resolution’s findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment – that respondents indeed
are in contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors and officers of the Court, and have violated
‘Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."
Their noble motive was purportedly evidenced by the portion of their Statement "focusing on constructive
action." Respondents’ call in the Statement for the Court "to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and
Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with
strictures enjoining lawyers to ‘participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts
in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice” and to "promote respect for the law and legal
processes". Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special interest and duty to vigilantly guard against
plagiarism and misrepresentation because these unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the academe,
especially in our law schools." Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the Court’s indifference to the
dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo that impelled them to urgently take a
public stand on the issue.
It is respondents’ view that had they remained silent on the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision, they would have
"compromised their integrity and credibility as teachers; their silence would have created a culture and generation
of students, professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research and pleading;
worse, that their silence would have communicated to the public that plagiarism and misrepresentation are
inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to one’s conduct." Respect for the
courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the bench than by an attempt to
compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a
case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their
clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional
intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case.
VASQUEZ COMPLIANCE [SATISFACTORY]: narrated the circumstances surrounding his signing of the Statement. He was
shown a copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class. Agreeing in principle with
the theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the same in utmost good faith. Prof. Vasquez took the position
that a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in a democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. Also in
contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he "might have been remiss in correctly
assessing the effects of such language in the Statement and could have been more careful."
DEAN LEONEN [UNSATISFACTORY -> ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty]: argues that he should not be deemed to have
submitted a dummy of the Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the same. The main body of
the Statement was unchanged in all its three versions and only the signature pages were not the same. This is merely
"reflective of the Statement’s essential nature as a ‘live’ public manifesto meant to continuously draw adherents to
its message, its signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic.
PROF LYNCH COMPLIANCE [EXCUSED from the proceedings]: manifests to this Court that he is not a member of the Philippine
bar, but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He first taught as a visiting professor at the UP College
of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in 2010. He further alleges that "debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." The right to speak means the right to speak
effectively.
ISSUE: W/N the Show Cause Resolution denies respondents their freedom of expression and violates respondents’
academic freedom as law professors
HELD: NO. The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression, nor does it interfere
with respondents’ academic freedom.
A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a
decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution.
It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for
the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause
Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under the
circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s
Restoring Integrity Statement.
This Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally
primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In
cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the
authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether
judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.
The real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must conform
to standards of fairness and propriety. It is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand,
and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
The obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves, when
they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times
the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts."
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in the
course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or
promotes distrust in judicial administration, or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of people in the
integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court; or of offensive and
abusive language; or abrasive and offensive language; or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and
malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge; or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-
for remarks.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in
pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case
with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personalityand to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his
pleadings must be dignified. Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded
the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech
Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar discipline cases, academic
freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The constitutional right to freedom of
expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to
the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason
that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic
freedom of law professors.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common Compliance that their issuance of
the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or
supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice" under Canon 4, we cannot
agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect
to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar
cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations.
Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholly
immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate matters to be properly
threshed out in separate proceedings.
One wonders what sort of effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among others, callous,
dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and respect. The Court fails to see how it can
ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to send a signal to their students that the only way to effectively
plead their cases and persuade others to their point of view is to be offensive. [LOL] The mark of the true intellectual
is one who can express his opinions logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive
recriminations.
With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that this appears to be the first
time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to give them
the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-intentioned in the issuance of the Statement.
However, it is established in jurisprudence that where the excessive and contumacious language used is plain and
undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance
should be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to
refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate
the courts and the administration of justice.

With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his Compliance compared to his
colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the respondents who showed true candor and sincere deference
to the Court. He did all this without having to retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for
undeserved reliefs and without baseless insinuations of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that
this Court expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only that they recognize that
they themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this affair.
ANTERO POBRE vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the CPR-> DISMISSED: Art. VI, Section 11]
[August 25, 2009]

In his sworn letter/complaint, Antero Pobre invites the Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only
that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by
idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and
the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment
proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.
SENATOR SANTIAGO: explained that the statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary
immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.
The purpose of her speech was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future
remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial
Bar Council," which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief
Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for
nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the
Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof." Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a
polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their
legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good.
Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the
legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides(bad
faith)o f the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary
authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed
in the name of parliamentary immunity.
ISSUE: W/N Senator Santiago’s privileged speech is actionable in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
HELD: NO. HOWEVER, the Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member
of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has
undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements
in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance.
If the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would
be the result. [In re: Sotto] No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be
allowed to erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule
8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct
by others.

Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a former
RTC judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law
textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and
officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain
the respect due its members.

Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive
individual, the impact her statements would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts. As Senator
Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This
allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said.

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger
and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, her remarks were outside the pale of
her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to
ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and
disgust. Parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of Congress for their
personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an "unjust act"
the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions
under the Court’s supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC’s ex-
officio chairperson, have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice.
The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago’s wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of
the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.

FIRST CANON OF LEGAL ETHICS states, “It is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts
against "unjust criticism and clamor," and more. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be
"with all good fidelity x x x to the courts."

GENERAL RULE: a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
committed while in the discharge of official duties UNLESS said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her
oath as a lawyer.
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct
reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification for the
admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not confined to one’s
behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct, which––albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession––would show them to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise
would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and
legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her.
Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this
Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is
not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives,
to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums
outside the congressional hall. It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator
from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public
institution." HOWEVER, the Senate President had not apparently called Atty. Santiago to order, let alone referred the
matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent
backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
We cannot overstress that the senator’s use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of
the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.
FLORENCIO SALADAGA vs. ATTY. ARTURO ASTORGA [breach of the Lawyer’s Oath; unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct; and disrespect
for the Court and causing undue delay of these cases -> 2-year SUSPENSION] [November 25, 2014]

On December 2, 1981, Florencio Saladaga and Atty. Arturo Astorga entered into a "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" where Atty. Astorga sold to Saladaga a parcel of coconut land located in Leyte covered by a TCT for
P15,000. Under the said deed, Atty. Astorga represented that he has "the right to dispose as owner in fee simple"
the subject property and that the said property is "free from all liens and encumbrances." The deed also provided
that Atty. Astorga, as vendor a retro, had two years within which to repurchase the property, and if not repurchased
within the said period, "the parties shall renew the instrument/agreement."

