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RACE TO JUDGE, RUSH TO ACT

Jae-Jung Suh

Online publication date: 18 August 2010

To cite this Article Suh, Jae-Jung(2010) 'RACE TO JUDGE, RUSH TO ACT', Critical Asian Studies, 42: 3, 403 — 424
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2010.507393
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 Critical Asian Studies
42:3 (2010), 403–424
Suh / Race to Judge

RACE TO JUDGE, RUSH TO ACT

The Sinking of the Cheonan and
the Politics of National Insecurity
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Jae-Jung Suh

ABSTRACT: On 26 March 2010, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy corvette Cheonan
broke in half and sank near Baekryong-do Island off the coast of North Korea.
Forty-six sailors lost their lives. Mysterious as the cause of the incident is, the ROK
government’s responses — the Navy’s failure to communicate through the chain of
command, the military’s incompetence in rescue and salvage operations, the Minis-
try of National Defense’s efforts to cover up basic facts, and the government’s rush
to blame North Korea as the culprit and take punitive measures — all added confu-
sion and heightened already high tensions on the peninsula. This articles argues
that the ROK government’s report failed to substantiate its claim that North Korea
attacked and sank the ship. Moreover, the author shows, its claim was based on in-
ternally inconsistent logic and likely fabricated data. The government’s rash, and
unsubstantiated, judgment was accompanied by saber-rattling against the North
and scare tactics intended to silence domestic critics immediately before local gov-
ernment elections. Amidst the heightened tension caused by the incident, the U.S.
administration succeeded in pressuring the Japanese prime minister Hatoyama to
cave in to its demand to keep the Futenma base within Okinawa. Also it agreed to
postpone the transfer of the wartime command control over the Korean military to
the ROK until 2015. The United States, economically wounded by the financial crisis
of 2008, found the heightened state of insecurity created by the Cheonan incident
an opportune excuse to strengthen its allies and its military, if not political, influ-
ence in Northeast Asia, although its success may prove Pyrrhic in the long run.

On the night of 26 March 2010, the 1,200-ton Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy cor-
vette Cheonan was torn in half and sank off Baekryong-do Island in the West Sea
(or, Yellow Sea). Initially informed that the ship had run aground, the ROK
Coast Guard was called in for a rescue operation. All fifty-eight crew members
ISSN 1467-2715 print/1472-6033 online / 03 / 000403–22 ©2010 BCAS, Inc. DOI:10.1080/14672715.2010.507393
 USS Ronald Reagan Strike Group and ROK Navy ships steam in formation during the an-
nual “Foal Eagle” military exercise. ROK naval vessels were engaged in such an exercise
in March 2010 in the vicinity of the Cheonan, but they took no part in the search and
rescue. (Credit: U.S. Navy/Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class [AW/SW] Aaron Burden, March 2007)
Downloaded At: 18:18 1 October 2010

standing on the deck of the sinking ship were rescued. But the rear part of the
severed ship sank fast, taking the crew’s remaining forty-six sailors. Over the
next few days, while the Navy was trying to locate the sunken vessel and rescue
the sailors, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) kept hopes alive that the
missing sailors would be able to survive on the air trapped inside the ship. Two
days passed before the rear part of the ship was located, although the wreckage
was reportedly only about 600 meters away from the accident site.1 The rescue
operation went on for additional agonizing days, with the nation transfixed on
the details of the search for sailors who might still be alive. On 3 April — eight
days after the Cheonan’s sinking, four days after a fishing boat, the Yýnsýng
(which was assisting the Navy) sank and disappeared with its crew in a bizarre
turn of events, and the day after a Navy SEAL member died in the rescue attempt
in curious circumstances2 — the families of the sailors gave up hope and asked
to have the rescue stopped. The following day, the Navy honored their request
and announced the initiation of the salvage operation. It was not until 15 April
that the rear part of the ship was salvaged and the bodies of most of the missing
sailors were recovered. On 24 April, the front portion of the Cheonan was recov-

1. Chýng Yýngil, “Ch'ýnanham hammi palgyýn…ch'immol wonin ‘misteri’ p’ullina [The Cheo-
nan’'s rear part discovered…will the mysterious cause be found?],” Mýnit'udei, 29 March
2010; and An Ænbyýl and Song Hogyun, “Ch'ýnanham hammi ch'ujýng mulch’e palgyýn
…haegun anin min’gan ýsýni ch’oich'o t’amji [Presumed Cheonan’s rear part discovered…
private fishing boat, not Navy, discovers it first],” P'æresian, 29 March 2010.
2. Although the military announced that Warrant Officer Han Chuho, a veteran underwater de-
molition team member, died during the search for the missing sailors near where the front part
of the ship landed, KBS news reported that Han was operating at a third location different from
where the front and rear parts were found. “Æmunæi ‘che3æi pup’yo’…woe? [Suspicious ‘third
floater’…why?],” KBSnyusu9, 9 April 2010. Available on-line at news.kbs.co.kr/tvnews/news9/
2010/04/07/2076673.html. (All websites in this article were accessed on 5 July 2010).

404 Critical Asian Studies 42:3 (2010)

 Images on the left show the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan before and after it was ripped in
half by an explosion on 26 March 2010. The JIG presented the image on the right to illus-
trate the damage a torpedo explosion would have caused to the ship.

ered. The still missing sailors were declared dead and a period of nationwide
mourning began.
What actually caused the naval vessel to break up and sink is a matter of dis-
pute, as we will see, but other events related to the sinking raise even more per-
plexing questions. Take these four, for example. A national audit revealed that at
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the time of the incident the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I Sangæi, was
out on a late-night drinking binge and could not be reached to be informed of
the ship’s sinking.3 The military proved surprisingly incompetent at the rescue
and salvage operation, failing to locate the sunken ship even with the aid of the
KNTDS (Korea Naval Tactical Data System) and despite the fact that the ship was
resting in rather shallow waters. Several naval ships were in the vicinity — en-
gaged in a joint field exercise, “Foal Eagle,” with the U.S. Navy — but it was the
Coast Guard that rescued the surviving sailors. Moreover, it was a private fishing
boat that located the sunken ship, even though the Navy was equipped with
state-of-the-art sonar and radar. Finally, MND officials created confusion by leak-
ing contradictory bits and pieces of information during the rescue operation
and changing its storyline along the way.4
After almost two months of investigation, the ROK government released an
interim report that was filled with twisted logic and contradictory pieces of evi-
dence.5 Nonetheless, the government used this report as the basis on which to
announce “stern” punitive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK) and South Korea’s president, Lee Myung-bak, chose the

3. Kwon Hyýkch’ýl and I Yongin, “Ch'ýnanham sago tangsi hapch’amæijang ‘p’okt’anju manch’
ui [Chairman of JCS drunk at time of Cheonan incident],” Han’gyýresinmun, 11 June 2010.
4. The MND changed the estimated time and location of the accident many times, fueling specu-
lation that it was trying to hide something.
5. The report released by the ROK on 20 May was actually an interim report; it plans to issue its fi-
nal report by the end of July 2010. Not only did the ROK government rush to judgment on the
cause of the Cheonan incident, as we argue in this article, but it has also rushed to advocate pu-
nitive measures against the DPRK, including urging the UN Security Council to act on the basis
of the interim report. The Korean-language version of the report is available on-line at
www.mnd. go.kr/mndMedia/temp/20100520/1_8652.jsp?topMenuNo=1&leftNum=4; the
English-language version, entitled “Investigation Result on the Sinking of ROK’S ‘Cheonan’,”
is available on-line at www.mnd.go.kr/mndEng_2009/WhatsNew/RecentNews/.

