HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL.

v. HERMINIO MARAVILLA
G.R. No. L-18799, March 31, 1964, Barrera, J.

Key Doctrine: The procedure of appeal is the same in civil actions as in special proceedings.

Facts

Respondent Herminio Maravilla sought the probate of the will of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla where
the former was named as the universal heir and executor. Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (siblings of the
deceased) filed an opposition to the probate of the will. The will was not allowed probate. Subsequently, respondent
was appointed by the court as special administrator of the estate of the deceased. On the other hand, petitioners filed
a petition for the appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion) as special co-administrator to protect their interest.
Eliezar was appointed as special co-administrator and Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for preliminary injunction) to annul the appointment of Eliezar. The CA issued
a preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed with the CA a petition to certify the case to the Supreme Court (SC) on the
grounds that the principal amount in controversy exceeds P200,000, and the writs prayed for are not in aid of
appellate jurisdiction of the CA. It was opposed by Respondent on the ground that the controversy is less than
P200,000.

Issue

Whether the CA has jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction

Ruling

NO. The CA has no jurisdiction over the testate proceedings, considering that the properties therein
involved are valued at P362, 424, 90, as per inventory of the special administrator. Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the
Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate.
This Court has already held that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the
death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the testate
or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in probate,
considering that the amount involved therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have
original jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant case, which
are merely incidental thereto.

The present proceedings under review were for the annulment of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special
co-administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing Respondent as special administrator. It is therefore,
a contest for the administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or value of the assets of the whole estate
is the value in controversy. It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the
Court of Appeals clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.

Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary civil cases, are
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not enumerated in Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting, arguendo, that a special proceeding is not a civil action, it has never been decided
that a special proceeding is not a "civil case.” On the other hand, it has been held that the term "civil case" includes
special proceedings. Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil
actions are applicable in special proceedings where they are not inconsistent with, or when they may serve to
supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings. Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same in civil
actions as in special proceedings.
 On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, we agree with
respondent that there was no need for it. Note that the Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-
administrator, the reason being, that the appointment of such special administrator is merely temporary and subsists
only until a regular executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus, it would not only be unnecessary but also
impractical, if for the temporary duration of the need for a special administrator, another one is appointed aside from
the husband, in this case, upon whom the duty to liquidate the community property devolves merely to protect the
interests of petitioners who, in the event that the disputed will is allowed to probate, would even have no right to
participate in the proceedings at all.
 Topic: Applicability of the Rules of Civil Action

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER v.

ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA (Administratix)
G.R. No. 157912, 13 December 2007, Austria-Martinez, J.

FACTS: Alice Sheker died leaving a holographic will which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial Court of
Iligan City. Her estate was left under the administration of Victoria Medina. The trial court issued an order for all
creditors to file their claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, Alan Joseph Sheker filed a contingent money
claim in the amount of P206,250 representing the amount of his commission as an agent for selling some properties
for Alice and another P275,000 as reimbursements for expenses he incurred.

Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Sheker’s claim alleging among others that the money claim filed by Alan
Sheker is void on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner
failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally. Subsequently, the RTC
dismissed the case.

On his petition for review on certiorari, Alan Sheker maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate
proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing,
and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court
provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

SPECPRO ISSUE: Whether or not the rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special
proceedings.

RULING: No, it must be emphasized that rules in ordinary actions may or may not supplement the rules in special
proceedings depending on the facts and circumstances.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides, that in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for
in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. Stated differently, special provisions under Part
II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in
Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished. This
means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as
much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court
does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings.
Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory
pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims
against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings
such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not the money claim against respondent estate is valid even for the failure to (1) pay the
docket fees; (2) attach the certification of non-forum shopping; and (3) submit a written explanation why service has
not been done personally.

RULING:

(1) On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals, that the trial court has jurisdiction to
act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix
to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees because the
filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the
 trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time. After all, the trial court had
already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of
filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against
the estate.

(2) The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. A
money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more
so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent
claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a
certification against non-forum shopping.

(3) In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and
the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken
judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve
and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals, the failure of petitioner to
submit a written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and
the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of
petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.

Mainly, the petition is granted and the orders of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside.
 VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners, versus THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-40502 / November 29, 1976 / J. Martin / First Division

Key Doctrine:
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of
Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because
such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the
subject matter is another.

Facts:
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over
by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration which stated that on April 26, 1973, Amado G.
Garcia died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in
other places. At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate.
Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of
interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special
administratrix. She contended that there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment
of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of
a special administratrix; and that Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia and is an illegitimate
sister of the latter. Judge Malvar denied the motion filed by Preciosa B. Garcia

Preciosa B. Garcia then commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary
injunction before the Court of Appeals primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar, or, in the alternative,
to vacate the questioned orders of that court. The Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings
before Judge Severo A. Malvar for lack of jurisdiction.

Denied of their motion for reconsideration, Virginia G. Fule elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on
appeal by certiorari. However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals,
Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her
appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed
Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the
office. On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting
Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations." Virginia G. Fule instituted a petition
for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from
further acting in the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch have jurisdiction over the intestate
estate of Amado G. Garcia.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and the petition for certiorari. Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether
a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of
the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction
to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence
of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the
person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the
intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and
left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration.

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the
caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. It could not have
been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is
another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a
given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner
in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not
exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the
power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it
means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered
defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once
raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain
words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate
cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First
Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be
brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of
letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive
of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate
of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue."

Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself
before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. On this issue, the Court rules that the last place of residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death
certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the death certificate of
Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows
that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the
deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death and other business documents show
in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. The conclusion becomes
imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court
of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
 URIARTE VS COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
L-21938-39, May 29, 1970

Testate Proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain and he left reasonable properties in the Philippines. Vicente Uriarte, who is claiming to be the son
and sole heir of the deceased, filed a petition for the intestate settlement of the estate of the deceased (Special Proceeding No.
6344) in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental alleging that as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir and that
during the lifetime of the decedent, he had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his acknowledgement as such natural
son. However, said petition (Special Pro No. 6344) was opposed by the nephews Hginio Uriarte and Juan Uriarte Zamacona who
commenced Proceeding No. 51396 of Juan stating that there was a Last Will and Testament executed in Spain, a copy of which is
being requested. Then, the nephews filed a settlement of the estate in the court of Manila (Special Proceeding No 51396) on the basis
of the alleged will of the deceased. Vicente filed an opposition to the settlement of estate in the court of Manila stating that the court
of Negros Occidental has already acquired original jurisdiction over the case. The opposition of Vicente was dismissed together with
the intestate settlement in the CFI of Negros. Hence, Vicente filed a petition for certiorari questioning the dismissal of the intestate
settlement in the CFI of Negros.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Proceeding No. 6644
2. Whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the intestate proceeding is proper. Under the Rules on the settlement
of estate of the deceased person, testate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. Therefore, in case intestate settlement
was filed prior to the finding of the will of the deceased, then the intestate proceedings shall be dismissed to give priority to the testate
proceeding.

The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is
regulated by Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the CFI in the province in which
he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which
he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien — like the deceased Juan Uriarte
— the CFI in provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these CFIs are the Negros and the
Manila Courts — province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte left considerable properties. From this premise
petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of said decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance with his
alleged will, and that consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the second
court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.

It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in
this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for
the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already
been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will
be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special
proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In
the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to
unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved. This, in effect, was the result of the
submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second place, when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an
opposition to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of administration, he had already informed the
Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for
submission to said court; and when the other respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special
Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which
fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court
that there was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of the same
deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear that in his opposition to petitioner's
petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to submit said will for probate to the Negros
Court.

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this
regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper
venue therefor. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the
light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived
the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection
that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite when Higinio Uriarte filed his
opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice
of the existence of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the
Manila Court when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these
notwithstanding, it was only later on that he filed with the Manila Court an Omnibus motion asking for leave to
intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein; thus enabling the Manila Court not
only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months
earlier. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the
validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence.
 CUENCO VS CA
QUEZON CITY: TEEHANKEE

FACTS:

On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was
survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both
surnamed Cuenco and by his children of the first marriage, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco
Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in
Cebu. On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator) respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition
for Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu, alleging that the late senator died intestate in
Manila. That he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu
and Quezon City. On 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano
Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last
will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in
the said last will and testament. Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, as well as an Opposition to Petition
for Appointment of Special Administrator, On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its
resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on
the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano
Jesus Cuenco." Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, opposing
probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for
probate and for appointment as executrix in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the
Cebu court. Said respondent prayed that it be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.

RTC RULING: In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a
principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." The Quezon City court in its
said order admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed
by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without
bond.

CA RULING: The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents and against the herein petitioner,
holding that: Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. The Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose
jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
resolution of respondent Court of Appeals; hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to
refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions?

RULING:

The Court finds that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon
City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions.

The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter of
probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down
the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts
which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but merely of venue.

The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." A fair reading of the Rule — since
it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with
whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise
jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been
presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving
widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died
intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in
abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged
last will.

Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.

Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take
cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu
court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City
court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction
over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the
same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to
probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be
declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.

It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules of venue,
and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu
court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen
days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and
petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's
estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit anew the
decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be converted
into a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of
record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow
had their conjugal domicile.

It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the
decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue
and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon
City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.

Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The
definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action,
in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong,”
necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant, on the other hand, a special
proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact," has one definite party, who
petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at
bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special
proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay
its liabilities, and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON,
WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS, VS. GAUDIOSO
PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. “GAUDIOSO E. YPON,” AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 198680, July 08, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages (Civil Case No. T-2246) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a.
Gaudioso E. Ypon. In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon died intestate and childless, leaving behind
two registered lots. Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
and caused the cancellation of the certificates of title of the said two registered lots, leading to their subsequent
transfer in his name, to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live
Birth; (b) two letters from Polytechnic School; (c) a certified true copy of his passport; and (d) marriage contract
between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista.

The RTC issued the assailed order, finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against
Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous
special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, this did not mean that they could already be
considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he
is Magdaleno’s son, and hence, his compulsory heir. Petitioners’ MR was likewise denied. Aggrieved,
petitioners sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a
cause of action was proper.

RULING: YES.

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful
heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be
declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the
foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint,
the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the
same. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in
the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession
of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has
consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such
a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a
civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right. Matters relating to the
rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to
the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to
institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action,
a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. Thus, concordant
with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of
ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be
pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out
and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid
of any legal effect.
 HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

KEY DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper
special proceedings for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession. However, it would be more
practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent specially if the parties had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceedings.

FACTS: Lourdes Evero Pacana claims that she is the sole heir of Hermogena Gabatan Evero, the alleged daughter of
Juan Gabatan (deceased). Juan is the registered owner of Lot 3095 C-5 situated in Cagayan De Oro.

Lourdes claims that after the death of his grandfather, his grand uncle, Teofilo Gabatan and his wife Rita were
entrusted to administer the said lot, but despite demands of her mother (deceased) to vacate the lot, Teofilo refused to
surrender the same. The lot was then utilized by the heirs of Teofilo (deceased).

Lourdes filed for recovery of property and ownership against the heirs of Teofilo. To prove her relationship with
Hermogena, she produced her handwritten Certificate of Live of Birth, indicating that her mother was “Hermogena
Clarito Gabatan”. However, she failed to offer a best evidence of Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan. The
testimonies of the witnesses presented were considered as hearsay as they were not yet born and/or at a very young
age when Juan allegedly had a daughter with Laureana Clarito named Hermogena.

The heirs of Teofilo countered that Juan died single and without any issue and was survived by his brother Teofilo
and two sisters. These siblings inherited the land from Juan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse,
continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than 50 years.

The RTC and CA ruled in favour of Lourdes. Thus, the heirs of Teofilo went to the Supreme Court assailing the
decision of the lower courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lourdes is the legal heir of Juan Gabatan.

HELD: No. The Court held that Lourdes failed to substantiate, with convincing proof, her assertion that she is the
sole heir of Juan as she did not come to court with clean hands for presenting a tampered/altered, spurious copy of
her certificate of live birth and for unreasonably delaying the prosecution of her own cause of action.

Further, the Court also held that to prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan, the best evidence of
familial tie is the record of birth appearing in the Civil Registrar, or an authentic document or a final judgement. In the
absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present
other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mother’s relationship to Juan.

In deciding the case, the Court discussed that the determination of legal heirs must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must
take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the
trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be
made in a special proceeding. A civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement of
protection of a right of the prevention or redress of a wrong, while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, right or a particular fact. It is clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a
special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

However, in the case at hand, the Court relaxed the rule stating that it would be more practical to dispense with a
separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent specially since the parties had voluntarily
submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in the said
proceeding.
 Testate Estate of Jose M. Valero, FLORA VALERO VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ and ROSIE VALERO DE
GUTIERREZ, petitioners-appellants, versus COURT OF APPEALS and CARMEN VALERO-RUSTIA,
respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-39532 / July 20, 1979 / J. Aquino / En Banc

Key Doctrine:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.

Facts:
Spouses Beatriz Bautista and Jose M. Valero did not beget any child during their marriage. In 1951, Beatriz
adopted Carmen Bautista. Jose wanted also to adopt her but because, by his first marriage, he had two children named
Flora Valero Vda. de Rodriguez and Rosie Valero Gutierrez, he was disqualified to adopt Carmen. Jose then donated
to Carmen (already married to Doctor Sergio Rustia) his ½ share in two conjugal lots located at San Lorenzo Village
in Makati. However, the deed of donation was not registered. Jose executed his last will and testament however the
donation was not mentioned therein. About a month later, the Valero spouses, sold the San Lorenzo Village lots to
Carmen B. Valero-Rustia. The sale was registered on the following day. Transfer Certificates of Title were issued to
the vendee.

Beatriz died intestate on September 12, 1972. Her estate is pending settlement and Carmen was named
administratrix of her adopted mother's estate. More than a month later, Jose died testate, survived by his two children.
His will was duly probated. Lawyer Celso F. Unson, the executor, submitted an inventory wherein, following the list
of conjugal assets in the testator's will, the two San Lorenzo Village lots were included as part of the testate estate.

Carmen filed a motion for the exclusion of the two San Lorenzo Village lots from the testator's inventoried
estate, as Carmen has been the registered owner of the lots. The executor opposed the motion on the ground that the
two lots were donated to Carmen and the donation would allegedly involve collation and the donee's title to the lots.
The probate court in its order of August 9, 1973 excluded the two lots from the inventory of the testator's estate but
with the understanding "that the same are subject to collation." Carmen then filed a motion for its reconsideration.
She insisted that she is the owner of the two San Lorenzo Village lots as indicated in the Torrens titles. No one
opposed that motion. The probate court in its order of December 14, 1973 ruled that the two lots were
unconditionally excluded from the inventory of Jose M. Valero's estate, meaning "that they are not subject to
collation." One of the legitimate children filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order of December 14, 1973.
She alleged that the two San Lorenzo Village lots were really conveyed to Carmen by way of donation because the
consideration for the sale was allegedly only one-fifth of the true value of the lots. The probate court denied the
motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973
was interlocutory and that it could be changed or modified at anytime during the course of the administration
proceedings. In this petition, the appellants' only assignment of error is that the Court of Appeals should have held
that the probate court's order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was not interlocutory but was a final and appealable
order such that the order of December 14, 1973 modifying the former is void.