Atty. Astorga failed to exercise his right of repurchase within two two years, and no renewal of the contract was
made even after Saladaga sent Atty. Astorga a final demand for the latter to repurchase the property. Saladaga
remained in peaceful possession of the property until December 1989 when he received letters from the Rural Bank
of Albuera, Inc. informing him that the property was mortgaged by Atty. Astorga to RBAI, that the bank had
subsequently foreclosed on the property, and that Saladaga should therefore vacate the property.

Upon investigation, Saladaga learned that TCT No. T-662 was already cancelled by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of
Philippine National Bank as early as November 17, 1972 after foreclosure proceedings. TCT No. T-3211 was cancelled
by TCT No. T-7235 in the names of Atty. Astorga and his wife on January 4, 1982 pursuant to a deed of sale between
PNB and Atty. Astorga. Atty. Astorga then mortgaged the subject property to RBAI, and RBAI foreclosed on the
property, and subsequently obtained TCT No. TP-10635 on March 27, 1991. Saladaga was subsequently
dispossessed of the property by RBAI.

THUS, Saladaga instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against Atty. Astorga and an Information was filed before
the MTC- Leyte formally charging Atty. Astorga with the crime of estafa under Article 316 of the RPC. Saladaga
likewise instituted the instant administrative cases by filing a complaint seeking the disbarment of Atty. Astorga.

ATTY. ASTORGA: denied that his agreement with Saladaga was a pacto de retro sale. He claimed that it was an
equitable mortgage. Thus, Atty. Astorga argues that he still had the legal right to mortgage the subject property to
other persons. Also, if only Saladaga rendered an accounting of his benefits from the produce of the land, the total
amount would have exceeded P15,000.

INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER: found that Atty. Astorga was in bad faith when he dealt with complainant and
executed the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" but later on claimed that the agreement was one of equitable
mortgage. Atty. Astorga was also guilty of deceit or fraud when he represented in the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662, even giving Saladaga the owner’s copy of the said
certificate of title, when the said TCT had already been cancelled. Thus, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that Atty. Astorga be (1) suspended from the practice of law for one year, and (2) ordered to return
the P15,000, the amount he received as consideration for the pacto de retro sale.

IBP Board of Governors: Considering Atty. Astorga’s "commission of unlawful acts, especially crimes involving moral
turpitude, acts of dishonesty, grossly immoral conduct and deceit," the Board adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with modification that Atty. Astorga be (1) suspended
from the practice of law for two years, and (2) ordered to return the P15,000 in consideration of the pacto de retro
sale.

SC: agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend Atty. Astorga from the practice of law
for two years, but it refrains from ordering respondent to return the P15,000 consideration.

Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and complainant is actually one of sale with pacto
de retroor of equitable mortgage, Atty. Astorga’s actuations in his transaction with Saladaga, as well as in the present
administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for the highest standards of legal proficiency, morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing required from lawyers, for which respondent should be held administratively liable. When
respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath where he undertook to "obey the laws," "do no
falsehood," and "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion." He gravely
violated his oath.
Atty. Astorga caused the ambiguity or vagueness in the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" as he was the one
who prepared or drafted the said instrument. He could have simply denominated the instrument as a deed of
mortgage and referred to himself and complainant as "mortgagor" and "mortgagee," respectively, rather than as
"vendor a retro" and "vendee a retro." If only Atty. Astorga had been more careful in the drafting and preparation of
the deed, then the controversy between him and complainant could have been avoided or, at the very least, easily
resolved. His imprecise and misleading wording of the said deed on its face betrayed lack of legal competence on his
part. More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and the fundamental tenet of human relations as
embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”

Atty. Astorga, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage it to complainant but, as a lawyer, he should have
seen to it that his agreement with complainant is embodied in an instrument that clearly expresses the intent of the
contracting parties. A lawyer who drafts a contract must see to it that the agreement faithfully and clearly reflects
the intention of the contracting parties. Otherwise, the respective rights and obligations of the contracting parties
will be uncertain, which opens the door to legal disputes between the said parties. Indeed, the uncertainty caused by
the poor formulation of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" was a significant factor in the legal controversy
between respondent and complainant. Such poor formulation reflects at the very least negatively on the legal
competence of respondent.

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Under Canon 1, a lawyer is not only mandated to
personally obey the laws and the legal processes, he is moreover expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto. On the other hand, Rule
1.01 states the norm of conduct that is expected of all lawyers.

UNLAWFUL - any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law.
Unlawful conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element.
DISHONEST - means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be untrustworthy; lacking inintegrity, honesty, probity, integrity in
principle, fairness and straightforwardness.
DECEITFUL – having the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant
of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon. In order to be deceitful, the person must either have knowledge of
the falsity or acted in reckless and conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal terms, and was done with the intent
that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in reliance of the false statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his
injury.

The actions of respondent in connection with the execution of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" clearly
fall within the concept of unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct. Respondent’s breach of his oath, violation of
the laws, lack of good faith, and dishonesty are compounded by his gross disregard of this Court’s directives, as
well as the orders of the IBP’s Investigating Commissioner which caused delay in the resolution of these
administrative cases.

The Court required Atty. Astorga to comment on complainant’s Affidavit-Complaint. While he requested for several
extensions of time within which to submit his comment, no such comment was submitted. When these cases were
referred to the IBP, respondent was again required several times to submit his consolidated answer. He only complied
more than six years after this Court originally required him to do so. Respondent’s disregard of the directives of this
Court and of the Investigating Commissioner, which caused undue delay in these administrative cases.

CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
CANON 12 – A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Rule 12.03 – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 – A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.

Atty. Astorga has already been imposed a disciplinary sanction before. In Nuñez v. Atty. Astorga, respondent was
held liable for conduct unbecoming an attorney for which he was fined P2,000. Given the foregoing, the suspension
of respondent from the practice of law for two years, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is proper.
SPOUSES JONATHAN and ESTER LOPEZ vs. ATTY. SINAMAR LIMOS [violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 11, Rule 12.04 of Canon 12,
Rules 16.01and16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR-> 3-year SUSPENSION] [February 2, 2016]

In June 2006, while living abroad, Spouses Lopez secured the services of Atty. Sinamar Limos as counsel in connection
with their intention to adopt a minor child, Ethan Benedict Victore. In consideration therefor, Spouses Lopez paid
Atty. Limos P75,000. A few months later, they purposely came back to the Philippines for a two-week stay to
commence the filing of the adoption case before the proper court. Despite payment and submission of all the
required documents to Atty. Limos, no petition was filed during their stay.

