G.R. Nos.
140371-72 November 27, 2006 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO
and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila,
ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D.
SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS,
VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO,
SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D.
SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO,
Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of
the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14,
1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21
(the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the
ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No.
99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et
al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of
Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D.
Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98–
90870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of
private respondent Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as special
administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy
Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all
surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in
full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo
executed a general power of attorney in favor of
Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise
control and supervision over his business in the
Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and
qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of
Segundo because she is a certified public accountant;
and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated
September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private
respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in
the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the
intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended
and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the
will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the
holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
99–93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC.
They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings
should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98–90870
priority over intestate proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s
holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa
naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay
tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang
mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio
dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses
siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid
niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob
ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw
gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at
siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo
ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at
kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China
Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng
babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng
malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng
China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng
kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of
the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si
Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si
Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat
at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay
hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa
longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc.
No. 98–90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99–93396 were
consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the probate proceedings5 primarily on the
ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does
not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the
Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will
only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the
decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else;
that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor
instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is
preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being
the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the
extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from
delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and
ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when
on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no
testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to
dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority of
the probate court is limited only to a determination of
the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents
question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of
the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of
the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition
does not apply because Segundo’s will does not
constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of
one or more compulsory heirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order,
dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by
oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly
shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs
mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other
heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code
thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng
Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she
not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for
to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate
Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its
position clear: "for … respondents to have tolerated the
probate of the will and allowed the case to progress
when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically
void … would have been an exercise in futility. It
would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added futility. The trial court could have denied its
probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provisions before the
extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (underscoring
supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. Special Proceedings No. 99–93396 is hereby
DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by
the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF
HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION
OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14
OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B"
HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
I Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN
COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE
76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER
PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR
INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED
THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED
GROUND THAT THE TESTATOR’S WILL IS VOID
ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF
PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT
THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS
LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE
EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE
DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR’S
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR
SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO
RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE
FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR’S WILL
THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE
WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND
EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO
SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A
SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS
TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE
PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3
and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which
respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and
place for proving the will when all concerned may
appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause
notice of such time and place to be published three
weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a
newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the
mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees
of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any
institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states,
Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a
disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no
preterition in the decedent’s will and the holographic
will on its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs,
petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole
exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were
preterited in the holographic will since there was no
institution of an heir;
the holographic will that it is both intrinsically and
extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to
proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the
intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and will
render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was
presented by petitioners was dated, signed and written
by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of
preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue
as regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng
Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo’s intention of
excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate
for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo
was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil
Code requires that the same must be effected through a
will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified.
With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that
were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court
believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be
considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his
son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient
cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant
under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for
the disinheritance of children and descendants,
legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of
an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her
spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator
of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment
for six years or more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of
adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to
make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the
parents or ascendant who disinherit such child or
descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the
child or descendant;8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or
disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the
penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the
document executed by Segundo can be considered as a
holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the
Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed
by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come
across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to
the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law.
It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be
clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and
while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the
latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other
words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the
property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or
the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within
the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the
supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are
designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It
is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to
law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given
effect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by
one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the
present case, should be construed more liberally than
the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the
instrument and the intention of the testator.12 In this
regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even
if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was
intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and
was executed by him in accordance with law in the
form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court
believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line
were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s
opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his
estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole
exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an
heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs.
The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners,
Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her
as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as
a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his
son, Alfredo.1âwphi1
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s
holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over
intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed
with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a
person to dispose of his property may be rendered
nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore,
should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence
over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set
aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear
SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the
holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case
or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the
termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS,
deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY,
executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM
PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors
appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-
appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et
al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust
Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of
law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089
therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the
State of Texas and of the United States." By his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis
(who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his
second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.
Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in
the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for,
his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c)
after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by
his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis,
Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and
Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a
resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of
the will, paid all the bequests therein including the
amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to
Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling
P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released
from time to time according as the lower court approved
and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the
latter three requesting partial advances on account of
their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its
administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration
and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia,
the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the
delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to
$240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount
of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the
project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the
"Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and
Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven
equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the
project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and,
therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice
to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the
registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and
other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30,
1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon
Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of
the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did
not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having
been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964,
oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the
issue of which law must apply — Texas law or
Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor
even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this
Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January
31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of
another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming
Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern,
the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi)
to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved
are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of
proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in
their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls
under the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the
Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code,
render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to
four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount
of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law
of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17,
paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil
Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the
provisions of this and the next preceding article" when
they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art.
