Perido vs Perido

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. No. 37034-R, affirming the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 6529.

 Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime.
 His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three children.
 After Benita died, Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five children.
 Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
 The children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document denominated
as “Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition,” whereby they partitioned among themselves parcels of land in
Occidental Negros.
 The children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second thoughts about the partition. On March 8, 1962
they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the children of the second marriage,
praying for the annulment of the so-called “Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition” and for another
partition of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone.
 They alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by the defendants to execute the document in question
through misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that the lots which were partitioned in said
document belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong; and that the five
children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to the
estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
 After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the “Declaration of Heirship and Extra-
judicial Partition.”
 However, it did not order the partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that
the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot
No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No . 458 belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat.
 The plaintiffs appealed. They insist that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three were born out
of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and were
not recognized by their parents before or after their marriage.
Issue:

Whether or not the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat are legitimate

Ruling:
Yes. They were born during their parents’ marriage therefore, legitimate.
 The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the
Spanish regime. Therefore, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first
child in 1900.
 The statement that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that
persons living together husband and wife are married to each other. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage."

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

Tanjanco vs Court of Appeals

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.

From December, 1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being
of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time
reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of defendant’s promise of marriage plaintiff consented and
 acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of love
and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived
a child;

To avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., making
her unable to support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter
suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation.

Santos prayed to the court that Tanjanco be compelled to recognize the unborn child she was bearing, and pay her for
support and damages.

Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted. Santos appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and the latter
decided the case, stating that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of the unborn child nor for its support,
but a cause of action was present for damages, under Article 21 of the Civil Code. Tanjanco appealed such decision pleading
that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction.

"ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin to proceed
with the case. Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not
permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30, 1960;
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.

Issue:

Whether or not a breach of promise of marriage can bring any action for damages in court.

Ruling:

No. No case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant
with repeated acts of intercourse. Such is not compatible to the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual
passion; for had the appellant been deceived she would not have again yielded to his embraces much less for one year without
exacting fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage and she would have cut all relationship upon finding that the defendant
did not intend to fulfill his promises. One cannot be held liable for a breach of promise to marry.

In its decision, Court of Appeals relied upon the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to
support the original draft of the Civil Code. In the example set forth by the memorandum, Court of Appeals failed to recognize
that it refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. Seduction connotes the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power
or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. That definition of seduction is not consistent
with the position of Santos, who was of legal age, and granted carnal access to Tanjanco and had sexual relations with him for
one whole year. Rather than being deceived, Santos exhibited mutual passion to Tanjanco which is incompatible with the premise
behind the idea of seduction.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed.
No costs

Anaya vs Palaroan

Appeal from an order of dismissal, issued motu proprio by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, Manila, of a complaint for
annulment of marriage, docketed therein as Civil Case No. E-00431, entitled "Aurora A. Anaya, plaintiff, vs. Fernando O. Palaroan,
defendant."

Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953;

Defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation
Judgment was rendered therein dismissing the complaint of Fernando and upholding the validity of the marriage and granting
Aurora's counterclaim;

While the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that
several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement
to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently
doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced . . . frank disclosure of which, certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff
herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted `FRAUD', in obtaining her consent, within
the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3).

She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.

Defendant Fernando, denied the allegations and denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative.

He set up the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel.

He counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit. Defendant Fernando did not pray for the dismissal of the
complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages."

Issue:
whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for
annulment of marriage.

Ruling:
HELD:
NO. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances
that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of article 86, providing that "no
other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.

For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the
facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;

This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of fraud enumerated in Article 86,
as follows:

ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the
penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other
than her husband.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.

The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground for annulment of marriage to the
foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only
one given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable marriages. If its intention were
otherwise, Congress would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned therein as a cause for
annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding
article," and proceeds by enumerating the specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure of a previous
conviction, and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress
further such intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was followed by the interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage."
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that
would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such
non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless
the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in
which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the
same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.

On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret intention on the husband's part not to perform
his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment based on that
fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage. Since appellant's wedding was celebrated in December of
1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby affirmed. No costs.

Kho vs. Kho

Facts:

The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein petitioner with the RTC of Oras,
Eastern Samar.

In the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner’s parents summoned Eusebio Colongon, the then clerk in the office of the municipal
treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the intended marriage
between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from
witnessing the marriage ceremony;

Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took place at around 3:00
o’clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there was a public dance held in the town plaza which is just situated
adjacent to the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00 o’clock of same early
morning of June 1, 1972;

Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had not seen much less signed
any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of a marriage license;

Considering the shortness of period from the time the afore named clerk of the treasurer’s office was told to obtain the pertinent
papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual
marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been validly issued, thereby
rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the most essential requisite.

