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BITOY JAVIER (DANILO P.

JAVIER),
Petitioner, vs.
FLY ACE CORPORATION/FLORDELYNCASTILLO,
Respondents.
FACTS

On May 23, 2008, the petitioner Danilo (Bitoy) Javier filed a complaing against the respondents
(Fly AceCorporation / Flordelyn Castillo) for underpayment of salaries and other labor standard
benefits.

Javier worked for the respondent’s company since


September 2007
as an all around worker around the
respondent’s warehouse and a
pahinante
for the company’s deliveries.

The petitioner claims that he worked for the respondent from 7:00 AM to 5:00 PM, Monday to
Saturday during histime of employment but was never issued a company ID nor any payslips
like the other employees.

On May 6, 2008, the petitioner was barred from entering the c


ompany’s premises and despite repeated
pleadingto allow him to resume work he was not allowed to,

Petitioner further claims that when asked for a reason on why he was being barred from
working, his superior acertain Ruben Ong (Mr. Ong) replied by telling him
“Tanungin mo anak mo”

Petitioner claims that Mr. Ong had been courting his daughter and apparently after
being spurned had terminatedJavier without a chance to refute the cause/s of his dismissal.

To support his allegations, the petitioner presented an affidavit of one Bengie Valenzuela
who alleged thatpetitioner was a stevedore or
pahinante
of Fly Ace from September 2007 to January 2008. The said affidavit wassubscribed before the
Labor Arbiter.

Fly Ace on the other hand claims that the petitioner was contracted by its employee Mr. Ong as
a
pahinante
on a
pakyaw
(or per work) basis at an agreed rate of 300 per trip (later increased to 325 on January 2008).

Mr. Ong had contracted the petitioner only roughly 5 to 6 times per month whenever their
contracted hauler(Milmar Hauling Services) was not available.

Fly Ace submitted their contract with Milmar, and copies of acknowledgement receipts
evidencing the payment for
the petitioner’s services with the words “daily manpower (
pakyaw
/piece rate pay) with the petitioner’s signature /
initials to try and prove that petitioner was not one of their employees.
LABOR ARBITER

LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, saying that the petitioner failed to present proof
of his regularemployment with the company:
o

Complainant has no employee ID showing his employment with the Respondent nor any
documentshowing that he received the benefits accorded to regular employees of the
Respondents. His contentionthat Respondent failed to give him said ID and payslips implies that
indeed he was not a regularemployee of Fly Ace considering that complainant was a helper and
that Respondent company hascontracted a regular trucking for the delivery of its products.
o

Respondent Fly Ace is not engaged in trucking business but in the importation and sales of
groceries.
Since there is a regular hauler to deliver its products, we give credence to Respondents’ claim
that
complainant was contracted on "pakiao" basis.
o

As to the claim for underpayment of salaries, the payroll presented by the Respondents
showing salariesof workers on "pakiao" basis has evidentiary weight because although the
signature of the complainantappearing thereon are not uniform, they appeared to be his true
signature.
NLRC

On appeal at the NLRC, Javier was favored. It ruled that the LA skirted the argument of
Javier and immediatelyconcluded that he was not a regular employee simply because he failed
to present proof. It was of the view that a
pakyaw
-basis arrangement did not preclude the existence of employer-employee relationship.
CA

On March 18, 2010, the CA annulled the NLRC findings that Javier was indeed a former
employee of Fly Ace and
reinstated the dismissal of Javier’s complaint as ordered by the
LA.

In an illegal dismissal case the


onus probandi
rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal was for a validcause. However, before a case
for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first beestablished. x
x x it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove the employee-employer relationship
bysubstantial evidence.

It is incumbent upon private respondent to prove, by substantial evidence, that he is an


employee of petitioners,but he failed to discharge his burden. The non-issuance of a company-
issued identification card to private
respondent supports petitioners’ contention that private respondent was not its employee.

Case was elevated to the SC on appeal.ISSUES + HELD1. WON the CA erred in holding that
the petitioner was not a regular employee of FLY ACE (NO)2. WON the CA erred in holding
that the petitioner is not entitles to his monetary claims (NO)

RATIO

The Court affirms the assailed CA decision.

It must be noted that the issue of Javier’s alleged illegal dismissal is anchored on the existence
of an employer
-employee relationship between him and Fly Ace. This is essentially a question of fact.

Generally, the Court does not review errors that raise factual questions
. However, when there is conflict amongthe factual findings of the antecedent deciding
bodies like the LA, the NLRC and the CA, "it is proper, inthe exercise of Our equity jurisdiction,
to review and re-evaluate the factual issues and to look into therecords of the case and re-
examine the questioned findings.
" In dealing with factual issues in labor cases,
"substantial evidence


that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion

is sufficient."