17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without
substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of
the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have
been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art.
16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied
in testate and intestate succession. As further indication
of this legislative intent, Congress added a new
provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity
to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same
to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent
executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate
and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this
that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine
estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention
in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not
alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's
will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed
in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article
10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis,
was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the
testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M.
BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN,
ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO,
VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO,
Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAXA, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a
will to clearly establish that the decedent was not of
sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution
of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give
full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his
estate in the manner provided in his will so long as it is
legally tenable.1
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 of the
June 15, 2006 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which reversed the
September 30, 2003 Decision4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in Special
Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed CA Decision
granted the petition for probate of the notarial will of
Paciencia Regala (Paciencia), to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal
to be impressed with merit, the decision in SP. PROC.
NO. G-1186 dated 30 September 2003, is hereby SET
ASIDE and a new one entered GRANTING the petition
for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA REGALA.
SO ORDERED.5
Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA
Resolution6 which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration thereto.
Petitioners call us to reverse the CA’s assailed Decision
and instead affirm the Decision of the RTC which
disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia.
Factual Antecedents
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her
last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o
Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala"7 (Will) in the
Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will,
executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G.
Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice.
After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will
and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the
end of the said document on page 38 and then on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.9
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A.
Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco)
and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested
to the Will’s due execution by affixing their signatures
below its attestation clause10 and on the left margin of
pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,11 in the presence of Paciencia
and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as
notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia
bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R.
Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their
children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa,
thus:
xxxx
Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to
me since then up to the present by the spouses
LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby
BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my properties
enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses
LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA and
their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and
KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa
and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos,
presently residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan],
Pampanga and their children, LUNA LORELLA and
KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are still not of legal
age and living with their parents who would decide to
bequeath since they are the children of the spouses;
xxxx
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be
discovered aside from the properties mentioned in this
last will and testament, I am also bequeathing and
giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and
Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also
command them to offer masses yearly for the repose of
my soul and that of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania
Regala and their spouses and with respect to the
fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise command
to fulfill the wishes of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala in
accordance with her testament as stated in my
testament. x x x12
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia
remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew
whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo
came to know and treated Paciencia as his own
mother.13 Paciencia lived with Lorenzo’s family in
Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and
cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the
execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981,
Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA).
There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her
death on January 4, 1996.
In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of
Judge Limpin.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on
April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition14 with the RTC
of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of
Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of
Administration in his favor, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. G-1186.
There being no opposition to the petition after its due
publication, the RTC issued an Order on June 13,
200015 allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June
22, 2000. On said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she
was one of the instrumental witnesses in the execution
of the last will and testament of Paciencia on September
13, 1981.16 The Will was executed in her father’s (Judge
Limpin) home office, in her presence and of two other
witnesses, Francisco and Faustino.17 Dra. Limpin
positively identified the Will and her signatures on all
its four pages.18 She likewise positively identified the
signature of her father appearing thereon.19 Questioned
by the prosecutor regarding Judge Limpin’s present
mental fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her father had
a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery.20 The
judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember her
name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated that her
father can no longer testify in court.21
The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner
Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition22 to
Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties
subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala
Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence,
Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.23
Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now
joined by petitioners Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio
Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael
Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L.
Mangalindan filed a Supplemental Opposition24
contending that Paciencia’s Will was null and void
because ownership of the properties had not been
transferred and/or titled to Paciencia before her death
pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil
Code.25 Petitioners also opposed the issuance of Letters
of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing that
Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he
being a citizen and resident of the USA.26 Petitioners
prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued
in favor of Antonio.27
Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an
Amended Opposition28 asking the RTC to deny the
probate of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds:
the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance
with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was
mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its
execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under
duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution
of the Will had been procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other
persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia
on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to
be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery;
and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be
her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an
Opposition and Recommendation29 reiterating their
opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as
administrator of the properties and requesting for the
appointment of Antonio in his stead.
On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order30
denying the requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to be
appointed administrator since the former is a citizen and
resident of the USA while the latter’s claim as a co-
owner of the properties subject of the Will has not yet
been established.