In May 2007, Spouses Lopez received Atty. Limos’ letter requesting that the spouses Lopez be allowed to come home
to the Philippines to appear and testify in court for the adoption case before the RTC-La Union. Spouses Lopez
returned to the Philippines in June 2007, only to find out that: (a) Spl. Proc. Case No. 2890 referred to a petition for
the declaration of the "presumptive death of another person filed by another lawyer; and ( b) Atty. Limos had yet to
file a petition for adoption on their behalf.

Thus, Spouses Lopez withdrew all their documents from Atty. Limos’ custody and hired another lawyer to handle the
filing of the adoption case. Moreover, Spouses Lopez demanded the return of the P75,000 given as legal fees. Atty.
Limos, however, refused to return such money, retorting that as a standard operating procedure, she does not
return "acceptance fees." In view of the foregoing, Spouses Lopez filed the instant administrative case against
respondent before this Court. Despite numerous directives to file a comment, Atty. Limos failed to do so. Thus, the
Court was constrained to dispense with the filing of the same and to impose a fine in the amount of P2,000 against
her.

INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER: found Atty. Limos respondent administratively liable and recommended a 3-year
suspension from the practice of law, and to return the P75,000. The Commissioner found respondent guilty of
violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, as she neglected the legal matter entrusted to her by complainants for
almost a year until complainants finally withdrew their documents from respondent and opted to have the filing of
the case handled by another lawyer. Worse, respondent refused to return the amount of P75,000 representing legal
fees paid by complainants to her. Atty. Limos’ liability was further aggravated by the fact that she: (a) deceived
complainants by informing them that a petition for adoption had already been filed on their behalf, when in truth,
there was none; and (b) failed to file any comment when the Court required her to do so; IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the aforesaid report.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Limos should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.

HELD: YES. Despite the lapse of almost a year and for reasons unknown, Atty. Limos failed to perform anything in
furtherance of the legal matter entrusted to her by complainants. As correctly pointed out by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, respondent's acts constitute a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend
to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity
to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's
neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable, as in this case. Atty. Limos also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when
she failed to return the amount of P75,000 representing legal fees that complainants paid her.

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.

The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and
good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the
money or property collected or received for or from his client. A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use
in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality, as well as of
professional ethics.

Even worse, Atty. Limos misrepresented to complainants that she had already commenced an adoption proceeding.
Atty. Limos even provided them with a case number which was purportedly pending before the RTC. Such
misrepresentation resulted in complainants going through the trouble of coming back to the Philippines, only to find
out that: (a) Spl. Proc. Case No. 2890 referred to a petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of another
person filed by another lawyer; and (b) respondent had yet to file a petition for adoption on their behalf. These
deceitful acts of respondent clearly violate Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provide:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that, as officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
Indubitably, respondent fell short of such standard when she committed the aforedescribed acts of deception
against complainants. Such acts are not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession;
they reveal basic moral flaws that make him unfit to practice law.

To aggravate further respondent's administrative liability, Atty. Limos repeatedly ignored the Courts commands to
attend the mandatory conference and to submit a position paper. Such audacity, which caused undue delay in the
resolution of the administrative case, contravenes Canon 11 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the CPR, all of which read:

CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
CANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.

The Court's patience has been tested to the limit by what in hindsight amounts to a lawyer's impudence and
disrespectful' bent. At the minimum, members of the legal fraternity owe courts of justice respect, courtesy, and
such other becoming conduct essential in the promotion of orderly, impartial, and speedy justice." What respondent
has done was the exact opposite, and hence, she must be disciplined accordingly.

The Court sustains the IBP's recommendation, ordering Atty. Limos to return the amount of P75,000 she received
from complainants as legal fees. While the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only
revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his civil liability, it must be
clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature; for instance,
when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement." Since Atty. Limos received the aforesaid amount as part of her
legal fees, the Court, thus, finds the return thereof to be in order, with legal interest as recommended by the IBP
Investigating Commissioner.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Sinamar Limos is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 11, Rule 12.04 of Canon
12, Rules 16.01and16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, she is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 3 years.

Furthermore, Atty. Limos is ORDERED to return to complainants-spouses Jonathan and Ester Lopez the legal fees she
received from the latter in the amount of P75,000.
SUZETTE DEL MUNDO vs. ATTY. ARNEL CAPISTRANO [violated Canon 16 and 18 of the CPR-> 1-year SUSPENSION & return of P73,500]
[April 16, 2012]

On January 8, 2005, Suzette Del Mundo and her friend, Ricky Tuparan, engaged the legal services of Atty. Arnel
Capistrano to handle the judicial declaration of nullity of their respective marriages, allegedly for a fee of
PhP140,000 each. On the same date, a Special Retainer Agreement was entered into by and between Suzette and
Atty. Capistrano which required an acceptance fee of PhP30,000, appearance fee of PhP2,500/hearing and another
PhP2,500/pleading. In addition, Atty. Capistrano allegedly advised her to prepare amounts for: Filing fee (P11,000),
Summon(P5,000), Fiscal(P15,000), Psychiatrist(P30,000), Commissioner(P15,000).

Thus, Suzette gave Atty. Capistrano the total amount of PhP78,500 – acceptance fee, and four filing fees. For every
payment that Suzette made, she would inquire from Atty. Capistrano on the status of her case. In response, the latter
made her believe that the two cases were already filed before RTC-Malabon City and awaiting hearing. In July 2005,
when she could hardly reach Atty. Capistrano, she verified her case from the Clerk of Court of Malabon and
discovered that while the case of Tuparan had been filed on January 27, 2005, no petition has been filed for her.

Hence, Suzette called for a conference where she demanded the refund of the P78,500, but Atty. Capistrano instead
offered to return P63,000 on staggered basis claiming to have incurred expenses in the filing of Tuparan’s case, to
which she agreed. On the same occasion, Atty. Capistrano handed to her copies of her unfiled petition, Tuparan’s
petition and his Withdrawal of Appearance in Tuparan’s case with instructions to file them in court, as well as a
list6 containing the expenses he incurred and the schedule of payment of the amount of PhP63,000. However, Atty.
Capistrano only returned P5,000 and thereafter, refused to communicate with her, prompting the institution of this
administrative complaint.

ATTY. CAPISTRANO: acknowledged receipt of P78,500 from Suzette and his undertaking to return P63,000. He also
admitted responsibility for his failure to file Suzette’s petition and cited as justification his heavy workload and busy
schedule as then City Legal Officer of Manila and lack of available funds to immediately refund the money received.

