RULE 70: FORCIBLE ENTRY and UNLAWFUL DETAINER the subject house and lot in favor of Mr.
ject house and lot in favor of Mr. Don Enciso Benitez, but, to
#1- same as Rule 69 case #1 Cano Vda de Viray v Spouses Usi
#2 G.R. No. 160914, March 25, 2015
MARCELA M. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO Q. HERMANO
AND HIS WIFE REMEDIOS HERMANO, Respondent.
SERENO, C.J.:
This is an appeal by way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing
the Decision1 and Resolution2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 76446, which reversed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 18, Tagaytay City, in Civil Case No. TG-2320. The RTC
affirmed the Decision4 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 1, Tagaytay City in Civil Case No. 471-2002, dismissing
respondents’ Complaint for Ejectment with Damages against
petitioner.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
Respondents Antonio and Remedios Hermano are the registered
owners of a house and lot situated in P.B. Constantino Subdivision,
Tagaytay City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
24503. On 13 June 2002, Antonio sued petitioner before the MTCC of
Tagaytay City, Branch 1, for ejectment and damages. The material
allegations of the Complaint5 are as follows:
4. Plaintiff is the registered and lawful owner of a house and lot
situated at Lot 2, Block 2, P.B. Constantino Subd., Tagaytay City, as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24503 issued by the
Registry of Deeds for Tagaytay City.
5. Defendant occupied and possessed the aforesaid house and lot
sometime on September 1, 2001 pursuant to the alleged Memorandum
of Agreement between her and a certain Don Mario Enciso Benitez,
without the authority and consent of the plaintiff;
6. The subject property is used by the plaintiff and his family as their
rest house/vacation place after a hard days [sic] work in Metro Manila;
7. On September 27, 2001, plaintiff through counsel sent a formal
demand letter to the defendant for the latter to vacate and turn over
the possession of the property and to pay the rental in the amount of
Ps20,000.00 a month starting September 1, 2001.6
In her Answer with Counterclaim,7 petitioner admitted the existence of
TCT No. T-24503, but she contended that the true and actual owner of
the property was Don Enciso Benitez (Benitez). Allegedly, Antonio and
his wife, respondent Remedios Hermano, had already sold the property
to Benitez; the latter, in turn, sold it to petitioner by virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Sale,8 which they executed on 1 March 2001. Petitioner
claimed that Antonio knew about the sale and her immediate
occupation of the premises. She also claimed that the place was
actually uninhabited when she occupied it and that it was Benitez who
had provided the keys thereto. Moreover, Antonio allegedly knew that
her caretakers had been managing the property since March 2001, and
that he never questioned their presence there. Thus, petitioner
contended that estoppel had set in, as he had made her believe that
she had the right to occupy and possess the property. 9
After submission of the parties’ Position Papers,10 the MTCC rendered a
Decision11 dated 21 November 2002 dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint.
The MTCC found that Antonio had, indeed, executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the subject property in favor of Benitez. The
transfer of title, however, was subject to a condition, i.e., Benitez was
supposed to broker Antonio’s purchase of a property situated in
Caloocan City. That condition had not yet been satisfied when Benitez
executed the Deed of Sale in favor of petitioner in March 2001. In
other words, Antonio still owned the property when Benitez delivered it
to petitioner. Even so, Antonio’s proper remedy was an action for
recovery, instead of the summary proceeding of ejectment, because
there was no showing of forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
The MTCC ruled thus:
Culled from the facts obtaining in this case, it appeared that Mr.
Antonio O. Hermano had indeed executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
the mind of the court, the obligation to deliver the subject property to
Don Enciso Benitez depends upon the happening of a condition, that
is, when the transaction involving the sale of the said Caloocan City
property would have been cleared and consummated; hence, the title
to the subject property shall only be transferred to Mr. Benitez if he
has complied with such condition, which may be the reason, why the
document has remained unnotarized.
While it may be true that the agreement to sell the Hermano property
to Mr. Benitez is binding as between the parties, yet, the obligation to
deliver the title to the property has not arisen, because Mr. Benitez
has yet to perform the condition; thus, title to the property has not
been transferred to Mr. Benitez. Thus, when Mr. Benitez sold the same
property to defendant, the title to the property shall pass to Mrs. Dela
Cruz only upon the happening of condition, that is the delivery of the
title to Mr. Benitez by the plaintiff, but, this time it is a mixed
condition, the happening of which depends upon the will of third party,
Mr. Antonio Hermano, who has yet to await and see the fulfilment of
the condition by Mr. Benitez, which as it now appears from the
defendant’s evidence, is already marred by serious trouble (Annex
“6”).
True that the defendant is now in possession of the subject property,
but she has not yet become the true owner thereof; hence, the
plaintiff may yet recover the same from the defendant, but not in an
action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as there exists none, but
in an action for recovery.12
Aggrieved, respondents appealed13 to the RTC, which rendered a
Decision14 dated 18 March 2003 affirming en toto the Decision of the
MTCC.
The RTC opined that respondents’ Complaint did not clearly show
whether it was one for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer. Because
it appeared to be an ejectment case, the MTCC took cognizance of it.
The parties’ subsequent pleadings revealed, however, that the case
was actually an accion reivindicatoria. Hence, the MTCC properly
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.15
On 10 April 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Review 16 with the CA.
The appellate court rendered a Decision17 dated 28 August 2003
granting the Petition. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is
hereby GRANTEDand the assailed 18 March 2003 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay [City], Branch 18, in Civil Case No.
TG-2320, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. ACCORDINGLY,
petitioner Antonio Hermano is hereby declared the lawful possessor of
the property located at Lot 2, Block 2, P.B. Constantino Subdivision,
Tagaytay City covered by Transfer Certificate Title No. T-24503 of the
Registry of Deeds of Tagaytay City. Mercy dela Cruz is hereby ordered
to VACATE the premises in question and surrender the possession
thereof to Antonio Hermano.
SO ORDERED.18
The reversal by the CA of the rulings of the courts a quo was based on
its finding that the case was an ejectment complaint for forcible entry,
and that Antonio had sufficiently alleged and proved prior physical
possession, as well as petitioner’s entry and possession by
stealth.19 Further, the appellate court found that the case was file
within the one-year time bar for an ejectment suit, as Antonio came to
know of petitioner’s possession only on 1 September
2001.20 Accordingly, it ruled that the MTCC erred in dismissing the
case. It pointed out that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the inferior
courts now retain jurisdiction over an ejectment case, even if the
question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the
issue of ownership. They retain jurisdiction, provided that the
resolution of the issue of ownership shall only be for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession.21
Hence, this Petition for Review.
ISSUE
The issue for resolution is whether Antonio has adequately pleaded
and proved a case of forcible entry.
THE COURT’S RULING
The Court GRANTS the Petition.
Page 1 of 69
At the outset, the Court notes that the arguments raised here
necessarily require a reevaluation of the parties’ submissions and the
CA’s factual findings. Ordinarily, this course of action is proscribed in a
petition for review on certiorari; that is, a Rule 45 petition resolves
only questions of law, not questions of fact. Moreover, factual findings
of the CA are generally conclusive on the parties and are therefore not
reviewable by this Court. By way of exception, however, the Court
resolves factual issues when the findings of the MTCC and of the RTC
differ from those of the CA, as in this case.22
After an exhaustive review of the case record, the Court finds that the
Complaint was sufficient in form and substance, but that there was no
proof of prior physical possession by respondents.
The Complaint’s allegations sufficiently
established the jurisdictional facts required
in forcible entry cases.
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, requires that in actions for
forcible entry, it must be alleged that the complainant was deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, and that the action was filed anytime within one
year from the time the unlawful deprivation of possession took place.
This requirement implies that in those cases, possession of the land by
the defendant has been unlawful from the beginning, as the
possession was obtained by unlawful means. Further, the complainant
must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in
litigation until he or she was deprived thereof by the defendant. The
one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry into the land, except
when entry was made through stealth; if so, the one-year period
would be counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. 23
It is not necessary, however, for the complaint to utilize the language
of the statute; i.e., to state that the person has been deprived of
possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. A
statement of facts showing that dispossession took place under those
conditions is sufficient. Still, the complaint must show enough on its
face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. 24
In the present case, petitioner argues that the Complaint failed to
allege prior physical possession, and that the CA skirted the issue of
the sufficiency of the allegations therein. Instead, the appellate court
allegedly addressed only the principal issue of who had the better right
to possess the subject property.
It can be readily seen from the Decision of the CA that it squarely
addressed the issue of the sufficiency of the Complaint’s
allegations. Thus, contrary to the RTC’s findings, the CA found that
the Complaint had sufficiently alleged respondents’ prior physical
possession and petitioner’s entry into the property by stealth.
Moreover, it differed with the RTC’s finding that the case was not for
forcible entry.
The CA discussed these issues as follows:
The complaint subject of this case was captioned as “ejectment”. From
a reading of the allegations of the subject Complaint, we find that the
action is one for forcible entry. Petitioner alleged that he is the owner
of the property registered under TCT No. T-24503; that the possession
thereof by respondent on 1 September 2001 was pursuant to an
alleged Memorandum of Agreement between her and a certain Don
Mario Enciso, without the authority and consent of the petitioner; and
that he has served written demands, dated 27 September 2001 and 24
October 2001, but that respondent refused to vacate the property.
According to petitioner, the Complaint, which was filed on 13 June
2002, was filed within one year from the occupation of the property.
xxxx
Petitioner likewise contends that prior to the disputed possession of
respondent, he and his family used the property as their “rest
house/vacation place” after their hard day’s work in Metro Manila. He
avers that his possession is anchored on TCT No. T-24503. Notably,
respondent acknowledged the existence of the muniment of title
presented by petitioner. In relation thereto, noteworthy is the fact that
respondent has shown no document evidencing proof of ownership
over the subject matter except for the unnotarized documents of
conveyances executed between her and Don Mario Enciso Benitez and
Don Mario Enciso Benitez and petitioner. The fact that the deeds were
not notarized nor acknowledged before a notary public raises doubt as
to the probative value of said documents. On this matter, evidentiary
value weighs in favor of petitioner.
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
As regards petitioner’s supplication for restoration of possession which
is based on his and his family’s use of the subject property prior to the
inception of the controversy, the rule is that whatever may be the
character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time,
he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he
is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right. From a reading of
the records, it is evident that the petitioner had addressed the element
of prior physical possession.
Having established prior possession, the corollary conclusion would be
that the entry of respondent – and her subsequent possession of the
contested property – was illegal at the inception. Respondent’s entry
into the land was effected without the knowledge of petitioner,
consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth. 25
The allegations in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Complaint adequately
aver prior physical possession by respondents and their dispossession
thereof by stealth, because the intrusion by petitioner was without
their knowledge and consent. The Court thus agrees with the findings
of the CA that contrary to those of the RTC that the case was an action
for ejectment in the nature of accion reivindicatoria,the case was
actually for forcible entry and sufficient in form.
Likewise, the Court agrees with the CA’s findings that the Complaint
was timely filed. It is settled that where forcible entry occurred
clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from
the time the person who was deprived of possession demanded that
the deforciant desist from dispossession when the former learned
about it.26 The owners or possessors of the land cannot be expected to
enforce their right to its possession against the illegal occupant and
sue the latter before learning of the clandestine intrusion. And to
deprive lawful possessors of the benefit of the summary action under
Rule 70 of the Revised Rules, simply because the stealthy intruder
managed to conceal the trespass for more than a year, would be to
reward clandestine usurpations even if they are unlawful. 27
The title to the property of respondents
and their Tax Declaration proved possession
de jure, but not their actual possession of the
property prior to petitioner’s entry.
The burden of sufficiently alleging prior physical possession carries
with it the concomitant burden of establishing one’s case by a
preponderance of evidence. To be able to do so, respondents herein
must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not on the weakness
of that of petitioner. It is not enough that the allegations of a
complaint make out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff must prove
prior physical possession. It is the basis of the security accorded by
law to a prior occupant of a property until a person with a better right
acquires possession thereof.28
The Court has scrutinized the parties’ submissions, but found no
sufficient evidence to prove respondents’ allegation of prior physical
possession.
To prove their claim of having a better right to possession,
respondents submitted their title thereto and the latest Tax
Declaration prior to the initiation of the ejectment suit. As the CA
correctly observed, petitioner failed to controvert these documents
with competent evidence. It erred, however, in considering those
documents sufficient to prove respondents’ prior physical possession.
Ownership certainly carries the right of possession, but the possession
contemplated is not exactly the same as that which is in issue in a
forcible entry case. Possession in a forcible entry suit refers only to
possession de facto, or actual or material possession, and not one
flowing out of ownership. These are different legal concepts under
which the law provides different remedies for recovery of possession.
Thus, in a forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior possession
can recover the possession even against the owner. Whatever may be
the character of the possession, the present occupant of the property
has the security to remain on that property if the occupant has the
advantage of precedence in time and until a person with a better right
lawfully causes eviction.29
Similarly, tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive
proofs of possession. They are merely good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner based on the presumption that no one in one’s right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in one’s actual or
constructive possession.30
Guided by the foregoing, the Court finds that the proofs submitted by
respondents only established possession flowing from ownership.
Although respondents have claimed from the inception of the
Page 2 of 69
controversy up to now that they are using the property as their
vacation house, that claim is not substantiated by any corroborative
evidence. On the other hand, petitioner’s claim that she started
occupying the property in March 2001, and not in September of that
year as Antonio alleged in his Complaint, was corroborated by the
Affidavit31 of petitioner’s caretaker. Respondents did not present any
evidence to controvert that affidavit.
Therefore, respondents failed to discharge their burden of proving the
element of prior physical possession. Their uncorroborated claim of
that fact, even if made under oath, is self-serving. It does not amount
to preponderant evidence, which simply means that which is of greater
weight or is more convincing than evidence that is offered in
opposition.32
As noted at the outset, it bears stressing that the Court is not a trier of
facts. However, the conflicting findings of fact of the MTCC and the
RTC, on the one hand, and the CA on the other, compelled us to revisit
the records of this case for the proper dispensation of
justice.33 Moreover, it must be stressed that the Court’s
pronouncements in this case are without prejudice to the parties’ right
to pursue the appropriate remedy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76446 are REVERSED, and the Decision
of the MTCC dismissing the Complaint against petitioner
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
#3 G.R. No. 182953 October 11, 2010
CORAZON D. SARMIENTA, JOSE DERAMA, CATES RAMA, JOSIE
MIWA, TOTO NOLASCO, JESUS OLIQUINO, NORBERTO LOPEZ,
RUBEN ESPOSO, BERNARDO FLORESCA, MARINA DIMATALO,
ROBLE DIMANDAKO, RICARDO PEÑA, EDUARDO ESPINO,
ANTONIO GALLEGOS, VICTOR SANDOVAL, FELICITAS
ABRANTES, MERCY CRUZ, ROSENDO ORGANO, RICKY BARENO,
ANITA TAKSAGON, JOSIE RAMA and PABLO
DIMANDAKO, Petitioners,
vs.
MANALITE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
(MAHA), Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the
Decision1 dated October 19, 2007 and Resolution2 dated May 21, 2008
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93050. The CA had
affirmed the Decision3 dated January 10, 20064 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 05-485
which reversed the Decision5 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Antipolo City, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 104-00.
The case stemmed from a complaint6 for "Forcible Entry/Unlawful
Detainer" filed by respondent Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc.
(MAHA) against AMARA W CIGELSALO Association (AMARA) and its
members. The complaint was raffled to the MTCC of Antipolo City,
Branch 1 and docketed as Civil Case No. 104-00.
MAHA alleged that it is the registered owner of a certain parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2226037 with an area
of 9,936 square meters situated in Sitio Manalite, Phase I, Barangay
Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City.8 Through force, intimidation, threat, strategy
and stealth, petitioners entered the premises and constructed their
temporary houses and an office building.9 Petitioners likewise even
filed a civil case to annul MAHA’s title on September 2, 1992, but said
case was dismissed by the trial court. After said dismissal, MAHA
demanded that petitioners vacate the land. Petitioners pleaded that
they be given one year within which to look for a place to transfer, to
which request MAHA acceded. The said one-year period, however, was
repeatedly extended due to the benevolence of MAHA’s members.
Later on, petitioners came up with a proposal that they become
members of MAHA so they can be qualified to acquire portions of the
property by sale pursuant to the Community Mortgage Program
(CMP).10 MAHA again agreed and tolerated petitioners’ possession,
giving them until December 1999 to comply with the requirements to
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
avail of the CMP benefits. Petitioners nonetheless failed to comply with
said requirements. Thus, on August 9, 2000, MAHA sent formal
demand letters to petitioners to vacate the property. Upon the latter’s
refusal to heed the demand, MAHA filed the complaint for "Forcible
Entry/Unlawful Detainer."
In their Answer with Counterclaims,11 petitioners denied the said
allegations and averred that they are the owners of the subject lot,
having been in actual physical possession thereof for more than thirty
(30) years before MAHA intruded into the land. They claimed that as
the years went by, they established the AMARA and bought the subject
property from Julian Tallano. The property later became known as the
Tallano Estate and registered under TCT No. 498. They likewise argued
that the allegations in the complaint do not confer jurisdiction upon the
court acting as an ejectment court, and that the complaint was
irregular and defective because its caption states that it was for
"Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer." MAHA, additionally, had no legal
capacity to sue and was guilty of forum shopping. Its officers were
likewise fictitious.
On May 19, 2005, the MTCC of Antipolo City rendered a decision
dismissing the case for lack of cause of action. The MTCC held that the
complaint filed was one of forcible entry, but MAHA failed to establish
the jurisdictional requirement of prior physical possession in its
complaint.12 Also, the trial court held that MAHA’s failure to initiate
immediate legal action after petitioners unlawfully entered its property
and its subsequent declaration of benevolence upon the petitioners
cannot be construed as tolerance in accordance with law as to justify
the treatment of the case as one for unlawful detainer.13
MAHA appealed the decision to the RTC. The RTC rendered a Decision
dated January 10, 2006, reversing the decision of the MTCC. The RTC
held that the lower court erred in dismissing the case by considering
the complaint as one of forcible entry which required prior physical
possession. The RTC found that MAHA was able to allege and prove by
preponderance of evidence that petitioners’ occupation of the property
was by mere "tolerance." MAHA tolerated the occupation until all those
who wanted to acquire MAHA’s rights of ownership could comply with
membership obligations and dues.14 Petitioners, however, failed to
comply with said obligations within the given period; thus, their
occupation became illegal after MAHA demanded that they vacate the
property.15 The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is rendered
ordering the defendants; their representatives and all persons acting
for and in their behalf; members of their families; their lessees and
sub-lessees; or other people whose occupation of the premises are
from the authority of defendants, their representatives or members of
the defendants’ families; and other transferees pendente lite:
1) to vacate the subject premises;
2) to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the sum of
THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000.00) as for
attorney’s fee[s] and the cost of suit; and,
3) to pay the plaintiff severally the sum of ONE HUNDRED
PESOS (P100.00) per month from June 1992 until the
premises are actually vacated.
SO ORDERED.16
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA assailing
the decision of the RTC. In a Decision dated October 19, 2007, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA held that while the complaint
in the beginning alleged facts which make out a case for forcible entry,
the rest of the averments therein show that the cause of action was
actually for unlawful detainer. The CA noted that the complaint alleged
supervening events that would show that what was initially forcible
entry was later tolerated by MAHA thereby converting its cause of
action into one for unlawful detainer. Accordingly, the complaint was
filed within the required one-year period counted from the date of last
demand. The CA further held that the fact that the complaint was
captioned as both for forcible entry and unlawful detainer does not
render it defective as the nature of the complaint is determined by the
allegations of the complaint. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads,
Page 3 of 69
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 74 dated January 10, [2006] is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration from the said decision was
denied in a Resolution dated May 21, 2008. Hence, petitioners are now
before this Court raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 74 IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 05-485 REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT [IN CITIES], BRANCH 1,
ANTIPOLO CITY THAT DISMISS[ED] THE FORCIBLE
ENTRY/UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF
ACTION.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE COURT [A
QUO] ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE CASE.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE COMPLAINT
BOTH CAPTIONED AS FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL
DETAINER IS NOT DEFECTIVE.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS [HAVE] A
SUPERIOR RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVER THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION.
V. WHETHER OR NOT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT IN
CITIES, BRANCH 1, ANTIPOLO CITY HAS JURISDICTION.
VI. WHETHER OR NOT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT IN
CITIES, BRANCH 1, ANTIPOLO CITY HAS JURISDICTION
OVER AN EJECTMENT CASE BASED ON FORCIBLE ENTRY
AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER.18
Essentially, there are two principal issues for our resolution: (1)
whether or not the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to make
up a case of forcible entry or unlawful detainer; and (2) whether or not
the CA was correct in affirming the RTC’s decision finding a case of
unlawful detainer.
Petitioners assert that the jurisdictional requirement of prior physical
possession in actions for forcible entry was not alleged with
particularity in the complaint, as it merely alleged that respondent had
been deprived of its possession over the property. They also
maintained that they were not withholding possession of the property
upon the expiration or termination of their right to possess because
they never executed any contract, express or implied, in favor of the
respondent. Hence, there was also no unlawful detainer.
We deny the petition.
Well settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action
as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the
allegations in the complaint.19 In ejectment cases, the complaint
should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly
within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. Section 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.-- Subject to
the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
with damages and costs.
There are two entirely distinct and different causes of action under the
aforequoted rule, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an
action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose
occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired
possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a
case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of
possession from the defendant whose possession of the property was
inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the
plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite
the termination of his right thereunder.
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove,
that he was in prior physical possession of the property in dispute until
he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means
provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. 20 In unlawful detainer, there
must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession of
defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any
contract, and that defendant holds possession of the land or building
"after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by
virtue of any contract, express or implied."
In the present case, a thorough perusal of the complaint would reveal
that the allegations clearly constitute a case of unlawful detainer:
xxxx
3. Plaintiff is the registered owner of that certain parcel of
land involved in the instant case covered by TCT No. 222603
containing an area of 9,936 sq.m. situated in Sitio Manalite,
Phase I, Baranggay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, which property
was place under community mortgage program (CMP);
4. Other defendants in the instant case are all member and
officers of defendant AMARA who, through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth entered into the
premises herein and constructed their temporary houses and
office building respectively, pre-empting plaintiff from using
the premises thus, depriving the same of its prior possession
thereof;
5. On September 2, 1992 as an strategy of the cheapest sort
defendants, in conspiracy and collusion with each other,
defendants as representative of Heirs of Antonio and
Hermogenes Rodriquez, the alleged owner of the property at
bar, filed civil case no. 92-2454 against plaintiff, lodge
before Branch 73 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
seeking to annul plaintiff title;
6. Immediately upon final dismissal of such groundless,
baseless and malicious suit, plaintiff demanded defendants
to vacate the premises, but the latter pleaded with the
former to be given a one (1) year period within which to
look for a place to transfer, which period, upon pleas of
defendants, coupled with plaintiff’s benevolence was
repeatedly extended by said plaintiffs tolerance of occupancy
thereof, but under such terms and conditions. Due to failure
to comply with their undertaking despite repeated demands
therefor plaintiffs sent a formal demand letter upon
defendants;
7. Upon receipt of the above-stated demand, defendants
propose to become members of plaintiff, as qualification to
acquire portions of the property by sale pursuant to the
CMP, to which plaintiff agreed and tolerated defendants
possession by giving the same a period until the month of
December 1999, to comply with all the requirements pre-
requisite to the availing of the CMP benefits but failed and
despite repeated demands therefor, thus, the filing of a
complaint with the Baranggay and the issuance of the
certificate to file action dated February 8, 2000;
8. As time is of the essence, and the fact that the
defendants are mere intruders or usurpers who have no
Page 4 of 69
 possessory right whatsoever over the land illegally occupied
by them, trifling technicalities that would tend to defeat the
speedy administration of justice formal demand is not
necessary thereto, (Republic vs. Cruz C.A. G.R. No. 24910 R
Feb. 7, 1964) however, to afford a sufficient period of time
within which to vacate the premises peacefully another oral
and formal demands were made upon the same to that
effect, and demolish the temporary office and houses they
constructed on plaintiff’s property and instead defendants
again, as representative to alleged "Estate of Julian Tallano"
filed a complaint for ejectment against plaintiffs former
President, Hon. Marcelino Aben which case, is docketed as
civil case no. 4119, lodged, before branch 11 of this
Honorable court, defendants obstinately refused to
peacefully turn over the property they intruded upon in fact
they even dared plaintiff to file a case against them boasting
that nobody can order them to vacate the premises;
9. Defendants’ letter dated August 9, 2000, acknowledged
actual receipt of plaintiffs two (2) formal demands letters.
Thus, "the issuance of Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa
Hukuman" dated September 25, 2000;
10. As a result thereof, plaintiff was compelled to engage
the services of the undersigned counsel in order to
immediately institute the instant suit for which services
plaintiff agreed to pay the amount of P35,000.00 plus
P3,500.00 per court appearance;
x x x x21
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer
if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2)
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one
year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 22
Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property,
MAHA tolerated petitioners’ stay and gave them the option to acquire
portions of the property by becoming members of MAHA. Petitioners’
continued stay on the premises was subject to the condition that they
shall comply with the requirements of the CMP. Thus, when they failed
to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to
vacate the property as their right of possession had already expired or
had been terminated. The moment MAHA required petitioners to leave,
petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying the land. 23 Well
settled is the rule that a person who occupies the land of another at
the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against him.24 Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled
in favor of MAHA.
As to petitioners’ argument that MAHA’s title is void for having been
secured fraudulently, we find that such issue was improperly raised. In
an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim
of ownership by any of the parties.25 Since the only issue involved is
the physical or material possession of the premises, that is
possession de facto and not possession de jure, the question of
ownership must be threshed out in a separate action.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated October 19,
2007 and Resolution dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 93050 are hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
#4 G.R. No. 205539 October 4, 2017
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
VELIA J. CRUZ, Petitioner
vs.
SPOUSES MAXIMO and SUSAN CHRISTENSEN, Respondents
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The prior service and receipt of a demand letter is unnecessary in a
case for unlawful detainer if the demand to vacate is premised on the
expiration of the lease, not on the non-payment of rentals or non-
compliance of the terms and conditions of the lease.
This is a, Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the October 11,
2012 Decision2 and January 21, 2013 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 117773. The assailed Decision reversed the
Regional Trial Court Decision4 dated December 29, 2010, which
ordered respondents Maximo and Susan Christensen (the Spouses
Christensen) to pay unpaid rentals and to vacate petitioner Velia J.
Cruz's (Cruz) property. The Court of Appeals instead reinstated the
Metropolitan Trial Court Decision5 dated June 3, 2010, dismissing the
complaint for unlawful detainer for Cruz's failure to prove that a
demand letter was validly served on the Spouses Christensen.
Cruz alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land located at A.
Santos Street, Balong Bato, San Juan City, which she acquired through
inheritance from her late mother, Ruperta D. Javier (Javier). She
further alleged that Susan Christensen (Susan) had been occupying
the property during Javier's lifetime, as they had a verbal lease
agreement.6
Cruz claimed that ever since she inherited the property, she tolerated
Susan's occupancy of the property. However, due to Susan's failure
and refusal to pay rentals of ₱l,000.00 per month, she was constrained
to demand that Susan vacate the property and pay all unpaid rentals.7
The matter was referred to barangay conciliation in Barangay Balong
Bato, San Juan, despite the parties being residents of different cities.
The parties, however, were unable to settle into a compromise. As a
result, the Punong Barangay issued a Certificate to File Action8 on
August 11, 2005.9
Three (3) years later, or on August 5, 2008, Cruz, through counsel,
sent Susan a final demand letter,10 demanding that she pay the unpaid
rentals and vacate the property within 15 days from receipt. 11
Cruz alleged that despite receipt of the demand letter, Susan refused
to vacate and pay the accrued rentals from June 1989 to Febn1ary
2009 in the amount of ₱237,000.00, computed at ₱l,000.00 per
month. Thus, Cruz was constrained to file a Complaint12 for unlawful
detainer13 on April 27, 2009.
In her Answer,14 Susan admitted to occupying a portion of the
property since 1969 on a month-to-month lease agreement. However,
she denied that she failed to pay her rentals since 1989 or that she
refused to pay them, attaching receipts of her rental payments as
evidence. She alleged that Cruz refused to receive her rental payments
sometime in 2002. Susan likewise denied receiving any demand letter
from Cruz and claims that the signature appearing on the registry
return card of the demand letter15 was not her signature.16
On June 3, 2010, Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court, San Juan City
rendered a Decision17 dismissing Cruz's Complaint. It found that for
the registry receipts and registry return cards to serve as proof that
the demand letter was received, it must first be authenticated through
an affidavit of service by the person mailing the letter. It also found
that Cruz failed to prove who received the demand letter and signed
the registry return receipt, considering that Susan denied it. 18
Cruz appealed to the Regional Trial Court.19 On December 29, 2010,
Branch 160, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City rendered a
Decision20 reversing the Metropolitan Trial Court Decision. It found that
the bare denial of receipt would not prevail over the registry return
card showing actual receipt of the demand letter. 21 The dispositive
portion of this Decision read:
Page 5 of 69
WHEREFORE, premise
Susan Christensen and all premises considered, the lower court's
decision is hereby REVERSED.
Susan Christensen and all persons claiming rights under her are
hereby ordered:
1. To vacate the premises A. Santos Street, Balong Bato,
San Juan City, Metro Manila, and to surrender possession
thereof to plaintiff;
2. To pay the accrued unpaid rentals in the amount of One
Thousand Pesos (₱l,000.00) per month reckoned from April
2000 (based on the evidence presented) until such time
defendant-appellee, and all persons claiming rights under
her, actually vacated and surrendered peaceful possession of
the subject real property in favor of the plaintiff-appellant;
3. To pay the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00)
as and by way of attorney's fees; and
4. The costs of suit.
Costs against appellee.
So ordered.22
The Spouses Christensen appealed to the Court of Appeals,23 arguing
that Cruz was unable to prove Susan's actual receipt of the demand
letter.24 They likewise alleged that Cruz's late filing of her
11emorandum before the Regionai Trial Court should have been
ground to dismiss her appeal.25
On October 11, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision26 reversing the Regional Trial Court Decision and reinstating
the Metropolitan Trial Court Decision. According to the Court of
Appeals, the filing of a memorandum of appeal within 15 days from
the receipt of order is mandatory under Rule 40, Section 7(b) of the
Rules of Court and the failure to comply will result in the dismissal of
the appeal.27 It likewise concurred with the Metropolitan Trial Court's
finding that registry receipts and return cards are insufficient proof of
receipt.28 The dispositive portion of this Decision read;
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING[,] the instant Petition for Review is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 29 December 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 160, Pasig City is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision rendered by the Municipal [sic] Trial Court,
San Juan City dated 3 June 2010 is hereby ORDERED REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.29
Cruz filed a Motion for Reconsideration30 but it was denied by the Court
of Appeals in a Resolution31 dated January 21, 2013. Hence, this
Petition32 was filed.
Petitioner concedes that while the 15-day period for filing the
memorandum of appeal is mandatory under the Rules of Court, 33 the
Regional Trial Court nonetheless opted to resolve her appeal on its
merits, showing that the issues and arguments raised in the appeal
outweigh its procedural defect.34 Petitioner submits that other than
respondent Susan's bare denial of signing the registry return card,
respondents did not deny receipt of the demand letter at their known
address or the authority of the signatory on the registry return card to
receive registered mail.35 She argues that notice by registered mail is
considered service to the recipient, and this cannot be overcome
simply by denying the signature appearing on the registry return
card.36 Petitioner points out that before receiving the demand letter,
the matter was already the subject of a barangay conciliation
proceeding, leading to the ejectment suit as the reasonable
consequence of respondents' non-compliance with the demand to pay
rentals and to vacate the property.37
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
Petitioner likewise submits that a prior demand is not required in an
action for unlawful detainer since prior demand only applies if the
grounds of the complaint are non-payment of rentals or non-
compliance with the conditions of the lease. She points out that where
the action is grounded on the expiration of the contract of lease, as in
this instance where the lease was on a month-to-month basis, the
failure to pay the rentals for the month terminates the lease. She
argues that a notice or demand to vacate would be
unnecessary38 since "nothing in the law obligates ... [the] owner-lessor
to allow [the lessees] to stay forever in the leased property without
paying any reasonable compensation or rental."39
Respondents counter that the Court of Appeals did not err in finding
that the Regional Trial Court should have dismissed her appeal since
petitioner admitted that she belatedly filed her memorandum of appeal
before the trial court. They maintain that petitioner has not shown any
justifiable reason for the relaxation of technical rules. 40 They insist that
the demand to pay or to vacate is a jurisdictional requirement that
must be complied with before an ejectment suit may be brought. 41
Respondents maintain that registry receipts and registry return cards
are not sufficient to establish that respondents received the demand
letter considering that they must first be authenticated to serve as
proof of receipt. They argue that the denial of receipt is sufficient since
petitioner had the burden of proving that respondents actually
received the demand letter.42 They further contend that petitioner's
complaint was grounded on the nonpayment of lease rentals and not,
as petitioner belatedly claims, on the expiration lease; thus, petitioner
must still comply with the jurisdictional requirement of prior demand.43
The issues for resolution before this Court are the following:
First, whether or not the Regional Trial Court should have dismissed
the appeal considering that petitioner Velia J. Cruz's Memorandum of
Appeals was not filed within the required period; and
Finally, whether or not petitioner Velia J. Cruz was able to prove
Spouses Maximo and Susan Christensen's receipt of her demand letter
before filing her Complaint for unlawful detainer. In order to resolve
the second issue, however, this Comi must first address whether or
not a demand was necessary considering that Maximo and Susan
Christensen had a month-to-month lease on the property.
The Petition is granted.
I
Procedural rules of even the most mandatory character may be
suspended upon a showing of circumstances warranting the exercise of
liberality in its strict application.
Petitioner admits that her Memorandum of Appeal was filed nine (9)
days beyond the 15"day period but that the Regional Trial Court opted
to resolve her case on its merits in the interest of substantial justice. 44
Rule 40, Section 7 of the Rules of Court states the procedure of appeal
before the Regional Trial Court. It provides:
Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.—
(a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the
clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such
fact.
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of
the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the
errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished
by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the appellant's memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum.
Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for
dismissal of the appeal.
Page 6 of 69
(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the
expiration of the period to do so, the case shall be considered
submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case
on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin and such memoranda as are filed. (Emphasis supplied)
The rule requiring the filing of the memorandum within the period
provided is mandatory. Failure to comply will result in the dismissal of
the appeal.45 Enriquez v. Court of Appeals46explained:
Rule 40, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a new
provision. Said section is based on Section 21 (c) and (d) of the
Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129) with modifications. These
include the following changes: (a) the appellant is required to submit a
memorandum discussing the errors imputed to the lower court within
fifteen (15) days from notice, and the appellee is given the same
period counted from receipt of the appellant's memorandum to file his
memorandum; (b) the failure of the appellant to file a memorandum is
a ground for the dismissal of the appeal.
Rule 40, Section 7 (b) provides that, "it shall be the duty of the
appellant to submit a memorandum" and failure to do so "shall be a
ground for dismissal of the appeal." The use of the word "shall" in a
statute or rule expresses what is mandatory and compulsory. Further,
the Rule imposes upon an appellant the "duty" to submit his
memorandum. A duty is a "legal or moral obligation, mandatory act,
responsibility, charge, requirement, trust, chore, function, commission,
debt, liability, assignment, role, pledge, dictate, office, (and)
engagement." Thus, under the express mandate of said Rule, the
appellant is duty-bound to submit his memorandum on appeal. Such
submission is not a matter of discretion on his part. His failure to
comply with this mandate or to perform said duty will compel the RTC
to dismiss his appeal.47
Rule 40, Section 7 is likewise jurisdictional since the Regional Trial
Court can only resolve errors that are specifically assigned and
properly argued in the memorandum.48 Thus, dismissals based on this
rule are premised on the non-filing of the memorandum. A trial court
does not acquire jurisdiction over an appeal where the errors have not
been specifically assigned.
In this instance, a Memorandum of Appeal was filed late but was
nonetheless given due course by the Regional Trial Court. Thus, the
jurisdictional defect was cured since petitioner was able to specifically
assign the Municipal Trial Court's errors, which the Regional Trial Court
was able to address and resolve. This Court also notes that all
substantial issues have already been fully litigated before the Municipal
Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals.
Procedural defects should not be relied on to defeat the substantive
rights of litigants.49 Even procedural rules of the most mandatory
character may be suspended where "matters of life, liberty, honor or
property"50 warrant its liberal application. Ginete v. Court of
Appeals51added that courts may also consider:
1. the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits
of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) a
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory[, and that] (5) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.52
Liberality in the application of Rule 40, Section 7 is warranted in this
case in view of the potential inequity that may result if the rule is
strictly applied. As will be discussed later, petitioner's meritorious
cause would be unduly prejudiced if this case were to be dismissed on
technicalities.
II
Possession of a property belonging to another may be tolerated or
permitted, even without a prior contract between the parties, as long
as there is an implied promise that the occupant will vacate upon
demand.53 Refusal to vacate despite demand will give rise to an action
for summary ejectment.54 Thus, prior demand is a jurisdictional
requirement before an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer
may be instituted.
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
Under Rule 70, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, an action for
unlawful detainer may be brought against a possessor of a property
who unlawfully withholds possession after the termination or
expiration of the right to hold possession. Rule 70, Section 2 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that there must first be a prior
demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to
vacate before an action can be filed:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the
provisions· of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration 'or te1mination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
with damages and costs.
Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. -
Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be
commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of
the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written
notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by
posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon,
and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the
case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.
The property in this case is owned by petitioner. Respondents had a
month-to-month lease with petitioner's predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioner contends that no prior demand was necessary in this case
since her Complaint was premised on the expiration of respondents'
lease, not on the failure to pay rent due or to comply with the
conditions of the lease.
The jurisdictional requirement of prior demand is unnecessary if the
action is premised on the termination of lease due to expiration of the
terms of contract. The complaint must be brought on the allegation
that the lease has expired and the lessor demanded the lessee to
vacate, not on the allegation that the lessee failed to pay rents. 55The
cause of action which would give rise to an ejectment case would be
the expiration of the lease. Thus, the requirement under Rule 70,
Section 2 of a prior "demand to pay or comply with the conditions of
the lease and to vacate" would be unnecessary.56
In Racaza v. Susana Realty, 57 the lessee was asked by the lessor to
vacate since the lessor needed the property. In Labastida v. Court of
Appeals,58the month-to-month lease was deemed to have expired
upon receipt of the notice to vacate at the end of the month.
In Tubiano v. Razo,59 the lessee was explicitly informed that her
month-to-month lease would not be renewed.
Admittedly, the Complaint60 in this case alleges that petitioner's verbal
consent and tolerance was withdrawn due to respondents' ''continuous
failure ~nd adamant refusal to pay rentals"61 and allegations of
accn1ed unpaid rentals from June 1989 to February 2009.62 The
demand letter dated August 5, 2008 also specifies that it was
premised on respondents' non-payment of the "reasonable
compensation verbally agreed upon."63 This would have been enough
to categorize the complaint for unlawful detainer as one for non-
payment of rentals, not one for expiration of lease.
However, respondents' Answer64 to the Complaint is telling.
Respondents admit that they only had a month-to-month lease since
1969. They contend that they had been continuously paying their
monthly rent until sometime in 2002, when petitioner refused to
receive it. 65 Thus, as early as 2002, petitioner, as the lessor, already
refused to renew respondents' month-to-month verbal lease.
Therefore, respondents' lease had already long expired before
petitioner sent her demand letters.
Respondents cannot feign ignorance of petitioner's demand to vacate
since the matter was brought to barangay conciliation proceedings in
2005. The barangay certification issued on August 11, 2005 shows
that no compromise was reached between the parties. 66
Page 7 of 69
Therefore, respondents' insistence on the non-receipt of the demand
letter is misplaced. Their verbal lease over the property had already
expired sometime in 2002. They were explicitly told to vacate in 2005.
They continued to occupy the property until petitioner sent her final
demand letter in 2008. The demand letter would have been
unnecessary since respondents' continued refusal to vacate despite the
expiration of their verbal lease was sufficient ground to bring the
action.
Respondents have occupied the property since 1969, or for 48 years
on a mere verbal month-to-month lease agreement and by sheer
tolerance of petitioner and her late mother. All this time, respondents
have failed to formalize their agreement in order to protect their right
of possession. Their continued occupation of the property despite the
withdrawal of the property owner's consent and tolerance deprived the
property owner of her right to use and enjoy the property as she sees
fit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals October 11, 2012 Decision and January 21, 2013
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 117773 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondents Maximo and Susan Christensen and all persons
claiming rights under them are ordered, upon finality of this Decision,
to immediately VACATE the property and DELIVER its peaceful
possession to petitioner Velia J. Cruz. Respondents Maximo and Stisan
Christensen are likewise ordered to PAY petitioner Velia J. Cruz
₱l,000.00 as monthly rental plus its interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum, to be computed from April 27, 2009, the date of
judicial demand, until the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
#5 G.R. No. 178159 March 2, 2011
SPS. VICENTE DIONISIO AND ANITA DIONISIO, Petitioner,
vs.
WILFREDO LINSANGAN, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
The case is about a) amendments in the complaint that do not alter
the cause of action and b) the effect in an unlawful detainer action of
the tolerated possessor’s assignment of his possession to the
defendant.
The Facts and the Case
Gorgonio M. Cruz (Cruz) owned agricultural lands in San Rafael,
Bulacan, that his tenant, Romualdo San Mateo (Romualdo) cultivated.
Upon Romualdo’s death, his widow, Emiliana, got Cruz’s permission to
stay on the property provided she would vacate it upon demand.
In September 1989 spouses Vicente and Anita Dionisio (the Dionisios)
bought the property from Cruz.1 In April 2002, the Dionisios found out
that Emiliana had left the property and that it was already Wilfredo
Linsangan (Wilfredo) who occupied it under the strength of a
"Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan"2 dated April 7, 1977.
The Dionisios wrote Wilfredo on April 22, 2002, demanding that he
vacate the land but the latter declined, prompting the Dionisios to file
an eviction suit3 against him before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
San Rafael, Bulacan. Wilfredo filed an answer with counterclaims in
which he declared that he had been a tenant of the land as early as
1977.
At the pre-trial, the Dionisios orally asked leave to amend their
complaint. Despite initial misgivings over the amended complaint,
Wilfredo asked for time to respond to it. The Dionisios filed their
amended complaint on August 5, 2003; Wilfredo maintained his
original answer.
The MTC issued a pre-trial order4 specifying the issues. For the
plaintiffs: (1) whether or not the defendant can be ejected from the
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
property and (2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to
reasonable rent for the use of the property, damages, and attorney’s
fees. For the defendant: (1) whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction to
try this case; (2) whether or not the defendant can be ejected from
the questioned property; and (3) whether or not the defendant is
entitled to damages and attorney’s fees.
On May 3, 2004 the MTC rendered judgment, ordering Wilfredo to
vacate the land and remove his house from it. Further, the MTC
ordered Wilfredo to pay the Dionisios ₱3,000.00 a month as
reasonable compensation for the use of the land and ₱20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and to pay the cost of suit.
On appeal,5 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan,
affirmed the MTC decision, holding that the case was one for forcible
entry. On review,6 however, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered
judgment on July 6, 2006, reversing the decisions of the courts below,
and ordering the dismissal of the Dionisios’ action. The CA held that,
by amending their complaint, the Dionisios effectively changed their
cause of action from unlawful detainer to recovery of possession which
fell outside the jurisdiction of the MTC. Further, since the amendment
introduced a new cause of action, its filing on August 5, 2003 marked
the passage of the one year limit from demand required in ejectment
suits. More, since jurisdiction over actions for possession depended on
the assessed value of the property and since such assessed value was
not alleged, the CA cannot determine what court has jurisdiction over
the action.
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the Dionisios’ amendment of their
complaint effectively changed their cause of action from one
of ejectment to one of recovery of possession; and
2. Whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction over the action
before it.
The Rulings of the Court
One. An amended complaint that changes the plaintiff’s cause of
action is technically a new complaint. Consequently, the action is
deemed filed on the date of the filing of such amended pleading, not
on the date of the filing of its original version. Thus, the statute of
limitation resumes its run until it is arrested by the filing of the
amended pleading. The Court acknowledges, however, that an
amendment which does not alter the cause of action but merely
supplements or amplifies the facts previously alleged, does not affect
the reckoning date of filing based on the original complaint. The cause
of action, unchanged, is not barred by the statute of limitations that
expired after the filing of the original complaint.7
Here, the original complaint alleges that the Dionisios bought the land
from Cruz on September 30, 1989; that Romualdo used to be the
land’s tenant; that when he died, the Dionisios allowed his widow,
Emiliana, to stay under a promise that she would leave the land upon
demand; that in April 2002 the Dionisios discovered on visit to the
land that Emiliana had left it and that Wilfredo now occupied it under a
claim that he bought the right to stay from Emiliana under a
"Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan;" that the Dionisios did not know
of and gave no consent to this sale which had not been annotated on
their title; that the Dionisios verbally told Wilfredo to leave the
property by April 31, 2002; that their lawyer reiterated such demand
in writing on April 22, 2002; that Wilfredo did not heed the demand;
that the Dionisios wanted to get possession so they could till the land
and demolish Wilfredo’s house on it; that Wilfredo did not give the
Dionisios’ just share in the harvest; and that the Dionisios were
compelled to get the services of counsel for ₱100,000.00.
The amended complaint has essentially identical allegations. The only
new ones are that the Dionisios allowed Emiliana, Romualdo’s widow
to stay "out of their kindness, tolerance, and generosity;" that they
went to the land in April 2002, after deciding to occupy it, to tell
Emiliana of their plan; that Wilfredo cannot deny that Cruz was the
previous registered owner and that he sold the land to the Dionisios;
and that a person occupying another’s land by the latter’s tolerance or
permission, without contract, is bound by an implied promise to leave
Page 8 of 69
upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy.
To determine if an amendment introduces a different cause of action,
the test is whether such amendment now requires the defendant to
answer for a liability or obligation which is completely different from
that stated in the original complaint.8 Here, both the original and the
amended complaint required Wilfredo to defend his possession based
on the allegation that he had stayed on the land after Emiliana left out
of the owner’s mere tolerance and that the latter had demanded that
he leave. Indeed, Wilfredo did not find the need to file a new answer.
Two. Wilfredo points out that the MTC has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case since it involved tenancy relation which comes under
the jurisdiction of the DARAB.9 But the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the
complaint.10 Besides, the records show that Wilfredo failed to
substantiate his claim that he was a tenant of the land. The MTC
records show that aside from the assertion that he is a tenant, he did
not present any evidence to prove the same. To consider evidence
presented only during appeal is offensive to the idea of fair play.
The remaining question is the nature of the action based on the
allegations of the complaint. The RTC characterized it as an action for
forcible entry, Wilfredo having entered the property and taken over
from widow Emiliana on the sly. The problem with this characterization
is that the complaint contained no allegation that the Dionisios were in
possession of the property before Wilfredo occupied it either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, an element of that kind of
eviction suit.11 Nowhere in the recitation of the amended complaint did
the Dionisios assert that they were in prior possession of the land and
were ousted from such possession by Wilfredo’s unlawful occupation of
the property.
Is the action one for unlawful detainer? An action is for unlawful
detainer if the complaint sufficiently alleges the following: (1) initially,
the defendant has possession of property by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, however, such possession
became illegal upon plaintiff’s notice to defendant, terminating the
latter’s right of possession; (3) still, the defendant remains in
possession, depriving the plaintiff of the enjoyment of his property;
and (4) within a year from plaintiff’s last demand that defendant
vacate the property, the plaintiff files a complaint for defendant’s
ejectment.12 If the defendant had possession of the land upon mere
tolerance of the owner, such tolerance must be present at the
beginning of defendant’s possession.13
Here, based on the allegations of the amended complaint, the
Dionisios allowed Emiliana, tenant Romualdo’s widow, to stay on the
land for the meantime and leave when asked to do so. But, without
the knowledge or consent of the Dionisios, she sold her "right of
tenancy" to Wilfredo. When the Dionisios visited the land in April 2002
and found Wilfredo there, they demanded that he leave the land. They
did so in writing on April 22, 2002 but he refused to leave. The
Dionisios filed their eviction suit within the year.
It is pointed out that the original complaint did not allege that the
Dionisios "tolerated" Emiliana’s possession of the land after her
husband died, much less did it allege that they "tolerated" Wilfredo’s
possession after he took over from Emiliana. But the rules do not
require the plaintiff in an eviction suit to use the exact language of
such rules. The Dionisios alleged that Romualdo used to be the land’s
tenant and that when he died, the Dionisios allowed his widow,
Emiliana, to stay under a promise that she would leave upon demand.