Suh / Race to Judge 405

 Yongsan War Museum in Seoul as the venue for announcing these measures. At
the trilateral summit meeting with Chinese and Japanese leaders several days
later, President Lee escalated matters with this saber-rattling remark: “We do not
fear war, although we do not desire it either.”6 The president’s pronouncements
ratcheted up the already tense inter-Korean relations. What began as the myste-
rious sinking of a naval corvette and the tragic loss of forty-six sailors gradually
became an intense domestic political struggle, engendering war hysteria
throughout the peninsula and causing an unexpected turn in regional politics
in Northeast Asia.
This article critically reviews the ROK government’s handling of the Cheonan
incident and describes how the incident and its aftermaths have affected
inter-Korean relations and regional politics in Northeast Asia. In the first part,
we subject the evidence in the government’s report to scientific analysis to as-
certain the validity of the government’s conclusion that the Cheonan was sunk
by a North Korean torpedo. The analysis will reveal a number of internal incon-
sistencies as well as disconnects in the physical evidence presented in the re-
port. These problems call the report’s conclusion into question and raise the
troubling possibility that some of the report’s data may have been fabricated to
fit the conclusion. The second part of the article situates the Cheonan incident
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and the government’s report in the context of South Korea’s domestic politics.
We ask why the government raced to produce such a faulty report and then
rushed to act on it. The article concludes with an analysis of the regional impact
of these events.
We argue, in conclusion, that in order to restore public confidence the ROK
government should form a new team to start the investigation all over again. We
also suggest that the international community should continue to insist on an
objective and thorough investigation while reiterating its commitment to peace
and stability on the Korean peninsula.

Disconnects and Inconsistencies in the Report

For almost two months after the incident, the Joint Civil–Military Investigation
Group (JIG), made up of twenty-two military experts, twenty-five experts from
ten military-related research institutes, and three civilian experts recommended
by the Parliament,7 conducted an almost CSI–like scientific investigation8 that in-
volved a test explosion, a computer simulation, and scientific analyses such as
electron-dispersive spectroscopy (EDS) and x-ray diffraction (XRD). The in-
terim report the JIG released at a press conference on 20 May cited three main

6. Chýng Yonggwan, “Haniljung chýngsanghoedam ‘chýnjaeng duryýwoanch’iman wonch’ido

annænda’ [Korea-Japan-China Summit, ‘neither fear war, nor desire war’],” Dongailbo, 31 May
2010.
7. Despite its name — the Joint Civil-Military Investigation Group — the absolute majority of the
Group’s members, sixty-five out of seventy-four, work for the Ministry of National Defense or
MND–related think tanks and institutes. One of its two heads, Pak Chýng-I, was a three star
general at the time of the investigation; after the release of the report, he was promoted to a
four star general.
8. CSI (Crime Scene Investigation) is a popular U.S. TV series that depicts police use of advanced
forensic and scientific techniques to investigate and solve crimes.

406 Critical Asian Studies 42:3 (2010)

Downloaded At: 18:18 1 October 2010

Images presented to the media by the Joint Civil–Military Investigation Group (JIG) illus-
trate the damage said to be caused by a gas bubble and shock wave that would accom-
pany the explosion of a torpedo near a ship. (Clockwise from top left): (1) Underwater
explosion: Gas bubble (inner circle) and shock wave (outer circle); (2) expansion of the
bubble; (3) contraction of the bubble; and (4) collapse of the bubble. The JIG claimed that
its evidence showed that the Cheonan was damaged in such a manner by a torpedo of
North Korean origin.

findings: (1) the Cheonan’s sinking was caused by an explosion outside the
ship; (2) the explosion was that of a torpedo; and (3) the torpedo was manufac-
tured in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Based on these
findings, the JIG charged that North Korea was responsible for the sinking of the
Cheonan. This is indeed a logical conclusion, but only if the JIG’s three findings
are all correct.
After a careful analysis of the JIG’s report and evidence and our own physical
testing, however, we find that the JIG has failed (1) to substantiate its claim that
there was an outside explosion; (2) to establish any causal linkage between the
Cheonan’s sinking and a torpedo; and (3) to demonstrate that the torpedo, pre-
suming one was involved, was manufactured by the DPRK. We argue that the
JIG’s findings are based on evidence that is not credible and that contradicts and
is inconsistent with the facts. The findings are so flawed, in fact, that they render
the JIG’s charge that the Cheonan’s sinking was caused by a DPRK-manufac-
tured torpedo unsustainable. Furthermore, there is a suspicion that the JIG’S
EDS and XRD data may have been fabricated.

Finding 1
We examine the JIG’s three findings in order. First, the JIG claimed that “an out-
side explosion” caused the ship to break up and sink. The JIG argues in its re-
port that the pattern of the ship’s deformation and severance is consistent with
Suh / Race to Judge 407
 9
damage caused by a bubble effect from an outside explosion. Yet, we contend
that there is no evidence to support this claim. The JIG did produce a simulation
that showed how a bubble might have been formed by an underwater explosion
and how such an explosion might have crippled the Cheonan, but this simula-
tion had not been completed at the time the JIG released its report. On 24 May,
Yun Týkyong, co-chair of the JIG, informed the Parliament’s Special Committee
on the Cheonan: “We are continuing our simulation and the final result of the
simulation will come out in July.” He added: “The simulation is not yet com-
pleted to show the water column [which the bubble effect would allegedly have
produced], but it will all be shown when the simulation is completed.”10 The
simulation the JIG presented at its 20 May press conference shows only a bubble
being formed and hitting the bottom of the ship, deforming the ship and slightly
rupturing the hull.11 Nowhere does the simulation demonstrate that the bubble
severed the ship in the middle, as the JIG report claims it does.
When questions were raised about the effect of the bubble, Dong-a Science, a
South Korean science publication published by the conservative Dong-A media
conglomerate, released additional information about the simulation, presum-
ably courtesy of data supplied or leaked by the JIG.12 Astonishingly, the updated
simulation still failed to show how the bubble might have severed the Cheonan.
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The simulation revealed only that the bubble hit the ship and caused a small
rupture in the hull, but the bubble then began to shrink and show signs of
breaking up. In all the time since the JIG released its report on 20 May, the ROK
Defense Ministry, speaking on behalf of the JIG investigation, has yet to produce
a bubble simulation consistent with the information presented in the JIG re-
port. On what grounds, then, did the JIG argue that the Cheonan was severed in
two by the bubble effect?

9. When a torpedo explodes underwater without touching an object, the hot gas from the explo-
sion forms a large bubble typically three to ten meters in diameter and with high internal
pressure. The bubble then goes through a cycle of expansion and contraction until it pops on
the surface of the water or dies out underwater. As the bubble expands and contracts, it pushes
the target ship up and down, producing a high level of stress. If the resulting stress is high
enough, it may break the ship apart; a bubble can only sever a ship, however, with the aid of a
shock wave, which causes more damage.
10. Pak Jýngi, another co-chairman, added that “the Korea Institute of Machinery and Materials
th
[which is in charge of the simulation] said it would complete the simulation by July 15 .” Kim
Namgwon and Kim Pýmhyýn, “Kimgukpang, ‘Puk, simnijýn konggyýkhamyýn chækkak
taeæng [Defense Minister Kim, ‘Will immediately respond if North attacks [our] psychological
warfare’],” Yonhap News, 24 May 2010. The latter quote is from “Ch’ýanhamt’ækwi, ‘mulgi-
dung chonjaeyýbu’ nonnan [Cheonan Special Committee, Controversy over ‘presence of wa-
ter column’],” Yonhap News, 24 May 2010.
11. The JIG’s simulation results are available on-line at www.mnd.go.kr/mndMedia/temp/2010
0520/1_8652.jsp?topMenuNo=1&leftNum=4. Although the ROK defense ministry has up-
dated the simulation, as of 2 July 2010 it still fails to show how the Cheonan was severed.
12. Jae-Jung Suh, “Býbælhyogwanæn ýbssýtta [There was no bubble effect],” P’æresian, 27 May
2010. Available on-line at www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article_num=401005270059
49&section=05. Chýn Tonghyýk, “P’okbalhu 1ch’okkaji…ch’ýnanham paemit irýtke jjigærý-
jyýtda [Up to a second after explosion.… The Cheonan’s bottom deformed this way],” Dong-a
saiýnsæ [Dong-A Science], 28 May 2010. Available on-line at news.dongascience.com/html/
News/2010/05/28/20100528100000185442/201005281000001854420118000000.html.
408 Critical Asian Studies 42:3 (2010)
Downloaded At: 18:18 1 October 2010

