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SANDIGANBAYAN In a Resolution promulgated, the Sandiganbayan partially granted the said motion by
requiring the Republic to submit a bill of particulars concerning the charges against
Facts: petitioner Virata stated only in paragraph 17 (acting as dummy, nominee and/or agent)
and paragraph 18 (gross abuse of authority and violation of laws and the Constitution)
Petitioner Cesar E. A. Virata is one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035, of the expanded Second Amended Complaint. However, as to the other charges, the
entitled Republic of the Philippines versus Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et. al.. The Sandiganbayan declared that these accusations are clear and specific enough to
case, which was filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government against allow Virata to submit an intelligent responsive pleading, hence, the motion for a bill of
fifty three persons (53) including Virata, involves the recovery of ill-gotten wealth particulars respecting the foregoing three charges was denied.
during the reign President Marcos.
In view of the Sandiganbayan's order of August 4, 1992, the Republic through the
The complaint against the defendants was amended three times. The last amended
Office of the Solicitor General submitted the bill of particulars dated October 22, 1992,
complaint filed with the Sandiganbayan, known as the expanded Second Amended
called as the Limited Bill of Particulars which was signed by a certain Ramon A. Felipe
Complaint, states the following relevant allegations against petitioner Virata “that
IV, who was designated in the bill of particulars as "private counsel".
Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, in unlawful
concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, unjustly
enriched themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people by: Way back on September 1, 1992, Virata, who was dissatisfied with the
Sandiganbayan Resolution of August 4, 1992, filed a petition for certiorari (G.R. No.
14.b.) gave MERALCO undue advantage (i) by effecting the increase of 106527) with this Court questioning the Sandiganbayan's denial of his motion for a bill
power rates, and (ii) by reducing the electric franchise tax from 5% to 2% of of particulars. The PCGG submitted the bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993,
gross receipts and the tariff duty on fuel oil imports by public utilities from which was apparently signed by a certain Reynaldo G. Ros, who was named in the bill
20% to 10%, resulting in substantial savings for MERALCO but without any of particulars as "deputized prosecutor" of the PCGG.
significant benefit to the consumers of electric power.
14.g.) secured, in a veiled attempt to justify MERALCO's anomalous Virata filed on November 23, 1993 his comment on the bill of particulars with motion to
acquisition of the electric cooperatives, the approval by Defendant dismiss the expanded Second Amended Complaint. He alleges that both the bills of
particulars are pro forma and should be stricken off the records. According to him, the
Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cabinet of the so-called "Three-Year Program
for the Extension of MERALCO's Services to Areas Within the 60-Kilometer bill of particulars dated November 3, 1993 is merely a rehash of the assertions made
Radius of Manila," which required government capital investment amounting in the expanded Second Amended Complaint. Furthermore, a reading of the Limited
to millions of pesos; Bill of Particulars shows that it alleges new imputations which are immaterial to the
charge of being a dummy, nominee or agent, and that Virata acted, not as a dummy,
14.m.) manipulated, with the collaboration of Philguarantee officials led by nominee or agent of his co-defendants as what is charged in the complaint, but as a
Chairman Cesar E. A. Virata, the formation of Erecton Holdings, Inc. without government officer of the Republic.
infusing additional capital solely for the purpose of making it assume the
Dissatisfied, Virata filed this instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
obligation of Erectors Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount of
P527,387,440.71 with insufficient Securities/collaterals just to enable Court to challenge the foregoing Resolution of the Sandiganbayan.
Erectors Inc. to appear viable and to borrow more capitals.
Issue: 1. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed GAD in admitting the Bill of
17. The following Defendants acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents Particulars submitted by the Repuublic. – Yes.
by allowing themselves (i) as instruments in accumulating ill-gotten wealth 2. Whether the Sol-Gen and the PCGG are authorized by law to deputize a counsel to
file the Bill of Particulars in behalf of the Repiblic. - No.
through government policies prejudicial to plaintiff, or (ii) to be directors of
corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by Defendants Ferdinand E.
Rationale:
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin (Kokoy) T. Romualdez and Julliette
Gomez Ramualdez in order (to) conceal and prevent recovery of assets
illegally obtained. 1. The instant petition meritorious. The rule is that a complaint must contain the
ultimate facts constituting plaintiff's cause of action. As long as a cause of action
exists even though the allegations therein are vague, and dismissal of the action is not
Asserting that the foregoing allegations are vague and are not averred with sufficient
definiteness as to enable him to effectively prepare his responsive pleading, petitioner the proper remedy when the pleading is ambiguous because the defendant may ask
Virata filed a motion for a bill of particulars. for more particulars.
As such, the Rules of Court provide that a party may move for more definite statement government? Who were the creditors in these obligations? When were these
or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness obligations contracted? How much were involved in the assumption of foreign
or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare obligations by the government?; and c) By the presence of the provision of the
for trial. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. contract quoted by the Republic, what made the agreement a 'sweetheart' deal? The
Under this Rule, the remedy available to a party who seeks clarification of any issue or allegation that the agreement is a 'sweetheart deal' is a general statement that needs
matter vaguely or obscurely pleaded by the other party, is to file a motion, either for a further amplification.
more definite statement or for a bill of particulars. An order directing the submission of
such statement or bill, further, is proper where it enables the party movant intelligently
In like manner, the statement of facts fails to provide the following relevant matters: a)
to prepare a responsive pleading, or adequately to prepare for trial.