Issue:
Whether or not the probate court have jurisdiction over questions to title of properties.

Ruling:
Generally, no. The order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was not a final order. It was interlocutory in the
sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots. The probate court, in the exclusion
incident, could not determine the question of title.
 The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties

Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and whether Carmen's Torrens titles thereto are
indefeasible are matters that may be raised later or may not be raised at all. How those issues should be resolved, if
and when they are raised, need not be touched upon in the adjudication of this appeal.

The intestate and testate proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased Valero spouses were
consolidated so that the conjugal estate of the deceased spouses may be properly liquidated. The Court have examined
the two cases and found that the proceedings have not yet reached the stage when the question of collation or
advancement to an heir may be raised and decided. The numerous debts of the decedents are still being paid. The net
remainder of their conjugal estate has not yet been determined. Moreover, no separate action has been brought by the
appellants to nullify Carmen's Torrens titles to the disputed lots or to show that the sale was in reality a donation.

In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of collation and to decide whether Carmen's titles to
the disputed lots are questionable. The proceedings below have not reached the stage of partition and distribution
when the legitimes of the compulsory heirs have to be determined.
 TERESITA N. DE LEON, ZENAIDA C. NICOLAS and the HEIRS OF ANTONIO NICOLAS,
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PABLO P. INVENTOR and RAMON NICOLAS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 128781. August 6, 2002.

KEY DOCTRINE: A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title provisionally.
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list
of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the
administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot
do so.

FACTS:

Petitioner Teresita N. de Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of Rafael C. Nicolas in Sp. Proc.
No. C-1679. Deceased spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas were the parents of petitioners Teresita N. de Leon,
Estrellita N. Vizconde, Antonio Nicolas, Ramon Nicolas and Roberto Nicolas. Private respondent Ramon G. Nicolas,
an oppositor-applicant in the intestate proceedings, filed a Motion for Collation claiming that deceased Rafael Nicolas,
during his lifetime, had given the following real properties to his children by gratuitous title and that administratrix-
petitioner Teresita failed to include the same in the inventory of the estate of the decedent. The RTC issued an Order
directing Ramon to submit pertinent documents relative to the transfer of the properties from the registered owners
during their lifetime for proper determination of the court if such properties should be collated, and set it for hearing
with notice to the present registered owners to show cause why their properties may not be included in the collation
of properties. Accordingly, after hearing, the Administratrix is ordered to include the subject properties which were
received from the decedent for collation.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the properties subject of the Order were already
titled in their names years ago and that titles may not be collaterally attacked in a motion for collation. The RTC
issued an Order denied said motion ruling that it is within the jurisdiction of the court to determine whether titled
properties should be collated, citing Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court which provides that the final order of the
court concerning questions as to advancements made shall be binding on the person raising the question and on the
heir.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order. The RTC removed petitioner from her position as
administratrix on ground of conflict of interest considering her claim that she paid valuable consideration for the
subject properties acquired by her from their deceased father and therefore the same should not be included in the
collation.

Petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied said motion.

Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals found the petition devoid of
merit, ruling that the Order directing the inclusion of the properties therein enumerated in the estate of the deceased
Rafael Nicolas had already become final for failure of petitioners to appeal from the order of collation; that the appeal
of the petitioner from the Order removing petitioner as administratrix is timely appealed and, observing that the
notice of appeal and record on appeal appear to be unacted upon by the RTC, the appellate court ordered the RTC to
have it resolved.

Thus, this petition. Petitioners claim that private respondent never presented any document to prove that the
properties transferred by their deceased parents to petitioners are by gratuitous title; private respondent never notified
petitioner of any hearing on said documents to give them opportunity to show cause why their properties should not
be collated; the said order is interlocutory in nature and therefore non- appealable; the properties acquired by
petitioners were sold to them as evidenced by public documents; and, the properties were already titled in their
respective names or sold to third persons.

Issue:

Whether or not the Order directing the inclusion of the properties therein enumerated in the estate of the deceased
Rafael Nicolas had already become final for failure of petitioners to appeal from the order of collation.

Ruling:

No.

A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can pass upon questions of title provisionally. The
patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which
result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action. All that the
said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then
the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

Accordingly, it is clear that the Court of Appeals committed an error in considering the assailed Order as final
or binding upon the petitioners. It is clear that any aggrieved party, or a third person for that matter, may bring an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims.

The Order in question is an interlocutory and not a final order. For all intents and purposes, said Order is a
mere order including the subject properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent.

The Court held in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals that the order of exclusion (or inclusion) is
not a final order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the subject lots;
that the prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.

Also, Section 2, Rule 90 should be interpreted in the context of Section 1 of the same Rule. The Order of
Collation is nothing more than an order of inclusion in the inventory of the estate which, as we have already
discussed, is an interlocutory order. The motion for collation was filed with the probate court at the early stage of the
intestate estate proceedings. We have examined the records of the case and we found no indication that the debts of
the decedents spouses have been paid and the net remainder of the conjugal estate have already been determined, and
the estates of the deceased spouses at the time of filing of the motion for collation were ready for partition and
distribution. In other words, the issue on collation is still premature.
 EMILIO B. PACIOLES, Jr., In His Capacity As Administrator And Heir Of The Intestate Estate Of
Miguelita Ching-Pacioles, Petitioner, VS. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.
G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Key Doctrine:
 The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to
do with the settlement of the estate and the probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings;
 A well-recognized exception to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of
ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory

This case involves the estate of Miguelita, wife of petitioner, Pacioles, Jr. and daughter of respondent, Chuatoco-
Ching.

On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of P10.5 million, stock
investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She
was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.

Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelita’s
estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be
divided among the compulsory heirs.

This was opposed by the respondent and prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her instead.

Petitioner alleged that the respondent does not have any direct and material interest in the properties because she is
not a compulsory heir. Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave
half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them would undertake whatever business
endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners.

On April 20, 1994, the intestate court appointed the Petitioner and Emmanuel (brother of Miguelita) as joint regular
administrators of the estate.

Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate. Emmanuel did not submit an
inventory.

On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of
Miguelita. And thus petitioner filed a motion for partition and distribution of the estate. This action was again
opposed by the respondent claiming that she owns bulk of Miguelita’s estate both as an heir and a co-owner.

The Intestate court denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being premature,
indicating that it will first resolve respondent’s claim of ownership.

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with CA which the CA dismissed.

Hence this petition.

Issue: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties
claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?

Held:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters
having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court
exercises special and limited jurisdiction.

A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon
questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory.

Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to
maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line
of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased
person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course
of an intestate or probate proceedings.

Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not
the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to
Miguelita’s estate.
 THELMA M. ARANAS, PETITIONER, VS. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,
CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, AND
FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.

The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of
the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution
of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.

Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate and survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado, and their five children,
namely: Allan, Felimon, Carmencita, Richard, and Maria Teresita; and his two children by his first marriage, namely:
respondent Franklin and petitioner Thelma. Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He
owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation. He assigned
his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot
No. 3353) to Mervir Realty.

Teresita was appointed as administratix of Emigdio’s estate. She submitted an inventory of the said estate for the
RTC’s approval indicating therein that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no real properties but only personal
properties” worth P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00;
pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of
stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the
RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it which the RTC granted. Teresita filed
copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock; the deed of assignment
executed by Emigdio involving real properties in exchange for Mervir Realty shares of stock; and the certificate of
stock for shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth. Thelma again moved and opposed the said inventory. With the
parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should be
included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.

After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued an order finding and holding that the
inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included; denying the administratrix’s motion
for approval of inventory; and ordered her to re-do the inventory of properties. Thereafter, Teresita filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to approve the
inventory. The CA partly granted the petition in reversing the inclusion of parcels of land in Cebu and the other
various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment. The CA opined that the RTC erred when it ruled
that petitioners are estopped from questioning its jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to submit
themselves to its jurisdiction of determining what properties are to be included in or excluded from the inventory to
be submitted, because the petitioners are not questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for
which they are not estopped, since that is their right, considering that there is grave abuse of discretion when it denied
Teresita’s motion for approval of the inventory of properties which were already titled and in possession of a third
person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under the law possessed a personality distinct
and separate from its stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the
presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty Corporation should stand undisturbed.

ISSUE: Did the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the
inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares
in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
RULING: NO. The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of
estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include
all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather
than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits
no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.

The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated
May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the
properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory
and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were
provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court
cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title
adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the
trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator. However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience. First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to
the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the
property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for the inclusion of the properties
in question in its assailed order, viz:

In the first place, Teresita admitted that Emigdio was one of the heirs of Severina Mercado who, upon her death,
left several properties as listed in the inventory in Special Proceedings No. 306-R which are supposed to be divided
among her heirs. She did not include in the inventory submitted by her in this case the shares of Emigdio in the
said estate of Severina. Certainly, said properties as Emigdio’s share in the estate of Severina should be included in
the inventory of properties required to be submitted to this Court.

In the second place, she also admitted in Court that she did not include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir
Realty Corporation which are in her name and which were paid by her from money derived from the taxicab
business which she and her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these shares of stock partake of
being conjugal in character, one-half thereof or of the value thereof should be included in the inventory of the
estate of her husband.

In the third place, she admitted in Court that she had a bank account in her name at Union Bank which she
opened when her husband was still alive. Again, the money in said bank account partakes of being conjugal in
character, and so, one-half thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties constituting as estate of
her husband.

Next, it has been established during the hearing that Lot No. 3353 in Cebu is still registered in the name of
Emigdio. When it was the subject of another civil case decided in 1995, it was the estate of the late Emigdio which
claimed to be its owner. Mervir Realty never intervened in the said case in order to be the owner thereof. So the
said property should be included in the inventory in this case.
 Lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the late Emigdio to Mervir Realty by virtue of
the Deed of Assignment was a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days before he died. A transfer
made in contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought that the transferor has not long to live and made
in place of a testamentary disposition. Section 78 of the 1977 NIRC provides that the gross estate of the decedent
shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property to the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of death. Thus, the said properties
should be included in the inventory to be approved in this case.

Clearly, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure
for preparing the inventory by the administrator.

The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid
basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly surrounding the
execution of the deed of assignment. The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a
system of registration of titles to lands.

Furthermore, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important purpose of
resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every
compulsory heir and the surviving spouse to “bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may
have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.”
Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir
“may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.” Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited
jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent
by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir
by the decedent.
 ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA
PORTUGAL- BELTRAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005.

KEY DOCTRINE: Questions as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an
ordinary civil action. But this rule is not without exceptions.

FACTS:

Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo in 1942. Again, in 1948, he married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.
In 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-
petitioner.
Meanwhile, in 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.
Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the
estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate. In the deed, Portugal’s siblings waived their rights,
interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor. The Registry of Deeds for
Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, “married to Paz C. Lazo”.
In 1984, Paz died. A year after, in 1985, Portugal died intestate. Accordingly, in1988, respondent executed an
Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of
land.
Petitioners filed before the RTC a complaint against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication
executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal,
hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false
representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
After trial, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners’ status
and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal
of the case, stating among others: “The status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet.
x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding,
not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a
wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the
law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the establishment of
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that
purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom.”

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can
pursue the case for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.

RULING:

No.

The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are
no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the
determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special
proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the
right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then
an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or
distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
 In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate,
executed in 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it
should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the
Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be
long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome
to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that
the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the
trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s
estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil
case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the
trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit: 1. Which of
the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid; 2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr.
and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.); 3. Whether or not TCT No.
159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs; 4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to
their claim under the complaint.
 DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA
v. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN
G.R. No. 155733, Jan. 27, 2006

Key Doctrine: Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed
only if he is the sole heir of the estate.

Facts

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia who died
in 1972 and 1974 respectively. The couple never had a child but took into their home two children, but never legally
adopted them. The claimants of their estates may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado,
consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the
alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de
facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedent.

Upon the death of Josefa, she was survived by Guillermo who executed an affidavit of self-adjudication of
the remaining properties comprising her estate.

Luisa Delgado, the sister of Josefa, filed a Petition on Letters of Administration of the estate of the deceased
couple which was opposed by Marciana Rustia, a sister of Guillermo, claiming that they should be the beneficiaries of
the estate. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) then allowed Guillerma Rustia, a legitimate child of Guillermo, to
intervene in the case as she claimed that she possessed the status of an acknowledged legitimate natural child, hence,
she should be the sole heir of the estate. Later, Luisa said that the spouses were living together without marriage.
Luisa died and was substituted by Carlota Delgado (herein petitioner). The RTC appointed the latter as the
administrator of the estates of the deceased.

Issue

Whether it was proper for Guillermo to adjudicate to himself Josefa’s estate

Held

NO. To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother
Felisa with Ramon must first be addressed. The Court ruled that they were never married. Hence, all the children born
to Felisa out of her relations with Ramon and Lucio, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberto, Jose,
Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children. The above-named
siblings of Josefa were related to her by full-blood, except Luis, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all
illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa.

Since Josefa had heirs other than Guillermo, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all
for himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent is allowed only if
he is the sole heir to the estate:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the state among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to
himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds.
BEATRIZ DE ZUZUARREGUI VDA. DE REYES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
PILAR IBAÑEZ VDA. DE ZUZUARREGUI, Administratrix, ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.,
ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI and PACITA JAVIER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-47027 January 27, 1989, REGALADO, J.

It is readily apparent from the project of partition that it was meant to be, as in fact it is, a full and complete adjudication and partition of
all properties of the estate, necessarily including the entire area of the Antipolo property.

Respondent administratrix, Pilar Ibañez Vda. de Zuzuarregui, is the surviving spouse of Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr.,
while petitioner Beatriz de Zuzuarregui Vda. de Reyes and the other heirs of said estate, namely, Antonio, Jr., Enrique
and Jose, are the illegitimate children of the decedent. The parties herein are the only heirs of the deceased whose
estate was the subject of said settlement proceedings. Petitioner was the daughter of the deceased by a mother
different from that of his aforesaid three (3) sons, their mother being Pacita Javier who was the niece of the herein
respondent administratrix.

According to the project of partition which was approved by the probate court, the respective shares of said heirs in
the real estate left by the deceased are as follows: Pilar (12/16), inclusive of 1/2 of said assets which pertains to her
share in the conjugal partnership; Beatriz (1/16); Antonio, Jr. (1/16); Enrique, (1/16); and Jose, (1/16). Among the
real properties in the project of partition is a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal. In said project of partition, its area is
stated as 83,781 square meters,. This statement of said area was repeated in said document four time, that is, in
adjudicating the corresponding portions of said land to Pilar (12/15), Antonio, Jr. (1/15). Enrique (1/15) and Jose
(1/15). The petitioner did not have a share in the aforesaid parcel of land because she relinquished her right thereto in
lieu of her bigger share in an another real estate property.