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate
of the Will continued. Dra. Limpin was recalled for
cross-examination by the petitioners. She testified as to
the age of her father at the time the latter notarized the
Will of Paciencia; the living arrangements of Paciencia
at the time of the execution of the Will; and the lack of
photographs when the event took place. 31
Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado
(Monico) also took the witness stand. Monico, son of
Faustino, testified on his father’s condition. According
to him his father can no longer talk and express himself
due to brain damage. A medical certificate was
presented to the court to support this allegation. 32
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his
departure for the USA in April 1980, he lived in
Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and his aunt,
Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and lived
with him and his family until her death in January 1996;
the relationship between him and Paciencia was like
that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care of
him since birth and took him in as an adopted son;
Paciencia was a spinster without children, and without
brothers and sisters; at the time of Paciencia’s death,
she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of
sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was
in the custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to
him after Paciencia’s death through Faustino; and he
was already residing in the USA when the Will was
executed.33 Lorenzo positively identified the signature
of Paciencia in three different documents and in the
Will itself and stated that he was familiar with
Paciencia’s signature because he accompanied her in
her transactions.34 Further, Lorenzo belied and denied
having used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or
trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was
not in the Philippines when the same was executed.35
On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia
informed him about the Will shortly after her arrival in
the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only after
her death.36
As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in
court as he already died on May 21, 2000.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and
Paciencia were first cousins.37 She claimed to have
helped in the household chores in the house of
Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay therein from
morning until evening and that during the period of her
service in the said household, Lorenzo’s wife and his
children were staying in the same house.38 She served in
the said household from 1980 until Paciencia’s
departure for the USA on September 19, 1981.39
On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw
Faustino bring "something" for Paciencia to sign at the
latter’s house.40 Rosie admitted, though, that she did not
see what that "something" was as same was placed
inside an envelope.41 However, she remembered
Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look for money
before she signs them.42 A few days after or on
September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house of
Antonio’s mother and brought with her the said
envelope.43 Upon going home, however, the envelope
was no longer with Paciencia.44 Rosie further testified
that Paciencia was referred to as "magulyan" or
"forgetful" because she would sometimes leave her
wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments
later.45 On cross examination, it was established that
Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her
conclusion that Paciencia was "magulyan" was based on
her personal assessment,46 and that it was Antonio who
requested her to testify in court.47
In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia
was his aunt.48 He identified the Will and testified that
he had seen the said document before because Paciencia
brought the same to his mother’s house and showed it to
him along with another document on September 16,
1981.49 Antonio alleged that when the documents were
shown to him, the same were still unsigned.50 According
to him, Paciencia thought that the documents pertained
to a lease of one of her rice lands,51 and it was he who
explained that the documents were actually a special
power of attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and
other properties upon her departure for the USA, and a
Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo
and his family upon her death.52 Upon hearing this,
Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words: "Why
will I never [return], why will I sell all my properties?"
Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I have
other relatives [who should] benefit from my properties.
Why should I die already?"53 Thereafter, Antonio
advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does
not want to, to which the latter purportedly replied, "I
know nothing about those, throw them away or it is up
to you. The more I will not sign them."54 After which,
Paciencia left the documents with Antonio. Antonio
kept the unsigned documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on
September 18, 1981.55
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its
Decision56 denying the petition thus:
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition
dated April 24, 2000; and (b) disallows the notarized
will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala.
SO ORDERED.57
The trial court gave considerable weight to the
testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time
Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed
of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have
testamentary capacity.58
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and
granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The
appellate court did not agree with the RTC’s conclusion
that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed
the Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being
‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound
so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a
Will."59 Moreover, the oppositors in the probate
proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption
that every person is of sound mind. Further, no concrete
circumstances or events were given to prove the
allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into
signing the Will.60
Petitioners moved for reconsideration61 but the motion
was denied by the CA in its Resolution62 dated August
31, 2006.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition
for Review on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the
following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE
PROBATE OF PACIENCIA’S WILL DESPITE
RESPONDENT’S UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF
COURT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS
NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT
PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE
TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED63
The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due
execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate.
Our Ruling
We deny the petition.
Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by
law is apparent from the face of the Will.
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the
extrinsic validity of a Will in probate proceedings.64
This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court, which states:
Rule 75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.
Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to
execution. – No will shall pass either real or personal
estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper
court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of
the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity
pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind,
freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law.65 These formalities are
enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil
Code, to wit:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must
be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself
or by the testator's name written by some other person
in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his
name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall
also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof,
except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used
upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the
will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to
the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of
the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of
Court.