IBP-CBD: found that Atty. Capistrano had neglected his client’s interest by his failure to inform Suzette of the status
of her case and to file the agreed petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It also concluded that his inability to
refund the amount he had promised Suzette showed deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor. Hence, he was held guilty of violating Rule 18.03, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR and recommended
the penalty of a 2-year SUSPENSION.

IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS: adopted the report of the Commissioner, with modification ordering the return of the
P140,000 attorney’s fees to Suzette; IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORSMR: reduced the penalty to a 1-year SUSPENSION.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Arnel Capistrano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES. The Court concurs with the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, but takes exception to the amount of
P140,000 recommended to be returned to Suzette.

Atty. Capistrano committed acts in violation of his sworn duty as a member of the bar. He himself admitted liability
for his failure to act on Suzette’s case, and only pleaded for the mitigation of his penalty citing the lack of intention to
breach his lawyer’s oath; that this is his first offense; and that his profession is the only means of his and his family’s
livelihood. He also prayed that the P140,000 be reduced to P73,500, representing the amount of PhP78,500 he
received less the P5,000.

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
RULE 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
RULE 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request
for information.
Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence 3 in protecting the
latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes
the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but
also to the legal profession, the courts and society. His workload does not justify neglect in handling one’s case
because it is settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as much as he can efficiently handle.

Moreover, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession. As trustee of such
funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific
purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand.
Failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on
him. The conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.

The practice of law is a PRIVILEGE given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality,
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty -- to society, the legal profession,
the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Falling short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer
by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in consideration of the
surrounding facts.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Arnel Capistrano, having clearly violated Canons 16 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR . He is ORDERED to return to Suzette Del Mundo
the full amount of PhP73,500 within 30 days from notice hereof and DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of such
payment.

3
DUE DILIGENCE - the care that a reasonable person exercises to avoid harm to other persons or their property
SPOUSES EMILIO AND ALICIA JACINTO vs. ATTY. EMELIE BANGOT, JR. [violation of lawyer’s oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 15, Canon 17,
Rule 18.03, Canon 20, and Rule 20.4 of the CPR -> 5-year SUSPENSION] [October 05, 2016]

A private survey team conducted a survey of Lot No. 1351 pursuant to the order of the RTC-Cagayan de Oro City in
connection with the reconstitution of the lost certificate of title of said lot by the Spouses Emilio and Alicia Jacinto,
then 81 and 76 years of age. The survey team had tried to enter the premises owned by the spouses but they had
prevented the team from doing so because their land covered by the OCT had already been subdivided into nine lots.
The survey team desisted from proceeding with their survey but had nonetheless informed them that they would
return another time for the survey. This forced the Spouses to consult Atty. Emelie Bangot, Jr. on the legal remedies
to prevent the intrusion on their property.

After scrutinizing the documents, Atty. Bangot told the spouses that he would be initiating a case for certiorari on
their behalf to nullify the order for the reconstitution of the lost title covering Lot No. 1351. He had then insinuated
that one of their lots would be his attorney's fees. They had not initially agreed to the insinuation because the lots
had already been allocated to each of their seven children, but they had ultimately consented to giving him only a
portion of the lot with an area of 250 sqm. Soon after, Atty. Bangot unilaterally prepared the Memorandum of
Agreement which states that Atty. Bangot shall be the counsel for the spouses in exchange for 300 sqm. lot. The
spouses were made to sign the agreement. [ “Because of full trust to Atty. Bangot, we did not bother reading the contents of the
documents. Per instruction, we brought the papers to their friend lawyer for notarization and after the notarization returned to the office where
we were given our personal file, without reading every detail of the documents.”]

The spouses aver that the MOA did not bear the signature of witnesses and that it did not reflect the true
intentions being contemplated in their previous discussions – a different area was written, but this lot could no
longer be disposed of because these lots were already committed to each of the spouses’ children. The lot area was
also increased from 250 sq. m. to 300 sq. m.

As a gesture of acknowledging his efforts, the spouses nonetheless offered to pay him in cash, fair enough for the
services he had rendered. However, Atty. Bangot refused to revoke the MOA because his wife was not amenable.
Likewise, he refused the offer to pay his services in cash alleging that he already filed a Manifestation in court and
that the possession would not be disturbed for he will be filing a case for Certiorari as promised. However, said
Manifestation filed by Atty. Bangot is not a preparatory pleading for certiorari and could not stop any legal
disturbance on the property of the spouses. Thus, spouses Jacinto filed an administrative case against Atty. Bangot.

ATTY. BANGOT: insisted that the complaint against him was a harassment tactic designed to intimidate him from
seeking judicial remedies to settle their dispute on the validity of the MOA. Allegedly, the administrative complaint
was designed to insure the derailment of his application for a judgeship position, and to cover up the negligence of
the complainants' counsel as the plaintiffs in a Civil, which case was dismissed for failure to comply with the
requirement for the prior barangay conciliation proceedings. Further, the spouses voluntarily signed the MOA
without intimidation, fraud or undue influence.

IBP COMMISSIONER: found the complaint against Atty. Banogt to be meritorious, and recommended that he be
SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR for his unfair and injudicious treatment of the complainants as his clients; IBP BOARD OF
GOVERNORS: increased the duration of the penalty to SUSPENSION for TWO YEARS, finding that Atty. Bangot
breached his duty of candor and fairness to his client.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Bangot violated his ethical duties as a member of the Bar in his dealings with the complainants.

HELD: YES. Atty. Bangot grossly violated his Lawyer's Oath and his ethical duties as an attorney because he did not
observe candor and fairness in his dealings with his clients. "Was the MOA fair to the parties and entered into by them in goodfaith?"

Atty. Bangot gave a different account of their agreement and took advantage of the frailty and advance age of his
clients. But, the most shocking of all, is the apparent inequity or disproportion between the amount of attorney's
fees and the effort or service already performed or still to be performed by him.
The Complainants were not made parties to the LRC case or any other case and Atty. Bangot filed a mere two-paged
Manifestation for Information in court which he did almost effortlessly. It is not clear how the court had reacted to
the manifestation but Atty. Bangot did not follow it up with any other action.
To determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees, Rule 20.1 of the CPR may serve as a guide, to wit:
(a) the time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) the importance of the subject matter;
(d) the skill demanded;
(e) the probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
(g) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
(h) the contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) the character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j) the professional standing of the lawyer.