What was this $33.5 million proposed behest loan? What were its terms? Who was
supposed to be the grantor of this loan?; b) What were these short term loans? Who
A bill of particulars is a complementary procedural document consisting of an were the parties to these transactions? When were these transacted? How was this $
amplification or more particularized outline of a pleading, and being in the nature of a 33.5 million behest loan related to the short term loans?
more specific allegation of the facts recited in the pleading. It is the office of the bill of
particulars to inform the opposite party and the court of the precise nature and
As clearly established by the foregoing discussion, the two bills of particulars filed by
character of the cause of action or defense which the pleader has attempted to set
the Republic failed to properly amplify the charges leveled against Virata because, not
forth and thereby to guide his adversary in his preparations for trial, and reasonably to
only are they mere reiteration or repetition of the allegations set forth in the expanded
protect him against surprise at the trial. It gives information of the specific proposition
Second Amended Complaint, but, to the large extent, they contain vague, immaterial
for which the pleader contends, in respect to any material and issuable fact in the
and generalized assertions which are inadmissible under our procedural rules.
case, and it becomes a part of the pleading which it supplements. It has been held
that a bill of particulars must inform the opposite party of the nature of the pleader's
cause of action or defense, and it must furnish the required items of the claim with 2. The Limited Bill of Particulars dated October 22, 1992 signed by Ramon Felipe IV
reasonable fullness and precision. Generally, it will be held sufficient if it fairly and and the Bill of Particulars dated November 3, 1993 signed by Reynaldo Ros are valid
substantially gives the opposite party the information to which he is entitled, as pleadings which are binding upon the Republic because the two lawyer-signatories
required by the terms of the application and of the order therefor. It should be definite are legally deputized and authorized by the Office of the Solicitor General and the
and specific and not contain general allegations and conclusions. It should be Presidential Commission on Good Government to sign and file the bills of particulars
reasonably certain and as specific as the circumstances will allow. concerned.
Guided by the foregoing rules and principles, both the bill of particulars and the The Administrative Code of 1987, which virtually reproduces the powers and functions
Limited Bill of Particulars are couched in such general and uncertain terms as would of the OSG enumerated in P.D. No. 478 (The Law Defining the Powers and Functions
make it difficult for petitioner to submit an intelligent responsive pleading to the of the Office of the Solicitor General): “Sec. 35. Powers and Functions, . . . . It (the
complaint and to adequately prepare for trial. It is apparent from the foregoing OSG) shall have the power to (8) Deputize legal officers of government departments,
allegations that the Republic did not furnish Virata the following material matters which bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent
are indispensable for him to be placed in such a situation wherein he can properly be the Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the courts
informed of the charges against him: a) Did Virata, who was only one of the members and exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with respect to such
of the Board, act alone in approving the Resolution? Who really approved the cases.” Thus, the Solicitor General acted within the legal bounds of its authority when
Resolution, Virata or the Monetary Board?; b) What were these outstanding loan it deputized Attorney Felipe IV to file in behalf of the Republic the bill of particulars
obligations of the three corporations concerned? Who were the creditors and debtors concerning the charges stated in paragraph 17 and 18 of the expanded Second
of these loan obligations? How much were involved in the restructuring of the loan Amended Complaint.
obligations? What made the transaction a 'sweetheart' or 'behest' accommodation?;
and c) How was the acquisition of MERALCO by Meralco Foundation, Inc. related to
the Resolution restructuring the loan obligations of the three corporations? BANCO FILIPINO vs. CA Case Digest
There are certain matters in the foregoing allegations which lack in substantial
particularity. The following are the specific matters which the Republic failed to BANCO FILIPINO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
provide, to wit: a) What made the transaction 'disadvantageous' to the government? 332 SCRA 241
The allegation that it was disadvantageous is a conclusion of law that lacks factual
basis. How did MERALCO gain the P206.2 million? The Republic should have
provided for more specifics how was the transaction favorable to MERALCO?; b)
What were these foreign obligations of MERALCO which were assumed by the
FACTS: Elsa Arcilla and her husband, Calvin Arcilla interest, for it was only from the moment that they
secured on three occasions, loans from the Banco discovered the petitioner’s unilateral increase thereof.
Filipino Savings and Mortgage bank in the amount of
Php.107,946.00 as evidenced by the “Promissory Note”
executed by the spouses in favor of the said bank. To DATE OF DISCOVERY FROM THE COMPLETION OF THE SURVEY
secure payment of said loans, the spouses executed
ALICE VITANGCOL and NORBERTO
“Real Estate Mortgages” in favor of the appellants (Banco VITANGCOL, Petitioners, v. NEW VISTA PROPERTIES, INC.,
Filipino) over their parcels of land. The appellee spouses MARIA ALIPIT, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA,
failed to pay their monthly amortization to appellant. On and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS Respondents.
DECISION
September 2, 1985 the appellee’s filed a complaint for
“Annulment of the Loan Contracts, Foreclosure Sale with FACTS : Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 1702 covered
Prohibitory and Injunction” which was granted by the by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (25311) 2528 of the
RTC. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, but Calamba, Laguna Registry in the name of Maria A. Alipit and
Clemente A. Alipit, married to Milagros
the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
On June 18, 1989, Maria and Clemente A. Alipit, with the marital
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it held that the consent of the latters wife, executed a Special Power of Attorney[4]
cause of action of the private respondents accrued on (SPA) constituting Milagros A. De Guzman as their attorney-in-fact to
October 30, 1978 and the filing of their complaint for sell their property described in the SPA as located at Bo. Latian,
Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. (25311) 2538 with Lot No.
annulment of their contracts in 1085 was not yet barred
1735 consisting of 242,540 square meters more or less. Pursuant to
by the prescription her authority under the SPA, De Guzman executed on August 9,
1989 a Deed of Absolute Sale[5] conveying to New Vista Properties,
RULING: The court held that the petition is Inc. (New Vista) a parcel of land with an area of 242,540 square
unmeritorious. Petitioner’s claim that the action of the meters situated in Calamba, Laguna.
private respondents have prescribed is bereft of merit.