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will
shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid
down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia,
her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all
present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation
clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will
in the presence of one another and that the witnesses
attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of
the testator and of one another. In fact, even the
petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the
Will may be authentic although they question her state
of mind when she signed the same as well as the
voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound
mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the
shoulders of the petitioners.
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that
Paciencia was "magulyan" or forgetful so much so that
it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity.
They likewise claimed in their Motion for
Reconsideration66 filed with the CA that Paciencia was
not only "magulyan" but was actually suffering from
paranoia.67
We are not convinced.
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of
being forgetful does not necessarily make a person
mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a
Will.68 Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of
unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil
Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that
the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other
cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time
of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie
pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would
show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of
the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find
more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to
the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went
to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the
Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will
concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to
great weight where they are truthful and intelligent."69
More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound
mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the
burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article
800 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of
sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound
mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the
person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the
testator, one month, or less, before making his will was
publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains
the validity of the will must prove that the testator made
it during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly
known to be insane one month or less before the
making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove
that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the
shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier
mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by
them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s
finding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was
aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the
proper objects of her bounty and the character of the
testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was
aware of the nature of the document she executed. She
specially requested that the customs of her faith be
observed upon her death. She was well aware of how
she acquired the properties from her parents and the
properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife
CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child
was born after the execution of the will and was not
included therein as devisee.70
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats,
undue and improper influence and pressure, fraud and
trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a
will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the
willingness of the testator or testatrix to execute the
document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions
upon his/her death. Petitioners claim that Paciencia was
forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of
fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit;
and that assuming Paciencia’s signature to be genuine,
it was obtained through fraud or trickery. These are
grounded on the alleged conversation between
Paciencia and Antonio on September 16, 1981 wherein
the former purportedly repudiated the Will and left it
unsigned.
We are not persuaded.
We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that
Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son and
that love even extended to Lorenzo’s wife and children.
This kind of relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not
unheard of in our culture for old maids or spinsters to
care for and raise their nephews and nieces and treat
them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and
accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many
family discords between those favored by the
testamentary disposition of a testator and those who
stand to benefit in case of intestacy.
In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that
Paciencia’s relationship with Lorenzo and his family is
different from her relationship with petitioners. The
very fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived
with him both here and abroad, even if the latter was
already married and already has children, highlights the
special bond between them. This unquestioned
relationship between Paciencia and the devisees tends to
support the authenticity of the said document as against
petitioners’ allegations of duress, influence of fear or
threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud,
and trickery which, aside from being factual in nature,
are not supported by concrete, substantial and credible
evidence on record. It is worth stressing that bare
arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on
concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to
move the Court to uphold said allegations.71
Furthermore, "a purported will is not [to be] denied
legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very
institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to
its foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed
in fact, whether x x x it will be probated would have to
depend largely on the attitude of those interested in [the
estate of the deceased]."72
Court should be convinced by the evidence presented
before it that the Will was duly executed.
Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s Will
on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court was not complied with. It provides:
RULE 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or
accounted for where will contested. – If the will is
contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary
in the case of wills executed under the Civil Code of the
Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane,
must be produced and examined, and the death,
absence, or insanity of any of them must be
satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such
witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the
province where the will has been filed, their deposition
must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the
due execution of the will, or do not remember having
attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility,
the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is
satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from
all the evidence presented that the will was executed
and attested in the manner required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be
allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know the
handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses, and
if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be
resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)
They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary
public should have been presented in court since all but
one witness, Francisco, are still living.
We cannot agree with petitioners.