Surely, the totality of Atty. Bangot’s actuations inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession. On the basis
of his acts and actuations, the attorney's fees in the form of the lot he charged from them were unconscionable and
unreasonable, and should be struck down for failing to pass muster under the aforestated guidelines. As worded, the
agreement was not a contingent fee arrangement. CONTINGENT FEE ARRANGEMENT - a contract in writing in
which the fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the
success in the effort to enforce or defend a supposed right. The amount of the contingent fee agreed upon by the
parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers.
A contract of this nature is permitted because it redounds to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer especially
in cases where the client has a meritorious cause of action but has no means with which to pay for the legal services
unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the
litigation. Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services. Atty. Bangot was deceitful, dishonest and
unreasonable in his dealings with the complainants as his clients. He thus violated his Lawyer's Oath, and also
breached the following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Canon 20- A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Rule 20.4 A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent
imposition, injustice or fraud.

The Law is neither a trade nor a craft, but a profession whose basic ideal is to render public service and to secure
justice for those who seek its aid. The respondent's behavior and deceit demonstrated a preference for self-gain
that transgressed his sworn duty of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to his clients' cause. His betrayal of his clients'
trust besmirched the honorable name of the Law Profession.

Moreover, in his motion for reconsideration filed with the IBP Board of Governors, Atty. Bangot had readily
attributed the filing of the administrative charge to the lawyer representing the complainants in the suit against him
to annul or rescind the MOA, as well as to "unseen but influential hands" in the hierarchy of the IBP. The attribution
was bereft of factual and legal justifications, however, because he did not even attempt to establish it with
satisfactory proof. We cannot but dismiss the attribution as malicious and unfounded in view of the record
establishing his serious ethical violations. He displayed an unmitigated lack of professionalism by casting aspersions
against his peers, and exhibited a dangerous propensity to disparage others, which should move us to consider his
violations as aggravated.

As long as the attorney is in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he
should have a reasonable compensation for such services. HOWEVER, the attorney should not accept the
engagement that is way above his ability and competence to handle, for there will then be no basis for him to accept
any amount as attorney's fees.

WHEREFORE, this Court FINDS ATTY. EMELIE BANGOT, JR. guilty of violation of the Lawyer's Oath and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; SUSPENDS him for FIVE YEARS. He is not entitled to any attorney's fees.
WILLIAM CAMPOS, JR. vs. ATTY. ALEXANDER ESTEBAL [violated Canons 15, 16 and 20 of the CPR -> 1-year SUSPENSION] [August
8, 2016]

In the early part of 2006, William Campos, Jr., Rita Batac, and Dorina Carpio engaged the services of Atty. Alexander
Estebal to assist each of them in securing tourist visas to the US. Campos and Atty. Estebal entered into a Service
Contract stipulating an acceptance/service fee of P200,000, exclusive of out-of-pocket expenses such as tickets,
filing fees, and application fees. In case no visa is issued, Campos is entitled to a refund of what has been actually
paid, less 7% thereof. Campos paid Atty. Estebal P150,000 while Batac and Carpio gave Atty. Estebal P75,000 and
P120,000 respectively. Unlike Campos, their agreement with Atty. Estebal was not put in writing. Complainants
claimed that despite receipt of their monies, Atty. Estebal failed to apply or secure for them the US tourist visas
that he promised. Thus, they demanded for the return of their monies. Atty. Estebal, however, failed to return the
amount despite repeated demands. Hence, they filed this Complaint praying that Atty. Estebal be suspended or
disbarred from the practice of law, and that he be directed to return their monies.

ATTY. ESTEBAL: contends that after interviewing complainants individually, he suggested that complainants file a
collective application, meaning that the complainants should constitute themselves into a tour group, so that their
overall chances of obtaining visas for all members of the group would be enhanced. HOWEVER, although some
applicants paid the proper fees and submitted the required documents, others neither paid the proper fees nor
submitted the necessary documents, thus, the plan did not push through at all. Atty. Estebal posited that
complainants’ demand for the return or refund of their money has no factual or legal basis at all, especially because
he had invested considerable time, talent and energy in the processing of complainants’ tourist visa applications.

INVESTIGATING COMMISIONER: noted that Atty. Estebal received a total of P345,000 from complainants.
Notwithstanding receipt thereof, Atty. Estebal did not make any attempt to process or submit their visa applications.
Even if the amount collected is considered as attorney’s fees, the same is excessive. P15,000 would be considered
appropriate under the circumstances. Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Estebal be
suspended from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS for violating Canons 15, 16 and 20 of CPR. Moreover, it was
recommended that Atty. Estebal be directed to refund the amount of P330,000 and to retain the amount of P15,000
as his attorney’s fees.

IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS: ADOPTED with modification, the Report of the Investigating Commissioner. The IBP
Board of Governors resolved to delete the recommended penalty of SUSPENSION and reduce the amount refunded
from P330,000 to P300,000; IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORSMR: resolved to reinstate the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner to suspend Atty. Estebal from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Estebal is guilty of professional misconduct for violating the pertinent provisions of the CPR.

HELD: YES. While lawyers are entitled to the payment of attorney’s fees, the same should be reasonable under the
circumstances. Even if we base the attorney’s fees of Atty. Estebal on quantum meruit, still, the amount collected by
the respondent is still excessive. Recovery of attorney’s fees on the basis of QUANTUM MERUIT is authorized:
(1) when there is no express contract for payment of attorney’s fees;
(2) when although there is a formal contract for attorney’s fees, the fees stipulated are found unconscionable or unreasonable by the Court;
(3) when the contract for attorney’s fees is void due to purely formal defects of execution;
(4) when the lawyer for justifiable cause was not able to finish the case for its conclusion;
(5) when the lawyer and the client disregard the contract for attorney’s fees; and
(6) when the client dismissed his client before the termination of the case or the latter withdrew therefrom for valid reason.

Since the amount received by Atty. Estebal either as payment for attorneys’ fees or either as payment for visa
application is excessive, he should return the money to the complainant. The attorney’s fees is excessive in a sense
that in the Service contract, the scope of work involves “initial interview of client and collation of all information
relevant to the case; assessment of case; evaluation of documents; formulation of the theory of the case; filing up of
forms; general briefing, specific briefing including mock interview.”

Respondent clearly violated Canons 15, 16 and 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
CANON 20 – A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees.

The complainants have satisfactorily shown the degree of the required evidence to convince this Commission that
indeed, Atty. Estebal, Sr. should be held administratively liable. In fairness to Atty. Estebal, he is also entitled to his
attorney’s fees. Having performed the scope of work he mentioned in his contract, the amount of
P5,000/complainant would be reasonable payment for his attorney’s fee.