Thereafter, Pilar and the other three distributees filed a motion to reopen the special proceedings for the purpose of
correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of the Antipolo property since the correct land area is
803,781.51 square meters and not 83,781 square meters. The heirs of Beatriz filed their opposition to said motion.
The court a quo issued the contested order, allowing the reopening for the purpose of correcting a clerical error in the
description. Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that she would not have relinquished her share in said parcel of
land if the true area was not fraudulently concealed from her at the time the project of partition was executed. She
further contends that the fact that the description of the area as 83,781 square meters was repeated several times is
sufficient evidence to show that such was the area intended in the project of partition

ISSUE: Was the reopening of the special proceedings proper?

RULING: YES.

It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors or mistakes or omission plainly due to
inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplied even after the judgment has been entered. The correction of
a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no amendment or correction may be made by the court in its
judgment once the latter had become final.

That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle the entire estate of the deceased
is obvious and elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to intentionally excluded or leave a parcel of land or a
portion thereof undistributed or undivided because the proceeding is precisely designed to end the community of
interests in properties held by co-partners pro indiviso without designation or segregation of shares.

It is readily apparent from the project of partition that it was meant to be, as in fact it is, a full and complete
adjudication and partition of all properties of the estate, necessarily including the entire area of the Antipolo property.
Thus as perceptively posed by the queries of the respondents, if the intention of the heirs was to make only a partial
adjudication and distribution of the subject parcel of land, why is it that they did not make any further disposition of
the remaining balance of 720,000 square meters? What sound reason would the heirs have in holding in suspense the
distribution of the difference of 720,000 square meters? Besides, petitioner suggests that she and the male heirs could
not see eye to eye because they did not have a common mother. 17 If so, this supposed antagonism would even be a
compelling reason for the parties to insist on the total partition of all the properties in the first instance, rather than
for them to remain as co-owners for a long time. As hereinbefore indicated, the project of partition is dated June 17,
1958, 18 while the motion to re-open the proceedings was filed only on January 29, 1973.

While it is not disputed that the area of the Antipolo property is 803,781.15 square meters, the petitioner insists that
the area intended by the heirs of Don Antonio, Sr., in the Project of Partition is the area of 83,781 sq. m. and not
803,781,51 sq. m. If that is the case, then the irresistible question would be how and why the parties arrived at that
particular latter figure. It will be observed that such a portion would constitute only 10.42336% of the total land area.
On top of this, the assumed area of 83,781 square meters has still to be divided into fifteen (15) parts to arrive at the
aliquot portions of 12/15 and 1/15 of the other heirs in this particular property. Why would the parties deliberately
create such an unlikely mathematical situation which would complicate the actual physical segregation of the area
supposed to be distributed? It is, therefore, a logical and credible explanation that the omission of the zero between
the figures "8" and "3" converted "803,781" to "83,781", a product purely of clerical oversight. Petitioner has not
offered any plausible contrary explanation. Parenthetically, she had the assistance of legal counsel in the intestate
proceedings and in the preparation of the project of partition.
 NERI VS HEIRS OF UY
G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

KEY DOCTRINES:
No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.

The power of administration of a natural guardian includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to
the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of the child,
exceeds the limits of administration. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only
with the court’s prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.

FACTS: Anuciacion Neri had seven children, two from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut, namely Eutopria and
Victoria and five from her second marriage with Enrique Neri, namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and
Rosa.

Several homestead properties located in Samal, Davao del Norte (Samal Properties) were acquired by Spouses
Anuciacion and Enrique. When the former died intestate, her husband, in his personal capacity and as natural
guardians of Rosa and Douglas (minors), and their three other children, executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favour of Spouses Uy for their Samal Properties for P80,000.00. The two
children from Anuciacion’s first marriage were not made as parties to the said contracts.

After two years from their knowledge that they were excluded as heirs, Eutopria and Victoria sought for the
annulment of the sale of Samal Properties on the ground that it was sold within the prohibited period of five years,
and that they were deprived of their legitimes being the legitimate children of Anuciacion.

The RTC ruled that sale was void as it deprived the petitioners of their hereditary rights, and that Enrique lacks the
authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas. The CA, however, reversed the decision of the
RTC and further held that it was unconscionable to deprive Spouses Uy of the Samal Properties after 17 years, while
the action to recover property held in trust prescribes only after 10 years from the time the cause of action accrues.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale is valid and binding
with Eutopria and Victoria.

HELD: No. An extrajudicial settlement shall not be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had
no notice thereof. Hence, all the heirs of Anuciancion should have participated, but in the said case, Eutopria and
Victoria were excluded in the transaction, while then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented by their
father.

With respect to Eutopria and Victoria, they are entitled to inherit from the Samal Properties in equal shares. Article
979 of the Civil Code provides that the legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
descendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages. Further,
Article 980 states that the children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares.

However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the Samal Properties by Enrique
and his other children, is valid but only with respect to their proportionate shares therein.

With respect to Rosa and Douglas, Enrique as their father, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the
property of his minor children. What the law confers upon Enrique as his children’s natural guardian is the power of
administration. Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according
to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the
patrimony of the child, exceeds the limits of administration. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian
of the ward’s property and even then only with the court’s prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings
set forth by the Rules of Court. However, with the ratification of Rosa of the settlement of the estate and the
subsequent sale, the defects existing at the time of the conveyance of the property is deemed cured. The same,
however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.

Further, the Court also explained that while the 10-year prescription for the petitioner to recover the property has
lapsed, the accrual of the cause of action should be counted from the time of actual notice in case of unregistered
deed. In this case, Eutopria and Victoria claimed to have knowledge of the settlement and sale only after the death of
their father in 1994. The complaint was filed in 1997, which is well within the prescriptive period.
 TEOFILO BAUTISTA, represented by FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, Attorney-in-Fact v. ALLEGRIA
BAUTISTA, et al.
G.R.160556, 529 SCRA 187 (2007)

Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it confers no rights upon the transferees under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet.

During her lifetime, Teodora Rosario was the owner of a 211.80 square meter parcel of land (the property) in
Pangasinan. She died intestate leaving the said property behind to her spouse Isidro Bautista, and five children namely:
Teofilo, Alegria, Angelica, Pacita, and Gil Bautista. Later on, Isidro and four of his five children, Pacita, Gil, Alegria
and Angelica (Teofilo not included), executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the property where Isidro waived
his share in favor of his four children.

Alegria and Angelica, sold the ½ of the property they have acquired to Pacita and her common-law husband Pedro
Tandoc, by Deed of Absolute Sale. Pacita, with Pedro‘s consent, later sold ½ of the property in favor of Cesar
Tamondong, Pedro‘s nephew via Deed of Absolute Sale. Teofilo, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Francisco
Muñoz, then filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court against his siblings claiming that his co-heirs defrauded him
of his rightful share of the property and that the Deed of Sale executed by Pacita in favor of Cesar was fictitious
because she was already seriously ill that time.

The RTC ruled in favor of Teofilo declaring null and void and no force and effect the documents mentioned. On
appeal by Tandoc and Tamondong, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court‘s decision and dismissed
Teofilo‘s complaint on the ground of prescription. The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Teofilo.
Thus, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilo Bautista‘s co-heirs is valid.

RULING: NO.

The Court of Appeals, in holding that prescription had set in, reasoned:
Unquestionably, the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition is invalid insofar as it affects the legitimate share pertaining to the
defendant-appellee in the property in question. There can be no question that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition was
fraudulently obtained. Hence, an action to set it aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted. Such action for the
annulment of the said partition, however, must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
Significantly, it cannot be denied, either, that by its registration in the manner provided by law, a transaction may be
known actually or constructively.

In the present case, defendant-appellee is deemed to have been constructively notified of the extra-judicial settlement
by reason of its registration and annotation in the certificate of title over the subject lot on December 21, 1981. From
the time of its registration, defendant-appellee had four (4) years or until 21 December 1985, within which to file his
objections or to demand the appropriate settlement of the estate. Unfortunately, defendant-appellee failed to institute
the present civil action within said period, having filed the same only on 17 January 1994 or more than twelve (12)
years from the registration of the deed of extra-judicial partition. Hence, defendant-appellee's right to question the
deed of extra-judicial partition has prescribed.

Even on the extreme assumption that defendant-appellee's complaint in Civil Case No. SC-1797 is an action for
reconveyance of a portion of the property which rightfully belongs to him based upon an implied trust resulting from
fraud, said remedy is already barred by prescription. An action of reconveyance of land based upon an implied or
constructive trust prescribes after ten years from the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title.

The complaint of defendant-appellee was filed only on 17 January 1994, while the deed of extra-judicial partition was
registered and inscribed on Transfer Certificate of Title 12951, on 21 December 1981. Clearly, the complaint was filed
twelve (12) years and twenty-seven (27) days after the inscription of the deed of extra-judicial partition on TCT 12951.
Hence, even if We consider defendant-appellee's complaint as an action for reconveyance against plaintiff-appellants
on the basis of implied trust, we find and so hold that his remedy for reconveyance has also prescribed.

The extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilo's co-heirs was invalid, however. So Segura v. Segura instructs:

The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares
in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extra-judicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has
not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded
heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two
years

The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled does not prescribe.

Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it transmitted no rights to Teofilo's co-heirs.[24] Consequently, the
subsequent transfer by Angelica and Alegria of ½ of the property to Pacita and her husband Pedro, as well as the
transfer of ½ of the property to Cesar Tamondong is invalid, hence, conferring no rights upon the transferees under
the principle of nemo dat quod non habet.
 PERFECTO MACABABBAD, Jr., deceased, substituted by his heirs SOPHIA MACABABBAD, GLENN
M. MACABABBAD, PERFECTO VENER M. MACABABBAD III and MARY GRACE MACABABBAD,
and SPS. CHUA SENG LIN and SAY UN AY, petitioners, vs. FERNANDO G. MASIRAG, FAUSTINA G.
MASIRAG, CORAZON G. MASIRAG, LEONOR G. MASIRAG, and LEONCIO M. GOYAGOY,
respondents.
FRANCISCA MASIRAG BACCAY, PURA MASIRAG FERRER-MELAD, and SANTIAGO MASIRAG,
intervenors-respondents.

G.R. No. 161237. January 14, 2009. BRION, J.:


Key Doctrines:

 As the nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale has been raised and is the primary issue, the action to secure this
result will not prescribe pursuant to Article 1410 of the Civil Code
 The issuance of a certificate of title in their favor could not vest upon them ownership of the entire property; neither could it
validate the purchase thereof which is null and void.

The deceased Spouses Pedro Masirag (Pedro) and Pantaleona Tulauan (Pantaleona) were the original registered owners
of Lot No. 4144 located in Tuguegarao (Lot No. 4144) with an area of 6,423 square meters.

Pedro and Pantaleona had eight (8) children, namely, Valeriano, Domingo, Pablo, Victoria, Vicenta, Inicio, Maxima
and Maria.

Respondents Fernando, Faustina, Corazon and Leonor Masirag are the children of Valeriano and Alfora Goyagoy,
while Leoncio is the son of Vicenta and Braulio Goyagoy. The respondents allegedly did not know of the demise of
their respective parents; they only learned of the inheritance due from their parents in the first week of March 1999
when their relative, Pilar Quinto, informed respondent Fernando and his wife Barbara Balisi about it. They
immediately hired a lawyer to investigate the matter.

The investigation disclosed that the petitioners falsified a document entitled Extrajudicial Settlement with
Simultaneous Sale of Portion of Registered Land (Lot 4144) dated December 3, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the
extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale) so that the respondents were deprived of their shares in Lot No. 4144. The
document purportedly bore the respondents signatures, making them appear to have participated in the execution of
the document when they did not; they did not even know the petitioners.

The document ostensibly conveyed the subject property to Macababbad for the sum of P1,800.00. Subsequently,
OCT No. 1946 was cancelled and Lot No. 4144 was registered in the names of its new owners under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13408, presumably after the death of Pedro and Pantaleona. However, despite the
supposed sale to Macababbad, his name did not appear on the face of TCT No. 13408. Subsequently, Macababbad
registered portions of Lot No. 4144 in his name and sold other portions to third parties.

Thus on On April 28, 1999, respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for quieting of title, nullity of titles,
reconveyance, damages and attorney’s fees against petitioners Macababbad, Chua and Say.

RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription because it was filed 32 years after the property was
partitioned and for failure to implead indispensable parties (other heirs and persons who acquired the property in
good faith)

On Appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of RTC. the CA ruled that the respondents cause of action had
not prescribed, because in assailing the extrajudicial partition as void, the [respondents] have the right to bring the action unfettered by
a prescriptive period.
Issues:

Whether or not the cause of action of the respondent heirs have prescribed.

Held:

In actions for reconveyance of the property predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of was null and
void ab initio, a claim of prescription of action would be unavailing. The action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. Neither could laches be invoked in the case at bar.

Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are basically courts of law and not courts of equity. Equity, which has
been aptly described as justice outside legality, should be applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory
law. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis.

The positive mandate of Art. 1410 of the New Civil; Code conferring imprescriptibility to actions for declaration of
the inexistence of a contract should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. Certainly,
laches cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right, and petitioners can validly vindicate
their inheritance despite the lapse of time.

In sum, the CA correctly reversed the RTC dismissal of the respondents’ complaint.

Note: There are several issues raised in this case like, propriety of the mode of appeal, failure to implead third parties etc. What was
included in this digest is the relevant issue on the subject matter.
 CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A.
FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987; Paras, J.

FACTS: The deceased Nemesio Acain left a will giving all his money, properties, lands, houses properties in Bantayan
and Cebu to his brother Segundo Acain and, in case the latter predeceases the testator, his children including
Petitioner Constantino shall, otherwise, inherit the properties.

Segundo predeceased Nemesio, thus it is Petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court-Cebu, a
petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters
testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB, on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will
in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura
were instituted as heirs.

Testators widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain and their legally adopted daughter filed a motion to dismiss on the
following grounds: (1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal
heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited. Said motion was denied by the trial judge. The
subsequent MR was also denied. Hence, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. The
IAC granted the respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of
Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB. Petitioner Constantino filed this present petition for the
review of respondent Court's decision.

SPECPRO ISSUE: Whether or not as an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the
petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain.

RULING: No, Petitioner Constantino has no legal interest and standing to file a petition for probate of the subject
will.

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or
in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested
party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a
creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee nor a legatee there being
no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called
upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined
under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by
operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the
universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to
petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.

Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the general rule is that
the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of
the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this
stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will.

The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless
to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of
Appeals). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the
petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical
considerations.

In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of
RTC-Cebu. It was denied by the trial court for the reason that “the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters
properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the case”. For private
respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its face the will
appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with
the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility. The
trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were
properly availed of by private respondents.

MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents have been preterited.

RULING: Yes. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that “The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not;
inofficious. Xxx If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall he effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation.”

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are
not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend
from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory
heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line (Art. 854, Civil
code). In case of the legally adopted child, Child and Youth Welfare Code (Article 39 of P.D. No. 603) provides that
adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and
makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in
the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can
it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted
child.

Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance.
The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand
valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Premises considered, the petition is hereby denied for lack of merit and the
questioned decision of respondent court of appeals promulgated on august 30, 1985 and its resolution dated october
23, 1985 are hereby affirmed.
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, versus FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID,
oppositors and appellees.
G.R. No. L-23445 / June 23, 1966 / J. Sanchez / En Banc

Key Doctrine:
The court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely
to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic
validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.