We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin
to appear and testify before the court was satisfactorily
explained during the probate proceedings. As testified
to by his son, Faustino had a heart attack, was already
bedridden and could no longer talk and express himself
due to brain damage. To prove this, said witness
presented the corresponding medical certificate. For her
part, Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge
Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo
brain surgery. At that time, Judge Limpin could no
longer talk and could not even remember his daughter’s
name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such
condition, her father could no longer testify. It is well to
note that at that point, despite ample opportunity,
petitioners neither interposed any objections to the
testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same
on cross examination. We thus hold that for all intents
and purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily
account for the incapacity and failure of the said
subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in
court. Because of this the probate of Paciencia’s Will
may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpin’s testimony
proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as
well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an
established rule that "[a] testament may not be
disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare
against its due execution; neither does it have to be
necessarily allowed just because all the attesting
witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is
decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence
before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses,
although they must testify, that the will was or was not
duly executed in the manner required by law."73
1âwphi1
Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of
the posture of any of the parties as regards the
authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in
question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the
evidence before the court and/or [evidence that] ought
to be before it that is controlling."74 "The very existence
of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the
supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her] estate be
distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is
incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such
desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of
the parties affected thereby."75 This, coupled with
Lorenzo’s established relationship with Paciencia, the
evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses,
as opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by
petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies,
constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the
authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated June 15, 2006 and the Resolution dated August
31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
80979 are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN
MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph
G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme
of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial
of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of
the motion for reconsideration of the order approving
the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by
the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed
of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that
the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the
failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of
partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to
Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions
requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the
partition in question puts into effect the provisions of
Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance
with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which
reason they are void as being in violation or article 10
of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides
the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property or
the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said
testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any
evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the
matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws,
they are presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the
Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence
on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of
the court in not having deferred the approval of the
scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to
prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into
consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find
no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record
that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo
was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question
which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be
complied with and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in
this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals
with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such
in will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause
of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am
a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred
upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by
nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a
considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I
now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my
property and everything in connection with this, my
will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the
laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of
my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and
cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this
will favorable to the person or persons who fail to
comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and
the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect
the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid,
any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein
oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has
not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void,
being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code
provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good
morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it
expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted,
such national law of the testator is the one to govern his
testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions
above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution
of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will
regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the
condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void,
being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their
dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary
to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it
is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in
such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre
Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of
partition submitted by the judicial administrator is
approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE
OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY
CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-
appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for
oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding,
in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated
September 14, 1949, approving among things the final
accounts of the executor, directing the executor to
reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of
P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her
legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled
to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her
lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of
said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C.
Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the
will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the
following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-
eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665
Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants,
and no descendants except my above named daughter,
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,
about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding
the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any
way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted
by me, and who, from all information I have now
resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be
deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen
with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank,
and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the
principal thereof as well as any interest which may have
accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-
beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now
residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from
the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and
estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind
or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may
be possessed at my death and which may have come to
me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions
that the executor in his final account and project of
partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the
estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition
was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it
deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having been declared
by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen.
The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the
distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is
contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen
Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children,
one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification
of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that
should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen
should not be the internal law of California alone, but
the entire law thereof because several foreign elements
are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even
if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of
the California Civil Code, which requires that the
domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
Christensen having been declared an acknowledged
natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all
purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen
was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death, the successional
rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will
are to be governed by the law of California, in
accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose
of his property in the way he desires, because the right
of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and
inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d
877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286,
49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal).
Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel,
filed various motions for reconsideration, but these
were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF
HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY
IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS,
ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING
FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD
BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY
TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V state, which would indicate that he would ultimately
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-
HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL
OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a
citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death. But there is also no
question that at the time of his death he was domiciled
in the Philippines, as witness the following facts
admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate,
the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E.
Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New
York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the
Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July
1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan"
with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco,
in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the
Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the
United States and stayed there for the following nine
years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and
was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in
July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again
departed the Philippines for the United States and came
back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years
later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and
came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was
interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in
April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to
the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as
Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM",
"MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21,
1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once
more to California shortly after the making of his last
will and testament (now in question herein) which he
executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5,
1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the
deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the
fact that he was born in New York, migrated to
California and resided there for nine years, and since he
came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to
California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps
to relatives), and considering that he appears never to
have owned or acquired a home or properties in that
abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of
California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of
meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to
denote something more than mere physical presence.
(Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the
citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913,
was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the
latter was a territory of the United States (not a state)
until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered
himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when
he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a
citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have
intended to abandon his California citizenship by
acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance
with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in
his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be
taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent
abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a
technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a
place where he has never been. And he may reside in a
place where he has no domicile. The man with two
homes, between which he divides his time, certainly
resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on
business which would require his presence for several
weeks or months, he might properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a
resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his
settlement as continuing only for the particular business
in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not
be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile
of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as
physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily
presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence,
however, is a term used with many shades of meaning,
from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one
use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country where said
property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires
the determination of the meaning of the term "national
law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity
of testamentary provisions in the United States, each
state of the Union having its own private law applicable
to its citizens only and in force only within the state.