Slides from the JIG media presentation show damage to the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan.
(Clockwise from upper left): (1) “stack-demist”; (2) front portion (port side) of ship showing
the break point; (3) water pressure marks on the hull bottom; (4) front half of the Cheonan
as it is lifted from the sea on 24 April 2010.
Moreover, further analysis reveals that the JIG simulation is not consistent
with the pattern of the ship’s damage. If the bottom of the ship was hit by a bub-
ble, it should show a spherical concave deformation resembling the shape of a
bubble, as the JIG’s own simulation suggests, but it does not. The bottom of the
front part of the ship is pushed up in an angular shape, as the images in the JIG
report show. This type of damage is more consistent with a collision with a hard
object. The tear line in the JIG simulation has a circular shape because the hull
shows a tear in the area that was hit by the spherical bubble, but the bottom of
the ship part that was supposed to have received the direct impact of the bubble
shows no circular tear. Equally important, if an outside explosion of 250 kg of
explosives produced the bubble jet effect, as the JIG argues, then that explosion
should have produced an immediate pre-bubble shock wave whose strength
would have been at least 5,000 pounds per square inch (psi) when it hit the bot-
tom of the Cheonan.13 Yet, the bottom and ruptured surface of the ship betray
no sign of such a large shock,14 the internal instruments and parts remain intact
in their original place, and none of the crew members suffered the kinds of inju-
ries that would have been expected from such a shock. Given that an underwa-

13. A calculation is based on the formula published in Reid 1996.

14. The Ministry of National Defense initially stated that 70 percent of a torpedo’s explosive en-
ergy will be a shock wave effect. After Suh’s article (see note 12) asked why the Cheonan be-
trays no signs of shock wave damage, the MND decreased the ratio to 54 percent and 46
percent. The ratio varies depending on the kind of explosive and the mix of other ingredients
Suh / Race to Judge 409
 ter explosion produces both a bubble effect and a shock wave — with the shock
wave usually being about six to ten times as destructive as the bubble effect —
the condition of both the ship and the crew is not consistent with the damage
expected as a result of an outside explosion.15
In short, the JIG failed to show that an outside explosion caused the ship to
break in half. At the time of its press conference on 20 May the JIG had not even
completed a computer simulation to show how a bubble might have affected
the ship. The parts of the simulation the JIG did present to the media failed to il-
lustrate how a bubble formed by an outside explosion could have severed the
Cheonan. Furthermore, their simulation showed that the bubble would deform
the ship in a different way than the Cheonan was actually damaged. Finally, the
small circular tear that the simulation shows does not appear on the body of the
Cheonan. The JIG’s first finding, therefore, has to be judged a mere allegation.
The JIG’s own evidence is groundless and has been contradicted by at least one
other analysis of underwater explosions in the military literature.16 Even if the
JIG could produce a simulation demonstrating that a bubble effect crippled the
Cheonan, there is still no proof that the bubble effect itself was caused by an ex-
plosion. Establishing this connection would involve showing a pattern of ship
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destruction that is consistent with a bubble effect simulation.

Finding 2
The JIG’s second finding alleged a causal link between the Cheonan’s sinking
and a torpedo. Even if the JIG succeeded in demonstrating that an outside ex-
plosion occurred — something, we contend, it failed to establish — it would
still need to show that the explosion was caused by the torpedo the JIG “recov-
ered.”17 The JIG presented two pieces of evidence to support this finding. First,
18
it alleged that white compounds found on the torpedo match those found on
the surfaces of the Cheonan ship; and, second, that the compounds resulted
from an explosion.19 The EDS and XRD analyses done by the JIG unambiguously

such as aluminum powder. For the MND’s initial position, see Kim Byýngnyun, “Ýroi kiroi,
sujung p’okbalæi wiryýk [Torpedo and sea mine, the power of underwater explosion],” Minis-
try of National Defense, 28 April 2010. Available on-line at www.mnd.go.kr/mndMedia/mnd
New/mndPlanManage/20100428/1_-12168.jsp?topMenuNo=1&leftNum=5. For its newer
numbers, see Kim Byýngnyun, “Ýroi sujungp’okbal ch’ungbyýkp’a býbælhyogwaro sýnch’e
p’agoe [Torpedo’s underwater explosion destroys ship with shock wave and bubble effect],”
Ministry of National Defense, 22 May 2010. Available on-line at www.mnd.go.kr/mnd Me-
dia/mndNew/mndPlan Manage/20100522/1_-12372.jsp?topMenuNo=1&leftNum=5.
15. Reid 1996, 1.
16. Reid 1996.
17. The JIG claimed that it retrieved the torpedo parts near the alleged explosion site on 15 May,
just five days before it announced its conclusion. A pair of trawlers under contract to the JIG
swept the bottom of the sea with a specially designed net and pulled up parts of a torpedo.
Nothing else was found before the sweeping operation was terminated on 20 May.
18. Described as “adsorbed materials” (AM) in the JIG’s report. (“Adsorbed” refers to a chemical
process of gas forming a thin film on a solid surface.) The term “adsorbed materials” does not
appear in the English-language version of the JIG’s report, but it does appear as an English in-
sertion in the Korean version, which is the report we analyzed.
19. S.-H. Lee, “Comments on the section ‘Adsorbed Material Analysis, of the Cheonan Report made
by the South Korean Civil and Military Joint Investigation Group (CIV–MIL JIG),” ArXiv, 6 June
2010. Available on-line at arxiv.org/abs/1006.0680v2.
410 Critical Asian Studies 42:3 (2010)
 establish that the atomic composition and chemical structure of the white com-
20
pounds found on the ship (AM-1) and the torpedo (AM-2) are identical. We ac-
cept this piece of evidence. But the second piece of evidence has no basis in
scientific fact. An explosion produces alumina, Al2O3, and to make its case the
JIG would have to demonstrate that the intensity ratio of the oxygen and alumi-
num peaks of the AM-1 and AM-2 compounds are similar to that of the alumina
Al2O3. The JIG’s EDS analyses failed to show this, however, and we conclude
from this that the AM-1 and AM-2 samples have nothing to do with any explo-
sion. The AM-1 and AM-2 samples are most likely the rust on the aluminum that
resulted from exposure to moisture or water over a long period of time rather
than the alumina, Al2O3, that the JIG alleged was formed from an explosion.21
An independent scientist, Dr. Yang Panseok, a member of the University of
Manitoba’s Department of Geological Sciences, has found that the EDS inten-
sity ratio of hydrogen and aluminum in the compounds matches that of alumi-
num hydroxide, Al(OH)3, found in nature commonly as aluminum rust or
22
gibbsite. His finding strengthens our conclusion that the AM-1 and AM-2 com-
pounds found on the ship and the torpedo are not associated with an explosion.
Furthermore, the x-ray diffraction pattern of the AM-3 compound, which was
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produced in the JIG’s test explosion, is completely different from the x-ray pat-
terns of the AM-1 and AM-2. The main difference is that the AM-3 taken from the
JIG’s test explosion shows sharp peaks corresponding to un-oxidized alumi-
num in its crystalline form whereas neither AM-1 nor AM-2 produce peaks re-
lated to any aluminum-related compounds, much less un-oxidized aluminum.
Lee’s laboratory experiment, which reproduced the physical and chemical
transformation of aluminum during an explosion, produced the same un-oxi-
dized aluminum crystalline as the JIG’s test explosion did, adding confidence to
our conclusion that AM-1 and AM-2 did not result from an explosion.23 The JIG
claims that the compounds have different crystal structures because the real tor-
pedo explosion produced a higher temperature and experienced a more rapid
cooling by the sea water than the JIG’s test explosion, and as a result, almost 100
percent of the Al was oxidized and almost 100 percent of the oxidized alumina
became amorphous. However, several scientific experiments have been done to

