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There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No.

167707,
a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
EN BANC (CA) affirming that 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan,
which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-
claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for
[G.R. No. 167707. October 8, 2008.]
titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 1064 3 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE into reserved forest and agricultural land.
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, The Antecedents
REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS,
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI G.R. No. 167707
PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a
REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF inhabitants 4 who live in the bone-shaped island's three barangays. 5
TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE
TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,vs.MAYOR JOSE S. On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural
YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those Island, 6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by
similarly situated, respondents. named persons. 7
On November 10, 1978,then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1801 8 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands,
[G.R. No. 173775. October 8, 2008.] caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine
reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined (PTA).President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-
by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY 82 9 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No.
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS 1801. CTHaSD
PETITION, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of
RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto
VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN,respondents.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure
titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or
DECISION through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since
June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands
for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. 10
REYES, R.T., J p:
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and
At stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of
occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands. man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible
of private ownership. Under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No.
141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does
the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect not in itself constitute a title to the land. CITcSH
titles.
SO ORDERED. 17
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants' right to have their
(OSG),opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that
occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No.
Boracay Island was anunclassified land of the public domain. It formed
1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were
part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest", which was not
inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. 18 The Circular itself
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3 (a) of Presidential Decree
recognized private ownership of lands. 19 The trial court cited Sections
(PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, 11 as amended.
87 20 and 53 21 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants' reliance on PD ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial lands were declared as part of the forest reserve. 22
confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable,
denied. 23 The Republic then appealed to the CA.
whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. ASIETa
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on
RTC decision, disposing as follows: cADEHI
the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in
possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises,
were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal
coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower
planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants court. 24
declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes. 12
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were
purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or part of a forest reserve.
impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly
with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their
denied. 25 Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
respective memoranda. 13
The RTC took judicial notice 14 that certain parcels of land in G.R. No. 173775
Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 1064 26 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of
5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. 15 The titles were reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight
issued on August 7, 1933. 16 and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and
RTC and CA Dispositions disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer
zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading: protection purposes. ITECSH
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando
declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular Sacay, 27 Wilfredo Gelito, 28 and other landowners 29 in Boracay filed
No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. 30 They allege that the
Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of
the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots
surveyed and approved by respondent Regional in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of
pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first II.
class resorts on their lots. 31
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF
as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY
pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL
first Public Land Act. 32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
III.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants
do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR
Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3 (a) AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER
of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE
inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE
title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority TORRENS SYSTEM?
to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable IV.
lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release
the lots for disposition. HEcaIC IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION
1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR
VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY,
the two petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
classification of Boracay Island. 33 THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION
1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a)
Issues OF RA 6657. IHCacT
G.R. No. 167707
V.
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY
and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO
Boracay Island. 34 APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF
THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF
G.R. No. 173775 PETITIONERS IN BORACAY? 35 (Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants
I.
(respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions
POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial
OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not
BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws. DCIEac
LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF Our Ruling
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV.
19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive to reclassify lands of
PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY the public domain
LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in
IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine
DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705? HcTSDa
Bill of 1902 36 in relation toAct No. 926, later amended and/or superseded The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or
by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; 37 (b) Proclamation No. 1801 38 issued the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the
by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064 39 issued by systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their claims. 52
rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law 53 partly amended
and executive acts.
the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant
executive to reclassify lands of the public domain. Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said
decree. 54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, aninformacion
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
posesoria or possessory information title, 55 when duly inscribed in the
agricultural, forest or timber. 40 Meanwhile, the 1973
Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the
Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing
actual, public, and adverse, 56 from the date of its
lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law, 41 giving the
inscription. 57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected
government great leeway for classification. 42 Then the 1987
one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895.