These allegations clearly imply the Dionisios’ "tolerance" of her stay
meantime that they did not yet need the land.
As for Wilfredo, it is clear from the allegations of the complaint that
Emiliana assigned to him her right to occupy the property. In fact that
assignment was in writing. Consequently, his claim to the land was
based on the Dionisios’ "tolerance" of the possession of Emiliana and,
impliedly, of all persons claiming right under her.
True, the "Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan" under which Emiliana
transferred her tenancy right to Wilfredo appears to have been
executed in 1977, years before Cruz sold the land to the Dionisios,
implying that Wilfredo had already been in possession of the property
before the sale. But what is controlling in ascertaining the jurisdiction
of the court are the allegations of the complaint. The Dionisios alleged
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
in their complaint that they were the ones who allowed Emiliana (and
all persons claiming right under her) to stay on the land meantime
that they did not need it. The MTC and the RTC gave credence to the
Dionisios’ version. The Court will respect their judgment on a question
of fact.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 92643 dated
July 6, 2006, and REINSTATES the Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of San Rafael, Bulacan, in Civil Case 1160-SRB-2003 dated May
3, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
#6 G.R. No. 202448 December 13, 2017
JOSEPH O. REGALADO, Petitioner,
vs.
EMMA DE LA RAMA VDA. DE LA PENA,1 JESUSA2 DE LA PENA,
JOHNNY DE LA PENA, JOHANNA DE LA PENA, JOSE DE LA PENA,
JESSICA DE LA PENA, and JAIME ANTONIO DE LA PENA,
Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review· on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside
the May 28, 2012 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 02994, which affirmed the January 20, 2009 Decision 4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RIC) of Bacolod City, Branch 42 in Civil Case No.
98-10187 for."Recovery of Possession and Damages with Injunction."
Factual Antecedents
Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and Jaime Antonio
(Jaime), all surnamed de la Pena (respondents), are the registered
owners of two parcels of land with a total area of 44 hectares located
in Murcia, Negros Occidental. These properties are referred to as Lot
Nos. 138-D and 138-S, and are respectively covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title No. T-103187 and T-1031895 (subject properties).
Purportedly, in 1994, without the knowledge and consent of
respondents, Joseph Regalado (petitioner) entered, took possession of,
and planted sugar cane on the subject properties without paying rent
to respondents. In the crop year 1995-1996, respondents discovered
such illegal entry, which prompted them to verbally demand from
petitioner to vacate the properties but to no avail. 6
Later, the parties appeared before the Barangay Office of Cansilayan,
Murcia, Negros Occidental but failed to arrive at any amicable
settlement. On September 29, 1997, the Lupon Tagapamayapa of
said Barangay issued a Certificate to File Action;7 and, on March 9,
1998, respondents filed a Complaint8 for recovery of possession and
damages with injunction against petitioner.
In his Answer,9 petitioner countered that in 1994, Emma, Jesusa,
Johnny, Johanna, and Jessica executed their separate Waivers of
Undivided Share of Lands renouncing their rights and interests over
the subject properties in favor of Jaime. In turn, Jaime subsequently
waived his rights and interests on the same properties to
petitioner.10Petitioner claimed that respondents did not attempt to
enter the properties as they already intentionally relinquished their
interests thereon.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on the ground, among
others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. Petitioner posited that based on the allegations in the Complaint,
the action involved recovery of physical possession of the properties in
dispute; said Complaint was also filed within one year from the date
the parties had a confrontation before the Barangay; and thus, the
case was one for Ejectment and must be filed with the proper
Municipal Trial Court (MTC).
Page 9 of 69
In their Reply,12 respondents alleged that the waiver of rights in favor
of Jaime was conditioned on the payment of their ₱6.7 million loan
with the Republic Planters Bank (RPB) and Philippine National Bank
(PNB); and, in case the subject properties would be sold, its proceeds
shall be equally distributed to respondents. They further stated that
such waiver bestowed rights over the properties solely upon Jaime.
They added that the subsequent waiver executed by Jaime to
petitioner should have been with conformity of the banks where the
properties were mortgaged; and conditioned on the payment of the
₱6.7 million loan. They pointed out that neither Jaime nor petitioner
paid any amount to RPB or PNB; and as a result, the waivers of rights
in favor of Jaime, and later to petitioner, were void.
Subsequently, in their Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,13 respondents
contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case because their
demand for petitioner to vacate the properties was made during the
crop year 1995- 1996, which was earlier than the refe1Tal of the
matter to Barangay Cansilayan.
On July 31, 2000, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. It held that it
had jurisdiction over the case because the area of the subject
properties was 44 hectares, more or less, and "it is safe to presume
that the value of the same is more than ₱20,000.00."14
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On January 20, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision ordering petitioner
to turn over the subject properties to respondents and to pay them
₱50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
The RTC ratiocinated that the waiver of rights executed by Jaime to
petitioner was coupled with a consideration. However, petitioner failed
to prove that he paid a consideration for such a waiver; as such,
petitioner was not entitled to possess the subject properties.
Both parties appealed to the CA.
On one hand, petitioner reiterated that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the case. He also maintained that respondents already waived
their shares and rights over the properties to Jaime, who, in turn,
renounced his rights to petitioner.
On the other hand, respondents assailed the RTC Decision in so far as
it failed to award them damages as a result of petitioner's purported
illegal entry and possession of the subject properties.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On May 28, 2012, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision
The CA dismissed respondents' appeal because they did not establish
entitlement to damages. It likewise dismissed the appeal interposed by
petitioner for failing to establish that he gave any consideration in
relation to Jaime's waiver of rights in his (petitioner) favor.
In addition, the CA ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over this case
considering that the parties stipulated on the jurisdiction of the RTC
but also because the assessed value of the subject properties is
presumed to have exceeded ₱20,000.00.
Issues
Hence, petitioner filed this Petition raising the issues as follows:
I. DID THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE?
II. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN RULING THAT PETITIONER
SHOULD RETURN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS
CASE TO THE RESPONDENTS?
III. SHOULD THE PETITIONER BE AWARDED DAMAGES?15
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner insists that respondents filed their Complaint for recovery of
physical possession of the subject properties on March 9, 1998 or
within one year from the date the parties had their confrontation
before the Barangay of Cansilayan (September 29, 1997). As such, he
maintains that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner also posits that even granting that this action is considered a
plenary action to recover right of possession, the RTC still had no
jurisdiction because the tax declarations of the properties were not
submitted, and consequently, it cannot be determined whether it is the
MTC or RTC which has jurisdiction over the case.
Moreover, petitioner argues that Jaime's waiver in his (petitioner's)
favor was coupled with the following considerations: 1) ₱400,000.00
cash; 2) a car worth ₱350,000.00; and 3) a convenience store worth
₱1,500,000.00. He adds that the delivery of the properties to him
confirms that he (petitioner) gave said considerations to Jaime.
Later, in his Manifestation and Motion,16 petitioner points out that
although the body of the assailed CA Decision made reference to the
January 20, 2009 RTC Decision, its dispositive portion pertained to a
different case, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 29, 2008 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 in Civil Case No. CEB- 30866 is
AFFIRMED.
Costs against both appellants.
SO ORDERED.17 (Underlining ours)
Consequently, petitioner prays that the dispositive portion of the CA
Decision be rectified to refer to the actual case subject of the appeal.
Respondents' Arguments
On the other hand, respondents contend that the CA did not commit
any reversible error in rendering the assailed Decision. They insist that
petitioner's contentions are unsubstantial to merit consideration.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
In our jurisdiction, there are three kinds of action for recovery of
possession of real property: 1) ejectment (either for un]awful detainer
or forcible entry) in case the dispossession has lasted for not more
than a year; 2) accion publiciona or a plenary action for recovery of
real right of possession when dispossession has lasted for more than
one year; and, 3) accion reinvindicatoria or an action for recovery of
ownership.18
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),19 the proper
Metropolitan Trial Court (Me TC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment cases.
Moreover, jurisdiction of the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall include civil
actions involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property does not exceed
₱20,000.00 (or ₱50,000.00 in Metro Manila),20 On the other hand, the
RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title
to or possession of real property, or any interest therein in case the
assessed value of the property exceeds ₱20,000.00(or ₱50,000.00 in
Metro Manila).21
Jurisdiction is thus determined not only by the type of action filed but
also by the assessed value of the property. It follows that in accion
publiciana and reinvindicatoria, the assessed value of the real property
is a jurisdictional element to determine the court that can take
cognizance of the action.22
In this case, petitioner consistently insists that a) the Complaint is one
for ejectment; or b) if the same is deemed an accion publiciana, the
Page 10 of 69
RTC still lacks jurisdiction as the assessed value of the subject
properties was not alleged in the Complaint.
As such, to ascertain the proper court that has jurisdiction, reference
must be made to the averments in the complaint, and the law in force
at the commencement of the action. This is because only the facts
alleged in the complaint can be the basis for determining the nature of
the action, and the court that can take cognizance of the case. 23
Here, the pertinent portions of the Complaint read:
2. That plaintiffs [herein respondents] are the owners of two (2)
parcels of land known as Lot. No. 138-D with Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-103187 and Lot No. 138-S with Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-103189, with a total land area of 44 hectares, all of Murcia
Cadastre xxx;
3. That sometime in 1994, without the knowledge and consent of
herein plaintiffs, the defendant [herein petitioner] entered into and
took possession of the aforementioned parcels of land and planted
sugar cane without paying any rental to herein plaintiffs;
4. That plaintiffs discovered the illegal entry and occupation by the
defendant of the aforementioned property and demand to vacate the
property was made orally to the defendant sometime in 1995-96 crop
year but defendant refused and still refuses to vacate the premises;
5. A confrontation before the Brgy. Kapitan of Brgy[.] Cansilayan,
Murcia, Negros Occidental, and before the Pangkat Tagapag[ka]sundo
between herein parties where plaintiffs again demanded orally for the
defendant to vacate the premises but defendant refused to vacate the
premises and no amicable settlement was reached during the
confrontation of the parties, thus a certificate to file action has been
issued x x x;
6. That plaintiffs were barred by the defendant from entering the
prope1iy of the plaintiffs for the latter to take possession of the same
and plant sugar cane thereby causing damages to the plaintiffs;
7. That because of the refusal of the defendant to allow the plaintiffs
to take possession and control of their own property, plaintiffs were
constrained to seek the aid of counsel and consequently thereto this
complaint.24
Under Section 1,25 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there are special
jurisdictional facts that must be set forth in the complaint to make a
case for ejectment, which, as mentioned, may either be for forcible
entry or unlawful detainer.
In particular, a complaint for forcible entry must allege the plaintiff's
prior physical possession of the property; the fact that plaintiff was
deprived of its possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth; and the action must be filed within one year from the time the
owner or the legal possessor learned of their dispossession. 26 On the
other hand, a complaint for unlawful detainer must state that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the real property
after the expiration or termination of his or her right to possess it; and
the complaint is filed within a year from the time such possession
became unlawful.27
In the instant case, respondents only averred in the Complaint that
they are registered owners of the subject properties, and petitioner
unlawfully deprived them of its possession. They did not assert therein
that they were dispossessed of the subject properties under the
circumstances necessary to make a case of either forcible entry or
unlawful detainer. Hence, in the absence of the required jurisdictional
facts, the instant action is not one for ejectment. 28
Nonetheless, the Court agrees with petitioner that while this case is
an accion publiciana, there was no clear showing that the RTC has
jurisdiction over it.1âwphi1
Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by law. It
cannot be presumed or implied, and must distinctly appear from the
law. It cannot also be vested upon a court by the agreement of the
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
parties; or by the court's erroneous belief that it had jurisdiction over
a case.29
To emphasize, when respondents filed the Complaint in 1998, RA 7691
was already in force as it was approved on March 25, 1994 and took
effect on April 15, 1994.30 As such, it is necessary that the assessed
value of the subject properties, or its adjacent lots (if the properties
are not declared for taxation purposes)31 be alleged to ascertain which
court has jurisdiction over the case.32
As argued by petitioner, the Complaint failed to specify the assessed
value of the subject properties. Thus, it is unclear if the RTC properly
acquired jurisdiction, or the MTC has jurisdiction, over respondents'
action.
Also worth noting is the fact that the RTC took cognizance of the
complaint only on the presumption that the assessed value of the
proper exceeds ₱20,000.00. Aside from affirming such presumption,
the CA, in turn, declared that the RTC had jurisdiction because the
parties stipulated on it. However, as discussed, jurisdiction cam1ot be
presumed. It cannot be conferred by the agreement of the parties, or
on the erroneous belief of the court that it had jurisdiction over a case.
Indeed, in the absence of any allegation in the Complaint of the
assessed value of the subject properties, it cannot be determined
which court has exclusive original jurisdiction over respondents'
Complaint. Courts cannot simply take judicial notice of the assessed
value, or even market value of the land.33 Resultantly, for lack of
jurisdiction, all proceedings before the RTC, including its decision, are
void,34 which makes it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised
by petitioner.
As a final note, while the modification of the clerical error in the
dispositive portion of the CA Decision is rendered irrelevant by the
dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, the Com1,
nonetheless, reminds the CA and all other courts to be more
circumspect in rendering their decision, including ensuring the
correctness of the information in their issuances. After all, courts are
duty-bound to render accurate decisions, or that which clearly and
distinctly express the facts and the law on which the same is based.35
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The May 28, 2012 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02994 is REVERSEDand
SETASIDE. Accordingly, the Complaint in Civil Case No. 98-10187
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
#7 G.R. No. 176341 July 7, 2014
PRO-GUARD SECURITY SERVICES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
TORMIL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Contending that it is obliged to pay back rentals only from the time the
demand to vacate was served upon it and not from the time it began
occupying the disputed premises, petitioner Pro-Guard Security
Services Corporation (ProGuard) seeks recourse to this Court.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the September 6, 2006
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58867 which
denied the Petition for Review filed therewith by Pro-Guard as one of
the petitioners. Likewise assailed is the CA's Janu'!l)' 23, 2007
Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
Page 11 of 69
On July 24, 1984, Manuel A.Torres, Jr., (Manuel)assigned to
respondent Tormil Realty and Development Corporation (Tormil) three
parcels of land located in Pasay Cityand all the improvements thereon
in exchange for shares of stock in the said corporation. 4 Despite the
assignment, however, title to the real properties remained in Manuel’s
name as he neither registered the transaction in the Registry of Deeds
nor provided Tormil the necessary documents to have the titles over
the properties transferred inits name. Later,Manuel unilaterally
revoked the transaction.
Subsequently, Manuel, together with two other persons, one of whom
is Edgardo Pabalan (Edgardo), established Torres Pabalan Realty,
Incorporated (Torres-Pabalan). As part of his capital contribution,
Manuelassigned the same aforesaid parcels of land to Torres-
Pabalan.In the meantime, construction of the Torres Building on the
subject real properties was completed in1985 and its units rented out.
Edgardo, who was also then the General Manager and Administrator of
Tormil, acted as the building administrator and occupied the 2 nd floor.
He later resigned from his position inTormil in September 1986.
In March 1987, Tormil filed a case before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) docketed as SEC Case No. 31535 (SEC case) to
compel Manuel to fulfill his obligation by turning over the documents
necessary to effect the registration and transfer of titles in its name of
the properties assigned to it by Manuel.
Meanwhile, Edgardo continued to actas the administrator of Torres
Building allegedly on behalf of Torres-Pabalan. He then set up in
October 1989 a law office (law office) with Atty. Augustus Cesar Azura
(Augustus) in the 2 nd floor of the building. Torres Building was
thereafter declared by Torres-Pabalan for tax purposes.6
On March 6, 1991, the SEC rendered judgment in favor of Tormil,7 and
this was later affirmed by the SEC en banc.8 Manuel appealed to the
CA. During the pendency thereof, Pro-Guard entered into an
agreement with Edgardo in March 1994 for the rentof a unit in the 3rd
floor of Torres Building. As payment, Pro-Guard was to provide
security servicesto Torres-Pabalan. Subsequently, the CA,9 and later
this Court,10 upheld the ruling in the SEC case such that it became
final and executory on December 12, 1997.11 By October 1998, not
only were the titles to the subject parcels of land registered in Tormil’s
name,12 but also the tax declaration over the Torres Building. 13
On November 5, 1998, Tormil sent letters14 to Edgardo and Augustus
(for the law office) and Pro-Guard asking them to validate their
possession/enter into a lease contract with Tormil and at the same
time settle their past and current rentals. Since these letters were
ignored, Tormil, on November 16, 1998 sent them separate demands
to vacate the premises and pay the monthly rentalof ₱20,000.00 from
the time of their occupation thereof untilthe same are actually turned
over to Tormil.15 As these were unheeded, Tormil asserting right of
possession based on its ownership of the Pasay properties, filed before
the Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) separate ejectment
suits against Edgardo and Augustus, and Pro-Guard16 which were
raffled to Branch44. The cases were later on consolidated. In its
complaints, Tormil stated that it deemed prudent to have the
ownership issue over the premises resolved first in the SEC case
before it filed the ejectment cases in order to prevent complication. It
thus averred that the occupancy by defendants of units in Torres
Building pending resolution of the SEC Case was out of tolerance.
Edgardo and Augustus disputed Tormil’s ownership of the parcels of
land where the building stands and asserted that Torres-Pabalan was
the owner of the same. It was also the onewho funded the building’s
construction. Unfortunately, its tax declarations over the building were
surreptitiouslyand unlawfully cancelled on the sole basis of the SEC
Case. Pro-Guard, for its part, claimed that it was paying rentals to the
owner,Torres-Pabalan, in the form of security services provided to the
latter. It likewise called attention to the fact that it was no longer in
the premises as Tormil forcibly ousted ittherefrom.
Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
The MeTC adjudged that Tormil has proven its right to possess the
property. Said court brushed aside the claim that Torres-Pabalan owns
the building since its SEC Certificate of Registration was already
cancelled, and that the construction of the building was completed in
July 1985 or prior to the time said corporation was incorporated in
September 1986. Finding the defendants’ occupancy of the units as
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
only upon Tormil’s tolerance, the MeTC concluded that their possession
became unlawful when Tormil decided to assert its right of ownership
over the building after the ruling in the SEC case was upheld with
finality by this Court.
Thus, in its June 28, 1999 Decision,17 the MeTC ordered Edgardo and
Augustus to vacate the unit they possessed, as well as topay
attorney’s fees and costs. With respect to Pro-Guard, it adjudged:
2. ordering defendant Pro-Guard Security Services
Corporation and all persons claiming rights under [it] to
vacate and surrender possession of Unit M, 3rd Floor, Torres
Building, 157 Buendia Ext., Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Pasay
City;
xxxx
4. ordering defendant Pro-Guard Security Services Corp. to
pay [Tormil] the fair and reasonable rental of the premises
[in] the amount of ₱20,000.00 per month with legal interest
from June, 1995 until the premises is fully vacated; 18
Contending that Tormil has no right to possess the building, the
defendants appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City
and the same was raffled to Branch 109 thereof. In the meantime,
Pro-Guard informed the MeTC that it had already vacated the premises
as early asMarch 20, 1999.19
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision20 dated December 15,1999, the RTC did not find merit
in the appeal, viz:
In view of the foregoing and pursuant to several decision[s] of the
Supreme Court and the provision of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of
Court to the effect [that] the occupancy and possession of the subject
premises by the defendants-appellants became illegal when they failed
and refused to heed the demand letters of herein plaintiff-appellee to
vacate the same and surrender possession peacefully, the Court finds
no cogent reason to reverse the decision of the trial court and hereby
affirms the same IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.21
On appeal to the CA, Edgardo, Augustus and Pro-Guard reiterated
their arguments on Torres-Pabalan’s ownership of the building and on
its right to possess it.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA adjudged Tormil tohave sufficiently proven its case for unlawful
detainer. It held that based on its Torrens titles over the subject
parcels of land and the tax declarations over the building thereon,
Tormil has the right to possess the disputed properties. It debunked
the claim of Edgardo, Augustus and Pro-Guard that the tax
declarations in Tormil’s nameare invalid, ratiocinating that their
issuance by the CityAssessor are presumed to have been regularly
performed.
Ultimately, the CA denied the petition and affirmed the RTC
Decision,22 viz:
WHEREFORE, PREMISESCONSIDERED, THE Petition is DENIED DUE
COURSE and ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
15 December 1999 and Order dated 02 May 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 in Civil Case Nos. 99-0618 & 99-
[0619] are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.23
In asking for a reconsideration, one aspect which Edgardo, Augustus
and Pro-Guard objected to was the order for them to pay ₱20,000.00
monthly rental and the reckoning point of payment. Pro-Guard, in its
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,24 argued that the CA should
Page 12 of 69
havemodified the RTC judgment by reckoning the payment from the
date of Tormil’s notice to vacate.
The CA found no reason to reverse its judgment, 25 impelling Pro-Guard
to elevate the case to this Court.
Issue
WHETHER THE [CA] ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF
THE [METC] AND THE [RTC] ON THE AWARD OF THE [METC] IN
RECKONING THE DATEOF PAYMENT OF RENTALS IN THE AMOUNT OF
₱20,000.00 PER MONTH WITH LEGAL INTEREST FROM JUNE 1995
UNTIL THE PREMISES IS FULLY VACATED CONTRARY TO PREVAILING
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.26
Parties’ Arguments
Pro-Guard stresses that the CA erred in affirming the lower courts’
award of ₱20,000.00 monthly rental reckoned from the time it
occupied the unit. It contends that it cannot be blamed if it relied on
the representations of TorresPabalan when it entered into a lease
contract with it, the latter being then in possession of the building.
Pro-Guard maintains that in any case, it owes no unpaid rentals to
Tormil for the entire period of its stay in the building out of Tormil’s
tolerance. On the other hand, Tormil argues that Pro-Guard’s stay ‘out
of tolerance’ does not bar it from claiming arrears from the time the
latter occupied a unit in the building. It contends that the demand to
vacate was not for the purpose of counting the reckoning period for
payment of rental arrears, but only for the purpose of counting the
prescriptive period to file a case for unlawful detainer. Besides, Pro-
Guard’s rentalpayments to Torres-Pabalan were not valid as the latter
was not its authorizedrepresentative. To it, Pro-Guard, fully aware of
the pending legal dispute between Tormil and Torres-Pabalan, should
have consigned the rental payments.
It would appear that Pro-Guard no longer impugns the uniform rulings
of the MeTC, RTC, and CA, on the right of Tormil to possessthe subject
premises. The only question it brought before this Court is when to
reckon its rental payments.
Our Ruling
While indeed Tormil, as the victor inthe unlawful detainer suit, is
entitled to the fair rental value for the use and occupation of the unit
in the building, such compensation should not be reckoned from the
time Pro-Guard began to occupy the same, but from the time of the
demand to vacate. "In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is
necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his
possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or
expiration of his right to possess."27 In other words, the entry is legal
but the possession thereafter became illegal. Additionally, the Rules of
Court requires the filing of such action within a year after the
withholding of possession,28 meaning that "if the dispossession has not
lasted for more than one year, [then] an ejectment proceeding (in this
case unlawful detainer) is proper x x x."29 Here, from the moment Pro-
Guard started to occupy the unit in March 1994 up to November 15,
1998, the right ofPro-Guard to possess the premises was not
challenged. It was only after Tormil prevailed over Manuel in its
ownership of the same that it terminated Pro-Guard’s right to possess
the unit it was occupying through a letter to vacate dated November
16, 1998. Hence, it is only from that point that Tormil is considered to
have withdrawn its tolerance of Pro-Guard’s occupation. Conversely,
Pro-Guard’s possession became unlawful at that same moment. This is
supported by the allegation in the complaint for ejectment that Tormil
initiated the same not because of non-payment of rentals, but because
of withdrawal oftolerance. Tolerance or "[t]oleration isdefined as ‘the
act or practice ofpermitting or enduring something not wholly
approved of,"30 while tolerated acts are "those which by reason of
neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of the property allowshis
neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally
those particular services or benefits which one’s property can give to
another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who
permitsthem out of friendship or courtesy."31
With regard to the effects of withdrawal of tolerance, it is settled that:
x x x A person who occupies the land ofanother at the latter’s
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him. His status is analogous to that of a lessee or
tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the date of
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possessionis to be counted from
the date of the demand to vacate.32
Thus, in Sps. Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc.,33 the lessor ended its tolerance
of the sublessees’ occupation of the property and demanded that they
vacate the premises on March 29, 1995. We upheld the ejectment of
the sublessees and ordered them to pay monthly rentals beginning
April 1995 until they vacate the premises. Indeed, it is inconsistent to
demand payment of rentals during the period of tolerance.
Incidentally, Tormil mentioned that Pro-Guard is obliged to consign the
payment of rentals. One legal cause for consignation is when two ot
more persons claim the same right to collect.34 Various claimants to a
debtor's payment must have the appearance of a right to collect such
that the debtor would have a reasonable doubt, not based on
negligence, as to who is entitled to the payment.35
Whether Pro-Guard was indeed aware of the legal dispute then
pending before the SEC and subsequently before the courts is of no
moment. When the dispute regarding the validity ofManuel's
assignment to Tonnil of the realties was pending before the SEC,
Tormil did not claim to Pro-Guard that it is the true owner of the
premises. It neither sought payment of rentals which it now claims
Pro-Guard should have consigned during the pendency of its suit
against Manuel. As such, from the viewpoint of Pro-Guard, the lease
contract remained to be then between it and Torres-Pabalan. The
latter was occupying and running the building, as evidenced by several
tax declarations in its name which, while not conclusive proofs of
ownership, nevertheless, are good indicia of possession in the concept
of owner.36 Moreover, Edgardo, who claimed to act on behalf of
TorresPabalan, administered the premises. Pro-Guard is not permitted
to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of
the relation of landlord and tenant between them.37
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP 58867 are
MODIFIED in that Pro-Guard is to pay for the fair and reasonable
rental of the premises in the amount of ₱20,000.00 per month with
legal interest beginning November 16, 1998 up to the time that the
premises are fully vacated.
SO ORDERED.
#8 G.R. No. 127850 January 26, 1998
MARIA ARCAL, JOSEFINA ARCAL, MARCIANA ARCAL, and
VIRGILIO ARCAL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DANILO BUCAL, COSTAN & LETTY
RICAFRENTE, RENIE & CENY RICAFRENTE, SANCHO and LANIE
RICAFRENTE, CORA GONEZ, SOLLY GONEZ, ENIE and FLORIDA
RICAFRENTE, CARMEN TAMBOC, BOY AGUILAR, NORMING
ARCAL, NORA and ALEX BOCITA, ELVIE TAHIMIC, ANCHANG
ARGUSON, IDRENG and JULIA ARGUSON, LIZA ARGUSON,
ACION ARGUSON, BALENG and FELY ARGUSON, FIDENG and
CILENG MURANIA, ROSIE and ALDO CALAGO, ENGAY and
SHIRLEY RICAFRENTE, NENITA and NARSING AGUILAR, ODIE
DOZA, NENENG and RAMON LUNGCAY, TISAY and ABET DONES,
YOLLY and ED PAULINO, ERIC and JENNIFER PAULINO,
CHARLIE PANGANIBAN, DELIA and PATRICIO BUEZA, ELLEN
DUEZA, BERTING and NORMA BUEZA, ALICE and PILO
RICAFRENTE, DELLY and FREDO NUNEZ, ANDRO and ELLEN
JIMENEZ, CRISELDA and GORIO CLARETE, NENA VELASCO,
DANNY CLARETE, ERLIN and NONONG IBONG, CHITA and
RESTIE REYES, SONNY and DONG REYES, and WALLY and
DAISY REYES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40824 dated November 15, 1996
and its Resolution dated January 13, 1997.
Page 13 of 69
Petitioners as plaintiffs filed on August 31, 1995 a complaint
for unlawful detainer docketed as Civil Case No. 370 before
the Municipal Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite against private
respondents as defendants. Subject of the complaint was a
21,435 square meter parcel of land designated as Lot No.
780 of the Santa Cruz de Malabon Estate Subdivision, Cavite
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26277 in the
names of Maria, Josefina, Marciana and Marcelina1 Arcal. 2
The complaint alleged, among others, that:
5. Defendants herein occupied the subject parcel
of land described above thru plaintiffs' implied
tolerance, or permission but without contract with
herein plaintiffs. From the dates of their
occupancy, plaintiffs did not collect any single
centavo from defendants, nor the latter pay to
plaintiffs any rental for their occupancy therein;
6. On June 18, 1984, plaintiffs herein, except
Virgilio Arcal, filed an ejectment suit against
substantially all of defendants herein with the
Municipal Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite, docketed as
Civil Case No. 285 covering the subject parcel of
land in dispute:
3
7. Meanwhile, on September 18, [1984], Lucio
Arvisu the alleged son of Gaudencio Arvisu and
Natalia Ricafrente Arvisu, and substantially all
defendants herein filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 23, Trece Martires, Cavite, a civil
case for "Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance
and Damages" against Salud Arcal Arbolante,
Marcelina Arcal (deceased), Maria Arcal, Josefina
Arcal and Marciana Arcal which was docketed as
Civil Case No. TM-59. Defendants therein,
plaintiffs herein, filed their Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim. On May 28,
[1985],4 the said complaint was ordered to be
dismissed by the trial court for failure to
prosecute. . . . An appeal was made to the Court
of Appeals but in the resolution of the latter Court
promulgated on November 28, 1986, said appeal
was considered abandoned and dismissed for
failure of appellants to file their brief. . . .
8. Dissatisfied therefrom, on March 10, 1987,
Lucio Ricafrente Arvisu, one of the plaintiffs in the
immediately cited Civil Case No. TM-59, filed
another case for "Registration of Claim Under
Section 8, RA 26", entitled "Lucio R. Arvisu vs.
Marcelina Arcal (deceased), Maria Arcal, Josefina
Arcal, Marciana Arcal, and the Register of Deeds of
Trece Martires City", docketed as Civil Case No.
TM-146 before the Regional Trial Court of Branch
23, Trece Martires City. Private respondent therein
filed a Motion to Dismiss basically on the ground
of lack of cause of action and res adjudicata. In
the Order of the trial court dated July 22, 1988,
the complaint filed by Lucio Arvisu was dismissed
though he thereafter filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals. . . . ;
9. With regard to the ejectment suit filed by
plaintiffs herein, except Virgilio Arcal, with the
Municipal Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite, the said
court rendered a favorable judgment in favor of
plaintiffs ordering defendants therein, among
others, to vacate the property in question and
remove residential houses and improvements
introduced therein and return the possession
thereof to plaintiffs. . . . Unfortunately, on appeal
with the RTC, Branch 23, Trece Martires City, by
defendants therein, the foregoing decision was
reversed and set aside, and the said complaint for
ejectment was dismissed without prejudice to the
filing of the proper action after the prejudicial
question in Civil Case No. TM-146 is resolved in a
fair and adversary proceeding. Said decision
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
attained finality for failure of plaintiffs' former
counsel to interpose an appeal. . . . ;
10. Upon the other hand, the decision in Civil Case
No. TM- 146 which dismissed the petition of Lucio
Arvisu was sustained by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision promulgated on October 28, 1994. . . ;
11. Several demands were made by plaintiffs for
defendants to vacate the premises in question, the
last written demand was made by plaintiffs' lawyer
on July 23, 1995, but they proved futile as they
refused and failed, and still refuse and fail to
vacate the premises, to the damage and prejudice
of plaintiffs . . . .
Private respondents failed to file their answer within the
reglementary period, prompting petitioners to file a motion
to render judgment. In a Decision dated October 26, 1995,
the municipal trial court held that petitioners are registered
owners of the property and as such they have the right to
enjoy possession thereof. The dispositive position of the
decision reads:
Wherefore, finding the allegations of the plaintiffs
to be with merits (sic), judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs ordering all the
defendants . . . :
1. To vacate the property in question which they
are occupying;
2. To remove their residential houses and
improvement introduce(d) therein and return the
possession of the lot to the plaintiff(s);
3. To pay the plaintiffs the sum of P200.00 as
monthly rental for the use and occupying (sic) of
the property from the date of the demand letter
made by the plaintiff(s);
4. To pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 by way
of attorney's fees and P3,000.00 as litigation
expenses; and
5. Ordering the cost of suit.5
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 23,
affirmed in toto the municipal trial court's decision.6
Private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals, arguing inter alia that "the respondent trial court
erred in not dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, the
complaint being one for recovery of right of possession."7
The appellate court, ruling in favor of private respondents,
granted the petition, reversed and set aside the decision of
the trial court and dismissed Civil Case No. 370. 8
In considering that the complaint was not one for unlawful
detainer, adverting that private respondents had previously
filed complaints questioning petitioners' ownership of the
land, the appellate court made the following disquisitions:
In commencing this suit for unlawful detainer,
private respondents are banking on their
allegation that they merely tolerated petitioners to
stay on the premises in question, but which
tolerance they already withdrew on July 23, 1995.
However, the other allegations and admissions of
private respondents in their complaint would show
that the case is not one of unlawful detainer as
petitioners did not actually occupy the subject
property upon the tolerance of private
respondents.
Page 14 of 69
 First. Herein private respondents, as plaintiffs,
filed on June 18, 1984 an ejectment suit against
substantially all of herein petitioners, as
defendants, also before the MTC of Tanza and this
was docketed as Civil Case No. 285. In that case,
it was the position of private respondents that for
humanitarian consideration they tolerated
petitioners to construct their respective houses on
the subject premises sometime in 1974. However,
this tolerance was withdrawn sometime in 1984
when demands to vacate were made on
petitioners by private respondents before the
commencement of Civil Case No. 285.
Consequently, this present action for unlawful
detainer based on the same theory of tolerance
has no leg to stand on as in fact the supposed
tolerance given by private respondents in 1974
was, as they themselves admit, already withdrawn
way back in 1984.
Second. The MTC of Tanza decided Civil Case No.
285 in favor of private respondents. This decision
was reversed however on appeal by the RTC of
Trece Martires, Branch 23. The RTC's decision
then gained finality for failure of private
respondents to elevate the case to the property
appellate court. Without passing upon the
propriety of the decisions of both the MTC and
RTC in Civil Case No. 285, the admission by
private respondents in that case that they
withdrew sometime in 1984 the tolerance they
supposedly extended to petitioners stands. That
is, inasmuch as private respondents admit that
they already made a demand to vacate upon
petitioners in 1984, they are bound by this
demand. And since they pursued this demand with
the filing of Civil Case No. 285, no tolerance can
be spoken of in this present case. Thus, the
written demand to vacate of July 3, 1995 made by
private respondents on petitioners did not
terminate any right of the latter to stay on the
subject premises supposedly founded on
tolerance.
Third. As further alleged and admitted by private
respondents in their complaint, a certain Lucio R.
Arvisu and substantially all of petitioners filed
against them on September 18, 1984 an action for
"Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance and
Damages" before the RTC of Trece Martires,
Branch 23, docketed therein as Civil Case No. TM-
59. Although that case was later dismissed for
failure to prosecute, there is no question that its
institution constituted an open challenge to the
title of private respondents over the premises in
dispute. In effect, petitioners never really
recognized private respondents as owners thereof.
With this position of petitioners which private
respondents became aware of with the filing of
Civil Case No. TM-59, the former can hardly be
considered to have occupied the subject premises
by mere tolerance of the latter.
Fourth. On March 10, 1987, Lucio R. Arvisu again
commenced a suit for "Registration of Claim Under
Section 8, R.A. 26" also before the RTC of Trece
Martires City, Branch 23, docketed as Civil Case
No. TM-146. Albeit dismissed later, this case also
served as an opposition to private respondents'
title over the subject property. Thus, like Civil
Case No. TM-59, Civil Case No. TM-146 also
destroys private respondents' theory of tolerated
possession.
We are therefore convinced that the allegations of
private respondents in their own complaint do not
sufficiently support an action for unlawful
detainer. True, the records will show that they are
the registered owners of the property in dispute.
As such, they have the preferential right to be the
possessors thereof. But for this right to be
enforced and respected, they will have to avail of
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
the proper remedy provided for by law and the
rules.9
Hence this petition, where petitioners assign to the appellate
court the following error:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
FINDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF TANZA, CAVITE,
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER
SUIT, AND IN DISMISSING THE SAME FOR LACK
OF JURISDICTION.10
We grant the petition.
The jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the
action, are determined by the averments in the
complaint.11 We examine the allegations of the complaint
filed by petitioners before the municipal trial court.
To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the
complaint should embody such a statement of facts as
brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which
the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its
face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
testimony.12
From a reading of the allegations of the complaint quoted
above, we find that the action is one for unlawful detainer.
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they are the
registered owners of the subject property. The cases filed by
a certain Lucio Arvisu and several of the private respondents
casting doubt on petitioners' ownership of the property,
namely Civil Case No. TM-59 for 'Annulment of Title, with
Reconveyance and Damages' and Civil Case No. TM-146 for
'Registration of Claim Under Section 8, R.A. No. 26,' were
resolved with finality adverse to private respondents. 13
Petitioners also alleged in the complaint that the possession
of the property by private respondents was with petitioners'
tolerance,14 and that they (petitioners) had served written
demands upon private respondents, the latest demand being
on July 23, 1995, but that private respondents refused to
vacate the property.15
The appellate court, however, made the conclusion that from
the allegations in the complaint, it can be gleaned that
private respondents "did not actually occupy the subject
property upon the tolerance of [petitioners]",16 as tolerance
was withdrawn sometime in 1984 when demands to vacate
were made on private respondents prior to the
commencement of Civil Case No. 285; therefore, unlawful
detainer is not the proper remedy.
We disagree with the appellate court.
The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such
possession becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made
by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to
comply with such demand.17 A person who occupies the land
of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without
any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing
which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against him. The status of the possessor is analogous to that
of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but
whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In
such case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to
vacate.18
The filing of the first ejectment case, Civil Case No. 285, in
1984 signified that petitioners sought the ouster of private
Page 15 of 69
respondents from possession of the property. Proceedings in
the case were however suspended with the filing of Civil
Case No. TM-59 for "Annulment of Title with Reconveyance
and Damages" by Lucio Arvisu and several of private
respondents.19 Civil Case No. TM-59 was eventually
dismissed and the judgment of dismissal attained
finality.20 The ejectment case was later resolved in favor of
petitioners, but on appeal, the case was dismissed on July 6,
1992 "without prejudice to the filing of the proper action
after the prejudicial question in Civil Case No. TM-146 [filed
by Lucio Arvisu against petitioners following the dismissal of
Civil Case No. TM-59] is resolved in a fair and adversary
proceeding."21 Civil Case No. TM-146 which also sought the
annulment of petitioners' title to the property, was
eventually resolved against private respondents on October
28, 1994.22
Because of the pendency of the cases involving ownership,
the proceedings in the first ejectment case were suspended.
Petitioners could not but await the outcome of these cases
and preserve the status quo in the meantime these were
pending. As the Court has stated:
In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry
and detainer the purpose of the law is to protect
the person who in fact has actual possession; and
in case of controverted right, it requires the
parties to preserve the status quo until one or the
other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a
court of competent jurisdiction upon the question
of ownership. It is obviously just that the person
who has first acquired possession should remain in
possession pending this decision; and the parties
cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a
petty warfare over the possession of the property
which is the subject of the dispute. To permit this
would be highly dangerous to individual security
and disturbing to social order. Therefore, where a
person supposes himself to be the owner of a
piece of property and desires to vindicate his
ownership against the party actually in
possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute
an action to this end in a court of competent
jurisdiction; and he cannot be permitted, by
invading the property and excluding the actual
possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of
instituting an action to try the property right.23
The proceedings involving ownership of the subject property
took all of ten years. Through all these ten years,
petitioners, giving due respect to the judicial process,
allowed the matter of ownership to be threshed out, without
creating any disturbance whatsoever on private respondents'
possession.
The complaint alleges that after the termination of the
second case filed by Lucio Arvisu in 1994, petitioners sent
written demands upon private respondents, the last being
on July 23, 1995.24The rule is that a complaint for unlawful
detainer must be filed within one year from demand,
demand being jurisdictional.25 This one-year period is
counted from the last demand.26Petitioners' letters of
demand preceded the filing of the complaint with the
municipal trial court on August 31, 1995.
An unlawful detainer suit involves solely the issue of physical
or material possession over the property or possession de
facto, that is, who between the plaintiff and the defendant
has a better right to possess the property in
question.27 Where, however, the issue is who has the better
and legal right to possess or to whom possession de
jure pertains, accion publiciana is proper.28 In the case at
bar, petitioners' complaint for unlawful detainer was
confined to recovery of de factoor physical possession of the
property and was resorted to after private respondents had
indubitably failed in their suits assailing petitioners' right of
ownership.
Notably, inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment
cases even if the defendant raises the question of ownership
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding provisionally the issue of ownership.29 'A contrary
rule would pave the way for the defendant to trifle with the
ejectment suit, which is summary in nature, as he could
easily defeat the same through the simple expedient of
asserting ownership.'30 Also, the issue of ownership raised in
a separate case, such as an accion publiciana or an action
for quieting of title,31 is not prejudicial to an ejectment suit
and does not abate the ejectment case.
In Wilman Auto Supply Corporation, et al., vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., the Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Narvasa, enumerated the cases which should not be
regarded as prejudicial to an ejectment suit:
1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by
defendants in ejectment actions in the municipal
trial courts or other courts of the first level
(Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 [1966] do not
abate the latter, and neither do proceedings on
consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868
[1956], citing Pue, et al. v. Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81
[1950].
2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an
ejectment suit against the plaintiff in the former
(Ramirez v. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 [1981].
3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is
concededly the principal issue before the Regional
Trial Court does not preclude nor bar the
execution of the judgment in an unlawful detainer
suit where the only issue involved is the material
possession or possession de facto of the premises
(heirs of F. Guballa, Sr., v. C.A., 168 SCRA 139
[1988].
4. An action for quieting of title to the property is
not a bar to an ejectment suit involving the same
property (Quimpo v. de la Victoria, 46 SCRA 139
[1972].
5. Suits for specific performance with damages do
not affect ejectment actions (e.g., to compel
renewal of a lease contract) (Desamito v.
Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA 1184 [1966]; Pardo de
Tavera v. Encarnacion, 22 SCRA 632 [1968];
Rosales v. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 [1987];
Commander Realty, Inc. v. C.A., 161 SCRA 264
[1988];
6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g.,
from deed of absolute sale to one of sale
with pacto de retro) does not suspend an
ejectment suit between the same parties (Judith
v. Abragan, 66 SCRA 600 [1975].
7. An action for reconveyance of property
or "accion reivindicatoria" also has no effect on
ejectment suits regarding the same property (Del
Rosario v. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549 [1963]; Salinas v.
Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la Cruz v. C.A., 133
SCRA 520 [1984]; Drilon v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA
352 [1987]; Ching v. Malaya, 153 SCRA 412
[1987]; Philippine Feeds Milling Co., Inc. v. C.A.,
174 SCRA 174 SCRA 108, Dante v. Sison, 174
SCRA 517 [1989]; Guzman v. C.A. [annulment of
sale and reconveyance], 177 SCRA 604 [1989];
Demamay v. C.A., 186 SCRA 608 [1990];
Leopoldo Sy v. C.A. et al. [annulment of sale and
reconveyance], G.R. No. 95818, Aug. 2, 1991).
8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title,
or document affecting property operate to abate
ejectment actions respecting the same property
(Salinas v. Navarro [annulment of deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare
the same an equitable mortgage], 126 SCRA 167
Page 16 of 69
 [1983]; Ang Ping v. RTC [annulment of sale and
title], 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Caparros v. C.A.
[annulment of title], 170 SCRA 758 (1989); Dante
v. Sison [annulment of sale with damages] 174
SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
[annulment of document], 177 SCRA 288 [1989]).
Here, the appellate court conceded that petitioners are the
registered owners of the subject property with the
preferential right to possession as an attribute of ownership.
No other issue is involved in the case, as the question of
ownership of the subject property had been judicially
settled. Quite simply, the only matter for consideration of
the court is the issue of possession de facto.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The Decision dated November 15, 1996 and
Resolution dated January 13, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 40824 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The judgment dated October 26, 1995 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Civil Case No. 370 and the judgment dated March 5,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 23
affirming said disposition of the inferior court are hereby
REINSTATED.
#9 G.R. No. 169380 November 26, 2012
FIORELLO R. JOSE, Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERTO ALFUERTO, ERNESTO BACAY, ILUMINADO BACAY,
MANUEL BANTACULO, LETTY BARCELO, JING BERMEJO, MILNA
BERMEJO, PABLO BERMEJO, JHONNY BORJA, BERNADETTE
BUENAFE, ALFREDO CALAGOS, ROSAURO CALAGOS, ALEX
CHACON, AIDA CONSULTA, CARMEN CORPUZ, RODOLFO DE
VERA, ANA DELA ROSA, RUDY DING, JOSE ESCASINAS,
GORGONIO ESPADERO, DEMETRIO ESTRERA, ROGELIO
ESTRERA, EDUARDO EVARDONE, ANTONIO GABALEÑO,
ARSENIA GARING, NARCING GUARDA, NILA LEBATO, ANDRADE
LIGAYA, HELEN LOPEZ, RAMON MACAIRAN, DOMINGO
NOLASCO, JR., FLORANTE NOLASCO, REGINA OPERARIO,
CARDING ORCULLO, FELICISIMO PACATE, CONRADO P
AMINDALAN, JUN PARIL, RENE SANTOS, DOMINADOR
SELVELYEJO, VILLAR, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE and Unknown
Occupants of Olivares Compound, Phase II, Barangay San
Dionisio, Parañaque City, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the decision1 dated March 14, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80166. The Court of Appeals’
decision reversed the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City, Branch 257, and of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 77, by dismissing petitioner Fiorello
R. Jose’s complaint for ejectment against Roberto Alfuerto, Ernesto
Bacay, Iluminado Bacay, Manuel Bantaculo, Letty Barcelo, Jing
Bermejo, Milna Bermejo, Pablo Bermejo, Jhonny Borja, Bernadette
Buenafe, Alfredo Calagos, Rosauro Calagos, Alex Chacon, Aida
Consulta, Carmen Corpuz, Rodolfo De Vera, Ana Dela Rosa, Rudy Ding,
Jose Escasinas, Gorgonio Espadero, Demetrio Estrera, Rogelio Estrera,
Eduardo Evardone, Antonio Gabaleño, Arsenia Garing, Narcing Guarda,
Nila Lebato, Andrade Ligaya, Helen Lopez, Ramon Macairan, Domingo
Nolasco, Jr., Florante Nolasco, Regina Operario, Carding Orcullo,
Felicisimo Pacate, Conrado Pamindalan, Jun Paril, Rene Santos,
Dominador Selvelyejo, Rosario Ubaldo, Sergio Villar, John Doe, Jane
Doe and Unknown Occupants of Olivares Compound, Phase II,
Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City (respondents), on the ground
that the petitioner’s cause of action was not for unlawful detainer but
for recovery of possession. The appellate court affirmed this decision in
its resolution of August 22, 2005.2
The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Rodolfo
Chua Sing under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52594, 3 with an area
of 1919 square meters, located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque
City. Chua Sing purchased the land in 1991. On April 1, 1999, Chua
Sing leased the property to the petitioner. Their contract of lease was
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
neither notarized nor registered with the Parañaque City Registry of
Deeds.4
The lease contract provided that:
That the term of this lease shall be FIVE (5) years and renewable for
the same period upon mutual agreement of the parties to commence
upon the total eviction of any occupant or occupants. The LESSOR
hereby transfers all its rights and prerogative to evict said occupants in
favor of the LESSEE which shall be responsible for all expenses that
may be incurred without reimbursement from the LESSOR. It is
understood however that the LESSOR is hereby waiving, in favor of the
LESSEE any and all damages that may be recovered from the
occupants.5(Underscore ours)
Significantly, the respondents already occupied the property even
before the lease contract was executed.
On April 28, 1999, soon after Chua Sing and the petitioner signed the
lease contract, the petitioner demanded in writing that the
respondents vacate the property within 30 days and that they pay a
monthly rental of P1,000.00 until they fully vacate the property.6
The respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. On October 20,
1999, the petitioner filed an ejectment case against the respondents
before Branch 77 of the Parañaque City MeTC, docketed as Civil Case
No. 11344.7
In this complaint, no mention was made of any proceedings before the
barangay. Jose then brought the dispute before the barangay for
conciliation.8 The barangay issued a Certification to File Action on
March 1, 2000.9 Jose was then able to file an amended complaint,
incorporating the proceedings before the barangay before the
summons and copies of the complaint were served upon the named
defendants.10
In the Amended Complaint11 dated March 17, 2000, the petitioner
claimed that as lessee of the subject property, he had the right to
eject the respondents who unlawfully occupy the land. He alleged that:
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of
the subject lot, have defiantly erected their houses thereat without
benefit of any contract or law whatsoever, much less any building
permit as sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true, lawful
and registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor.12
The petitioner also stated that despite his written demand, the
respondents failed to vacate the property without legal justification. He
prayed that the court order the respondents; (1) to vacate the
premises; (2) to pay him not less than P41,000.00 a month from May
30,1999 until they vacate the premises; and (3) to pay him attorney’s
fees of no less than P50,000.00, and the costs of suit. 13
In their Answer, the respondents likewise pointed out that they have
been in possession of the land long before Chua Sing acquired the
property in 1991, and that the lease contract between the petitioner
and Chua Sing does not affect their right to possess the land. The
respondents also presented a Deed of Assignment,14 dated February
13, 2000, issued by David R. Dulfo in their favor. They argued that the
MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case as the issue deals with
ownership of the land, and sought the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of cause of action and for lack of jurisdiction. They also filed a
counterclaim for actual and moral damages for the filing of a baseless
and malicious suit.