20. AM-1, AM-2, and AM-3 are designations created by Seunghun Lee in a scientific paper he
authored that discusses the JIG’s analysis of the adsorbed materials.
21. Kang Yanggu, “Ch’ýanham deit’ý ch’imyýngjýk oryu…aluminyumæn kýjitmal anhae [The
Cheonan data has fatal flaws…aluminum does not lie],” P’æresian, 24 June 2010. Available
on-line at www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article_num=60100623153324&section=05.
22. After careful analysis of the JIG’s EDS data, Yang Panseok suspects that the AM-1 and AM-2 are
not aluminum oxides but more likely aluminum hydroxide, Al(OH)3, found in nature com-
monly as gibbsite. Kang Yanggu and Hwang Chunho, “Isanghan naraæi ch’ýnanham…alu-
minium sanhwamulæn ýbssýtta [The Cheonan in Wonderland.… There was no aluminum
oxide],” P’æresian, 30 June 2010. Available on-line at www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?ar-
ticle_ num=60100630132420&section=05; and Hankyere, 30 June 2010, available on-line at
www.hani.co.kr/arti/ISSUE/72/428236.html.
23. Testing also showed that the un-oxidized Al remains in its crystalline form, while in the AM-1
and AM-2 compounds no signal related to any Al-related compounds was observed. Seunghun
Lee, “Comments on the section ‘Adsorbed Material Analysis, of the Cheonan Report made by
the South Korean Civil and Military Joint Investigation Group (CIV–MIL JIG),” ArXiv, 6 June
2010. Available on-line at arxiv.org/abs/1006.0680v2.
Suh / Race to Judge 411
 approximate a real explosion and these show that the resulting Al-related com-
pounds are both crystalline alumina, called α-Al2O3, and amorphous alumina,
called γ-Al2O3. Lee Seunghun has performed a laboratory test in which an alu-
24

minum sample was heated above its melting temperature and then was rapidly
cooled by water, mimicking the conditions of an explosion. When the resulting
materials were examined using EDS and x-ray, it turned out that only a fraction
of the aluminum had oxidized, and the resulting compound contained un-oxi-
dized Al and α-Al2O3, both crystalline. This is consistent with earlier scientific
studies and indicates that experimental heating and cooling of Al resembles a
real explosion at least qualitatively, if not quantitatively. In fact, the JIG x-ray data
of the AM-3 sample (the JIG’s test experiment data) shows strong crystalline Al
signals and weak crystalline α-Al2O3, consistent with Lee’s experimental results.
When the media reported our experimental results and the inconsistencies be-
tween the AM-3 and the other two samples, the ROK Ministry of Defense re-
sponded that the crystalline Al signal found in the AM-3 sample was due to an
experimental mistake, which we believe is a plain lie.25
To summarize, our scientific analysis and experiment lead us to conclude
that (1) JIG’s AM-1 and AM-2 samples did not result from an explosion, and (2)
some of JIG’s data, most likely the AM-3 EDS data, may have been fabricated.26
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Thus, the “critical evidence” presented by the JIG to link the Cheonan sinking to
the alleged explosion of the torpedo is scientifically groundless and perhaps
fabricated.

Finding 3
The JIG’s third finding alleged that the torpedo parts recovered from the area of
presumed explosion were of DPRK origin, thus linking the explosion to North
Korea. An independent investigation, however, revealed a serious inconsis-
tency that casts doubt on the integrity of the JIG’s evidence related to the tor-
pedo. The outer surface of the torpedo propulsion unit that was found and
shown to the media was greatly corroded, presumably because the coat of paint
that would have protected the metal had been burnt off during the explosion.
The paint burn-off and resulting metal corrosion are consistent with a high heat
explosion commonly found in bombs and torpedoes. And yet the blue ink
marking of Hangul — “1býn” in Korean — was still visible on the torpedo de-
spite the fact that ink has a lower boiling point, typically around 150 degrees
Celsius, than paint, typically 350 degrees Celsius, and thus should have burnt

24. S.-H. and P. Yang, “Was the “critical evidence” presented in the South Korean official Cheonan
report fabricated?” 28 June 2010. Available on-line at arxiv.org/abs/1006.0680v4.
25. I Sænghýn, “Ch’ýnanham habjodanæi ‘gyýljýngjýk chænggý’næn chojaktoetta [The JIG’s ‘criti-
cal evidence’ is fabricated],” P’æresian, 16 June 2010. Available on-line at www.pressian.
com/article/article.asp?article_num=40100614152149&section=05. Ministry of National De-
fense. “Mo int’ýnet maech’eesý pododoen ‘isænghýn kyosu chujang(1)’e daehan dapbyýnim-
nida [Response to ‘Professor Lee Senghun’s allegation (1) reported in an internet media],” 21
June 2010. Available on-line at www.mnd.go.kr/ mndMedia/mediaElucidation/20100621/1_-
12672.jsp?topMenuNo=1&leftNum=14.
26. S.-H. Lee, and P. Yang, “Was the “critical evidence” presented in the South Korean official
Cheonan report fabricated?” 28 June 2010. Available on-line at arxiv.org/abs/1006.0680v4.
412 Critical Asian Studies 42:3 (2010)
 away just like the
outer paint. In a situa-
tion like this a tor-
ped o w ould h a v e
been subjected to
heat of at least 350
degrees Celsius and
quite likely ov er
1,000 degrees, high
enough to burn the
paint and the blue ink
ma rking a s w ell.
There is no scientific
explanation for this
Slide from media briefing by ROK Ambassador Han Duk-soo inconsistency — the
purports to show evidence of a DPRK marking (circled) on a high heat tolerant
torpedo recovered near the site of the Cheonan sinking. paint was burnt, but
the low heat–tolerant
ink was not — and thus the JIG’s finding in this regard is baseless.27 Further-
Downloaded At: 18:18 1 October 2010

more, any Korean, North or South, would be able to write the Korean letter
“1býn,” and thus the mark cannot be cited as evidence of exclusive North Ko-
rean writing.28 Finally, the JIG alleges that it possesses a North Korean pamphlet
and CD and that their description and drawing of a torpedo match the recov-
ered torpedo parts, but it has refused to release them for examination, citing
“national security reasons.”
In summary, the JIG had the burden of demonstrating beyond reasonable
doubt all three of its findings in order to substantiate its charge that a DPRK tor-
pedo destroyed and sank the Cheonan. But we have shown that each of the
three findings contains serious inconsistencies — inconsistencies that the JIG
has been unable to explain away. While we emphatically stress that our findings
do not prove that North Korea did not torpedo the ship, we insist that the JIG’s
so-called critical evidence fails to prove the opposite, namely, that North Korea

27. The JIG argues that when the torpedo exploded it produced heat higher than 3,000 degrees
Celsius and that aluminum powder in the explosive material melted and transformed into
amorphous aluminum oxides that bonded with the propeller of the torpedo. Aluminum ox-
ides in powder form, however, cannot bond with another metal; it must be in liquid state.
Given that aluminum’s melting temperature is 660 degrees and aluminum oxide’s melting
point is 2,000 degrees Celsius, the rear part of the torpedo must have been subjected to heat of
at least somewhere between 660 and 2,000 degrees Celsius, if the JIG claim is correct. Whether
660, 2,000, or 3,000 degrees Celsius, it cannot be scientifically explained that none of this heat
affected the ink marking.
28. The ROK Defense Ministry reported on 29 June that the ink is made of “solvent blue-5.” Ac-
knowledging that this is a common ingredient used in markers worldwide, the ministry con-
ceded that “it might be difficult to conclude that the ink is made in North Korea.” A military
official added that the result of the ink analysis will not be included in the final report on the
Cheonan incident due to be completed by the end of July. “‘1býn’ ingkæsý solbentæbælu5
sýngbun gýmch’ul [Solvent blue-5 detected from ‘1býn’ ink],” Yonhap News, 29 June 2010.
Available on-line at www.yonhapnews.co.kr/issues/2010/06/29/1202380000akr20100629090
900043.html.
Suh / Race to Judge 413
 did attack and sink the Cheonan. Moreover, the seriousness of the inconsisten-
cies described above casts doubt not only on the validity of the JIG’s conclu-
sions but also on the integrity of its investigation. Given the suspicions raised
about some of the EDS data the JIG used as evidence, we contend that an impar-
tial board should be formed to probe the integrity of the JIG data.