For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner’s and Respondent’s marriage aforestated was solemnized sans the required
marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning and neither was it performed under circumstances exempting the
requirement of such marriage license;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due notice and
hearing, judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June 1, 1972, at Arteche, Eastern
Samar, null and void ab initio and of no legal effect.
xxxx4

One of the evidences presented by petitioner is a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar
which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to
petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.

Respondent filed her Answer praying that the petition be out rightly dismissed for lack of cause of action because there is no
evidznce to prove petitioner’s allegation that their marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage license and that, on
the contrary, both petitioner and respondent personally appeared before the local civil registrar and secured a marriage license
which they presented before their marriage was solemnized.
On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA. The
CA REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S
JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE
MARRIAGE LICENSE.

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the CA and held that the marriage is void from the beginning.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court cited several cases where in which the certification of the local civil registrar as well as
the lack of any entry on the marriage certificate which will indicate that there is a marriage license obtained were held sufficient
proof that there was no valid marriage license issued. Among the cases cited are the following: Cariño vs. Cariño, Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Abbas vs Abbas

In Cariño vs. Cariño(1), a case decided in 2007, the Court considered the marriage of Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago
S. Carino as void ab initio. According to the records, the marriage contract of Nicdao and Cariño bears no marriage license
number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the
marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly
void ab initio.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals(2), the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability to
find a record or entry to the effect that a marriage license was issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of due
search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage
void ab initio.

In addition to the cases cited, the 2013 case of Abbas v. Abbas(3) was also cited, the court again followed the ruling in Republic
vs. CA and held that the Certification of the Local Civil Registrar is sufficient as proof that no marriage license was issued to the
parties. The court in the said case stated the following when the lack of categorical statement that indicates that a diligent search
was made was assailed :
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. "The presumption of regularity of official acts may
be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand.

Based on the cases cited the court decided that that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the
law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported
by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.

In this Veronica claimed that she and Raquel obtained a marriage license yet she failed to present evidence to prove it. She did
not present the alleged marriage license or a copy of it in court. In addition the certificate of marriage issued by the officiating
priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license. The court said that she could have obtained a copy of their
marriage contract from the National Archives and Records Section where the information regarding the marriage license can be
obtained. The SC also mentioned that it is settled in the rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not an evidence.

1 Susan Nicdao cariño vs.Susan Yee Cariño G.R. no. 132529. February 2, 2001
2 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994
3 Syed Azhar Abbas Vs.Gloria Goo Abbas G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted between Raquel G. Kho and
Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family
Code. The foregoing is without prejudiced to the application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Vilar vs. Paraiso

Facts:

During the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were among the
candidates d for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija.
Paraiso was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
However, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was then a minister of the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Vilar instituted the present quo warranto proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to
assume office and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be declared null and void. He also prayed that he be declared duly
elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of respondent Paraiso.
Respondent denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines
on August 21, 1951, that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan
on August 27, 1951, and that even if respondent was not eligible to the office, petitioner could not be declared elected to
take his place.
The court found respondent to be ineligible for the office of mayor, being an ecclesiastic, and, consequently, it declared his
proclamation as mayor null and void, but refrained from declaring petitioner as mayor-elect for lack of sufficient legal
grounds to do so.
From this decision both parties have appealed.

Issue:

Whether or not Paraiso, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code

Ruling:

Yes.

Section 2175:
Persons ineligible to municipal office— In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in
active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or Insular funds, or contractors for public works of the
municipality.
After carefully examining the evidence of record, and after weighing its credibility and probative value, we have not found any
reason for deviating from the finding of the trial court that respondent never ceased as minister of the order to which he
belonged and that the resignation he claims to have filed months before the date of the elections is but a mere scheme to
circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office.
Indeed, if respondent really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of the religious organization to which he belonged for
the purpose of launching his candidacy why did he not resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation
registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries. The importance of resignation cannot be underestimated. The purpose of
registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the minister to discharge religious functions, but
equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This information is necessary for the protection of the public.
This is especially so with regard to the authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the law
mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It is no argument to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the requisite
resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his organization or upon the official in charge of such
registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the interested
party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to do. And
what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister knowing full
well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office.
As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible, petitioner can be declared elected, having obtained second place in
the elections, our answer is simple: this Court has already declared that this cannot be done in the absence of an express
provision authorizing such declaration. Our law not only does not contain any such provision but apparently seems to prohibit
it.

Kho vs Republic ruling:

The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 12 Hence,
the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a
contract, to wit:

ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local
civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These
marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3)
consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan
marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void,
this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage
contract.

Petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner]
and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification,
the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent
to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to
discharge that burden.

Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion
that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that
there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect the validity of the marriage.
The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage
which is performed without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.

Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.33 As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides
that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under Articles
72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be characterized as among the
exceptions.

(Side Note)
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his motives are less than pure -
that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it may, the same does
not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence
presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly
absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.