There is hardly any doubt that Atty. Estebal’s act of receiving such substantial sums from complainants without in the
least intending to honor his word to secure the U.S. tourist visas that he promised to get for them constitutes a
breach of his professional responsibility. It was both a refusal and a failure to give complainants their due; it was
also both a refusal and a failure to observe honesty and good faith in his dealings with them. Indeed, Atty. Estebal
acted unjustly; he denied complainants their due; and he displayed unmitigated dishonesty and bad faith in his
professional and personal relations with complainants.

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity
to the client's cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deseives full attention, diligence, skill and competence,
regardless of importance. A lawyer also owes it to the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair.

A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public
confidence in the legal profession. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deseives punishment. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title but not used for the purpose, should be
immediately returned.

ACCORDINGLY, Atty. Alexander Estebal is found GUILTY of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE YEAR. He is also ORDERED to return the amounts of
P135,000 to William Campos, Jr., P60,000 to Rita Batac; and P105,000 to Dorina Carpio.
ELENA DE CAIÑA, ET AL. vs. HON. GUSTAVO VICTORIANO, ET AL. [ANNULMENT of order] [February 26, 1959]

Elena de Caiña, et al. are the widow and children of the late Valeriana Caiña who was the owner of a parcel of land
covered by a TCT. A portion of this property was transferred to one Gavina Cierte de Andal. As a result, said title was
cancelled and a new one was issued in their names.
Flaviano Dalisay, Jr. was the attorney of one of petitioners, Elena de Caiña, in an action for ejectment filed before
the Justice of the Peace-Caloocan, Rizal, against one Ricardo Nabong, which was dismissed and appealed to CFI-
Rizal. Because of the non-appearance of defendant, the latter was declared in default and judgment was rendered in
favor of plaintiff. This judgment became final and executory for lack of appeal.
Thereafter, Atty. Dalisay filed a motion in the same ejectment case for annotation of his attorney's lien on the back of
the TCT claiming that, notwithstanding the services he had rendered to Elena de Caiña, they have failed to pay him
his attorney's fees which he fixed at P2,020. This motion was set for hearing and thereafter the same was
GRANTED.
JUDGE GUSTAVO VICTORIANO: ordered petitioners to surrender their duplicate copy of said certificate in order that
the annotation requested may be made.
Upon receipt of a copy of this order, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that they were never
furnished with a copy of respondent's motion, nor notified of the date of its hearing, for which reason they were
not able to appear to contest the same. This motion was opposed by Atty. Dalisay who averred that petitioners were
furnished with a copy of his motion by registered mail three days before the hearing as shown by the return card
attached to his written opposition. Thus, the court denied the motion. Hence the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the attorney's lien of Atty. Dalisay for services he had rendered in the ejectment case can be ordered
annotated on the back of the TCT.
HELD: NO. An attorney's lien is of two kinds: one is called retaining alien and the other charging lien.
RETAINING LIEN-the right of the attorney to retain the funds, documents, and papers of his client which have lawfully
come into his possession until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid and to apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof.
CHARGING LIEN-the right which the attorney has upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions
issued in pursuance of said judgments, which he has secured in litigation of his client (Section 33, Rule 127).
Under this rule, this lien, whether retaining or charging, takes legal effect only from and after, but not before, notice
of said lien has been entered in the record and served on the adverse party. It may therefore be seen that the right of
a lawyer to insure the payment of his professional fee is either to retain the funds, documents, and papers of his
client which may have lawfully come into his possession, or to enforce it upon any judgment for the payment of
money he may secure in favor of his client. The retaining lien is dependent upon possession and does not attach to
anything not in attorney's hands. The lien exists only so long as the attorney's retains possession ends.
In the instant case, the lien which Atty. Dalisay tried to enforce for the satisfaction of his professional fee
is charging in the sense that his purpose is to make of record his claim in order that it may be considered in the
execution of the judgment that may be rendered in the case, and this he has already done. Thus, he had already
caused a statement of his claim to be entered in the record of the ejectment case and that is all what the rule
requires of him to do.
Certainly, he cannot go any further, such as what he led the trial court to do, that is, to have his lien annotated on the
back of the title of petitioners which is beyond the province of the court. The lien of Atty. Dalisay is not of a nature
which attaches to the property in litigation but is at most a personal claim enforceable by a writ of execution.
Judge Victoriano has therefore exceeded his authority in issuing the order subject of the present petition
for certiorari.
THUS, the order of JUDGE VICTORIANO judge dated July 10, 1957 is hereby set aside.
JOSEFINA ANIÑON vs. ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR. [GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03,
Canon 15 of the CPR -> 1-year SUSPENSION] [April 11, 2012]

Josefina Aniñon previously engaged the legal services of Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana in the preparation and execution
in her favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr.
Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant
accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential information he obtained from her in filing the civil case.

ATTY. SABITSANA: admitted having advised Aniñon in the preparation and execution of the Deed of Sale, HOWEVER,
he denied having received any confidential information. Atty. Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment
complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint who lost a court
case against Atty. Sabitsana and had instigated the complaint for this reason.

IBP COMMISSIONER: found Atty. Sabitsana administratively liable for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer may
not represent conflicting interests in the absence of the written consent of all parties concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. In the present case, no such written consent was secured by respondent before accepting
employment as Mrs. Cañete’s counsel-of-record. Complainant and Atty. Sabitsana’s present client, being contending
claimants to the same property, the conflict of interest is obviously present. There is said to be INCONSISTENCY OF
INTEREST when on behalf of one client, it is the attorney’s duty to contend for that which his duty to another client
requires him to oppose. In brief, if he argues for one client this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for
the other client. Thus, the IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended for ONE YEAR; IBP
BOARD OF GOVERNORS: adopted and approved the Report of the IBP Commissioner.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests.

SC: YES. The relationship between a lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust
and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s
most confidential information to his lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to
state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of
utmost secrecy and discretion. The lawyer is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and
transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests:
Rule 15.03-A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

"The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties
are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action." The prohibition also applies even if the "lawyer
would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that
there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other
as the two actions are wholly unrelated." To be held accountable under this rule, it is "enough that the opposing
parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the
lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.”

THREE TESTS in determining INCONSISTENCY OF INTEREST is present in a given case:

1. Whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the
other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a
violation of the rule.
2. Whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.
3. Whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired
through their connection or previous employment.
There is substantial evidence to support Atty. Sabitsana’s violation of the above rule:
1. his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest over a certain property. Upon the legal advice of Atty.
Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed in the complainant’s favor.
2. Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Cañete to discuss the latter’s legal interest over the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point,
Atty. Sabitsana already had knowledge that Zenaida Cañete’s interest clashed with the complainant’s interests.
3. despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty. Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Cañete.
 4. Atty. Sabitsana’s actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a
case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Cañete; second, he impleaded the complainant as the defendant in the case; and third, the
case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and executed for the complainant.