As the records bear out, the LA and the CA found Javier’s claim of employment with Fly Ace as
wanting and
deficient. The Court is constrained to agree.
Although Section 10, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure ofthe NLRC
28
allows a relaxation of the rules of procedure and evidence in labor cases, this rule of
liberalitydoes not mean a complete dispensation of proof.

In sum, the rule of thumb remains: the


onus probandi
falls on petitioner to establish or substantiate such claim bythe requisite quantum of evidence.
"Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law shouldestablish his or her right
thereto
. Javier failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief.

While Javier remains firm in his position that as an employed stevedore of Fly Ace, he
was made to work in thecompany premises during weekdays arranging and cleaning grocery
items for delivery to clients
, no other proofwas submitted to fortify his claim
.
The lone affidavit executed by one Bengie Valenzuela was
unsuccessful in strengthening Javier’s cause.
The Court cannot ignore the inescapable conclusion that hismere presence at the workplace
falls short in proving employment therein. The supporting affidavit could have, to
an extent, bolstered Javier’s claim of being tasked to clean grocery items when there were no
scheduled delivery
trips, but no information was offered in this subject simply because
the witness had no personal knowledge of
Javier’s employment
The Court is of the considerable view that on Javier lies the burden to pass the well-settled
tests to determine theexistence of an employer-employee relationship,
viz
: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee’s
conduct. Of these
elements, the most important criterion is whether the employer controls or has reserved the
right to control theemployee not only as to the result of the work but also as to the means and
methods by which the result is to beaccomplished.
35

In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the above elements exist in his
case.

Fly Ace does not dispute having contracted Javier and paid him on a "per trip" rate as a
stevedore, albeit on a
pakyaw
basis. The Court cannot fail to note that Fly Ace presented documentary proof that Javier was
indeedpaid on a
pakyaw
basis per the acknowledgment receipts admitted as competent evidence by the
LA.Unfortunately for Javier, his mere denial of the signatures affixed therein cannot
automatically sway us to ignorethe documents because "forgery cannot be presumed and must
be proved by clear, positive and convincingevidence and the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery."

Considering the above findings, the Court does not see the necessity to resolve the second
issuepresented.

The Court’s decision does not contradict the settled rule that "payment by the piece is just a
method of
compensation and does not define the essence of the relation."
Payment on a piece-rate basis does notnegate regular employment.

"The term ‘wage’ is broadly defined in Article 97 of the Labor Code as


remuneration or earnings, capable of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or
ascertained on a time,task, piece or commission basis.
Payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and does notdefine the essence of
the relations.
Nor does the fact that the petitioner is not covered by the SSS affect theemployer-employee
relationship. However
, in determining whether the relationship is that of employer andemployee or one of an
independent contractor, each case must be determined on its own facts
and all thefeatures of the relationship are to be considered.

While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of
the working class, it shouldnot be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically
decided in favor of labor. Management also has itsrights which are entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for theless privileged in life,
the Court has inclined, more often than not, toward the worker and upheld his cause in
hisconflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule
that justice is in everycase for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts
and the applicable law and doctrine.

PETITION DENIED, CA RULING AFFIRMED.

Jaime Gapayao vs Rosario Fulo et al

698 SCRA 485 – Labor Law – Social Legislation – SSS Claims


Labor Standards – Hours of Work – Employer-Employee Relations – Control Test
Jaime Fulo had been working in a farm owned by Jaime Gapayao since 1983. In November
1997, Jaime Fulo was electrocuted while working in the said farm. Jaime Fulo died. Thereafter,
Rosario Fulo, the widow of Jaime Fulo, filed a claim for death benefits before the SSS (Social
Security System). It turned out however that Jaime Fulo was never registered with the SSS.
Eventually, SSS ordered Gapayao, as the employer, to pay the SSS contributions due with
penalty.
Gapayao averred he cannot be made liable to pay the SSS contributions because according to
him there was no employer-employee relationship between him and Jaime Fulo. He argued,
among others, that Jaime Fulo was not his employee because:
1. he did not work regular hours as he was only called when needed and that Fulo can even
look for other jobs elsewhere if he wanted to. In fact, Fulo also worked for some other people;
2. he was only an “extra” in the farm;
3. Gapayao had no control over him (lack of control);
ISSUE: Whether or not Jaime Fulo was an employee of Jaime Gapayao.
HELD: Yes. Fulo was a regular employee and was thus entitled to receive SSS benefits, among
others. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals in ruling that it “does not follow
that a person who does not observe normal hours of work cannot be deemed an employee.” It
is also not material that Gapayao never supervised Fulo.
In this case, the number of hours worked is not material. Gapayao is considered a pakyaw
worker. Pakyaw workers are considered regular employees for as long as their employers have
control over them. The power of the employer to control the work of the employee is
considered the most significant determinant of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. This is the so-called control test and is premised on whether the person for whom
the services are performed reserves the right to control both the end achieved and the manner
and means used to achieve that end.” It should be remembered that the control test merely
calls for the existence of the right to control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof. It is not
essential that the employer actually supervises the performance of duties by the employee. It
is enough that the former has a right to wield the power.