After the required position papers, affidavits and other pieces of
evidence were submitted, the MeTC resolved the case in the
petitioner’s favor. In its decision15 of January 27, 2003, the MeTC held
that the respondents had no right to possess the land and that their
occupation was merely by the owner’s tolerance. It further noted that
the respondents could no longer raise the issue of ownership, as this
issue had already been settled: the respondents previously filed a case
for the annulment/cancellation of Chua Sing’s title before the RTC,
Branch 260, of Parañaque City, which ruled that the registered owner’s
title was genuine and valid. Moreover, the MeTC held that it is not
divested of jurisdiction over the case because of the respondents’
assertion of ownership of the property. On these premises, the MeTC
Page 17 of 69
ordered the respondents to vacate the premises and to remove all
structures introduced on the land; to each pay P500.00 per month
from the date of filing of this case until they vacate the premises; and
to pay Jose, jointly and severally, the costs of suit and P20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.
On appeal before the RTC, the respondents raised the issue, among
others, that no legal basis exists for the petitioner’s claim that their
occupation was by tolerance, "where the possession of the defendants
was illegal at the inception as alleged in the complaint, there can be no
tolerance."16
The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision of January 27, 2003. It issued its
decision17 on October 8, 2003, reiterating the MeTC’s ruling that a case
for ejectment was proper. The petitioner, as lessee, had the right to
file the ejectment complaint; the respondents occupied the land by
mere tolerance and their possession became unlawful upon the
petitioner’s demand to vacate on April 28, 1999. The RTC, moreover,
noted that the complaint for ejectment was filed on October 20, 1999,
or within one year after the unlawful deprivation took place. It cited
Pangilinan, et al. v. Hon. Aguilar, etc., et al. 18 and Yu v. Lara, et al.19 to
support its ruling that a case for unlawful detainer was appropriate.
On March 14, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and MeTC
decisions.20 It ruled that the respondents’ possession of the land was
not by the petitioner or his lessor’s tolerance. It defined tolerance not
merely as the silence or inaction of a lawful possessor when another
occupies his land; tolerance entailed permission from the owner by
reason of familiarity or neighborliness. The petitioner, however,
alleged that the respondents unlawfully entered the property; thus,
tolerance (or authorized entry into the property) was not alleged and
there could be no case for unlawful detainer. The respondents’
allegation that they had been in possession of the land before the
petitioner’s lessor had acquired it in 1991 supports this finding. Having
been in possession of the land for more than a year, the respondents
should not be evicted through an ejectment case.
The Court of Appeals emphasized that ejectment cases are summary
proceedings where the only issue to be resolved is who has a better
right to the physical possession of a property. The petitioner’s claim,
on the other hand, is based on an accion publiciana: he asserts his
right as a possessor by virtue of a contract of lease he contracted after
the respondents had occupied the land. The dispositive part of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision dated
October 8, 2003 of the RTC, Branch 257, Parañaque City, in Civil Case
No. 03-0127, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the amended
complaint for ejectment is DISMISSED.21
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,22 which the Court of
Appeals denied in its resolution23 of August 22, 2005. In the present
appeal, the petitioner raises before us the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT IS NOT FOR
UNLAWFUL DETAINER BUT FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND
THEREFORE DISMISSIBLE
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING THE
CASE BASED ON RESPONDENTS’ MATERIAL CHANGE OF THEORY
WHICH IS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR DEFENSES
INVOKED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
III
WHETHER OR NOT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY DECIDE THIS CASE
ON THE MERITS TO AVOID CIRCUITOUS PROCEDURE IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.24
The Court’s Ruling
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
We find the petition unmeritorious.
Unlawful detainer is not the proper
remedy for the present case.
The key issue in this case is whether an action for unlawful detainer is
the proper remedy.
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession
of real property. This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. In
unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant was originally legal,
as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an
express or implied contract between them. However, the defendant’s
possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the
defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the
defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer
must be instituted one year from the unlawful withholding of
possession.25
The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the
action and the jurisdiction of the court. The complaint must specifically
allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the absence of these
allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper
remedy and the municipal trial court or the MeTC does not have
jurisdiction over the case.26
In his amended complaint, the petitioner presents the following
allegations in support of his unlawful detainer complaint:
3. On April 1, 1999, plaintiff leased from lessor, Mr. Rudy Chuasing,
that parcel of lot owned and registered in the lessor’s name, covering
the area occupied by the defendants.
xxxx
6. Plaintiff’s lessor had acquired the subject property as early as 1991
through sale, thereafter the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title was
subsequently registered under his name.
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of
the subject lot, have defiantly erected their houses thereat without
benefit of any contract or law whatsoever, much less any building
permit as sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true, lawful
and registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor.
8. By reason of defendants’ continued unlawful occupancy of the
subject premises, plaintiff referred the matter to his lawyer who
immediately sent a formal demand upon each of the defendants to
vacate the premises. Copies of the demand letter dated 28 April 1999
are xxx hereto attached as annexes "C" to "QQ."
9. Despite notice, however, defendants failed and refused and
continues to fail and refuse to vacate the premises without valid or
legal justification.27 (emphasis ours)
The petitioner’s allegations in the amended complaint run counter to
the requirements for unlawful detainer. In an unlawful detainer action,
the possession of the defendant was originally legal and his possession
was permitted by the owner through an express or implied contract.
In this case, paragraph 7 makes it clear that the respondents’
occupancy was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual or
legal basis. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s possession
becomes illegal only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the defendant to
vacate the property and the defendant’s subsequent refusal. In the
present case, paragraph 8 characterizes the defendant’s occupancy as
unlawful even before the formal demand letters were written by the
petitioner’s counsel. Under these allegations, the unlawful withholding
of possession should not be based on the date the demand letters
Page 18 of 69
were sent, as the alleged unlawful act had taken place at an earlier
unspecified date.
The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly alleged that the
respondents occupied the premises by mere tolerance of the owner.
No allegation in the complaint nor any supporting evidence on record,
however, shows when the respondents entered the property or who
had granted them permission to enter. Without these allegations and
evidence, the bare claim regarding "tolerance" cannot be upheld.
In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al., 28 the Court cited Prof. Arturo M.
Tolentino’s definition and characterizes "tolerance" in the following
manner:
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are
"those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of
property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property;
they are generally those particular services or benefits which one’s
property can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the
owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy." He adds that:
"they are acts of little disturbances which a person, in the interest of
neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do on his
property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or
getting some water from a well." And, Tolentino continues, even
though "this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by
prescription." Further expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes:
"There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely
tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the part of
the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance
that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, acts of
possession are realized or performed. The question reduces itself to
the existence or non-existence of the permission. [citations omitted;
italics supplied]
The Court has consistently adopted this position: tolerance or
permission must have been present at the beginning of possession; if
the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would not be the proper remedy and should be dismissed. 29
It is not the first time that this Court adjudged contradictory
statements in a complaint for unlawful detainer as a basis for
dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs of Urban,30 the claim that the defendant’s
possession was merely tolerated was contradicted by the
complainant’s allegation that the entry to the subject property was
unlawful from the very beginning. The Court then ruled that the
unlawful detainer action should fail.
The contradictory statements in the complaint are further deemed
suspicious when a complaint is silent regarding the factual
circumstances surrounding the alleged tolerance. In Ten Forty Realty
Corporation v. Cruz,31 the complaint simply stated that: "(1) defendant
immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an
action merely tolerated by the plaintiff; and (2) the respondent’s
allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance."
The Court expressed its qualms over these averments of fact as they
did not contain anything substantiating the claim that the plaintiff
tolerated or permitted the occupation of the property by the
defendant:
These allegations contradict, rather than support, plaintiff’s theory that
its cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments
advance the view that defendant’s occupation of the property was
unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential
requirement in unlawful detainer cases that plaintiff’s supposed act of
sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the start of a
possession that is later sought to be recovered.
As the bare allegation of plaintiff’s tolerance of defendant’s occupation
of the premises has not been proven, the possession should be
deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that
the ejectment case should have been for forcible entry — an action
that had already prescribed, however, when the Complaint was filed
on May 12, 1999. The prescriptive period of one year for forcible entry
cases is reckoned from the date of defendant’s actual entry into the
land, which in this case was on April 24, 1998.32
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
Similarly, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court considered the
owner’s lack of knowledge of the defendant’s entry of the land to be
inconsistent with the allegation that there had been tolerance.
In Padre v. Malabanan,34 the Court not only required allegations
regarding the grant of permission, but proof as well. It noted that the
plaintiffs alleged the existence of tolerance, but ordered the dismissal
of the unlawful detainer case because the evidence was "totally
wanting as to when and under what circumstances xxx the alleged
tolerance came about." It stated that:
Judging from the respondent’s Answer, the petitioners were never at
all in physical possession of the premises from the time he started
occupying it and continuously up to the present. For sure, the
petitioners merely derived their alleged prior physical possession only
on the basis of their Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), arguing that the
issuance of said title presupposes their having been in possession of
the property at one time or another.35
Thus, the complainants in unlawful detainer cases cannot simply
anchor their claims on the validity of the owner’s title. Possession de
facto must also be proved.
As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,36 we already
ruled that a complaint which fails to positively aver any overt act on
the plaintiff’s part indicative of permission to occupy the land, or any
showing of such fact during the trial is fatal for a case for unlawful
detainer. As the Court then explained, a case for unlawful detainer
alleging tolerance must definitely establish its existence from the start
of possession; otherwise, a case for forcible entry can mask itself as
an action for unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed beyond the
required one-year prescription period from the time of forcible entry:
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance"
confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer — not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous
doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an
open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right
authorizes the speedy redress — in the inferior court — provided for in
the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before
suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor
is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court.
Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after
the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no
action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such
defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a
demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon plea of tolerance to
prevent prescription to set in — and summarily throw him out of the
land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind
the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is
but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.37 (italics
supplied)
Given these rulings, it would be equally dangerous for us to deprive
the respondents of possession over a property that they have held for
at least eight years before the case was filed in 1999, by means of a
summary proceeding, simply because the petitioner used the word
"tolerance" without sufficient allegations or evidence to support it.
There was no change in the respondents’ theory during the appeal that
would amount to a deprivation of the petitioner’s right to due process.
The petitioner alleges that the respondents had never questioned
before the MeTC the fact that their occupancy was by tolerance. The
only issues the respondents allegedly raised were: (1) the title to the
property is spurious; (2) the petitioner’s predecessor is not the true
owner of the property in question; (3) the petitioner’s lease contract
was not legally enforceable; (4) the petitioner was not the real party-
in-interest; (5) the petitioner’s predecessor never had prior physical
possession of the property; and (6) the respondents’ right of
possession was based on the "Deed of Assignment of Real Property"
executed by Dulfo. The respondents raised the issue of tolerance
merely on appeal before the RTC. They argue that this constitutes a
change of theory, which is disallowed on appeal.38
Page 19 of 69
It is a settled rule that a party cannot change his theory of the case or
his cause of action on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court will not be
considered by the reviewing court. The defenses not pleaded in the
answer cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the
issue in the case. To do so would be unfair to the adverse party, who
had no opportunity to present evidence in connection with the new
theory; this would offend the basic rules of due process and fair play. 39
While this Court has frowned upon changes of theory on appeal, this
rule is not applicable to the present case. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the action due the petitioner’s failure to allege and prove the
essential requirements of an unlawful detainer case. In Serdoncillo v.
Spouses Benolirao,40 we held that:
In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of
an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the
complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring
the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts
must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to
aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where
it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. (emphasis ours; italics supplied)
Regardless of the defenses raised by the respondents, the petitioner
was required to properly allege and prove when the respondents
entered the property and that it was the petitioner or his predecessors,
not any other persons, who granted the respondents permission to
enter and occupy the property. Furthermore, it was not the
respondents’ defense that proved fatal to the case but the petitioner’s
contradictory statements in his amended complaint which he even
reiterated in his other pleadings.41
Although the respondents did not use the word "tolerance" before the
MeTC, they have always questioned the existence of the petitioner’s
tolerance. In their Answer to Amended Complaint, the respondents
negated the possibility of their possession of the property under the
petitioner and his lessor’s tolerance when the respondents alleged to
have occupied the premises even before the lessor acquired the
property in 1991. They said as much in their Position Paper:
RODOLFO CHUA SING never had actual physical possession of his
supposed property, as when he became an owner of the 1,919 square
meters property described in TCT No. 52594, the property had already
been occupied by herein DEFENDANTS since late 1970. Therefore,
DEFENDANTS were already occupants/possessors of the property from
where they are being ejected by FIORELLO JOSE, a supposed LESSEE
of a property with a dubious title. The main thing to be proven in the
case at bar is prior possession and that the same was lost through
force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, so that it behooves
the court to restore possession regardless of title or even ownership
xxx. In the case at bar, neither RODOLFO CHUA SING nor herein
PLAINTIFF ever had any actual physical possession of the property
where DEFENDANTS have already possessed for more than ten (10)
years in 1991 when RODOLFO CHUA SING got his fake title to the
property.42 (citation omitted)
In addition, whether or not it was credible, the respondent’s claim that
their possession was based on the Deed of Assignment executed by
Dulfo, in behalf of the estate of Domingo de Ocampo, shows that they
considered the petitioner and his lessor as strangers to any of their
transactions on the property, and could not have stayed there upon
the latter’s permission.
We note that even after the issue of tolerance had been directly raised
by the respondents before the RTC, the petitioner still failed to address
it before the RTC, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court. 43 At
best, he belatedly states for the first time in his Memorandum 44 before
this Court that his lessor had tolerated the respondents’ occupancy of
the lot, without addressing the respondents’ allegation that they had
occupied the lot in 1970, before the petitioner’s lessor became the
owner of the property in 1991, and without providing any other
details. His pleadings continued to insist on the existence of tolerance
without providing the factual basis for this conclusion. Thus, we cannot
declare that the Court of Appeals had in anyway deprived the
petitioner of due process or had unfairly treated him when it resolved
the case based on the issue of tolerance.
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
The Court cannot treat an ejectment
case as an accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria.
The petitioner argues that assuming this case should have been filed
as an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, this Court should still
resolve the case, as requiring him to properly refile the case serves no
other ends than to comply with technicalities. 45
The Court cannot simply take the evidence presented before the MeTC
in an ejectment case and decide it as an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. These cases are not interchangeable and their
differences constitute far more than mere technicalities.
In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,46 we ruled that an action for forcible
entry cannot be treated as an accion publiciana and summarized the
reasons therefor. We find these same reasons also applicable to an
unlawful detainer case which bears the same relevant characteristics:
On the issue of whether or not an action for forcible entry can be
treated as accion publiciana, we rule in the negative. Forcible entry is
distinct from accion publiciana. First, forcible entry should be filed
within one year from the unlawful dispossession of the real property,
while accion publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful dispossession
of the real property. Second, forcible entry is concerned with the issue
of the right to the physical possession of the real property; in accion
publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the better right to possession
over the real property. Third, an action for forcible entry is filed in the
municipal trial court and is a summary action, while accion publiciana
is a plenary action in the RTC. [italics supplied]
The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. An ejectment suit is brought
before the proper inferior court to recover physical possession only or
possession de facto, not possession de jure. Unlawful detainer and
forcible entry cases are not processes to determine actual title to
property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the issue of ownership is made
only to resolve the issue of possession, and is therefore
inconclusive.47 Because they only resolve issues of possession de facto,
ejectment actions are summary in nature, while accion publiciana (for
the recovery of possession) and accion reivindicatoria (for the recovery
of ownership) are plenary actions.48 The purpose of allowing actions for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be decided in summary
proceedings is to provide for a peaceful, speedy and expeditious
means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from
unjustly taking and continuing his possession during the long period it
would take to properly resolve the issue of possession de jure or
ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in
the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession
might take the law in his hands and seize the property by force and
violence.49 An ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full-blown
trial for the purpose of determining rights of possession or ownership.
Citing Mediran v. Villanueva,50 the Court in Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals51 describes in detail how these two remedies should be used:
In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the
purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual
possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties to
preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to
invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the
question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person who has
first acquired possession should remain in possession pending the
decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in
a petty warfare over the possession of the property which is the
subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous to
individual security and disturbing to social order.1âwphi1 Therefore,
where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a piece of
property and desires to vindicate his ownership against the party
actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an action
to this end in a court of competent jurisdiction; and he cannot be
permitted, by invading the property and excluding the actual
possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action
to try the property right. [italics supplied]
Thus, if we allow parties to file ejectment cases and later consider
them as an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, we would
encourage parties to simply file ejectment cases instead of plenary
actions. Courts would then decide in summary proceedings cases
which the rules intend to be resolved through full-blown trials. Because
these "summary" proceedings will have to tackle complicated issues
Page 20 of 69
requiring extensive proof, they would no longer be expeditious and
would no longer serve the purpose for which they were created.
Indeed, we cannot see how the resulting congestion of cases, the
hastily and incorrectly decided cases, and the utter lack of system
would assist the courts in protecting and preserving property rights.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals'
decision dated March 14, 2005 and resolution dated August 22, 2005
in CA-G.R. SP No. 80116.
SO ORDERED.
#10 G.R. No. 158231 June 19, 2007
BABY ARLENE LARANO,* Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. ALFREDO CALENDACION and RAFAELA T.
CALENDACION,** Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated May 13, 2003
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68272 which dismissed
the complaint for unlawful detainer of Baby Arlene Laraño (petitioner)
against Spouses Alfredo and Rafaela Calendacion (respondents).
The factual background of the case is as follows:
Petitioner owns a parcel of riceland situated in Barangay Daniw,
Municipality of Victoria, Laguna covered by TCT No. 175241 of the
Register of Deeds of Laguna. On September 14, 1998, petitioner and
respondents executed a Contract to Sell whereby the latter agreed to
buy a 50,000-square meter portion of petitioner's riceland for
₱5Million, with ₱500,000.00 as down payment and the balance payable
in nine installments of ₱500,000.00 each, until September 2001.2
Pending full payment of the purchase price, possession of the riceland
was transferred to respondents under the condition that they shall
account for and deliver the harvest from said riceland to petitioner.
Respondents, however, failed to pay the installments and to account
for and deliver the harvest from said riceland.3
On March 7, 2000, petitioner sent respondents a demand letter 4 to
vacate the riceland within 10 days from receipt thereof, but as her
demand went unheeded, she filed on April 5, 2000 a
Complaint5 against respondents for unlawful detainer before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Victoria, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case
No. 826, praying that respondents be directed to vacate the riceland
and to pay ₱400,000.00 per year from September 1998 until they
vacate, as reasonable compensation for the use of the property,
₱120,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and ₱50,000.00 as litigation
expenses.6
In their Answer7 dated April 26, 2000, respondents admit the
execution of the Contract to Sell but deny that it contains all the
agreements of the parties. They allege that petitioner has no cause of
action against them because the three-year period within which to pay
the purchase price has not yet lapsed; that the MTC has no jurisdiction
over the case because the complaint failed to allege that a demand to
pay and to vacate the riceland was made upon them.8
On August 2, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision,9 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants, as
follows:
1.) To immediately vacate the premises in question;
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
2.) To pay the amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND
(₱365,000.00) PESOS as a reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property;
3.) To pay TWENTY THOUSAND (₱20,000.00) PESOS for and attorney's
fees; and
4.) To pay FIVE THOUSAND (₱5,000.00) PESOS as litigation expenses,
plus costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Respondents filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 26, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. SC-
4141.11 On December 3, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision,12 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed subject
to the modification that defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff the
amount of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱400,000.00), as yearly
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of said riceland
computed from 1999 until such time that defendants have actually
vacated the same.
SO ORDERED.13
Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for Review with the CA. 14 For
failure to file her comment despite receipt of CA Resolution15 dated
May 8, 2002 which required her to file a comment, petitioner was
deemed to have waived her right to file comment to the petition in CA
Resolution dated August 28, 2002.16
On May 13, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision17 setting aside the
Decision of the RTC and dismissing the complaint for unlawful
detainer. The CA nullified the proceedings before the MTC for want of
jurisdiction. It held that the issues in the case - whether or not there
was a violation of the Contract to Sell, whether or not such violation
gives the petitioner the right to terminate the contract and
consequently, the right to recover possession and the value of the
harvest from the riceland - extend beyond those commonly involved in
unlawful detainer suits where only the issue of possession is involved;
that the case is not a mere detainer suit but one incapable of
pecuniary estimation, placing it under the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the RTC, not the MTC.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the present petition anchored on the
following grounds:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave error in giving
due course to the private respondents' petition for review
notwithstanding the fact that said petition contains no verification to
the effect that the allegations therein were read and understood by the
private respondents and that they are true and correct of their own or
personal knowledge or based on authentic records, as required by the
rules.
2. The respondent Court of Appeals grievously erred in dismissing the
case on the ground that the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction
over the case for unlawful detainer, and thus the Regional Trial Court
likewise has no jurisdiction on appeal to decide the case for unlawful
detainer, which allegedly involves a matter incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
3. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court dated December 3, 2001, modifying the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court dated August 2, 2000 both
ordering the eviction of private respondents from the subject property
and payment of the reasonable value of the use of the subject
premises.18
Petitioner contends that the CA should have dismissed outright the
petition for review filed before it since it contains no verification as
required by the Rules; and that the CA, in finding that the complaint
before the MTC was not one for unlawful detainer but for specific
performance, did not limit itself to the allegations in the complaint but
Page 21 of 69
resorted to unrestrained references, deductions and/or conjectures,
unduly influenced by the allegations in the answer.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that verification is just a
formal requirement; that petitioner waived her right to question the
defect when she failed to submit her comment; that the CA correctly
pointed out that the present case involves one that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation since the crux of the matter is the rights of the
parties based on the Contract to Sell.
The petition is bereft of merit.
As to the contention of petitioner that the CA should not have taken
cognizance of the petition for review because it was not verified, as
required by the Rules, this Court has held in a number of instances
that such a deficiency can be excused or dispensed with in meritorious
cases, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal.19The
requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal. 20 Such
requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the
non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading
fatally defective.21Verification is simply intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and
not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that
the pleading is filed in good faith.22 The court may order the correction
of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although
it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the Rules may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may thereby be served.23
Besides, petitioner did not raise the issue of lack of verification before
the CA. She did not file a comment to the petition and it is too late in
the day to assail such defect, as she is deemed to have waived any
objection to the formal flaws of the petition. Points of law, theories,
issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.24
The main issue being raised in the present petition is whether the
complaint is one for unlawful detainer.
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by
the allegations pleaded in the complaint.25It cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the
defendant.26Neither can it be made to depend on the exclusive
characterization of the case by one of the parties. 27 The test for
determining the sufficiency of those allegations is whether, admitting
the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer of the plaintiff.28
The facts upon which an action for unlawful detainer can be brought
are specially mentioned in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other
person may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
with damages and costs. (Emphasis supplied)
In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became
unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess;
hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action,
the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action
is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession. 29
Applied to the present case, petitioner, as vendor, must comply with
two requisites for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit: (a) there
must be failure to pay the installment due or comply with the
conditions of the Contract to Sell; and (b) there must be demand both
to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in Section
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
230of Rule 70, namely: 15 days in case of land and 5 days in case of
buildings. The first requisite refers to the existence of the cause of
action for unlawful detainer, while the second refers to the jurisdiction
requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be
pursued.31
Both demands – to pay installment due or adhere to the terms of the
Contract to Sell and to vacate are necessary to make the vendee
deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed.32 It is the
vendor's demand for the vendee to vacate the premises and the
vendee's refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of the
possession.33 Such refusal violates the vendor's right of possession
giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer. 34 However, prior to the
institution of such action, a demand from the vendor to pay the
installment due or comply with the conditions of the Contract to Sell
and to vacate the premises is required under the aforequoted rule.
Thus, mere failure to pay the installment due or violation of the terms
of the Contract to Sell does not automatically render a person's
possession unlawful. Furthermore, the giving of such demand must be
alleged in the complaint; otherwise, the MTC cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the case.35
A review of the Complaint of petitioner discloses these pertinent
allegations: petitioner owns the subject riceland; she executed a
Contract to Sell in favor of respondents; pending full payment of the
purchase price, possession of subject riceland was transferred to
respondents subject to accounting and delivery of the harvest to
petitioner; respondents failed to pay the installments and to account
for and deliver the harvest; petitioner asked respondents to vacate the
subject riceland, but they failed to do so. Accordingly, petitioner
prayed for judgment ordering respondents to vacate the subject
riceland and to pay ₱400,000.00 per year from September 1998 until
they vacate as reasonable compensation for the use of the property,
₱120,000.00 as attorney's fees, and ₱50,000.00 as litigation expenses.
It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in the Complaint
failed to constitute a case of unlawful detainer. What is clear is that in
the Complaint, petitioner alleged that respondents had violated the
terms of the Contract to Sell. However, the Complaint failed to state
that petitioner made demands upon respondents to comply with the
conditions of the contract – the payment of the installments and the
accounting and delivery of the harvests from the subject riceland. The
10-day period granted respondents to vacate even fell short of the 15-
day period mandated by law. When the complaint does not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the
MTC does not have jurisdiction to hear the case.36
An allegation of a violation of a contract or agreement in a detainer
suit may be proved by the presentation of competent evidence, upon
which an MTC judge might make a finding to that effect, but certainly,
that court cannot declare and hold that the contract is rescinded. The
rescission of contract is a power vested in the RTC. 37 The rescission of
the contract is the basis of, and therefore a condition precedent for,
the illegality of a party's possession of a piece of realty. 38 Without
judicial intervention and determination, even a stipulation entitling one
party to take possession of the land and building, in case the other
party violates the contract, cannot confer upon the former the right to
take possession thereof, if that move is objected to. 39
Clearly, the basic issue raised in the complaint of petitioner is not of
possession but interpretation, enforcement and/or rescission of the
contract, a matter that is beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear
and determine.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May
13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68272
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
#11 A.M. MTJ-96-1085. October 8, 1998
SALVACION P. ONQUIT, complainant, vs. JUDGE AURORA
BINAMIRA-PARCIA, and SHERIFF IV DANILO O.
MATIAS, Respondents.
Page 22 of 69
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an administrative complaint charging respondents, namely:
Judge Aurora Binamira-Parcia, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (5th
Judicial Region), Ligao-Oas, Albay, with grave abuse of authority, bias
and grave misconduct; and, Sheriff IV Danilo O. Matias, with grave
misconduct, misbehavior in the performance of his official duties, and
collusion.1cräläwvirtualibräry
The charge against respondent Judge stems from a forcible entry
case2with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction with damages. Said case was assigned to her sala. The
complainant and her two brothers were therein co-defendants.
Complainant raised the issue of jurisdiction stating that said case falls
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) because it involves tenancy over an
agricultural land. Thereafter, complainant and her co-defendants filed
with respondent Judge, an Ex-Parte Motion for Disqualification,
Request for Disqualification and Request for Resolution. Basically,
these motions were founded on the trial courts alleged lack of
jurisdiction. In a single Order,3 respondent Judge denied all three
motions ruling that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and not those raised by defendants. Moreover, according to
respondent Judge , the claim regarding the nature of the case at bar
would not automatically divest the court of its jurisdiction.
Subsequently, plaintiff in the lower court filed an injunction bond which
was approved by respondent Judge and a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued against the defendants, including herein complainant. A
seizure order followed which directed respondent Sheriff to seize the
palay from the land in question.4cräläwvirtualibräry
In the complaint now before this Court, complainant details several
allegations as follows:
(1) That the land subject of the forcible entry case is an agricultural
riceland, thus, it is the Department of Agrarian Reform which has
original and exclusive jurisdiction, and not the respondent Judge's
court;
(2) That the plaintiffs injunction bond was approved by respondent
Judge without first serving a copy to the complainant resulting in a
violation of due process. Complainant avers that it left her no
opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond. Further, a copy of
the writ of injunction was not served on complainants counsel;
(3) That a notice regarding the Motion for Issuance of Seizure Order
was not served on the complainant thereby depriving her of a chance
to oppose it;
(4) That respondent Judge has been heard saying that complainant
and his co-defendants ought to leave the land because it is certain that
they will lose their case;
(5) And that, with regard to respondent Sheriff, upon the issuance of
the seizure order, he seized all the palay harvested without issuing a
receipt, despite demand therefor, and delivered the palay to the
plaintiff.5cräläwvirtualibräry
In her Comment, respondent Judge asserts principally that the
complaint was maliciously filed to harass her. She recounts that
ejectment cases were earlier filed before her sala against some of
complainants family members involving different areas of the disputed
lot. In these separate cases, respondent Judge ordered their
ejectment,6 which she claims is the reason for complainants
vindictiveness. She claims moreover, that in a Special Civil Case (No.
1852) filed against her before the Albay Regional Trial Court, to
restrain her from taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 1048-L, she
nevertheless proceeded Civil Case No. 1048-L, after the special civil
case was dismissed. She then ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, and required an injunction bond from
complainants opponents.7 All these were resented, according to the
respondent Judge, by the complainant.
With regard to the averment by complainant that she and her co-
defendants were not furnished a copy of the bond before its approval,
respondent Judge replies that the records of the case would show that
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
complainants counsel was furnished with a copy of the Motion to Admit
Bond. Furthermore, even granting that the complainant and co-
defendants were not furnished with a copy of the bond, the failure to
serve a copy would be merely a formal defect. She states that
complainant should have asked the court to furnish the parties with a
copy, but complainant failed to do so.8cräläwvirtualibräry
In response to the accusation regarding her order denying the Motion
to Fix Defendants Bond and to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, she states that the injunction bond posted by plaintiff was
sufficient to cover damages to which complainant and her co-
defendants might be entitled, in case a judgment would be rendered in
their favor.9cräläwvirtualibräry
As for the questioned seizure order, respondent Judge maintains that
the reason for this order was that even after the issuance of an
injunction, complainant and co-defendants re-entered the land in
question and harvested the palay thereon. It was an ex-parte motion
which she had to grant considering the urgency of the matter, keeping
in mind that there was an injunction bond for the benefit of
complainant and co-defendants.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent Judge denies ever talking to complainant in her chambers.
According to her, it was Merle Porte, a sister of complainant and not a
party to the case, who approached respondent Judge in the afternoon
of April 10, 1996. Porte pleaded that her brothers and sisters be
allowed to harvest the palay and that they would settle the matter
with the plaintiff in said case. Respondent Judge states that her reply
was for Porte to discuss the matter with their lawyer instead of
personally speaking with her. Further, respondent Judge denies for
being totally untrue the incident alleged by complainant wherein she
was allegedly confronted concerning a purported payment to her
of P20,000 by plaintiff. According to respondent Judge, it was actually
complainants counsel, a former professor of respondent Judge, who
went inside her chambers to ask that she should deny the plaintiffs
request for an injunction.11 For the satisfaction of complainant and her
co-defendants, respondent Judge inhibited herself from rendering
judgment in Civil Case No. 1048-L and from further hearing the
Petition for Contempt filed by plaintiff against
complainant.12cräläwvirtualibräry
In sum, respondent Judge avers to this Court that from the outset
complainant and her co-defendants were already doing all that they
could do to disqualify her from taking cognizance of Civil Case No.
1048-L. As a matter of fact, when the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, denied the plaintiff's petition seeking
respondent Judge to be disqualified from hearing said case,
complainant filed a similar administrative case against the Presiding
Judge.13cräläwvirtualibräry
Concerning the charges of Grave Misconduct, Misbehavior in the
Performance of Official Duties and Collusion against respondent
Sheriff, he states in his Comment that when the Clerk of Court
received the Seizure Order, he was ordered to implement it
immediately. Police assistance was requested from the station
commander to accompany respondent Sheriff in entering the ricefield.
He stated that despite the heavy rain in the area he found complainant
and her co-defendants harvesting the palay. Said palay was seized as
ordered and placed inside sacks, and then brought by him to the Hall
of Justice. Early the following morning, he went to the Hall of Justice,
and had the palay, although wet, threshed and cleaned. He decided
that it was best to turn over the palay to the wife of the plaintiff due to
the fact that the grains were dripping wet from the previous days rains
and if not dried immediately would deteriorate as, in fact, there were
already grains showing signs of germination. A copy of the receipt of
the Sheriffs Return of Service was signed by the wife of plaintiff. He
admits though that the vehicle used in transporting the seized palay
was provided for by plaintiff, which he concluded was the reason
behind the alleged collusion between him and plaintiff.
On the charge by complainant that he refused to issue a receipt upon
seizure, respondent Sheriff replied that he could not do so immediately
upon seizure as the palay was not yet threshed and he would only
know the number of cavans seized after such was threshed and
cleaned. He claims that he did this the next day after the palay was
threshed and cleaned. Only then was it quantifiable as to the number
of cans in which they were stored. Respondent Sheriff then furnished
the receipt to complainants counsel of record, together with the
Sheriffs Return of Service.14cräläwvirtualibräry
Page 23 of 69
Complainant subsequently filed a Reply to each of the Comments
submitted by respondent Judge and respondent Sheriff. The Reply to
the Comment of respondent Judge centered on the fact that there was
personal bias involved, which accounted for the way respondent Judge
conducted herself towards the hearing of complainants case. 15 As to
her Reply to the respondent Sheriffs Comment, complainant denied
the allegation that they reacted defiantly to the writ of preliminary
injunction. According to complainant, the land was owned by another
family who, together with her co-defendants, were the actual
occupants thereof. Further, complainant maintains that aside from the
illegality of the seizure order, the respondent Sheriff made an error in
his Sheriffs Return, when he reported his estimate of the seized palay
way below the actual volume of the palay.16cräläwvirtualibräry
Considering the Complaint, the Comments, and the Reply as well as
the pleadings and exhibits submitted, we find no grave abuse of
authority, grave misconduct and bias on the part of respondent Judge.
The fact that respondent Judge took cognizance of the forcible entry
case did not taint her action with grave abuse of authority, even if
defendant had alleged that the land in question was under agricultural
tenancy, and that there was an issue of jurisdiction. Well-settled is the
principle that the courts shall not be divested of jurisdiction over a
case merely by what is raised in the answer. What determines the
nature of an action and a court's jurisdiction over it are the allegations
set up by the plaintiff.17 Basic is the rule that the material averments
in the complaint, which in this case is for ejectment, determine the
jurisdiction of the court. And, jurisprudence dictates that the court
does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple
expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence
of a tenancy relationship between the parties.18 It is the duty of the
court to receive evidence to determine the veracity of allegations of
tenancy. In an Order of respondent Judge dated 09 February 1996, it
was ruled that, considering the evidence presented, the land in
question is an irrigated riceland, but not tenanted. 19 This matter was
even brought up on a petition for certiorari with prohibition to the
Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, but said petition was
denied.20 These antecedents are sufficient to convince us that the
respondent Judge did not act with grave abuse of authority in
assuming jurisdiction over the case filed in her sala.
With regard to the allegation of having failed to furnish to the
defendants a copy of the bond and the writ of preliminary injunction,
we give credence to the findings made by the Office of the Court
Administrator, as follows:
However, Section 8, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court in
conjunction with Section 3, Rule 70 thereof provides that the [p]arty
filing the bond shall forthwith served (sic) a copy of such bond on the
other party, who may except to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the
surety or sureties thereon. This means that the plaintiff and not the
Court or the respondent Judge for that matter, who (sic) is duty bound
to serve a copy of the injunction bond to the defendants. x x x
Nevertheless, the failure of the plaintiff to serve a copy of the
injunction bond to the defendant is merely a formal defect and not a
reversible error. For in this case the defendant may ask the [c]ourt to
order the plaintiff to serve upon him the copy of the bond.
xxx
On the other hand, the records belie the claim of complainant that the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction was not served to (sic) the defendants.
Records show that said writ was served to (sic) the defendants on
February 16, 1996 at their residence but all refused to acknowledge
receipt therefor, nevertheless the executing Sheriff left each a copy to
(sic) the defendants (Annex H, rollo, p.41). 21cräläwvirtualibräry
We also find that there was no impropriety on the part of respondent
Judge when she issued the seizure order. It was apparent that the
complainant and her co-defendants showed defiance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. This was all the more demonstrated when they
re-entered the land and harvested the palay, in direct and open
violation of the writ. The order to seize the harvested palay was issued
to preserve the status quo, and in no way done with grave abuse of
authority.
The charges of bias imputed on respondent Judge, specifically, that
she received money from the plaintiffs and that she told complainant
that they will surely lose the case, are only allegations which are not
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
supported by evidence apart from the self-serving statements made by
complainant. Given no support on the record, we are not persuaded by
said accusations hurled by complainant simply because there is no
evidence thereon to implicate the respondent Judge.
With regard to the charges against respondent Sheriff, we find that his
actuation of immediately implementing the seizure order did not
constitute grave misconduct nor was it an act of collusion with the
adverse party. He did what was expected of any sheriff given charge of
enforcing a court order. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff,
it is his ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and
promptness to execute it in accordance with its
mandates.22cräläwvirtualibräry
Neither are we convinced that respondent Sheriff was remiss in his
duty to issue a receipt for the palay he seized. Admittedly, he did not
issue the receipt on the spot, but we accept the reason stated earlier
for issuing it when the palay was already cleaned and measured, next
day. From the record, complainant made no averment that respondent
Sheriff derived pecuniary benefit in not immediately giving
complainant a receipt. It was reasonable to briefly wait until
measurement could be made as to the volume of the palay after being
cleaned and threshed before issuance of the receipt. In the absence of
contrary evidence, the presumption prevails that the sheriff has
regularly performed his official duty.23cräläwvirtualibräry
On the matter of where to deposit the seized palay, however, it was
incumbent on respondent Sheriff to deliver the palay to the court
considering it was still considered property in custodia legis. Deposit of
seized items in litigation is not a discretionary matter. Until the court
had made its decision as to the disposal of the palay, the presumption
was that the seized palay should remain in the court's custody, hence
to be deposited in court. Respondent Sheriff should not have handed
them over to the plaintiff in the absence of a directive to that effect in
the seizure order. However, this Court takes note of the circumstances
surrounding respondent Sheriffs delivery to the plaintiff of what was
seized. Although the palay was already threshed and cleaned, it was
still dripping wet from the previous days heavy rains and respondent
Sheriff felt that if not dried immediately the grains would deteriorate
and might just eventually be rendered useless. This leads us to
conclude that there was no bad faith in his acts. Furthermore, he
documented his turnover of the seized grains in the presence of
witnesses from the barangay. His actuation was without malice and
could be deemed not unreasonable under the circumstances obtaining,
although not in strict compliance with official duty concerning a matter
in custodia legis.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS the
administrative charges against respondent Judge Aurora Binamira-
Parcia for lack of merit. The charges against respondent Sheriff Danilo
Matias are also DISMISSED, but he is hereby ADMONISHED to strictly
observe always the rules and regulations governing the performance of
his duties in regard to the enforcement of seizure orders of the court.
SO ORDERED.
#12 G.R. No. 107741. October 18, 1996.
FRANCISCO BERNARTE, BENEDICTO DANAN, BIENVENIDO
BELLEZA, ROBERTO MALLARI, FELICIANO MALLARI, PESCASIO
DIMARUCUT, REYNALDO TIMBANG, ALFREDO SANTOS,
FERERICO SANTOS, LAMBERTO DANAN, JESUS CASTRO,
VICTORINO TALA, MARIANO SANTOS, IGNACIO CASTRO DE LA
CRUZ, WILFREDO TAPALLA, REYNALDO OSBUAL, ANTONIO
SANTOS, TEOFILO MUNOZ, MANUEL NAGUIAT, FELICISIMO
MACASPAC, ROMAN BERNAL, JR., FAUSTINO PANGAN,
FRANCISCO MACASPAC, CARLITO AGUILUZ, FIDEL CASTRO,
SALVADOR TALA, ROMEO TALA, LUCIANO MANLAPAZ, TOMAS
PAULE, DANNY MANUEL, BENIGNO PORTALES, CONRADO
MALLARI, MARTA DANAN, REGINA TIMBANG, CONCHITA
VISDA, AMELIA ALFARO, VIOLETA ALFARO, CONCHITA MALIT,
SEVERINA RIVERA, FLORENCIA PAULE, ROSITA BERNAL,
GLORIA MALLARI, LILIA SERRANO, NORMA CABUAN-BAUTISTA
and ANITA MANGANTI, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
The Hon. CARLOS BARTOLO, Municipal Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Lubao, Pampanga, THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF
THE PROVINCE OF PAMPANGA, MAJOR JESUS MANINANG
(PNP), SPO3 CARLOS GUINTO (PNP), SPO1 JESUS KABILANG
(PNP), SPO4 EDGARDO LALIC (PNP) & SPO4 DOMINADOR
Page 24 of 69
LACANLALE (PNP) and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 50,
GUAGUA, PAMPANGA, Respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision 1 dated November 19, 1992
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29284 dismissing for lack of
merit the petition for habeas corpus of petitioners.
The records show that on October 5, 1989, Estrella Arastia, in her own
behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Teodorica Reinares
Arastia, Leticia Arastia-Montenegro and Juanita Arastia, filed a
complaint for violation of Section of Section 73 (b) of Republic Act No.
6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) before the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48 in its
capacity as a Special Agrarian Court.
Docketed as Agrarian Case No. 2000, the complaint 2 alleged that
after the EDSA Revolution, herein petitioners, who organized
themselves into the Anibang Mangagawa sa Agricultura (A.M.A.),
illegally intruded into the land located at Lubao, Pampanga (with an
aggregate area of around 210 hectares) of the plaintiffs, burned the
existing sugarcane plants and started to cultivate small portions
thereof. As a result, the land was abandoned by Rustico Coronal, the
civil lessee, and taken over by plaintiff-owners. Alleging further that
there had been "definite findings and rulings by the Department of
Agrarian Reform" that "no tenancy relationship" existed between the
parties, petitioners herein continued to forcibly enter, intrude into and
molest the possession of the plaintiffs over the land in question in
violation of Section 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657. The complaint
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin
petitioners from entering into the land and intruding in the possession
thereof and, after hearing, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction which should be made permanent after a full-blown trial.
In their answer, 3 petitioners averred that they had been in continuous
and peaceful possession of their respective tillages since 1950 when
the late Teodorica Arastia was still the administratrix of the
landholding in question. They moved for the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction as it was the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to Section 50
of Republic Act No. 6657, that had jurisdiction over the case.
Moreover, petitioners asserted that due to the malicious and evil
intentions of plaintiffs in harassing and ejecting them from the land,
they suffered actual, as well as moral damages, for their failure to
harvest their standing crops.
Inasmuch as the complaint was very specific as regards petitioners’
commission of facts prohibited by Section 73 (b) of Republic Act No.
6657 and pursuant to Section 57 thereof, 4 the lower court denied the
motion to dismiss on November 2, 1989. It issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering petitioners "and/or any other person acting in their
command and/or their behalf to desist and refrain from occupying their
respective portions they are allegedly cultivating pending the
termination of this litigation, and/or unless a country order is issued by
this Court." 5
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration praying that the writ of
preliminary injunction be set aside and that the case be dismissed for
lack of merit was denied by the lower court on April 25, 1990. It
reiterated the writ of preliminary injunction in the Order of July 31,
1991 which deputized members of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
based on Lubao and Guagua, Pampanga, to enforce the said writ. On
April 23, 1992, the complaint was amended to reflect the names of the
"John Does" originally impleaded therein and who had been identified.
Subsequently, on July 17, 1991, petitioners filed before this Court a
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 100663 and entitled "Jesus
Bernal, Et. Al. v. Estrella Arastia, Et Al.," assailing the jurisdiction of
the lower court over Agrarian Case No. 2000. On July 31, 1991, this
Court dismissed the petition for failure to comply with Circular No. 1-
88, specifically No. 4 thereof, requiring, a "verified statement of the
date when notice of the judgment, order or resolution subject of the
petition was received, when a motion for reconsideration was filed and
when notice of the denial thereof was received." 6
Meanwhile, on November 29, 1989, petitioners filed before the DARAB
a complaint 7 against Estrella Arastia. Docketed as DARAB Case No.
161-P’89, the complaint alleged that on September 25, 1989, through
the use and employ of armed men, Estrella Arastia forcibly evicted and
above them out of their land holdings, harvested and appropriated
their standing rice crops, destroyed their vegetable crops, took their
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
deep well and set fire their houses. As a consequence thereof, they
suffered damages in the total amount of P3,300,000.00 for which
Estrella Arastia should be held liable. They prayed for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order to enjoin defendant
therein from preventing their re-entry and re-occupation of the
landholdings pending the resolution of the case.
Pursuant to Section 19 of Executive Order No. 229 and Section 47 of
Republic Act No. 6657, the case was referred to the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Committee (BARC) of barangays San Isidro, Santiago, San
Rafael and Lourdes in Lubao, Pampanga for fact-finding and
exploration of the possibility of an amicable settlement. After
conducting the necessary proceedings, the BARCs found that
petitioners had been in possession and cultivation of their respective
farmholdings. This fact was contained in the report dated May 23,
1988 of Mr. Vicente Jimenez, CARPO/Officer-in-Charge, Provincial
Office of Pampanga, to the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform which was transmitted to the DARAB on September 18, 1989.
However, despite receipt of summons and the DARAB orders of June 5,
1990, September 19 1990 and October 5, 1990, Estrella Arastia did
not file an answer nor comply with said orders. DARAB construed this
as her waiver and affirmation of what had been submitted by
petitioners, and that the she had no evidence to submit for its
consideration.
On December 7, 1990, based on the findings on the BARCs, the
DARAB issued an order 8 declaring the 300-hectare land as within the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988;
maintaining petitioners’ "possession and cultivation of their respective
land holdings" from where "they were forcibly ejected on September
29, 1989" and "restraining the respondent or any other persons acting
in her behalf from entering, intruding, and disturbing the farming
activities of the said petitioners in their respective farmholdings;"
directing the MARO of Lubao, Pampanga and the DAR employees
concerned "to process and take appropriate action on the petition for
coverage under Republic Act 6657 of their respective farmholdings in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the DAR," and dismissing
for lack of merit the claims for damages. 9
The petitioners, having filled a bond in the amount of five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00), on September 29, 1992, the DARAB
issued the writ of preliminary injunction 10 they had prayed for.
Consequently, with the assistance of two (2) police officers assigned
by the Chief of Police of Lubao, Sheriff Joselito B. Dollente served the
writ on September 30, 1992, in the presence of some barangay
officials and the GAFGU-CVO in charge. Since Estrella Arastia was not
in her provincial address, a certain Primitivo Maninang received the
writ for her.
On October 7, 1992, on the strength of the said writ of preliminary
injunction in DARAB Case No. 161-’89, petitioners resumed occupation
and cultivation of the subject land. Such actions resulted in the
dispatch of several policemen to the area. They reminded petitioners
of the writ of preliminary injunction issued earlier in Agrarian Case No.
2000 and ordered them to leave the land in dispute. Upon their refusal
to leave, the policemen arrested them and subsequently charged them
with resistance and/or disobedience to the lawful order of persons in
authority before the Municipal Trial Court of Lubao. On the same day,
however, they were released from police custody on the recognizance
of Atty. Zenaida Ducut.
Insisting on their right to work on the land in accordance with the writ
issued in DARAB Case No. 161-’89, the following day, October 8, 1992,
petitioners again entered the land. Without a warrant of arrest, herein
respondent police officers named Jesus Maninang, Carlos Guinto, Jesus
Kabiling, Edgardo Lalic and Dominador Lacanlale arrested petitioners
for having entered the landholding and for resisting and intimidating
said police officers. Recovered from petitioners’ possession were seven
(7) assorted bolos used in cultivating the land. 11
Petitioners were detained at the municipal jail of Lubao, Pampanga on
October 8, 1992. On even date, they were charged with direct assault
upon agents of a person in authority under Criminal Case No. 5999.
On October 14, 1992, the said municipal court ordered the transfer of
petitioners to the provincial jail in San Fernando, Pampanga on the
ground that the case fell within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court and the fact that petitioners, having refused to receive copy of
the complaint and the affidavits of the complainants, did not "intend to
file counter-affidavit." On October 16, 1992, the municipal court also
ordered that the records of the case be forwarded to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in San Fernando, Pampanga for appropriate
action. On October 21, 1992, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an
Page 25 of 69
information for direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3171 before the Regional
trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga. Arraignment was set for December
1, 1992 at 9:00 o’clock in the morning.