By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another client in the same action; he
also accepted a new engagement that entailed him to contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a
property in which his legal services had been previously retained.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides an EXCEPTION to the above prohibition.
However, such would not apply in the present case since Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of facts to the
complainant and to Zenaida Cañete before he accepted the new engagement with Zenaida Cañete. Although Atty.
Sabitsana wrote a letter to the complainant informing her of Zenaida Cañete’s adverse claim to the property covered
by the Deed of Sale and, urging her to settle the adverse claim, Atty. Sabitsana did not disclose to the complainant
that he was also being engaged as counsel by Zenaida Cañete. Moreover, Atty. Sabitsana failed to obtain the written
consent of his two clients, as required by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ATTY. SABITSANA: takes exception to the IBP recommendation on the ground that the charge in the complaint was
only for his alleged disclosure of confidential information, not for representation of conflicting interests. To Atty.
Sabitsana, finding him liable for the latter offense is a violation of his due process rights since he only answered the
designated charge.

SC: There is no violation of Atty. Sabitsana’s due process rights. Although there was indeed a specific charge in the
complaint, the complaint itself contained allegations of acts sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on the
prohibition against representing conflicting interests.

Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in his answer. He also averred in his Answer he asked
the permission of Mrs. Cañete (which she granted) that he would first write a letter to the complainant proposing to
settle the case amicably between them but complainant ignored it. Neither did she object to respondent’s handling
the case in behalf of Mrs. Cañete on the ground she is now invoking in her instant complaint.

We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be informed of the charge
against oneself and to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one’s side or
the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. These opportunities were all
afforded to Atty. Sabitsana, as shown by the above circumstances.

All told, DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS against lawyers are sui generis. In the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession. We likewise aim to ensure the proper and honest administration
of justice by purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. This is all that we did in this case. Significantly, we
did this to a degree very much lesser than what the powers of this Court allows it to do in terms of the imposable
penalty. In this sense, we have already been lenient towards respondent lawyer.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR
from the practice of law.
RAUL SESBREÑO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PROVINCE OF CEBU [No AWARD FOR DAMAGES for Sesbreño] [April 16, 2008]

On January 26, 1970, Rosario Sen and other camineros4 hired Atty. Sesbreño to prosecute TWO CIVIL CASES, as
evidenced by an agreement for attorney’s fees wherein Sen, et. al agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreño, 30% of whatever
back salaries, damages, etc. they may recover against the Province of Cebu, the Provincial Governor, etc., whether
or not the said cases will be amicably settled or decided by the courts by final judgment.

During the pendency of the aforesaid cases, Atty. Sesbreño registered his charging/retaining lien based on the
Agreement. The camineros obtained favorable judgment when CFI-Cebu ordered that they be reinstated to their
original positions with back salaries.The Commissioner of Public Highways and the District Engineer
filed certiorari cases where Atty. Sesbreño rendered further legal assistance and represented the camineros.

When Gov. Eduardo Gullas assumed the position of governor of Cebu, the camineros, represented by the petitioner,
and the province of Cebu, forged a Compromise Agreement, with the following terms and conditions:
1. to immediately pay full backwages and salaries as awarded by the trial court in its decision to all the private respondents-employees
9. That the amounts payable to the employees concerned represented by Atty. Raul Sesbreño is subject to said lawyer’s charging and
retaining liens as registered in the CFI and CA.
11. That upon request of the employees concerned, the Province of Cebu is agreeable to paying an advance of P5,000 to each employee
payable through their counsel, Atty. Raul Sesbreño, deductible from the total amount that each will receive from the Province of Cebu,
effective upon confirmation by the Solicitor General, the SC and the PNB where funds are now in deposit under trust.

In view of the finality of the above decision, the camineros, through their new counsel who substituted Atty.
Sesbreño, moved for its execution. The court ordered the issuance of a partial writ of execution directing the
payment of only 45% of the amount due them based on the computation of the provincial engineering office as
audited by the authority concerned. The court did not release the remaining 55%, thus holding in abeyance the
payment of the lawyer’s fees pending the determination of the final amount of such fees. HOWEVER, instead of
complying with the court order directing partial payment, the province of Cebu directly paid the camineros the full
amount of their adjudicated claims.

Thus, Atty. Sesbreño filed the complaint for Damage and Attorney’s Fees against the Province of Cebu, the
provincial governor, as well as against his former clients (the camineros). Atty. Sesbreño alleged that by directly
paying the camineros the amounts due them, the respondents induced the camineros to violate their written
contract for attorney’s fees. He likewise claimed that they violated the compromise agreement approved by the
Court by computing the camineros’ money claims based on the provincial instead of the national wage rate which,
consequently, yielded a lower amount. Atty. Sesbreño contends that by virtue of the registration of his charging lien,
he was a quasi-party and thus, had legal standing to institute the case below. LATER, Atty. Sesbreño moved to
dismiss the case against the camineros after he had entered into an agreement with them and settled their
differences. The case, however, proceeded against the respondents. Atty. Sesbreño clarifies that he instituted the
instant case for breach of the compromise agreement and not for violation of the agreement for attorney’s fees as
mistakenly concluded by the appellate court.

RTC: rendered a decision in favor of Atty. Sesbreño. While maintaining the validity of the compromise agreement,
the trial court found that the Atty. Sesbreño’s money claims should have been computed based on the national and
not the provincial rate of wages paid the camineros. Accordingly, Atty. Sesbreño was prejudiced to the extent of the
difference between these two rates. The court further upheld the Atty. Sesbreño’s status as a quasi-party considering
that he had a registered charging lien. However, it did not give credence to Atty. Sesbreño’s claim that the public
officials induced the camineros to violate their contract, and thus, absolved them from liability.

CA: reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court concluded that Atty.
Sesbreño failed to sufficiently establish his allegation that the respondents induced the camineros to violate the
agreement for attorney’s fees and the compromise agreement, and that he suffered damage due to respondents’ act
of directly paying the camineros the amounts due them.

4
CAMINEROS - permanent laborers holding positions in the national plantilla of floating personnel chargeable against the "JJ"
funds with particular assignments at the First Engineering District of Cebu.
ISSUE: W/N respondents are liable for damages for breach of contract.