The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or
apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no
other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California
governing the disposition of personal property? The
decision of the court below, sustains the contention of
the executor-appellee that under the California Probate
Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in
the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate
of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But
appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the
Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's
opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the
other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is
correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as
the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of
California, the internal law thereof, which is that given
in the abovecited case, should govern the determination
of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State
of California of which Christensen was a citizen.
Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946
should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the
validity of the testamentary provision in question should
be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile,
which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by
various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the
Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter
to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the
purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to
the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of
Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan
court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the
Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the
matter back to Michigan law. But once having
determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule
looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back
should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws.
This would have resulted in the "endless chain of
references" which has so often been criticized be legal
writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked
merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the
renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference
should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of
Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on
a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the
renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by
getting off at the second reference and at that point
applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the
renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to
internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the
objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will
result from adoption of their respective views. And still
more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve
uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the
dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis
of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should
be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine,
the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of
the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan
court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been
against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the
Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi,
judgment would be for the woman. The same result
would happen, though the courts would switch with
respect to which would hold liability, if both courts
accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two
instances: where the title to land is in question, and
where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged.
In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of
the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce
case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference
goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to
land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by
every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of
the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled
in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts,
England, and France. The question arises as to how this
property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts
court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to
intestate succession to movables calls for an application
of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by
hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural
thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn
to French statute of distributions, or whatever
corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
distribution accordingly. An examination of French law,
however, would show that if a French court were called
upon to determine how this property should be
distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national
law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts
statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of
action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate
succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court
and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on
the assumption that this is what a French court would
do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will
follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented
which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a
foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn,
refers the matter back again to the law of the forum.
This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term
for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard
Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is
to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the
further question may arise: Are the rules as to the
conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be
resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been
considered by the courts in but a few instances, has
been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters
and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been
descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to
send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the
question postulated and the operation of the adoption of
the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in
returning the main controversy to be decided according
to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has
been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is
that the court of the forum, in determining the question
before it, must take into account the whole law of the
other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of
laws, and then apply the law to the actual question
which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This
may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi
has generally been repudiated by the American
authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined
and the reasons for its application in a country
explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale
Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The
pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the
rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of
the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict
of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the
Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in
the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as
regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary
exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the
right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their
personal statute, and desires that said personal statute
shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even
by the law of the place where the act in question
occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law,
provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
competent, which agree in attributing the determination
of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to
distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has
died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law
of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of
Belgium would distribute personal property upon death
in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds
that the Belgian law would make the distribution in
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the
English law — he must accept this reference back to his
own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is
its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on
succession and the conflict of laws rules of California
are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman
should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article
946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The
rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in
the determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of
American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
most matters or rights which follow the person of the
owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or
more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of
distribution of the property, the law of the state where
he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked
to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions
about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the
domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal
estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules
should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is
not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of
the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules
at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition
as in the case of intestate succession, is the general
convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has
said on the point: 'The general principle that a
dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile
of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal
application. It had its origin in that international comity
which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it
this age, when business intercourse and the process of
accumulating property take but little notice of boundary
lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is
more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws,
Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the
internal law of California. But as above explained the
laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for
its citizens, one for residents therein and another for
those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands
that We should enforce the California internal law
prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce
the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled
abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in
comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16
of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of
California in accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal
law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule
for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there
is no law to the contrary in the place where the property
is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code
refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the
provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the
deceased should govern. This contention can not be
sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited
above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our
Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
authorizes the reference or return of the question to the
law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule
in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers
back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in
the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and
should not refer the case back to California; such action
would leave the issue incapable of determination
because the case will then be like a football, tossed back
and forth between the two states, between the country
of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of
his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own
law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of
the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil.
156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider
Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59
Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can
not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important
reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to
be a citizen of a state in the United States but with
domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in
each case that there exists in the state of which the
subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with
Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased
Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines,
the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant
to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine
law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with
costs against appellees.
G.R. No. 176422 March 20, 2013
MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as
Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA,
DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed
MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY
BAUTISTA, JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA
MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS,
substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS
SANTOS, ROSA BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P.
DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO, LEONILA P.
DELOS SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS
VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-
CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS,
LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO,
PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS, JR., and
CECILIA M. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to
assure the return of a reservable property to the third
degree relatives belonging to the line from which the
property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated
into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.1
The Facts
The properties subject in the instant case are three
parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan: (1) Lot
1681-B, with an area of 7,749 square meters;2 (2) Lot
1684, with an area of 5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot No.
1646-B, with an area of 880 sq m.4 Lot Nos. 1681-B
and 1684 are presently in the name of respondent Julia
Delos Santos5 (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the
other hand, is also in the name of respondent but co-
owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of
the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her
siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza
(Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Placido
and Dominga had four children: Antonio, Exequiel,
married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners
Maria, Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and
Ricardo are the children of Antonio. Petitioners Juliana,
Fely, Mercedes, Elvira and Fortunato, on the other
hand, are Valentin’s children. Petitioners alleged that
the properties were part of Placido and Dominga’s
properties that were subject of an oral partition and
subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s
death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and only
daughter, Gregoria. After Leonor’s death, her share
went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and
without issue. They claimed that after Gregoria’s death,
respondent, who is Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto
herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of
Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the
properties should have been reserved by respondent in
their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve
the properties as these did not originate from
petitioners’ familial line and were not originally owned
by Placido and Dominga. According to respondent, the
properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a
certain Alfonso Ramos in 1931. It appears, however,
that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of the
properties.6
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 6, found merit in petitioners’ claim and granted
their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva
Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. In its
Decision dated November 4, 2002, the RTC disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment
is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to
reconvey the three (3) parcels of land subject of this
action in the name of the plaintiffs enumerated in the
complaint including intervenor Maria Cecilia M.
Mendoza except one-half of the property described in
the old title, TCT No. T-124852(M) which belongs to
Victorina Pantaleon;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel
the titles in the name of Julia Policarpio, TCT No. T-
149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-149035(M) and
reconvey the same to the enumerated plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorney’s fees
and damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set
aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint
filed by petitioners. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision dated November 16, 2006 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4,
2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 6, Third
Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Third Amended Complaint in Civil
Case No. 609-M-92 is hereby DISMISSED. Costs
against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the
CA denied the same per Resolution9 dated January 17,
2007.
In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that
petitioners failed to establish that Placido and Dominga
owned the properties in dispute.10 The CA also ruled
that even assuming that Placido and Dominga
previously owned the properties, it still cannot be
subject to reserva troncal as neither Exequiel
predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria
predecease Exequiel.11
Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:
A.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE
NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS
THEY DO FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF THE
PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS
DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON
RESERVA TRONCAL.12
Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA,
contending that it is sufficient that the properties came
from the paternal line of Gregoria for it to be subject to
reserva troncal. They also claim the properties in
representation of their own predecessors, Antonio and
Valentin, who were the brothers of Exequiel.13
Ruling of the Court
This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. The general rule in this regard
is that it should raise only questions of law. There are,
however, admitted exceptions to this rule, one of which
is when the CA’s findings are contrary to those of the
trial court.14 This being the case in the petition at hand,
the Court must now look into the differing findings and
conclusion of the RTC and the CA on the two issues
that arise – one, whether the properties in dispute are
reservable properties and two, whether petitioners are
entitled to a reservation of these properties.
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article
891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as
he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and
belong to the line from which said property came.
(Emphasis ours)
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva
troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous title,
whether by inheritance or donation, from an
ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the
prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of
law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or
reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last
transmission is from the reservista to the reservees or
reservatarios who must be relatives within the third
degree from which the property came.15
The lineal character of the
reservable property is reckoned
from the ascendant from whom the
prepositus received the property by
gratuitous title
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article
891 on reserva troncal is not applicable.
The fallacy in the CA’s resolution is that it proceeded
from the erroneous premise that Placido is the
ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil
Code. From thence, it sought to trace the origin of the
subject properties back to Placido and Dominga,
determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and
whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by lucrative or
gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who
received the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who
obtained the property from the prepositus by operation
of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third
degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the
(linea o tronco) from which the property came and for
whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.16
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the
properties should be reckoned only from Exequiel’s as
he is the ascendant from where the first transmission
occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the
properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than
such ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal
character of the property.17 It was also immaterial for
the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased
Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased
Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the
properties and he is the ascendant from whom the
properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the
other hand, is the descendant who received the
properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property
should have been acquired by the descendant or
prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative
title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title
when the recipient does not give anything in return.18
At risk of being repetitious, what was clearly
established in this case is that the properties in dispute
were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death,
Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the
properties as inheritance.