After the filing of the information for direct assault or on October 23,
1992, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for habeas
corpus under G.R. No. 107399 questioning the legality of their arrest
and detention. On October 28, 1992, this Court issued the writ
returnable to the Acting Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals. The
return of the writ was filed on November 9, 1992. In due course, on
November 19, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
lack of merit in the herein questioned Decision which held in part as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The petitioners’ claim that they were exercising their rights when they
were working and farming on the said land pursuant to the preliminary
injunction issued in DARAB Case No. 161-P’89, and that the
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC being enforced by the
respondent PNP Team in unlawful for said RTC, Br. 48, San Fernando,
Pampanga has no jurisdiction over Agrarian Case No. 2000, deserves
scant consideration. As brought out by respondents and verified from
the records of the Supreme Court, the petitioners had filed therewith
a certiorari petition entitled ‘Jesus Bernal, Et. Al. v. Hon. Eli G.C.
Natividad, Et. Al.’ (G.R. No. 100663) questioning the said Regional
Trial Court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction in
Agrarian Case No. 2000. Said petition in G.R. No. 100663 was
dismissed for non-compliance with Supreme Court Circular No. 1-88.
Entry of final judgment thereon was made by the Supreme Court on
October 10, 1991.
As matter (sic) now stands, the said RTC, Branch 48, San Fernando,
Pampanga, has not been declared as without jurisdiction over Agrarian
Case No. 200 and therefore, the said writ of preliminary injunction it
issued is in order.
In fine, since at the time the petitioners were arrested, the PNP team
was enforcing a lawful order of the same RTC and in seriously resisting
the same the appellants intimidated the PNP team committing the
alleged crime of Direct Assault Upon An Agent of A Person In
Authority, a warrant was not necessary for their arrest, as provided in
Sec. 5(a), Rule 113, Rule on Criminal Procedure, to wit:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
‘SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it;
In the light of the foregoing, the issue regarding the validity of the four
warrants of arrest issued against the petitioners need not be taken up.
Let it also be stated that there is no explicit rule requiring a judge,
after an accused has been arrested without a warrant for an offense
cognizable by the regional trial court and later charged in a complaint
or information conformably with the provisions of Rule 112, Section 7
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure to still issue a warrant of
arrest or order of commitment for the said accused (Re: Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Gloria Jopson Asuncion [G.R. L-No. 84907, Minute
Resolution, First Division, November 3, 1988]). As explained by the
Supreme Court, such rule is not provided since the accused is already
under detention so that the issuance of a warrant for his arrest or an
order for his commitment would be an absolute superfluity,
considering that the need of a warrants of arrest arises only when the
accused is at large as under Rule 113, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure means ‘the taking of a person in custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense,’
and that the obvious purpose of the warrant is for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the accused (Re: Petition of Habeas
Corpus of Gloria Jopson Asuncion, supra)."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioners received a copy of said Decision on November 20, 1992, a
Friday. On November 23, 1992, they filed in this Court a motion for an
extension of two (2) days within which to file a petition for reviews
on certiorari. They followed the motion with another requesting an
additional two (2) days within which to file said petition. They
eventually filed the instant petition on November 27, 1992.
On November 22 and 29, 1992 and January 21, 1993, thirty (30) of
the forty-five (45) petitioners posted bail in Criminal Case No. 5999 for
direct assault. 12 As of May 18, 1993, only three (3) remained
detained at the provincial jail. 13 In their Memorandum which was
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
received by the Court on May 17, 1995, petitioners furnished the
information that "most if not all of the petitioners were already
released on bail and therefore cannot avail of the writ of habeas
corpus for being moot and academic." 14 And yet, invoking Soriano v.
Heirs of Domingo Magali (sic), 15 Malabanan v. Hon. Ramento 16 and
Salonga v. Pano 17 where the Court considered the issues raised
notwithstanding that certain events had supervened to render the case
moot and academic, petitioners insist that dismissal of the case on
such ground should not bar the resolution of this case on the merits.
The writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
extends "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The function
of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the
legality of one’s detention. 18 In all petitions for habeas corpus, the
court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner’s
detention — from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to
the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition and "only
after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process
clause of our Constitution has been satisfied." 19
However, once the person detained in duly charged in court, he may
no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus. His remedy then is the quashal of the information
and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. 20 The reason for the
issuance of the writ even becomes more unavailing when the person
detained files a bond for his temporary release. Thus, in Velasco v.
Court of Appeals, 21 the Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar
his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is
the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at
its inception illegal, it may reason of some supervening events, such
as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer
illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Among such
supervening events is the issuance of judicial process preventing the
discharge of the detained person . . . Another is the filing of a
complaint of information for the offense for which the accused is
detained, as in the instant case. By then, the restraint of liberty is
already by virtue of the complaint or information and, therefore, the
writ of habeas corpus is no longer available. Section 4 of Rule 102
reads in part as follows: ‘Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with . . . an offense in the
Philippines.’
x x x
It may also be said that by filling his motion for bail, Larkins admitted
that he was under the custody of the court and voluntarily submitted
his person to its jurisdiction. In De Asis v. Romero (41 SCRA 235, 240
[1971]), this Court stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
De Asis could have, right after his arrest, objected to the regularity of
the issuance of the warrant of arrest in question. Instead he not only
filed a petition for bail with the lower court, thereby accepting the
court’s jurisdiction over his person, but he also pleaded, on
arraignment, to the information filed against him. (Emphasis supplied)
The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is
recommended has the same legal import and effect as the posting of
bail in cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that the giving or
posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his
person to the jurisdiction of the court."cralaw virtua1aw library
The instant petition for habeas corpus has thus been rendered moot
and academic by the filing against petitioners of charges for direct
assault on October 8, 1992 before the Municipal Trial Court of Lubao
which, on being forwarded to the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga
upon the filing of an information for direct assault on October 21, 1992
became Criminal Case No. 3171, even before the filing of the petition
for habeas corpus docketed as G.R. No. 107399. Their subsequent
filing of bailbonds to secure their provisional liberty sealed the
mootness of the instant petition.
As stated above, under the circumstances, petitioners’ remedy would
have been the quashal of the information in case they have valid
reasons therefor. In any event, the Court shall consider the principal
issues raised in the instant petition for habeas corpus in the interest of
justice and if only to clarify certain procedural misconceptions which
appear to confuse petitioners and their counsel. 22
Page 26 of 69
Petitioners posit the view that resolution of the instant petition
for habeas corpus is interrelated with the issue as to which of the two
writs of preliminary injunction affecting them should prevail. They
counted that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the DARAB,
not that earlier issued by the Regional Trial Court in Agrarian Case No.
2000, is the valid one because the regular court had no jurisdiction
over said agrarian case. Therefore, petitioners aver, the invalidity of
the writ being enforced by police authorities could only result in the
invalidity of the arrest. They further assert that if their petition in G.R.
No. 100663 questioning the validity of the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction in Agrarian Case No. 2000 was dismissed, such
dismissal "on a formal technicality does not amount to rendering as
valid the otherwise void writ of preliminary injunction" issued in said
case. 23
The petition in G.R. No. 100663 was dismissed for noncompliance with
Circular No. I-88. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, however, such a
dismissal through a minute resolution was one on the merits of the
petition. Thus, where a first petition for certiorari was dismissed for
noncompliance with paragraph 4 of Circular No. I-88 and another
petition, complying with said circular and basically reiterating the same
issues raised in the first petition was filed a year later, the Court
dismissed the second petition and severely censured counsel for
petitioner for refilling the same petition. In a Resolution, the Court
stated as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . (I)t is equally axiomatic that minute resolutions of this Court,
denying due course to petitioners, or dismissing cases summarily —
for failure to comply with the formal or substantial requirements laid
down therefor by the law — are actually dispositions on the merits
(SEE Smith Bell & Co. v Court of Appeals, 197 Phil. 201 [1991] citing:
Policarpio v. PVB, 106 Phil. 125; Commercial Union v. Lepanto, 86
SCRA 79, Novino v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 279), constituting res
judicata." 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, even though the Court did not explicitly resolve G.R. No.
100663 on the merits, its dismissal on the ground of noncompliance
with Circular No. I-88 had the effect of resolving the issues raised
therein. While it may be argued that said circular is merely a remedial
measure which should not unduly affect the substantive aspects of a
case, its force and effect must be at all times be upheld for, after all, it
was designed for the orderly administration of justice.
As regards the issue of jurisdiction over the dispute between them and
the Arastias, petitioners should be reminded that the allegations in a
complaint are determinative factors of said issue. On this matter, the
Court declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the
allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff
is entitled or not entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein —
a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the
jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses made
by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the
rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon
the defendant."25cralaw:red
In her complaint in Agrarian Case No. 2000, Estrella Arastia alleged
that she and the rest of the plaintiffs therein were the registered
owners of the parcels of land in question which herein petitioners
illegally intruded into, damaged and cultivated under the status of
holding "actual title over the properties;" that the definite findings and
rulings of the DAR showed that "no tenancy relationship" existed
between the parties and that petitioners were definitely not qualified
beneficiaries of the rights and benefits under Republic Act No. 6657 as
they were not in any way tenants and/or legitimate tillers of the
subject land, and that the acts of petitioners violated Section 73 (b) of
said law.
Petitioner’s raising the issue of jurisdiction in their answer to the
complaint did not automatically divest the lower court of jurisdiction
over Agrarian Case No. 2000. The court had to continue exercising
authority to hear the evidence for the purpose of determining whether
or not it had jurisdiction over the case. In a plethora of cases, this
Court has made the pronouncement that once jurisdiction is vested,
the same is retained up to the end of the litigation. 26 After such
hearing, if tenancy had in fact been shown to be the real issue, then
the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. 27
It should be pointed out, moreover, that in filing Agrarian Case No.
2000, Estrella Arastia was merely ejecting petitioners from the land on
the ground that no tenancy relationship existed between them.
However invocation of Sec. 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 which
considers as a prohibited act "forcible entry or illegal detainer by
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
persons who are not qualified beneficiaries under this Act to avail
themselves of the rights and benefits of the Agrarian Reform
Program," obviously led the court to docket the case as Agrarian Case
No. 2000 and assume jurisdiction over it as a special agrarian court.
28
Such actions were in consonance with Sections 56 29 and 57 of said
law which vest upon the Regional Trial Court, acting as a Special
Agrarian Court, with jurisdiction over two classes of agrarian-related
cases: (1) "petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners" and (2) "prosecution of all criminal offenses" under the
same law. A criminal offender under Republic Act No. 6657 is,
pursuant to Section 74 of the law," (a)ny person who knowingly and
willfully violates the provisions of this Act." 30 Thus, the lower court
correctly assumed jurisdiction over Agrarian Case No. 2000.
It was within petitioners’ rights to question the issuance of the writ
before this Court through G.R. No. 100663. However, in filing the
petition, they failed to comply with Circular No. 1-88. The consequent
dismissal of the case for noncompliance with said circular deprived this
Court authority to look into the validity of the writ once again. To
repeat, such dismissal constituted res judicata on the issue of validity
of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Consequently, petitioners are treading on shaky ground in questioning
the legality of their arrest in this petition for habeas corpus for the
reason that the police officers were enforcing a writ of preliminary
injunction illegally issued in Agrarian Case No. 2000 and, in the same
breath, allege that they could use force or "legally resist and even
intimidate another, be he a private individual or an agent of a person
in authority, who interferes with the legitimate exercise of (his) rights"
31 as possessors and cultivators of the Arastia property.
If indeed petitioners are tenants of the Arastias under the law, 32 they
are not without other legal recourses. Certainly, through their counsel,
who appear to be zealous in protecting whatever rights petitioners
believe they may have, they should pursue DARAB Case No. 161-P’89
and whatever actions are available for them under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Although it is well-accepted that a court should always strive to settle
the controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to
bear the seeds of future litigation, 33 this rule cannot apply if the
result would negate the rational application of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners may not engage in procedural shortcuts to revive the
settled issue of the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued
in Agrarian Case No. 2000 allegedly on the ground of the existence of
a tenancy relationship between the parties in the instants petition
for habeas corpus arising from their arrest for having assaulted
persons in authority.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby
DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
#13 G.R. No. 217296 OCTOBER 11, 2017
SPOUSES ERWIN C. SANTIAGO and MARINELA A. SANTIAGO;
SPOUSES GAUDENCIO A. MANIMTIM, JR. and EDITHA P.
MANIMTIM; SPOUSES RAMIRO C. ALBARAN and ELVA C.
ALBARAN; and CESAR F. ODAN,Petitioners
vs.
NORTHBAY KNITTING, INC., Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review seeking to annul and set aside
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 26, 2014,
as well as its Resolution2 dated February 25, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No.
132962, reversing the Decision3 of the Malabon Regional Trial
Court (RTC) dated May 29, 2013 in Civil Case No. ACV 12-008-MN.
The procedural and factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Northbay Knitting, Inc. (NKI) filed a Complaint for
Ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)of Navotas City
against petitioners spouses Ramiro and Elva Albaran (the Spouses
Page 27 of 69
Albaran) who were doing business under the name REA General
Marine Services (REA), spouses Gaudencio and Editha Manimtim (the
Spouses Manimtim) who were doing business under the name Junedith
Brokerage Corporation (JBC), spouses Erwin and Marinela
Santiago (the Spouses Santiago) who were doing business under the
name Quick Care Cargo Handler (QCCH), and Cesar Odan who was
doing business under the name Transment Freight Forwarder (TFF).
NKI alleged that it owns the subject property, a parcel of land in Phase
I, North Side of the Dagat-Dagatan Project in Navotas covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-38092. All petitioners were
simply allowed to occupy said property by NKI and they were not
paying any rent. On March 5, 2009, NKI sent demand letters to
petitioners asking them to vacate the property within five (5) days
from receipt and to pay rent in the event that they refuse to vacate
within the grace period given. However, despite receipt of said letters,
petitioners refused to vacate or pay the necessary rent. Thus, on April
14, 2009, NKI filed an ejectment complaint against petitioners.
For their part, petitioners averred that NKI merely exists on paper as
its certificate of registration had already been revoked by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for failure to operate. NKI
only became the registered owner of the subject prope1iy on June 16,
2008, while petitioners came into possession of said property through
their predecessor-in-interest, Hermeginildo Odan, and have been
continuously in possession since 1970. Odan had leased the prope1iy
from the family of the late Francisco Felipe Gonzales. Later, he
subleased the property to petitioners. The gove1nment likewise
expropriated the subject property and declared it as an Area for
Priority Development or Urban Land Reform Zone under Proclamation
No. 3 3 84 dated April 13, 1983. Being tenants and actual occupants of
the place, petitioners could not be evicted. Then a Conditional Contract
to Sell was entered into between NKI and National Housing
Authority (NHA). NKI violated the terms of said contract, causing the
automatic cancellation of the same. Sometime in 2008, the NHA
sold the property to NKI without giving petitioners, as the actual
occupants, the right of first refusal granted under the law. Thus,
petitioners filed a case questioning said sale which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 06-11-MN. Petitioners contended that this case on the
issue of their right of first refusal is a prejudicial question that must be
resolved first before the MeTC can take cognizance of the ejectment
case.
On June 11, 2012, the Navotas Me TC rendered a Decision in favor of
NKI, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff Northbay Knitting, Inc. and against defendants as
follows:
1. ORDERING defendants-spouses Ramiro Albaran & Elva Alba.ran,
spouses Gaudencio Manimtim & Edith Manimtim, Junedith Brokerage
Corporation, spouses Erwin Santiago & Marinela Santiago, and Cesar
Odan, and all persons claiming rights under them to remove the
improvements they introduced on the property located in Phase 1,
No1ih Side of the Dagat-Dagatan Project in Navotas, Metro Manila
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-38092 issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Malabon City in the name of the plaintiff
Northbay Knitting, Inc.;
2. ORDERING defendants-spouses Ramiro Albaran & Elva Albaran,
spouses Gaudencio Manimtim & Edith Manimtim, Junedith Brokerage
Corporation, spouses Erwin Santiago & Marinela Santiago, and Cesar
Odan, and all persons claiming rights under them to PEACEFULLY
VACATE AND VOLUNTARILY SURRENDER to plaintiff Northbay Knitting,
Inc. the possession of the said lot situated in Phase 1, North Side of
the Dagat-Dagatan Project in Navotas, Metro Manila covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-38092 issued by the Registry
of Deeds of Malabon City in the name of the plaintiff Northbay Knitting,
Inc.;
3. ORDERING each defendant named-above to each pay plaintiff the
amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00) per month for the
use and occupation of the above-described prope11y computed from
May 4, 2009 until possession of said property is surrendered and
turned-over to plaintiff; and
4. ORDERING defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the
amount of Php20,000.00, as and by way of attorney's fees. The
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
Counterclaim of defendants-spouses Albaran, Santiago, and Odan is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.4
On May 29, 2013, however, the Malabon RTC set aside the MeTC
Decision for lack of jurisdiction, since NKI failed to show a case of
Unlawful Detainer, to wit:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Sec. 8 par. 2, Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court, this Com1 hereby assumes jurisdiction over this case.
In the meantime, let this case be set for preliminary conference
on July 24, 2013 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED.5
Upon appeal, the CA ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 29, 2013 and
Order dated October 29, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 170, Malabon City in Civil Case No. ACV 12-008-MN are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated June 11, 2012 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 54, Navotas City is hereby AFFIRMED
and REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.6
Hence, this petition.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
by law and is determined by the material allegations of the complaint.
It cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of
the parties, neither can it be cured by their silence, acquiescence, or
even express consent.7 In ejectment cases, the complaint should
embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the
class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough
on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
evidence.8
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer
if it states the following:
1) possession of property by the defendant was initially by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff
to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the same; and
4) within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 9
Here, as the CA aptly found, NKI's complaint sufficiently shows all the
allegations required to support a case for unlawful detainer, thereby
vesting jurisdiction in the MeTC over the case. NKI stated that it is the
absolute owner of the subject property, as evidenced by TCT No. M-
38092, and supported by Tax Declaration No. C-002-08822-C and real
property tax receipt for the tax due in 2008. Petitioners, who are the
actual occupants of said property, never paid rent but continued to
possess the property upon NKI's mere tolerance. Despite receipt of
NKI's demand letters to vacate, petitioners refused and continued to
occupy the property.
Page 28 of 69
The statements in the complaint that petitioners' possession of the
property in question was by mere tolerance of NKI clearly make out a
case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the person's
withholding from another of the possession of the real property to
which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the
former's right to hold possession under the contract, either expressed
or implied. A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful
detainer case is that possession must be originally lawful, and such
possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the
right to possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially
lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be established.
If, as in the instant case, the claim is that such possession is by mere
tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved. 10
Here, petitioners claim that NKI only became the registered owner of
the subject property on June 16, 2008. However, from that time when
the title to the disputed property was registered in NKI's name on June
16, 2008 until the time when it sent the demand letters to vacate on
March 5, 2009, petitioners' possession had certainly been one upon
mere tolerance of the owner. NKI's right to possess the property had
then become absolute and undeniable. And when NKI demanded that
they leave the premises and petitioners refused to do so, their
possession had already become unlawful. As the registered owner, NKI
had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of the
attributes of its ownership.11
Further, petitioners argue that there is a pending action questioning
the validity of the sale of the disputed prope1iy to NKI, consequently
affecting the validity of its title to said property. Such argument is
clearly a collateral attack on NKI's title, which is not allowed in an
unlawful detainer case. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a
collateral attack and can be altered, modified, or cancelled only in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.12 A Torrens Certificate of
Title cannot be the subject of collateral attack. Such attack must be
direct and not by a collateral proceeding. Considering that this is an
unlawful detainer case wherein the sole issue to be decided is
possession de facto rather than possession de Jure, a collateral attack
by petitioners on NKI's title is proscribed. The present case only covers
the issue of who has the better right of possession in relation to the
issue of disputed ownership of the subject properties. Questions as to
the validity of NKI's title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted
separately to directly attack its validity, an issue that cannot be
definitively resolved in the extant unlawful detainer case. 13
It has been held time and again that the only issue for resolution in an
unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the
premises, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party
litigants. Possession refers to possession de facto, and not
possession de Jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the
property is questionable. Where the parties to an ejectment case raise
the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to
determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the
property. However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked
to that of possession, as 'n this case, adjudication of the ownership
issue is not final and binding, but merely for the purpose of resolving
the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is
only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property.14
SO ORDERED.
#14 G.R. No. 196795 March 7, 2018
INTRAMUROS ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner
vs.
OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
Respondent
LEONEN, J.:
The sole issue in ejectment proceedings is determining which of the
parties has the better right to physical possession of a piece of
property. The defendant's claims and allegations in its answer or
motion to dismiss do not oust a trial court's jurisdiction to resolve this
issue.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the April 14, 2011 Decision2 of Branch 173, Regional
Trial Court, Manila in Civil Case No. 10-124740. The Regional Trial
Court affirmed in toto the October 19, 2010 Order3 of Branch 24,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila in Civil Case No. 186955-CV,
dismissing Intramuros Administration's (Intramuros) Complaint for
Ejectment against Offshore Construction and Development Company
(Offshore Construction) on the grounds 6f forum shopping and lack of
jurisdiction.
In 1998, Intramuros leased certain real properties of the national
government, which it administered to Offshore Construction. Three (3)
properties were subjects of Contracts of Lease: Baluarte De San
Andres, with an area of 2, 793 sq. m.;4 Baluarte De San Francisco De
Dilao, with an area of 1,880 sq. m.;5 and Revellin De Recoletos, with
an area of 1,036 sq. m.6 All three (3) properties were leased for five
(5) years, from September 1, 1998 to August 31, 2003. All their lease
contracts also made reference to an August 20, 1998 memorandum of
stipulations, which included a provision for lease renewals every five
(5) years upon the parties' mutual agreement.7
Offshore Construction occupied and introduced improvements in the
leased premises. However, Intramuros and the Department of Tourism
halted the projects due to Offshore Construction's non-conformity with
Presidential Decree No. 1616, which required 16th to 19th centuries'
Philippine-Spanish architecture in the area.8 Consequently, Offshore
Construction filed a complaint with prayer for preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order against Intramuros and the
Department of Tourism before the Manila Regional Trial Court, 9 which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-91587.10
Eventually, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement on July 26,
1999,11 which the Manila Regional Trial Court approved on February 8,
2000.12 In the Compromise Agreement, the parties affirmed the
validity of the two (2) lease contracts but terminated the one over
Revellin de Recoletos.13 The Compromise Agreement retained the five
(5)-year period of the existing lease contracts and stated the areas
that may be occupied by Offshore Construction:

An ejectment suit is likewise summary in nature and is not susceptible FROM:

to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over
the property.1avvphi1 In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases,
even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings (1) Baluarte de San Andres
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the CA, nonetheless, have
TO:
the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of
ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.
Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership (1) Only the stable house, the gun powder room and two (2)
of the land nor is conclusive of the facts found in said case between
the same parties but upon a separate cause of action involving
possession.15 Chambers with comfort rooms, will be utilized for restaurants. All other
structures built and introduced including trellises shall be
transferred/relocated to:
Therefore, the Comi finds no cogent reason to depart from the assailed
rulings of the CA.
(a) Two (2) restaurants as Asean Garden. Each will have an aggregate
area of two hundred square meters (200 sq. mtrs.);
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DENIES the
petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 26, 2014 as well as its Resolution dated February 25, 2015 b) One (1) kiosk at Puerta Isabel Garden fronting Terraza de la Reyna
in CA-G.R. SP No. 132962. with an aggregate area of twenty (20) square meters;

PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext Page 29 of 69

(c) Three (3) restaurants at the chambers of Puerta Isabel II with an
aggregate area of 1,180.5 sq.m.;
(d) One (1) restaurant at Fort Santiago American Barracks. Subject to
IA Guidelines, the maximum floor area will be the perimeter walls of
the old existing building;
FROM:
(2) Baluarte De San Francisco Dilao
TO:
(2) All seven (7) structures including the [Offshore Construction]
Administration Building and Trellises shall be transferred [t]o Cuartel
de Sta. Lucia, [O]therwise known as the PC Barracks[.] 14
During the lease period, Offshore Construction failed to pay its utility
bills and rental fees, despite several demand letters. 15 Intramuros
tolerated the continuing occupation, hoping that Offshore Construction
would pay its arrears. As of July 31, 2004, these arrears allegedly
totaled P6,762,153.70.16
To settle its arrears, Offshore Construction proposed to pay the
Department of Tourism's monthly operational expenses for lights and
sound equipment, electricity, and performers at the Baluarte Plano
Luneta de Sta. Isabel. Intramuros and the Department of Tourism
accepted the offer, and the parties executed a Memorandum of
Agreement covering the period of August 15, 2004 to August 25,
2005.17
However, Offshore Construction continued to fail to pay its arrears,
which amounted to ₱13,448,867.45 as of December 31, 2009. On
March 26, 2010, Offshore Construction received Intramuros' latest
demand letter.18
Intramuros filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the Manila
Metropolitan Trial Court on April 28, 2010.19 Offshore Construction
filed its Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory
Counterclaim.20
On July 12, 2010, Offshore Construction filed a Very Urgent
Motion,21 praying that Intramuros' complaint be dismissed on the
grounds of violation of the rule on non-forum shopping, lack of
jurisdiction over the case, and litis pendentia. First, it claimed that
Intramuros failed to inform the Metropolitan Trial Court that there
were two (2) pending cases with the Manila Regional Trial Court over
Puerta de Isabel II.22 Second, it argued that the Metropolitan Trial
Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the relationship
between the parties was not one of lessor-lessee but governed by a
concession agreement.23 Finally, it contended that Intramuros' cause
of action was barred by litis pendentia, since the pending Regional
Trial Court cases were over the same rights, claims, and interests of
the parties.24
In its October 19, 2010 Order,25 the Metropolitan Trial Court granted
the motion and dismissed the case. Preliminarily, it found that while a
motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary
Procedure, Offshore Construction's motion was grounded on the lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.26
The Metropolitan Trial Court found that Intramuros committed forum
shopping and that it had no jurisdiction over the case. 27
First, it pointed out that there were two (2) pending cases at the time
Intramuros filed its complaint: Civil Case No. 08-119138 for specific
performance filed by Offshore Construction against Intramuros, and SP
CA No. 10-123257 for interpleader against Offshore Construction and
Intramuros filed by 4H Intramuros, Inc. (4H Intramuros), 28 which
claimed to be a group of respondent's tenants. 29
The Metropolitan Trial Court found that the specific performance case
was anchored on Offshore Construction's rights under the Compromise
Agreement. In that case, Offshore Construction claimed that it
complied with its undertakings, but Intramuros failed to perform its
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
obligations when it refused to offset Offshore Construction's expenses
with the alleged unpaid rentals. The interpleader case, on the other
hand, dealt with Offshore Construction's threats to evict the tenants of
Puerta de Isabel II. 4H Intramuros prayed that the Regional Trial Court
determine which between Offshore Construction and Intramuros was
the rightful lessor of Puerta de Isabel II.30
The Metropolitan Trial Court found that the cause of action in
Intramuros' complaint was similar with those in the specific
performance and intetj)leader cases. Any judgment in any of those
cases would affect the resolution or outcome in the ejectment case,
since they would involve Offshore Construction's right to have its
expenses offset from the rentals it owed Intramuros, and the
determination of the rightful lessor of Puerta de Isabel II. The
Metropolitan Trial Court pointed to the arrears in rentals that
Intramuros prayed for as part of its complaint. Further, Intramuros
failed to disclose the specific performance and interpleader cases in its
certification against forum shopping.31
Second, the Metropolitan Trial Court held that it had no jurisdiction
over the complaint. While there were lease contracts between the
parties, the existence of the other contracts between them made
Intramuros and Offshore Construction's relationship as one of
concession. Under this concession agreement, Offshore Construction
undertook to develop several areas of the Intramuros District, for
which it incurred expenses. The trial court found that the issues could
not be mere possession and rentals only.32
Intramuros appealed the October 19, 2010 Order with the Regional
Trial Court. On April 14, 2011, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the
Municipal Trial Court October 19, 2010 Order in toto.33
On May 25, 2011, Intramuros, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review
on Certiorari (Motion for Extension) before this Court. It prayed for an
additional 30 days, or until June 16, 2011, within which to file its
petition for review on solely on questions of law. 34
On June 16, 2011, Intramuros filed its Petition for Review
on Certiorari,35 assailing the April 14, 2011 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court.
In its Petition for Review, Intramuros argues that the Regional Trial
Court erred in upholding the Metropolitan Trial Court findings that it
had no jurisdiction over Intramuros' ejectment complaint36 and that it
committed forum shopping.37
First, Intramuros argues that Offshore Construction's Very Urgent
Motion should not have been entertained by the Metropolitan Trial
Court as it was a motion to dismiss, which was prohibited under the
Rule on Summary Procedure.38 It claims that the Metropolitan Trial
Court could have determined the issue of jurisdiction based on the
allegations in its complaint. It points out that "jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations [in] the complaint" and
that the trial court's jurisdiction is not lost "just because the defendant
makes a contrary allegation" in its defense.39 In ejectment cases,
courts do not lose jurisdiction by a defendant's mere allegation that it
has ownership over the litigated property. It holds that the
Metropolitan Trial Court did not lose jurisdiction when Offshore
Construction alleged that its relationship with Intramuros is one of
concession, that the cause of action accrued in 2003, and that there
was litis pendentia and forum shopping. It contends that the sole issue
in an ejectment suit is the summary restoration of possession of a
piece of land or building to the party that was deprived of it. 40 Thus,
the Metropolitan Trial Court gravely erred in granting Offshore
Construction's motion to dismiss despite having jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Intramuros' complaint.41
Second, Intramuros avers that it did not commit forum shopping as to
warrant the dismissal of its complaint. It claims that while there were
pending specific performance and interpleader cases related to the
ejectment case, Intramuros was not guilty of forum shopping since it
instituted neither action and did not seek a favorable ruling as a result
of an earlier adverse opinion in these cases. 42 Intramuros points out
that it was Offshore Construction and 4H Intramuros which filed the
specific performance and interpleader cases, respectively. 43 In both
cases, Intramuros was the defendant and did not seek fossession of
Puerta de Isabel II as a relief in its answers to the
complaints.44 Moreover, the issues raised in these earlier cases were
Page 30 of 69
different from the issue of possession in the ejectment case. The issue
in the specific performance case was whether or not Intramuros should
offset the rentals in arrears from Offshore Construction's expenses in
continuing the WOW Philippines Project.45 Meanwhile, the issue in the
interpleader case was to determine which between Intramuros and
Offshore Construction was the rightful lessor of Puerta de Isabel II. 46
Finally, Intramuros maintains that there is no concession agreement
between the parties, only lease contracts that have already expired
and are not renewed. It argues that there is no basis for alleging the
existence of a concession agreement. It points out that in the
Contracts of Lease and Memorandum of Agreement entered into by
Intramuros and Offshore Construction, the expiry of the leases would
be on August 31, 2003. Afterwards, Intramuros tolerated Offshore
Construction's continued occupation of its properties in hopes that it
would pay its arrears in due course.47
On July 20, 2011, this Court issued its Resolution48 granting the Motion
for Extension and requiring Offshore Construction to comment on the
Petition for Review.
On October 10, 2011, Offshore Construction filed its Coniment49 to the
Petition for Review. In its Comment, Offshore Construction argues that
the Petition for Review should be dismissed because it violates the
principle of hierarchy of courts and raises questions of fact. 50 It points
out that Intramuros did not move for the reconsideration of the
Regional Trial Court April 14, 2011 Decision. Instead of directly filing
with this Court, Intramuros should have filed a Petition for Review with
the Court of Appeals, in accordance with Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court.51 It claims that Intramuros raises questions of fact in its Petition
for Review, namely, the expiration of the Contracts of Lease and the
business concession in favor of Offshore Construction. 52
In its November 21, 2011 Resolution, this Court noted the Comment
and required Intramuros to file its Reply.53
On March 12, 2012, Intramuros filed its Reply54 to the Comment. It
argues that direct resort to this Court is proper because the issues it
raises in its Petition for Review do not require review of evidence to
resolve, and the facts of the case are undisputed. 55 It claims that the
nature of Intramuros and Offshore Construction's relationship is never
an issue because all the documents referenced and relied upon by the
parties were lease agreements.56
On August 23, 2012, this Court gave due course to the Petition for
Review and ordered both parties to submit their memoranda. 57
On January 7, 2013, Intramuros filed its Memorandum,58 while
Offshore Construction filed its Memorandum59 on August 16, 2013.
In its Memorandum, Offshore Construction claims that it occupies
Puerta de Isabel II by virtue of a legal concession based not only on
the parties' contracts but also on the contemporaneous and
subsequent acts of Intramuros and Offshore Construction. It argues
that under the Contracts of Lease, Offshore Construction was required
to invest around ₱20,000,000.00 worth of investments in the leased
properties and that it lost its initial investments, which were
demolished due to adverse criticism by then Intramuros Administrator
Anna Maria L. Harper. Under the Compromise Agreement, Offshore
Construction was again required to make new developments, again
worth millions of pesos. Offshore Construction claims that these
conditions make their relationship not one of mere lessor and lessee. 60
Further, it attests that Intramuros committed illegal and inhuman acts,
and injustice against it and its sublessees, allegedly because the
Contracts of Lease had expired.61 Moreover, it points out that
Intramuros only filed the ejectment complaint in 2010, even though
the Contracts of Lease expired on August 31, 2003. It argues that
Intramuros was guilty of estoppel in pais, since it continued to accept
rental payments as late as July 10, 2009.62Assuming that the lease
contracts had expired, these contracts were impliedly renewed by the
mutual and voluntary acts of the parties, in accordance with Article
1670 of the Civil Code.63 Offshore Construction claims that there is
now novation of the Contracts of Lease, and the courts may fix a
period for them,64 pursuant to Article 1687 of the Civil Code.65 It
reiterates its prayer that the Petition for Review be dismissed, due to
questions of fact more properly cognizable by the Court of Appeals. 66
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
The issues to be resolved by this Court are:
First, whether or not direct resort to this Court is proper;
Second, whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction
over the ejectment complaint filed by Intramuros Administration;
Third, whether or not Intramuros Administration committed forum
shopping when it filed its ejectment complaint despite the pending
cases for specific performance and interpleader; and
Finally, whether or not Intramuros Administration is entitled to possess
the leased premises and to collect unpaid rentals.
I
At the outset, petitioner should have filed a petition for review under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to assail the Regional Trial Court's ruling
upholding the Metropolitan Trial Court October 19, 2010 Order instead
of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this
Court.
Under Rule 42, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the remedy from an
adverse decision rendered by a Regional Trial Court exercising its
appellate jurisdiction is to file a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. -A party desiring to
appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk
of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees,
depositing the amount of ₱500.00 for costs, and furnishing the
Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition.
The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time
after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full
amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs
before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which
to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted
except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen
(15) days.
Petitioner puts in issue before this Court the findings of the
Metropolitan Trial Court that it has no jurisdiction over the ejectment
complaint and that petitioner committed forum shopping when it failed
to disclose two (2) pending cases, one filed by respondent Offshore
Construction and the other filed by respondent's group of tenants, 4H
Intramuros. Both of these cases raise questions of law, which are
cognizable by the Court of Appeals in a petition for review under Rule
42.
"A question of law exists when the law applicable to a particular set of
facts is not settled, whereas a question of fact arises when the truth or
falsehood of alleged facts is in doubt."67 This Court has ruled that the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a complaint 68 and the
existence of forum shopping69 are questions of law.
A petition for review under Rule 42 may include questions of fact, of
law, or mixed questions of fact and law.70 This Court has recognized
that the power to hear cases on appeal in which only questions of law
are raised is not vested exclusively in this Court.71 As provided in Rule
42, Section 2, errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by
the Regional Trial Court in its decision must be specified in the petition
for review:
Section 2. Form and Contents. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7)
legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being
indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names
of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or
judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the
specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth
concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the
specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by
Page 31 of 69
the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for
the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible
duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of
both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional
Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support
the allegations of the petition.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a
certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any
other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the
status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid
courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days
therefrom. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner's direct resort to this Court, instead of to the Court of
Appeals for intermediate review as sanctioned by the rules, violates
the principle of hierarchy of courts.72 In Diocese of
Bacolod v. Commission onElections:73
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was
created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary
performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial
courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the
evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to
determine issues of law which may include the validity of an
ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are
territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs
generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they
mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the
evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many
instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which
properly present the 'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of
the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course,
would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where
resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their
decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the
Court of Appeals.74 (Citation omitted)
Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and
this Court has provided several exceptions to the doctrine. 75 One of
these exceptions is the exigency of the situation being
litigated.76 Here, the controversy between the parties has been
dragging on since 2010, which should not be the case when the initial
dispute-an ejectment case-is, by nature and design, a summary
procedure and should have been resolved with expediency.
Moreover, this Court's rules of procedure permit the direct resort to
this Court from a decision of the Regional Trial Court upon questions of
law, such as those which petitioner raises in this case. In Barcenas v.
Spouses Tomas and Caliboso: 77
Nonetheless, a direct recourse to this Court can be taken for a review
of the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the RTC, but only on
questions of law. Under Section 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court has the power to
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in:
....
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
This kind of direct appeal to this Court of RTC judgments, final orders
or resolutions is provided for in Section 2(c) of Rule 41, which reads:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. -
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
....
(c) Appeal by certiorari. - In all cases where only questions of law are
raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
Procedurally then, petitioners could have appealed the RTC Decision
affirming the MTC (1) to this Court on questions of law only; or (2) if
there are factual questions involved, to the CA - as they in fact did.78
Thus, petitioner's resort to this Court is proper and warranted under
the circumstances.
II
In dismissing the complaint, the Metropolitan Trial Court found that
"[t]he issues . . . between the parties cannot be limited to a simple
determination of who has the better right of possession of the subject
premises or whether or not [petitioner] is entitled [to] rentals in
arrears."79 It held that the relationship between the parties was a
"more complicated situation where jurisdiction is better lodged with
the regional trial court,"80 upon a finding that there was a concession,
rather than a lease relationship between the parties. 81
It is settled that the only issue that must be settled in an ejectment
proceeding is physical possession of the property
involved.82 Specifically, action for unlawful detainer is brought against
a possessor who unlawfully withholds possession after the termination
and expiration of the right to hold possession.83
To determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court,
the allegations in the complaint must be examined. The jurisdictional
facts must be evident on the face of the complaint. 84 There is a case
for unlawful detainer if the complaint states the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff
to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.85 (Citation omitted)
A review of petitioner's Complaint for Ejectment shows that all of these
allegations were made.
First, petitioner alleges that respondent is its lessee by virtue of three
(3) Contracts of Lease. The validity of these contracts was later
affirmed in a Compromise Agreement, which modified certain
provisions of the previous leases but retained the original lease period.
Respondent does not dispute these contracts' existence or their
validity.
Second, following respondent's failure to pay rentals, petitioner alleges
that it has demanded that respondent vacate the leased premises.
Third, respondent continues to occupy and possess the leased
premises despite petitioner's demand. This is admitted by respondent,
which seeks to retain possession and use of the properties to "recoup
its multimillion pesos worth of investment."86
Fourth, petitioner filed its Complaint for Ejectment on April 28,
2010,87 within one (1) year of its last written demand to respondent,
made on March 18, 2010 and received by respondent on March 26,
2010.88 Contrary to respondent's claim, the one (1)-year period to file
the complaint must be reckoned from the date of last demand, in
instances when there has been more than one (1) demand to vacate.89
Page 32 of 69
The Metropolitan Trial Court seriously erred in finding that it did not
have jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint because the parties'
situation has allegedly become "more complicated"90 than one of lease.
Respondent's defense that its relationship with petitioner is one of
concession rather than lease does not determine whether or not the
Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint.
The pleas or theories set up by a defendant in its answer or motion to
dismiss do not affect the court’s jurisdiction. 91 In Morta v. Occidental:92
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint
and the character of the relief sought. "Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon a claim
asserted therein - a matter resolved only after and as a result of the
trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon
the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to
dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely upon the defendant."93 (Citations omitted)
Not even the claim that there is an implied new lease or tacita
reconduccion will remove the Metropolitan Trial Court's jurisdiction
over the complaint.94 To emphasize, physical possession, or de
facto possession, is the sole issue to be resolved in ejectment
proceedings. Regardless of the claims or defenses raised by a
defendant, a Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over an
ejectment complaint once it has been shown that the requisite
jurisdictional facts have been alleged, such as in this case. Courts are
reminded not to abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
physical possession, as there is a public need to prevent a breach of
the peace by requiring parties to resort to legal means to recover
possession of real property.95
III
In its October 19, 2010 Order, the Metropolitan Trial Court found that
petitioner committed forum shopping when it failed to disclose that
there were two (2) pending cases in other trial courts concerning the
same parties and similar causes of action. These two (2) cases were
Civil Case No. 08- 119138 for specific performance filed by respondent
against petitioner; and SP CA Case No. 10-123257 for interpleader
filed by 4H Intramuros. Both cases were pending with the Manila
Regional Trial Court. The Metropolitan Trial Court found that if it
decides petitioner's Complaint for Ejectment, its ruling would conflict
with any resolution in the specific performance and interpleader cases,
since the same contracts were involved in all three (3) cases. It found
that the parties were the same and the reliefs prayed for were the
same.
Forum shopping is the practice of resorting to multiple fora for the
same relief, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable
judgment.96 In Spouses Reyes v. Spouses Chung:97
It has been jurisprudentially established that forum shopping exists
when a party avails himself of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other courts.
The test to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another. Simply put, when litis pendentia or res judicata does not
exist, neither can forum shopping exist.
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at
least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such
that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other. On the other hand, the elements
of res judicata, also known as bar by prior judgment, are: (a) the
former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and
second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action.98 (Citation omitted)
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
As observed by the Metropolitan Trial Court, there is an identity of
parties in the specific performance and interpleader cases, and the
Complaint for Ejectment. However, there is no identity of asserted
rights or reliefs prayed for, and a judgment in any of the three (3)
cases will not amount to res judicata in the two others.
In respondent’s amended complaint for specific performance, it prays
that petitioner be compelled to offset respondent's unpaid rentals, with
the expenses that respondent supposedly incurred due to the
Department of Tourism's WOW Philippines project,99 pursuant to a July
27, 2004 Memorandum of Agreement. Concededly, one of
respondent's reliefs prayed for is for petitioner to respect respondent's
lease over Puerta de Isabel II, Asean Garden and Revellin de
Recoletos:
2. Order [Department of Tourism], [Intramuros Administration] and
[Anna Maria L. Harper] to perform their obligation under the
"Memorandum of Agreement" dated 27 July 2004 by OFFSETTING the
rentals in arrears from the expenses incurred by Offshore in the
continuance of the Department of Tourism's WOW Philippines Project
and to allow Offshore to recover their investment at Intramuros by
respecting their lease over Puerta Isabel II, Asean Garden and Revellin
de Recoletos[.]100
Nevertheless, the Memorandum of Agreement expressly stated that its
purpose was for respondent to pay petitioner and the Department of
Tourism rentals in arrears as of July 31, 2004:
WHEREAS, [respondent] has been indebted to [petitioner] in the form
of rental and utility consumption arrears for the occupancy of Puerta
Isabel Chambers, Asean Gardens and Baluarte de San Andres (Stable
House) in the amount of Six Million Seven Hundred Sixty[-]Two
Thousand One Hundred Fifty[-]Three and 70/100 (P6,762,153.70) as
of July 31, 2004 and as a way of settling said arrears, [respondent]
had proposed to pay its obligations with [petitioner] as shown in the
breakdown in "Annex A" hereof through [respondent's] assumption of
[Department of Tourism's] monthly operational expenses for lights and
sound equipment, electricity, and performers at the Baluarte Plano
Luneta de Sta. Isabel in Intramuros, Manila[.]101
This was affirmed in petitioner's May 29, 2005 letter to respondent, in
which petitioner stated:
During our meeting last May 5, 2005 with Mr. Rico Cordova, it was
reiterated that the subject of the [Memorandum of Agreement] for the
lights and sound at Plano Luneta de Sta. Isabel was your accumulated
account as of July 2004. Subsequent rentals have to be remitted to
[Intramuros] as they become due and demandable. We have
emphasized this concern in our letter of November 12, 2004.102
A final judgment in the specific performance case will not affect the
outcome of the ejectment case. As pointed out by petitioner,
respondent's right to possess the leased premises is founded initially
on the Contracts of Lease and, upon their expiration, on petitioner's
tolerance in hopes of payment of outstanding arrears. The July 27,
2004 Memorandum of Agreement subject of the specific performance
case cannot be the source of respondent's continuing right of
possession, as it expressly stated there that the offsetting was only for
respondent's outstanding arrears as of July 31, 2004. Any favorable
judgment compelling petitioner to comply with its obligation under this
agreement will not give new life to the expired Contracts of Lease,
such as would repel petitioner's unlawful detainer complaint.
In its Amended Answer in the specific performance case, petitioner
sets up the counterclaim that "[respondent] be ordered to pay its
arrears of (₱13,448,867.45) as of December 31, 2009 plus such rent
and surcharges as may be incurred until [respondent] has completely
vacated the [leased] premises."103 This counterclaim is exactly the
same as one of petitioner's prayers in its ejectment complaint:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that
JUDGMENT be rendered ORDERING:
....
(2) DEFENDANT [OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION] TO PAY ITS ARREARS
OF THIRTEEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED FORTYEIGHT THOUSAND,
Page 33 of 69
EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN PESOS AND FORTY-FIVE CENTAVOS
(₱13,448,867.45), PLUS INTEREST OF 1% PER MONTH AS
STIPULATED IN THE LEASE CONTRACTS[.]104
A compulsory counterclaim is a defendant's claim for money or other
relief which arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the subject
matter of the complaint. In Spouses Ponciano v. Hon. Parentela, Jr.:105
A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief which
a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the
time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff's
complaint.
It is compulsory in the sense that if it is within the jurisdiction of the
court, and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, it must be set
up therein, and will be barred in the future if not set up. 106 (Citation
omitted)
In its complaint for specific performance, respondent claimed that
petitioner should offset its outstanding rentals and that it was
petitioner which had an outstanding debt to respondent:
16. In compliance with the Memorandum of Agreement, Offshore
incurred expenses amounting to Seven Million Eight Hundred Twenty[]
Five Thousand Pesos (P7,825,000.00) by way of Expenses for Rentals
of Lights & Sound System, Electrical Bill and Performers Fees. This
amount is excluding the expenses incurred during the period Offshore
supplied the Light & Sound System, as well as Performers,
aforementioned started in October 2004. A copy of the Statement of
Account is hereto appended as ANNEX "H" to "H-4";
17. Based on Offshore's records, upon re-computation of Actual Area
used during all these period[s] from July 2001 to March 30, 2008,
copy of Statement of Accounts has been sent to Intramuros
Administration for reconciliation, Offshore’s total obligation by way of
back and current rentals up to March 30, 2008 is only in the amount of
Six Million Four Hundred Three Thousand Three Hundred Sixty[-]Four
Pesos (P6,403,364.00);
18. Obviously, when both accounts are offset, it will clearly show that
[Intramuros] still owes Offshore the amount of One Million Four
Hundred Twenty[-]One Thousand Six Hundred Thirty[-]Six Pesos
(P1,421,636.00) as of March 2008;
19. Unfortunately, despite this glaring fact that [Intramuros] owes
Offshore, Defendant [Anna Maria L.] Harper (who has already showed
sour and adverse treatment of Offshore in the past), being the new
Administrator of Intramuros Administration, sent a Letter dated 09
April 2008 demanding from Offshore to pay [Intramuros] alleged
rentals in arrears in the amount of P12,478[,]461.74, within seven (7)
days from receipt. A copy of the Letter is hereto attached and marked
as Annex "I" to "1-1";
20. It can be deduced from the attachment to the aforementioned
letter that [Intramuros] did not honor the obligations imposed in the
Memorandum of Agreement because the monthly expenses incurred
by Offshore for the payment of the Lights and Sound System,
Electricity and Performers Fees for the continuance of the Department
of Tourism WOW Project at Baluarte Plano, Luneta de Sta. Isabel
which were duly furnished [Intramuros] in the amount of Seven Million
Eight Hundred Twenty[-]Five Thousand Pesos (P7,825,000.00) as
expressly agreed by [Department of Tourism], [Intramuros] and
Offshore in the Memorandum of Agreement were NOT deducted from
the rentals due[.]107
Petitioner's counterclaim in its Amended Answer was set up to defend
itself against such a claim:
26. [Offshore Construction] has not established its right, or the reality
is, [Offshore Constructioin] has been delinquent in the payment of its
financial obligations which are specifically provided in its contract with
defendant [Intramuros], such as rental fees.