Facts:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6)
brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will
allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that
said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid (legitimate parents of the deceased) entered their
opposition to the probate of her will, claiming that they are the compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct
ascending line and that they were illegally preterited.

The trial court's order held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of
the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs. A motion to reconsider having
been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the court can look into the intrinsic validity of a will without such being admitted to probate
first.

Ruling:
Generally, no. The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of,
and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity,
and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and
to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic
validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.

However, this case involves a peculiar situation. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the
will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes
only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. But petitioner and oppositors, in the court
below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the
court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the
intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions
of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a
complete nullity.
 The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the
direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely
omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither
were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.

Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the
nullification of such institution of universal heir without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for
inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. As
aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That
institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.
CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, FRANCIS COLLADO, JOSE P. COLLADO, JUDITH PROVIDO, CLARITA
PROVIDO, ALFREDO PROVIDO, MANUEL PROVIDO, JR., LORNA DINA E. PROVIDO, SEVERO
ARENGA, JR., SERGIO ARENGA, EDUARDO ARENGA, CAROL ARENGA, RUTH BABASA, NORMA
HIJASTRO, DOLORES M. FLORES, ANTONIO MARIN, JR., JOSE MARIN, SR., AND MATHILDE
MARIN, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005, TINGA, J.

KEY DOCTRINE: The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that the court’s jurisdiction extends to all persons
interested in said will or in the settlement of estate of the decedent upon publication of the petition.

On November 8, 2000, Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will of the late Soledad
Provideo Elevencionado, who died on October 26, 2000 at Janiuay, Iloilo. He alleged that he was the sole heir and
executor of the will. The notice of hearing was published. In turn, the RTC allowed the probate of the will of the
decedent on May 30, 2001, and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to Francisco.

More than four (4) months after the decision, Cynthia Alaban, et al., who are nephews and nieces of the
deceased, filed a motion to reopen the probate proceedings, arguing among others that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the petition due to lack of notice to them as intestate heirs. The RTC denied the motion and ruled
that Cynthia, et al. were deemed notified of the hearing, and that the RTC’s decision was already final and executory
even before the filing of the motion to open. The CA likewise denied Cynthia, et al.’s petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cynthia, et al. became parties to the probate proceedings upon publication.

RULING: YES.

A proceeding for the probate of a will is in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition,
the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto
as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.

As parties to the probate proceedings, Cynthia, et al. could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for
new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, they filed a motion to reopen, which is
essentially a motion for new trial. When the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, they could have still
filed a petition for relief of judgment, which Cynthia, et al. failed to do.

And even if a petition for relief of judgment were filed, the same must fail for lack of extrinsic fraud. To
sustain an allegation of extrinsic fraud, it must be shown that Francisco prevented Cynthia, et al. from having their day
in court. While the Rules require that notice be personally given to “known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator”, Cynthia, et al. as nephews and nieces of the decedent are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are
entitled to be personally notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Thus, Francisco had no obligation to
personally notify Cynthia, et al. Not to mention that the “infirmity” was cured by publication of the notice, and that
personal notice upon the heirs is only a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.
ACUÑA

OZAETA ET.AL. VS. PECSON AND BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

(L−5436 June 30, 1953)
Key Doctrine −Executor named in the will should be appointed upon probate of will, even if order of probate is on appeal.
−Rule 81 of Rules of Court grants discretion to probate court in appointment of special administrator. But
such discretion should not be whimsical rather reasonable and logical and in accord with fundamental legal principles and justice.
Facts
Carlos Palanca executed a will on May 19, 1945 where he named the petitioner Roman Ozaeta, a
former Associate Justice of the Court as executor if General Manuel Roxas fails to qualify. Upon Palanca’s
death, and Gen. Roxas dying previously, petitioner presented petition for probate of the will and prayed to be
appointed as special administrator.
Some heirs opposed the petition and the probate court appointed Philippine Trust Company
(Philippine Trust) as special administrator. But Philippine Trust later resigned due to incompatibility of
interest as it granted a loan to heir Angel Palanca who pledged shares allegedly belonging to the estate of the
deceased. The court then appointed Sebastian Palanca, one of the heirs.
On October 23, 1951 the court rendered an order admitting the will to probate and appointed the
petitioner as administrator. However, pending appeal of such order, on October 25, 1951 the court allowed
Philippine Trust to resign, reconsidered appointing Sebastian Palanca and appointed Bank of Philippine
Islands as special administrator instead. Petitioner filed for reconsideration but was denied by the court and
held that pending appeal of order of probate, it has discretion to choose a special administrator and not
bound to appoint the person named therein as executor.

Issue
Is it valid for the court, pending appeal, to appoint as special administrator any person other than the
executor named in the will?

Ruling
NO, it is invalid for the court pending appeal to appoint special administrator any person other than
the executor named in the will.
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right
to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one
of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of the estate. And as the
rights granted by will take effect from the time of death (Article 777, Civil Code of the Philippines), the
management of his estate by the administrator of his choice should be made as soon as practicable, when no
reasonable objection to his assumption of the trust can be interposed any longer. It has been held that when a
will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to the person named
as executor upon his application, even if order of probate is on appeal. Mandamus lies to compel such
appointment.
In the case at bar, the will has already been admitted to probate, and respondent judge himself has
expressly appointed petitioner as administrator. If the new special administrator appointed takes office, the
estate may again be subjected to expensive cost of administration. Under these circumstances, it would seem
unreasonable to refuse to appoint the petitioner as special administrator. To do so would be delaying the
fulfilment of the wishes of the testator and subjecting the estate to unnecessary expense.
Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, grants discretion to the probate court to appoint or not to appoint a
special administrator. It is silent as to the person that may be appointed as special administrator, unlike
ACUÑA

section 6 of Rule 79, which expressly gives the order of preference of the persons that may be appointed as
regular administrator, the appointment of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the
appointment of regular administrators. (Roxas vs. Pecson, 82 Phil., 407, 46 Off. Gaz. [5] 2058.) But while the
choice of the person lies within the court's discretion, such discretion should not be a whimsical one, but one
that is reasonable and logical and in accord with fundamental legal principles and justice. The fact that a judge
is granted discretion does not authorize him to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes
prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. And there is no reason why the same fundamental and
legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the
appointment of the special administrator.
The writ prayed for is, therefore, granted, the appealed order reversed, and the temporary injunction
issued by the court made absolute. Let temporary letters of administration be issued in favor of petitioner
during the pendency of the appeal from the order admitting the will to probate.
AGOOT

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES v. ALELI “CORAZON’ ANGELES-MAGLAYA

G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005, Garcia, J.

Key Doctrine: When the law speaks of “next of kin,” the reference is to those who are entitled,
under the statute of distribution, to the decedent’s property; one whose relationship is such that
he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir.

Facts

Petitioner Belen wanted to set aside the decision of the CA in reversing the decision of
RTC Caloocan which earlier dismissed the petition of Respondent Corazon for the settlement of
the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles. Corazon contends that she is the legitimate daughter of
Francisco and her mother Genoveva which is evidenced by her birth certificate indicating that
Francisco is her father who is married to Genoveva. The birth certificate was not signed by either
Francisco or Genoveva. The marriage certificate of the two was not presented because it was
allegedly destroyed. RTC ruled that Corazon failed to state or prove a cause of action for failure
to establish her filiation with the decedent. On appeal, CA reversed the decision predicating on
the basis that since Belen’s motion to dismiss partakes of a demurrer to evidence under Sec. 1 of
Rule 33, it follows then that she waives her right to present opposing evidence to rebut
Corazon’s testimonial and documentary evidence therefore sufficiently establishing her
legitimate filiation with the decedent because the presumption of Corazon’s legitimacy was
unrebutted. CA ordered the trial court to appoint Corazon as administratix of the in intestate
estate of Francisco. Hence, this petition

Issue

Whether the CA erred in it’s decision that Corazon is the legitimate daughter of Francisco
and in decreeing her appointment as administratix of Francisco’s intestate estate

Ruling

YES. SC states that a legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and
lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation
between parents and child. The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 may be availed only
upon convincing proof of the factual bases which the respondent Corazon failed to do so.
Jurisprudence states that a birth certificate to be considered as validating proof of paternity and
as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly or by the mother
alone if the father refuses. Since there was no sufficient proof that Francisco and Genoveva were
married, it follows then that Corazon cannot avail of the presumption of legitimacy. The SC also
did not overlook of it’s previous ruling involving the same respondent in which case it was ruled
that Corazon, contrary to her claim is not a legitimate daughter of Francisco because Francisco
was never married to Genoveva before or at anytime prior to his marriage to Belen.

It should also be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of
the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the
law speaks of “next of kin,” the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of
AGOOT

distribution, to the decedent’s property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share
in the estate as distributed, or in short, an heir. And in resolving the issue of whether an applicant
for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of decedent, the probate court perforce has
to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation.
ANTALAN

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA

VENTURA, executrix- appellant, MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA
CARDONA, heirs-appellants,
vs.
GREGORIA VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO,
MERCEDES VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, PEDRO D.
CORPUZ, oppositors-appellees.

G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988, Paras, J.

Key Doctrine:

The necessity to appoint another administrator when the institution of heirs is annulled:
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If no executor is named in

the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to
give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;"

Facts:

Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio Ventura
while Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona are his son and saving spouse who are also the brother
and mother of Maria Ventura. On the other hand, appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are
the deceased's legitimate children with his former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano but the
paternity of appellees was denied by the deceased in his will.

On December 14,1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not
include the appellees and the petition was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 812. In the said
will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was named and appointed by the
testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate.

In due course, said will was admitted to probate on January 14,1954. Gregorio Ventura died on
September 26,1955. On October 10, 1955, the appellant Maria Ventura filed a motion for her
appointment as executrix and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. On October 17,
1955, Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the corresponding letters testamentary was
issued in her favor.

On or about July 26, 1956, Maria Ventura submitted an inventory of the estate of Gregorio
Ventura.

On June 17,1960, she filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to 1960, inclusive.
Said account of administration was opposed by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz
ANTALAN

on July 25, 1960 and by Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura on August 5,1963. Both
oppositions assailed the veracity of the report as not reflecting the true income of the estate and
the expenses which allegedly are not administration expenses. But on January 25, 1961, Maria
Ventura filed a motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts of administration or to
have their approval without the opposition of the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz
and Gregoria Ventura and Exequiel Victorio on the ground that the question of the paternity of
Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura is still pending final determination before the Supreme
Court and that should they be adjudged the adulterous children of testator, as claimed, they are
not entitled to inherit nor to oppose the approval of the counts of administration. Spouses
Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz filed on February 2, 1961 their opposition to the motion to
hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts of administration on the ground that Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura had already been declared by the Court of First Instance in Civil Cases No.
1064 and 1476, which cases are supposed to be pending before the Supreme Court, as the
legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, hence, they have reason to protect their interest. On
February 9,1961, the motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts was denied.

On October 5, 1965, the court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the
funds of the estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with the orders of the
Court in the matter of presenting up-to-date statements of accounts and neglected to pay the real
estate taxes of the estate and then removed as administratrix and executrix.

On November 4, 1959, after a joint hearing of Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476, the lower court
rendered its judgment, declaring Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura to be the ligitimate
daughters of Paulina Simpliciano and Gregorio Ventura; declaring that as such ligitimate
daughters of Paulina Simpliciano they are entitled to 1/2 of the properties described in
paragraph six of the complaint; ordering the defendant Maria Ventura, as administratrix of the
estate of Gregorio Ventura to pay to Mercedes Ventura and Gregorio Ventura the amount of P
19,074.09 which shall be divided equally between Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura declaring
Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz are the exclusive owners of the property describe in the
certificate of Title Nos. T-1102, 212, T-1213, T-1214; ordering Mercedes Ventura and Pedro D.
Corpuz to pay to the conjugal partnership of Gregorio Ventura and Paulina Simpliciano the sum
of P100,000.00, one-half of which shall pertain to the estate of Gregorio Ventura and the other
half to the estate of Paulina Simpliciano to whom Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura have
succeeded, to be divided between Mercedes and Gregoria in equal parts.

Issue:

Whether or not Maria Ventura is the proper adminitratrix of the estate

Ruling:

No. Maria Ventura is not the proper adminitratrix of the estate.

Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "the pretention or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious," and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering
the previous appointment of Maria Ventura as executrix moot and academic. This would now
necessitate the appointment of another administrator, under the following provision:
ANTALAN

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If no executor is named in

the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to
give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;"

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while
the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of
kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the
decedent's property. It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is
more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class the
strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of
kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina
Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference
over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence,
under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be
appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion
of the Court, in order to represent both interests.
CO

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 147561, June 22, 2006, PANGANIBAN, CJ

Key Doctrine: Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising
from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor.

Facts:

Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation entered into a contract with Jose D. Santos, Jr., the
proprietor of JDS Construction for the construction of roadways and a drainage system in
Republic-Asahi’s compound, where Republic-Asahi was to pay P5,300,000.00 to JDS. To guarantee the
faithful and satisfactory performance of its undertakings, JDS posted performance bond of
P795,000.00, which it executed jointly and severally with Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (SICI).

Due to the slow pace of progress and alarmed that it will not be finished within 240 days, and
with the dissatisfaction with the progress of work of JDS, Republic-Asahi extrajudicially rescinded the
contract. Such rescission, according to Article XV of the contract shall not be construed as a waiver of
right to recover damages from JDS and the latter’s sureties. Because of the failure to comply and the
recission of the contract, Republic-Asahi hired another to finish the project and incurred an additional
expense of P3,256,874.00. Republic-Asahi then sent a letter to SICI filing its claim under the bond and
another reiterating the demand. Both letters were unheeded. Respondent then filed a complaint against
JDS and SICI. Sheriff was able to serve summons to SICI but not to Jose Santos, Jr. since he is already
dead.

SICI claimed that the money claims is already extinguised by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr.

Issue:

Whether petitioner’s liability under the performance bond was automatically extinguished by
the death of Santos, the principal, or not.

Ruling:

No. As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the
obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the
law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or
are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.

Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims
arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually
extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligee’s action or suit filed before the court, which is not
then acting as a probate court.

Whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with respondent
were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death did not
result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate.
Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the
CO

performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary
obligation under its performance bond.
BITUDIO

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT

CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 170498, January 9, 2013, Brion, J.

Key Doctrines: Quasi-contracts are included in claims that should be filed pursuant to Rule 86, Section 5
of the Rules of Court;

FACTS

Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of money against
Absolute Management Corporation (AMC). The complaint was assigned to the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 80. SHCI alleged that it made advance payments to AMC for the purchase of pieces of plywood
and plyboards covered by Metrobank Checks. These checks were all crossed, and were all made payable
to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC’s General Manager, who later on died. A special proceeding
for the settlement of his estate was commenced before the RTC of Pasay City. This proceeding was
pending at the time AMC filed its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint against
Metrobank. In its answer, Metrobank admitted that it deposited the checks in question to the account of
Ayala Lumber and Hardware, a sole proprietorship Chua owned and managed. The deposit was allegedly
done with the knowledge and consent of AMC. Subsequently, Metrobank filed a motion for leave to
admit fourth party complaint against Chua’s estate. It alleged that Chua’s estate should reimburse
Metrobank in case it would be held liable in the third-party complaint filed against it by AMC.