Domestic and Regional Politics of the Cheonan Report

In order to understand why the JIG raced to produce its problem-ridden report,
we need to examine subtle but important shifts in the handling of this incident
and situate those shifts in the context of domestic politics in South Korea. For
the first few weeks after the sinking, the Blue House was careful not to jump to
any conclusion about the cause of the sinking. Meanwhile, the ROK Navy was
making one blunder after another in its rescue and salvage operations and the
Ministry of National Defense was releasing bits and pieces of information that
were contradictory. In the early weeks after the loss of the ship, Defense Minis-
ter Kim T’aeyýng openly admitted that “there were no signs of North Korea’s at-
tack at the time,” and he speculated that “a North Korean sea mine [could have]
floated in [the ship’s path].”29
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A subtle change in the government’s tone could be seen on 16 April when the
JIG released its first progress report and suggested that an “outside explosion”
could have caused the sinking. That same day Defense Minister Kim issued a
statement in which he called the sinking of the Cheonan “a grave national secu-
rity incident” and declared the need to “implement resolute responses.” His
statement strongly insinuated that the North was implicated. In his regular ra-
dio address on 19 April, President Lee voiced his determination to “unearth the
cause of the sinking…and resolutely respond,” but he declined to name a per-
petrator, noting that the investigators had not yet reached any conclusion about
the cause. On 25 April, the JIG stated that a “non-contact outside explosion” was
responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan and strongly implicated the North
without explicitly naming any culprit.
The government’s reluctance to cast blame evaporated on 20 May when the
JIG released its interim report. The government’s turnabout and the rushed
manner of the JIG’s investigation were both curious. As we have seen, the JIG
had not yet completed many of its analyses. Its bubble effect simulation, for in-
stance, had progressed only to one second, too short a time to establish with
certainly that such a bubble might have severed the ship.30 In addition the tor-
pedo parts that the JIG paraded as unassailable proof of DPRK involvement had
been recovered only five days earlier than the 20 May presentation, and this
meant that the JIG had not had enough time to analyze the data, much less to de-

29. Defense Minister Kim T’aeyýng’s testimony before the Parliament National Defense Commit-
tee, 29 March 2010.
30. The Korea Institute of Machinery and Materials (KIMM), which had been simulating the bubble
effect of a torpedo explosion, made only limited progress. When the JIG showed the simula-
tion at the press conference, it could show how the bubble effect would have affected the ship
during the first 0.5 seconds. By the JIG’s own admission, the KIMM would need until mid-July
to complete its simulation.
414 Critical Asian Studies 42:3 (2010)

“In the early weeks after the loss of the ship, tional facts would change the govern-
Defense Minister Kim T’aeyýng [pictured
here] openly admitted that ‘there were no
signs of North Korea’s attack at the time,’
and he speculated that ‘a North Korean sea
Downloaded At: 18:18 1 October 2010
termine the origin of the ink used for
the “1býn” marking. The gas turbine
room, which would have been di-
rectly hit by an outside explosion,
was retrieved only the day before the
press conference, giving investigators
no time to examine and analyze the
crucial bits of evidence that the tur-
bine room would have contained.
But these issues and questions no
longer seemed to matter to the gov-
ernment. Defense Minister Kim de-
clared that the JIG had accumulated
98 percent of the evidence necessary
to reach a conclusion and no addi-
ment’s conclusion. JIG co-chair Yun
Týkyong expressed his confidence

that the simulation, when completed,

mine [could have] floated in [the ship’s
path]’.” (Credit: Wikipedia, undated) would show what he expected to see.
The release of the JIG’s report on
20 May happened to coincide with the official start of campaigns for local gov-
ernment elections. It was also three days before the first-year commemoration
of the late President Roh Moo-hyun’s death, an event that would rally oppo-
nents of the current regime.31 The day after the commemoration — which drew
together an estimated 200,000 mourners in events throughout the nation, de-
spite rain and the security scare — President Lee took to the War Museum to an-
nounce stern countermeasures against the North as if to counter the rise of his
opponents.

Domestic Politics of the Cheonan Incident

Successfully using the national security threat to contain the opposition at the
Roh commemorative event, Lee Myung-bak’s administration began a systematic
drive to silence critics and weaken opposition. Several current and former gov-
ernment officials, for instance, were charged with defamation: Sin Sangch’ýl,
one of the three civilian members of the JIG and the only one recommended by
the opposition Democratic Party, had openly raised the possibility that the
Cheonan sank because it had run aground. The Navy responded by charging Sin
with defamation.32 Pak Sýnwon, a former official with South Korea’s National
Security Council (NSC) in the Roh administration, was charged by Kim T’ae-

31. “‘Minjujæi wansýng, unmyýngida’ nomuhyýn 1jugi chýn’guk ch’umo [‘Completing democ-
racy is our fate,’ nation mourns on Roh Moo-Hyun’s first commemoration],” Kyonghyang-
sinmun, 23 May 2010.
32. Kim Kwigæn, “Haegun, sinsangch’ælwiwon ‘myýngyehoeson’ hyýmæi koso [Navy charges
Shin Sang-Chul of ‘defaming’ it,”] Yonhap News, 19 May 2010.
Suh / Race to Judge 415
 yýng, Minister of National Defense, with defaming him for allegedly claiming
that the U.S. military must have had some intelligence about the incident and
was keeping it secret. Seven colonels on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) leveled
defamation charges against I Chýnghæi, a parliamentarian from the progressive
Democratic Labor Party, because she claimed on the Parliament floor that the
JCS had watched a TOD (Thermal Observation Device) recording of the inci-
dent the JCS had in its possession and she insinuated that the JCS was hiding
something by not releasing the recording to the public. In addition, the police
began to investigate others who were spreading alternative hypotheses and rais-
ing questions about the government announcements. These maneuverings all
had a chilling effect on public discourse.
Silencing potential critics of the government’s handling of the Cheonan inci-
dent was critical to the ruling Grand National Party (GNP), which was then fac-
ing an uphill battle in the upcoming local government elections. Two years ear-
lier, the GNP had won a landslide victory, but its success in 2007 was short lived.
Scandals swirling around cabinet appointments caused the GNP’s popularity to
sag. The GNP hit bottom when it rashly decided to open the beef market to U.S.
imports and faced a public backlash with candlelight protests in the summer of
Downloaded At: 18:18 1 October 2010

2008. The party managed to rebuild some public support, only to quickly undo
all its successes by its own actions. In January 2009, for example, the public was
appalled by actions the Seoul Metropolitan Police took to end a sit-in protest in
Yongsan over eviction issues. Four protesters and one Special Operations offi-
cer were killed and scores of participants were injured in the crackdown.33 In
May 2009, former president Roh Mu-Hyun committed suicide because of the in-
tense pressure the incoming Lee government was putting on him and his sup-
porters. His suicide elicited a national outpouring of condolences. Three
months later, former president Kim Dae-Jung passed away, feeding public anxi-
eties that something was wrong with the current administration.
President Lee added to the growing discontent against his government by
forcefully pushing to implement one of his pet projects, the Pan Korea Grand
Waterway (or, Grand Canal Project), a 540-kilometer-long canal connecting Se-
oul and Busan, two of South Korea’s largest cities.34 Lee also decided to scuttle
the previous regime’s project to build an administrative capital in Sejong City.
These were both highly controversial issues. In March 2010, an even more vola-
tile controversy erupted over GNP majority leader An Sangsu’s alleged involve-