Following the sale, New Vista immediately entered the subject lot,
Under Article 1150 of the Civil Code, the time for fenced it with cement posts and barbed wires, and posted a security
prescription of all kinds of action where there is no guard to deter trespassers. he controversy arose more than a
special provision which ordains otherwise shall be decade later when respondent New Vista learned that the parcel of
counted from the day they may be brought. Thus the land it paid for and occupied, i.e., Lot No. 1702, was being claimed
by petitioners Vitangcol on the strength of a Deed of Absolute Sale
period of prescription of any cause of action is reckoned
for Lot No. 1702 under TCT No. (25311) 2528 entered into on
only from the date of the cause of action accrued. The August 14, 2001 by and between Vitangcol and Maria Alipit.
period should not be made to retroact to the date of the Consequent to the Vitangcol-Maria Alipit sale, TCT No. (25311) 2528
execution of the contract, but from the date they received was canceled and TCT No. T-482731 issued in its stead in favor of
the statement of account showing the increased rate of Vitangcol on August 15, 2001.
Alarmed by the foregoing turn of events, New Vista lost no time in contained in the plaintiffs complaint.[21] When a motion to dismiss is
protecting its rights by, first, filing a notice of adverse claim over TCT grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon
No. T-482731, followed by commencing a suit for quieting of title should, as rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the
before the RTC. By Order of November 25, 2003, the trial court complaint.[22] However, this principle of hypothetical admission
denied Vitangcols and Maria Alipits separate motions to dismiss the admits of exceptions. Among others, there is no hypothetical
amended complaint. As there held by the RTC, the amended admission of conclusions or interpretations of law which are false;
complaint[10] sufficiently stated a cause of action as shown therein legally impossible facts; facts inadmissible in evidence; facts which
that after the purchase and compliance with its legal obligations appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be
relative thereto, New Vista was immediately placed in possession of unfounded;[23] allegations which the court will take judicial notice are
the subject lot, but which Maria Alipit, by herself, later sold to not true;[24] and where the motion to dismiss was heard with
Vitangcol to New Vistas prejudice submission of evidence which discloses facts sufficient to defeat the
claim.[25]
On August 14, 2006, the appellate court rendered the assailed
Decision reversing the December 21, 2004 RTC Order Dabuco vs CA
petitioner relating to the evidence will be We clarify. Macarubbo testified that sometime in
discussed together. May 1974, respondent had contacted him to
supervisor).[49]
Challenge to Volumetric Tests
From the foregoing facts, it is evident that
Macarubbo did not testify as an expert witness. Petitioner disputes the CAs finding that it had
The CA correctly noted that he had testified failed to disprove the results of the volumetric
based on his personal knowledge and tests conducted by respondent. The former
involvement in discovering the short claims that it was able to controvert the latters
deliveries.[50] His testimony as an ordinary evidence.[52]
witness was aptly allowed by the appellate court
under the following rule on admissibility: During the July 24, 1974 volumetric test,
Sec. 36. Testimony generally representatives of both petitioner and
confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. A witness can testify respondent allegedly agreed to conduct two tests
only to those facts which he knows of
his personal knowledge; that is, which using drums independently chosen by
are derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in these
rules.[51]
each.[53] Respondent allegedly chose the worst-
dented drum that could fill only up to 190 liters.
The second drum, which was chosen by Petitioner also challenges the reliability of
petitioner, was not tested in the presence of the volumetric tests on the grounds of failure to
Macarubbo because of heavy rain.[54] It simulate the position of the drums during
supposedly filled up to 210 liters, however.[55] filling[56] and the fact that those tested were not
The issue, therefore, relates not to the 1974.[57] These contentions fail to overturn the
submission of evidence, but to its weight and short deliveries established by respondent.
credibility. While petitioner may have submitted The evidence of petitioner challenging the
evidence, it failed to disprove the short volumetric tests was wanting. It did not present
deliveries. The lower courts obviously gave any as regards the correct position of the drums
credence to the volumetric tests witnessed by during loading. Notably, its representative had
both parties as opposed to those done solely by witnessed the two tests showing the short
From the foregoing observations, it is Having sustained the finding of short deliveries,
apparent that the evidence presented by both the Court finds it no longer necessary to address
parties preponderates in favor of respondent. the contention of petitioner that its subsequent
The Court agrees with the following reduction of billings constituted merely a
We do not agree. It is elementary that a quasi- even if based on a Contract, has nevertheless
delict, as a source of an obligation, occurs only already prescribed, because more than ten years
when there is no preexisting contractual relation had lapsed since 1955 to August 20, 1970 -- the
between the parties.[62] The action of respondent period of short deliveries that the latter seeks to
for specific performance was founded on short recover.[64] Respondents request for fuel
deliveries, which had arisen from its Contract of adjustments on October 24, 1974, February 1,
1975, April 3, 1975, and September 22, 1975, extrajudicial demands that interrupted the
were not formal demands that would interrupt prescriptive period.[67] Nevertheless, the
the prescriptive period, says petitioner. interruption has no bearing on the prescriptive
of a cause of action: (1) a right in favor of the commences, not from the date of the execution
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever of the contract, but from the occurrence of the
violate the right; and (3) an act or omission on The cause of action resulting from a breach
the part of the defendant violative of the right of of contract is dependent on the facts of each
the plaintiff or constituting a breach of an particular case. The following cases involving
obligation to the latter.[70] It is only when the last prescription illustrate this statement.