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one
Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State. 58
addition: national parks. 43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be
alienated. 44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could
Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any only be founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely:
of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant;
domain. cCTIaS (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or
title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain
title. 59
belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the
patrimony. 45 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, Philippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill
1973, and 1987 Constitutions. 46 of 1902. 60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands
were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral,
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
and timber or forest lands. 61 The act provided for, among others, the
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 47 Thus, all lands that
disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system)
have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by
and by lease (leasehold system). 62 It also provided the definition by
grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
exclusion of "agricultural public lands". 63 Interpreting the meaning of
domain. 48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the
"agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared
public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government,
in Mapa v. Insular Government: 64 THADEI
as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona
in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as ...In other words, that the phrase "agricultural
well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership. 49 lands.... 65 (Emphasis Ours)
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. On February 1, 1903,the Philippine Legislature passed Act
Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act
territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes
Crown. 50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the system. 66
foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government,
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903,the Philippine Commission
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." 51
passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act
introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court
public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the government, such as an official proclamation, 80 declassifying
public domain. 67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten purposes. 81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
(10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited
of imperfect title. 68 and classified." 82
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject
Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave of the application is alienable or disposable. 83 To overcome this
Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land
and occupation en concepto dueño since time immemorial, or since July subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. 84 There
26, 1894, was required. 69 must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No.
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a
141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No.
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than
of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. 85 The applicant
timber and mineral lands, 70 and privately owned lands which reverted to
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed
the State. 71
to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
Section 48 (b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act disposable. 86 aITECA
No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the
superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, 72 which provided for a
Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the
simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect
portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073, 73 which now
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent
provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June
such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
12, 1945, or earlier. 74
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to
The issuance of PD No. 892 75 on February 16, 1976 disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification
discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration cannot be assumed. They call for proof. 87
proceedings. 76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants
Ankron and de Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay
should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6)
Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands.Private claimants posit that
months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter,
Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron
the recording of all unregistered lands 77 shall be governed by Section
v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919) 88 and de Aldecoa v. The
194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
Insular Government (1909). 89 These cases were decided under the
3344. TAcSaC
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD statement in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the
No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
codify the various laws relative to registration of property. 78 It governs contrary is shown." 90
registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered
Private claimants' reliance on Ankron and de Aldecoa is
lands, including chattel mortgages. 79
misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of
Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed
that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally
manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of the repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine. aESIDH
public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land
agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative
President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant
domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No.
free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or
vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the
the evidence. 91 This was the Court's ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and,
Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. de Palanca v. by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
Republic, 92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not
...Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there
land need not be formally released by an act of the was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the
Executive before it can be deemed open to private courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the
ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry
Islands. HCDaAS
(supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that
xxx xxx xxx whether the particular land in question belongs to one
class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a
Petitioner's reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not
v. Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the
Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no extent and present or future value of the forestry and of
legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions
Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, have been given for "agriculture", "forestry", and "mineral"
timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral
implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the
evidence. 93 forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not
926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the
Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified
presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the
lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown." 94 exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as
agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable
Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public domain had been minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be
automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be
By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the decided upon the proof in that particular case, having
public domain into agricultural lands. regard for its present or future value for one or the
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of other purposes.We believe, however, considering the
1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority
Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land, of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands
alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever Government, 101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular
the land involved in a particular land registration case Government, 102 and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter Islands. 103
of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a
other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in
totally different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether
each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar
residential lots were included in the general classification of agricultural
[mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide
lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court
whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may
ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the1935
perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of
Constitution 104 from acquiring agricultural land, which included
land. The Government, in the first instance, under the
residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public
provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide
domain are automatically deemed agricultural. ASIETa
for itself what portions of public land shall be considered
forestry land, unless private interests have intervened Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned
before such reservation is made. In the latter case, in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act
whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a No. 2874, including Ankronand De Aldecoa. 105 As We have already
question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the
the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural,
1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public timber, or mineral.
domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or
mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. Private claimants' continued possession under Act No.
175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra) 95 (Emphasis 926 does not create a presumption that the land is alienable. Private
ours) ACSaHc claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of
Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No.
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the 926 106 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence,
classification of lands from the facts of each case, except those that have they may apply for a title in their name. EHSADc
already became private lands. 96Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado
reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department,
through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify v. Court of Appeals. 107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno inCruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. 96-a Since
Resources, 107-a ruled:
then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to
determine the classification of lands of the public domain. 97 "Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act,
was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were
issued their title in 1933, 98 did not present a justiciable case for Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the
determination by the land registration court of the property's land disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of
resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were
the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by
private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the
longer authorized to determine the property's land classification. Hence, Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of
patents to certain native settlers upon public
private claimants cannot bank onAct No. 926.