ISSUE

1. Whether quasi-contracts are included in claims that should be filed pursuant to Rule 86, Section 5
of the Rules of Court.
2. Whether Metrobank’s claim against the Estate of Jose Chua is based on a quasi-contract.

HELD

1. YES. Citing Leung Ben v. O’Brien, it explained that the term “implied contracts,” as used in our
remedial law, originated from the common law where obligations derived from quasi-contracts and from
law are both considered as implied contracts. Thus, the term quasi-contract is included in the concept
“implied contracts” as used in the Rules of Court. Accordingly, liabilities of the deceased arising from
quasi-contracts should be filed as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court.
2. YES. According to the CA, Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint falls under the quasi-contracts
enunciated in Article 2154 of the Civil Code. Article 2154 embodies the concept “solutio indebiti” which
arises when something is delivered through mistake to a person who has no right to demand it. It obligates
the latter to return what has been received through mistake.
In its fourth-party complaint, Metrobank claims that Chua’s estate should reimburse it if it
becomes liable on the checks that it deposited to Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s account upon Chua’s
instructions.
This fulfills the requisites of solutio indebiti. First, Metrobank acted in a manner akin to a mistake
when it deposited the AMC checks to Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s account; because of Chua’s control
over AMC’s operations, Metrobank assumed that the checks payable to AMC could be deposited to Ayala
Lumber and Hardware’s account. Second, Ayala Lumber and Hardware had no right to demand and
receive the checks that were deposited to its account; despite Chua’s control over AMC and Ayala
Lumber and Hardware, the two entities are distinct, and checks exclusively and expressly payable to one
cannot be deposited in the account of the other. This disjunct created an obligation on the part of Ayala
BITUDIO

Lumber and Hardware, through its sole proprietor, Chua, to return the amount of these checks to
Metrobank.
A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature – the claim
depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or
may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be
included in the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
We read with approval the CA’s use of the statutory construction principle of lex specialis
derogat generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be filed) is
primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary claims,
including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely apply suppletorily.
BORILLO

ROSITA SANTIAGO DE BAUTISTA, ET AL.

vs. VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-28298, November 25, 1983, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Key Doctrine: Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides that: “All claims for money against the decedent arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the
last sickness of the decedents, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time in the notice; otherwise
they are barred forever; except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may
bring against the claimants ... Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.”

Facts

Numeriano Bautista was a passenger of a jeepney owned by Rosendo de Guzman and driven by the
latter’s employee, Eugenio Medrano. Eugenio drove said jeepney in a negligent and reckless manner which
inflicted physical injuries to Numeriano that caused his death. Eugenio was convicted of homicide through
reckless imprudence by the trial court, and was ordered to indemnify the heirs of Numeriano, herein
plaintiffs. However, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied and Rosendo died. The plaintiffs filed a
complaint before CFI Rizal against the heirs of Rosendo, herein defendants. The defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, which was sustained by the lower court, on the ground that a money claim against the supposed
debtor who was already dead should be filed in testate or intestate proceedings. This order became final.

After more than a year from said order, the plaintiffs filed a complaint before the same trial court.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging the same grounds and res judicata in view of the dismissal of
the first case which became final already. However, the lower court denied the motion. Hence, this appeal.

Issue

WON the trial court erred in giving due course to the complaint

Ruling

YES. Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. The requirement therein is for the
purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased. The executor or administrator is informed of the claims
against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should
be allowed. Therefore, upon the dismissal of the first complaint of herein plaintiffs, they should have
presented their claims before the intestate proceedings filed in the same court. Instead of doing so,
however. the plaintiffs slept on their right. They allowed said proceedings to terminate and the properties
to be distributed to the heirs pursuant to a project of partition before instituting this separate action. Such do
not sanctioned by the above rule for it strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of claims
against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and
distribute the residue. With the exception provided for in the above rule, the failure of herein plaintiffs to
present their claims before the intestate proceedings of the estate of Rosendo de Guzman within the
prescribed period constituted a bar to a subsequent claim against the estate or a similar action of the same
import.

Therefore, it was an error on the part of the trial court to hold that the plaintiffs had a cause of
action against the defendants who are the heirs of the deceased against whom the liability is sought to be
enforced, much less take cognizance of the complaint. As in the first complaint, said court could not have
assumed jurisdiction over the second case for the simple reason that it was no longer acting as a
probate court which was the proper forum to file such complaint. The termination of the intestate
proceedings and the distribution of the estate to the heirs did not alter the fact that plaintiffs' claim
was a money claim which should have been presented before the probate court. The liability of the late
BORILLO

Rosendo de Guzman arose from the breach of his obligations under the contract of carriage between him
and the unfortunate passenger. The obligations are spelled out by law but the liability arose from a breach of
contractual obligations. The resulting claim is a money claim.

The only instance wherein a creditor can file an action against a distributee of the debtor's asset is
under Section 5, Rule 88 of the Rules of Court. However, the contingent claims must first have been
established and allowed in the probate court before the creditors can file an action directly, against the
distributees. Such is not the situation, however, in the case at bar. The complaint herein was filed after the
intestate proceedings had terminated and the estate finally distributed to the heirs. If we are to allow the
complaint to prosper and the trial court to take cognizance of the same, then the rules providing for
the claims against the estate in a testate or intestate proceedings within a specific period would be
rendered nugatory as a subsequent action for money against the distributees may be filed
independently of such proceedings. This precisely is what the rule seeks to prevent so as to avoid
further delays in the settlement of the estate of the deceased and in the distribution of his property to
the heirs, legatees or devisees.

Furthermore, even assuming that the plaintiffs had no knowledge of the intestate proceedings which
is not established, the law presumes that they had such knowledge because the settlement of estate is a
proceeding in rem and therefore the failure to file their claims before such proceedings barred them
from subsequently filing the same claims outside said proceedings.
CAYLAO

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLAN M. CHUA as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate
of the late ANTONIO M. CHUA and Mrs. ASUNCION M. CHUA
G.R. No. 121597, June 29, 2001, QUISUMBING, J.:

Key Doctrine: The result of extrajudicial foreclosure is that the creditor waives any further deficiency claim.

Facts

Spouses Antonio M. Chua and Asuncion M. Chua were the owners of a parcel of land TCT No. P-
142 and registered in their names. Upon Antonio’s death, the probate court appointed his son, private
respondent Allan M. Chua, special administrator of Antonio’s intestate estate. The court also authorized Allan
to obtain a loan accommodation of P550,000.00 from petitioner Philippine National Bank to be secured by a
real estate mortgage over the above-mentioned parcel of land.

Allan obtained a loan of P450,000.00 from petitioner PNB evidenced by a promissory note with
interest at 18.8 percent per annum. To secure the loan, Allan executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the
aforesaid parcel of land.

For failure to pay the loan in full, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage, through
the Ex-Officio Sheriff, who conducted a public auction of the mortgaged property pursuant to the authority
provided for in the deed of real estate mortgage. During the auction, PNB was the highest bidder with a bid
price P306,360.00. Since PNB’s total claim as of the date of the auction sale was P679,185.63, the loan had a
payable balance of P372,825.63. To claim this deficiency, PNB instituted a civil action with the RTC Batang
against both Mrs. Asuncion M. Chua and Allan Chua in his capacity as special administrator of his father’s
intestate estate.

RTC: dismissed PNB’s complaint

CA: affirmed the RTC decision

Issue

Whether or not it was error for the CA to rule that petitioner may no longer pursue by civil action
the recovery of the balance of indebtedness after having foreclosed the property securing the same. (A
resolution of this issue will also resolve the secondary issue concerning any further liability of respondents and of the decedent’s
estate.)

Ruling

NO.

Petitioner:

When the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right to recover
the deficiency from the debtor. It also contends that Act 3135, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the
Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages," is the law
applicable to this case of foreclosure sale and not Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court as
held by the Court of Appeals.
CAYLAO

Private respondents:

Having chosen the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property of the deceased,
petitioner is precluded from pursuing its deficiency claim against the estate of Antonio M. Chua. This they say
is pursuant to Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, which states that:

Sec. 7. Rule 86. Mortgage debt due from estate. — A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured
by mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the
manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he
may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or
administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the
mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon
the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section;
or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone and foreclose the same at any time within
the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive
no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the
executor or administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged by paying the debt for
which it is hold as security, under the direction of the court if the court shall adjudge it to be for the
interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made.

To begin with, it is clear from the text of Section 7, Rule 89, that once the deed of real estate
mortgage is recorded in the proper Registry of Deeds, together with the corresponding court order
authorizing the administrator to mortgage the property, said deed shall be valid as if it has been
executed by the deceased himself. Section 7 provides in part:

Sec. 7. Rule 89. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate – The court
having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell
personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these
rules when it appears necessary or beneficial under the following regulations:

(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate thus sold,
mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the order of the court, together
with the deed of the executor or administrator for such real estate, which shall be valid as if the deed had
been executed by the deceased in his lifetime.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the conditions under the aforecited rule have been
complied with. It follows that we must consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86, appropriately applicable to the
controversy at hand.

Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and
mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the
satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:

(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary
claim;

(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and

(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by
prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency
CAYLAO

The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to
recover any deficiency from the estate. Following the Perez ruling that the third mode includes
extrajudicial foreclosure sales, the result of extrajudicial foreclosure is that the creditor waives any
further deficiency claim.

Clearly, in our view, petitioner herein has chosen the mortgage-creditor’s option of
extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any
subsequent deficiency claim against the estate of the deceased, Antonio M. Chua. Petitioner may no
longer avail of the complaint for the recovery of the balance of indebtedness against said estate, after
petitioner foreclosed the property securing the mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this case no
further liability remains on the part of respondents and the late Antonio M. Chua’s estate.
CO

HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES FLA VIANO MAGLASANG and SALUD

ADAZA-MAGLASANG
v. MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, now substituted by FIRST SOVEREIGN ASSET
MANAGEMENT SPV-AMC, INC. FSAMI
G.R. No. 171206, September 23, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Key Doctrine: Under Section 7, Rule 86 the secured creditor has three remedies/options that he
may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness. He may choose to:
(a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary
claim;
(b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim;
and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same before it is barred
by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any deficiency. The third option includes
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.

Facts:

Spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang obtained a credit line from respondent in the
amount of P350,000.00 which was secured by real estate mortgage executed over 7 of their
properties. After Flaviano died intestate, Salud and their children appointed their brother Edgar
Magsalang as attorney-in-fact. He filed a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate
of Flaviano, which the court granted. The court issued a Notice to Creditors for the filing of money
claims against the estate of Flaviano. The respondent notified the probate court of its claim in the
amount of P382,753.19. The surviving heirs executed an extrajudicial partition of the estate, the
probate court then terminated the proceedings. The claim of the respondent remains unsatisfied due
to respondent’s certification that Flaviano’s account was undergoing a restructuring. The
respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the mortage covering the properties however there remained
a deficiency of P250,601.05. Respondent filed a suit for the recovery of the deficiency.

Petitioners argue that it is not Act 3135 that is applicable but the Sec 7 of Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court. Having filed its claim against the estate during the intestate proceedings, petitioners
argue that respondent had effectively waived the remedy of foreclosure and, even assuming that it
still had the right to do so, it was precluded from filing a suit for the recovery of the deficiency
obligation.

Issue:

Whether the MBC have the right to recover the deficiency or not.

Ruling:

No. Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and explains that the
secured creditor has three remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of
his indebtedness. In particular, he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt
from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and
prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other
security and foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim
CO

for any deficiency. It must, however, be emphasized that these remedies are distinct, independent
and mutually exclusive from each other.

It may be reasonably concluded that the aforementioned section covers all secured claims,
whether by mortgage or any other form of collateral, which a creditor may enforce against the
estate of the deceased debtor.

Anent the third remedy, it must be mentioned that the same includes the option of
extra-judicially foreclosing the mortgage under Act No. 3135,as availed of by respondent in this
case. However, the plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives
his right to recover any deficiency from the estate.

In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties
previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang and, therefore, availed of the third option. Lest it be
misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as
petitioners assert, since it merely notified the probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim
against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account. Thus, having
unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule
86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier
discussed.

The Court observes that the operation of Act No. 3135 does not entirely discount the
application of Section 7, Rule 86, or vice-versa.On the one hand, Section 7, Rule 86 lays down the
options for the secured creditor to claim against the estate and, according to jurisprudence, the
availment of the third option bars him from claiming any deficiency amount. On the other hand,
after the third option is chosen, the procedure governing the manner in which the extra-judicial
foreclosure should proceed would still be governed by the provisions of Act No. 3135. Simply put,
Section 7, Rule 86 governs the parameters and the extent to which a claim may be advanced against
the estate, whereas Act No. 3135sets out the specific procedure to be followed when the creditor
subsequently chooses the third option – specifically, that of extra-judicially foreclosing real
property belonging to the estate. The application of the procedure under Act No. 3135 must be
concordant with Section 7, Rule 86 as the latter is a special rule applicable to claims against the
estate, and at the same time, since Section 7, Rule 86 does not detail the procedure for extra-judicial
foreclosures, the formalities governing the manner of availing of the third option – such as the place
where the application for extra-judicial foreclosure is filed, the requirements of publication and
posting and the place of sale – must be governed by Act No. 3135.
CONDUCTO

Reyes v. RTC of Makati, Branch 142

G.R. No. 165744, August 11, 2008. J. Brion.

FACTS:

Petitioner Oscar Reyes and Private Respondent Rodrigo Reyes are two of the
four children of Sps. Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar, and Rodrigo
each owned shares of stock of Zenith Insurance Corporation. In 1964, Pedro died. His
estate was judicially partitioned sometime in the 1970s. In 1993, Anastacia died.
However, there was no settlement/partition of her estate. As of June 1990, Anastacia
owned 136,598 shares of Zenith, which was part of her estate. Oscar then owned
8,715,637 shares; while, Rodrigo has 4,250. Then, Rodrigo sued Oscar, alleging that the
latter fraudulently appropriated for himself the shares of their parents. The complaint
was designated as a derivative suit. Oscar moved to declare the complaint as nuisance.
Oscar argued that it is not a bona fide derivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a
petition for the settlement of estate of the deceased Anastacia. The RTC denied Oscar’s
Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance. Oscar appealed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC, sitting as a special commercial court, has jurisdiction
over Rodrigo’s complaint.

HELD:

No. In the present case, each of Anastacia’s heirs holds only an undivided
interest in the shares. This interest, at this point, is still inchoate and subject to the
outcome of a settlement proceeding; the right of the heirs to specific, distributive shares
of inheritance will not be determined until all the debts of the estate of the decedent are
paid. In short, the heirs are only entitled to what remains after payment of the
decedent’s debts; whether there will be residue remains to be seen.

Rodrigo must, therefore, hurdle two obstacles before he can be considered a

stockholder of Zenith with respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to
Anastacia. First, he must prove that there are shareholdings that will be left to him and
his coheirs, and this can be determined only in a settlement of the decedent’s estate. No
such proceeding has been commenced to date. Second, he must register the transfer of
the shares allotted to him to make it binding against the corporation. He cannot
demand that this be done unless and until he has established his specific allotment (and
prima facie ownership) of the shares. Without the settlement of Anastacia’s estate, there
can be no definite partition and distribution of the estate to the heirs. Without the
partition and distribution, there can be no registration of the transfer. And without the
registration, we cannot consider the transferee-heir a stockholder who may invoke the
existence of an intra-corporate relationship as premise for an intra-corporate
controversy within the jurisdiction of a special commercial court.