33. The Seoul Metropolitan Police mobilized over 300 officers and an unknown number of Special
Operations Group forces to disperse about 30 evictees who were staging a sit-in on top of a
building. The evictees, who had been forcefully removed from their business locations to
make room for the gentrification of the Yongsan area, were demanding fair compensation. In
the middle of the operation, a fire broke out and four protesters and one Special Operations
Group officer were killed. Twenty three were injured. Yongsan ch’ýlgýminpýmgukmindaech’
aekwiwonhoi, Yongsan ch’ýlgýmin salinjinabæi chinsil [The truth about the murderous sup-
pression of the Yongsan evictees], Seoul, February 2009. Chakasýnýn 6.9, Chigæm naerisil
yýkæn yongsanch’amsayýkimnida [The station you are getting off at is the Yongsan disaster
station]. Seoul: Silch’ýnmunhaksa, 2009.
34. The canal would run diagonally across the country connecting the Han River, which flows
through Seoul into the Yellow Sea, to the Nakdong River, which flows through Busan into the
Korea Strait.
416 Critical Asian Studies 42:3 (2010)
 ment in an effort to remove the Vener-
able Myýngjin, an outspoken critic,
35
from his temple.
The government’s efforts to
dampen public discontent and si-
lence its opponents had an unantici-
pated result. The public was growing
resentful at what they began to per-
ceive to be a regression in the demo-
cratic progress Korea had made dur-
ing the Roh administration. The
public perception was vindicated
when Han Myýngsuk, prime minister
in the Roh administration, was de-
clared innocent of the embezzlement
charges that had been made against
her on 9 April. The court trial, meant Han Myýngsuk, prime minister in the Roh
to tarnish and convict Han, trans- administration, pictured here visiting Osan
U.S. Air Force base in December 2006.
Downloaded At: 18:18 1 October 2010

formed her into a symbol of opposi- (Credit: USAF / Airman 1st Class Chad Strohmeyer)
tion and, ironically, into a viable chal-
lenger to Seoul’s incumbent mayor, O Sehun, the GNP candidate who was until
then considered invincible. O’s predicament symbolized what other conserva-
tive candidates would face in the 2 June election. Conservatives, once consid-
ered a sure bet, found themselves caught in the wave of rising anti-incumbent
sentiment. Seizing this opportunity, opposition parties and civic organizations
combined forces behind a single consensus candidate in many localities.
At this critical moment, the sinking of the Cheonan and the government’s
subsequent attempts to implicate North Korea in the tragic event came to the
GNP’s rescue. By May, about a month before the election, the Cheonan event
was eclipsing controversial issues such as the Grand Canal and the Sejong City
projects, which had been proving disadvantageous for the GNP.36 The JIG
charge that the Cheonan had been destroyed in a North Korean torpedo at-
tack proved to be more chilling than anything else the GNP had tried. The op-
position was immobilized by the fear that any criticism of the government
might lead to charges of undermining national security. At the same time the

35. Representative An had reportedly called Venerable Myýngjin “a leftist” at a meeting in Novem-
ber 2009 with the secretary general of the Jogye Order, the largest denomination of Korean
Buddhism, and conspired to remove him from his temple in an attempt to disempower and si-
lence him. When Venerable Myýngjin made An’s allegation public and Kim Yýngguk, who had
arranged the November meeting, confirmed the allegation at a press conference in March
2010, the scandal revealed the extent to which the government was trying to exert its influ-
ence: even religion was no longer free from the government’s meddling.
36. The Grand Canal was the most salient issue for voters in polls in April, but the Cheonan inci-
dent replaced it in May. For earlier polls, see “T’upyo yýnhyang ch’oedae isyunæn 4daegang’
29% [The most influential issue is the Grand Canal Project with 29 percent]” Kyýnghyang
sinmun, 14 April 2010. For a May poll, see “P’yosim hændænæn ch’ýnanham…posu chinbo
modu che1byýnsu [The Cheonan shaking up voters’ mind…number one issue for both con-
servatives and progressives]” Seoul sinmun, 10 May 2010.
Suh / Race to Judge 417
 government’s national security gambit rallied conservative support behind
the ruling party and solidified President Lee’s hold over the GNP, dealing a fa-
tal blow to the growingly popular conservative challenger Park Geun-hye.
The conservative media, which had been promoting the North-Korea-did-it
charge even before the JIG released its findings, now felt free to unleash an
all-out attack not only on critics but also on skeptics. Leading the charge to put
aside questions and doubts was the Dong-a Daily, which, for example, ran a
front page story entitled “What country’s citizens are those who say [they] can-
not believe the Cheonan report?”37
The national security campaign began to have its intended effect. The conser-
vative candidates in South Korea’s “big three” cities — Seoul, Incheon, and
Kyonggi — were able to beat back rising challenges and widen their lead in the
polls. If the Cheonan incident was found to have resulted from government in-
competence, this could have proved disastrous for the ruling party. But the
blame-the-DPRK story completely turned the GNP’s fortune around. It buried
all other issues in national discourse and put political challengers on the defen-
sive. The conservatives could not have asked for more.”
The election outcome, however, was anything but what was expected. The
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popular GNP incumbents were able to defeat their challengers in Seoul and
Kyonggi, but they did so only by a hair’s breadth, contrary to projections about
an easy victory. Incheon fell to the opposition Democratic candidate. So many
other local government positions went to the opposition that the Korea media
quickly called the outcome a landslide for the Democratic Party. The national se-
curity campaign and their efforts to silence critics made voters afraid to voice
their true preference — even in anonymous opinion polls — before they cast
their ballot. Underneath the public’s seeming acquiescence lay a deeper and
more widespread disenchantment with the conservative government, but this
was not being expressed in public. The campaigns in fact backfired: the young
were so aggravated by what they saw happening that they made an effort to go to
the polls and the middle class was so worried about the potentially negative eco-
nomic impact of these tactics that they voted against the ruling party.

Impacts on Regional Politics

If North–South relations in Korea had been deteriorating since Lee’s assump-
tion of power in February 2008, they reached a critical point in mid 2008 when a
South Korean tourist who was visiting the Kumgang resort in the North was shot
and killed. In the early hours of 11 July 2008, the tourist strayed out of the per-
mitted visitor zone and crossed into a militarily sensitive area. A North Korean
soldier, spotting an unidentified individual in the patrol area and watching her
turn to flee upon being discovered, fired a shot and killed the woman before
she could return to the tourist zone. The tragic accident quickly escalated into
a wrangling between the North and South governments. The ROK’s Ministry

37. “Ch’ýnanham palp’yo motmitgettani daeche ýnænara kungmininga [What country’s citizens
are those who say [they] cannot believe the Cheonan report?],” Dongailbo, 24 May 2010.

418 Critical Asian Studies 42:3 (2010)

 of Unification immediately halted the entire Kumgang tour and stipulated
three conditions for resuming the tour: DPRK officials would have to allow the
South Korean government to become involved in investigating the incident; the
DPRK government had to apologize for the killing; and the DPRK and ROK’s rel-
evant ministries would have to work out safety measures for future tourist visits.
The DPRK rejected these demands, claiming that its Tourism Bureau had al-
ready cooperated with the tour organizer, Hyundai-Asan,38 to investigate the in-
cident, had offered its apology, and had a safety rule in place. The incident,
DPRK officials insisted, was caused by the tourist who violated the rules.
The wrangling over the tourism business was sparked by the tourist’s killing,
but the differences between the ROK and DPRK governments had a deeper
cause, and that was what to do about the agreements made earlier at the two
inter-Korea summits in 2000 and 2007. The Lee government, consistent with its
“Anything-But-Roh” policy,39 refused to honor the agreements, whereas the Kim
Jong-Il government made them a cornerstone of its South policy. The deteriora-
tion accelerated when the Lee government used the shooting of the tourist as a
way to force Pyongyang to accept Seoul’s refusal to accept the summit agree-
ments. If Kim Jong-Il’s government objected they faced the termination of tour-
ism business from the South, a cash cow that brings in $65.00 per tourist.40
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Pyongyang stuck to its position despite the high economic cost, and relations
took a turn for the worse as a result.
The deterioration that began on the east coast, with the shooting of the tour-
ist, spread to the west in December 2008 when the DPRK military restricted
transportation across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and halted a Gaesung tour-
ist visit in the west. Eight months later the Ministry of Unification allowed the
Gaesung tour to resume, but with the same three demands it had made after the
Kumgang incident. Pyongyang upped the ante by threatening to “review all the
benefits provided to the South side” and demanding that the wages of North Ko-
rean workers and the rent costs of North Korean properties in the Gaesung In-
dustrial Complex(GIC)41 had to be renegotiated. By early 2010, all communica-
42
tion channels, contacts, and exchanges between the two Koreas ceased.
Tension was mounting.
The increased tension fueled speculation that the North’s armed forces were
behind the sinking of the Cheonan. Early media reports pointed to the Dae-
chong Naval War as the proximate reason why the North’s military might have