Applying the foregoing elements, it can action to rescind a Contract of Sale. The cause of
readily be determined that a cause of action in a action arose at the time when the last installment
contract arises upon its breach or was not paid. Since the case was filed ten years
after that date, the action was deemed to have
In Elido v. Court of Appeals,[75] the overdraft with real estate mortgages, whereby the creditor
Agreement stipulated that the obligation was could unilaterally increase the interest rate. When
payable on demand. Thus, the breach started the debtor failed to pay the loan, the creditor
only when that judicial demand was made. This foreclosed on the mortgage. The Court ruled that
rule was applied recently to China Banking the cause of action for the annulment of the
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[76] which held that foreclosure sale should be counted from the date
the prescriptive period commenced on the date the debtor discovered the increased interest rate.[78]
certificate of indebtedness. In that case, the In Cole v. Gregorio,[79] the agreement to buy
certificate had stipulated that payment should be and sell was conditioned upon the conduct of a
Declaration. Both the agreement and the survey prior to the definite denial of the claim, because
were made in 1963. The Court ruled that the the employee could have still been reinstated.[83]
only in 1966, when the plaintiff discovered the Naga Telephone Co. v. Court of
Serrano v. Court of Appeals[81]dealt with action filed by the plaintiff included allegations
money claims arising from a Contract of that the contract was too one-sided in favor of
Employment, which would prescribe in three the defendant, and that certain events had made
years from the time the cause of action the arrangement inequitable.[85] The Court ruled
accrued.[82] The Court noted that the cause of that the cause of action for a reformation would
action had arisen when the employer made a arise only when the contract appeared
The Court of Appeals noted that, in the the agreed volume can be, and actually is,
case before us, respondent had been negotiating contained in those drums.
ruled that the cause of action had arisen only in Buyer dependence is common in many
1979, after a manifestation of petitioners denial ordinary sale transactions, as when gasoline is
The nature of the product in the present cream in bulk containers. In these cases, the
factual milieu is a major factor in determining buyers rely, to a considerable degree, on the
when the cause of action has accrued. The sellers representation that the agreed volumes are
delivery of fuel oil requires the buyers being delivered. They are no longer expected to
make a meticulous measurement of each and brought within the prescriptive period when it
action in the present case arose on July 24, 1974, Petitioner alleges, in addition to prescription, that
when respondent discovered the short deliveries respondent is estopped from claiming short
with certainty. Prior to the discovery, the latter deliveries.[88] It is argued that, since the initial
had no indication that it was not getting what it deliveries had been made way back in 1955, the
was paying for. There was yet no issue to speak latter belatedly asserted its right only in 1980, or
of; thus, it could not have brought an action after twenty-five years. Moreover, respondent
against petitioner. It was only after the discovery should allegedly be bound by the Certification in
of the short deliveries that respondent got into a the delivery Receipts and Invoices that state as
position to bring an action for specific follows:
performance. Evidently then, that action was RECEIVED ABOVE
PRODUCT(S) IN GOOD CONDITION. I
HAVE INSPECTED THE
COMPARTMENTS OF THE BULK Respondent cannot be held guilty of delay
LORRY, WHEN FULL AND EMPTY,
AND FOUND THEM IN ORDER.[89] in asserting its right during the time it did not yet
know of the short deliveries. The facts in the
Estoppel by Laches present case show that after the discovery of the
stated, negligence or omission to assert a right lower courts that respondents claim was not lost
within a reasonable time warrants a presumption by laches.
that the party has abandoned or declined the
right.[91] This principle is based on grounds of
Alleged Certification Not a Bar
public policy, which discourages stale claims for
the peace of society.[92]
It is not disputed that the alleged
contract of adhesion.[94] The statement was in warrant the contrary.[96] Noting the nature of the
fine print at the lower right of petitioners product in the present factual milieu, as
invoices.[95] It was made in the form and language discussed earlier in the claim of prescription, the
prepared by petitioner. The latters customers, dependence of the buyer upon the seller makes
evidence delivery and receipt of the goods stated impractical for respondent to measure the fuel
While the Court has sustained the validity former was obliged to sign the Certification in
of similar stipulations in other contracts, it has the invoice. In signing it, respondent could not
also recognized that reliance on them cannot be have waived the right to a legitimate claim for
hidden defects. Thus, it is not estopped from awards of exemplary damages and attorneys fees
against the party that prepared them. This this fact is borne out by the evidence.
waivers, which are not presumed, but which The CA sustained the award of exemplary
must be clearly and convincingly shown.[97] damages because of petitioners wanton refusal to
Exemplary Damages Not Proper volumetric tests. It simply had the mistaken
belief that it was not liable for any shortages.
Exemplary damages are imposed as a corrective
Unfortunately, the evidence showed the contrary.
[102]
measure when the guilty party has acted in a
Absent any showing of bad faith on the part of
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
petitioner, exemplary damages cannot be
[103]
malevolent manner. These damages are
imposed upon it.
awarded in accordance with the sound discretion
of the court.[104]
Attorneys Fees Allowed
Petitioner argues that its refusal to deliver the Petitioner claims that the award of attorneys fees
shortages of fuel was premised on good was tied up with the award for exemplary
faith.[105] Indeed, records reveal that it had damages.[107] Since those damages were not
reviewed respondents requests for the delivery of recoverable, then the attorneys fees allegedly had
While attorneys fees are recoverable when actual fees spent to prosecute its cause. The case
exemplary damages are awarded, the former may has dragged on unnecessarily despite petitioners
also be granted when the court deems it just and failure to present countervailing evidence during
equitable.[108] The grant of attorneys fees depends the trial. Moreover, respondent was compelled to
on the circumstances of each case and lies within litigate, notwithstanding its attempt at an
the discretion of the court. They may be awarded amicable settlement from the time it discovered
when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur the shortages in 1974 until the actual filing of the
The allegations in private respondent's complaint and the The spouses Bate and Julie Nabus were the owners of parcels
evidence it has presented sufficiently made out a cause of action of land with a total area of 1,665 square meters, situated in
under Article 1267. The Court, therefore, release the parties from Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet, duly registered in their names
their correlative obligations under the contract. However, the under TCT No. T-9697 of the Register of Deeds of the Province
disposition of the present controversy does not end here. The of Benguet. The property was mortgaged by the Spouses Nabus
to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), La Trinidad Branch, to guardianship papers of Michelle. However, Julie Nabus did not
secure a loan in the amount of P30,000.00. return.