lands", for the establishment of town sites and
We note that the RTC decision 99 in G.R. sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect
No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of
Manila, 100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Spanish concessions and grants in the
Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was Islands". In short, the Public Land Act operated
on the assumption that title to public lands in the into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks", do
Philippine Islands remained in the government; not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered
and that the government's title to public land by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. 113 The discussion in Heirs
sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry 114 is particularly instructive:
subsequent treaties between Spain and the
A forested area classified as forest land of the
United States.The term "public land" referred to
public domain does not lose such classification simply
all lands of the public domain whose title still
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its
remained in the government and are thrown open
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
to private appropriation and settlement, and
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops
excluded the patrimonial property of the
by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do
government and the friar lands."
not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms,
that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also
Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals be classified as forest land. The classification is
of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
are alienable and disposable. 108 (Emphasis Ours) have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like.Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
under PD No. 705. The DENR 109 and the National Mapping and
do not apply. 115 (Emphasis supplied)
Resource Information Authority 110 certify that Boracay Island is an
unclassified land of the public domain. SEHTIc There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a
dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all
public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3 (a) of PD
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for
No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain
legal purposes. 116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine
which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for
the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout.
the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which
Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
are not". Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been
Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705,
automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural
however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
land. AHDacC
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as
under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities
basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did
in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover
not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private
to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist
claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President
destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a
Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi- Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of
million peso beach resorts on the island; 111 that the island has already private ownership.
been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert
of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island's tourism industry,
the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law
do not negate its character as public forest. AaIDCS
or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands" 117 and "areas declared
the Constitution 112 classifying lands of the public domain as alienable and disposable" 118 does not by itself classify the entire
island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who
to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable
Section 3 provides: or disposable, timber and mineral lands. 121
No trees in forested private lands may be cut In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-
without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of
in public lands are declared forest reserves.(Emphasis the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights.
supplied) AHDacC Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public
to do so. 122 Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified
lands merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive
until released and rendered open to disposition. 123
department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of
the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development's authority Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of
to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides: reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The
Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as
the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and
alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest
which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection
Development.
purposes. HCSEIT
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive
Contrary to private claimants' argument, there was nothing invalid
act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and
Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within
disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of
her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.
each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not
done in Proclamation No. 1801. HEISca Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the
No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other
Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into
islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and
agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest
marine reserve to be administered by the PTA — to ensure the
under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an
concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development
agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4 (a) of RA No. 6657,
of the areas' tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the
thus:
marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at
administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does SEC. 4. Scope. — The Comprehensive Agrarian
not address the areas' alienability. 119 Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No.
Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the
131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands
Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera
of the public domain suitable for agriculture. aEHASI
in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island,
Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in More specifically, the following lands are covered
Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public
virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would
domain devoted to or suitable for
likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or
been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively undertaken after the approval of this Act
declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private until Congress, taking into account
ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 120 provide that it is only the ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are
law, the specific limits of the public domain. two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as
domain despite PD No. 705. alienable and disposable land of the public domain. 128
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926,
Rafols v. Republic, 124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are public and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into
forests. an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public
While it is true that the land classification map domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
does not categorically state that the islands are public Private claimants' bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title,
forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No.
leads to the same result. In the absence of the 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our
unclassified land until released and rendered open to present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied
disposition. 125 (Emphasis supplied) for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a the law itself. 129 Where the land is not alienable and disposable,
"reclassification" of land. If the land had never been previously classified, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under possessory rights. 130
the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of
Justice 126 on this point: imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to
the prohibition in Section 4 (a) is the word prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
"reclassification". Where there has been no previous possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for
mass of the public domain which has not been the subject declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the requisite period
of the present system of classification for purposes of of possession.
determining which are needed for forest purposes and
which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are
some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note that the
there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were
of within the meaning of Section 4(a). DcCIAa issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not
sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of occupation commenced on June 12, 1945. IEAHca
the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to
agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay,
of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those having been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested
lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their
under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been continued possession and investments give them a vested right which
previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest cannot be unilaterally rescinded byProclamation No. 1064.