More than the matters of injury and redress, what Rodrigo clearly aims to
accomplish through his allegations of illegal acquisition by Oscar is the distribution of
Anastacia’s shareholdings without a prior settlement of her estate—an objective that, by
law and established jurisprudence, cannot be done. The RTC of Makati, acting as a
special commercial court, has no jurisdiction to settle, partition, and distribute the estate
of a deceased. [See Section 2, Rule 90, Rules of Court]
CRUZ

QUASHA ANCHETA PENA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICES FOR ITS OWN BEHALF, AND
REPRESENTING THE HEIRS OF RAYMOND TRIVIERE v LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP.
G.R. No. 174873, August 26, 2008, Chico-Nazario, J.

Key Doctrine: The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court allows the distribution of the estate prior to
the payment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided that "the distributees, or any of them, gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs."

Facts

Quasha Ancheta Pena and Nolasco Law Offices represented the widow and children of the late Raymond
Triviere, in a Special Proceeding for the Settlement of his Estate. Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha were appointed as
administrators of the estate. In 1995, both lawyers filed a Motion for Payment of their litigation expenses. The same
was however denied due to their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities. In 1996, Atty. Quasha
passed away and was substituted by Atty. Zapata. In 2002, another Motion for Payment was filed by Atty. Syquia and
Atty. Zapata, stating that they have diligently performed their duties as administrators; that they are entitled to
Additional Administrator’s fees and all costs of litigation; and to have the amount of 1 million be taken from the
Estate Funds to be divided between the law office and the heirs. LCN Construction being the only claimant left
against the estate filed its Opposition to the Motion. It averred that its claims are still outstanding, thus, no
distribution should be allowed until they have been paid. The RTC granted the Motion for Payment only reducing the
amount. CA reversed.

Issue

Whether there can be distribution of the estate, considering the claim of LCN.

Ruling

NO. A perusal of the 12 June 2003 RTC Order would immediately reveal that it was not yet distributing the
residue of the estate. The said Order grants the payment of certain amounts from the funds of the estate to the
petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere considering that they have not received their respective
shares therefrom for more than a decade. The intestate proceedings were not yet concluded, and the RTC still had to
hear and rule on the pending claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere and only thereafter can it
distribute the residue of the estate, if any, to his heirs.

The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court allows the distribution of the
estate prior to the payment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided that "the distributees, or any of them, gives
a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs." In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance
distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following: [1] only part of the estate
that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule
109); and [2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding
obligations of the estate (second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90). There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the
petitioner children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two requirements or,
at the very least, took the same into consideration. Its Order of 12 June 2003 is completely silent on these matters. Taking into account
that the claim of LCN against the estate, the RTC should have been more prudent in approving the advance distribution of the same.
There was no determination on sufficiency of assets or absence of any outstanding obligations of the estate of the late
Raymond Triviere was made by the RTC in this case. In fact, there is a pending claim by LCN against the estate, and
the amount thereof exceeds the value of the entire estate.
DIVIVA

NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN,Petitioner,- versus -JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 37, Et. Al.,Respondents. G.R. No. 182497,
PEREZ, J.

Key Doctrine: A petition for habeas corpus will not lie if the detained person is under Restrictive Custody
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of
1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and
Reorganization Act of 1998).

Facts

Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M.
H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted yielded the identity of the male
perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director
for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office.

On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against
PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and
recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1
Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held
for other charges/legal grounds.

Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is
the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of
Manila on 22 April 2008.

On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein respondents to
produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding
or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan. However, the RTC denied the petition and held that the Chief
PNP is authorized to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A.
8551.

Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the administrative case against PO1
Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject
police officer. The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the
administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however stressed that the resignation has not been acted
by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while PO1
Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be granted?

RULING
No. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful.
If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the
earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception
DIVIVA

illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule
102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application

In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known
as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551
(also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that
members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP.

Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for
his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or
whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or
restraint of liberty.

Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither
actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible
precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted
for.

In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance of the writ
prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is
unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.
ESPINOLA

SAMUEL BARREDO y GOLANI vs. HON. VICENTE VINARAO

G.R. No. 168728, August 2, 2007

Key Doctrine: Writ of Habeas Corpus Will Not Issue If Detention Is By Virtue Of Valid
Judgment. The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement, detention or
deprivation of liberty. It was devised as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint. More specifically, it is a remedy to obtain immediate relief for those who may have
been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful
custody. It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances under which a person is
detained. The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by
virtue of a valid judgment.

Facts:

Petitioner Samuel Barredo y Golani prays for his release from the maximum security
compound of the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on the ground that he has already served the
sentence imposed on him in 2 Criminal cases through a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. He was convicted of the crime of carnapping, and illegal possession of firearms. Both cases
were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

The cases were tried jointly. After trial, the court rendered a joint decision finding petitioner guilty of
both charges. He was held guilty of the crime of Carnapping aggravated and qualified by the
frustrated killing of Ciriaco Rosales and was sentenced to undergo an imprisonment term of 30
years; in the illegal p[ossession of firearms case, he was sentenced to an imprisonment term of 18
years and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal. No appeal was made, hence, the decision became final and
executory.

According to petitioner, as of August 2, 2004, he already served a total of 18 years. He

claims that, on October 9, 2001, the Board of Pardons and Parole passed a resolution
recommending the commutation of his sentence to a period of from 15 to 20 years. He further points
out that, based on the Bureau of Corrections’ revised computation table for determining the time to
be credited prisoners for good conduct while serving sentence, he should only serve 14 years, 9
months and 18 days. Thus, this petition.

Issue:

Whether of not the petitioner is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court held that the writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under
a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment. The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases
of illegal confinement, detention or deprivation of liberty. It was devised as a speedy and effective
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. More specifically, it is a remedy to obtain
immediate relief for those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient
cause and thus deliver them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test
the circumstances under which a person is detained. However, the writ may be allowed as a post-
conviction remedy when the proceedings leading to the conviction were attended by any of the
following exceptional circumstances:
ESPINOLA

(1) there was a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;

(2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence or

(3) the imposed penalty was excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.

The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record the writ of
habeas corpus will not be allowed.

Petitioner was detained pursuant to a final judgment of the Quezon City RTC convicting him for the
crimes of carnapping and illegal possession of firearms. He is therefore not entitled to the writ of
habeas corpus.
FERNANDEZ

KIANI VS. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (BID)

G.R. No. 160922. February 27, 2006, Callejo, Sr., J.

Key Doctrine: Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error, nor is it intended as substitute for the trial court’s
function— it cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error.

Facts

On June 19, 2002, Javed Kiani, a British national but a Pakistani by birth reported to the Rodriguez,
Rizal Police Station that his friends had been forcibly taken by four (4) armed men from their residence at
Balita, Rodriguez, Rizal. A couple of days later, then Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) issued Mission Order No. ADD02203 based on EO No. 287 of former
President Joseph Estrada. In said Order, appropriate officers of the Bureau were directed to conduct
verification/validation of the admission status and activities of Javed Kiani, and, if found to have violated the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, to immediately place him under arrest. Per records of the
BID, Javed Kiani was married to a Filipina, Jeany-Vi Kiani. He was admitted as an immigrant and was issued
a permanent resident visa on March 17, 1993.

A week later, Javed Kiani was arrested at Felicidad Village, Montalban, Rizal. The arresting officers
relied on information from Iqbal and Balbir Singh, who pointed to Javed Kiani as the one who had furnished
them with fake Alien Certificate Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate Registration (ICR).
Apparently, the forms used were not official BID forms.

The BID Prosecutor filed a Charge Sheet against “Javed Kiani alias Ahmad Singh” before the Board
of Special Inquiry (BSI) for violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, particularly
Section 37(a)(7) and Section 45 thereof. On the same day, the Board of Commissioners (BOC) conducted a
summary proceeding and issued a Summary Deportation Order revoking the visa issued to Javed Kiani.

The next day, Javed Kiani’s wife, Jeany-Vi, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus for and in
behalf of her husband before the RTC of Manila, naming the BID and its intelligence officers as respondents.
She prayed that the court issue a writ of habeas corpus directing respondents to produce the person of Javed
Kiani before it “in the soonest time possible and to show the cause or legal justification for the latter’s
detention and imprisonment, if any; and for such other or further reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable
under the premises.” She insisted that the arrest and detention of her husband were bereft of factual and legal
basis, since at the time, no deportation order had yet been issued against him. She alleged that the Mission
Order issued by the Immigration Commissioner was void.

The RTC issued an Order granting bail for Javed Kiani on a bond of P50,000.00, and ordered
respondent BID Intelligence Officers to file their return on the writ. The respondents complied, and alleged
in their return that Javed Kiani had already been charged before the BOC and ordered deported; hence, the
petition had become moot and academic. They refused to release Kiani although the bond had already been
posted. Instead, the respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for the reconsideration of the Order.

The RTC issued an Order granting the motion and setting aside its prior Order. In dismissing the
petition, it ruled that Jeany-Vi was barred from questioning the legality of the arrest and detention of her
husband, following the filing of the Charge Sheet with the BSI; as such, there was no justification for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The RTC also ruled that the proper remedy of Javed Kiani from the
Summary Deportation Order of the BOC was to file a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court (and not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before it), as it had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and reverse the Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC.
FERNANDEZ

Jeany-Vi appealed the RTC’s Order to the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal, declaring that a Petition
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus can no longer be allowed since the party sought to be released had been charged
before the BSI. MR denied.

Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the SC. Petitioner avers
that:
1. The Mission Order issued by the Immigration Commissioner for the investigation and arrest of her
husband, Javed Kiani, is null and void.
2. When said Order was issued, the BOC had not yet made a determination as to the existence of a
lawful ground for his deportation.
3. The Immigration Commissioner has no power to issue a Mission Order or Warrant of Arrest solely
for the purpose of investigation and before a final order for deportation is issued.
4. An order of arrest is proper only if the BOC has already issued an Order of deportation.
5. The filing of the Charge Sheet against Javed Kiani by the BOC did not render the issue of the
illegality of arrest and detention moot and academic.
6. There is no factual and legal basis for the deportation of her husband because he had been issued a
permanent visa and his passport is yet to expire.
7. A warrant for the arrest of her husband may be issued only after a Summary Deportation Order shall
have become final and executory.

Issue

Whether the CA erred in holding that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC was
not the proper remedy of petitioner.

Ruling

NO. The CA acted in accord with jurisprudence when it affirmed the assailed Order of the RTC
dismissing the Petition for Habeas Corpus. As the Court held in Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 452 SCRA 312
(2005), Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial
court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be
used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on
the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the
proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily
granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The
orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where
exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a
writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions of
jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional
safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that
where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings
void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.

When petitioner filed her Petition for Habeas Corpus with the RTC in behalf of her husband, a Charge
Sheet had already been filed against him for violation of Section 37(a)(7) and Section 45 of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The filing of the Charge Sheet before the BSI cured whatever
irregularities or infirmities were attendant to his arrest. The remedy of petitioner was to file a motion for the
dismissal of the Charge Sheet and the Mission Order of the Immigration Commissioner, not a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus before the RTC. The RTC had no authority to nullify the Mission Order issued by the
Immigration Commissioner, much less set aside the arrest of Javed Kiani.
FERNANDEZ

The CA acted in accord with jurisprudence when it affirmed the ruling of the RTC declaring that it
had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s plea to set aside the Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC
against her husband Javed Kiani. Under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292,
the power to deport aliens is vested on the President of the Philippines, subject to the requirements of due
process. The Immigration Commissioner is vested with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Thus, a party aggrieved by a Deportation Order issued by
the BOC is proscribed from assailing said Order in the RTC even via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Conformably with ruling of the Court in Domingo v. Scheer, such party may file a motion for the
reconsideration thereof before the BOC. The Court ruled therein that “there is no law or rule which provides
that a Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC in the exercise of its authority becomes final after one
year from its issuance, or that the aggrieved party is barred from filing a motion for a reconsideration of any
order or decision of the BOC.” The Court, likewise, declared that in deportation proceedings, the Rules of
Court may be applied in a suppletory manner and that the aggrieved party may file a motion for
reconsideration of a decision or final order under Rule 37 of said Rules.

In case such motion for reconsideration is denied by the BOC, the aggrieved party may appeal to the
Secretary of Justice and, if the latter denies the appeal, to the Office of the President of the Philippines. The
party may also choose to file a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on the
ground that the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in dismissing the appeal, the remedy of appeal not being adequate and speedy remedy. In case the
Secretary of Justice dismisses the appeal, the aggrieved party may resort to filing a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

In this case, the petitioner did not file any motion with the BOC for reconsideration of the Summary
Deportation Order or appeal therefrom; neither did she appeal to the Secretary of Justice or to the Office of
the President or file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
GONZALES

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ENGR. ASHRAF

KUNTING
G.R. No. 167193, April 19, 2006, AZCUNA, J.
Doctrine: the writ is not allowed or discharged if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order; or if the jurisdiction appears after the
writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines,
or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

Facts:

On October 19, 2001, Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal
Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task
Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan for having been
charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention; he was immediately flown
to the Philippines and brought to the Camp Crame for custodial investigation.

Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Police Superintendent and Chief of the Legail Affairs Division of the
PNP-IG informed the Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in the custody of PNP-IG, and
requested for Kunting’s temporary detention at the PNP-IG due to high security risks involved.

The RTC allowed the temporary detention of Kunting at Camp Crame, on the condition that
Kunting shall be brought to Basilan as soon as the necessary security escort can be provided.

Upon the filing an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC issued an Order directing the
immediate turn over of Kunting to the trial court.

February 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kunting’s Motion to Set Case for Preliminary
Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting, and reiterated its Order directing the PNP-IG
to turn over Kunting to the Court. However, the PNP-IG filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer
Implementation of the Order on the ground of the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the
venue of the trial against Kunting.

On March 14, 2005, Kunting filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus, stating that
he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG. He alleged that he was never
informed of the charges filed against him until he requested his family to research in Zamboanga City, where
it was found out that his name appeared in the list of accused who allegedly participated in the kidnapping in
Lamitan, Basilan. Kunting further asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident.

Issue:

Whether or not the Petition for Habeas Corpus can prosper

Held: NO. Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to “all case of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” The remedy of habeas corpus has one
GONZALES

objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and if found illegal, the court orders the release
of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.

Under Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ is not allowed or discharged if it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order; or if the jurisdiction appears after
the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with
or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

Kunting’s detention was under process issued by RTC; his temporary detention at PNP-IG
was thus authorized by the trial court. Moreover, he was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for
Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-
1165. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot
be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 323
(1996), holds that “once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his
detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”
BORILLO

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS

OF EUFEMIA E. RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ
vs. LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO
G.R. No. 169482, January 29, 2008, CORONA, J.

Key Doctrine: While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on
the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is
presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the
applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.

Facts

Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental
health and deteriorating cognitive abilities. She was living with petitioner, her nephew, who acted as her
guardian. Respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R. Pabello, Eufemia’s legally adopted children, took
Eufemia from petitioner. He made repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but these proved futile.
Claiming that respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that respondents were
unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of
Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied.