PIGCAULAN vs. SECURITY and CREDIT NVESTIGATION, INC. and/or REYES DIGEST

DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 173648 January 16, 2012

ABDULJUAHID R. PIGCAULAN,* Petitioner,


vs.
SECURITY and CREDIT NVESTIGATION, INC. and/or RENE AMBY REYES, Respondents.
FACTS: It is not for an employee to prove non-payment of benefits to which he is entitled by
law. Rather, it is on the employer that the burden of proving payment of these claims rests.

Canoy and Pigcaulan were both employed by SCII as security guards and were assigned to SCII’s
different clients. Subsequently, however, Canoy and Pigcaulan filed with the Labor Arbiter
separate complaints7 for underpayment of salaries and non-payment of overtime, holiday, rest
day, service incentive leave and 13th month pays. These complaints were later on consolidated
as they involved the same causes of action. Canoy and Pigcaulan, in support of their claim,
submitted their respective daily time records reflecting the number of hours served and their
wages for the same. They likewise presented itemized lists of their claims for the
corresponding periods served.
RESPONDENT MAINTAINS: that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid their just salaries and other
benefits under the law; that the salaries they received were above the statutory minimum
wage and the rates provided by the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency
Operators (PADPAO) for security guards; that their holiday pay were already included in the
computation of their monthly salaries; that they were paid additional premium of 30% in
addition to their basic salary whenever they were required to work on Sundays and 200% of
their salary for work done on holidays; and, that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid the
corresponding 13th month pay for the years 1998 and 1999. In support thereof, copies of
payroll listings8 and lists of employees who received their 13th month pay, for the said
periods.

LABOR ARBITER: (in favor of petitioner herein) held that the payroll listings presented by the
respondents did not prove that Canoy and Pigcaulan were duly paid as same were not signed
by the latter or by any SCII officer. The 13th month payroll was, however, acknowledged as
sufficient proof of payment, for it bears Canoy’s and Pigcaulan’s signatures.

NLRC affirmed; CA however reversed in favor of respondent.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari [filed by petitionerPIGCAULAN alone]
ISSUE: WON the Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the complaint allegedly
due to absence of legal and factual [bases] despite attendance of substantial evidence in the
records.
HELD: YES

There was no substantial evidence to support the grant of overtime pay.


The Labor Arbiter relied heavily on the itemized computations they submitted which he
considered as representative daily time records to substantiate the award of salary
differentials. The NLRC then sustained the award on the ground that there was substantial
evidence of underpayment of salaries and benefits.

We find that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred in this regard. The handwritten
itemized computations are self-serving, unreliable and unsubstantial evidence to sustain the
grant of salary differentials, particularly overtime pay. Unsigned and unauthenticated as they
are, there is no way of verifying the truth of the handwritten entries stated therein. Written
only in pieces of paper and solely prepared by Canoy and Pigcaulan, these representative
daily time records, as termed by the Labor Arbiter, can hardly be considered as competent
evidence to be used as basis to prove that the two were underpaid of their salaries.

Hence, in the absence of any concrete proof that additional service beyond the normal working
hours and days had indeed been rendered, we cannot affirm the grant of overtime pay to
Pigcaulan.

However, with respect to the award for holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th
month pay, we affirm and rule that Pigcaulan is entitled to these benefits [under the Labor
Code, Article 94-95].
SCII failed to show any other concrete proof by means of records, pertinent files or similar
documents reflecting that the specific claims have been paid.With respect to 13th month pay,
SCII presented proof that this benefit was paid but only for the years 1998 and 1999. To repeat,
the burden of proving payment of these monetary claims rests on SCII, being the employer.
The CA erred in dismissing the claims instead of remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter for a
detailed computation of the judgment award.
PETITION GRANTED. Pigcaulan is hereby declared entitled to holiday pay and service incentive
leave pay for the years 1997-2000 and proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2000. The
case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings to determine the exact amount
and to make a detailed computation of the monetary benefits due
___________

NOTES:

ART. 94. RIGHT TO HOLIDAY PAY. – (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during
regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten
(10) workers;
xxxx
While Article 95 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 95. RIGHT TO SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE. – (a) Every employee who has rendered at least
one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive of five days with pay.
 Consistent with the rule that all money claims arising from an employer-employee
relationship shall be filed within three years from the time the cause of action
accrued, Pigcaulan can only demand the amounts due him for the period within three years
preceding the filing of the complaint in 2000.

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