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
27. [Offshore Construction] has to pay rent for being still in possession
of Puerta Isabel II and Asean Garden. Moreover, plaintiff has enjoyed
the fruits of subleasing these premises for years and yet it has
continuously failed to remit all rental fees and surcharges despite
repeated demands from defendants. It bears stressing that as of
December 31, 2009, [Offshore Construction's] arrears has already
ballooned to thirteen million four hundred and forty[-]eight thousand
eight hundred and sixty[] seven pesos and forty[-]five centavos
(PB,448,867.45).
28. Glaringly, [Offshore Construction] has been remiss in performing
its obligations stated in the Lease Contracts (Annexes A to A- 15; B to
B-14 and C to C-14 of the Complaint), Compromise Agreement
(Annexes E to E-17 of the Complaint) and Memorandum of Agreement
(Annexes F to F-16 of the Complaint). [Intramuros and Anna Maria L.
Harper] are therefore constrained to demand payment from [Offshore
Construction] for the latter's failure or refusal to honor its just and
valid obligations. Necessarily, [Intramuros and Anna Maria L. Harper]
will not hesitate to seek legal remedies if [Offshore Construction]
continues to be delinquent.
29. Essentially, [Offshore Construction] is protesting the computation
of its arrears (P12,478,461.74) in the demand letter sent by
Administrator [Anna Maria L.] Harper on April 9, 2008. [Offshore
Construction] also asserts that it only owes defendant [Intramuros] six
million four hundred three thousand and three hundred sixty[-]four
pesos (P6,403,364.00).
30. [Offshore Construction] is misguided. The [Memorandum of
Agreement] dated July 27, 2004 was executed because [Offshore
Construction], at that time, had been indebted to defendant
[Intramuros] in the form of rental and utility consumption arrears for
the occupancy of Puerta Isabel Chambers, Asean Gardens and Baluarte
de San Andres in the amount of six million seven hundred sixty[-]two
thousand one hundred fifty[-]three and seventy centavos (P6, 762,
153. 70) ....
....
32. Even after July 27, 2004, and up to this time, [Offshore
Construction] remained in possession of, used and/or subleased the
subject premises. As such, [Offshore Construction] still has to pay
rental fees, aside from the aforesaid arrears. The rental fees continued
to pile up and triggered the imposition of surcharges as [Offshore
Construction] again failed to remit payments thereon. This explains
the demandable amount of P13,448,867.45 (Annex I to 11 of
Complaint). [Offshore Construction] is therefore mistaken in believing
that it only owes defendant [Intramuros] the arrears subject of the
[Memorandum of Agreement] of July 27, 2004 and nothing more. 108
Clearly, petitioner's counterclaim is compulsory, arising as it did out of,
and being necessarily connected with, the parties' respective
obligations under the July 27, 2004 Memorandum of Agreement.
Petitioner cannot be faulted for raising the issue of unpaid rentals in
the specific performance case or for raising the same issue in the
present ejectment case, since it appears that respondent's alleged
failure to pay the rent led to the nonrenewal of the Contracts of Lease.
However, it must be emphasized that any recovery made by petitioner
of unpaid rentals in either its ejectment case or in the specific
performance case must bar recovery in the other, pursuant to the
principle of unjust enrichment.109
A judgment in the Complaint for Interpleader will likewise not be res
judicata against the ejectment complaint. The plaintiff in the
interpleader case, 4H Intramuros, allegedly representing the tenants
occupying Puerta de Isabel II, does not expressly disclose in its
Complaint110 for Interpleader the source of its right to occupy those
premises. However, it can be determined from petitioner's
Answer111 and from respondent's Memorandum112 that the members of
4H Intramuros are respondent's sublessees.
A sublessee cannot invoke a superior right over that of the
sublessor.113 A judgment of eviction against respondent will affect its
sublessees since the latter's right of possession depends entirely on
that of the former.114 A complaint for interpleader by sublessees
cannot bar the recovery by the rightful possessor of physical
possession of the leased premises.
Page 34 of 69
Since neither the specific performance case nor the interpleader case
constituted forum shopping by petitioner, the Metropolitan Trial Court
erred in dismissing its Complaint for Ejectment.
IV
Ordinarily, this case would now be remanded to the Metropolitan Trial
Court for the determination of the rightful possessor of the leased
premises. However, this would cause needless delay inconsistent with
the summary nature of ejectment proceedings.115 Given that there
appears sufficient evidence on record to make this determination,
judicial economy dictates that this Court now resolve the issue of
possession.116
It is undisputed that respondent's occupation and use of Baluarte de
San Andres, Baluarte de San Francisco de Dilao, and Revellin de
Recoletos started on September 1, 1998 by virtue of Contracts of
Lease all dated August 20, 1998.117 The Contracts of Lease were
modified through Addendums to the Contracts likewise dated August
20, 1998.118
Then, to amicably settle Civil Case No. 98-91587 entitled Offshore
Construction and Development Company v. Hon. Gemma Cruz-Araneta
and Hon. Dominador Ferrer, Jr., then pending before Branch 47,
Regional Trial Court, Manila,119 the parties and the Department of
Tourism entered into a July 26, 1999 Compromise Agreement. In the
Compromise Agreement, the parties affirmed the validity of the lease
contracts, but agreed to transfer the areas to be occupied and used by
respondent in Baluarte de San Andres and Baluarte de San Francisco
de Dilao due to improvements that it had introduced to the leased
premises.120 The lease over Revellin de Recoletos was terminated.121 It
appears that under this Compromise Agreement, the original five (5)-
year period of the Contracts of Lease were retained, 122 such that the
leases would expire on August 31, 2003, and renewable for another
five (5) years upon the parties' mutual agreement. 123
Thereafter, the Contracts of Lease expired. Respondent does not
concede this, but there is no proof that there has been any contract
mutually agreed upon by the parties for any extensions of the leases.
Respondent can only argue that petitioner's continuing tolerance of
respondent's possession and acceptance of respondent's rental
payments impliedly renewed the Contracts of Lease. 124
But petitioner's tolerance of respondent's occupation and use of the
leased premises after the end of the lease contracts does not give the
latter a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in its favor.
When a demand to vacate has been made, as what petitioner had
done, respondent’s possession became illegal and it should have left
the leased premises.1âwphi1 In Caniza v. Court of Appeals:125
The Estradas’ first proffered defense derives from a literal construction
of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which inter alia authorizes
the institution of an unlawful detainer suit when "the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied." They contend that since they did not acquire
possession of the property in question "by virtue of any contract,
express or implied" - they having been, to repeat, "allowed to live
temporarily ... (therein) for free, out of ... (Cañiza’s) kindness" - in no
sense could there be a4n "expiration or termination of . . . (their) right
to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." Nor
would an action for forcible entry lie against them, since there is no
claim that they had "deprived (Cañiza) of the possession of ... (her
property) by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth."
The argument is arrant sophistry. Cañiza’s act of allowing the Estradas
to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and
indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense,
and the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that act of
liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the
necessary burden on the Estradas of returning the house to Cañiza
upon her demand. More than once has this Court adjudged that a
person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by
an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The
situation is not much different from that of a tenant whose lease
expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in
which case there is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
withholding of possession as of the date of the demand to vacate. In
other words, one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant
illegally occupying the land or property the moment he is required to
leave. Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals,where a
company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant upon its
undertaking to buy the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill
its promise of payment despite demands, this Court held that "(a)fter
demand and its repudiation, ... (its) continuing possession ... became
illegal and the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the ... (plant’s
owner) was its proper remedy."126 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
The existence of an alleged concession agreement between petitioner
and respondent is unsupported by the evidence on record. The
Metropolitan Trial Court found that a concession agreement existed
due to the agreements entered into by the parties:
This Court agrees with the defendant. The various contracts of lease
between the parties notwithstanding, the existence of the other
agreements involved herein cannot escape the scrutiny of this Court.
Although couched in such words as "contracts of lease", the
relationship between the parties has evolved into another kind - that
of a concession agreement whereby defendant [Offshore Construction]
undertook to develop several areas of the Intramuros District,
defendant [Offshore Construction] actually commenced the
development of the subject premises and incurred expenses for the
said development, effectively making the relationship more than an
ordinary lessor-lessee but one governed by concession whereby both
parties undertook other obligations in addition to their basic
obligations under the contracts of lease. Consensus facit legem (The
parties make their own law by their agreement). It behooves this
Court to respect the parties' contracts, including the memoranda of
agreement that ensued after it. ...127
Respondent claims that the parties’ agreement was for it to operate
the leased premises to recover its investments and to make
profits.1âwphi1 However, a review of the Contracts of Lease show that
they are lease contracts, as defined in Article 1643 of the Civil Code:
Article 1643. In the lease of things, one of the parties binds himself to
give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and
for a period which may be definite or indefinite. However, no lease for
more than ninety-nine years shall be valid.
The restrictions and limitations on respondent's use of the leased
premises are consistent with petitioner’s right as lessor to stipulate the
use of the properties being leased.128 Neither the Contracts of Lease
nor their respective Addendums to the Contract contain any stipulation
that respondent may occupy and use the leased premises until it
recovers the expenses it incurred for improvements it introduced
there. Instead, the lease period was fixed at five (5) years, renewable
for another five (5) years upon mutual agreement:
3. CONTRACT TERM. (Leased Period) This lease shall be for a period of
FIVE YEARS (5 YRS) commencing from September 1, 1998 to August
31, 2003, renewable for another period of FIVE YEARS (5 YRS) under
such terms and condition that may be mutually agreed upon in writing
by the parties[.]129
The subsequent contracts, namely, the July 26, 1999 Compromise
Agreement and the July 27, 2004 Memorandum of Agreement, also do
not point to any creation of a "concession" in favor of respondent. The
Compromise Agreement affirms the validity of the lease contracts,
while the Memorandum of Agreement was for the payment of
respondent's arrears until July 2004.
However, this Court cannot award unpaid rentals to petitioner
pursuant to the ejectment proceeding, since the issue of rentals in
Civil Case No. 08-119138 is currently pending with Branch 37,
Regional Trial Court, Manila, by virtue of petitioner's counterclaim. As
the parties dispute the amounts to be offset under the July 27, 2004
Memorandum of Agreement and respondent’s actual back and current
rentals due,130 the resolution of that case is better left to the Regional
Trial Court for trial on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
April 14, 2011 Decision of Branch 173, Regional Trial Court, Manila in
Civil Case No. 10-124740 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a new
Page 35 of 69
decision is hereby rendered ordering respondent Offshore Construction
and Development Company and any and all its sublessees and
successors-in-interest to vacate the leased premises immediately.
Branch 37, Regional Trial Court, Manila is DIRECTED to resolve Civil
Case No. 08-119138 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
#15 G.R. No. 152423 December 15, 2010
SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and VICTORIA
SORDEVILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
MARIA COPRADA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 and the
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals, dated April 6, 2001 and February
15, 2002, respectively, (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 49994.
The antecedents are as follows:
On February 24, 1997, petitioners, spouses Marcos Esmaquel and
Victoria Sordevilla (Victoria) filed an ejectment case3 against
respondent Maria V. Coprada before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Magdalena, Liliw and Majayjay Laguna. Petitioners
claimed that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated
in M.H. Del Pilar St., Barangay San Miguel, Majayjay, Laguna,
containing an area of Two Hundred Fifty-Three (253) square meters
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-93542. In
1945, respondent was able to persuade the petitioners to allow her
and her family to use and occupy the land for their residence, under
the condition that they will vacate the premises should petitioners
need to use the same. Respondent and her family were allowed to
construct their residential house. Since then, the petitioners never
made an attempt to drive them away out of pity, knowing that
respondent and her eight children have no other place to live in. Also,
respondent and her family have been occupying the subject premises
free of rent, including payment of realty taxes. Respondent's present
circumstances have completely improved, i.e., some of her children
are already working; they are regularly sending her financial
assistance; and she has acquired her own residential house at
Barangay Panglan, Majayjay, Laguna. Because of this, petitioners
verbally demanded that respondent vacate the subject land, but the
latter refused. Thus, petitioners were forced to send a demand letter
dated August 22, 1996, giving respondent until November 30, 1996 to
vacate the subject premises. However, respondent still ignored said
demand, which prompted petitioners to bring a complaint before the
barangay authorities. No settlement was reached, hence, a
certification to file action in Court was issued. Petitioners were,
therefore, constrained to lodge an ejectment case against the
respondent before the MCTC.
Respondent admitted that petitioners are the registered owners of the
subject land. However, she averred that in 1945, it was Emiliana
Coprada (petitioner Victoria Sordevilla's mother and original owner of
the subject land) and not the petitioners who gave permission to her
late husband Brigido Coprada to use the subject lot. Emiliana allowed
her nephew Brigido and his family to occupy the lot as their permanent
abode, because of her love and affection for her nephew, and also, due
to the fact that the said lot is virtually a wasteland. Thereafter, Brigido
and his family cleared the area and built therein a nipa hut to dwell in.
When Emiliana died, the ownership of the property was inherited by
her only child, petitioner Victoria Sordevilla. Respondent alleged that
sometime in the early 1960's, petitioner Victoria offered the said lot for
sale for ₱2,000.00 to respondent, who readily agreed. The purchase
price was paid in installments and was fully paid in 1962. Due to their
close relationship, the agreement was never reduced to writing.
Respondent further maintained that since the execution of the oral
sale of the subject lot, she has been the one paying the realty taxes
due on the property. After the sale, respondent built on the subject
land a semi-concrete structure. Respondent stated that petitioners'
claim is barred by laches. Even granting, without admitting, that
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
respondent's claim of ownership over the property is improper because
petitioners are the registered owners thereof, respondent argued that
she is a builder in good faith, because she was able to build the
structure on the subject lot with the prior permission of the owner.
In its Decision4 dated September 11, 1997, the MCTC rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint. It held that laches had already set
in which prevented petitioners from questioning the validity of the
purported sale between Victoria and Maria.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MCTC’s
judgment. The RTC ruled that respondent's occupation of the subject
property was by virtue of petitioners' tolerance and permission. Hence,
respondent is bound by an implied promise that she will vacate the
property upon demand. Thus, her possession over the subject property
became unlawful after the petitioners demanded her to vacate the
property. The RTC found that respondent failed to prove the alleged
oral sale and that petitioners have adequately proven that they are
entitled to the possession of the subject land as registered owners
thereof. The RTC ordered the respondent and all other persons
claiming rights under her to vacate and surrender the possession of
the subject land to the petitioners and to remove any and all
improvements she introduced on the parcel of land.5
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by
the RTC in an Order6 dated November 24, 1998. Obviously dissatisfied
by the Decision, respondent filed with the CA a petition for review with
prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. 7
In its Decision dated April 6, 2001, the CA granted respondent's
petition, reversed the Decision of the RTC and affirmed in toto the
Decision of the MCTC. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied by the CA in a Resolution8 dated February 15, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following grounds:
I
THE RIGHT OF THE REGISTERED OWNERS TO RECOVER POSSESSION
IS NEVER BARRED BY LACHES AND/OR THE PERSON WHO HAS A
TORRENS TITLE OVER A PARCEL OF LAND IS ENTITLED TO THE
POSSESSION THEREOF.
II
THE OWNERSHIP AND RIGHT OF PETITIONERS TO RECOVER
POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY CANNOT BE DEFEATED BY
UNPROVEN ORAL SALE.
III
LACHES HAD SET IN AGAINST [RESPONDENT].
IV
THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IS NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL
ATTACK.9
The petition is meritorious.
The pertinent point of inquiry in this case is whether or not petitioners
have a valid ground to evict respondent from the subject property.
An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is governed by Section
1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to
the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
Page 36 of 69
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
with damages and costs.
In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was
originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on
account of an express or implied contract between them. However,
defendant's possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded
that defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess under their contract, and defendant
refused to heed such demand.10
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim
of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is
raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in
order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The
adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.11 Since the issue of ownership was raised in the unlawful
detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of the parties'
respective evidence deserves more weight.
In the case at bar, petitioners' cause of action for unlawful detainer is
based on their ownership of the land covered by TCT No. T-93542 and
on their claim that they merely tolerated respondent's stay thereat.
Respondent's possession, as well as those persons claiming right under
her, became unlawful upon her refusal to vacate the premises.
Petitioners contend that since they are the registered owners of the
subject land, they are entitled to the possession thereof and their right
to recover possession over it is never barred by laches. They maintain
that respondent's claim of ownership is based on an unproven oral
sale, which does not exist. Further, respondent cannot rely on the Tax
Declarations as she was paying taxes in the petitioners' name, as the
declared owners of the property. Moreover, she started paying the
taxes only in 1984 despite her claim that the property was sold to her
in 1962. Even assuming that the sale took place in 1962, respondent is
guilty of laches as she failed to take any positive action for the delivery
and conveyance to her of the portion of the property she is occupying.
Finally, respondent cannot collaterally attack the title of the petitioners
to the subject land.
On her part, respondent, although admitting that the property is
registered in petitioners' name, claimed that the 100-square-meters
portion of the property, where her house was erected, was already
sold to her by petitioner Victoria. Thus, by virtue of the sale, she and
her family have the right to possess the said property. The non-
presentation of receipt and deed of sale, non-delivery of the owner's
certificate of title, and her payment of the real property taxes in the
name of the petitioners were due to the close relationship between the
parties and the existing practice of palabra de honor in their day to
day transactions. Respondent further alleged that she is not guilty of
laches; rather, it is the registered owners' right to recover possession
of their property which is barred by laches.
In the present case, respondent failed to present evidence to
substantiate her allegation that a portion of the land was sold to her in
1962. In fact, when petitioners sent a letter12 to the respondent,
demanding her to vacate the subject property, the respondent, in
reply13 to the said letter, never mentioned that she purchased the
subject land in 1962. If the sale really took place, the respondent
should have immediately and categorically claimed that in her letter
response. Clearly therefore, respondent's submission that there was
an oral sale is a mere afterthought.
On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject property is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-93542, registered in the
name of the petitioners. As against the respondent's unproven claim
that she acquired a portion of the property from the petitioners by
virtue of an oral sale, the Torrens title of petitioners must prevail.
Petitioners' title over the subject property is evidence of their
ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in land registration
that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person
who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. 14
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
Further, respondent's argument that petitioners are no longer the
owners of a portion of the subject land because of the sale in her favor
is a collateral attack on the title of the petitioners, which is not
allowed. The validity of petitioners' certificate of title cannot be
attacked by respondent in this case for ejectment. Under Section 48 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or canceled, except
in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The
issue of the validity of the title of the petitioners can only be assailed
in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the
respondent has the right to claim ownership over the property is
beyond the power of the trial court to determine in an action for
unlawful detainer.15
In Rodriguez v. Rodriguez,16 citing the case of Co v. Militar,17 the Court
held that:
[T]he Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was
believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of
land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding
upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court
of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law,
the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the
first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct
proceeding for cancellation of title.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the
property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. x x x
Anent the issue on laches, the CA's ruling that petitioners' long
inaction to assert their rights over the subject land bars them from
recovering the same is without basis. Also, the doctrine invoked by the
appellate court that a registered owner may loose his right to recover
its possession by reason of laches is not applicable here.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert
it.18 There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or
staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its
particular circumstances, with the question of laches addressed to the
sound discretion of the court. Because laches is an equitable doctrine,
its application is controlled by equitable considerations and should not
be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud or injustice. 19
Respondent first acquired possession of the subject lot by mere
tolerance. From 1945 until the filing of the complaint for ejectment in
1997, the nature of that possession has never changed. Petitioners
allowed the respondent to possess the property with the knowledge
that the respondent will vacate the same upon demand. Hence, until
such demand to vacate was communicated by the petitioners to the
respondent, petitioners are not required to do any act to recover the
subject land, precisely because they knew of the nature of the
respondent's possession, i.e., possession by mere tolerance. Thus, it
cannot be said that petitioners are guilty of failure or neglect to assert
a right within a reasonable time. Further, after the petitioners gave a
demand letter to the respondent giving the latter until November 30,
1996 to vacate the subject premises, which respondent failed to heed,
they immediately filed a complaint before the barangay authorities
and, thereafter, lodged an ejectment case before the MCTC on
February 24, 1997. In sum, We find that petitioners are not guilty of
laches as would bar their claim to the property in question.
In contrast, respondent, who is claiming that a portion of the property
was sold to her in 1962, has herself failed within a long period of time
to have that portion transferred in her name. Respondent had to wait
for almost 35 years since 1962, and were it not for the filing of the
ejectment suit in 1997, she would not have bothered to assert her
rights under the alleged sale. Respondent's failure to assert that right
only goes to prove that no sale ever transpired between the parties.
Moreover, as the registered owners, petitioners' right to eject any
person illegally occupying their property is not barred by laches.
Page 37 of 69
In Gaudencio Labrador, represented by Lulu Labrador Uson, as
Attorney-in-Fact v. Spouses Ildefonso Perlas and Pacencia Perlas and
Spouse Rogelio Pobre and Melinda Fogata Pobre, 20 the Court held that:
x x x As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any
person illegally occupying his property. This right is
imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches. In Bishop v.
Court of Appeals, we held, thus:
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents
have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This
right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of
the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the
length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand
the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was
unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by
laches.
Since respondent's occupation of the subject lot is by mere tolerance
or permission of the petitioners, without any contract between them,
respondent is bound by an implied promise that she will vacate the
same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against her.21
In respondent's Answer filed before the MCTC, she claimed that since
she was able to build a structure on the subject lot with the prior
permission from the owner, she is a builder in good faith and thus
entitled to be reimbursed the necessary and useful expenses under
Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Without such
reimbursement, she has the right of retention over the property and
she cannot just be ejected from the premises.
Respondent's argument does not hold water. Since respondent's
occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance, she has no
right to retain its possession under Article 448 of the Civil Code. She is
aware that her tolerated possession may be terminated any time and
she cannot be considered as builder in good faith.22 It is well settled
that both Article 44823 and Article 54624 of the New Civil Code, which
allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in
good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the
owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer
tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. 25 At the time
respondent built the improvements on the premises in 1945, she knew
that her possession was by mere permission and tolerance of the
petitioners; hence, she cannot be said to be a person who builds on
land with the belief that she is the owner thereof.
Respondent's reliance on her payment of realty taxes on the property
is unavailing. She started paying taxes only in 1984 despite her claim
that she bought the property in 1962. Further, aside from the rule that
tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to
prove title to or ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not
conclusive evidence of the same,26 the RTC found that although the
payment for said taxes were received from respondent, the declared
owner was petitioner Victoria.
It must be stressed, however, that the court's adjudication of
ownership in an ejectment case is merely provisional, and affirmance
of the RTC's decision would not bar or prejudice an action between the
same parties involving title to the property, if and when such action is
brought seasonably before the proper forum.27
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated April 6, 2001 and February
15, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49994, affirming the
Decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court in Civil Case No. 1875,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. SC-3580,
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
#16 G.R. No. 157985 December 2, 2005
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
ZENAIDA BUGARIN, VIOLETA ABANO, LIZA ABAYATA, ANTONIO
ALEGRE, REMEDIOS ALEGRE, CHRIS ANASCO, JEFFREY
ARQUILLOS, LOURDES BAGARESE, EUGENIA BARAQUIL,
PRECIOS BASOY, RANNY BASOY, FELY BERMEJO, CARLOS BO,
JUN BO, ALEX BORRES, ANNA MARIE CORDOVA, ESPERANZE
CORDOVA, EDWIN DEPETILLO, ROMULO FERRY, LEONISA
GABRIEL, MA. FE GABRIEL, SALOME CORDOVA, ELEN JACOB,
JEREMIAS JACOB, OLIVIA LERIN, CRISELDA MADEJA, JOMARI
MANONG, NESTOR MANONG, VALENTIN MANONG,
EDMUNDO/FELY MINA, TEDDY PARUAN, SALVACION PASCUA,
ROMMEL POLISTICO, DANIEL/NANCY PRADO, ARMANDO
ROMERO, SANCHO VILLAFUERTE, and FERNANDO
YAMID, Petitioners,
vs.
CECILIA B. PALISOC, MARINA B. MATA and REYNALDO T.
NEPOMUCENO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing
the Order1 dated April 30, 2003 and the Special Order of
Demolition2 dated May 9, 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Parañaque City, Branch 77. Petitioners had applied for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO) but the Court in a
resolution3 dated May 15, 2003 denied the application.
The facts in this case, culled from the record, are as follows.
The present controversy arose from a complaint for ejectment,
docketed as Civil Case No. 11799, filed before the MeTC by private
respondents Cecilia B. Palisoc and Marina B. Mata. In a decision4 dated
February 27, 2002, the court declared respondents as the rightful
possessors of the properties in dispute. It also ordered the petitioners
to vacate the premises and pay to private respondents the rentals.
Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque
City, Branch 274 while private respondents moved for execution
pending appeal. On January 8, 2003, the RTC affirmed the MeTC
decision with the modification that petitioners must start paying
rentals from the date of the appealed decision.
On January 28, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. In an order
dated March 3, 2003, the RTC denied the motion and granted private
respondents’ motion for execution for failure of petitioners to post a
supersedeas bond or to pay the back rentals. Thus, a writ of execution
pending appeal was issued. On March 7, 2003, petitioners were served
with the writ and notice to vacate.
On March 11, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Implementation
of the Writ of Execution. On March 14, 2003, private respondents filed
a Motion to Issue a Special Order of Demolition since petitioners
refused to vacate the premises. The RTC deferred action on the
motions to allow petitioners to exhaust legal remedies available to
them.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Supplement to the Motion to Defer
Implementation of Writ of Execution and Opposition to Motion to Issue
Special Order of Demolition, contending that Section 28 of Republic
Act No. 72795 was not complied with.
On April 4, 2003, private respondents filed a Motion Reiterating the
Motion for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition. In an order dated
April 11, 2003, the RTC declared the decision denying petitioners’
appeal final and executory, and remanded the records of the case to
the MeTC without acting on the motions.
However, on April 10, 2003, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction
before the Court of Appeals. They also filed an Urgent Vigorous
Opposition and Motion to Suspend Proceedings on respondents’ Motion
Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition
before the MeTC.
Page 38 of 69
The MeTC set the Motion for the Issuance of Special Order of
Demolition for hearing. The court granted said motion on April 30,
2003, but gave petitioners five (5) days from receipt of its order to
voluntarily vacate the premises and remove all structures and
improvements made thereon.
On May 6, 2003, MeTC Branch Sheriff Reynaldo T. Nepomuceno
reported that petitioners refused to vacate the premises. Petitioners
instead filed a Motion to Quash and Recall the Order dated April 30,
2003 and/or Special Order of Demolition. The MeTC denied the motion
and issued the Special Order of Demolition on May 9, 2003.
Hence, this petition where petitioners raise the lone error that
THE COURT A QUO, IN BRUSHING ASIDE REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 7279
IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE CASE AGAINST THESE
UNDERPRIVILEGED PETITIONERS, HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE, NOT THERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME
COURT, AND/OR HAS DECIDED IT IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.6
Simply, the issue is, are the Orders of the MeTC proper?
Petitioners contend that the Orders of the MeTC violated the
mandatory requirements of Section 287 of Rep. Act No. 7279 since
there was no 30-day notice prior to the date of eviction or demolition
and there had been no consultation on the matter of resettlement.
They also claim that there was neither relocation nor financial
assistance given. They insist that the MeTC orders are patently
unreasonable, impossible and in violation of the law. 8
Private respondents for their part argue that Rep. Act No. 7279 is not
applicable. They aver that there was no proof that petitioners are
registered as eligible socialized housing program beneficiaries in
accordance with procedure set forth in the Implementing Rules and
Regulations Governing the Registration of Socialized Housing
Beneficiaries issued by the Department of Interior and Local
Government and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council. They aver that even if Rep. Act No. 7279 was applicable, the
required notices under the law had already been complied with.
According to them, petitioners were already notified on March 7, 2003
of an impending demolition, when the writ of execution was served. 9
We find for respondents.
Under Section 19,10 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, a
judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is immediately
executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor, and the
court’s duty to order the execution is practically ministerial. 11 The
defendant may stay it only by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a
supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property
during the pendency of the appeal.12 Once the Regional Trial Court
decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately executory under
Section 21,13 Rule 70, without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for
review, before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.14
However, petitioners failed to file a petition for review. Records show
that petitioners received on March 12, 2003 the RTC decision denying
their motion for reconsideration. They had until March 27, 2003 to file
a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. Instead, they filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition on April 10, 2003. In said
petition, which is still pending, petitioners contended that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the MeTC decision
and insisted that the latter court had no jurisdiction over the
complaint.
The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the
merits in the instant case is appeal. This holds true even if the error
ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or
grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the
decision. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits
the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter
remedy is that "there should be no appeal."15
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
Clearly, petitioners’ petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
was filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not
and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter
remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. 16 Thus,
the filing of the petition for certiorari did not prevent the RTC decision
from becoming final and executory.17 The RTC acted correctly when it
remanded the case to the court of origin in the order dated April 11,
2003.18
Thus, we find that the MeTC cannot be faulted for issuing the assailed
orders to enforce the RTC judgment. Both orders were issued after the
requisite notice and hearing. Moreover, the Court of Appeals did not
issue any writ of preliminary injunction to stay the execution of the
judgment.
Petitioners tried to stay the execution of the order of demolition by
filing a petition for review with prayer for TRO before us. We earlier
denied said prayer for TRO. We also find petitioners’ contention that
the said orders violated Rep. Act No. 7279, particularly Section
28(c),19 totally without merit. Under the provision, eviction or
demolition may be allowed when there is a court order for eviction and
demolition, as in the case at bar. Moreover, nothing is shown on
record that petitioners are underprivileged and homeless citizens as
defined in Section 3(t) of Rep. Act No. 7279.20 The procedure for the
execution of the eviction or demolition order under Section 28(c) is, in
our view, not applicable.
It also appears that the order of demolition had already been
executed. Petitioners had already vacated the area and private
respondents now possess the properties free from all occupants, as
evidenced by the sheriff’s turn-over of possession dated May 19, 2003.
Thus, the instant case before us has indeed become moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review assailing the Order dated April
30, 2003 and the Special Order of Demolition dated May 9, 2003 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 77,
is DENIED for mootness and lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
#17 G.R. No. 136274 September 3, 2003
SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, represented by
FLORO ARAGAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE LORIFEL
LACAP PHIMNA, MeTC, Branch 77, Parañaque City and ELISA
MAGLAQUI-CAPARAS, respondents.
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the July 16, 1998 decision of the Court
of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 46861 (a) declaring null and void the
injunction orders respectively issued by Judge Amelita Tolentino2 in
Civil Case No. 96-0253, for Expropriation, and Judge Rolando G. How
in Civil Case No. 96-0480, for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction;
and (b) ordering the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque
City, Branch 78, to enforce its July 8, 1996 Writ of Demolition. The
dispositive portion read:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the injunction orders subject of
the instant petition are hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID. Corollary
thereto, the Court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 78,
Parañaque, is hereby directed to ENFORCE its Writ of Demolition dated
July 8, 1996.3
The antecedent facts follow.
Private respondent Elisa Maglaqui-Caparas, in her capacity as
executrix of the testate estate of Macaria Maglaqui, filed on March 16,
1993 a complaint for unlawful detainer (Civil Case No. 8550) against
Alfredo Mogar and 46 other persons4 who were occupying several
parcels of land (Lots 1-A, B, C, E, F and G) in Yellow Ville, United
Parañaque Subdivision IV, Metro Manila. These parcels of land are
Page 39 of 69
covered by individual transfer certificates of title 5 registered in the
name of Macaria Maglaqui, private respondent’s mother.
The MeTC of Parañaque City, Branch 78, eventually decided in favor of
private respondent. On appeal, the decision of the MeTC was affirmed
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66. Mogar et
al. elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but their petition was
dismissed by the appellate court on December 12, 1994. After the
dismissal became final, a writ of demolition was issued by the MeTC of
Parañaque City, Branch 78. The writ, however, was not immediately
implemented because the case was transferred to Branch 77 of the
same court. On February 6, 1997, Mogar et al. filed a petition with the
RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 257, presided over by Judge Rolando
G. How, to enjoin the implementation of the writ of demolition.
However, this petition was denied and subsequently, an alias writ of
demolition was issued by Judge Vivencio G. Lirio of MeTC Branch 77,
the court of origin.
The alias writ of demolition was, again, not executed, this time due to
the ex parte issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by Judge
Amelita Tolentino, in connection with the expropriation case (Civil Case
No. 96-0253) filed by the Municipality of Parañaque against the
Testate Estate of Macaria Maglaqui.
Meanwhile, another group of persons occupying portions of the parcels
of land (Lots I-F and I-G) subject of the unlawful detainer case,
organized themselves into the Sunflower Neighborhood Association
(Sunflower), the petitioner herein. On November 18, 1996, Sunflower,
represented by one Floro Aragan, filed a complaint for
prohibition/injunction with preliminary injunction against private
respondent also with the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 257.
Sunflower argued that its members should be excluded from the
demolition order as they were not parties to the original unlawful
detainer case. To include their houses in the demolition would be to
deprive them of due process. This time, Judge How granted the
injunction and ordered the exclusion of the houses belonging to
petitioner from demolition.
Thus, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with the Court of Appeals (CA GR SP No. 46861) assailing
both the injunction orders issued by Judge Tolentino in the
expropriation case and by Judge How in the prohibition case.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent holding that,
as the judgment in the unlawful detainer case had already become
final, the execution could not be enjoined. Consequently, the MeTC of
Parañaque City, Branch 77 issued another alias writ of demolition on
September 14, 1998.
In order to stay the execution of the writ of demolition, Sunflower filed
on January 7, 1999 an urgent motion in this Court for the issuance of
a status quo order. This we granted in a resolution dated January 20,
1999. Prior to the issuance of our resolution, however, the writ of
demolition was implemented on January 14, 1999. Petitioner thus filed
a motion to allow its members to return to the premises, which we
granted in another resolution dated April 28, 1999. Thereafter, we
required both parties to submit their memoranda.
Sometime in November 1998, the group of Mogar et al. filed in this
Court a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
GR SP No. 46861. However, we dismissed the same on January 18,
1999 for failure of said petitioners to comply with certain procedural
requirements, including their failure to submit a certification of non-
forum shopping.6
For its part, petitioner Sunflower likewise assailed the same decision of
the Court of Appeals in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Before we proceed, it should be pointed out that any issue relating to
the expropriation case (Civil Case No. 96-0253) filed by the
Municipality of Parañaque has been rendered moot by the dismissal of
that case. This Court, in a Resolution dated January 29,
2003,7 ordered the presiding judge of the RTC of Parañaque City,
Branch 274 to report on the status of the expropriation case filed by
the Municipality of Parañaque against herein private respondent. The
presiding judge reported that the case was already dismissed on June
1, 1999 in an order issued by then Presiding Judge Amelita Tolentino
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
who granted the motion to dismiss filed by herein private respondent.
Said dismissal was not challenged by the Municipality of Parañaque. 8
The basic issue before us is whether petitioner’s members, who were
not parties to the unlawful detainer case, may be ejected from the
land subject of this case.
We rule in the affirmative. It is well-settled that, although an
ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the judgment is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and given an
opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone
who has not been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, squatter
or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to
frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the premises with
the permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee pendente lite; (d) a
sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the family, relative or
privy of the defendant.9
In the case at bar, the records show that petitioner’s members are
trespassers or squatters who do not have any right to occupy the
property of respondent. Petitioner does not dispute the ownership of
the parcels of land in question. In fact, it even admitted that the
subject property is owned by Macaria Maglaqui, mother of private
respondent.10 Petitioner failed to establish any right which would
entitle its members to occupy the land in any capacity, whether as
lessees, tenants and the like. Petitioner’s only defense against the
eviction and demolition orders is their supposed non-inclusion in the
original detainer case. This defense, however, has no legal support
since its members are trespassers or squatters who are bound by the
judgment.
Petitioner’s argument that the parcels of land occupied by its members
(Lots I-F and I-G) were not included in the original ejectment
complaint has no basis. The complaint private respondent filed with
the MeTC of Parañaque City, Branch 78, clearly included Lots I-F and
I-G as part of the subject matter under litigation in the unlawful
detainer case.11 Thus, petitioner’s members, together with all the
parties in the unlawful detainer case, must vacate the disputed land.
The Court commiserates with respondent, already in her twilight years,
who has been unlawfully deprived of her land for a good number of
years. Thus, we exhort the court of origin to execute this decision with
reasonable dispatch, consistent with the requirements of Section 28 of
RA 7279 and EO 152,12 on eviction and demolition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 46861 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
#18 G.R. No. 173616 June 25, 2014
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINETEENTH DIVISION) and
BERNIE G. MIAQUE, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition of the Air Transportation
Office (ATO) seeks the nullification of the Court of Appeals'
Resolution1 dated March 29, 2006 and Resolution2 dated May 30, 2006
in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603. The Resolution dated March 29, 2006
granted the application for temporary restraining order (TRO) of Bernie
G. Miaque, while the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the writ of
execution issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo despite
Miaque's alleged continued failure and refusal to make current the
supersedeas bond and to pay to the A TO the rental and concession
privilege fees.
The proceedings on the main case of ejectment
Page 40 of 69
MTCC of Iloilo City: Civil Case No. 01 (38)
In May 2001, the ATO filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Miaque in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City,
Branch 3. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 01 (38). The ATO sought
the following, among others:
(1) That Miaque be ordered to permanently vacate and
peacefully return to the ATO possession of:
(a) the 800-square meter Refreshment Parlor
fronting the New Terminal Building-Iloilo Airport;
(b) the 310-square meter Restaurant/Gift Shop
inside the Iloilo Airport Terminal; and
(c) all areas occupied or otherwise utilized by
Miaque incident to his operation of the Porterage
Service within the Iloilo Airport; and
(2) That Miaque be ordered to immediately pay the ATO the
amount of not less than ₱1,296,103.10, representing unpaid
space rental and concessionaire privilege fees as of October
15, 2000 plus interest and additional rental and fees which
may be proven during the trial.3
The MTCC subsequently rendered a Decision4 dated May 27, 2002 the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding [Miaque] to be unlawfully
detaining the following premises and orders [him], his men and privies
to:
a. vacate the 800[-]square meter Refreshment Parlor
fronting the New Terminal Building-Iloilo Airport. [Miaque] is
further ordered to pay [the ATO] the rental and
concessionaire privilege fee[s] accruing from November
1986 to October 2000, totaling ₱460,060.70, plus
differential billings from January 1990 to July 1993 for
₱4,652.60 and interest charges from January 2000 to
October 2000 for ₱2,678.38 or a total amount of
₱467,397.68 as of October 2000, less the payments made
by [Miaque] under Official Receipt No. 4317842 dated
December 1998, and the monthly current lease/concession
privilege fee from November 2000 until [Miaque] shall have
vacated the premises;
(b) vacate the 310[-]square meter Restaurant/Gift Shop
inside the Iloilo Terminal Building which was reduced to a
total of 183 square meters in 1998 (51.56 square meters
inside the pre-departure area and 126.72 square meters
outside the pre-departure area). [Miaque] is also ordered to
pay [the ATO] rentals/concessionaire’s privilege fee[s] from
January 16, 1992 to October 15, 2000 in the total amount of
₱719,708.43 and from October 16, 2000, to pay the current
monthly lease/concessionaire privilege fees until [Miaque]
shall have vacated the premises; and
(c) vacate the area occupied or used by [Miaque] incident to
his operation of the Porterage Service within the Iloilo
Airport. [Miaque] is further ordered to pay Tender Offer Fee
due from March 1992 to October 2000 in the total amount of
₱108,997.07. [Miaque] is further ordered to pay the current
monthly concession privilege fee from October 2000 until
such time that [Miaque] shall have vacated the premises.
Costs against [Miaque].5
RTC of Iloilo City: Civil Case No. 02-27292
Miaque appealed the MTCC Decision to the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch
24. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-27292. The RTC, in its
Decision6 dated June 7, 2003, affirmed the MTCC Decision in its
entirety. Miaque’s motion for reconsideration was denied. 7 Court of
Appeals: CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 Miaque questioned the RTC Decision in
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 79439, on September 25, 2003. In a Decision8 dated April
29, 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the
RTC Decision. Miaque moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a
Resolution dated January 5, 2006.9
Supreme Court: G.R. No. 171099
Miaque brought the case to this Court in a petition for review,
docketed as G.R. No. 171099. In a Resolution10dated February 22,
2006, the petition was denied as no reversible error in the Court of
Appeals Decision was sufficiently shown. The motion for
reconsideration of Miaque was denied with finality. 11
The proceedings on execution
As an incident of CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the Court of Appeals issued
on February 27, 2004 a temporary restraining order (TRO) effective for
a period of 60 days and required Miaque to post a bond in the amount
of ₱100,000.00.12 After the lapse of the TRO, the ATO filed an urgent
motion for the execution of the RTC Decision pursuant to Section 21,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. This was opposed by Miaque. 13
In an Order14 dated August 2, 2004, the RTC granted the ATO’s
motion:
Wherefore, in view of the above consideration, the court finds merit
[i]n the reasons given in the motion of [the ATO] and hereby Grants
the issuance of a Writ of Execution.
Pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which mandates that the judgment of this Court being immediately
executory in cases of this nature, let a writ of execution shall issue,
ordering the sheriff of this Court to effect its Decision dated June 7,
2003, affirming the Decision of the MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.
Furnish copies of this order to the Asst. Solicitor Almira Tomampos of
the Office of the Solicitor General and Atty. Rex Rico, counsel for
[Miaque].15
Miaque sought reconsideration of the above Order but the RTC denied
the motion in an Order16 dated August 13, 2004. Thereafter, the RTC
issued a Writ of Execution dated August 16, 2004.17
However, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution18 dated August 18,
2004 ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
enjoining the ATO and all persons acting in its behalf from enforcing
the respective Decisions of the MTCC and the RTC while CA-G.R. SP
No. 79439 is pending. Thus, after the dismissal of Miaque’s petition for
review in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the ATO filed another urgent motion
for execution of the RTC Decision. In its motion, the ATO pointed out
that the supersedeas bond filed by Miaque had lapsed and was not
renewed and that the rental and concessionaire privilege fees have not
been paid at all in violation of Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court.19 Miaque again opposed the ATO’s urgent motion for
execution,20 while the ATO filed a supplemental urgent motion for
execution stating that Miaque’s appeal in the Court of Appeals had
been dismissed.21
In an Order22 dated June 1, 2005, the RTC granted the ATO’s urgent
motion for execution and issued a Writ of Execution23 dated June 2,
2005. On the basis of the said writ, a notice to vacate was given to
Miaque.24 On June 3, 2005, Miaque filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Order dated June 1, 2005, with prayer to set aside the writ of
execution and notice to vacate.25 At the same time, he filed a motion
in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 praying that the Court of Appeals order the
RTC judge and the concerned sheriffs to desist from implementing the
writ of execution.26 Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution27 dated June 14, 2005 ordering the sheriffs to desist from
executing the Decisions of the MTCC and the RTC while CA-G.R. SP No.
79439 is still pending. However, on June 15, 2005, before the
concerned sheriffs received a copy of the Resolution dated June 14,
2005, the said sheriffs implemented the writ of execution and
delivered the possession of the following premises to the ATO:
Page 41 of 69
 (a) the Restaurant/Gift Shop inside the Iloilo Terminal
Building in the reduced area of 183 square meters; and
(b) the area which Miaque occupied or used incident to his
operation of the Porterage Service within the Iloilo Airport.
The sheriffs who implemented the writ then filed a return of
service28 and issued reports of partial delivery of
possession.29 However, Miaque subsequently regained possession of
the said premises on the strength of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution
dated June 14, 2005.30
On February 9, 2006, after the Court of Appeals issued its Resolution
dated January 5, 2006 denying Miaque’s motion for reconsideration of
the Decision dated April 29, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the ATO
filed with the RTC a motion for the revival of the writs of execution
dated August 16, 2004 and June 2, 2005.31 This was opposed by
Miaque.32 After the RTC heard the parties, it issued an Order33 dated
March 20, 2006 granting the ATO’s motion and revived the writs of
execution dated August 16, 2004 and June 2, 2005. Miaque filed a
motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it. 34
A new case in the Court of Appeals: CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603
On March 28, 2006, Miaque filed a petition35 for certiorari (with prayer
for issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction) in the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603, where he assailed
the RTC’s Order dated March 20, 2006. He prayed, among others, that
the implementation of the writs of execution be enjoined. It is here
where the Court of Appeals issued the Resolutions being challenged in
this case, namely, the Resolution dated March 29, 2006 issuing a TRO
effective for 60 days, and Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issuing a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the writs of
execution dated August 16, 2004 and June2, 2005. In particular, the
Resolution dated May 30, 2006 reads: Before us for resolution is
[Miaque]’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction that would restrain the respondent judge, Sheriffs Marcial B.
Lambuso, Winston T. Eguia, Camilo I. Divinagracia, Jr. and Eric George
S. Luntao and all other persons acting for and in their behalves, from
enforcing the orders issued by the respondent judge on March 20,
2006 and March 24, 2006, including the writ[s] of execution issued
pursuant thereto, while the petition in the case at bench is still
pending with us.
After examining judiciously the record in this case, together with the
submissions and contentions of the parties, we have come up with a
finding and so hold that there is a sufficient showing by [Miaque] that
the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enumerated in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court
exist. We find that [Miaque] has a right in esse to be protected and the
acts against which the injunction is sought to be directed are violative
of said right. To our mind, [Miaque] appears to have a clear legal right
to hold on to the premises leased by him from ATO at least until such
time when he shall have been duly ejected therefrom by a writ of
execution of judgment caused to be issued by the MTCC in Iloilo City,
which is the court of origin of the decision promulgated by this Court in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 on April 29, 2005. Under the attendant
circumstances, it appears that the respondent judge orthe RTC in Iloilo
City has no jurisdiction to order the issuance of such writ of execution
because we gave due course to the petition for review filed with us in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 and, in fact, rendered a decision on the merit in
said case, thereby divesting the RTC in Iloilo City of jurisdiction over
the case as provided for in the third paragraph of Section 8(a) of Rule
42of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. In City of Manila vs. Court of
Appeals, 204 SCRA 362, as cited in Mocles vs. Maravilla, 239 SCRA
188, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"The rule is that, if the judgment of the metropolitan trial court is
appealed to the RTC and the decision of the latter itself is elevated to
the CA whose decision thereafter became final, the case should be
remanded through the RTC to the metropolitan trial court for
execution."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, a WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION is hereby ordered or caused to be issued
by us enjoining the respondent judge, Sheriffs Marcial B. Lambuso,
Winston T. Eguia, Camilo I. Divinagracia, Jr. and Eric George S. Luntao
and all other persons acting for and in their behalves, from enforcing
the orders issued by the respondent judge on March 20, 2006 and
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
March 24, 2006, including the writ[s] of execution issued pursuant
thereto, while the petition in the case at bench is still pending with us.
This is subject to the petitioner’s putting up of a bond in the sum of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS(₱100,000.00) to the effect that he
will pay to the respondent ATO all damages which said office may
sustain by reason of the injunctive writ if we should finally decide that
[Miaque] is not entitled thereto.36
The present petition
The ATO claims that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
TRO and the subsequent writ of preliminary injunction through the
Order dated March 29, 2006 and the Resolution dated May 30,2006,
respectively. According to the ATO, the Court of Appeals ignored the
government’s right under the law, Rules of Court, jurisprudence and
equity to the possession as well as to the payment of rental and
concession privilege fees which, at the time of the filing of this
petition, already amounted to ₱2 Million. Such right had already been
decided with finality by this Court, which affirmed the Decision dated
April 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, but
the Court of Appeals has repeatedly thwarted it. The RTC acted
properly and pursuant to Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
when it issued the writs of execution.37 Moreover, the ATO asserts that
a TRO cannot restrain an accomplished fact, as the RTC’s writ of
execution dated June 1, 2005 had already been partially
implemented.38
The ATO also argues that, by his admission that the issues in CAG.R.
SP No. 79439 and CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603 are exactly the same,
Miaque has committed forum shopping. In this connection, the ATO
points out that, in his opposition to the ATO’s motion for additional
period of time to file its comment on Miaque’s petition in CA-G.R. CEB-
SP No. 01603, Miaque pointed out the similarity of the core issues in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 and CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603, to wit:
b) The legal issues raised by the petition [in CA-G.R. CEBSP
No. 01603] are very simple and not complicated. In fact, the
threshold issue, i.e., whether or not respondent court (RTC)
has jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution after the
appeal over its decision had been perfected and the petition
for review [in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439] given due course, is
exactly the same one earlier raised by [the ATO itself in its]
"Motion for Reconsideration" of the Resolution dated June
14, 2005, in CA G.R. No. 79439, entitled "Bernie G. Miaque
vs. Hon. Danilo P. Galvez and Air Transportation Office
(ATO)", (same parties in this proceeding), then pending
before the 20th Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.