38. Hyundai Asan Co., an affiliate of South Korean conglomerate Hyundai Group, has operated
tours of Mt. Geumgang on North Korea’s eastern coast since 1992. Since 2003 it has been in
charge of developing the Gaesung Industrial Complex. It has operated the Gaesung tourism
business since 2007. Gaesung, an old capital of the Koryo Dynasty, is about thirty-eight miles
north of Seoul on the western coast.
39. Styled after George Bush’s “ABC” (Anything-But-Clinton) policy.
40. Close to 2 million tourists visited the Kumgang resort by the time the tour was halted in
mid-2008. Kim Minhyýng, “Hyýndae asan kæmgangsan kwan’ gwang saýp 10tol [Hyundai
Asan Kumgang tourism business enters its tenth year],” Sýulgyýngje, 18 June 2008.
41. For a solid scholarly treatment on the Gaesung Industrial Complex and the tourism, see Son
2006.
42. The GIC remained the only exception, but it was operating at a reduced level and facing an un-
certain future.
Suh / Race to Judge 419
 launched an attack against the Cheonan. In the Daechong clash, which took
place in November 2009, ROK naval ships fired thousands of shells at a DPRK
naval ship, all but destroying it. Several soldiers aboard the ship were reported
to have been killed. About a month later, in his address to the Korea Institute of
Defense Analysis, I Sangæi, then chairman of the JCS, warned about the possibil-
ity of a retaliatory strike by the North. After the Cheonan incident, Korean media
picked up on I Sangæi’s warning to speculate that the North attacked the
Cheonan in revenge for its defeat in November 2009.43 The media speculation,
and I Sangæi’s warning itself, was based on the South’s own assessment, not on
the North’s. The DPRK, in fact, had claimed that its Navy beat back the South’s
aggression in the Daechong Naval War, and it even showcased two sailors who
detailed in a TV program last December how they achieved their victory. The
North’s alleged motive for attacking the Cheonan out of revenge was thus con-
tradicted by the fact that the North did not consider the Daechong a defeat at all,
but conservative media nonetheless continued to accuse the North of sinking
the Cheonan to revenge their “defeat” last November. They concocted scenarios
about the North’s military sneaking around the far side of Baekryong Island, fir-
ing a torpedo that severed the ship, and escaping without being detected. The
conservative Chosun Daily became even more creative, speculating that a “hu-
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man torpedo” zoomed underwater to destroy the Cheonan.44

The conservative drumbeat increased in volume after the JIG pointed to the
North as the perpetrator, supposedly confirming what they had believed from
the beginning. Cho Kabche, a leading conservative writer, argued that “the
Cheonan incident taught the lesson that South Korea’s nuclear armament was
the ultimate solution.”45 Kim Chin, an editor of the Choongang Daily, a conser-
vative newspaper owned by Samsung, argued that the U.S.–ROK combined
forces had the capability for a limited military retaliation; he quoted an un-
named “leader” who declared that “a war can be won…if the public endures it
for only three days.”46
President Lee added fuel to the fire by proclaiming in his address on 24 May
47
that “the North will pay the price corresponding to its action.” The Ministry of
National Defense followed up with its own measures, including the resumption
of its psychological warfare using loudspeakers and flyers. The day after Lee’s
address, the Army staged an exercise (in an undisclosed location), and on 26
May, the Navy engaged in an antisubmarine exercise in the West Sea.
Never a docile or passive onlooker, the North Korean military responded
with threats of their own: if the ROK military started its loudspeaker broadcasts,
they threatened to fire at them and destroy the speakers. The South’s defense
minister, Kim T’aeyýng, raised the stakes by threatening a proportionate retalia-

43. An Chýngsik, “Pukhan ‘taechýnghaejýn igyýtta’…sýn’gunjýngch’i sýnggwa sýnjýn? [North

Korea ‘won Taechong battle’…propaganda for military first politics’ achievement?],” SBSnyu-
sæ, 25 December 2009. Available on-line at news.sbs.co.kr/section_news/news_read.jsp?
news_id=N1000689082.
44. Chu Yongjung and Yu Yongwon, “‘Puk in’ganýroe chosimhara’ haegun olch’o t’ongbobattada
[‘Watch the North’s human torpedo’ Navy warned early this year],” Chosýnilbo, 22 April 2010.

420 Critical Asian Studies 42:3 (2010)

 tion if the North fired on their loudspeakers. The North escalated the war of
words on 12 June when its joint chiefs of staff raised the possibility of an “all out
military strike” that would not be proportional to the South’s use of force but
would create “a sea of fire in Seoul.”48 By this point, there was so much bad
blood between Seoul and Pyongyang and so few communication channels left
open that little could be done to defuse the tension and a lot could happen —
accidentally or otherwise — to escalate the conflict.
If few anticipated the Cheonan’s sinking would heighten inter-Korean ten-
sions as much as it has, no one expected the repercussions in Northeast Asian
regional politics to be as serious. One of the first casualties in this regard was
Japanese prime minister Yukio Hatoyama’s campaign pledge to move the
Futenma U.S. Marine Corps Air Station out of Okinawa. Just three days after
South Korea’s JIG officially identified North Korea as the alleged culprit behind
the Cheonan’s sinking, Hatoyama used the JIG’s charge as an excuse to renege on
this pledge. Hatoyama told Okinawa governor Hirokazu Nakaima that “given se-
curity concerns in East Asia such as the situation on the Korean Peninsula,” he had
“no choice” but to keep the Futenma base on the island.49
When the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee issued a joint state-
Downloaded At: 18:18 1 October 2010

ment on 28 May making the agreement to leave the Futenma base in Okinawa
official, it also referred to tensions in the Korean peninsula, noting that “recent
developments in the security environment of Northeast Asia reaffirmed the sig-
nificance of the alliance.”50 The United States reiterated its “unwavering com-
mitment to Japan’s security” and both sides insisted that the U.S.–Japan Treaty
of Mutual Security and Cooperation “remains indispensable not only to the de-
fense of Japan, but also to the peace, security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific
region.” To this end, “a robust forward presence of U.S. military forces in Ja-
pan, including in Okinawa, provides the deterrence and capabilities neces-
sary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of regional stability.”51
The Cheonan incident thus reminded Koreans and Japanese alike of “secu-
rity concerns in East Asia” and the “indispensable” alliance that the United
States represents in the region. The U.S. administration of Barack Obama,