On February 19, 1977, the Spouses Nabus executed a Deed of Getting suspicious, Catalina Pacson went to the Register of
Conditional Sale4 covering 1,000 square meters of the 1,665 Deeds of the Province of Benguet and asked for a copy of the
square meters of land in favor of respondents Spouses Pacson title of the land. She found that it was still in the name of Julie
for a consideration of P170,000.00, which was duly notarized and Michelle Nabus.
on February 21, 1977. After a week, Catalina Pacson heard a rumor that the lot was
Pursuant to the Deed of Conditional Sale, respondents paid already sold to petitioner Betty Tolero.
PNB the amount of P12,038.86 on February 22, 19776 and On March 28, 2008, respondents Joaquin and Julia Pacson filed
P20,744.30 on July 17, 19787 for the full payment of the loan. with the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet (trial
On December 24, 1977, before the payment of the balance of court) a Complaint for Annulment of Deeds, with damages and
the mortgage amount with PNB, Bate Nabus died. On August prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
17, 1978, his surviving spouse, Julie Nabus, and their minor Julie and Michelle Nabus alleged that respondent Joaquin
daughter, Michelle Nabus, executed a Deed of Extra Judicial Pacson did not proceed with the conditional sale of the subject
Settlement over the registered land covered by TCT No. 9697. property when he learned that there was a pending case over
On the basis of the said document, TCT No. T- 177188 was the whole property. Joaquin proposed that he would rather
issued on February 17, 1984 in the names of Julie Nabus and lease the property with a monthly rental of P2,000.00 and
Michelle Nabus. apply the sum ofP13,000.00 as rentals, since the amount was
Meanwhile, respondents continued paying their balance, not in already paid to the bank and could no longer be withdrawn.
installments of P2,000.00 as agreed upon, but in various, often Hence, he did not affix his signature to the second page of a
small amounts ranging from as low as P10.009 to as high as copy of the Deed of Conditional Sale.26 Julie Nabus alleged that
P15,566.00,10 spanning a period of almost seven years, from in March 1994, due to her own economic needs and those of
March 9, 197711 to January 17, 1984.12 her minor daughter, she sold the property to Betty Tolero, with
There was a total of 364 receipts of payment. The receipts authority from the court.
showed that the total sum paid by respondents to the Spouses Betty Tolero put up the defense that she was a purchaser in
Nabus was P112,455.16,14 leaving a balance of P57,544.84. good faith and for value. She testified that it was Julie Nabus
During the last week of January 1984, Julie Nabus, who went to her house and offered to sell the property
accompanied by her second husband, approached Joaquin consisting of two lots with a combined area of 1,000 square
Pacson to ask for the full payment of the lot. Joaquin Pacson meters. She consulted Atty. Aurelio de Peralta before she
agreed to pay, but told her to return after four days as his agreed to buy the property. She and Julie Nabus brought to
daughter, Catalina Pacson, would have to go over the Atty. De Peralta the pertinent papers such as TCT No. T-17718
numerous receipts to determine the balance to be paid. When in the names of Julie and Michelle Nabus, the guardianship
Julie Nabus returned after four days, Joaquin sent her and his papers of Michelle Nabus and the blueprint copy of the survey
daughter, Catalina, to Atty. Elizabeth Rillera for the execution plan showing the two lots. After examining the documents and
of the deed of absolute sale. Since Julie was a widow with a finding that the title was clean, Atty. De Peralta gave her the go-
minor daughter, Atty. Rillera required Julie Nabus to return in signal to buy the property.
four days with the necessary documents, such as the deed of
extrajudicial settlement, the transfer certificate of title in the ISSUES:
names of Julie Nabus and minor Michelle Nabus, and the
1. Whether or not the Deed of Conditional Sale was converted contract of sale is absolute when title to the property passes to
into a contract of lease. the vendee upon delivery of the thing sold. A deed of
2. Whether the Deed of Conditional Sale was a contract to sell or a sale is absolute when there is no stipulation in the contract that
contract of sale. title to the property remains with the seller until full
payment of the purchase price. The sale is also absolute if
RULING: there is no stipulation giving the vendor the right to cancel
unilaterally the contract the moment the vendee fails to
1. The Deed of Conditional Sale entered into by the Spouses pay within a fixed period. In a conditional sale, as in a contract
Pacson and the Spouses Nabus was not converted into a to sell, ownership remains with the vendor and does not pass
contract of lease. The 364 receipts issued to the Spouses to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. The
Pacson contained either the phrase "as partial payment of lot full payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive
located in Km. 4" or "cash vale" or "cash vale (partial payment condition, and non- fulfillment of the condition prevents
of lot located in Km. 4)," evidencing sale under the contract and the obligation to sell from arising.36
not the lease of the property. Further, as found by the trial
court, Joaquin Pacson’s non-signing of the second page of a Coronel v. Court of Appeals distinguished a contract to
carbon copy of the Deed of Conditional Sale was through sheer sell from a contract of sale, thus:
inadvertence, since the original contract and the other copies
of the contract were all signed by Joaquin Pacson and the other Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual
parties to the contract. contract because it is perfected by mere consent. The
essential elements of a contract of sale are the
2. The Court holds that the contract entered into by the Spouses following:
Nabus and respondents was a contract to sell, not a contract of a. Consent or meeting of the
sale. minds, that is, consent to
transfer ownership in
A contract of sale is defined in Article 1458 of the Civil exchange for the price;
Code, thus: b. Determinate subject matter;
and
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale, one of the contracting c. Price certain in money or its
parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to equivalent.
deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price
certain in money or its equivalent. Under this definition, a Contract to Sell may
not be considered as a Contract of Sale because the
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional. first essential element is lacking. In a contract to sell,
the prospective seller explicitly reserves the transfer
Ramos v. Heruela differentiates a contract of absolute of title to the prospective buyer, meaning, the
sale and a contract of conditional sale as follows: prospective seller does not as yet agree or consent to
transfer ownership of the property subject of the
Article 1458 of the Civil Code provides that contract to sell until the happening of an event,
a contract of sale may be absolute or conditional. A which for present purposes we shall take as the full
payment of the purchase price. What the entered into by the parties. In this case, the contract
seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to fulfill his entitled "Deed of Conditional Sale" is actually a
promise to sell the subject property when the contract to sell. The contract stipulated that "as soon
entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to as the full consideration of the sale has been paid by
him. In other words, the full payment of the purchase the vendee, the corresponding transfer documents
price partakes of a suspensive condition, the shall be executed by the vendor to the vendee for the
non-fulfilment of which prevents the obligation to sell portion sold."41 Where the vendor promises to
from arising and, thus, ownership is retained by the execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion
prospective seller without further remedies by by the vendee of the payment of the price, the contract
the prospective buyer. is only a contract to sell."42 The aforecited stipulation
shows that the vendors reserved title to the subject
Stated positively, upon the fulfillment of the property until full payment of the purchase price.
suspensive condition which is the full payment of the
purchase price, the prospective seller’s obligation to If respondents paid the Spouses Nabus in accordance
sell the subject property by entering into a contract of with the stipulations in the Deed of Conditional Sale,
sale with the prospective buyer becomes demandable the consideration would have been fully paid in June
as provided in Article 1479 of the Civil Code which 1983. Thus, during the last week of January 1984, Julie
states: Nabus approached Joaquin Pacson to ask for the full
payment of the lot. Joaquin Pacson agreed to pay, but
Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a told her to return after four days as his daughter,
determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally Catalina Pacson, would have to go over the numerous
demandable. receipts to determine the balance to be paid.
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell Unfortunately for the Spouses Pacson, since the Deed
a determinate thing for a price certain is of Conditional Sale executed in their favor was merely
binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a a contract to sell, the obligation of the seller to sell
consideration distinct from the price. becomes demandable only upon the happening of the
suspensive condition. The full payment of the
purchase price is the positive suspensive condition,
A contract to sell may thus be defined as a bilateral
the failure of which is not a breach of contract, but
contract whereby the prospective seller, while
simply an event that prevented the obligation of the
expressly reserving the ownership of the subject
vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
property despite delivery thereof to the prospective
Thus, for its non-fulfilment, there is no contract to
buyer, binds himself to sell the said property
speak of, the obligor having failed to perform the
exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment
suspensive condition which enforces a juridical
of the condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of
relation. With this circumstance, there can be no
the purchase price.
rescission or fulfilment of an obligation that is still
non-existent, the suspensive condition not having
It is not the title of the contract, but its express terms
occurred as yet. Emphasis should be made that the
or stipulations that determine the kind of contract
breach contemplated in Article 1191 of the New Civil
Code is the obligor’s failure to comply with an FACTS: From 1974 to 1991, A Company, the
obligation already extant, not a failure of a condition to local agent of foreign corporation B Company,
render binding that obligation.
deployed petitioner Serrano as a seaman to
Since the contract to sell was without force and effect, Liberian, British and Danish ships. As petitioners
Julie Nabus validly conveyed the subject property to was on board a ship most of the time, respondent
another buyer, petitioner Betty Tolero, through a Maersk offered to send portions of petitioners salary
contract of absolute sale, and on the strength thereof, to his family in the Philippines by money order.
new transfer certificates of title over the subject Petitioner agreed and from 1977 to 1978, he
property were duly issued to Tolero.
instructed respondent Maersk to send money orders
The Spouses Pacson, however, have the right to the to his family. Respondent Maersk
reimbursement of their payments to the Nabuses, and also deducted various amounts from his salary
are entitled to the award of nominal damages. for Danish Social Security System (SSS),
welfarecontributions, ship clubs, and SSS medicate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision Petitioner’s family failed to received the money
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44941, dated
November 28, 2003, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
orders petitioners sent through respondent Maersk.
Judgment is hereby rendered upholding the validity of Upon learning this in 1978, petitioners demanded
the sale of the subject property made by petitioners that respondent Maersk pay him the amounts the
Julie Nabus and Michelle Nabus in favor of petitioner latter deducted from his salary, which request
Betty Tolero, as well as the validity of Transfer were ignored. Whenever he returned to the
Certificates of Title Nos. T-18650 and T-18651 issued
Philippines, petitioners follow up his money claims
in the name of Betty Tolero. Petitioners Julie Nabus
and Michelle Nabus are ordered to reimburse but he would be told to return after several weeks
respondents spouses Joaquin and Julia Pacson the sum while respondent Maersk would hire him again to
of One Hundred Twelve Thousand Four Hundred Fifty- board another one of their vessels for about a year.