Hence, all that [the ATO has] to do is simply to reiterate [its] said
arguments, the law and jurisprudence [it has] earlier invoked and, if
[it wishes], add some more arguments, laws or jurisprudence thereto.
Such an exercise would definitely not require a sixty (60) day period. A
ten (10) day period is more than sufficient.39
The ATO further contends that the subject premises form part of a
public utility infrastructure and, pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1818, the issuance of a TRO against a public utility infrastructure is
prohibited.40
The ATO adds that Miaque’s petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. CEBSP
No. 01603 introduces a new matter which is the alleged novation of
the MTCC Decision when he deposited the amount of ₱319,900.00 to
the Land Bank of the Philippines account of the ATO in February 2006.
At any rate, the ATO asserts that its tenacity in pursuing the execution
of the judgment against Miaque belies its consent to the alleged
novation.41
For his part, Miaque argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to
dismiss a petition still pending with the Court of Appeals. Thus, the
ATO cannot properly pray that this Court dismiss CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
01603. According to Miaque, the jurisdiction of this Court is limited
only to the determination of whether or not the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion in issuing a TRO and, subsequently, a
preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603. In this
connection, Miaque insists that the Court of Appeals acted well within
its jurisdiction in the issuance of both the Order dated March 29, 2006
Page 42 of 69
granting a TRO and the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issuing a writ
of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603. As this Court
has effectively affirmed the MTCC Decision, then it is the MTCC and
not the RTC which should have directed the execution of the MTCC
Decision. Moreover, the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of
execution dated August 16, 2004 and June 1, 2005 because the said
court already lost its jurisdiction when Miaque filed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals on September 25, 2003, which appeal was given due
course.42
Miaque also asserts that the ATO’s claim that the RTC’s writ of
execution had been partially implemented is not true and that he is in
possession of the entire subject premises when the Court of Appeals
issued the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction being challenged in
this case.
Finally, Miaque alleges that no writ may be issued to enforce the MTCC
Decision as the said decision had already been novated by his deposit
of ₱319,000.00 to the ATO’s account with the Land Bank of the
Philippines in February 2006.43
This Court, in a Resolution44 dated August 14, 2006, issued a TRO
enjoining the Court of Appeals, Miaque, and his agents and
representatives from implementing the Resolution dated March 29,
2006 and the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
01603.
The Court’s ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminarily, the Court notes that the challenge to the Order dated
March 29, 2006 granting a TRO, effective for 60 days, is moot as its
effectivity had already lapsed.
Cutting through the tangled web of issues presented by the contending
parties, the basic question in this petition is whether or not the Court
of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolution dated May 30, 2006
which granted petitioner’s application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603.
Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides the key to that
question: Sec. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals
or Supreme Court. – The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against
the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a
further appeal that may be taken therefrom. (Emphasis supplied.)
This reflects Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 21. Appeal. - The judgment or final order shall be appealable to
the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same in
accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision
of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases governed by this Rule,
including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately
executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken
therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)
The above provisions are supplemented and reinforced by Section 4,
Rule 39 and Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court which
respectively provide:
Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. – Judgments in actions for
injunction, receivership, accounting and support, and such other
judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be immediately
executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall not be
stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the
trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion
may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the
injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support.
The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or
otherwise as may be considered proper for the security or protection of
the rights of the adverse party.
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
xxxx
Sec. 8. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.–
(a) Upon the timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of
the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, the appeal is deemed
perfected as to the petitioner.
The Regional Trial Court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the
time to appeal of the other parties.
However, before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the petition,
the Regional Trial Court may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any
matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals
of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance
with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
(b) Except in civil cases decided under the Rules on Summary
Procedure, the appeal shall stay the judgment or final order unless the
Court of Appeals, the law, or these Rules shall provide otherwise.
(Emphases supplied.)
The totality of all the provisions above shows the following significant
characteristics of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case appealed to
it:
(1) The judgment of the RTC against the defendant-
appellant is immediately executory, without prejudice to a
further appeal that may be taken therefrom; and
(2) Such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal
taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the RTC or, in
the appellate court’s discretion, suspended or modified.
The first characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is immediately
executory -- is emphasized by the fact that no resolutory condition has
been imposed that will prevent or stay the execution of the RTC’s
judgment.45 The significance of this may be better appreciated by
comparing Section 21 of Rule 70 with its precursor, Section 10, Rule
70 of the 1964 Rules of Court which provided:
Sec. 10. Stay of execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court. – Where defendant appeals from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance, execution of said judgment, with respect to the
restoration of possession, shall not be stayed unless the appellant
deposits the same amounts and within the periods referred to in
section 8 of this rule to be disposed of in the same manner as therein
provided.
Under the old provision, the procedure on appeal from the RTC’s
judgment to the Court of Appeals was, with the exception of the need
for a supersedeas bond which was not applicable, virtually the same as
the procedure on appeal of the MTC’s judgment to the RTC. Thus, in
the contemplated recourse to the Court of Appeals, the defendant,
after perfecting his appeal, could also prevent the immediate execution
of the judgment by making the periodic deposit of rentals during the
pendency of the appeal and thereby correspondingly prevent
restitution of the premises to the plaintiff who had already twice
vindicated his claim to the property in the two lower courts. On the
other hand, under the amendatory procedure introduced by the
present Section 21 of Rule 70, the judgment of the RTC shall be
immediately executory and can accordingly be enforced forthwith. It
shall not be stayed by the mere continuing deposit of monthly rentals
by the dispossess or during the pendency of the case in the Court of
Appeals or this Court, although such execution of the judgment shall
be without prejudice to that appeal taking its due course. This
reiterates Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
which replaced the appellate procedure in, and repealed, the former
Section 10, Rule 70 of the 1964 Rules of Court.46 Teresa T. Gonzales
La’O & Co., Inc. v. Sheriff Hatab47 states:
Unlike Rule 70 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court where the
defendant, after perfecting his appeal, could prevent the immediate
execution of the judgment by taking an appeal and making a periodic
Page 43 of 69
deposit of monthly rentals during the pendency of the appeal thereby
preventing the plaintiff from taking possession of the premises in the
meantime, the present wording of Section 21, Rule 70 explicitly
provides that the judgment of the regional trial court in ejectment
cases appealed to it shall be immediately executory and can be
enforced despite the perfection of an appeal to a higher
court.48 (Emphasis supplied.)
The RTC’s duty to issue a writ of execution under Section 21 of Rule 70
is ministerial and may be compelled by mandamus. 49 Section 21 of
Rule 70 presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful
detainer case is unsatisfied with the RTC’s judgment and appeals to a
higher court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of
execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course. 50 The
rationale of immediate execution of judgment in an ejectment case is
to avoid injustice to a lawful possessor.51 Nevertheless, it should be
stressed that the appellate court may stay the writ of execution should
circumstances so require.52
The second characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is not stayed by
an appeal taken therefrom – reinforces the first.1âwphi1 The judgment
of the RTC in an ejectment case is enforceable upon its rendition and,
upon motion, immediately executory notwithstanding an appeal taken
therefrom. The execution of the RTC’s judgment is not discretionary
execution under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Section 2. Discretionary execution. –
(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. – On
motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in
the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in
possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the
case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may,
in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even
before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution
pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order after due hearing.
(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments. – A several,
separate or partial judgment may be executed under the same terms
and conditions as execution of a judgment or final order pending
appeal.
Discretionary execution is authorized while the trial court, which
rendered the judgment sought to be executed, still has jurisdiction
over the case as the period to appeal has not yet lapsed and is in
possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the
case may be, at the time of the filing of the motion for execution. It is
part of the trial court’s residual powers, or those powers which it
retains after losing jurisdiction over the case as a result of the
perfection of the appeal.53 As a rule, the judgment of the RTC,
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, being sought to
be executed in a discretionary execution is stayed by the appeal to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. On the other hand, execution of the RTC’s judgment under
Section 21, Rule 70 is not discretionary execution but a ministerial
duty of the RTC.54 It is not governed by Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court but by Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on judgments
not stayed by appeal. In this connection, it is not covered by the
general rule, that the judgment of the RTC is stayed by appeal to the
Court of Appeals under Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, but
constitutes an exception to the said rule. In connection with the
second characteristic of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case
appealed to it, the consequence of the above distinctions between
discretionary execution and the execution of the RTC’s judgment in an
ejectment case on appeal to the Court of Appeals is that the former
may be availed of in the RTC only before the Court of Appeals gives
due course to the appeal while the latter may be availed of in the RTC
at any stage of the appeal to the Court of Appeals. But then again, in
the latter case, the Court of Appeals may stay the writ of execution
issued by the RTC should circumstances so require. 55 City of Naga v.
Hon. Asuncion56 explains:
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
This is not to say that the losing defendant in an ejectment case is
without recourse to avoid immediate execution of the RTC decision.
The defendant may x x x appeal said judgment to the Court of Appeals
and therein apply for a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, as held in
Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, even if RTC judgments in unlawful
detainer cases are immediately executory, preliminary injunction may
still be granted. (Citation omitted.)
To reiterate, despite the immediately executory nature of the
judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases, which judgment is not stayed
by an appeal taken therefrom, the Court of Appeals may issue a writ of
preliminary injunction that will restrain or enjoin the execution of the
RTC’s judgment. In the exercise of such authority, the Court of
Appeals should constantly be aware that the grant of a preliminary
injunction in a case rests on the sound discretion of the court with the
caveat that it should be made with great caution.57
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must
be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights.
The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary
for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it. In the
absence of the same, and where facts are shown to be wanting in
bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the
ancillarywrit must be struck down for having been rendered in grave
abuse of discretion.58
In this case, the decisions of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 01 (38), of the
RTC in Civil Case No. 02-27292, and of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R.
SP No. 79439 unanimously recognized the right of the ATO to
possession of the property and the corresponding obligation of Miaque
to immediately vacate the subject premises. This means that the
MTCC, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals all ruled that Miaque does
not have any right to continue in possession of the said premises. It is
therefore puzzling how the Court of Appeals justified its issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction with the sweeping statement that
Miaque "appears to have a clear legal right to hold on to the premises
leased by him from ATO at least until such time when he shall have
been duly ejected therefrom by a writ of execution of judgment caused
to be issued by the MTCC in Iloilo City, which is the court of origin of
the decision promulgated by this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439."
Unfortunately, in its Resolution dated May 30, 2006 granting a writ of
preliminary injunction in Miaque’s favor, the Court of Appeals did not
state the source or basis of Miaque’s "clear legal right to hold on to the
[said] premises." This is fatal.
In Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc.,59 this Court stated that, in
granting or dismissing an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, the court must state in its order the findings and
conclusions based on the evidence and the law. This is to enable the
appellate court to determine whether the trial court committed grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
resolving, one way or the other, the plea for injunctive relief. In the
absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by one who
seeks an injunctive writ, an order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction will be nullified. Thus, where the right of one
who seeks an in junctive writ is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary
injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without
proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary
injunction.
The sole basis of the Court of Appeals in issuing its Resolution dated
May 30, 2006 is its view that the RTC "has no jurisdiction to order the
issuance of [the] writ of execution" because, when it gave due course
to the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the RTC was
already divested of jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the third
paragraph of Section 8(a), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The Court of
Appeals is mistaken. It disregards both (1) the immediately executory
nature of the judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases, and (2) the rule
that such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken there
from. It ignores the nature of the RTC’s function to issue a writ of
execution of its judgment in an ejectment case as ministerial and not
discretionary.
The RTC was validly exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to Section 21,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court when it issued the writs of execution
dated August 16, 2004 and June 2,2005. While the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 enjoined the execution of the RTC’s judgment
during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the RTC revived the
writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and June 1, 2005 in its Order
Page 44 of 69
dated March 20, 2006, after the Court of Appeals denied Miaque’s
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79439. Indeed, the said writs of execution need not even be
revived because they continue in effect during the period within which
the judgment may be enforced by motion, that is within five years
from entry of judgment, pursuant to Section 14,60 Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court in relation to Section 661 of the same Rule.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to
the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or (2) executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal
bias.62 In this case, the Court of Appeals issued the Resolution dated
May 30, 2006 granting Miaque’s prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction contrary to Section 21, Rule 70 and other relevant
provisions of the Rules of Court, as well as this Court’s
pronouncements in Teresa T. Gonzales La’O & Co., Inc. 63 and
Nisce.64 Thus, the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it issued the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 in CA-
G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603.
This Court notes that the controversy between the parties in this case
has been unduly protracted, considering that the decisions of the
MTCC, the RTC, the Court of Appeals, and this Court in favor of the
ATO and against Miaque on the ejectment case are already final and
executory. The Court of Appeals should therefore proceed
expeditiously in resolving CA-G.R. CEBSP No. 01603.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated
May 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603 is
ANNULLED for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals is directed to conduct its proceedings in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 01603 expeditiously and without delay.
SO ORDERED.
#19 G.R. No. 196219 July 30, 2014
SPOUSES MAURICIO M. TABINO and LEONILA DELA CRUZ-
TABINO, Petitioners,
vs.
LAZARO M. TABINO, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August
25, 2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107957,
entitled "Lazaro M Tabina, Petitioner, versus Spouses Mauricio Tabina
and Leonila dela Cruz-Tabina, Respondents," as well as its March 18,
2011 Resolution3 denying reconsideration of the assailed judgment.
Factual Antecedents
Proclamation No. 5184 (Proc. 518) e)(cluded from the operation of
Proc. 4235 – which established the military reservation known as Fort
Bonifacio situated in the then municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Pateros
and Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City – certain portions in
said reservation known and identified as BarangaysCembo, South
Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo, and Pitogo,
situated in Makati, and declared the sameopen for disposition in
accordance with Republic Act (RA) No. 274,6 and RA 7307 in relation to
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141.8
Among others, Proc. 518 allowed a maximum area of 300 square
meters for disposition to any bona fideoccupants/residents of said
BarangaysCembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo,
Comembo, Pembo, and Pitogo who have resided in or occupied such
areas on or before January 7, 1986.
In 1985, petitioner Mauricio M. Tabino (Mauricio) – a technical
sergeant in the military – and his brother, respondent Lazaro M.
Tabino – a colonel in the military – occupied a 353-square meter lot in
Pembo, Makati City. Mauricio established residence within the lot,
while respondent continued to reside in Novaliches, Quezon City. 9The
lot was later subdivided into two portions, denominated as Lots 2 and
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
3, Block 255, Zone 12, Group 10, Sampaguita Extension, Pembo,
Makati City.
Lot 2 – containing an area of 184 squaremeters – was applied for
coverage under Proc. 518 by Mauricio, while Lot 3 – containing an area
of 169 square meters – was applied for by respondent. Respondent
was later on issued by the Fort Bonifacio Post Commander a Revocable
Permit10 to occupy his lot, but the permit authorized him to occupy an
area of only 150 square meters.
In 1988, Lot 3 was awarded to respondent, and a Certificate 11 to such
effect was issued by the Bureau of Lands (now Land Management
Bureau).
On May 11, 2004, respondent filed an ejectment case against Mauricio
and the latter’s wife, Leonila dela Cruz (petitioners) with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati (MeTC). Docketedas Civil Case No.
85043 and assigned to Branch 64, the ejectment case is based on the
theory that respondent is the true and sole owner of the 353-square
meter lot; that he used Mauricio only for the purpose of circumventing
the 300-square meter limit set by Proc. 518 by asking the latter to
apply for the purchase of a portion of the lot after subdividing the
same into two smaller lots; that Mauricio’s stay in the premises is
merelyby tolerance of respondent; that petitioners introduced
permanent structures on the land; and that petitioners refused to
vacate the premises upon respondent’s formal demand. Respondent
thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to vacate Lots2 and 3 and to
pay the former rentals, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. 12
Petitioners counteredin their Answer13 that respondent had no right to
eject them; that the parties’ trueagreement was that petitioners would
act as caretakers of respondent’s Lot 3, and for this, respondent would
pay petitioners a monthly salary of ₱800.00; that respondent failed to
honor the agreement; and that relative to Lot 2, there was a pending
Protest filed with the Regional Executive Director of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)National Capital Region.
Protests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
It appears that petitioners and respondent both filed Protests with the
DENR relative to Lots 2 and 3. In a June 13, 2006 Decision,
respondent’s Protest – docketed as Case No. 2004-821 and entitled
"Lazaro M. Tabino, Protestant, versus Mauricio Tabino and Leonila C.
Tabino, Protestees" – was resolved as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Protest should be as it
is hereby "DENIED" for lack ofmerit. The MiscellaneousSales
Application filed by Mauricio Tabino over Lot 2, Block 255, Zone 12,
Group 190, Sampaguita St., Pembo, Makati should now be given due
course by this Office. x x x14
The DENR held in Case No. 2004-821 that respondent is not qualified
to acquire Lot 2 under Proc. 518 since he was already awarded a home
lot in Fort Bonifacio, specifically Lot 19, Block 22, Fort Bonifacio
(AFPOVAI), Taguig. Moreover, he failed to provethat Mauricio was not
a bona fideresident/occupant of Lot 2; on the contrary, it has been
shown that Mauricio, and not respondent, has been in actual
possession and occupation of the lot.
In an August 28, 2007 Order,15 the above disposition was reiterated
after respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
On the other hand, petitioners’ Protest,docketed as Case No. 2005-939
and entitled "Leonila Tabino and Adrian Tabino, Protestants, versus
Lazaro Tabino and Rafael Tabino, Respondents", was resolved in an
August 28, 2007 Order,16 which decreed thus –
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Protest lodged before this
Office on 21 January 2005 by Leonila Tabino and Adrian Tabino as
against the Application of Lazaro/Rafael Tabino over Lot 3, Blk. 255,
Zone 12, Pembo, Makati City is, as it is hereby "GRANTED". As a
consequence, the MSA (Unnumbered) of Rafael H. Tabino is hereby
CANCELLED and DROPPED from the records of the Office. Thus, the
Order dated July 16, 2004 re: Cancellation Order No. 04-032 should
be, as it is hereby SET ASIDE. After the finality of this Decision,
Claimant-Protestant Adrian Tabino may now file his land application
over the subject lot.
Page 45 of 69
SO ORDERED.17
The ruling in Case No. 2005-939 is similar to the pronouncement in
Case No. 2004-821: that respondent was disqualified from acquiring
any more lots within Fort Bonifacio pursuant to Proc. 518, since he was
previously awarded a home lot therein, specifically Lot 19, Block 22,
PEMBO,Fort Bonifacio (AFPOVAI), Taguig; that respondent is not a
bona fideresident/occupant of Lot 3, as he and his family actually
resided in Novaliches, Quezon City; and that Mauricio has been in
actual possession and occupation of Lot 3 since 1985.
Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
On April 4, 2008, a Decision18 was rendered in Civil Case No. 85043,
as follows:
The only issue to be resolved in this action to recover possession of
the subject property is the question on who is entitled to the physical
or material possession of the premises. In ejectment cases, the word
"possession" means nothing more than physical possession, not legal
possession, in the sense contemplated in civil law.
It is undisputed that the revocable permit extended to the plaintiff was
to occupy a parcel of land withan area of 150 square meters. Suffice it
to say that beyond the 150 square meterswould be contrary to the
permit extended to the plaintiff to occupy the lot. Plaintiff therefore,
would violate the provisions of the revocable permit if he goes beyond
whatwas specified therein or up to 150 square meters. When the land
was declared open pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 274
and Republic Act No. 730 both parties applied in their respective name
pursuant to the size of the land which they are permitted. Since then
defendants have been in possession of the subject property up to the
present pursuant to the permit to occupy the subject land.
Furthermore, defendants had acquired the property in their own name,
a valid claim to establish possession.
Plaintiff’s contention thatdefendants’ stay on the premises is by mere
tolerance is devoid of merit. Well-established is the rule that findings
of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also
finality when the decision or order is not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. The
order dated August 28, 2007 by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources affirming its previous decision in Case No. 2004-821
dated June13, 2006 clearly stating therein that defendants are
awardees of Lot 2, Block 255, Zone 12, Sampaguita Street, Pembo,
Makati City, are accorded with respect and finality. Truly, defendants
are rightful possessors of the subject property.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the complaint as well as
defendants’ counterclaim are herebyordered Dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Respondent appealed before the Makati Regional Trial Court
(RTC),20 but in a February 19, 2009 Decision21 the RTC affirmed the
MeTC in toto, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court Branch 64, Makati City dated April 4, 2008 in Civil Case No.
85043 is hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.
SO ORDERED.22
The RTC agreed with the MeTC in ruling that respondent is not entitled
to possession of the disputed premises on account of the DENR
findings in Case Nos. 2005-939 and 2004-821 that petitioners are
registeredclaimants and bona fideresidents thereof, and have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof under a
bona fideclaim of ownership,while respondent was permitted to occupy
an area of only 150 square meters and not more; petitioner would be
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
in direct violation of his permit ifhe were to occupy more than the
allowed area stated in said permit.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondent filed his Petition for Review 23 with the CA, assailing the
RTC Decision and insisting that he had a better right of possession
since he was the bona fideoccupant of the disputed lot and Mauricio
was merely his caretaker. He added that in 1994, Mauricio executed
an Affidavit24 (1994 affidavit) acknowledging that respondent was the
true owner of Lot 2 and that he was merely allowed by the latter to
occupy the same and introduce improvements thereon; this operated
as an admission against interest which may be used against
petitioners. Finally, respondent argued that the decision in the DENR
Protest is not yet final and executory on account of his pending
appeal; thus, the courts may not rely on the findings contained
therein. On August 25, 2010, the CA issued the assailed Decision,
which held thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is
GRANTED. The assailed decisions ofthe RTC and the MeTC are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ejectment suit filed by the petitioner
against the respondents over Lot Nos. 2 and 3 is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the respondents are ordered to vacate the subject
premises.
SO ORDERED.25
In reversing the trial court, the CA held that the 1994 affidavit – which
petitioners do not dispute – should be taken as an admission by
Mauricio that he was merely appointed by respondent as the caretaker
of Lot 2, and that respondent is the true possessor and owner thereof.
This being the case, petitioners occupy the premises by mere tolerance
of respondent, and are boundto the implied promise that they shall
vacate the sameupon demand. The CAadded that while respondent
was authorized to occupy only 150 square meters, this was irrelevant
since the only issue that must be resolvedin an unlawful detainer case
is actual physical or material possession, independent of any claim of
ownership; since respondent has satisfactorily shown by preponderant
evidence that he was in actual possession of Lots 2 and 3, he is
entitled to recover the same from petitioners.
The CA also held that while respondent’s application for Lot 2 was
denied by the DENR in its June 13, 2006 Decision– since he was
already an awardee of another lot within Fort Bonifacio, the issue of
possession was not touched upon. For this reason, the DENR Decision
has no bearing on the unlawful detainer case. Additionally, the DENR
rulings are still the subject of appeals, and thus could not have
conclusive effect.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but in a March 18, 2011
Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. CAN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE DENR IN
RESOLVING CONFLICTING CLAIMS AS TO WHO HAS A
BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION BETWEEN PETITIONERS
AND RESPONDENT OVER SUBJECT PARCELS OF LOT BE
NULLIFIED BY THE COURT UNDER AN EJECTMENT CASE?
2. HAS THE COURT VALIDLY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION TO
HEAR AND ADJUDICATE ON REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF
FACTS BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY WITHOUT HAVING
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FIRST EXHAUSTED?
3. HAS RESPONDENT VIOLATEDTHE RULE AGAINST FORUM-
SHOPPING IN FILING EJECTMENT CASE AGAINST
PETITIONERS DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE
MISCELLANEOUS SALES APPLICATION CASES BEFORE THE
DENR WHICH ADMINISTRATIVE BODY, IN EXERCISE OF ITS
QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION, HAS FIRST ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME PARTIES, SAME SUBJECT
MATTER AND SAME ISSUES OF FACT AND LAW?26
Page 46 of 69
Petitioners’ Arguments
In their Petition and Reply,27 petitioners seek a reversal of the assailed
CA dispositions and the reinstatement of the MeTC’s April 4, 2008
Decision, arguing that the ejectment case constituted an attack on the
DENR rulings in Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 – which
disqualified respondent from acquiring Lots 2 and 3 on the ground that
he was already an awardee of a lot within Fort Bonifacio; that Mauricio
has been in actual possession and occupation of Lots 2 and 3 since
1985; and that respondent is not a bona fideresident/occupant of Lot 2
or 3 – which is not allowed, as it encroached on the administrative
authority of the DENR. They argue that respondent should not have
resorted to the ejectment case; instead, he should have exhausted all
administrativeremedies made available to him through the DENR.
Petitioners add that respondent is guilty of forum-shopping in filing the
ejectment case without awaiting resolution of the pending DENR
Protests, which necessarily touched upon the issue of possession.
Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent argues in his Comment28 that petitioners are estopped
from claiming that the ejectment case indirectlyattacked the DENR
rulings and that it constituted forum-shopping, since these issues were
not raised by petitioners in their pleadings below; thatthe courts are
not divested of jurisdiction over the ejectment case, since the only
issue involved therein is possession and not who is entitled to a
miscellaneous sales application covering the disputed lot – which the
DENR is tasked to determine; and thatas a consequence of Mauricio’s
1994 affidavit, petitioners are estopped from questioning respondent’s
possession.
Our Ruling
The Court partially grants the Petition.
Respondent is correct in arguing that petitioners may not raise the
issues of exhaustion of administrative remedies and forum-shopping,
after having voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
MeTC and the RTC trying the ejectment case. Besides, these issues are
being raised for the first time at this stage of the proceedings.
Moreover, petitioners in the instant Petition pray for the reinstatement
of the MeTC Decision;as such, they cannot be allowed to
simultaneously attack and adopt the proceedings or actions taken by
the lower courts.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that the appellate court erred in ordering
petitioners to vacate the premises. With the pendency of the DENR
Protests – Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 – respondent’s claim of
possession and his right to recover the premises is seriously placed in
issue. If the ejectment case – Civil Case No. 85043 – is allowed to
proceed without awaiting the result of the DENR Protests, then a
situation might arise where the existing structures thereon would have
to be demolished. If petitioners’ position, as affirmed by the DENR, is
further upheld with finality by the courts, then it would mean that
respondent had no right to occupy or take possession of the subject
lots, which thus negates his right to institute and maintain the
ejectment case; and an injustice would have occurred as a
consequence of the demolition of petitioners’ residence and other
permanent improvements on the disputed lots.
Indeed, DENR Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 have found their
way to the CA, and the pronouncementsof the latter do not exactly
favor respondent. Thus, in CA-G.R. SP No. 125056, entitled "Lazaro M.
Tabino, Petitioner, versus Mauricio M. Tabino and Leonila C. Tabino,
Respondents," the CA dismissed respondent’s Petition for Review of
the DENR Secretary’s affirmance of the DENR NCR Regional Executive
Director’s June 13, 2006 Decision in Case No. 2004-821. In its January
13, 2014 Decision,29 the CA’s 6th Division held as follows:
The DENR Secretary, acting through the OIC, Assistant Secretary for
Legal Services, denied the appeal on the basis that upon findings of
the Regional Executive Director, Mauricio has all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications based on the disposition of Public Lands.
The DENR further ruled that upon ocular inspection made, it was
ascertained that 1) per records, Mauricio is a survey claimant of Lot 2,
Block 255, Psd-a3-0054204 with an area of 184 sq.m. situated in
Pembo, Makati City; 2) that the land is residential in nature, a house
stands erected in said area where Mauricio and his family reside; 3)
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
that a portion of the said area is being utilized as a carinderiaand a
sari-sari store as their family’s business; 4) thatMauricio is occupying
the area since 1985 up to the present; 5) that Lazaro Tabino
(petitioner) is actually residing in Quezon City; and, 6) the Yvonne
Josephine Tabino, petitioner Lazaro Tabino and Rafael Tabino are
bonafideresidents of Quezon City for noless than twenty years, per
Certification of Barangay Chairman Almario Francisco on 2 September
2004 of Barangay San Agustin, Novaliches, Quezon City. Further, the
DENR held that the above findings were never refuted by the
petitioner.
On this point, it is worth stressing that the courts generally accord
great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative
agencies because of their special knowledgeand expertise over matters
falling under their jurisdiction. Echoing the explanation of the private
respondent DENR, citing the case of Ortua vs. Encarnacion, the
findings of facts of the Director of Land (now the Regional Director) is
conclusive in the absence of any showing that such decision was
rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition or mistake, other than
error of judgment in estimating the value or effect ofevidence,
regardless of whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of
evidence, so long as there is some evidence upon which the findings in
question could be made.
Moreover, notwithstanding the issue of physical possession having
been ruled upon by the Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 107957, it is well to
note that in the case of Estrella vs. Robles, it was explained that the
Bureau of Lands determines the respective rights of rival claimants to
public lands, but it does not have the wherewithal to police public
lands. Neither does it have the means to prevent disorders or breaches
of the peace among the occupants. Its power is clearly limited to
disposition and alienation and any power to decide disputes over
possession is but in aid of making the proper awards.
xxxx
In disposing of the case of Estrella, the Supreme Court held that,
"Under the Public Land Act, the Director of Lands primarily and the
DENR Secretary ultimately have the authority to dispose of and
manage public lands. And while the DENR’s jurisdiction over public
lands does not negate the authority of courts of justice to resolve
questions of possession, the DENR’s decision would prevail with regard
to the respective rights of public land claimants. Regular courts would
have no jurisdiction to inquire intothe validity of the award of the
public land."
Under the circumstances, the Court finds no reason to disturb the
ruling of public respondent DENR in its disposition of the subject
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
In the second case decided by the CA – CA-G.R. SP No. 126100
entitled "Lazaro M. Tabino and Rafael H. Tabino, Petitioners, versus
Leonila C. Tabino and Adrian C. Tabino, Respondents" relative to the
disposition in DENR Case No. 2005-939, the appellate court’s 9th
Division held in a June 28, 2013 Decision30 that –
We agree with the respondents and dismiss the petition for petitioners’
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone
of Our judicial system. The thrust of the ruleis that courts must allow
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser
expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies.
Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from
a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed.
Another important reason for the doctrine of exhaustion is the
separation of powers, which enjoins the Judiciary a becoming policy of
non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively)
withinthe competence of the other departments. The theory is that the
Page 47 of 69
administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions
addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by
subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if
given a chance to do so. Strict enforcement of the rule could also
relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which
otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.
Thus, the party with an administrative remedy must not only
commence with the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain
relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking
judicial intervention to give the administrative agency an opportunity
to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the court. The non-observance of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of
action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the
dismissal of the complaint.
Indeed, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits
of exceptions, but none of these apply in this
case.1âwphi1 Consequently, Lazaro and Rafael should have first
appealed to the Office ofthe President, which has the power to review
the orders or acts of the DENR Secretary, being his subordinate,
before coming to Us through a petition for review. x x x
xxxx
FOR THESE REASONS, WeDISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
In Samonte v. Century Savings Bank,31 this Court made the following
pronouncement:
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of a
pending civil action. In Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, and Amagan v.
Marayag, we ordered the suspension of the ejectment proceedings on
considerations of equity. We explained that the ejectment of
petitioners therein would mean a demolition of their house and would
create confusion, disturbance, inconvenience, and expense.
Needlessly, the court would be wasting much time and effort by
proceeding to a stage wherein the outcome would at best be
temporary but the result of enforcement would be permanent, unjust
and probably irreparable.32
On the other hand, Vda. de Legaspi v. Hon. Avendaño, 33 which
Samonte refers to, states:
x x x Where the action, therefore, [is] one of illegal detainer, as
distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right ofthe plaintiff to
recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial
proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of
confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its
concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the
issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is
brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed
with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer
case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case
involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has
been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to
physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the
prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might
ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved,
thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force,
strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.34
More significantly, Amagan v. Marayag35 dictates, thus –
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by
the mere filing before the regional trial court (R TC) of another action
raising ownership of the property as an issue. As an exception,
however, unlawful detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal,
on considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners'
house would result from the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial
court (MCTC) judgrnent.36
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
In light of the developments in the DENR Protests, the Court cannot in
good conscience order the petitioners to vacate the premises at this
point. The better alternative would be to await the outcome of these
Protests, before any action is taken in the ejectment case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed August
25, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107957 is
MODIFIED, in that the directive for petitioners to vacate the suqject
premises is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the proceedings in the ejectment case, Civil Case No.
85043, are ordered SUSPENDED until the proceedings in DENR Case
Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 are concluded. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
#20 G.R. No. 156995 January 12, 2015
RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, CONCEPCION
GONZALES AND LUIS MANALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) shall decide the appeal of the judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) in unlawful detainer or forcible entry cases on the basis of
the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda and/or briefs as may be required by the RTC. There is no
trial de nova of the case.
The Case
The petitioners assail the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68419,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC, Branch 49, in Guagua,
Pampanga, and reinstated the judgment rendered on August 31, 2000
by the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga dismissing their complaint for
unlawful detainer and the respondents’ counterclaim. They also hereby
assail the resolution promulgated on January 24, 2003 denying their
motion for reconsideration.2
Antecedents
Petitioners Ruben Manalang, Amado Manalang, Carlos Manalang,
Concepcion M. Gonzales, Ladislao Manalang and Luis Manalang were
the co-owners of Lot No 4236 with an area of 914 square meters of
the Guagua Cadastre, and declared for taxation purposes in the name
of Tomasa B. Garcia. The land was covered by approved survey plan
Ap-03-004154. Adjacent to Lot 4236 was the respondents’ Lot No.
4235 covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. N-216701. In
1997, the petitioners caused the relocation and verification survey of
Lot 4236 and the adjoining lots, and the result showed that the
respondents had encroached on Lot No. 4236 to the extent of 405
square meters. A preliminary relocation survey conducted by the
Lands Management Section of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) confirmed the result on the encroachment.
When the respondents refused to vacate the encroached portion and
to surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the
petitioners commenced this action for unlawful detainer on April 21,
1997 in the MTC of Guagua (Civil Case No. 3309), and the casewas
assigned to Branch 2 of that court.3
On September 17, 1998, the MTC (Branch 2) dismissed Civil Case No.
3309 for lack of jurisdiction based onits finding that the action involved
an essentially boundary dispute that should be properly resolved in an
accion reivindicatoria.4 It stated that the complaint did not aver any
contract, whether express or implied, between the petitioners and the
respondents that qualified the case as one for unlawful detainer; and
that there was also no showing that the respondents were in
possession of the disputed area by the mere tolerance of the
petitioners due to the latter having become aware of the
encroachment only after the relocation survey held in 1997.
Page 48 of 69
On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC (Branch 2), and
remanded the case for further proceedings,5holding that because there
was an apparent withholding of possession of the property and the
action was brought within one year from such withholding of
possession the proper action was ejectment which was within the
jurisdiction of the MTC; and that the case was not a boundary dispute
that could be resolved in an accion reinvidicatoria, considering that it
involved a sizeable area of property and not a mere transferring of
boundary.6
Upon remand, the MTC, Branch 1,7 ultimately dismissed the complaint
and counterclaim for lack ofmerit through the decision rendered on
August 31, 2000,8 ruling that the petitioners failed to adduce clear and
convincing evidence showing that the respondents had encroached on
their property and had been occupying and possessing property
outside the metes and bounds described in Bienvenido Bacani’s OCT
No. N-216701; that the preponderance of evidence was in favor of the
respondents’ right of possession; and that the respondent’s
counterclaim for damages should also be dismissed, there being no
showing that the complaint had been filed in gross and evident bad
faith.9
Once more, the petitioners appealed to the RTC.
At that point, the RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation
survey to determine their allegation of encroachment, and also heard
the testimony of the surveyor, Engr. Emmanuel Limpin, then Acting
Chief of the Survey Section of the CENR- DENR.
On September 19, 2001,10 the RTC rendered its judgment whereby it
reversed and set aside the MTC’s decision of August 31, 2000,
observing that the respondents had encroached on the petitioners’
property based on the court-ordered relocation survey, the reports by
Engr. Limpin, and his testimony;11 that the respondents could not rely
on their OCT No. N-216701, considering that although their title
covered only 481 squaremeters, the relocation survey revealed that
they had occupied also 560 square meters of the petitioners’ Lot No.
4236;12 that the petitioners did not substantiate their claims for
reasonable compensation, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses; and
that, nevertheless, after it had been established that the respondents
had encroached upon and used a portion of the petitioners’ property,
the latter were entitled to ₱1,000.00/month as reasonable
compensation from the filing of the complaint up to time that the
respondents actually vacated the encroached property, plus
₱20,000.00 attorney’s fees.13
The respondents moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied their
motion for its lack of merit.14
The respondents appealed.
On October 18, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,15 viz:
WHEREFORE, the appealed RTC decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the decisions of the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga, Branches
1 and 2, are REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The CA concluded that the RTC,by ordering the relocation and
verification survey "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" upon motion of
the petitioners and over the objection of the respondents, and making
a determination of whether there was an encroachment based on such
survey and testimony of the surveyor, had acted as a trial court in
complete disregard of the second paragraph of Section 18, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court. It declared such action by the RTC as unwarranted
because it amounted to the reopening of the trial, which was not
allowed under Section 13(3) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It observed
that the relocation and verification survey was inconclusive inasmuch
as the surveyor had himself admitted that he could not determine
which of the three survey plans he had used was correct without a full-
blown trial.
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
The CA held that considering that the petitioners’ complaint for
unlawful detainer did not set forth when and how the respondents had
entered the land in question and constructed their houses thereon,
jurisdiction did not vest in the MTC totry and decide the case; that the
complaint, if at all, made out a case for either accion reivindicatoria or
accion publiciana, either of which fell within the original jurisdiction of
the RTC; and that the RTC’s reliance on Benitez v. Court of
Appeals16 and Calubayan v. Ferrer17 was misplaced, because the
controlling ruling was that in Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 18 in which
the complaint was markedly similar to that filed in the case.
The petitioners sought reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion
for its lack of merit in the resolution of January 24, 2003. 19
Issues
Hence, this appeal.
The petitioners contend that the RTC had authority to receive
additional evidence on appeal in anejectment case because it was not
absolutely confined to the records of the trial in resolving the appeal;
that the respondents were estopped from assailing the relocation and
verification survey ordered by the RTC because they had actively
participated in the survey and had even cross-examined Engr. Limpin,
the surveyor tasked to conduct the survey;20 that Engr. Limpin’s
testimony must be given credence, honoring the well-entrenched
principle of regularity in the performance of official functions;21 that
the RTC did not conduct a trial de novoby ordering the relocation and
verification surveyand hearing the testimony of the surveyor; that the
desirability of the relocation and verification survey had always been
part of the proceedings even before the case was appealed to the
RTC;22that, in any case, the peculiar events that transpired justified
the RTC’s order to conduct a relocation and verification survey; 23 that
the case, because it involved encroachment into another’s property,
qualified as an ejectment case that was within the jurisdiction of the
MTC; and that the respondents were barred by laches for never
questioning the RTC’s February 11, 1999 ruling on the issue of
jurisdiction.24
In contrast, the respondents assail the relocation and verification
survey ordered by the RTC as immaterial, because (a) it could not vest
a right of possession or ownership; (b) the petitioners were mere
claimants, not the owners of the property; (c) the petitioner had never
been in possession of the area in question; and (d) cadastral surveys
were not reliable. Hence, they maintain that whether or not the
relocation and verification survey was considered would not alter the
outcome of the case.25
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
To start with, the RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment
case, shall not conduct a rehearing or trial de novo. 26 In this
connection, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Courtclearly provides:
Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in
actions involving title or ownership. — x x x.
xxxx
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate
Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the
entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or
required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)
Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of
the relocation and verification survey "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction" and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing
so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation was
accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based
on the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of
the proceedings had in the court of origin. Secondly, on whether or not
Civil Case No. 3309 was an ejectment case within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, decisive are the allegations of the
Page 49 of 69
complaint. Accordingly, the pertinent allegations of the petitioners’
complaint follow:
2. Plaintiffs are co-owners ofland known as Lot no. 4236 of
the Guagua cadastre. Plaintiffs inherited the said parcel of
residential land from Tomasa B. Garcia-Manalang who is the
absolute owner of the said property and the same is
declared for taxation purposes in her name under Tax
Declaration No. 07014906, a copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "A";
3. Lot No. 4236 is covered by an approved plan, Plan Ap-03-
004154 (a copy made Annex ‘B") and it consists of 914
square meters;
4. Adjacent to plaintiff’s [p]roperty is Lot No. 4235 of the
Guagua Cadastre and covered by approved plan As-03-
00533 (copy made Annex "C") which is being claimed by
defendants and is the subject matter of Cadastral Case No.
N-229 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Branch 53
where a decision (copy made Annex "D") was rendered by
said court on August 28, 1996 confirming the title over said
lot in favor of defendant Bienvenido Bacani. The said
decision is now final and executory …
5. On February 23, 1997, plaintiffs caused the relocation and
verification survey of cadastral Not No. 4236 of the Guagua
Cadastre belonging to plaintiff and the adjoining lots,
particularly Lot No. 4235 being claimed by defendants;
6. The relocation and verification survey conducted by Engr.
Rufo R. Rivera, a duly licensed Geodetic Engineer per plan
(copy made Annex "F") revealed that defendants had
encroached an area of 405 square meters of the parcel of
land belonging to plaintiffs. In fact, the whole or part of the
houses of the said defendants have been erected in said
encroached portion;
7. Sometime in June of 1997, plaintiffs through plaintiff
Concepcion Gonzales lodged a complaint before the
Barangay Council of San Juan, Guagua, Pampanga against
defendants regarding the encroached portion. A preliminary
relocation survey was conducted by the Lands Management
Sector of the DENR and it was found that indeed, defendants
encroached into the parcel of land belonging to plaintiffs.
This finding was confirmed by the approved plan Ap-03-
004154;
8. Since defendants refused to vacate the premises and
surrender the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiff, the
Barangay Captain of San Juan, Guagua, Pampanga issued a
certification to file action (copy made Annex "G’) dated
March 4, 1997 to enable the plaintiff to file the appropriate
action in court;
9. On March 10, 1997, plaintiffs senta formal demand letter
(copy made Annex ‘H") to defendants to vacate the premises
and to pay reasonable compensation for the use of the said
encroached portion;
10. Despite receipt of said demand letter per registry return
cards attached to the letter, defendants failed and refused to
vacate the encroached portion and surrender the peaceful
possession thereof to plaintiffs;
11. Plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable compensation in
the amount of P 3,000.00 from defendants for the illegal use
and occupation of their property by defendants;
12. By reason of the unjust refusal of defendants to vacate
the premises and pay reasonable compensation to plaintiffs,
the latter were constrained to engage the services of counsel
for ₱30,00.00 plus ₱1,000.00 per appearance and incur
litigation expenses in the amount of ₱10,000.00.27
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
Given the foregoing allegations, the case should be dismissed without
prejudice to the filing of a non-summary action like accion
reivindicatoria. In our view, the CA correctly held that a boundary
dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not
an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but
encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant
formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute cannot be
settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings
under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In
unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession
of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right to hold
such possession under any contract, express or implied. The
defendant’s possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful
only because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession.
In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the
very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff
and the defendant had the prior possession de facto.
Thirdly, the MTC dismissed the action because it did not have
jurisdiction over the case. The dismissal was correct. It is fundamental
that the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought by the complaint determine the nature of the action and the
court that has jurisdiction over the action.28 To be clear, unlawful
detainer is an action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.29 To vest in
the MTC the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment from the land of the
respondents as the occupants in unlawful detainer, therefore, the
complaint should embody such a statement of facts clearly showing
the attributes of unlawful detainer.30 However, the allegations of the
petitioners' complaint did not show that they had permitted or
tolerated the occupation of the portion of their property by the
respondents; or how the respondents' entry had been effected, or how
and when the dispossession by the respondents had started. All that
the petitioners alleged was the respondents' "illegal use and
occupation" of the property. As such, the action was not unlawful
detainer.
Lastly, the conclusion by the MTC that the petitioners failed to show by
clear and convincing evidence that the respondents had encroached on
the petitioners' property was also warranted. In contrast, the only
basis for the RTC's decision was the result of the relocation and
verification survey as attested to by the surveyor, but that basis
should be disallowed for the reasons earlier mentioned. Under the
circumstances, the reinstatement of the ruling of the MTC by the CA
was in accord with the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October
18, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
#21 G.R. No. 217694 January 27, 2016
FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
ARTURO LOO PO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to reverse and set
aside the October 31, 2014 Decision2 and the March 6, 2015
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 134701
which affirmed the September 16, 2013 Decision4 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 67 (RTC) in SCA Case No. 3831. The RTC
decision, in turn, sustained the March 21, 2013 Decision5 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig City (MeTC), which
dismissed the unlawful detainer case filed by petitioner Fairland
Knitcraft Corporation (Fairland) against respondent Arturo Loo
Po (Po) for failure to prove its case by preponderance of evidence.
The Antecedents
Page 50 of 69
In a complaint6 for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No.
19429, filed before the MeTC, Fairland alleged that it was the owner of
Condominium Unit No. 205 in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street,
Pasig City. The said unit was leased by Fairland to Po by verbal
agreement, with a rental fee of P20,000.00 a month, to be paid by Po
at the beginning of each month. From March 2011, Po had
continuously failed to pay rent. For said reason, Fairland opted not to
renew the lease agreement anymore.
On January 30, 2012, Fairland sent a formal letter7 to Po demanding
that he pay the amount of P220,000.00, representing the rental
arrears, and that he vacate the leased premises within fifteen (15)
days from the receipt of the letter. Despite receipt of the demand
letter and the lapse of the said 15-day period to comply, Po neither
tendered payment for the unpaid rent nor vacated the premises. Thus,
on December 12, 2012, Fairland was constrained to file the complaint
for unlawful detainer before the MeTC. Po had until January 7, 2013 to
file his answer but he failed to do so. Hence, on February 6, 2013,
Fairland filed a motion to render judgment.8
In its February 21, 2013 Order,9 the MeTC considered the case
submitted for decision.
On March 1, 2013, Po’s counsel filed his Entry of Appearance with
Motion for Leave of Court to file Comment/Opposition to Motion to
Render Judgment.10 In the attached Comment/Opposition, Po denied
the allegations against him and commented that there was no
supporting document that would show that Fairland owned the
property; that there was no lease contract between them; that there
were no documents attached to the complaint which would show that
previous demands had been made and received by him; that the
alleged unpaid rental was P220,000.00, but the amount of damages
being prayed for was P440,000.00; that the issue in the case was one
of ownership; and that it was the RTC which had jurisdiction over the
case.
The MeTC treated the comment/opposition as Po’s answer to the
complaint. Considering, however, that the case fell under the Rules of
Summary Procedure, the same was deemed filed out of time. Hence,
the motion was denied.11
The Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
In its March 21, 2013 Decision, the MeTC dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit due to Fairland’s failure to prove its claim by
preponderance of evidence. The MeTC explained that although the
complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action, Fairland failed to prove
that it was entitled to the possession of the subject property. There
was no evidence presented to support its claim against Po either.
Aggrieved, Fairland seasonably filed its appeal before the RTC under
Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. Being an appealed case, the RTC
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
In its memorandum,12 Fairland argued that an unlawful detainer case
was a special civil action governed by summary procedure. In cases
where a defendant failed to file his answer, there was no need for a
declaration of default. Fairland claimed that the Rules stated that in
such cases, judgment should be based on the “facts alleged in the
complaint,”13 and that there was no requirement that judgment must
be based on facts proved by preponderance of evidence. Considering
that the presentation of evidence was not required when a defendant
in an ejectment case failed to appear in a preliminary conference, the
same should be applied when no answer had been filed.
Fairland continued that the failure to file an answer in an ejectment
case was tantamount to an admission by the defendant of all the
ultimate facts alleged in the complaint. There was no more need for
evidence in such a situation as every allegation of ultimate facts in the
complaint was deemed established by the defendant’s acquiescence.
On July 18, 2013, Po filed his memorandum14 and countered that there
was no merit in Fairland’s insistence that evidence was unnecessary
when no answer had been filed. The facts stated in the complaint did
not warrant a rendition of judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. The court
had the discretion to rule on the pleadings based on its evaluation of
the allegation of facts.
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
Further, all the statements in the complaint were mere allegations
which were not substantiated by any competent evidence. Po asserted
that there was no proof presented to show that the subject property
was indeed owned by Fairland; that there was no lease contract
between the parties; that he never received the demand letter, dated
January 30, 2012; and that the amount stated in the prayer of the
complaint did not coincide with the amount of unpaid rent. Po also
reiterated that the case involved an issue of ownership over the
condominium unit he was occupying.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 16, 2013, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling and agreed
that Fairland failed to establish its case by preponderance of evidence.