Issue

WON the writ of habeas corpus should be granted

Ruling

NO. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one
entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from
exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a
person’s liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of
any person from someone entitled to such custody.

In this case, the issue is not whether the custody of Eufemia is being rightfully withheld from
petitioner but whether Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty. Significantly, although petitioner admits that
he did not have legal custody of Eufemia, he nonetheless insists that respondents themselves have no right to
her custody. Thus, for him, the issue of legal custody is irrelevant. What is important is Eufemia’s personal
freedom.

Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must
be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.

In this case, the Court of Appeals made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her
liberty. It found that she was not:

There is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained of her liberty by respondents.
Nothing on record reveals that she was forcibly taken by respondents. On the contrary, respondents,
being Eufemia’s adopted children, are taking care of her.
HIPOLITO

ANDAL VS PEOPLE
(Special Proceedings – Habeas Corpus is not granted)

Facts:

Petitioners convicted of rape with homicide seek a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a claim of mistrial
and/or that the decision if the RTC was void. The petitioners argue that the trial court was ousted of
jurisdiction to try their case since the pre-trial identification of the accused was made without the assistance of
counsel and without a valid waiver from the accused.

Issue:

WON a writ of habeas corpus should be granted.

Held:

No. The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to inquire into questions of violation
of the petitioners’ constitutional rights and that this court has jurisdiction to entertain this review. The
jurisdiction of this court has been expanded to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. In this case findings show that there was no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
and a resultant deprivation of liberty or due process of law. The accused were sentenced to the supreme
penalty of death as a result of a valid jurisdiction, after a fair and equitable trial.
LAUDE

DANILO EVANGELISTA y SOLOMON v. HON. PEDRO SISTOZA, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF

CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA CITY, METRO MANILA
G.R. No. 143881, August 9, 2001, De Leon, Jr., J.

Key Doctrine: The remedy of Writ of Habeas Corpus can be used as post-judgment remedy in order to apply the retroactive effect of a
jurisprudential decision and newly passed penal statute.

Facts

Petitioner Danilo Evangelista was convicted of robbery and illegal possession of the firearm used in the
commission of the robbery before RTC Manila. For illegal possession of firearms, Evangelista was sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 18 years of reclusion temporal as minimum to reclusion perpetua as
maximum. For robbery, the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 6 years of prision correccional as minimum to 10
years of prision mayor as maximum was imposed.
CA later modified the penalties to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 4 Years, 2 Months and 1 Day of
Prision Correccional as minimum 6 Years and 8 Months of Prision Mayor as maximum for illegal possession of firearms,
and an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 12 Years, 5 Months and 11 days of Prision Mayor as minimum to 17
Years, 4 Months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum for robbery.
On July 6, 1997, Republic Act No. 8294 took effect. The said law effectively reduced the imposable penalty for
the offense of illegal possession of firearms. Hence, for the illegal possession of a low powered firearm such as that of
the petitioners, the penalty is now prision correccional in its maximum period which has a duration of four (4) years, two
(2) months, and one day to six (6) years.
Evangelista filed an instant Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus to seek his release from
imprisonment on the ground that after giving retroactive application to the provisions of Republic Act No. 8294, he
already has been incarcerated for 9 years and 3 months, or for more than the maximum imposable penalty for the
crime of robbery he committed, which is only 6 years and 8 months.

Issue

Whether Evangelista can be released via a Writ of Habeas Corpus during the service of his sentence.

Ruling

YES. In light of the recent ruling in People vs. Walpan Ladjaalam, Evangelista may be found guilty only of the
crime of robbery. The Court held in People vs. Walpan Ladjaalam, the accused can be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. Conversely stated, if
another crime was committed by the accused, he cannot be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms.

A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there
can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder of homicide,
illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA
8294s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the
language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused.

It bears reiterating that this Court’s interpretations of laws are as much a part of the law of the land as the
letters of the laws themselves. Meaning, our interpretation of Republic Act No. 8294 forms part of the said law.

In view of the well-entrenched rule that criminal laws shall be given retroactive effect if favorable to the
LAUDE

accused, petitioner Danilo Evangelista is deemed to have committed only the crime of robbery for which he has
already served more than the maximum period of the penalty imposed upon him.
LETADA

JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO

G.R. No. 154994 June 28, 2005

CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO vs.COURT OF APPEALS; Hon. HELEN B. RICAFORT,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Parañaque City, Branch 260; and JOYCELYN D. PABLO-
GUALBERTO.
G.R. No. 156254 June 28, 2005

Key Doctrine: Custody of the Minor Child

Facts:
On March 12, 2002 Crisanto filed before the RTC of Paranaque a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage to Joycelyn, with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year old son, Rafaelito,
whom allegedly Joycelyn took away with her from their conjugal home and his school when she decided to abandon
Crisanto in February 2002. On April 2002, RTC heared the ancillary prayer and awarded custody pendente lite of
the child to Crisanto because of Joycelyn’s failure to appear despite notice.

On May 17, 2002, RTC reversed its original decision and awarded custody of the child to the mother. The
CA ruled that the prior order awarding provisional custody of the child to the father should prevail.

Issue:

Whether the CA violated Article 213 of the Family Code which mandates that no child over 7 years of age
shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

Ruling:

YES. The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their mother finds
its raison d’ etre in the basic need of minor children for their mothers loving care. A similar provision is embodied
in Article 8 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603). Article 17 of the same Code is
even more explicit in providing for the child’s custody under various circumstances, specifically in case the parents
are separated. It clearly mandates that no child under five years of age shall be separated from his mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to do so. It should be noted that the Family Code has reverted to the Civil Code
provision mandating that a child below seven years should not be separated from the mother.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that in all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

In this case, Crisanto cites the immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to
deprive Joycelyn of custody. But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or
incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her
unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her
moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from
exercising proper parental care. It is therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian.
He must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the
presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral development. Such a fact has
not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities or
that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.
LETADA

Moreover, it is worthy to note that the trial court judge, Helen Bautista-Ricafort, ruled in her May 17, 2002
Order that she had found the reason stated by [Crisanto] not to be compelling as to suffice as a ground for separating
the child from his mother. The judge made this conclusion after personally observing the two of them, both in the
courtroom and in her chambers on April 16, 2002, and after a chance to talk to the boy and to observe him firsthand.
This assessment, based on her unique opportunity to witness the child’s behavior in the presence of each parent,
should carry more weight than a mere reliance on the records. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to
wrench the child from the mother’s custody.
MERCADO

MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE, in behalf of the minor CRISELDA M. CADA

v. RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA
July 28, 2014; G.R. No. 210636

Statement of Facts:

On March 24, 2011, respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the RTC
of Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus. In the said petition,
respondent demanded the immediate issuance of the special writ, directing
petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to produce before the Court, respondent's
biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada, and to return to her the custody over
the child. Respondent indicated that petitioner has three (3) known addresses
where she can be served with summons and other court processes.

The next day, on March 25, 2011, the RTC of Caloocan issued a writ of habeas
corpus, ordering petitioner to bring the child to the Court on March 28, 2011.
Despite diligent efforts and several attempts, however, the Sheriff was
unsuccessful in personally serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus
petition and of the writ. Instead, on March 29, 2011, the Sheriff left copies of the
court processes at petitioner’s Caloocan residence, as witnessed by respondent’s
counsel and barangay officials. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to appear at the
scheduled hearings before the RTC of Caloocan.

Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011, petitioner filed Petition for Guardianship over
the person of Criselda before the RTC, Branch 89 in Quezon City. Respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the petition for guardianship on the ground of litis pendentia,
among others. Thereafter, or on June 3, 2011, respondent filed a criminal case for
kidnapping before the Office of the City Prosecutor–Quezon City against petitioner
and her counsel. On July 12, 2011, the RTC of Quezon City granted respondent’s
motion and dismissed the guardianship case due to the pendency of the habeas
corpus petition before RTC of Caloocan.

Petitioner prayed before the RTC of Caloocan for the dismissal of the habeas
corpus petition, claiming, among others, that she was not personally served with
summons. Thus, as argued by petitioner, the RTC of Caloocan did not acquire
jurisdiction over her and Criselda’s person.

Rulings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals:

RTC of Caloocan issued an Order denying petitioner’s omnibus motion, citing

Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, where the Court held that a writ of habeas corpus, being an
extraordinary process requiring immediate proceeding and action, plays a role
somewhat comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of
said writ, the Court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, as
petitioner herein. Moreover, personal service, the RTC said, does not necessarily
require that service be made exclusively at petitioner’s given address, for
MERCADO

service may be made elsewhere or wherever she may be found for as long as she
was handed a copy of the court process in person by anyone authorized by law.
Since the sheriff was able to personally serve petitioner a copy of the writ, albeit in
Quezon City, the RTC of Caloocan validly acquired jurisdiction over her person.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and affirmed
the ruling of the Regional Trial Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC of Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus
petition filed by respondent and, assuming arguendo it does, whether or not it
validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of Criselda. Likewise
pivotal is the enforce ability of the writ issued by RTC of Caloocan in Quezon City
where petitioner was served a copy thereof.

Held:

YES. The RTC of Caloocan correctly took cognizance of the habeas corpus
petition. Subsequently, it acquired jurisdiction over petitioner when the latter was
served with a copy of the writ in Quezon City.

Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region,

petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC,
may therefore be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where
enforcement thereof is sought. In view thereof, it is indubitable that the filing of a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of the
cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the
National Capital Judicial Region, as here.

In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of
Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same
judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC of Caloocan can still be
implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the
latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.

Lastly, as regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons were improperly

served, suffice it to state that service of summons, is not required in a habeas
corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.
NOBLE

Thornton v. Thornton
G.R. No. 154598
Aug. 16, 2004

Key Doctrine: Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts of
Habeas Corpus involving custody of minors.

Facts:
Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were married and had one
daughter. After 3 years, the woman grew restless and bored as a plain housewife and wanted to return
to her old job as GRO in a nightclub. One day, the woman left the family home together with their
daughter and told her servants that she was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but was dismissed because the child was in Basilan.
When he went to Basilan, he didn’t find them and the barangay office issued a certification that
respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner filed another petition for habeas corpus in CA which
could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. The petition was denied by CA on
the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave
family courts exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An
Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.)

Issue:
W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in
light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions.

Held:
Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in RA 8369 revoked its
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. The reasoning of CA can’t be
affirmed because it will result to iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining
custody. The minor could be transferred from one place to another and habeas corpus case will be left
without legal remedy since family courts take cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction. Literal
interpretation would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and contradiction. The literal
interpretation of “exclusive” will result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the rights and
promote welfare of children.

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it
cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA
8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus
in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with
RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC
Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of
the rule provides that:
NOBLE

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of
minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs.

xxx xxx xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family
Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for
hearing and decision on the merits.
ISMAEL

Madrinan vs. Madrinan

527 SCRA 487, GR No. 159374
July 12, 2007

Key Doctrine: Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts of
Habeas Corpus involving custody of minors.

Facts:
Felipe and Francisca, married to each other, begot three children, Philip, born in 1996, Francis
Angelo, 1998, and Krizia, 2000. They reside in Paranaque City. After a bitter quarrel, Felipe left the
conjugal abode together with the children, went to Albay, and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
Because of this, Francisca filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals, which ordered
Felipe to produce the children. At first, Felipe agreed to return to Francisca, but changed his mind and
instead filed his memorandum. According to him, Francisca was a drunk who frequently left their house
and neglected her duties as a mother. He questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to issue a
writ of habeas corpus, claiming that under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act 8369, family courts have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and try habeas corpus petitions. Francisca denied the allegations of Felipe.
According to her it was Felipe’s drug addiction and alcoholism which was the cause of their quarrels. The
Court of Appeals rendered a decision, awarding custody of Philip and Francis Angelo to Francisca, in
view of Article 213 of the Family Code. Withe respect to Philip, it left to the proper family court to
decide his custody under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. It also asserted its authority to decide the
petition. Felipe thus filed his petition for review with the Supreme Court, questioning the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals in deciding the case, since it is the Family Courts under RA 8369 which had
exclusive jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus cases.

Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of
minors.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals should has
cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of
habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.

The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family courts in said cases
was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ
of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall
be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the
writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
TAGLE

The Secretary of DND vs Manalo

Key Doctrine: The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation of an unlawful act or omission by
public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities.

Facts: Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to CAFGU.
The said abduction was based on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. The
brothers managed to escape on August 13, 2007 after 18 months of detention and torture. The brothers
filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and TRO to stop the military officers and agents from
depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. The rule on Writ of Amparo took effect on
October 24, 2007 while the case was pending. The Manalo brothers subsequently filed a manifestation
and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petitions. CA granted the privilege of Writ
of Amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense (DND) and the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to furnish the Manalo brothers and the court with all the official
assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo
brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense (DND) and the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) appealed to the SC to reverse and set aside the decision of the
CA.
Issue/s: Whether the serving of the Writ of Amparo is proper.

Ruling: Yes. It is proper. The SC held that there is a continuing violation of the Manalo brother’s right to
security. The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation of an unlawful act or omission by
public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. The Manal brothers have been under
concealment and protection by private citizens since their escape. It is because of the threat against their
life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture, and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, executed. The
Court explained that these constitutes threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a Writ
of Amparo.
PASICOLAN

G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008

CANLAS v. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS’N.

Facts:

The petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig
City. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished or is about to be demolished pursuant
to a court judgment. Petitioners pray for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo, that the unprincipled
Land Officials be summoned to answer their participation in the issuances of the fraudulent and
spurious titles in the hands of the Private Respondents.

Issue:

Whether the Writ of Amparo applies in the case.

Held:

No.

The Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this
case was affirmed with finality by this Court is not included among the enumeration of rights for
which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming
they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute
right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of
amparo.
PEDRAJAS

REVEREND FATHER ROBERT P. REYES vs. RAUL M. GONZALES, et.al.

G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009, Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Key Doctrine: This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court
intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right
to life, liberty and security.

Facts

Rev. Fr. Robert Reyes, petitioner, along with 50 others, were arrested in the Manila Hotel
Siege on Nov. 30, 2007. They were brought to Camp Crame for inquest proceedings to ascertain
whether there is probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion
and/or Inciting to Rebellion. As a result, their names were also included in the Hold Departure
List upon request of the then DILG Secretary, Raul Gonzales. An Information for the crime of
Rebellion was filed against the petitioner and 36 others in the RTC Branch 150 of Makati City.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of probable cause and release of
accused Robert Reyes upon recognizance. The RTC ordered the dismissal of the charge against
petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Chavez thus wrote
a letter to the DOJ Secretary requesting to lift the Hold Departure Order (HDO) in view of the
said dismissal. However, Sec. Gonzales replied to the said letter stating that the DOJ cannot act
on said request until counsel’s right to represent petitioner is settled as a certain Atty. Bautista
had also written a letter to the DOJ representing the petitioner.

As petitioner continues to be on the HD List, he has experienced several complications

such as being held up and interrogated by the BID officers during his travels. Thus, he filed the
petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo contending that the continued restraint on his right
to travel is illegal.

Issue

Is the right to travel covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo?