HELD: NO. We cannot allow Atty. Sesbreño to question anew the compromise agreement on the pretext that he
suffered damage. As long as he was given the agreed percentage of the amount received by the camineros, then, the
agreement is deemed complied with, and petitioner cannot claim to have suffered damage.

Atty. Sesbreño claims that he was prejudiced by respondents’ act in directly paying the camineros the amounts due
them, as it rendered inutile the charging lien duly registered for his protection. To insure payment of his professional
fees and reimbursement of his lawful disbursements in keeping with his dignity as an officer of the court, the law
creates in favor of a lawyer a lien, not only upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully
come into his possession until what is due him has been paid, but also a lien upon all judgments for the payment
of money and executions issued pursuant to such judgments rendered in the case wherein his services have been
retained by the client Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 37. Attorney’s liens. – An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client, which have lawfully come
into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the
satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall
have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over
such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

CHARGING LIEN - is an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to the lawyer for services in a suit secured to
him out of the judgment or recovery in that particular suit. It is based on the natural equity that the plaintiff should
not be allowed to appropriate the whole of a judgment in his favor without paying thereout for the services of his
attorney in obtaining such judgment.

In the instant case, the Atty. Sesbreño rightly commenced an action against both his clients and the judgment
debtors. HOWEVER, at the instance of Atty. Sesbreño himself, the complaint against his clients was withdrawn on the
ground that he had settled his differences with them. He maintained the case against respondents because,
according to him, the computation of the camineros’ money claims should have been based on the national and not
the provincial wage rate. Thus, Atty. Sesbreño insists that the respondents should be made liable for the difference.

In the instant case, Atty. Sesbreño’s act in withdrawing the case against the camineros and agreeing to settle their
dispute may be considered a waiver of his right to the lien. Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers
are not merchants. Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job
done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from
governmental interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to state regulation.

Considering that petitioner’s claim of higher attorney’s fees is baseless and considering further that he had settled
his case as against his former clients, we cannot sustain his right to damages for breach of contract against the
respondents, even on the basis of Articles 1191 or 1311. Although we sustain his status to institute the instant case,
we cannot render a favorable judgment because there was no breach of contract. Even if there was such a breach,
he had waived his right to claim against the respondents by accepting payment and/or absolving from liability those
who were primarily liable to him. Thus, no liability can be imputed to the province of Cebu or to the respondent
public officials, either in their personal or official capacities.

Lastly, the Court cannot ascribe bad faith to the respondents who directly paid the camineros the amounts due
them. The records do not show that when they did so, they induced the camineros to violate their contract with the
petitioner; nor do the records show that they paid their obligation in order to cause prejudice to Atty. Sesbreño. The
attendant circumstances show that the camineros acknowledged their liability to the petitioner and they willingly
fulfilled their obligation. It would be contrary to human nature for the petitioner to have acceded to the withdrawal
of the case against them, without receiving the agreed attorney’s fees.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SPOUSES HENRY and BLESILDA CONCEPCION vs. ATTY. ELMER DELA ROSA [violating
Rule 16.04 and Canon 7 of the CPR-> 3-year SUSPENSION] [February 3, 2015]
From 1997 until August 2008, Atty. Elmer Dela Rosa served as the retained lawyer and counsel of spouses Henry and
Blesilda Concepcion. In this capacity, Atty Dela Rosa handled many of their cases and was consulted on various legal
matters, among others, the prospect of opening a pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said business,
however, failed to materialize.

Aware of the fact that spouses Concepcion had money intact from their failed business venture, Atty Dela Rosa
borrowed from them P2.5 million, which he promised to return with interest five days thereafter. Thus, the spouses
issued three EastWest Bank checks in Atty Dela Rosa’s name, and the checks were subsequently encashed by the
latter.

On the day Atty. Dela Rosa promised to return the money, he failed to pay spouses Concepcion. Despite demands,
Atty. Dela Rosa failed to pay. Rather, Atty. Dela Rosa denied borrowing any money from the complainants. Instead,
Atty. Dela Rosa claimed that a certain Jean Charles Nault, one of his other clients, was the real debtor. Upon failing
to reach a settlement, IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter received complainants’ letter-complaint charging Atty. Dela Rosa
with violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR. The rule prohibits lawyers from borrowing money from clients unless the
latter’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. In the course of the
proceedings, Atty. Dela Rosa failed to appear during the scheduled mandatory conferences.

IBP INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER: found Atty. Dela Rosa guilty of violating: (a) Rule 16.04 of the CPR which
provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his clients unless the client’s interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice; (b) Canon 7 which states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the IBP; and (c) Canon 16 which provides that a
lawyer shall hold in trust all monies and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Dela Rosa be disbarred and that he be ordered to return the
₱2.5 million to complainants, with stipulated interest;

IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS: adopted the Investigating Commissioner’s Report but reduced the penalty to indefinite
suspension and ordered the return of the P2.5 million with legal interest, instead of stipulated interest.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Dela Rosa should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.

HELD: YES. Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
in a legal matter he is handling for the client."

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with
trust and confidence. As true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule
against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of
his influence over his client. The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the
legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.

Atty. Dela Rosa borrowed money from complainants who were his clients and whose interests, by the lack of any
security on the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and confidence in Atty. Dela Rosa, complainants
relied solely on the former’s word that he will return the money plus interest within five days. However, Atty. Dela
Rosa abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients the runaround up to this day.
Accordingly, there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.

In the same vein, the Court finds that respondent also violated Canon 7 of the CPR which reads:
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.

In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the same, Atty. Dela Rosa abused
the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession.Thus, he should be equally held administratively liable on this score.
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.

Considering the amount involved in this case and Atty. Dela Rosa’s continuous refusal to pay his debt, the Court
deems it apt to suspend him from the practice of law for THREE YEARS, instead of the IBP's recommendation to
suspend him indefinitely.

The Court also deems it appropriate to modify the IBP's Resolution insofar as it orders respondent to return to
complainants the amount of P2.5 million and the legal interest thereon. It is settled that in disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member
of the Bar. In such cases, the Court's only concern is the determination of respondent's administrative liability.

It should not involve his civil liability for money received from his client in a transaction separate, distinct, and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. In this case, Atty. Dela Rosa received the P2.5 million as a loan
from complainants and not in consideration of his professional services. Hence, the IBP's recommended return of
the aforementioned sum lies beyond the ambit of this administrative case, and thus cannot be sustained.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Elmer dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for THREE YEARS.