There was nothing on record that would establish Fairland’s right over
the property subject of the complaint. Though it had been consistently
ruled that the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case was the
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent
of any claim of ownership by any of the party-litigants, the court may
go beyond the question of physical possession provisionally. The RTC
concluded that even assuming that Po was not the lawful owner, his
actual physical possession of the subject property created the
presumption that he was entitled to its possession thereof.
Fairland filed a motion for reconsideration15 attaching its condominium
certificate of title16 over the subject property, but it was denied by the
RTC in its Order,17 dated February 24, 2014.
Undaunted, Fairland filed a petition for review 18 under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court before the CA.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In the assailed Decision, dated October 31, 2014, the CA dismissed
the petition and ruled that an action for unlawful detainer would not lie
against Po. Notwithstanding the abbreviated proceeding it ordained
and the limited pleadings it allowed, the Rules on Summary Procedure
did not relax the rules on evidence. In order for an action for recovery
of possession to prosper, it was indispensable that he who brought the
action should prove not only his ownership but also the identity of the
property claimed. The CA concluded, however, that Fairland failed to
discharge such bounden duty.
Fairland filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
CA in its assailed Resolution, dated March 6, 2015.
Hence, this petition.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS
I
IN AN EJECTMENT CASE WHEREIN NO ANSWER WAS
SEASONABLY FILED, IT IS AN ERROR OF LAW TO BASE
JUDGMENT ON PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
II
HOLDING THAT EVIDENCE IN AN EJECTMENT CASE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN ATTACHED TO THE COMPLAINT IS AN ERROR OF
LAW.19
Fairland argues that in ejectment cases, presentation of evidence was
undertaken through the submission of position papers but the same
was dispensed with when the defendant failed to file an answer or
when either party failed to appear during the preliminary conference.
In an ejectment case, the scope of inquiry should be limited to the
sufficiency of the cause of action stated in the complaint when no
seasonable answer was filed. The attachment of documentary evidence
to the Complaint was not a requirement and was even proscribed by
law.
In his Comment,20 Po countered that the present petition raised a
question of fact. Although couched in different words, the issues raised
Page 51 of 69
here were substantially the same as the issues raised before the CA.
There was no legal basis in Fairland’s assertion that evidence was
dispensed with when no answer to the complaint had been filed. Such
argument would undermine the inherent authority of the courts to
resolve legal issues based on the facts of the case and on the rules on
evidence. Contrary to Fairland’s position, the court decided the case on
the basis of the complaint which was found wanting in preponderance
of evidence.
In its Reply,21 Fairland posited that the petition did not raise mere
questions of fact but one of law as what was being sought for review
was the erroneous dismissal of the ejectment case for lack of
preponderance of evidence. Since no answer was filed and the
complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action for unlawful detainer, it
became the duty of the MeTC to decide the case in its favor.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Complaint has a valid cause of action for Unlawful Detainer
Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements
for filing a complaint for unlawful detainer, to wit:
Section 1. – Who may institute proceedings, and when. –
Subject to the provision of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or
the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within
one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding
of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial
Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding
or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.1âwphi1
Stated differently, unlawful detainer is a summary action for the
recovery of possession of real property. This action may be filed by a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person from whom the possession of
any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract,
express or implied. The possession of the defendant was originally
legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an
express or implied contract between them. The defendant’s
possession, however, became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that
the defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the
defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer
must be instituted one year from the unlawful withholding of
possession.22
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer
if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of the property by
the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2)
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff
to the defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property,
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one
(1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.23
There is no question that the complaint filed by Fairland adequately
alleged a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The pertinent portion of
the said complaint reads:
xxx
3. Plaintiff is the owner of, and had been leasing to the
defendant, the premises mentioned above as the residence
of the latter;
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
4. There is no current written lease contract between
plaintiff and the defendant, but the latter agreed to pay the
former the amount of Php20,000.00 as rent at the beginning
of each month. Thus, the term of the lease agreement is
renewable on a month-to-month basis;
5. Since March 2011, defendant has not been paying the
aforesaid rent despite plaintiff’s repeated demands;
6. Due to defendant’s continuous failure to pay rent, plaintiff
reached a decision not to renew the lease agreement. It sent
a formal letter, x x x demanding defendant to pay the
amount of Php220,000.00, representing defendant’s twelve
month rental arrears beginning January 2011, and to vacate
the leased premises, both within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of said letter;
7. Despite receipt of the aforesaid demand letter and lapse
of the fifteen day period given to comply with plaintiff’s
demand, defendant neither tendered payment for the unpaid
rent nor vacated the leased premises. Worse, defendant has
not been paying rent up to now;
x x x24
The above-cited portions of the complaint sufficiently alleged that
Fairland was the owner of the subject property being leased to Po by
virtue of an oral agreement. There was a demand by Fairland for Po to
pay rent and vacate before the complaint for unlawful detainer was
instituted. The complaint was seasonably filed within the one-year
period prescribed by law. With all the elements present, there was
clearly a cause of action in the complaint for unlawful detainer.
Under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the weight of evidence is not
considered when a judgment is rendered based on the complaint
The question now is whether the MeTC correctly dismissed the case for
lack of preponderance of evidence. Fairland posits that judgment
should have been rendered in its favor on the basis of the complaint
itself and not on its failure to adduce proof of ownership over the
subject property.
The Court agrees with Fairland’s position.
The summons, together with the complaint and its annexes, was
served upon Po on December 28, 2012. This presupposes that the
MeTC found no ground to dismiss the action for unlawful
detainer.25 Nevertheless, Po failed to file his answer on time and the
MeTC had the option to render judgment motu proprio or on motion of
the plaintiff. In relation thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules on
Summary Procedure provide:
Sec. 5. Answer. – Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the
defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy
thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded
therein shall be deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not
asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to
counterclaims or cross-claims shall be filed and served within ten (10)
days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded.
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendant fail to
answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court,
motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for therein. The court may in its
discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney’s fees claimed
for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to
the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are
two or more defendants.
[Emphasis Supplied]
Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to file his answer,
the court shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon plaintiff’s
motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and
Page 52 of 69
limited to what is prayed for. The failure of the defendant to timely
file his answer and to controvert the claim against him constitutes his
acquiescence to every allegation stated in the complaint. Logically,
there is nothing to be done in this situation26 except to render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint. 27
Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which
governs the rules for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, if the
defendant fails to answer the complaint within the period provided, the
court has no authority to declare the defendant in default. Instead, the
court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment
as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for.28
This has been enunciated in the case of Don Tino Realty and
Development Corporation v. Florentino,29 citing Bayog v.
Natino,30 where the Court held that there was no provision for an entry
of default under the Rules of Summary Procedure if the defendant
failed to file his answer.
In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint despite proper
service of summons. He also failed to provide a sufficient justification
to excuse his lapses.1âwphi1 Thus, as no answer was filed, judgment
must be rendered by the court as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint.
Failure to attach annexes is not fatal if the complaint alleges a
sufficient cause of action; evidence need not be attached to the
complaint
The lower courts erroneously dismissed the complaint of Fairland
simply on the ground that it failed to establish by preponderance of
evidence its ownership over the subject property. As can be gleaned
above, the rules do not compel the plaintiff to attach his evidence to
the complaint because, at this inception stage, he only has to file his
complaint to establish his cause of action. Here, the court was only
tasked to determine whether the complaint of Fairland alleged a
sufficient cause of action and to render judgment thereon.
Also, there was no need to attach proof of ownership in the complaint
because the allegations therein constituted a sufficient cause of action
for unlawful detainer. Only when the allegations in the complaint are
insufficient to form a cause of action shall the attachment become
material in the determination thereof. Even under Section 4 of the
Rules of Summary Procedure,31 it is not mandatory to attach annexes
to the complaint.
In the case of Lazaro v. Brewmaster32 (Lazaro), where judgment was
rendered based on the complaint due to the failure of the defendant to
file an answer under the Rules of Summary Procedure, it was written
that:
xxx To determine whether the complaint states a cause of action, all
documents attached thereto may, in fact, be considered, particularly
when referred to in the complaint. We emphasize, however, that
the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the
material allegations in the complaint. Thus, consideration of
the annexed documents should only be taken in the context of
ascertaining the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint.
[Emphasis Supplied]
In Lazaro, the assailed invalid invoices attached to the complaint were
not considered because the complaint already alleged a sufficient
cause of action for collection of sum of money. Those assailed
documents were not the bases of the plaintiff’s action for sum of
money, but were only attached to the complaint to provide evidentiary
details on the alleged transactions.
Similarly, in the case at bench, there was no need for documentary
attachments to prove Fairland’s ownership over the subject
property. First, the present action is an action for unlawful detainer
wherein only de facto or material possession is required to be alleged.
Evidently, the attachment of any deed of ownership to the complaint is
not indispensable because an action for unlawful detainer does not
entirely depend on ownership.
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
Second, Fairland sufficiently alleged ownership and superior right of
possession over the subject property. These allegations were evidently
manifest in the complaint as Fairland claimed to have orally agreed to
lease the property to Po. The Court is of the view that these
allegations were clear and unequivocal and did not need supporting
attachments to be considered as having sufficiently established its
cause of action. Even the MeTC conceded that the complaint of
Fairland stated a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer. 33 It must
be stressed that inquiry into the attached documents in the complaint
is for the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations in the
complaint.
Third, considering that Po failed to file an answer within the prescribed
period, he was deemed to have admitted all the allegations in the
complaint including Fairland’s claim of ownership. To reiterate, the
failure of the defendant to timely file his answer and controvert the
claim against him constituted his acquiescence to every allegation
stated in the complaint.
In the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Leave of Court to file
Comment/Opposition to Motion to Render Judgment, which was
belatedly filed and so was denied by the MeTC, Po merely denied the
allegations against him without even bothering to aver why he claimed
to have a superior right of possession of the subject property.34
Fourth, it is only at the later stage of the summary procedure when
the affidavits of witnesses and other evidence on factual issues shall
be presented before the court. Sections 8 and 9 of the Rules on
Summary Procedure state:
Sec. 8. Record of preliminary conference. – Within five (5) days after
the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an
order stating the matters taken up therein, x x x
Sec. 9. Submission of affidavits and position papers. – Within ten (10)
days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding
section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses
and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order,
together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts
relied upon by them.
[Emphasis Supplied]
Again, it is worth stressing that these provisions are exactly Sections 9
and 10 under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, it is only at this part of the proceedings that the parties
will be required to present and offer their evidence before the court to
establish their causes and defenses. Before the issuance of the record
of preliminary conference, the parties are not yet required to present
their respective evidence.
These specific provisions under the Rules of Summary Procedure which
are also reflected in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, serve their purpose
to immediately settle ejectment proceedings. “Forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide
for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right
to possession of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in
the determination thereof. It is a ‘time procedure’ designed to remedy
the situation.35 Thus, as a consequence of the defendant’s failure to
file an answer, the court is simply tasked to render judgment as may
be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what
is prayed for therein.
As the complaint contains a valid cause of action, a judgment can
already be rendered
In order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
unlawful detainer cases, a remand of this case to the lower courts is
no longer necessary and the case can be determined on its merits by
the Court.
To recapitulate, as Po failed to file his answer on time, judgment shall
be rendered based only on the complaint of Fairland without the need
to consider the weight of evidence. As discussed above, the complaint
of Fairland had a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer.
Page 53 of 69
Consequently, there is no more need to present evidence to establish
the allegation of Fairland of its ownership and superior right of
possession over the subject property. Po’s failure to file an answer
constitutes an admission of his illegal occupation due to his non-
payment of rentals, and of Fairland’s rightful claim of material
possession. Thus, judgment must be rendered finding that Fairland has
the right to eject Po from the subject property.
The Judicial Affidavit Rule
On a final note, the Court deems it proper to discuss the relevance of
the Judicial Affidavit Rule or A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, where documentary
or object evidence are required to be attached. To begin with, the rule
is not applicable because such evidence are required to be attached to
a judicial affidavit, not to a complaint. Moreover, as the rule took
effect only on January 1, 2013, it cannot be required in this case
because this was earlier filed on December 12, 2012.
Granting that it can be applied retroactively, the rule being essentially
remedial, still it has no bearing on the ruling of this Court.
In the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the attachments of documentary or
object evidence to the affidavits is required when there would be
a pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing.
As stated earlier, where a defendant fails to file an answer, the court
shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon plaintiff’s motion,
based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what
is prayed for. Thus, where there is no answer, there is no need for a
pre-trial, preliminary conference or hearing. Section 2 of the Judicial
Affidavit Rule reads:
Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct
testimonies. - (a) The parties shall file with the court and serve on the
adverse party, personally or by licensed courier service, not later than
five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled
hearing with respect to motions and incidents, the following:
(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take
the place of such witnesses' direct testimonies; and
(2) The parties' docun1entary or object evidence, if any,
which shall be attached to the judicial affidavits and marked
as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant
or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the case
of the respondent or the defendant.
(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or
object evidence in his possession, he may, after the same has been
identified, marked as exhibit, and authenticated, warrant in his judicial
affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to such affidavit is a
faithful copy or reproduction of that original. In addition, the party or
witness shall bring the original document or object evidence for
comparison during the preliminary conference with the attached copy,
reproduction, or pictures, failing which the latter shall not be admitted.
This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in
place of the original when allowed by existing rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 31, 2014
Decision and the March 6, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CAG. R. SP No. 134701 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Arturo Loo Po is ORDERED TO
VACATE Condominium Unit No. 205 located in Cedar Mansion II on
Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City.
Respondent Po is further ORDERED TO PAY the rentals-in-arrears, as
well as the rentals accruing in the interim until he vacates the
property. The unpaid rentals shall incur a legal interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from January 30, 2012, when the demand to pay and
to vacate was made, up to the finality of this decision. Thereafter, an
interest of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on the total
amount due until full payment is made.
SO ORDERED.
#22 G.R. No. 202354 September 24, 2014
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
AMADA C. ZACARIAS, Petitioner,
vs.
VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA ANACAY, CYNTHIAANACAYGUISIC,
ANGELITO ANACAY, JERMIL ISRAEL, JIMMY ROY ISRAEL and all
other persons claiming authority under them, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision1 dated
June 20, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195
which reversed the Decision2 dated August 22, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch 18, Tagaytay City and affirmed the
Decision3 dated October 8, 2010 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Amadeo-Silang, Cavite, Branch 17 in Civil Case No. 862.
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint4 for Ejectment
with Damages/Unlawful Detainer filed on December 24, 2008 by
petitioner Amada Zacarias thru her son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C.
Zacarias, against the above-named respondents, Victoria Anacay and
members of her household. Said respondents are the occupants of a
parcel of land with an area of seven hundred sixty-nine (769) square
meters, situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite and covered by
Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in the name of petitioner and
issuedby Municipal Assessor Reynaldo L. Bayot on August 31, 2007.
The parties were ordered to proceed to the Philippine Mediation Center
pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended. Mediation was unsuccessful and thus the case was
returned to the court.5
After due proceedings, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
complaint, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is, hereby, rendered in
favor of defendants Victoria Anacay, Edna Anacay, Santiago Amerna,
Raymond and Cynthia Guisic, Angelito Anacay and Myrlinda Yalo, and
all persons acting under them, and against plaintiff Amada C. Zacarias,
represented by her attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, the instant
Complaint for ejectment with damages, Unlawful Detainer is, hereby,
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.6
The MCTC held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the
essential elements of an action for unlawful detainer as the claim that
petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents’ occupation of the
subject property was unsubstantiated. It noted that the averments in
the demand letter sent by petitioner’s counsel that respondents
entered the property through stealth and strategy, and in petitioner’s
own "Sinumpaang Salaysay", are more consistent withan action for
forcible entry which should have been filed within one year from the
discovery of the alleged entry. Since petitioner was deprived of the
physical possession of her property through illegal means and the
complaint was filed after the lapse of one year from her discovery
thereof, the MCTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case.
On appeal to the RTC, petitioner argued that unlawful detainer was the
proper remedy considering that she merely tolerated respondents’ stay
in the premises after demand to vacate was made upon them, and
they had in fact entered into an agreement and she was only forced to
take legal action when respondents reneged on their promise to vacate
the property after the lapse of the period agreed upon.
In reversing the MCTC, the RTC pointed out that in her complaint,
petitioner did not state that respondents entered her property through
stealth and strategy but that petitioner was in lawful possession and
acceded to the request of respondents to stay in the premises until
May 2008 but respondents’ reneged on their promise to vacate the
property by that time. It held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer
because the respondents unlawfully withheld the property from
petitioner after she allowed them to stay there for one year.
With the subsequent oral agreement between the parties, the RTC
ruled that respondents’ occupation ofthe property without petitioner’s
Page 54 of 69
consent can be converted to a contract, such agreement not being
prohibited by law nor contrary to morals or good customs. Having
satisfied the requisites for an unlawful detainer action, the RTC found
that petitioner’s complaint was filed within the prescribed one-year
period counted from the time the final demand to vacate was received
by the respondents on July 24, 2008.
The falloof the Decision of the RTC states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo dated October 8, 2010 is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new one is entered ordering the
defendants and all claiming under their rights to: (1) vacate the
subject property and surrender possession and control over the same
to the plaintiff; Pay the sum of Two Thousand (₱2,000.00) Pesos each
as rentals or compensation for the use thereof starting from July 2008
until the same is paid in full, with interests thereon at twelve (12%)
percent per annum; (2) pay the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00)
Pesos, as moral damages; (3) pay the sum of Ten Thousand
(₱10,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages; and (4) pay the sum of
Twenty Thousand (₱20,000.00) Pesos, as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.7
With the failure of respondents to file a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period, the above decision became final and executory. 8
On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a writ
of execution. At the hearing heldon January 4, 2012,respondents were
given a period of ten days within which to file their comment. At the
next scheduled hearing on February 6, 2012,respondents’ counsel
appeared and submitted a Formal Entry of Appearancewith
Manifestation informing the court that on the same day they had filed
a petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction before the CA, copies
ofwhich were served to petitioner thru her counsel and to the RTC.
Nonetheless, in its Order dated February 6, 2012, the RTC stated that
said manifestation was "tantamount to [a] comment to the pending
motion" and thus gave petitioner’s counsel a period of ten (10) days
within which to fileher Reply and thereafter the incident will be
submitted for resolution.9
On June 20, 2012, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Order
dated August 22, 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
4th Judicial Region, Branch 18, Tagaytay City is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated October 8, 2010 rendered by the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Branch 17 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA held that the MCTC clearlyhad no jurisdiction over the case as
the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer. Since the prescriptive period for filing an
action for forcible entry has lapsed, petitioner could not convert her
action into one for unlawful detainer, reckoning the one-year period to
file her action from the time of her demand for respondents to vacate
the property.
Further, the CA said that while petitioner has shown that she is the
lawful possessor of the subject property,she availed of the wrong
remedy to recover possession but nevertheless may still file an accion
publicianaor accion reivindicatoria with the proper regional trial court.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in nullifying
the judgment of the RTC which has long become final and executory.
She argues that the suspension of the strictadherence to procedural
rules cannot be justified by unsupported allegationsof the respondents
as to supposed non-receipt of documents concerning this case.
On their part, respondents maintain that they were not aware of the
proceedings before the RTC and were not furnished a copy of the said
court’s adverse decision. They also stress that resort to certiorari was
proper and the suspension of procedural rules was justified by
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
compelling circumstances such as the imminentdestruction of the only
property possessed by respondents who are indigent, respondents’
lack of awareness of unfavorable judgment rendered on appeal by the
RTC, substantive merits of the case insofar as the jurisdictional
requirements in a suit for unlawful detainer, lack of showing that
resortto certiorari petition was frivolous and dilatory, and there being
no prejudice caused to the other party.
After a thorough review of the records and the parties’ submissions,
we find neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion
committed by the CA.
The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as
well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the
allegations in the complaint.11 In ejectment cases, the complaint
should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly
within the class of cases for which Section 112 of Rule 70 provides a
summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court
jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.13 Such remedy is either
forcibleentry or unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is
deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal detainer, the
defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or
implied.14
The MCTC and CA both ruled thatthe allegations in petitioner’s
complaint make out a case for forcible entry but not for unlawful
detainer.
In Cabrera v. Getaruela,15 the Court held that a complaint sufficiently
alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract
with or by toleranceof the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff
to defendant of the termination ofthe latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 16
In this case, the Complaint alleged the following:
3. Plaintiff is the owner of that parcel of land situated at Barangay
Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite with an area of SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY
NINE (769) SQUARE METERS, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-
026-01182 issued by the Municipal Assessor of Silang, Cavite. Copy of
said tax declaration is hereto attached as Annex "B";
4. Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control over the subject
property. She had it planted to Bananas and other fruit bearing trees.
However, sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants
have entered the subject property and occupied the same;
5. Consequently, Plaintiff demanded that they leave the premises. The
defendants requested for time toleave and she acceded to said
request. The defendants committed to vacate the subject property by
the end of May, 2008;
6. Inspite of several repeateddemands, defendants unjustifiably
refused to vacate the subject premises prompting the Plaintiff to seek
the assistance of a lawyer who wrote them a FORMAL and FINAL
DEMAND to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable compensation
for their illegal use and occupancy of the subject property. A copy of
the DEMAND LETTER is hereto attached as Annex "C";
7. Plaintiff also referred this matter to the Lupon Tagapamayapa of
Barangay Lalaan 1st for possible conciliation but to no avail as the
defendants still refused to vacate the subject property. Thus, the said
Page 55 of 69
Barangay issued a CERTIFICATION TOFILE ACTION, as evidenced by a
copy thereto attached as Annex "D";
x x x x17
The above complaint failed to allegea cause of action for unlawful
detainer as it does not describe possession by the respondents being
initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and which became illegal
upon termination by the petitioner of suchlawful possession.
Petitioner’s insistence that she actually tolerated respondents’
continued occupation after her discovery of their entry into the subject
premises is incorrect. As she had averred, she discovered
respondents’occupation in May 2007. Such possession could not have
been legal from the start as it was without her knowledge or consent,
much less was it based on any contract, express or implied. We stress
that the possession ofthe defendant in unlawful detainer is originally
legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the
right to possess.18
In Valdez v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court ruled that where the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause
for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over
the case. Thus:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the
plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered.
Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for
unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in
Sarona v. Villegas:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the
owner, still, distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiencydefendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s
tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate
the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule
70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.
xxxx
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance"
confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous
doctrine. And for two reasons:First. Forcible entry into the land is an
open challenge tothe right of the possessor. Violation of that right
authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court - provided for in
the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before
suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to bespeedy; and the possessor is
deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court.
Second,if a forcible entry action in the inferior courtis allowed after the
lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action
of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such
defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a
demand, bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to
prevent prescription to set in - and summarily throw him out of the
land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind
the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action. (Italics and
underscoring supplied)
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the
cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the
entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder
is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession
thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases
for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the
court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint.
When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or
how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an
accion publicianaor an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial
court. Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, petitioners filed an unlawful
detainer case against respondent alleging that they were the owners of
the parcel of land through intestate succession which was occupied by
respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased
mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not petitioners’ case for
unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property
registered under TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession
thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of their mother, and
after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had served
written demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent
refused to vacate the property. x x x
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a
deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to
leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that
plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered.
This is where petitioners’ cause of action fails. The appellate court, in
full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the alleged
tolerance by their mother and after her death, by them, was
unsubstantiated. x x x
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at
the inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint,
considering that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then
built a house thereon without the permission and consent of
petitioners and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendant’s
entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge
of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth
which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in
Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals[224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible
entry x x x.
xxxx
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any
averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents.
The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without
any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building
their house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the
possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents’ entry
was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no
express contract existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners
to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is
fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement
of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case.It is in this light that this Court finds that the
Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint. (Emphasis supplied.)
The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege
how and when entry was effected. The bare allegation of petitioner
that "sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have
enterep the subject property and occupied the same", as correctly
found by the MCTC and CA, would show that respondents entered the
land and built their houses thereon clandestinely and without
petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not
unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the
case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing the lower court's ruling and
granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.
Lastly, petitioner's argument that the CA gravely erred in nullifying a
final and executory judgment of the RTC deserves scant consideration.
It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court
to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. 20 Indeed,
a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot
Page 56 of 69
be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no
legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution
based on it is void.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated June 20, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195
is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
#23 G.R. No. 203075, March 16, 2016
MILAGROS DIAZ, EDUARDO Q. CATACUTAN, DANTE Q.
CATACUTAN, REPRESENTED BY THEIR COMMON ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT, FERNANDO Q. CATACUTAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES
GAUDENCIO PUNZALAN AND TERESITA
PUNZALAN, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
For the Court's Resolution is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court which petitioners Milagros Diaz, Eduardo Q. Catacutan,
Dante Q. Catacutan, et al. filed, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated February 17, 2012, and its Resolution2 dated July
25, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 112959. The CA reversed the Decision3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 43,
in Civil Case No. 13692, which affirmed the June 22, 2009 Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) Decision.4
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Petitioners alleged that their mother, Rufina Vda. de Catacutan, who
died on November 17, 2005, had acquired a parcel of land in
Mapanique, Candaba, Pampanga, consisting of 3,272 square meters,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3169. They contend that
respondents spouses Gaudencio and Teresita Punzalan (Spouses
Punzalan) constructed their house on a portion of said lot without their
consent and knowledge. But petitioners allowed them to stay, thinking
that they would vacate once their need for the property arises.
However, when they made a demand, the Spouses Punzalan refused
to vacate. Thus; on April 9, 2008, petitioners wrote the spouses a
formal demand letter to vacate. Still, they refused to leave the
property.
On August 22, 2008, petitioners filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer
with the MCTC of Sta. Ana-Candaba, Pampanga. The MCTC then
rendered a Decision on June 22, 2009, with .the following dispositive
portion:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
ordering the latter, their privies and all persons claiming rights,
interests or possession over lot No. 8 of the subdivision plan PSD-
020070 (OLT), being a portion of PSU-103330 situated in the Barrio
(Mapanique) Barangca, Municipality of Candaba, Pampanga, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3169 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pampanga in the name of Rufina Vda. de Catacutan, to vacate and
surrender its peaceful possession to the plaintiffs; to pay Php1,000.00
per month from April 09, 2008, the date of Demand to Vacate, until
defendants finally vacate the premises; to pay Php20,000.00 by way
of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs and to pay the costs of suit in the
amount of Php2,735.00 duly covered by Official Receipts.
SO ORDERED.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Spouses Punzalan, thus, brought the case before the San
Fernando RTC, which ruled, on November 25, 2009, in this wise:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed Decision, the
court hereby AFFIRMS it in toto.
Costs against the defendants-appellants.
Furnish all concerned parties with copies of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
Aggrieved, the Spouses Punzalan elevated the case to the CA. On
February 17, 2012, the CA reversed the RTC, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the instant petition
is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando City, Pampanga, Branch 43 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 08-0407 of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Sta. Ana-Candaba, Pampanga is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Hence, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same
was denied. Thus, the present petition.
Petitioners insist that their complaint states a cause of action for
unlawful detainer and thus, the MCTC duly acquired jurisdiction.
The petition lacks merit.
Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases
is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of
the relief sought.8 The complaint should embody such statement of
facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases under
Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Said provision states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to
the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
with damages and costs.
Under the aforequoted rule, there are two (2) entirely distinct and
different causes of action, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is
an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant
whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired
possession by fierce, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2)
a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of
possession from the defendant whose possession of the property was
lawful at the inception by virtue of a contract with the plaintiff, be it
express or implied, but subsequently became illegal when he
continued his possession despite the termination of his right or
authority.9
Here, petitioners claim that their cause of action is one for unlawful
detainer and not for forcible entry. The Court disagrees.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer
if it recites the following: (1) the defendant's initial possession of the
property was lawful, either by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon the
plaintiffs notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right
of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the property; and (4)
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment within one (1) year
from the last demand to vacate the property.10
On the other hand, in an action for forcible entry, the following
requisites are essential for the MTC to acquire jurisdiction over the
case.: (1) the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the
property; (2) the plaintiff was deprived of possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (3) the action must be
filed within one (1) year from the date of actual entry on the land,
except that when the entry is through stealth, the one (1)-year period
is counted from the time the plaintiff-owner or legal possessor learned
of the deprivation of the physical possession of the property. It is not
necessary, however, for the complaint to expressly use the exact
language of the law. For as long as it is shown that^the dispossession
took place under said conditions, it is considered as sufficient
compliance with the requirements.11
Contrary to petitioners' contention that none of the means to
effectuate forcible entry was alleged in the complaint, the Court finds
that the allegations actually make up a case of forcible entry. They
claimed in thiir Complaint12 that the Spouses Punzalan constructed
their dwelling house on a portion of petitioners' lot, without the latter's
Page 57 of 69
prior consent and knowledge. This clearly falls under stealth, which is
defined as any secret, sly or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to
gain entrance into, or to remain within residence of another without
permission.13 Here, the evidence clearly reveal that the spouses'
possession was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated,
considering that they started to occupy the subject lot and thereafter
built a house on the same without the permission and consent of
petitioners. The spouses' entry into the land was, therefore, effected
clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners. Consequently, it is
categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. 14
The CA correctly held that the allegations of the complaint failed to
state the essential elements of an action for unlawful detainer. The
allegation that the Spouses Punzalan entered the subject property and
constructed their house on a portion of the same without petitioners'
knowledge and consent is more consistent with an action for forcible
entry, which should have been filed within a year from the discovery of
said illegal entry.15 Instead, petitioners allowed them to stay, thinking
that they would simply accede if asked to vacate the premises.
Certainly, petitioners' kind tolerance came, not from the inception, as
required to constitute unlawful detainer, but only upon learning of the
unlawful entry.
In the similar case of Zacarias v. Anacay,16 the petitioner argued that
unlawful detainer was the proper remedy, considering that she merely
tolerated respondents' stay in the premises after demand to vacate
was made upon them. They had, in fact, entered into an agreement
and she was only forced to take legal action when respondents
reneged on their promise to vacate the property after the lapse of the
period agreed upon. The Court held that the MCTC clearly had no
jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer. As in
said case, the complaint in the case at bar likewise failed to allege a
cause of action for unlawful detainer as it did not describe possession
by the Spouses Punzalan being initially legal or tolerated by petitioners
and which merely became illegal upon the latter's termination of such
lawful possession. The fact that petitioners actually tolerated the
spouses' continued occupation after discovery of their entry into the
subject premises will not and cannot automatically create an action for
unlawful detainer. Such possession could not have possibly been legal
from the start as it was without their knowledge or consent, much less
based on any contract, express or implied. What is decisive is the
nature of the defendant's entry into or initial possession of the
property. It must be stressed that the defendant's possession in
unlawful detainer is originally legal but simply became illegal due to
the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The plaintiffs
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the
start of the possession. Otherwise, if the possession was already
unlawful at the outset, it would constitute an action for forcible entry,
and the filing of one for unlawful detainer would be an improper
remedy. To hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine, and
for two reasons: (1) forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to
the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes a speedy
redress in the inferior court provided for in the rules. But if one (1)
year from the entry is allowed to lapse before a suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to be speedy, and the possessor is deemed to have
waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court; and (2) if a forcible
entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number
of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry
can actually prescribe. No matter how long such defendant has
already, been in physical possession, the plaintiff will merely have to
make a demand, file a case upon a plea of tolerance - to prevent
prescription from setting in - and summarily throw him out of the land.
Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the
postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
summary in nature, and that the one (1)-year time-bar to initiate a
suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.17 Since
the prescriptive period for filing an action for forcible entry had lapsed,
petitioner could not convert her action into one for unlawful detainer,
reckoning the one (1)-year period to file her action from the time of
the demand to vacate.18
Verily, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases
for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to
give the court jurisdiction without having to resort to parol
testimony.19
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any
averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners' claim that they
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by the Spouses
Punzalan right from the start. This failure of petitioners to allege the
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since
the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer, the MCTC corollarily failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the case.20
Indeed, a void judgment for lack of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right neither can it be the creator of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. The same can never become final and any
writ of execution based on it will be void.21
Petitioners may be the lawful possessors of the subject property, but
they unfortunately availed of the wrong remedy to recover possession.
Nevertheless, they may still opt to file an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria with the proper RTC.22
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition
is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated February 17,
2012, and its Resolution dated July 25, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No.
112959, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
#24 G.R. No. 191527, August 22, 2016
BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. AND PHILIPPINE
BAPTIST S.B.C., INC., Petitioners, v. FAITH IN CHRIST JESUS
BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. AND REYNALDO GALVAN, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated March 5, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97292.
The facts follow.
The instant petition originated from a Complaint2 for unlawful detainer
and damages filed by Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc. (BFBC) and
Philippine Baptist S.B.C., Inc. (PBSBC) against Faith in Christ Jesus
Baptist Church, Inc. (FCJBC) and Reynaldo Galvan (Galvan) before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Branch 2, Angeles City, docketed as Civil
Case No. 02-388. The complaint sought the ejectment of FCJBC from
the subject parcel of land with improvements, known as Lot 3, Blk. 35
of (LRC) PCS-2364, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
82587,3 and located at 35-3 Sarita St., Diamond Subdivision,
Balibago, Angeles City, and owned by PBSBC.
On March 7, 1990, a contract of loan was entered into between PBSBC
and BFBC where the latter borrowed money from the former to enable
it to purchase the subject property. Thereafter, respondent BFBC took
possession of the subject property and held therein their religious
activities.
While BFBC was still in possession of the subject property, Galvan and
his companions began attending BFBC's religious activities at the
subject property. BFBC alleged that Galvan apparently was interested
on the property because after some time Galvan formed and
incorporated FCJBC and took control of the subject property.
Galvan's actuations came to the attention of the Luzon Convention of
Southern Baptist Churches, Inc. (LCSBC). Thus, in a Letter4 dated
September 5, 2001, LCSBC upheld BFBC's right over the subject
property and recognized BFBC's pastor, Rev. Rolando T. Santos, as its
legitimate pastor.
However, FCJBC continued to occupy the subject property, thus, in a
Demand Letter5 dated September 4, 2002, BFBC demanded that
FCJBC vacate the property within five (5) days from notice and to pay
the amount of P10,000.00 per month beginning October 2001 as
reasonable compensation for its use.
Due to non-compliance with its demand, on September 24, 2003,
BFBC and PBSBC filed a Complaint6for unlawful detainer and damages
against FCJBC and Galvan.
In its Answer, FCJBC and Galvan contend that it has been in existence
since 1984. Allegedly, it was formerly known as "Faith Baptist Church"
(FBC) and held services at the Tacipit family residence at 31-1 Dona
Maria St., Diamond Subdivision, Angeles City. FBC eventually moved
to a building along MacArthur Highway in the same subdivision.
Sometime in 1990, some of the members of the FBC availed of the
loan from the Church Loan Fund of Foreign Mission Board, SBC,
Page 58 of 69
Philippine Baptist Mission for the purpose of purchasing the subject
property. This was embodied in a Contract of Simple Loan
or Mutuum dated March 7, 1990.
Rolando Santos was the pastor of FBC from 1993 to 2000. Due to a
misunderstanding within the church group, Santos left FBC, together
with some of its members. In February 2001, Santos' group formed
BFBC, an organization which was duly registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
Meanwhile, FBC continued to occupy the subject property and, on
January 9, 2001, organized themselves into FCJBC.
On May 30, 2001, FCJBC paid installments due on the subject property
in the sum of P10,000.00, leaving a balance of P240,615.53. FCJBC
alleged that since June 2001, they were willing and able to pay the
installments due on the subject property, however, PBSBC refused to
accept any payment from it. By September 9, 2002, the installments
due had reached P47,232.00.
FCJBC further averred that, prior to BFBC's filing of the present
complaint, a Petition for Consignation of Payment was already filed on
October 9, 2002 with the RTC, Branch 62, Angeles City entitled "Carlos
Gelacio, et al. v. Foreign Mission Board, S.B.C. Philippine Baptist
Mission, now Philippine Baptist, S.B.C, Inc." docketed as Civil Case No.
10713. FCJBC prayed that PBSBC be required to accept the amount of
P240,615.53 as full payment of the Contract of Simple Loan or
Mutuum.
On October 29, 2002, FCJBC filed a Motion seeking the suspension of
proceedings in Civil Case No. 02-388 pending resolution of the petition
for consignation.
On February 9, 2004, the MTC rendered its Decision7 in favor of
respondent BFBC in Civil Case No. 02-388. The MTC ruled that the
case was one of forcible entry and not unlawful detainer. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryWHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Balibago Faith Baptist
Church, Inc. and against the defendants Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist
Church, Inc., Reynaldo Galvan and all persons claiming rights under
them, ordering the latter the following:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. To vacate and surrender possession of the subject
property to plaintiff within three (3) months from receipt of
this Decision;
2. To pay the sum of P20,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees;
and cralawlawlibrary
3. To pay the costs of the suit.
Defendants' counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.8
Both parties filed their respective appeal memoranda with the RTC. On
April 19, 2006, the RTC issued the assailed Decision9 which affirmed
the Decision of the MTC. FCJBC moved for reconsideration, but was
denied on November 24, 2006. Thus, FCJBC filed a petition for review
on certiorari before the appellate court.10chanrobleslaw
In the disputed Decision11 dated March 5, 2010, the appellate court
granted the petition, the dispositive portion of which
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Angeles
City, dated April 19, 2006 and November 24, 2006, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The complaint for unlawful detainer is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Undaunted, BFBC and PBSBC filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following
issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER AND RULING THAT THE MTC
HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RAISING ISSUES ON
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT AND THE MTC JURISDICTION
WHICH WERE NOT BROUGHT OUT BY THE PARTIES.
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT INSTEAD OF DECIDING THE CASE ON THE
MERITS IN LIGHT OF SECTION 8, RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
In a nutshell, the main issue before us is whether the instant case is
one of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.
In Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,,13 the Court differentiated the
distinct causes of action in forcible entry vis-a-vis unlawful detainer, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of ;. action
defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry,
one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful
detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal
from the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior
possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally
lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the
right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one
decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual
possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the
defendant's right to continue in
possession.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
From the foregoing, it is then clear that unlawful detainer and forcible
entry are entirely distinct causes of action, to wit: (a) action to recover
possession founded on illegal occupation from the beginning - forcible
entry; and (b) action founded on unlawful detention by a person who
originally acquired possession lawfully - unlawful detainer.
The rule is that the allegations in the complaint determine both the
nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court.15 The cause of
action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint
states, but what the allegations in the body of the complaint define
and describe. The designation or caption is not controlling, more than
the allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it is not even an
indispensable part of the complaint.16 The complaint must specifically
allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer or forcible entry if the
complaint filed was for unlawful detainer, or forcible entry,
respectively. It cannot be made to depend on the exclusive
characterization of the case by one of the parties, jurisdiction cannot
be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer, in a
motion to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration. 17chanrobleslaw
It should then be stressed that what determines the cause of action is
the nature of defendants' entry into the land. If entry is illegal, then
the cause of action which may be filed against the intruder within one
year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, entry is legal
but thereafter possession became illegal, the case is one of illegal
detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the last
demand.18chanrobleslaw
Indeed, to vest the court of jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts which brings the party clearly within the class of
cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings
are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face
the court's jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. 19This is
where petitioners' cause of action fails.
In Cabrera, et al. v. Getaruela, et al. , 20 the Court held that a
complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if
it recites the following:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of
possession;
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;
and cralawlawlibrary
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
Page 59 of 69
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this case, BFBC presented the following allegations in support of its
unlawful detainer complaint:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxxx
2. Plaintiff Philippine Baptist S.B.C., Inc. is the registered owner of a
parcel of land with improvements under Lot 3 Blk. 35 of (LRC) Pcs-
2364 described under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 82587
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Angeles City, located at 35-3 Sarita
St., Diamond Subd., Balibago, Angeles City, which is the subject
matter of this case and hereinafter referred to as subject premises. A
copy of the title is hereto attached as Annex "A" and to form an
integral part hereof;
3. On March 7, 1990, plaintiff PBSBC granted a contract of simple
loan to plaintiff BFBC for the latter's purchase of the subject premises
and plaintiff BFBC started to possess the same and hold their religious
activities thereat;
4. While plaintiff BFBC was in possession of the subject
premises, defendant Reynaldo Galvan and his companions
joined the regular religious services of plaintiff BFBC at the
subject premises;
5. It turned out that defendants have an interest in the
subject premises and defendant Reynaldo Galvan formed and
incorporated the defendant FCJBC and took control of the
subject premises;
6. The take-over of the defendants was brought to the attention of
the Luzon Convention of Southern Baptist Churches, Inc., (LCSBC) and
the latter, in letter dated September 5, 2001, has affirmed the right of
the plaintiff BFBC, headed by Rev. Rolando T. Santos, to occupy the
subject premises. A copy of LCSBC's letter dated September 5, 2001 is
hereto attached as Annex "B";
7. Despite [LCSBC's] letter and plaintiffs peaceful overtures for the
defendants to turn over to plaintiffs the subject premises, defendants
ignored the same;
8. Due to exhaustion, expense and exasperation, plaintiffs were
constrained to refer this matter to the undersigned counsel
and, accordingly, on September 4, 2002, a demand letter was sent to
the defendants for them to pay the reasonable compensation
of TEN THOUSAND (PI0,000.00) PESOS per month beginning October
2001 for the use of the subject premises and to vacate the same
within five (5) [days upon] their receipt thereof. A copy of the demand
letter is hereto attached as Annex "C" and to form an integral part
hereof;
9. Despite plaintiffs' lawyer's demand letter, defendants failed and
refused to pay the reasonable compensation for the subject premises
and to vacate the subject premises;
x x x.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A perusal of the above-quoted allegations in the complaint would show
that it contradicts the requirements for unlawful detainer. In an
unlawful detainer action, the possession of the defendant was
originally legal and its possession was tolerated or permitted by the
owner through an express or implied contract.
In this case, paragraphs 5 and 6 make it clear that FCJBC's occupancy
was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual or legal
basis. There was, likewise, no allegation that BFBC and PBSBC
tolerated FCJBC's possession of the subject property. Neither was
there any averment in the complaint which shows any overt act on the
part of BFBC and PBSBC indicative of permission to occupy the land. In
an unlawful detainer case, the defendant's possession becomes illegal
only upon the plaintiffs demand for the defendant to vacate the
property and the defendant's subsequent refusal. Here, paragraphs 7
and 8 characterize the defendant's occupancy as unlawful even before
the formal demand letters were written by the petitioner's counsel.
Given these allegations, the unlawful withholding of possession should
not be based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged
unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified date.
This case would have to fall under the concept of forcible entry as it
has been long settled that in forcible entry cases, no force is really
necessary. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful
possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the
property, and this is all that is necessary.23 However, while BFBC
sufficiently alleged that they had prior physical possession of the
subject property, nothing has been said on how FCJBC's entry was
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
effected or when dispossession started. It is in this light that we rule
that the present complaint is similarly defective even if we are to treat
the same as forcible entry as it failed to allege how and when entry
was effected. The bare allegation of BFBC that "[i]t turned out that
defendants have an interest in the subject premises and
defendant Reynaldo Galvan formed and incorporated the
defendant FCJBC and took control of the subject
premises," would not suffice since it only shows that FCJBC entered
the land and occupied the house thereon without BFBC and PBSBC's
consent or permission which are constitutive of forcible entry.
Unfortunately, BFBC and PB SBC's failure to allege when the
dispossession took place and how it was effected leaves the complaint
wanting in jurisdictional ground.
Suffice it to say, the one-year period within which to bring an action
for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry on
the land, except that when entry was made through stealth, the one-
year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof. 24 If
the dispossession did not occur by any of the means stated in Section
1, Rule 70, as in this case, the proper recourse is to file a plenary
action to recover possession with the Regional Trial
Court.25cralawred Consequently, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the
case.
We likewise reiterate that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority
of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the
action. Indeed, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment
at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any
writ of execution based on it is void.26chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the instant petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 5,
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97292
is AFFIRMED in toto.
#25 G.R. No. 221071 January 18, 2017
EDDIE E. DIZON and BRYAN R. DIZON, Petitioners,
vs.
YOLANDA VIDA P. BELTRAN, Respondent.
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari, 1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
Restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, filed by Eddie
E. Dizon (Eddie) and Bryan James R. Dizon (Bryan) (collectively, the
petitioners) to challenge the Decision2 rendered on January 23, 2015
and Resolution3 issued on September 7, 2015 by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 05256-MIN. The dispositive portion of the
assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
dated 13 June 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
14, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 11 November
2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Davao City, Branch 1, in
Civil Case No. 21 [,]755-A-10, is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, Branch 14, is hereby ORDERED to issue a writ of
execution for the en Corcemen1 of the MTCC Decision dated 11
November 2011.
4
SO ORDERED.
The assailed resolution denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Antecedents
Eddie started working as a seafarer in the 1980s. 5He has two children,
namely, Bryan and James Christopher R. Dizon (James). 6
Eddie and Verona Juana Pascua-Dizon (Verona) (collectively, the
Spouses Dizon) got married on March 8, 1995.7Verona was a
Page 60 of 69
housewife.8 She and her mother, together with Bryan and James,
resided in the house erected on a 240-square-meter lot (disputed
property) at No. 42 Mahogany Street, Nova Tierra Subdivision,
Lanang, Davao City.9 The disputed property was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-35170710 issued in 2002. The registered
owners were "[Verona], married to [Eddie]."
In 2008, Verona filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao
City a petition for the issuance of Temporary and Permanent Protection
Orders against Eddie and James. 11
On ,April 9, 2008, the Spouses Dizon entered into a Compromise
Agreement, 12 whereby they contemplated selling the disputed
property in the amount of not less than ₱4,000,000.00, which price
shall be increased by ₱100,000.00 for every succeeding year until the
same is finally sold. They would thereafter equally divide the proceeds
from the sale.
On September 27, 2009, Eddie left the Philippines to work on board a
ship.13 Sometime in October of 2009, Verona was confined at the
Adventist Hospital in Bangkal, Davao City. She was transferred to
Ricardo Limso Medical Center on November 30, 2009. 14 She died on
December 8, 2009 due to cardio-respiratory arrest, with "leukonoid
reaction secondary to sepsis or malignancy (occult)" as antecedent
cause. 15
Eddie claimed that he was unaware of Verona's hospital confinement.
On December 9, 2009, his brother Jun Dizon (Jun), called him through
the Telephone and informed him about Verona's death. Eddie intended
to promptly return to the Philippines before Verona's burial. Hence, he
advised Jun to ask Verona's relatives to wait for his arrival. 16
It took a while before Eddie's employer finally permitted him to go
home. Verona was already buried before Eddie's arrival on December
21, 2009. 17
Thereafter, a copy of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed), 18 dated
December, 1, 2009, was shown to Eddie. Its subject was the disputed
property conveyed to herein respondent, Yolanda Vida P. Beltran
(Vida), for ₱1,500,000.00. 19
Eddie alleged that the Deed was falsified, and his and Verona's
signatures thereat were forgeries.20 In January of 2010, Eddie filed two
complaints against Vida. One was a civil case for nullification of the
Deed, and for payment of damages and attorney's fees. 21 The other
was a criminal complaint for falsification of public document. 22 He also
caused the annotation of a notice of lis penden upon TCT No. T-
351707.23
On April 6, 20 l 0, TCT No. T-351707 was cancelled, and in its place,
TCT No. T-146-2010002236 was issued in Vida's name.24 Eddie
belatedly discovered about the foregoing fact sometime in May 2010
after Davao Light and Power Company cut off the electrical connection
purportedly upon the advice of the new owner of the disputed
property. 25
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
In June of 2010, Vida filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of Davao City an action for unlawful detainer26 against the
petitioners, James and their unnamed relatives, house helpers and
acquaintances residing in the disputed property. 27
Vida alleged that she is the registered owner of the disputed property.
While the Deed evidencing the conveyance in her favor was executed
on December 1, 2009, Eddie pre-signed the same on April 9, 2008
before he left to work abroad. The Spouses Dizon's respective lawyers
witnessed the signing. After Verona's death, Vida tolerated the
petitioners' stay in the disputed property. On May 18, 2010, Vida sent
a formal letter requiring the petitioners to vacate the disputed
property, but to no avail. 28
The petitioners sought the dismissal of Vida's complaint arguing that at
the time the Deed was executed, Verona was already unconscious.
Eddie, on the other hand, could not have signed the Deed as well since
he left the Philippines on September 27, 2009 and returned only on
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
December 21, 2009. Further, Verona's signature appearing on the
Deed was distinctly different from those she had affixed in her petition
for the issuance of a temporary protection order and Compromise
Agreement, elated March 26, 2008 and April 9, 2008, respectively.