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the The continued possession and considerable investment of private
Revised Forestry Code. 127 claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on
the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed
jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 inDirector of Forestry v. Munoz: 134
confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is
continued possession and considerable investment in the island.
but in adherence to public policy that should be followed
with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and
many more have spoken, and quite often, about the
One Last Note
pressing need for forest preservation, conservation,
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for protection, development and reforestation. Not without
the development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any
international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by
years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the now that absence of the necessary green cover on our
Court commiserates with private claimants' plight, We are bound to apply lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of
the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up;
batas at ito ang dapat umiral. HScCEa rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their
contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will
be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is
48 (b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic
washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion
ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now
come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and
classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial
destruction to property — crops, livestock, houses, and
investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not
highways — not to mention precious human lives. Indeed,
necessarily mean lack of right to possess. the foregoing observations should be written down in a
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith lumberman's decalogue. 135
as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying
for original registration of title, such as by homestead 131 or sales 1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and
patent, 132 subject to the conditions imposed by law. the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private
claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from 2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for
certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such lack of merit.
bill 133 now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or
SO ORDERED. HTCaAD
a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.
Puno, C.J.,Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the
Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco,
step necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture
Jr.,Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ.,concur.
may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the
classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That Corona, J., is on official leave per Special Order No. 520 dated
the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the September 19, 2008.
vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance
Nachura, J.,took no part. Justice Nachura participated in the
between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as
present case as Solicitor General.
economic progress. EacHCD
||| (Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation's survival.
Yap, G.R. Nos. 167707 & 173775, [October 8, 2008], 589 PHIL 156-201)
Their promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians
and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of
EN BANC the offense, and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency
of the information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia,
that the information state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
[G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996.] the offense.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. —
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68
OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.,
of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. Punished in this section
Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural
are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other
Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES,
forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority;
Chief, Special Actions and Investigation Division,
and (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
DENR, respondents.
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
Indeed the wordlumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex
gratia that this omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the
[G.R. No. 106424. June 18, 1996.]
section's coverage, do the facts averred in the information in the
CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation of the said section? A cursory
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion
TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as the thatlumber is not solely its subject matter. It is evident therefrom that
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital what are alleged to be in the possession of the private respondent,
Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, without the required legal documents, are truckloads of (1) almaciga and
and RI CHUY PO, respondents. lauan; and (2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa. The "almaciga and lauan"
specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as "lumber". They
[G.R. No. 123784. June 18, 1996.] cannot refer to the "lumber" in no. (2) because they are separated by the
words "approximately 200,000 bd. ft." with the conjunction "and," and not
with the preposition "of". They must then be raw forest products or, more
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT specifically, timbersunder Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended. It
OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the
Special Actions and Investigation Division, information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said
(DENR), ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. section, and as to them, the information validly charges an offense.
PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA, JR.,
respondents. 3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WORDS AND PHRASES;
LUMBER, DISCUSSED. — The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition
of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as
Francisco D. Estrada for Mustang Lumber. defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of
the same section in the definition of "Processing plant." Lumber is a processed
log or processed forest raw material. The Code uses the term lumber in its
SYLLABUS ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third
New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs
after being prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is aprocessed log or
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO QUASH; timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary,
GROUNDS; THAT FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and
OFFENSE. — Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the
an information may be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
not constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither
this ground is the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SEARCH AND the indictment. While generally factual matters outside of the information
SEIZURE; LAWFUL IN CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner's truck was coming out should not weigh in resolving a motion to quash following the standing rule
from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of that the allegations of the information must alone be considered and should
different sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied with the required not be challenged, there should, however, be no serious objections to taking
invoices and transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was into account additional and clarificatory facts which, although not may out in
a valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by the information, are admitted, conceded, or not denied by the parties. The
Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, the coverage of Section 68, PD 705, as so amended, its explicit, and it is confined
search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully to "timber and other forest products." Section 3(q) of the decree defines "forest
conducted without a search warrant. product" and distinguishes it, in correlation with Section 3 (aa) of the law, from
that which has undergone processing. Timber is so classified, under Section
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN PROPER WITHOUT WARRANT. — Search of 3(q) of the law, as a forest product, while lumber has been categorized, under
a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Section 3(aa), among the various finished wood products.
constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by
virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence 2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES;
of probable cause. The other exceptions are (1) search as an incident to a INTERPOLATION THEREOF MUST BE CONGRUOUS WITH THE
lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and STATUTE. — While great weight is ordinarily accorded to an interpretation or
(4) consented warrantless search. construction of a statute by the government agency called upon to implement
the enactment, the rule would only be good, however, to the extent that such
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH AND interpretation or construction is congruous with the governing statute.
SEIZURE; VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT. — Under Section 9, Rule 126 Administrative issuances can aptly carry the law into effect but it would be legal
of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it absurdity to allow such issuances to also have the effect, particularly those
could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose which are penal in nature, of extending the scope of the law or its plain
cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the following mandate.
day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one
day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same warrant the following
day, provided it is still within the ten-day period.