Five Pesos and Sixteen Centavos (P112,455.16), and to
pay Joaquin and Julia Pacson nominal damages in the Finally, in October 1993, petitioner wrote to
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), with
annual interest of twelve percent (12%) until full respondent Maersk demanding immediate payment
payment of the amounts due to Joaquin and Julia to him of the total amount of the money
Pacson. orders deducted from his salary from 1977 to 1978.
On November 11, 1993, B company replied to
Serrano vs CA; GR 139420 – COA petitioner that they keep accounting documents
only for a certain number of years, thus data on his
money claims from 1977 to 1978 were no longer
declined petitioners demand for payment. In April the defendant to the plaintiff. In October 1993,
1994, petitioners filed a complaint for collection of Serrano finally demanded in writing payment of the
the total amount of the unsent money orders unsent money orders. Then and only then was the
and illegal salary deductionsagainst the respondents claim categorically denied by respondent. AP. Moller
Maersk in the Philippine in its letter dated November 22, 1993. Following the
Overseas EmploymentAgency (POEA). The NLRC Baliwag Transit ruling (1989), petitioner’s cause of
dismissed within three years from the time the action accrued only upon respondent. AP. Mollers
cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be definite denial of his claim in November 1993.
forever berried. Having filed his action five (5) months thereafter or
in April 1994, we holds that it was filed within the
three – year (3) prescriptive period provided in
ISSUE: Did the money claim of petitioner
Article 291 of the Labor Code.
prescribe? ELIDO v CA
Issue: Whether or not Civil Case No. 12251 is Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final
barred by res judicata although the compromise judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a
agreement did not expressly include Benelda Estate court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the
as a party and although the compromise agreement rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits
made no reference to the lots registered in the name and on all points and matters determined in the
of Benelda Estates. previous suit.
Ruling: Yes, Civil Case No. 12251 is barred by res The first requisite of res judicata – that the
judicata although the compromise agreement did former judgment must be final –is attendant in the
not expressly include Benelda Estate as a party and case. Civil Case No. 6-1936 was already terminated
although the compromise agreement made no under the compromise agreement, for the judgment,
reference to the lots registered in the name of being upon a compromise, was immediately final
Benelda Estates. and unappealable. As to the second requisite, the
RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action in the
A compromise agreement is a contract first case, the action being incapable of pecuniary
whereby the parties, by making reciprocal estimation. Lastly, that the compromise agreement
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one explicitly settled the entirety of the first case by
already commenced. It encompasses the objects resolving all claims of the parties against each other,
specifically stated therein, although it may include indicated that the third requisite was also satisfied.
other objects by necessary implication, and is Hence all three requisites concur. Thus Civil Case
binding on the contracting parties, being expressly No. 12251 is barred by res judicata
acknowledged as a juridical agreement between
them. It has the effect and authority of res judicata
upon the parties. The intent of the parties to settle HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, SR., Petitioners,
vs. and for recovery of the value of the cut trees. Hence, the case
falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO and BIENVENIDA GUYA, The trial court denied dismissal and the subsequent MR. On
appeal, the CA reversed RTC decision on the ground of
ET. AL., Respondents. prescription ruling that an action for reconveyance based on
fraud prescribes in ten years. Here, the titles involved has
PONENTE: PUNO, C.J.
been issued for at least 22 years prior to the filing of the
Facts: complaints. Hence, the present appeal by certiorari under
Petitioners, claiming to be the rightful owners of Lot 6195 (CC: Rule 45.
5188), a one-hectare portion of Lot 6196-A (CC: 5433), and a
one-hectare portion of Lots 6196-B and 7529-A (CC: 5434), Issue:
under Sec. 48(b) of CA 141, filed a complaint for Reconveyance Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction.
and / or Annulment of Title against respondent
siblings Gregorio Lumocso (CC: 5188), Cristita Lumocso Vda. Ruling:
de Daan (CC: 5433) and Jacinto Lumocso (CC: 5434), who are NO. CA Decision is Affirmed.
the patent holders and registered owners of the subject lots. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and
The complaints alleged that: (1) on 21 May 1958, petitioners' determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings
parents acquired a 24-hectare parcel of land by homestead; 2) in question belong.[28] It is conferred by law and an objection
since 1931, they "painstakingly preserved" it including the based on this ground cannot be waived by the parties.[29] To
excess 4 hectares "untitled forest land"; (3) they possessed determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject
this excess land (subject lots) "continuously, publicly, matter of a case, it is important to determine the nature of the
notoriously, adversely, peacefully since 1931 when cause of action and of the relief sought.[30]
respondents, by force, intimidation, and stealth forcibly The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve
entered it; and (4) respondents' free patents and OCTs were actions for reconveyance.[31] An action for reconveyance
issued by fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation. Respondents respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but
moved for dismissal on grounds of: (1) lack of seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or
jurisdiction of RTC pursuant to Section 19(2) of BP 129, as erroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful
amended by RA 7691, the assessed values of subject lots and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better
being less than P20K; (2) failure to state causes of action for right.[32] There is no special ground for an action for
reconveyance; (3) prescription; and (4) waiver, abandonment, reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a
laches and estoppel. Petitioners opposed contending that: (1) legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered
the subject matters of the case are incapable of pecuniary owner[33] and that the property has not yet passed to the
estimation; (2) their causes of action are for reconveyance hands of an innocent purchaser for value.[34]
The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
an action for reconveyance. The following are also the thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro
common allegations in the three complaints that are sufficient Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
to constitute causes of action for reconveyance, viz: (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
(a) That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction
with his spouse Dorotea Concha have painstakingly over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
preserve[d] the forest standing in the area [of their Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
24-hectare homestead] including the four hectares untitled x x x.
forest land located at the eastern portion of the forest from In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are
1931 when they were newly married, the date they situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are
acquired this property by occupation or possession;[35] less than P20,000.00, to wit:
(b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and Civil Case No. Lot No. Assessed Value
Dorotea P. Concha have preserved the forest trees standing 5188 6195 P1,030.00
in [these parcels] of land to the exclusion of the defendants 5433 6196-A 4,500.00
Lomocsos or other persons from 1931 up to November 12, 5434 6196-B 4,340.00
1996 [for Civil Case No. 5188] and January 19 7529-A 1,880.00.[43]
account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant
misrepresentation;[40] and cases.