Ascendants, descendants and
collateral relatives under Article
964 of the Civil Code
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve
the property should be an ascendant (also known as the
reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia,
however, is not Gregoria’s ascendant; rather, she is
Gregoria’s collateral relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of
degrees among ascendants and descendants, and those
who are not ascendants and descendants but come from
a common ancestor, viz:
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may
be either direct or collateral.1âwphi1 A direct line is
that constituted by the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of
degrees among persons who are not ascendants and
descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
(Emphasis and italics ours)
Gregoria’s ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and
Leonor, her grandparents, great-grandparents and so on.
On the other hand, Gregoria’s descendants, if she had
one, would be her children, grandchildren and great-
grandchildren. Not being Gregoria’s ascendants, both
petitioners and Julia, therefore, are her collateral
relatives. In determining the collateral line of
relationship, ascent is made to the common ancestor and
then descent to the relative from whom the computation
is made. In the case of Julia’s collateral relationship
with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to
her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the
common ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonor’s parents
(second line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her aunt
(third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s collateral
relative within the third degree and not her ascendant.
First cousins of the
descendant/prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered
reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within
the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties
came. The person from whom the degree should be
reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the one at the
end of the line from which the property came and upon
whom the property last revolved by descent.19 It is
Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth
degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of
the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not
reservees or reservatarios.20
They cannot even claim representation of their
predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants
a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to
the third degree from whom the reservable properties
came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of
nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the
right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers)
who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and
relatives within the third degree.21 In Florentino v.
Florentino,22 the Court stated:
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate
succession, when there are relatives of the descendant
within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatario, over the property which the
reservista (person holding it subject to reservation)
should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged
when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the
third degree belong to the line from which such
property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the
Civil Code in Article 811 now Article 891 is in the
highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
the designated persons who are the relatives, within the
third degree, of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the
succeeding degrees can never be considered as
reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as
such.
x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the
part of reservatarios who are within the third degree
mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the
deceased person from whom the reservable property
came. x x x.23 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear
that the properties are reservable in character,
petitioners cannot benefit from reserva troncal. First,
because Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute,
is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article
891 of the Civil Code and second, because petitioners
are not Gregoria’s relatives within the third degree.
Hence, the CA’s disposition that the complaint filed
with the RTC should be dismissed, only on this point, is
correct. If at all, what should apply in the distribution of
Gregoria’s estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the
Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters,
nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral
relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the
whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to
determine the proper distribution of Gregoria’s estate at
this point as the cause of action relied upon by
petitioners in their complaint filed with the RTC is
based solely on reserva troncal. Further, any
determination would necessarily entail reception of
evidence on Gregoria’s entire estate and the heirs
entitled thereto, which is best accomplished in an action
filed specifically for that purpose.
A reservista acquires ownership of
the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is
extinguished
Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable
error in the RTC’s disposition of the case. In upholding
the right of petitioners over the properties, the RTC
ordered the reconveyance of the properties to petitioners
and the transfer of the titles in their names. What the
RTC should have done, assuming for argument’s sake
that reserva troncal is applicable, is have the reservable
nature of the property registered on respondent’s titles.
In fact, respondent, as reservista, has the duty to reserve
and to annotate the reservable character of the property
on the title.24 In reserva troncal, the reservista who
inherits from a prepositus, whether by the latter’s wish
or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance by
virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute
ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to
him exclusively.25
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor
predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary
of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to
the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee’s
rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at
the time of the death of the reservor but become
indefeasible when the reservees predecease the
reservor.26 (Citations omitted)
It is when the reservation takes place or is
extinguished,27 that a reservatario becomes, by
operation of law, the owner of the reservable property.28
In any event, the foregoing discussion does not detract
from the fact that petitioners are not entitled to a
reservation of the properties in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated November 16, 2006 and Resolution dated January
17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
77694 insofar as it dismissed the Third Amended
Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are
AFFIRMED. This Decision is without prejudice to any
civil action that the heirs of Gregoria
Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for
the determination of ownership of the properties in
question.
SO ORDERED.