Besides, the purchase price of ₱l,500,000.00 was not in accord with
the Spouses Dizon's agreement to sell the disputed property for not
less than ₱4,000,000.00. 29
On November 11, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision30 directing the
petitioners and their co-defendants to turn over to Vida the possession
of the disputed property, and pay ₱1,000.00 monthly rent from July
12, 2010 until the said property is vacated, ₱20,000.00 as attorney's
fees and cost of suit. Vida was, however, ordered to pay therein
defendants ₱414,459.78 as remaining balance relative to the sale. 31
The MTCC rationalized as follows:
The claim of [the petitioners] as to the falsity of the sale is a collateral
attack on the generated title itself, which can only be impugned in a
direct proceeding litigated for that matter. The fact that [Eddie]
presigned the [Deed] prior to the death of [Verona], in the presence of
counsels[,] which remained unrebutted[,] was in fact giving consent to
the act of disposing the property to answer for any exigency or
impending situation that will arise later[,] which may or may not be
entirely connected with the medical requirements of his ailing
spouse[,] whose health condition at that time of the execution [of the
Deed] ha[d] apparently started to deteriorate. Records show [that]
[Vida] incurred a hefty sum of One Million Eighty-Five Thousand Five
Hundred and Forty pesos and twenty-one
centavos (₱1,085,540.21) for both medical and burial expenses of
the deceased of which [Eddie] failed to support in violation of the Civil
Code on the rights and, [sic] obligation of the husband and wife to
render mutual support.
xxxx
While evidences were presented to prove the existence of fraud in the
execution of the instrument[,] the same cannot be appreciated in this
summary action for want of jurisdiction.
x x x [A] notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred
upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the
presumption of regularity. x x x.
xxxx
x x x The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not defendants
unlawfully withheld the property sold to [Vida.]
xxxx
While it is true that defendants herein filed both civil and criminal
cases for the Nullification of the [Deed] and Falsification alleging
forgeries, the issues therein are entirely different from this ejectment
case. The criminal case, [sic] only proves the existence of probable
cause to determine criminal culpability. The nullification tackles the
validity or invalidity of the sale on grounds of falsity.
The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the annulment of
sale; title or document do not abate any ejectment action respecting
the same property x x x.
xxxx
x x x [C]onsidering the conjugal nature of the property and the
subsequent dissolution of the conjugal partnership upon the death of
[Verona] on December 08, 2009, with the execution of conveyance in
favor of [Vida], this Court deemed it equitable and just for [Vida], to
return to [Eddie], [sic] the remaining balance of the sale representing
the net amount less the total actual medical and burial expenses of
[Verona] from the proceeds of the sale, in the amount of FOUR
HUNDRED, FOURTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED, FIFTY-NINE
PESOS AND SEVENTY-NINE centavos (P414,459.79)in the
absence of evidence to that effect and for reasons of equity. 32
Page 61 of 69
Ruling of the RTC
The petitioners filed an appeal33 before the RTC. During its pendency,
Vida filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. On June 13,
2012, the RTC reversed the MTCC ruling, dismissed the complaint for
unlawful detainer and denied Vida's motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution.34 The RTC explained that:
Under Republic Act No. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCCs], Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending Batas Pambansa [Blg.] 129,
otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,["]
paragraph 2, of Section 33 therein provides that the court of first level
has "x-x- Exclusive Original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer: Provided, that when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot he resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership[, the latter shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession[.]["] x x x
In the pleadings of the [petitioners] filed before the court a quo, and
even in their memorandum on appeal, they vigorously raise[d] the
question of ownership of [Vida] based on the alleged notarized [Deed]
signed by [Eddie] in favor of [Vida] where the latter derived her so-
called ownership over the subject premises[.] Truly indeed upon
examination by any sensible man[,] it would reveal that the
signature[s] of [the Spouses Dizon] appearing at the bottom of the
al1eged Deed [were] falsified x x x. Thus, a document challenged by a
party in litigation as falsified may be proved without resorting to an
opinion of handwriting experts. x x x.
In another case[,] the Supreme Court held that: "x-x- A finding of
forgery does not entirely depend on the testimony of handwriting
experts. Although it is useful[,] the judge still exercises independent
judgment on the issue of authenticity of the signatures under
scrutiny by comparing the alleged forged signature and the
authentic and genuine signatures of the person whose
signature is theorized upon to have been forged. x x x
This court x x x took occasion in comparing and examining the
signature of [Verona] in the [Deed] x x x vis-a-vis her signature
appearing in the compromise agreement executed [with Eddie] x x x[.]
[The comparison] lucidly showed that the signatures of [Verona]
[were] x x x very different from each other and [the differences are]
detectable by a human eye. x x x.
xxxx
Another thing that caught the curiosity of this court is the stipulation
contained in the compromise agreement x x x wherein [the Spouses
Dizon] agreed x x x that the "x-x- net selling price of the said conjugal
property should be sold not lower than FOUR MILLION
(P4,000,000.00) PESOS for the year 2008 x x x."
xxxx
x x x [T]here was never proof adduced that the compromise
agreement adverted to was rescinded or modified by the [Spouses
Dizon]. To the view of this Court[,] the consideration of the said
[Deed] x x x has an indicia of fraud x x x [and] the signature[s] of the
[Spouses Dizon] as falsified. [A] [f]alsified document cannot give right
or ownership to a party who uses it.
xxxx
x x x To justify an action for unlawful detainer[,] the permission or
tolerance must have been present at the beginning of the
possession[.]-x-x-x- Since the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the
[MTCC] had no jurisdiction over the case. x x x. 35 (Emphasis and
underlining in the original)
Ruling of the CA
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
Vida assailed the foregoing via a petition for review, which the CA
granted in the herein assailed decision and resolution. The CA's
reasons are cited below:
[Vida] was able to sufficiently allege and consequently established the
requisites of unlawful detainer.
First, [Vida] alleged that she is the registered owner of the [disputed]
property and she merely tolerated the continuous possession of the
[petitioners] [of] the [disputed] property after she purchased it and
had it titled in her name. Second, [the petitioners'] possession became
illegal upon notice by [Vida] to [the petitioners] of the termination of
the [petitioners'] right of possession as shown by the Notice to Vacate
dated 18 May 2010 sent by [Vida's] counsel to [the
petitioners]. Third, [the petitioners] refused to vacate the [disputed]
property x x x thereby depriving [Vida] of the enjoyment thereof.
And fourth, [Vida] instituted the complaint dated 03 June 2010 for
unlawful detainer within one (1) year from demand to vacate the
premises. x x x.
xxxx
x x x While the said [Deed] was questioned by [the petitioners] for
being a nullity in a separate case, yet, it should be emphasized that
the determination of the validity or the nullity of the [Deed] should be
properly threshed out in that separate proceeding and not in the
summary action for unlawful detainer. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Nothing is more settled than the rule that "[i]n an unlawful
detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties. However, where the issue of
ownership is· raised, the courts may pass upon the issue of ownership
in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The
Court stresses, however, that this adjudication is only an initial
determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of
possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably linked thereto.
The lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is
merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between
the same parties involving title to the property. It is, therefore, not
conclusive as to the issue of ownership, which is the subject matter of
a separate case for annulment of [the Deed] filed by [the petitioners].
x x x [T]he RTC[,] in resolving the issue of possession in the unlawful
detainer 'case[,] has not only provisionally passed upon the issue of
ownership of the [disputed] property but it in fact made a
determinative and conclusive finding on the ownership thereof,
contrary to the settled rule that in [an] unlawful detainer case, the
only issue to be resolve[d] by the court is the physical or material
possession or the property involved x x x.
x x x [W]hile the Court may make provisional determination of
ownership in order to determine who between [Vida] and [the
petitioners] had the better right to possess the property, yet, the court
is proscribed from making a conclusive finding on this issue. x x x
[T]he RTC has already made a preemptive finding on the validity or
invalidity of the document, [but] the resolution thereof properly
pertains to a separate proceeding pending before it in a separate case.
x x x.
xxxx
x x x [T]his Court agrees with the contention of [Vida] that the RTC's
pronouncement that the signatures in the [Deed] were forged and
[Vida's] title issued pursuant thereto is void is a collateral attack on
[Vida's] title which violates the [principle of] indefeasibility of the
Torrens title. x x x.
xxxx
Verily, unless and until [Vida's] title over the [disputed] property is
annulled in a separate proceeding instituted by [the petitioners], the
same is valid and [Vida] has the right to possess the subject property,
being an attribute of her ownership over it. x x x.
Page 62 of 69
 xxxx
x x x [T]o stay the immediate execution of judgment in ejectment
proceedings, the defendant-appellant must: (a) perfect his appeal, (b)
file a supersedeas bond, and (c) periodically deposit the rentals falling
due during the pendency of the appeal.
x x x [T]he supersedeas bond was paid by [the petitioners] only on 02
May 2012. x x x [T]he bond filed by [the petitioners] in order to stay
the: immediate execution of the MTCC Decision was filed out of time
as it was not filed within the period to appeal.
x x x [T]he failure of the [petitioners] in this case to comply
with any of the conditions provided under Section 19, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment,
the duty of the court in this respect being "ministerial and imperative."
x x x.
Thus, as the supersedeas bond was filed out of time or beyond the
period to appeal, [Vida's] motion for immediate execution should have
been acted upon by the RTC and the writ of execution should have
been issued as a matter of right. 36 (Citations omitted and italics in the
original)
The CA, through the herein assailed resolution,37 denied the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 38
Issues
The instant petition is anchored on the issues of whether or not:
1. Vida has a cause of action for unlawful detainer against the
petitioners considering that the Deed she relied upon in filing
her complaint was falsified, hence, null; and
2. the RTC correctly ruled that in an unlawful detainer case, the
MTCC can resolve the issue of ownership.39
In support thereof, the petitioners point out that relative to the
falsification case filed by Eddie against Vida, the Office of the Davao
City Prosecutor issued a Resolution, 40 dated June 11, 2010, stating
that no expert eye is needed to ascertain that the signatures
appearing in the Deed were different from the standard signatures of
the Spouses Dizon. Further, on September 20, 2010, another
resolution41 was issued finding probable cause to indict Vida for the
crime of falsification of public documents. Thereafter, the MTCC issued
a Warrant of Arrest42 against Vida.
The petitioners also insist that no Deed was executed conveying the
disputed property in Vida's favor. When the Deed was purportedly
executed on December l, 2009, Verona was already unconscious, while
Eddie was abroad. Having been simulated, the Deed was void and
inexistent. It produced no effect and cannot create, modify or
extinguish a juridical relation. Hence, Vida had no right to transfer the
title in her name using the falsified Deed. Perforce, her complaint for
unlawful detainer against the petitioners had no leg to stand on and
should be dismissed.
Citing Spouses De Guzman v. Agbagala,43the petitioners claim that the
rule on non-collateral attack of a Torrens title does not apply in a case
where the title is void from the start. An action to declare the nullity of
a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to
collateral attack. 44
Anent the belated posting of the supersedeas bond, the petitioners
stress that fault cannot be ascribed to them. They waited for the
MTCC's order approving and fixing the amount. When the order was
finally issued, the petitioners were required to post the bond before
the RTC and deposit the monthly rental as well. The petitioners
complied before the RTC rendered its Decision dated June 13, 2012. 45
As counterclaims, the petitioners impute malice and bad faith against
Vida in filing the complaint for unlawful detainer. The petitioners, thus,
pray for the award of ₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages, ₱500,000.00
as exemplary damages, ₱50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and ₱2,000.00
for each appearance of their counsel.46
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
In Vida's Comment,47 she argues that the petitioners' claim of forgery
is yet to be proven in court by clear, positive and convincing evidence.
Having been notarized, the Deed enjoys the presumption of due
execution, and shall remain valid unless annulled in a proper
proceeding. Besides, the allegation of forgery and nullity of the Deed
are immaterial in a summary action for unlawful detainer. Allowing the
foregoing claims to be litigated amounts to a collateral attack on Vida's
title.
Vida also points out that the petitioners paid the supersedeas bond
only on May 2, 2012, beyond the period to perfect an appeal. 48
Ruling of the Court
On matters of procedure
While the petitioners explicitly raise only two substantive issues, in the
body of the petition, they discuss procedural matters anent their
payment of the sudersedeas bond and an alleged error on the part of
the CA in concluding that the RTC should have issued a writ of
execution relative to the MTCC's decision in Vida's favor. 49
The petitioners admit that they posted the supersedeas bond beyond
the period to perfect an appeal, but claim that it was the MTCC, which
belatedly fixed the amount. Pending the appeal they had filed before
the RTC, they promptly posted the bond after the amount was
determined by the MTCC.50
In Spouses Chua v. CA,51the Court ruled that:
Petitioners need not require the MTC to fix the amount of the
supersedeas bond. They could have computed this themselves. As
early as 1947, we have held in Aylon vs. Jugo and De Pablo that the
supersedeas bond is equivalent to the amount of rentals, damages and
costs stated in the judgment.52
If the cited case were to be applied, the petitioners' failure to post the
supersedeas bond within the allowable period shall result in the
immediate execution of the MTCC judgment. Nonetheless, in City of
Naga v. Hon. Asuncion, et al.,53the Court has carved exceptions to
immediate execution of judgments in ejectment cases, viz.:
Petitioner herein invokes seasonably the exceptions to immediate
execution of judgments in ejectment cases cited m Hualam
Construction and Dev't. Corp. v. Court of Appeals and Laurel v.
Abalos, thus:
Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment)
bring about a material change in the situation of the parties which
makes the execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling
urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing
circumstances, the court may stay immediate execution of the
judgment.
Noteworthy; the foregoing exceptions were made in reference to
Section 8, Rule 70 of the old Rules of Court which has been
substantially reproduced as Section 19, Rule 7054 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Therefore, even if the appealing defendant was not
able to file a supersedeas bond, and make periodic deposits to the
appellate court, immediate execution of the MTC decision is not proper
where the circumstances of the case fall under any of the above-
mentioned exceptions. x x x. 55(Citations omitted and underlining
ours)
In Laurel, et al. v. Hon. Abalos, etc., et al., 56 therein respondent filed
an action for reformation of the deed of sale against therein petitioners
pending the appeal of the unlawful detainer case before the RTC. The
RTC thereafter denied therein petitioners' motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution relative to the MTCC judgment, and required therein
respondent to post a supersedeas bond. According to the Court, the
peculiar environmental circumstances obtaining in the case justify the
non-immediate execution of the MTCC's judgment pending appeal. The
Court further expounded as follows:
[T]his Court took pains at length to explain that this provision
(regarding immediate execution of the judgment of inferior courts in
Page 63 of 69
cases of unlawful detainer) can be availed of only if no question of title
is involved and the ownership or the right to the possession of the
property is an admitted fact. Through Mr. Justice Labrador, this Court
said in De los Reyes vs. Castro, et al.:
.... The provision for the immediate execution of a judgment of the
justice of the peace court in actions of unlawful detainer under Section
8 of Rule 72 of the [old] Rules of Court, is not applicable to an action
of detainer like the present, where there is no immediate urgency for
the execution because it is not justified by the circumstances. This
view is based on the history of the action of forcible entry. This action
originated in the English common law where it was originally in the
form of a criminal proceeding whereby ands or properties seized
through the use of force could immediately be returned. x x x.
It is 'the opinion of the writer that inasmuch as the prope1iy now
subject of litigation was originally sold only with right to repurchase to
the plaintiff, so that the plaintiff was not really and originally the
owner and possessor of the property, and since there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contract entered into between them was
not one of lease but one of loan with mortgage of the property, the
right of the plaintiff to the immediate possession of the property is not
apparent, clear or conclusive, and neither should his right to the
immediate execution of the property [be] allowed until opportunity to
settle the question of ownership is had. In other words, the writer of
the opinion holds that while Section 8 of Rule 72 is applicable also in
cases of unlawful detainer, the immediate execution it provides for
may be availed of only if no question of title is involved and the
ownership and the right to the possession of the property is an
admitted fact.
xxxx
Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment)
bring about a material change in the situation of the parties which
makes the execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling
urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing
circumstances, the court may stay immediate execution of the
judgment.
The assertion by Laput of "ownership" of the house she is occupying,
the appeal pending in the [CA] from the decision in Civil Case 1517
which declared null and void from the beginning the deed of sale in
favor of the petitioners, the latter's unexplained silence in the face of
the manifestation filed by Laput informing this Court of the
supervening occurrences, and their failure to submit their comment as
required by this Court, are strong and sufficient additional reasons,
cumulatively, to justify the :dismissal of the present
petition.57 (Citations, emphasis and italics omitted, and underlining
ours)
By analogy, in the unlawful detainer case from which the instant
petition arose, Eddie was originally a co-owner of the disputed
property, and he remains in possession thereof. Vida, on the other, is
not even a resident of Davao City.58 Moreover, prior to Vida's filing of
the unlawful detainer case, Eddie had already instituted actions for
nullification of the Deed and falsification of public documents. The
Office of the Davao City Prosecutor had likewise made a preliminary
determination of probable cause that forgery was committed. Eddie,
thus, insists that no valid conveyance was made by Verona to Vida. In
the mind of the Court, the foregoing are persuasive; reasons justifying
the non-immediate execution of the MTCC judgment despite the
petitioners' belated posting of the supersedeas bond. Hence, the CA
erred in declaring that the RTC improperly denied Vida's motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal.
On substantive issues
Being interrelated, the two substantive issues raised shall be discussed
jointly. Essentially, the petitioners allege that the MTCC should have
dismissed Vida's complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of basis as
the Deed she relied upon is falsified and void. It is also claimed that
the CA erred in not upholding the RTC's ruling that the latter can take
cognizance of the issue of ownership in an unlawful detainer case.
The Court finds merit in the petitioners' arguments.
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
In Consolacion D. Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo v. Engracia D.
Singson,59where there were similar allegations of forgery and the issue
of ownership was raised in the ejectment case, the Court pronounced:
In arriving at its pronouncement, the CA passed upon the issue or
claim of ownership, which both parties raised. While the procedure
taken is allowed - under Section 16, Rule 7060 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the issue of ownership may be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession - the CA nonetheless committed
serious and patent error in concluding that based solely on
respondent's TCT 12575 issued in her name, she must be considered
the singular owner of the subject property and thus entitled to
possession thereof - pursuant to the principle that "the person who
has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof." Such
provisional determination of ownership should have been resolved in
petitioners' favor.
When the deed of sale in favor of respondent was purportedly
executed by the parties thereto and notarized on June 6, 2006, it is
perfectly obvious that the signatures of the vendors therein, Macario
and Felicidad, were forged. They could not have signed the same,
because both were by then long deceased: Macario died on February
22, 1981, while Felicidad passed away on September 14, 1997. This
makes the June 6, 2006 deed of sale null and void; being so, it is
"equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not
create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation."
And while it is true that respondent has in her favor a Torrens title
over the subject property, she nonetheless acquired no right or title in
her favor by virtue of the null and void June 6, 2006 deed. "Verily,
when the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the
owner's duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not
thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed
acquire any right or title to the property."
xxxx
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned,
the registration of the property in said person's name would not be
sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the property. A certificate of
title merely confirms or' records title already existing and vested. The
indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to
perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith
must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would
be an exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for
fraud, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a
constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal
principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person
in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.
Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property, the
same remained in the name of the original registered owners, Macario
and Felicidad. Being heirs of the owners, petitioners and respondent
thus became, and remain co-owners - by succession - of the subject
property. As such, petitioners may exercise all attributes of ownership
over the same, including possession - whether de
facto or dejure; respondent thus has no right to exclude them from
this right through an action for ejectment.
With the Court's determination that respondent's title is null and void,
the matter of direct or collateral attack is a foregone conclusion as
well. "An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe
and is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack;" petitioners
were not precluded from questioning the validity of respondent's title
in the ejectment case.61 (Citations and emphasis omitted and
underlining ours)
In the case at bar, when the Deed was executed on December 1,
2009, Eddie claimed that he was abroad while Verona was already
unconscious. Vida did not directly refute these allegations and instead
pointed out that the Deed was pre-signed in April of 2008. The
foregoing circumstances reduced the Deed into the category of a
private instrument as can be drawn from the Court's discussion
in Adelaida Meneses (deceased) v. Venturozo, 62viz.:
As notarized documents, [Deeds] carry evidentiary weight conferred
upon them with respect to their clue execution and enjoy the
presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so
Page 64 of 69
clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity.
The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed
only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular.
A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character
and reduce it to a private instrument. Consequently, when there is a
defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document
is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such
document is preponderance of evidence.63 (Citations omitted and
underlining ours)
Further, in Dela Rama, et al. v. Papa, et al.,64the Court elucidated
that:
Papas['] admissions, refreshing in their self-incriminatory candor, beat
legal significance.1âwphi1 With respect to deeds of sale or
conveyance, what spells the difference between a public document and
a private document is the acknowledgment in the former that the
parties acknowledging the document appear before the notary public
and specifically manifest under oath that they are the persons who
executed it, and acknowledge that the same are their free act and
deed. x x x
xxxx
The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed
only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular.
We cannot ascribe that conclusion at bar to the deed of
sale. Respondent failed to confirm before the RTC that he had actually
appeared before the notary public, a bare minimum requirement under
Public Act No. 2103. Such defect will not ipso facto void the deed of
sale. However, it eliminates the presumptions that are carried by
notarized public documents and subject the deed of sale to a different
level of scrutiny than that relied on by the [CA].This consequence is
with precedent. In Tigno v. Sps. Aquino, where the public document in
question had been notarized by a judge who had no authority to do
so, the Court dispensed with the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard normally attached to duly notarized documents, and instead
applied preponderance of evidence as the measure to test the validity
of that doctiment.65 (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
In the instant petition, Vida impliedly admits the irregularity of the
Deed's notarization as both of the vendors were not personally
present.1avvphi1 Consequently, clue execution can no longer be
presumed. Besides, the extant circumstances surrounding the
controversy constitute preponderant evidence suggesting that forgery
was committed. Eddie promptly filed a criminal case for falsification of
documents and a civil case to nullify the Deed. Later, the Office of the
Davao City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Vida for
falsification. Consequently, the issue of ownership cannot be
disregarded in the unlawful detainer case. It bears stressing though
that while the RTC aptly resolved the issue of ownership, it is at best
preliminary and shall not be determinative of the outcome of the two
other cases filed by Eddie against Vida.
Other matters
The Court observes that the MTCC ruling, which the CA affirmed, is
based partly on equitable grounds. Notably, the MTCC referred to
Verona's medical expenses of ₱l,085,540.21, which Vida had
shouldered.66 The Court commiserates with Vida, if indeed she remains
unpaid by Eddie for Verona's medical and burial expenses. However, a
creditor cannot resort to procedural shortcuts to collect in kind for
sums of money owed by a debtor.
In sum, the Court agrees with the RTC that the dismissal of Vida's
complaint for unlawful detainer is in order.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution, dated January 23, 2015 and September 7, 2015,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 05256-MIN,
are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated June 13, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch. 14, in Civil Case No. 34,450-2012,
is REINSTATED. Consequently, Yolanda Vida P. Beltran's complaint
for unlawful detainer is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
#26 G.R. No. 220389 December 6, 2017
TERESITA BUGAYONG-SANTIAGO, EARL EUGENE SANTIAGO,
EDWARD SANTIAGO, and EDGARDO SANTIAGO, JR, Petitioners
vs.
TEOFILO BUGAYONG, Respondent
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated
29 September 2014 and the Resolution3dated 6 August 2015 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116322. The CA affirmed the
Decision4 dated 11 December 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 45 (RTC), which set aside the
decision of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Asingan-San Manuel,
Asingan, Pangasinan (MCTC) and dismissed petitioners' complaint for
unlawful detainer.
The Facts
On 24 November 1993, petitioner Teresita Bugayong-Santiago
(Teresita) and her husband Edgardo Santiago (Edgardo), through a
Deed of Absolute Sale, bought a 169 square meter commercial land
with a building structure located in Poblacion, Asingan, Pangasinan.
The land was originally owned by Teresita's parents, the late spouses
Francisco Bugayong and Segundina Ventura-Bugayong, and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 37637, which was issued to
the late spouses on 9 November 1961.
On 23 May 2007, Edgardo died. He was survived by Teresita and their
children, petitioners Earl Eugene, Edward, and Edgardo, Jr. The
children inherited one-half of the land.
In 2008, petitioners sent a letter dated 15 February 2008 to
respondent Teofilo Bugayong (Teofilo), Teresita's brother, demanding
him to vacate the subject property within 15 days from receipt of the
letter and to pay the amount of ₱3,000 monthly. Respondent received
the letter on 20 February 2008 but refused to vacate the property.
Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint5 for Unlawful Detainer dated 15
March 2008 with the MCTC. Petitioners alleged that since 2002, they
have been tolerating the stay and occupation of Teofilo over the two-
third (2/3) eastern portion of the land and a part of the commercial
building without paying any lease rental. Petitioners added that Teofilo
had been harassing Teresita whenever she went to Asingan,
Pangasinan and that on 3 June 2006, Teofilo slapped and pulled her
hair which caused some injuries. Thus, she filed a criminal case for
physical injuries against him. Also, before they executed the
complaint, petitioners exerted serious efforts to settle the case
amicably but to no avail.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, Teofilo alleged that his parents,
Francisco Bugayong and Segundina Ventura-Bugayong, were the
absolute and registered owners of the subject parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 37637 where a commercial building had been erected.
Prior to their death, the late spouses executed a Deed of Quitclaim
dated 21 December 1995 in favor of all their six children, namely:
Antonio, Teofilo, Erlinda, Teresita, Francisco, Jr., and Estrellita
Bugayong-Cachola (Cachola). Teofilo stated that when he was about to
register the quitclaim with the Register of Deeds after paying the
necessary taxes, petitioners caused the annotation on the title of the
Deed of Absolute Sale by way of Adverse Claim on 4 March 2004.
Teofilo also claimed that during the lifetime of his parents, they
reported the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 37637 as lost and
they executed an Affidavit of Loss on 16 November 1995 and had it
annotated atthe back of the title. Consequently, a Second Owner’s
Duplicate Copy was granted by the RTC in lieu of the lost title. Teofilo
maintained that while the petitioners claimed that they purchased the
subject property in 1993, he had been paying the realty taxes of the
subject property for the benefit of the estate of his deceased parents
and all the heirs, including the northwestern portion of the building
occupied by Cachola, the sister of both Teofilo and Teresita. Further,
Teofilo contended that he had been in actual possession and
enjoyment of the subject property long before the execution of the
assailed Deed of Absolute Sale between his parents and Teresita and
Edgardo.
Page 65 of 69
In a Decision6 dated 29 September 2008, the MCTC ordered Teofilo to
vacate the property. The MCTC resolved the question of ownership in
order to resolve the issue of possession. The MCTC reasoned that the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 24 November 1993 should be given effect
and validity since it was executed before the Deed of Quitclaim was
executed on 21 December 1995 and had been annotated at the back
of TCT No. 37637. Also, the MCTC considered Teofilo’s occupation over
the subject property as mere tolerance and demanded that Teofilo
vacate the property. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Ordering defendant or anyone acting in his ·behalf to vacate the two
third (2/3) eastern portion of the subject premises;
2. Ordering defendant to surrender possession of the subject premises
to the plaintiff[s];
3. Ordering the dismissal of the counter-claim;
4. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable lease rental of the subject
premises the amount of ₱3,000 monthly starting from February 20,
2008 until he vacates and surrender[ s] possession to the plaintiffs
and to pay ₱15,000.00 as attorney’s fees and to pay the costs of this
suit.
SO ORDERED.7
Teofilo filed an appeal8 with the RTC. Teofilo averred that petitioners
had failed to establish a cause of action for unlawful detainer against
him such that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
In a Decision9 dated 11 December 2009, the RTC reversed the decision
of the MCTC. The RTC stated that tolerance must be present right from
the start of possession to bring the action within the ambit of unlawful
detainer. In this case, there was forcible entry at the beginning and
tolerance thereafter; thus, there can be no basis for the action for
unlawful detainer.
The RTC declared that the remedy of the petitioners was either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The dispositive portion of the
Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is set
aside. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC, in an Order
dated 7 September 2010, denied the motion.
11
On 29 October 2010, petitioners filed a petition for review with the
CA. In a Decision dated 29 September 2014, the CA denied the
petition for lack of merit.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration dated 24 October
2014 which the CA denied in a Resolution12dated 6 August 2015.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC which
dismissed the unlawful detainer case against respondent.
The Court's Ruling
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC which
dismissed the unlawful detainer case against respondent.
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners contend that from the start, they have tolerated and have
been tolerating the stay and occupation of respondent over two-third
(2/3) portion of the commercial lot and the building situated thereon.
Petitioners explain that when they bought the land, it has been agreed
upon between Teresita and her husband Edgardo, that Teresita’s
parents would stay on the land until their death. Teresita’s mother
passed away on 11 February 1997 and her father on 26 November
1999. Afterwards, Teresita allowed her sister, Cachola, to occupy the
subject property located in Asingan, Pangasinan since petitioners have
been residing in San Fernando, Pampanga since 1974. Petitioners
allege that sometime in 2002, Teofilo, in the presence of Cachola, just
entered the property without their knowledge and consentand had
been occupying two-third (2/3) portion of the property without paying
any lease rental. Since petitioners wanted to take possession of the
subject property, they sent a demand letter for Teofilo to vacate the
premises.
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that he had been in actual
possession and enjoyment of the subject property, being one of the
forced heirs of the registered owners, his parents. Respondent
contends that the MCTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint
since the complaint failed to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer - how entry was affected or how and when
dispossession started. Thus, the complaint or case filed should not
have been for unlawful detainer with the MCTC but one for accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.
Ejectment or accion interdictal takes on two forms: forcible entry and
unlawful detainer. The remedies for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are laid down in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
which states:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.-Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
with damages and costs.
In Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 13 the distinction between forcible
entry and unlawful detainer had been clearly explained:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions
defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry,
one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer,
one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express
or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the
beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior
possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally
lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the
right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for,
in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff's
cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue
in possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of
defendant's entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the
action which may be filed against the intruder within one (1) year
therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but
the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful
detainer which must be filed within one (1) year from the date of the
last demand. (Emphasis supplied)
Page 66 of 69
In the present case, petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against
respondent before the MCTC. Petitioner Teresita alleges that she and
her husband Edgardo bought the subject property from her parents on
24 November 1993. Since her family stays in San Fernando,
Pampanga she allowed her sister Cachola to live in the property.
However, sometime in 2002, without Teresita’s knowledge and
consent, respondent Teofilo entered the property and occupied the
two-third (2/3) eastern portion of the same. Teresita maintains that
she had been merely tolerating Teofilo’s stay and occupation in that
part of the property. In 2008, when petitioners were ready to make
use of the property, they demanded that Teofilo vacate the premises
but he refused.
In Manila Electric Company v. Heirs of Spouses Deloy, 14 we held that
the only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or
material possession of the property, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties involved. However, as emphasized in
the Sarmiento 15 case above, what determines the cause of action in
ejectment cases is the nature of defendant's entry into the land.
Petitioners insist that Teofilo entered the property without their
knowledge and consent. Meaning, Teofilo's entry into the property had
been illegal from the beginning. Later on, when they found out that he
occupied the subject property, petitioners merely tolerated his stay
there.
The Rules are clear that if the entry into the property is illegal, the
action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry and this
action must be brought within one (1) year from the illegal entry. But
if the entry is originally legal then became illegal due to the expiration
or termination of the right to possess, an unlawful detainer case may
be brought within one (1) year from the date of the last demand. This
action will only prosper in a case where the plaintiff allows the
defendant to use the property by tolerance without any contract, and
the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate on demand.
However, based on the records, petitioners claimed that respondent
entered the property "without their knowledge and consent"16 on one
hand, and by mere "tolerance"17 on the other. It can be concluded
then that respondent occupied the subject property without
petitioners' knowledge and consent and thereafter petitioners tolerated
respondent's stay in the property for many years. Thus, there was
illegal entry into the property at the start.
As correctly observed by the RTC, since there was forcible entry at the
beginning and tolerance thereafter, an action for unlawful detainer
cannot prosper since a requisite for an action for unlawful detainer is
that the possession was originally lawful, but turned unlawful only
upon the expiration of the right to possess. In Spouses Valdez v. Court
of Appeals, 18 we held that to justify an action for unlawful detainer, it
is essential that the plaintiffs supposed act of tolerance must have
been present right from the start of the possession which is later
'sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful at
the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper
remedy.
The complaint was not clear on how entry into the subject property
was effected and how or when dispossession started.1âwphi1 The
complaint merely states that "since 2002, plaintiff Teresita B. Santiago
and her late husband have been tolerating the stay and occupation of
the defendant, brother of plaintiff Teresita B. Santiago, over the two-
third (2/3) eastern portion of the lot and portion of the commercial
house thereon, without paying [any] lease rental."19However, in
succeeding, pleadings, petitioners insisted that respondent entered the
property without their knowledge and consent. Also, no contract,
whether express or implied, existed between the parties and there
were no other details submitted 'or evidence presented by petitioners
to show how respondent exactly entered the property and when
petitioners were dispossessed of such. As similarly held in the case
of Zacarias v. Anacay:20
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any
averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners' claim that they
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents.
The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without
any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the land in question by
building their house [o]n the said land thereby 1depriving petitioners
the possessionthereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents'
entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly,
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
no express contract existed between the parties. This failure of
petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful
detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case. It is in this light that this Court
finds that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial
court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.21
We have ruled in Rosario v. Alba22 that jurisdiction in ejectment cases
is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of
the relief sought. The complaint should embody such statement of
facts as to bring the case clearly within the class of cases under
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. Thus, since the complaint fell short of the
jurisdictional facts to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment
of respondent, the MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
petitioners' complaint and both the RTC and the CA correctly dismissed
the unlawful detainer case against respondent.
However, on a final note, this ruling is limited only to the
determination of whether the complaint for unlawful detainer was
properly filed and whether the MCTC had jurisdiction over the case.
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of possession
or ownership and thus, will not bar any party from filing a case in the
proper RTC for (1) accion publiciana, where the owner of the property
who was dispossessed failed to bring an action for ejectment within
one (1) year from dispossession, or (2) accion reivindicatoria alleging
ownership of the property and seeking recovery of its full possession.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated
29 September 2014 and the Resolution dated 6 August 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 116322.
SO ORDERED.
UNDER #8 G.R. No. 164277, October 08, 2014
FE U. QUIJANO, Petitioner, v. ATTY. DARYLL A.
AMANTE, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
Where the plaintiff does not prove her alleged tolerance of the
defendant's occupation, the possession is deemed illegal from the
beginning. Hence, the action for unlawful detainer is an improper
remedy. But the action cannot be considered as one for forcible entry
without any allegation in the complaint that the entry of the defendant
was by means of force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.
Antecedents
The petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and Gloria,
inherited from their father, the late Bibiano Quijano, the parcel of land
registered in the latter's name under Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 0-188 of the Registry of Deeds in Cebu City with an area of 15,790
square meters, more or less.1 On April 23, 1990, prior to any partition
among the heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of his share, measuring 600
square meters, to respondent Atty. Daryll A. Amante (respondent),
with the affected portion being described in the deed of absolute sale
Eliseo executed in the following manner:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A portion of a parcel of land located at the back of the Pleasant Homes
Subdivision and also at the back of Don Bosco Seminary, Punta
Princesa, Cebu City, to be taken from my share of the whole lot; the
portion sold to Atty. Amante is only 600 square meters which is the
area near the boundary facing the Pleasant Homes Subdivision, Cebu
City.2chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On July 25, 1991, Eliseo, sickly and in need of money, sold an
additional 1/3 portion of his share in the property to the respondent,
with their deed of absolute sale stating that the sale was with the
approval of Eliseo's siblings, and describing the portion subject of the
sale as:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That the portion covered under this transaction is Specifically located
right at the back of the seminary facing Japer Memorial School and
where the fence and house of Atty. Amante is
located.3chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Page 67 of 69
On September 30, 1992, Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed
of extrajudicial partition to divide their father's estate (consisting of
the aforementioned parcel of land) among themselves. 4 Pursuant to
the deed extrajudicial partition, OCT No. 0-188 was cancelled, and on
July 12, 1994 the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 6555, TCT No. 6556, TCT No. 6557 and TCT No. 65585 to
the petitioner, Gloria, Jose, and Eliseo, respectively. The partition
resulted in the portions earlier sold by Eliseo to the respondent being
adjudicated to the petitioner instead of to Eliseo. 6
Due to the petitioner's needing her portion that was then occupied by
the respondent, she demanded that the latter vacate it. Despite
several demands, the last of which was by the letter dated November
4, 1994,7 the respondent refused to vacate, prompting her to file
agamst him on February 14, 1995 a complaint for ejectment and
damages in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City (MTCC),
docketed as Civil Case No. R-34426.8 She alleged therein that she was
the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 6555, a
portion of which was being occupied by the respondent, who had
constructed a residential building thereon by the mere tolerance of
Eliseo when the property she and her siblings had inherited from their
father had not yet been subdivided, and was thus still co-owned by
them; and that the respondent's occupation had become illegal
following his refusal to vacate despite repeated demands.
The respondent denied that his possession of the disputed portion had
been by mere tolerance of Eliseo. He even asserted that he was in fact
the owner and lawful possessor of the property, having bought it from
Eliseo; that the petitioner and her siblings could not deny knowing
about the sale in his favor because they could plainly see his house
from the road; and that the deed of absolute sale itself stated that the
sale to him was with their approval, and that they had already known
that his house and fence were existing; that before he purchased the
property, Eliseo informed him that he and his co-heirs had already
orally partitioned the estate of their father, and that the portion being
sold to him was Eliseo's share; and that with his having already
purchased the property before the petitioner acquired it under the
deed of extrajudicial partition, she should respect his ownership and
possession of it.9
Judgment of the MTCC
On February 5, 1996, the MTCC rendered its decision in favor of the
petitioner,10 ruling that the deeds of sale executed by Eliseo in favor of
the respondent did not have the effect of conveying the disputed
property to him inasmuch as at the time of the sale, the parcel of land
left by their father, which included the disputed property, had not yet
been partitioned, rendering Eliseo a mere co-owner of the undivided
estate who had no right to dispose of a definite portion thereof; that
as a co-owner, Eliseo effectively conveyed to the respondent only the
portion that would ultimately be allotted to him once the property
would be subdivided; that because the disputed property was
adjudicated to the petitioner under the deed of extrajudicial settlement
and partition, she was its owner with the consequent right of
possession; and that, as such, she had the right to demand that the
respondent vacate the land.
The MTCC disposed as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, and on the basis
thereof, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant, ordering the defendant; to:
1) vacate from the portion, presently occupied by him and whereon his
building stands, of that parcel of land located in Cebu City covered by
TCT No. 6555 and registered in the name of the plaintiff; and to
remove and/or demolish the building and all the structures that may
have been built on said portion;chanrobleslaw
2) pay the plaintiff the rental of P1,000.00 a month for the portion in
litigation from November 21, 1994 until such time that the defendant
shall have vacated, and have removed all structures from said portion,
and have completely restored possession thereof to the plaintiff; and
3) pay unto the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
the sum of P5,000.00 for litigation expenses; and
4) to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.11
Decision of the RTC
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the judgment of
the MTCC, and dismissed the complaint,12 holding that the summary
proceeding for ejectment was not proper because the serious question
of ownership of the disputed property was
involved, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the case at bar, by virtue of the deed of absolute sale executed by
Eliseo Quijano, one of the co-heirs of Fe Quijano, in 1990 and 1991,
the defendant Atty. Amante took possession of the portion in question
and built his residential house thereat. It was only in 1992 that the
heirs of Bibiano Quijano executed the deed of extrajudicial partition,
and instead of giving to Eliseo Quijano the portion that he already sold
to the defendant, the same was adjudicated to plaintiff, Fe Quijano to
the great prejudice of the defendant herein who had been in
possession of the portion in question since 1990 and which possession
is not possession de facto but possession de jure because it is based
on 2 deeds of conveyances executed by Eliseo Quijano. There is,
therefore, a serious question of ownership involved which cannot be
determined in a summary proceeding for ejectment. Since the
defendant is in possession of the portion in question where his
residential house is built for several years, and before the extrajudicial
partition, the possession of the defendant, to repeat, is one of
possession de jure and the plaintiff cannot eject the defendant in a
summary proceeding for ejectment involving only possession de facto.
What the plaintiff should have done was to file an action publiciana or
action reinvindicatoria before the appropriate court for recovery of
possession and ownership. However, since there is a pending
complaint for quieting of title filed by the defendant against the
plaintiff herein before the Regional Trial Court, the matter of ownership
should be finally resolved in said
proceedings.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Undaunted, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the RTC
denied her motion on November 13, 1996.14
Decision of the CA
The petitioner appealed to the CA by petition for review.
On May 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,15 affirming the
decision of the RTC, and dismissing the case for ejectment, but on the
ground that the respondent was either a co-owner or an assignee
holding the right of possession over the disputed property.
The CA observed that the RTC correctly dismissed the ejectment case
because a question of ownership over the disputed property was
raised; that the rule that inferior courts could pass upon the issue of
ownership to determine the question of possession was well settled;
that the institution of a separate action for quieting of title by the
respondent did not divest the MTCC of its authority to decide the
ejectment case; that Eliseo, as a co-owner, had no right to sell a
definite portion of the undivided estate; that the deeds of sale Eliseo
executed in favor of the respondent were valid only with respect to the
alienation of Eliseo's undivided share; that after the execution of the
deeds of sale, the respondent became a co-owner along with Eliseo
and his co-heirs, giving him the right to participate in the partition of
the estate owned in common by them; that because the respondent
was not given any notice of the project of partition or of the intention
to effect the partition, the partition made by the petitioner and her co-
heirs did not bind him; and that, as to him, the entire estate was still
co-owned by the heirs, giving him the right to the co-possession of the
estate, including the disputed portion.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court on appeal
by certiorari,16 contending that the CA grossly erred in holding that the
respondent was either a co-owner or an assignee with the right of
possession over the disputed property.17
The petitioner explains that the respondent, being a lawyer, knew that
Eliseo could not validly transfer the ownership of the disputed property
to him because the disputed property was then still a part of the
undivided estate co-owned by all the heirs of the late Bibiano Quijano;
that the respondent's knowledge of the defect in Eliseo's title and his
failure to get the co-heirs' consent to the sale in a registrable
document tainted his acquisition with bad faith; that being a buyer in
bad faith, the respondent necessarily became a possessor and builder
in bad faith; that she was not aware of the sale to the respondent, and
it was her ignorance of the sale that led her to believe that the
respondent was occupying the disputed property by the mere
tolerance of Eliseo; that the partition was clearly done in good faith;
and that she was entitled to the possession of the disputed property as
its owner, consequently giving her the right to recover it from the
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respondent.18
To be resolved is the issue of who between the petitioner and the
respondent had the better right to the possession of the disputed
property.
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari lacks merit.
An ejectment case can be either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
It is a summary proceeding designed to provide expeditious means to
protect the actual possession or the right to possession of the property
involved.19 The sole question for resolution in the case is the physical
or material possession (possession de facto) of the property in
question, and neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de
jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly
deprive the trial court from taking due cognizance of the case. Hence,
even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, like here,
the court may pass upon the issue but only to determine the question
of possession especially if the question of ownership is inseparably
linked with the question of possession.20 The adjudication of ownership
in that instance is merely provisional, and will not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving the title to the property.21
Considering that the parties are both claiming ownership of the
disputed property, the CA properly ruled on the issue of ownership for
the sole purpose of determining who between them had the better
right to possess the disputed property.
The disputed property originally formed part of the estate of the late
Bibiano Quijano, and passed on to his heirs by operation of law upon
his death.22 Prior to the partition, the estate was owned in common by
the heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. 23 In a
co-ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to different persons,
with each of them holding the property pro indiviso and exercising her
rights over the whole property. Each co-owner may use and enjoy the
property with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a
division is actually made, the respective share of each cannot be
determined, and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-
participants, joint ownership of the pro indiviso property, in addition to
his use and enjoyment of it.24
Even if an heir's right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been
fully settled and partitioned and is thus merely inchoate, Article
49325cralawred of the Civil Code gives the heir the right to exercise
acts of ownership. Accordingly, when Eliseo sold the disputed property
to the respondent in 1990 and 1991, he was only a co-owner along
with his siblings, and could sell only that portion that would be allotted
to him upon the termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not vest
ownership of the disputed property in the respondent but transferred
only the seller's pro indiviso share to him, consequently making him,
as the buyer, a co-owner of the disputed property until it is
partitioned.26
As Eliseo's successor-in-interest or assignee, the respondent was
vested with the right under Article 497 of the Civil Code to take part in
the partition of the estate and to challenge the partition undertaken
without his consent.27 Article 497 states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take part
in the division of the thing owned in common and object to its being
effected without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any
partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it
was made notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it,
without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its
validity.
The respondent could not deny that at the time of the sale he knew
that the property he was buying was not exclusively owned by Eliseo.
He knew, too, that the co-heirs had entered into an oral agreement of
partition vis-a-vis the estate, such knowledge being explicitly stated in
his answer to the complaint, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
12. That defendant, before he acquired the land from Eliseo Quijano
was informed by the latter that the portion sold to him was his share
already; that they have orally partitioned the whole lot before
defendant acquired the portion from him.28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
His knowledge of Eliseo's co-ownership with his co-heirs, and of their
oral agreement of partition notwithstanding, the respondent still did
not exercise his right under Article 497. Although Eliseo made it
appear to the respondent that the partition had already been
PROVREM RULE 70 Fulltext
completed and finalized, the co-heirs had not taken possession yet of
their respective shares to signify that they had ratified their
agreement, if any. For sure, the respondent was no stranger to the
Quijanos, because he himself had served as the lawyer of Eliseo and
the petitioner herself.29 In that sense, it would have been easy for him
to ascertain whether the representation of Eliseo to him was true. As it
turned out, there had been no prior oral agreement among the heirs to
partition the estate; otherwise, Eliseo would have questioned the deed
of extrajudicial partition because it did not conform to what they had
supposedly agreed upon. Had the respondent been vigilant in
protecting his interest, he could have availed himself of the rights
reserved to him by law, particularly the right to take an active part in
the partition and to object to the partition if he wanted to. It was only
on September 30, 1992, or two years and five months from the time
of the first sale transaction, and a year and two months from the time
of the second sale transaction, that the co-heirs executed the deed of
extrajudicial partition. Having been silent despite his ample
opportunity to participate in or to object to the partition of the estate,
the respondent was bound by whatever was ultimately agreed upon by
the Quijanos.
There is no question that the holder of a Torrens title is the rightful
owner of the property thereby covered and is entitled to its
possession.30 However, the Court cannot ignore that the statements in
the petitioner's complaint about the respondent's possession of the
disputed property being by the mere tolerance of Eliseo could be the
basis for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the defendant's
withholding of the possession of the property to which the plaintiff is
entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former's right to
hold possession under the contract, whether express or implied. A
requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the
possession was originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the
expiration of the right to possess.
To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such
lawful possession must then be established. With the averment here
that the respondent's possession was by mere tolerance of the
petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of
tolerance did not suffice. At least, the petitioner should show the overt
acts indicative of her or her predecessor's tolerance, or her co-heirs'
permission for him to occupy the disputed property.31 But she did not
adduce such evidence. Instead, she appeared to be herself not clear
and definite as to his possession of the disputed property being merely
tolerated by Eliseo, as the following averment of her petition for review
indicates:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
6.9. Their ignorance of the said transaction of sale, particularly
the petitioner, as they were not duly informed by the vendor-
co[-]owner Eliseo Quijano, [led] them to believe that the
respondent's occupancy of the subject premises was by mere
tolerance of Eliseo, so that upon partition of the whole
property, said occupancy continued to be under tolerance of the
petitioner when the subject premises became a part of the land
adjudicated to the latter;32 (emphasis
supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In contrast, the respondent consistently stood firm on his assertion
that his possession of the disputed property was in the concept of an
owner, not by the mere tolerance of Eliseo, and actually presented the
deeds of sale transferring ownership of the property to him. 33
Considering that the allegation of the petitioner's tolerance of the
respondent's possession of the disputed property was not established,
the possession could very well be deemed illegal from the beginning.
In that case, her action for unlawful detainer has to fail. 34 Even so, the
Court would not be justified to treat this ejectment suit as one for
forcible entry because the complaint contained no allegation that his
entry in the property had been by force, intimidation, threats, strategy
or stealth.
Regardless, the issue of possession between the parties will still
remain. To finally resolve such issue, they should review their options
and decide on their proper recourses. In the meantime, it is wise for
the Court to leave the door open to them in that respect. For now,
therefore, this recourse of the petitioner has to be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May
26, 2004 subject to the MODIFICATION that the unlawful detainer
action is dismissed for being an improper remedy; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
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