DECISION
7. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES; ADMINISTRATIVE
SEIZURE PROPER FOR VIOLATION OF SUSPENDED LICENSE AS
LUMBER DEALER. — Petitioner's lumber-dealer's license had been DAVIDE, JR., J p:
suspended by Secretary Factoran and the suspension was never lifted. Thus,
petitioners had absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784,
lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative had were originally assigned to the Second and Third Divisions of the Court,
the authority to seize the lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as respectively. They were subsequently consolidated with the second, a
amended. case of the Court en banc.
VITUG J., dissenting Opinion: Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos.
1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila, and with a lumberyard at
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO QUASH; Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro
GROUND; FACTS DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE IN CASE AT BAR.
Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest
— Ri Chuy Po was charged with the Violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705.
Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-
The information, charge him with possession without required legal documents
0469. Its permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
of ". . . truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa, . . . ." It has Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and
failed to specify whether the "almaciga" and "lauan" there mentioned refer to respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were, during all the time material to
"timber" or "lumber" or both. A perusal of the pleadings and annexes before these cases, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
the Court, however, would indicate that only lumber has been envisioned in
Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the Special Actions and On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report
Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively. recommending to Secretary Factoran the following:
The material operative facts are as follows: 1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the
lumber Dealer's Permit of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of
operating an unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and
narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the
petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID organized a team of possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) without
foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said the required documents;
lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out 2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang
from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, Lumberyard including the truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR compound
dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and in the event its owner fails to submit documents showing
transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo legitimacy of the source of said lumber within ten days from
and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, date of seizure;
Quezon City. 1 The team was not able to gain entry into the premises
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po,
because of the refusal of the owner. 2
owner of Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if the
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and
from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court almaciga lumber and shorts if and when recommendation
(RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on no. 2 pushes through;
that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts,
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639
trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and and CDV-458 as well as the lumber loaded therein for
approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various transport lumber using "recycled" documents. 7
species including almaciga and supa. 3
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the suspending immediately the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-
petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative 4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within
seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with
fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.
a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to
produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter
auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had already secured the
the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source required documents and was ready to submit them. None, however, was
and origin. 4 submitted. 8
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order
seizure the owner retains the physical possession of the seized articles. wherein, after reciting the events which took place on 1 April and 3 April
Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his 1990, he ordered "CONFISCATED in favor of the government to be
representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them until further disposed of in accordance with law" the approximately 311,000 board
orders. 5 feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside
the petitioner's lumberyard. 9
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to
Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a
produce the required documents covering the seized articles because petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order
some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly or preliminary injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied the motion on the ground that and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL
the documents being required from the petitioner must accompany the CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to
lumber or forest products placed under seizure. 6 Branch 35 of the said court. The petitioner questioned therein (a) the
seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search and seizure order issued by
a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted
lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of
dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs covered by legal
Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa. 12
and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations Silvestre H. Bello III, who served as Chairman of the Task Force on
of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), as Illegal Logging. 13
amended, were committed and acting upon instruction of Robles and On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5
under Special Order No. 897, series of 1990, a team of DENR agents
June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela,
went to the business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan
charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
Luna Street, Tondo, Manila. The team caught the petitioner operating as
amended, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-V-91
a lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had already been (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the
suspended on 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's information reads as follows:
lumberyard was open, the team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep
with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon investigation, the team was That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior
informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered to the to or subsequent thereto, within the premises and vicinity of
petitioner's customer. It also came upon the sales invoice covering the Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro
transaction. The members of the team then introduced themselves to the Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po, who was then out of feloniously and unlawfully, have in his possession
town. The team's photographer was able to take photographs of the truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately
stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species
or cutting machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded including almaciga and supa, without the legal documents
with lumber. The team thereupon effected a constructive seizure of as required under existing forest laws and regulations. 14
approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its
stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt therefor. 10 decision 15 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the dispositive portion of which
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the reads:
petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered
prohibition. The case (hereinafter, theSECOND CIVIL CASE) was as follows:
docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the
said court. 1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the
DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice May 1990 ordering the confiscation in favor of the
(DOJ) a complaint against the petitioner's president and general Government the approximately 311,000 board feet of lauan,
manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside
amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate preliminary investigation, and seized from the lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune
the investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a Drive, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro
resolution 11 whose dispositive portion reads: Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby vacated, and instead the respondents are required to report