(f) The land in question has not been transferred to Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of
an innocent purchaser.[41] pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction
These cases may also be considered as actions to remove of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.
cloud on one's title as they are intended to procure the In a number of cases, we have held that actions for
cancellation of an instrument constituting a claim on reconveyance[44] of or for cancellation of title[45] to or to quiet
petitioners' alleged title which was used to injure or vex them title[46] over real property are actions that fall under the
in the enjoyment of their alleged title.[42] classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of,
Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to real property, or any interest therein."
remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its
which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,[47] as amended, gave
amended by R.A. No. 7691, viz: the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial original jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction
over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], contention that the pecuniary claim of the complaint was only
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and attorney's fees of P10,000, hence, the MTC had
municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended)." Thus, under jurisdiction. The Court defined the criterion for determining
the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether an action is one that is incapable of pecuniary
whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was estimation and held that the issue of whether petitioner
incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration of
129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2).The Restriction of the Corporation is one that is incapable of
distinction between the two classes became crucial with the pecuniary estimation.The claim for attorney's fees was merely
amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691[48] in 1994 which incidental to the principal action, hence, said amount was not
expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level determinative of the court's jurisdiction. Nor
courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or can Commodities Storage and ICE Plant
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where Corporation provide any comfort to petitioners for the issue
the assessed value of the property or interest therein resolved by the Court in said case was venue and not
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) jurisdiction. The action therein was for damages, accounting
or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed and fixing of redemption period which was filed on October 28,
value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos 1994, before the passage of R.A. No. 7691. In resolving the
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of issue of venue, the Court held that "[w]here the action affects
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and title to property, it should be instituted in the [RTC] where the
costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over property is situated. The Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage is
cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The venue in Civil Case No.
of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) 94-727076 was therefore improperly laid."
of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, Worse, the cases of Swan v. CA[52] and Santos v.
with the assessed value of the real property involved as the CA[53] cited by the petitioners, contradict their own position
benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the that the nature of the instant cases falls under Section 19(1)
overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the of B.P. 129. The complaints in Swan and Santos were filed
speedier administration of justice."[49] prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 7691. In Swan, the Court
The cases of Raymundo v. CA[50] and Commodities held that the action being one for annulment of title, the RTC
Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA,[51] relied upon had original jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P.
by the petitioners, are inapplicable to the cases at 129. InSantos, the Court similarly held that the complaint for
bar. Raymundo involved a complaint for mandatory cancellation of title, reversion and damages is also one that
injunction, not one for reconveyance or annulment of involves title to and possession of real property under Section
title. The bone of contention was whether the case was 19(2) of B.P. 129. Thus, while the Court held that the RTC had
incapable of pecuniary estimation considering petitioner's jurisdiction, the Court classified actions for "annulment of
title" and "cancellation of title, reversion and damages" as civil Facts:
actions that involve "title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.
The Cid spouses, herein private respondents, were
Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject purchasers of ready-mix concrete from petitioner
properties constitutes "any interest therein (in the subject properties)" herein, PhilRock, Inc. The concrete delivered by
that should be computed in addition to the respective assessed values of the latter turned out to be of substandard quality,
the subject properties is unavailing. Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended
and as a result the structures built using such
by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil
actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real cement developed cracks and honey combs.
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed Respondents, thus, filed a Complaint for Damages
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty against petitioner with the RTC of Quezon City,
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in which then issued an order dismissing the case and
Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00)." It is true that the recovery of the
referring the same to CIAC because the spouses
value of the trees cut from the subject properties may be and petitioner had filed an Agreement to
included in the term "any interest therein." However, the law Arbitrate. Since no common ground can be
is emphatic that in determining which court has jurisdiction, it reached by the parties, they requested the case be
is only the assessed value of the realty involved that should be
computed.[54] In this case, there is no dispute that the
remanded back again to court, to which it had
assessed values of the subject properties as shown by their declared it no longer had jurisdiction over the case
tax declarations are less than P20,000.00.Clearly, jurisdiction and ordered the records of the case to be remanded
over the instant cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC. back again to CIAC. Petitioner while contending
the supposed jurisdiction of CIAC, the latter
PHILROCK V. rendered a decision in favor of the spouses. Thus,
petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the
CONSTRUCTION CA, to which the latter dismissed. Hence this
INDUSTRY ARBITRATION petition.
Issue:
COMMISSION (G.R. Whether or not the CIAC could take jurisdiction
NO. 132848-49) over the case of respondent spouses and petitioner
after it had been dismissed by both the RTC and
CIAC.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit. Section 4 of EO 1008
expressly vests in the CIAC original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes arising from or
connected with construction contracts entered into
by parties that have agreed to submit their disputes
to voluntary arbitration. Further, petitioner
continued participating in the arbitration even after
the CIAC order has been issued as evidenced by
their concluding and signing of the Terms of
Reference. The Court will not countenance any
effort of any party to subvert or defeat the
objective of voluntary arbitration for its own
private motives. Petitioner is stopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the CIAC, merely
because the latter rendered an adverse decision.