45. Kim Tonghyýn, “Cho Kapche ‘Han’guk, tokchajýk haekmujanghaeya’ [Cho Kapche, ‘Korea
must acquire own nuclear arms’],” Views&News, 5 May 2010.
46. Kim Chin, “Kungmini 3ilman ch’amajumyýn…[Only if the public perseveres for three days
…],” Chungangilbo, 23 May 2010.
47. Lee Myong-Bak, “Taekungmin tamwha [Address to the nation],” 24 May 2010. Available on-line
at www.bluehouse.go.kr/kr/president/speech/speech_view.php?uno=441&article_no=52&
board_no=P04&search_key=&search_value=&search_cate_code=&order_key1=1&order
_key2=1&cur_page_no=1&cur_year=2010&cur_month=.
48. Son Wonje and Sin Soyýng, “Puk 16nyýnmane ‘sýul pulbada’ kyýnggo [The North warns ‘sea
of fire in Seoul’ after sixteen years],” Han’gyýresinmun, 12 June 2010.
49. Takashi Hirokawa and Sachiko Sakamaki, “Hatoyama says Japan has no choice, [but] to keep
U.S. Marine base within Okinawa,” Bloomberg, 23 May 2010.
50. The Committee consisted of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Defense Secretary
Robert Gates, Minister for Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada, and Minister of Defense Toshimi
Kitazawa.
51. All quotations are from the “Joint Statement of U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee.”
28 May 2010. Available on-line at www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint1005.
html.
Suh / Race to Judge 421
 [left] U. Joy Ogwu, permanent
representative of Nigeria to the
UN and president of the Secu-
rity Council for July, reads a
statement on behalf of the UN
Security Council deploring the
26 March sinking of the Cheo-
nan but declining to hold the
Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea responsible for the
loss of the ship and the lives of
its crew members. The state-
ment encouraged “the settle-
ment of outstanding issues on
the Korean peninsula by peace-
ful means to resume direct dia-
logue and negotiation through
appropriate channels as early
as possible, with a view to
avoiding conflicts and averting
escalation.” See www.un. org/News/
Press/ docs/2010/ sc9975.doc.htm.
(Credit: UN Photo/ John McIlwaine)
Downloaded At: 18:18 1 October 2010

which had been pushing the Hatoyama cabinet to uphold the 2006 agreement
to move Futenma to another location in Okinawa, got its wish thanks to the
Cheonan. When the Hatoyama cabinet collapsed on 2 June 2010 — due in part
to its decision on Futenma — its ambitious desire to build an “East Asia Commu-
nity” sank with it. In an op–ed piece in the New York Times Hatoyama had pro-
posed to work toward building an East Asia Community under the principle of
fraternity so that East Asia could develop its regional currency integration and
permanent security frameworks.52 His article fueled speculation, and worries in
Washington, that Hatoyama’s Asianist turn and emphasis on multilateralism
might weaken the bilateral alliance as the central pillar of Japan’s postwar secu-
rity policy. Three months later, he recognized the U.S.–Japan alliance as the
linchpin of Japanese foreign policy, as if to allay Washington’s concern, but he
nonetheless emphasized the initiative for an East Asian community as the “main
pillar” of Japan’s diplomacy in his address at the APEC summit defiantly titled
“Japan’s New Commitment to Asia.”53 Behind the six months of the wrangling
over Futenma lay the tug-of-war between the allied governments over the larger
strategic issue of Japan’s foreign policy orientation and priority. The Futenma
decision, seen in this larger context, reflects the outcome of the war that
Hatoyama’s aspiration to make an Asianist turn sank under the weight of the
Cheonan incident as the U.S.–Japan bilateral alliance resurfaced as the recon-

52. Yukio Hatoyama, “A New Path for Japan,” New York Times, 26 August 2009. Available on-line at
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27iht-edhatoyama.html.
53. Yukio Hatoyana, “Japan’s New Commitment to Asia: Toward the Realization of an East Asian
Community,” 15 November 2009, Singapore. Available on-line at www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/
hatoyama/statement/200911/15singapore_e.html.
422 Critical Asian Studies 42:3 (2010)
 firmed “hub” of the security architecture in the region. The Futenma relocation
within Okinawa is after all an integral part of “the bilateral Realignment
Roadmap agreement that will ensure a long-term presence of U.S. forces in Ja-
pan and transform Guam, the western-most sovereign territory of the United
States, into a hub for security activities in the region.” The U.S.–Japan alliance
emerged out of the six months of wrangling between the allied governments as
the reconfirmed “hub” of the security architecture that the United States had
maintained in the region.54
While the Obama administration prevailed over the Hatoyama cabinet in its
insistence that the Japanese government had to honor the agreement made by
the previous administration, it sang a different tune with the Lee government in
South Korea. Obama agreed to change the agreement that the administrations
of George W. Bush and Roh Moo-hyun had made to transfer the wartime opera-
tional command to the Korean military by 2012. On 26 June the U.S. and ROK
leaders agreed to postpone the transfer until 1 December 2015. The Cheonan
event proved chameleonic: it provided a convenient cover for a significant
change in Korea while in Japan it served as a reason not to change. But the effect
was the same: both the change in Korea and the refusal to change in Japan
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helped solidify the alliances that the United States maintains in the region. Soon
after President Obama agreed to keep the command control over the Korean
military beyond 2012, as Korean conservatives had been wishing, the ROK mili-
tary unit “Oshino” and a South Korean Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
began operations in Afghanistan on 1 July, as if to reciprocate the American
goodwill to honor the conservatives’ desire to have the United States keep com-
mand control over the Korean military.
The arrival of the Korean military unit and PRT in Afghanistan, however, was
greeted with rocket attacks, portending an ominous future for South Korean
military involvement in the conflict. Nor does the sudden collapse of the Hato-
yama government bode well for the future of the government that honors Amer-
ican wishes in spite of popular sentiments to the contrary. Finally, the June local
government elections in South Korea should serve as a warning: the govern-
ment’s successful pursuit of national insecurity politics may in the end under-
mine its own position.

Conclusion
The complete truth about the corvette Cheonan’s sinking may not be known in
the near future. Future historians may gain access to the documents and testi-
monies that we are not privy to at this time and these may reveal what we do not
know now. What we do know, however, is that the ship sank, taking the lives of
forty-six sailors, and in its wake a political drama unfolded on the peninsula and
in the region. In the drama that unfolded, the truth of the incident was not as
critical as what was made of the incident. While we cannot rule out the possibil-

54. All quotations are from the “Joint Statement of the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Commit-
tee.” 28 May 2010. Available on-line at www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint
1005.html.
Suh / Race to Judge 423
 ity that the JIG’s conclusion was correct — despite flawed evidence and twisted
logic — we can see that the JIG played a central role in the drama and that the in-
terim report it released on 20 May took events in an unexpected direction. The
Cheonan drama was not staged in a sterile theater but in the powder keg that is
Korea. Moreover, the escalating tensions and saber-rattling meshed seamlessly
with a plot that involved political parties caught up in local election campaigns.
Finally, the Cheonan theme also reverberated through the reinvigoration of U.S.
alliances in the region.
Despite all the war mongering the Cheonan incident triggered, a glimmer of
hope can be seen in the drama. Voters in South Korea did not fall for the na-
tional insecurity hysteria. In fact, a majority voted against it. Their vote of confi-
dence in reason and peace helped defuse the Korean powder keg when the rele-
vant governments involved abandoned their responsibility to protect in favor of
their interest to perpetuate insecurity.
Much remains to be done to consolidate the fragile peace carved out by the
June 2010 vote. First and foremost, there must be a period of cooling off. South
and North Korean governments need to stop their war of words and refrain
from taking any action that could trigger an uncontrollable chain of events. The
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international community, including the UN Security Council, must take a step

back from getting entangled in the escalation of tension and create a positive at-
mosphere in which the two Koreas can come together to dialogue and ex-
change views. In the meantime, the ROK government must reopen its investiga-
tion into the sinking of the Cheonan with a new, and more objective, team of
investigators. Finally, the Korean Parliament should open a separate investiga-
tion into the JIG investigation itself in order to critically assess the integrity of
the investigation, the tests it conducted, and the data it publicized.
In the United States the Obama administration should support and assist an
objective and thorough investigation of the Cheonan incident, while making a
clear commitment to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Korean pen-
insula.
An investigation that is as thorough, objective, and scientific as humanly pos-
sible is needed to get to the bottom of the Cheonan incident. After all, forty-six
lives were lost and the peace and security of Korea and Northeast Asia is at stake.
The dead sailors deserve such a report. So does the international community.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: The “Disconnects and Inconsistencies in the Cheonan Report” is a

revised and edited version of an article coauthored with Seunghun Lee and published
on-line in the July 2010 edition of the Asia Pacific Journal, “Rush to Judgment: Inconsis-
tencies in South Korea’s Cheonan Report”: www.japanfocus.org/ -JJ-Suh/3382.

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