recommended that an information be filed against and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio, Executive Judge,
respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of said 311,000 board feet of lauan, supa and almaciga
almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with as directed by
lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. law;
277, series of 1987. 2. The respondents are required to initiate and
prosecute the appropriate action before the proper court
regarding the lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST
and dimensions loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate CIVIL CASE to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-
No. CCK-322 which were seized on April 1, 1990; G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL
CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on the
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the
Court on August 2, 1990 shall be rendered functus following grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense, for
oficio upon compliance by the respondents with paragraphs possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section
68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even
1 and 2 of this judgment;
grantingarguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section,
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken
lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and sticks by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch
mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be 35 of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before
returned to said petitioner, is withheld in this case until after the Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of the seizure, raises a
the proper court has taken cognizance and determined how prejudicial question. 19
those lumber, shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs. included in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and possession
SO ORDERED. thereof without the required legal documents is penalized therein. It
referred to Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, series of
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless 1989, for the definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that
search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat the very purpose of the
moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has resulted in the
loaded with large volumes of lumber without covering document showing rapid denudation of our forest resources. 20
the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional
mandate that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, 21
The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the motion to quash
warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving and dismissed the case on the ground that "possession of lumber without
vehicle. 16 As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and the legal documents required by forest laws and regulations is not a
lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled that crime." 22
the said seizure was a continuation of that made the previous day and Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of
was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant issued by 18 October 1991, 23 the People filed a petition for certiorari with this
Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends that the respondent Judge
question. 17 And, although the search warrant did not specifically acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash and
mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was in dismissing the case.
valid because it is settled that the executing officer is not required to
ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of the search. 18 On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision 24 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit the
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and
3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As to the claim that
Government for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant the truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law
to the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should punishing the possession of lumber, and that lumber is not timber whose
have been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant. possession without the required legal documents is unlawful under P.D.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals held:
Factoran, the trial court ruled that the same had been rendered moot and This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial
academic by the expiration of the petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit on nature of the forest product involved has always been
25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner admitted in its memorandum. foisted by those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate
business of lumber dealership. But what is important to
consider is that when appellant was required to present the Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said
valid documents showing its acquisition and lawful Section 80 are the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or
possession of the lumber in question, it failed to present any other forest products or possession of timber or other forest products
despite the period of extension granted to it. 25 without the required legal documents.
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the
denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 March 1992. 26 Court of Appeals in the resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed
Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a petition for review with this Court on 27 February 1996 a petition for review
on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was filed on 2 May 1992. 27 on certiorari in G.R. No. 123784.
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R.
down a decision in the SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition 106424 with which the other two were consolidated.
for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the petitioner did not exhaust G.R. No. 106424
administrative remedies; (b) when the seizure was made on 17
September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal
license was still under suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under Case No. 324-V-91 on the ground that it does not charge an offense.
Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d) the seizure was Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the motion reasoning that
justified as a warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. the subject matter of the information in the CRIMINAL CASE is
No. 705, as amended. LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of without the required legal documents is not prohibited and penalized
Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. under the said section.
In its decision 28 of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,
dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of an information may be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged
merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial court in therein do not constitute an offense. It has been said that "the test for the
dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the definition of correctness of this ground is the sufficiency of the averments in the
"lumber" by Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after being prepared information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
for the market," and by the Random House Dictionary of the English constitute the elements of the offense, 29 and matters aliunde will not be
Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or adapted for various building considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule 110
purposes," the respondent Court held that sincewood is included in the of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the
definition of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
amended, lumber is necessarily included in Section 68 under the
termforest product. Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with he violation of Section
68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or
employee can seize the forest product involved in a violation of Section SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting
68 of P.D. No. 705pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as amended by P.D. Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. — Any
No. 1775, which provides in part as follows: person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from
SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. — alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police products without the legal documents as required under
shall arrest even without warrant any person who has existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
committed or is committing in his presence any of the the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
equipment used in committing the offense, or the forest ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall
products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
process of committing the offense.
addition to the penalty, be deported without further It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration information. The public and the private respondents obviously
and Deportation. miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly, even
if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted
above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the
The Court shall further order the confiscation in information validly charges an offense.