Ruling

No. SC dismissed the petition. The writ of amparo shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof. It is intended to address violations of or threats to
life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available
under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. As the Court has held in
Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed
by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. The rights that fall within the
protective mantle of the writ of amparo under Sec.1 of the Rules thereon are: (1) the right to life;
PEDRAJAS

(2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security. Petitioner failed to establish that his right to travel
was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right
to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
RABAGO

CARAM VS SEGUI
GR# 193652 August 5, 2014

Not proper remedy to obtain a custody of a minor child

FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram (Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino
Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino). She eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child
without the benefit of marriage. During her pregnancy, she mislead Marcelino into believing that
she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During
this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children
(Sun and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family in a potentially embarrassing
situation for having a second illegitimate son.

After the petitioner gave birth to Baby Julian, Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and
medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of
a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.

Few months later, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died without knowing about the birth of
his son. During the wake of Marcelino, Christina disclosed to Marcelino’s family that she and the
Marcelino had a son and had given him up for adoption due to financial distress and initial
embarrassment. After her revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the baby.

Thereafter, the DSWD issued a certificate declaring Baby Julian as "Legally Available for
Adoption”. A local matching conference was held and Baby Julian was "matched" with the
spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses) of the Kaisahang Bahay Foundation.

Christina then wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption
proceedings. But through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, DSWD sent a Memorandum to
DSWD Assistant Secretary Vilma B. Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby
Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality three months after Christina signed the
Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made
Baby Julian a ward of the State

On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelino’s brother, sent a letter to Atty. Escutin
informing her that a DNA testing was scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the DNA Analysis
Laboratory at the University of the Philippines.

On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera sent a letter to Noel Constantino stating that it
would not allow Baby Julian to undergo DNA testing. She informed Noel Constantino that the
procedures followed relative to the certification on the availability of the child for adoption and
the child’s subsequent placement to prospective adoptive parents were proper, and that the
DSWD was no longer in the position to stop the adoption process. She further stated that should
Christina wish to reacquire her parental authority over Baby Julian or halt the adoption process,
RABAGO

she may bring the matter to the regular courts as the reglementary period for her to regain her
parental rights had already lapsed under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523.

Christina then filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of Quezon City
seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD. In her petition, Christina accused
respondents of "blackmailing" her into surrendering custody of her child to the DSWD utilizing
what she claims to be an invalid certificate of availability for adoption which respondents
allegedly used as basis to misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of the minor child
had been complied with. She argued that by making these misrepresentations, the respondents
had acted beyond the scope of their legal authority thereby causing the enforced disappearance
of the said child and depriving her of her custodial rights and parental authority over him.

The RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo without prejudice to the filing of
the appropriate action in court. The RTC held that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to
regain custody of her child Baby Julian. The RTC further stated that Christina should have filed
a civil case for custody of her child as laid down in the Family Code and the Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If there is extreme urgency
to secure custody of a minor who has been illegally detained by another, a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be availed of, either as a principal or ancillary remedy,
pursuant to the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus inRelation to Custody of
Minors.

ISSUE:

WON a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and
custody of a minor child.
RULING:
NO. In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced
separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced disappearance"
within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD
officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the
DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the
Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her
petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before
the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is therefore, no
"enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth
elements are missing.

Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost
child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him. Since
it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the
exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
RABAGO

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the
perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual.
It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of
persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
RAMIL

P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO ET AL. VS DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON

CRUZ, AND FERDINAND CRUZ
G.R. NO. 182165, November 25, 2009, Carpio Morales, J.
When Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data may be properly availed of as a remedy
FACTS
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz
(Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property),
refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan
(the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects. An unlawful detainer case was filed
in the then Municipal Trial Court of Bulacan, Bulacan which rendered judgment against the
Spouses Cruz which later was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court. The spouses Curz then filed
cases against the government and the judges who presided over the case, all of which were
dismissed except their petition for annulment of judgment and a civil case for injunction where
they sought for an issuance of permanent writ of injunction to prevent the execution of judgment
against them. RTC ruled that a determination of the metes and boundaries of said properties be
submitted and returned the issue for consideration of the MTC, the latter ruled that the injuction
by RTC is ineffective thus issued a second ali writ of demolition. In receiving this order Spouses
Cruz filed before the RTC for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order while motion was
set for hearing, however demolition had been implemented, notwithstanding TRO. Sps. Cruz and
their sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand refused to turn over the property and shoved herein
petitioners Police Supt. Castillo et al, who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with
a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to protect, secure and
maintain the possession of the property, entered the property. This forced the latter to arrest them
and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats. Hence,
the filing by herein respondents Of Motion-petition for Writ of Amapro and Habeas Data.
Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully
entered the property with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and
tents, and arrested them when they resisted petitioners entry; and that as early as in the evening
of February 20, 2008, members of the Philippine National Police had already camped in front of
the property.
ISSUE
Whether or not a controversy involving property dispute between Provincial Government
and respondents are covered by the privilege of the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data.
RULING
NO. To be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful
act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the
Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts
RAMIL

complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not
delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the property.
Respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to
their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners in unison, conspiracy and in
contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and
intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and
arrested the herein petitioners (respondents) will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of
the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present.
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof
Respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged
that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person,
family, home and correspondence
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.
TAGLE

MERALCO vs Lim

Key Doctrine: The Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ only against public
officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home. The habeas data rule, in
general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth
and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life,
liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology.

Facts: Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO). On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the
Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which
respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads:

Cherry Lim:

MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG

MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG
BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL
NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB.

Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it,
respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.
By Memorandum dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource
Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS
Clerk, effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of reports that there were accusations and threats
directed against her from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise her safety and
security. Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President
and Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a
dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the punitive nature
of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the
implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised.

No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition[5] for the issuance of
a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. By
respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and
refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly
received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life,
liberty and security, correctible byhabeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ
commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following:
TAGLE

a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report
purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and
security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection;

b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or

information; and

c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.

Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.

RTC directed petitioners to file their verified written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial
court granted respondents application for a TRO.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter
alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the
case which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). By Decision of
September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such
time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required. The trial court justified its ruling by declaring
that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings
and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and security are
jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her
person. Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot
restrain MERALCOs prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the
issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.

Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ
only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home; and
that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities.

Issue/s: May an employee invoke the remedies available under the writ of habeas data where an employer
decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein ─ imputing
to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to
inform her of the details thereof?
TAGLE

Ruling: No. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum
to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional
guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology.

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given
the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules. Castillo v.
Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario[15] that the writs of amparo and habeas
data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in
support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the
context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondents reservations on the real
reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment -
are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns
is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed
any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or
security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the
threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best
speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her
earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if
they existed at all. And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work betray[s] the real
intent of management] and could be a punitive move. Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is
labor-related
VICENTE

G.R. No. 170340 June 29, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN, HEDDY MOIRA
KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and KELLY DOGMOC KHO
(Minor), respondents.

Doctrine: Cases of correction of entries in the civil registry are in rem proceedings which bind
the whole world through publication, failure to implead an indispensable party is cured by
publication in these cases because they are made bound by the publication involved.

Facts

This is a petition for correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City. Herein
respondents, originally the petitioners, prayed for the correction of some entries in their birth
certificates. Respondent Carlito Kho et al requested to change the citizenship of their mother, as
indicated in their birth certificates, from Chinese to Filipino, and to delete the word married from
their birth certificates indicating that their parents, Epifania Inchoco and Juan Kho, were married
but according to Carlito and his siblings and fellow respondents they are not.

Further “With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that the date
of his and his wife’s marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date
appearing in their marriage certificate.” Carlito further prayed “that Carlito’s second name of
"John" be deleted from his record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlito’s father in
his (Carlito’s) marriage certificate be corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to
"Chinese," respectively.” Furthermore “During the same hearing, an additional correction in the
birth certificates of Carlito’s children was requested to the effect that the first name of their
mother be rectified from "Maribel" to "Marivel."

The trial court granted all of the aforementioned prayers, but the OSG through the Office
of the Prosecutor of Butuan City appealed the case to the higher courts stating that since what
has been altered are the citizenship of the respondents parents and their marriage as well as the
date of Carlito’s marriage with Marivel are substantial alterations because this makes
respondents illegitimate children and affects the citizenship of their parents. Rule 108 must then
be followed requiring an adversarial proceeding which requires that all indispensable parties be
impleaded, in this case Marivel (Carlito the respondent’s wife) and their children were not
impleaded, as well as the respondents’ mother Epifania Inchoco.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents stating that the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 of the ROC were all met. The case was elevated to the Supreme
Court.
VICENTE

Issue

WON the case failed to follow Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling

The court ruled in favor of respondents, corrections involving substantial alterations are
required to undergo adversarial proceedings because “If the entries in the civil register could be
corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to
fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and
far reaching.” However “even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true
facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding.”

Adversarial proceedings are with “opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an

ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.”

“Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not
against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole
world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to
the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded
to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of
such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on
whether Marivel or respondents’ parents should have been impleaded as parties to the
proceeding.”

“With respect to Carlito’s mother, it bears noting that she declared at the witness stand
that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in 1959.” In which the prosecutor did not oppose.
VIZCARRA

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MERLYN MERCADERA through

her Attorney-in-Fact, EVELYN M. OGA, respondent.
G.R. No.186027 / December 8, 2010 / MENDOZA, J.

Key Doctrine: Section 2, Rule 108 also includes “changes of name” the correction of patently
misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one’s
name are confined in Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.

Facts:
Merlyn Mercadera sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her
Certificate of Live Birth—from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Local
Civil Registrar pursuant to R.A. 9048 (An act authorizing the City or Municipal Registrar or the
Consul General to correct a Clerical or Typographical Error or Nickname in the Civil Register
without need of judicial order.) However, the Office of the Local Civil Register refused to effect
the correction unless a court order was obtained because it cannot validly act on said petition as
it was not equipped with permanent appointment yet. Thus, Mercadera was constrained to file a
Petition for Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under
RULE 108 before the RTC where the OSG made its appearance and deputized the City
Prosecutor to assist in the case.

On the day of hearing, the City Prosecutor did not oppose the move of counsel of
Mercadera for leave of court to present evidence ex parte. It appeared from the evidence that
Mercadera never used the name “Marilyn” in any public or private transactions (Mercadera was
baptized in the name of “Merlyn” and used such name ever since as evidence in her school
records and GSIS issued certificate of membership.) The RTC granted the petition but the OSG
interposed an appeal arguing that the correction in the spelling might seem innocuous enough to
grant but “it is in truth a material correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights.”
What the lower court allowed was a change of Mercadera’s given name, which would have been
proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor. The CA
was not persuaded by the argument of OSG and thus affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence
this petition.

Issue/s:
Whether the case falls under Rule 103 “Change of Name”, wherein Mercadera must
prove any of the grounds mentioned thereof.

Ruling:
NO. The “change of name” contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be
confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted,
only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be
VIZCARRA

a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be
prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked,
there must be adversarial proceedings.

In petition for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
civil registry may be raised. Considering that in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes “changes of
name” the correction of patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not
all alterations allowed in one’s name are confined in Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors
may be set right under Rule 108.

Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply
sought a correction of misspelled given name. To correct simple means “to make or set a right;
to remove the faults or error from.” To change means “to replace something with something else
of the same kind or with something that serves as substitute.” From the allegations in her
petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court “to remove faults or error” from her
registered given name “Marilyn,” and “to make or set a right” the same to conform to the one she
grew up to, “Merlyn.” It does not take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its
intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the
remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which the
law provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief.
NOBLE

Braza vs. Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental

G.R. No. 181174
December 4, 2009

Key Doctrine: RTC’s Jurisdiction to pass on the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an
action to correct entries in the civil registrar

Facts:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a vehicular
accident. During the wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and
introduced themselves as the wife and son, respectively, of Pablo. Cristina made inquiries in the course
of which she obtained Patrick’s birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which
stated that: (1) Pablo is the father of Patrick having acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997;
and, (2) Patrick was legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name
was changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract
showing that Pablo and Lucille were married in 1998.

Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate children with Pablo) filed before the RTC of Negros a
petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They
contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed subsequent marriage between
Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous on account of a valid and subsisting marriage
between her (Cristina) and Pablo.

Petitioner prayed for the:

1. Correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the
father and his acknowledgment and the use of the last name “BRAZA”;

2. A directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to
submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation;

3. The declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this
purpose, the declaration of the marriage between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

The trial court dismissed the petition holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the
court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to
annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test, and that the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

Issue:
May the court pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action to
correct entries in the civil registrar?
NOBLE

Held:

No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacy and filiations.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an
entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may
generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error
made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a
correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all
interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.

The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void
for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule
108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code,
respectively; hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is
well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack
such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
ISMAEL

Republic vs. Coseteng- Magpayo

G.R. No. 189476
February 2, 2011

Key Doctrine:

Facts:
Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo claimed that his parents were never married and
filed a petition in QC to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng (using the
maiden name of his mother)
Respondent submitted proof Mother has no record of marriage from NSO and
Records which show that he has been using the surname of Coseteng since childhood (academic
records)
Trial Court granted petition and ordered Civil Registrar to:
1. Delete the entry “date and place of marriage”(of parents) in respondent’s live birth
Certificate,
2. Change entry of “Last name” from Magpayo to Coseteng
3. Delete entry of Coseting from “Middle name”
4. Delete entry of Fulvio Miranda Magpayo Jr in the entry for “Father”

Republic filed a motion against the order of the court stating that:
The change of name of respondent also calls for a change of civil status from legitimate to illegitimate
and
Court exceeded jurisdiction when it ordered deletion of name of the father.

A person can effect a change of name under rule 103 using valid grounds:
 when the name is ridiculous, dishonourable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce
 when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation
 when the change will avoid confusion
 when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage
 a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody
 when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest

Issue:
WON respondents change of name was affected through an appropriate adversary proceeding

Held:
Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as anyone of the recognized
grounds in rule 103 (respondent denies his legitimacy by affecting his legal status in relation to his
parents)

Since respondent’s desired change affects his legitimacy, rule 108 should apply
ISMAEL

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the
civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected (Makati, not QC) and "all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the
proceeding.
When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial
and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation,
or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
mandated

Decision of Trial Court was nullified

RAMIL

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR

G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014,
Justice Diosdado M. Peralta
Cancellation or Correction of Entry; Entries that may be corrected
FACTS
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon
receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace
of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage with the Korean national and that it is
physical impossible for her to appear before the solemnizing officer as she was employed in
Makati as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma during the said marriage, that her signature
was forged. Thus a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, was filed by her
especially the entries in the wife portion. Petition was granted by the RTC ordering Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City to cancel all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract.
Herein petitioner Republic, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the
grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2)
granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is,
in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio
Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases
for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being
the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondent’s identity was used
by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for
respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the
void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the
marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
RULING
Petition Denied.

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and
the remedy is granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not
always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It
requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may
claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil
RAMIL

registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the
court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either
dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the
personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged
and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words,
she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who
entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR
from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the
cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is
likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with.
The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized
the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was
conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage
was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were also
considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found
that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent’s
signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards. The court thus made a
categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and,
therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such
marriage was celebrated.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered
into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage
certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties
had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were
followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of,
but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling
the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of.