favor of the government of the timber or any forest products
cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his
dissenting opinion that this Court go beyond the four corners of the
the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally
information for enlightenment as to whether the information exclusively
used in the area where the timber or forest products are
refers to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and the annexes thereto,
found.
he arrives at the conclusion that "only lumber has been envisioned in the
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, indictment."
collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the places
therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possession of timber or The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his
proposition violates the rule that only the facts alleged in the
other forest products without the legal documents as required under
information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in determining
existing forest laws and regulations.
whether an information charges an offense.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But
conceding ex gratiathat this omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are
insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the contrary, the Joint Affidavit of
from the section's coverage, do the facts averred in the information in the
Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of the annexes
CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation of the said section?
he referred to, 30 cannot lead one to infer that what the team seized was
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
infallible conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject matter. It is
8. That when inside the compound, the team found
evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the possession of the
approximately four (4) truckloads of narra shorts,
private respondent, without the required legal documents, are truckloads
trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra
of
lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and
(1) almaciga and lauan; and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and which are classified as prohibited wood species. (Emphasis
shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. supplied)

The "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution 31 of the
described as "lumber". They cannot refer to the "lumber" in no. (2) investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis for the filing of the
because they are separated by the words "approximately 200,000 bd. ft." information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:
with the conjunction "and," and not with the preposition "of". They must WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby
then be raw forest products or, more specifically, timbersunder Section recommended that an information be filed against
3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which reads: respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd.
SEC. 3. Definitions. — ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal
shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of PD
xxx xxx xxx 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (Emphasis
(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, supplied)
firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be
beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion
shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
scenic, historical, recreational and geological resources in as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal
forest lands. documents is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such
possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is included in Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted
the term timber. exceptions to the constitutional mandate 34 that no search or seizure
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as personally determining the existence of probable cause. The other
exceptions are (1) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of
defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa)
evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented
of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant"; which reads:
warrantless search. 35
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up,
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of
machine or combination of machine used for the processing
of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, Appeals that the search on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of the search
on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on
plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper
3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of
or other finished wood products.
the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest could be served at any time within the said period, and if its object or
raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued
common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New the following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a
International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same
after being prepared for the market." 32 Simply put, lumber is warrant the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day period. 36
a processed log or timber.
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the because possession of lumber without the required legal documents is
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, not illegal under Section 68 ofP.D. No. 705, as amended, since lumber is
ordinary, and common usage meaning. 33 And insofar as possession neither specified therein nor included in the term forest product, the same
of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 hardly merits further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or
G.R. No. 123784
processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus. The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this
case palpably fail to show prima facie that a reversible error has been
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of
committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision of 31 July
Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave
1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We
abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash the information in the
must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need to require
CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said case.
the respondents to comment on the petition.
G.R. No. 104988
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has from the judgment of the trial court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The
miserably failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed any petitioner never disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's license or
reversible error in its assailed decision of 29 November 1991. permit had been suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck suspension was never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of
with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard up to 25 September 1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary
which were not accompanied with the required invoices and transport Factoran or his authorized representative had the authority to seize the
documents The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which
of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 provides as follows:
of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the
held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL Department Head or his Duly Authorized Representative to
CASE, the search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search Order Confiscation. — In all cases of violations of this Code
could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant. or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department
Head or his duly authorized representative may order the
confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, ||| (Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 104988, 106424 &
removed, or possessed or abandoned . . . . 123784, [June 18, 1996], 327 PHIL 214-249)

The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is


not penalized must also fail in view of our disquisition and ruling on the
same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is totally irrelevant in
the SECOND CIVIL CASE which involves administrative seizure as a
consequence of the violation of the suspension of the petitioner's license
as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing
more than rituals to cover up blatant violations of the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. They are
presumably trifling attempts to block the serious efforts of the DENR to
enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the commendation of the
public in light of the urgent need to take firm and decisive action against
despoilers of our forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to
the generations to come, if not the present, an inheritance of parched
earth incapable of sustaining life. The Government must not tire in its
vigilance to protect the environment by prosecuting without fear or favor
any person who dares to violate our laws for the utilization and protection
of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING
ASIDE and ANNULLING, for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October
1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172,
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No.
324-V-91, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po"; (c)
REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and (d)
DIRECTING the respondent Judge or her successor to hear and decide
the case with purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G.R. No.
123784 for utter failure of the petitioner to show that the respondent
Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged
decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST
CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 in the
SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

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