Cuizon vs.

Ramolete
Francisco Cuizon et al. vs. Hon. Jose R. Ramolete
May 29, 1984 | Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts:
As early as 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land in Mandaue City
docketed as L.R. Case No. N-179. In 1970, he distributed his property between his two daughters, Rufina
and Irene, to whom the salt beds subject of the controversy was given. In 1971, Irene executed a Deed of
Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of petitioners Franciso et al.

Although the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in 1972, the decree of registration
and the corresponding O.C.T. was issued only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that same
year, T.C.T No. 10477 covering the property in question was issued to Irene. The latter died in 1978.

During the extrajudicial settlement of the estate, Rufina, the mother of Francisco et al., adjudicated to
herself all the property of Irene including the salt beds in question. She then executed a deed of
Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified the 1971 deed of sale and renounced and
waived whatever rights and interests and participation she may have in the property in question in favor of
the petitioners. The deed was annotated in T.C.T. No. 10477. Subsequently, T.C.T. No. 12665 was
issued in favor of the petitioners.

In 1978, Domingo Antigua, who allegedly was chosen by the heirs of Irene to act as administrator, was
appointed administrator by the CFI of Cebu. Antigua included the salt bed in the inventory of Irene’s
estate and asked the Cebu CFI to order petitioners to deliver the salt to him. The Cebu CFI granted the
same.

Issue: Whether a court handling the intestate proceedings has jurisdiction over parcels of land already
covered by a TCT issued in favor owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said
parcels of have been?

Held: No. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which
are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All said court could do is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is dispute, then the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

In the instant case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside parties but it was sold seven
years before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who are not party to
the proceedings.

In Bolisay vs. Alcid, the Court held that “if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling
evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action.”

Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was covered by a TCT issued in the name
of third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate.

Doctrine: Probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate
and equally claimed to belong to outside parties.
SAN DIEGO v NOMBRE (Yap)

11 SCRA 165, May 29, 1964

Petitioner/s: MOISES SAN DIEGO, SR.

Respondent/s: ADELO NOMBRE and PEDRO ESCANLAR

Doctrine: The provisions on agency should not apply to a judicial administrator. A judicial administrator is
appointed by the court. He is not only the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of
the estate. Before entering into his duties, he is required to file a bond. These circumstances are not
required in agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal. The protection which law gives the
principal in limiting the powers and rights of an agent stems from the fact that control by the principal can
only be through agreements. Whereas, the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific
provisions of law and orders of the appointing court.

Facts:

(1) Respondent Adelo Nombre was the duly constituted judicial administrator. As such, he leased
one of the properties of the estate—a fishpond—to Pedro Escanlar, the other respondent. The
terms of the lease was for 3 years, with a yearly rental of P3,000. The transaction was done
without previous authority or approval of the Court.

(2) A year after, Nombre was removed as administrator, and was replaced by one Sofronio
Campillanos. Escalanlar was cited for contempt for allegedly refusing to surrender the fishpond to
the newly appointed administrator.

(3) Subsequently, Campillanos filed a motion for authority to execute a lease contract over the
fishpond, in favor of petitioner Moises San Diego, for 5 years with yearly rental of P5,000.
Escalanlar was not notified of the said motion. Nombre, on the other hand, opposed to the
motion, pointing out that the fishpond was leased by him to Escalandar for 3 years. He alleged
that the validity of the lease contract entered into by a judicial administrator must be recognized
unless declared void in a separate action.

(4) The lower court declared the contract in favor of Escanlar null and void for want of judicial
authority and that San Diego offered better lease conditions than Escanlar. In light of this,
Escanlar agreed to increase the rental to P5,000 after the termination of his original contract.
However, the trial judge stated that such contract was fraudulent and executed in bad faith
because Nombre was removed as administrator and the rentals of the property was inadequate.

(5) However, on appeal, the CA ruled:

No such limitation on the power of a judicial administrator to grant lease of property placed under
his custody is provided for in the present law. Under Art. 1647, it is only when the lease is to be
recorded in the Registry of Property that it cannot be instituted without special authority. Thus,
regardless of the period of lease, there is no need for special authority unless the contract is to be
recorded in the Registry.
 Rule 85, Sec. 3 of the ROC authorizes a judicial administrator to administer the estate of the
deceased not disposed by will, for purposes of liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore,
exercise all acts of administration without special authority of the Court; such as the leasing the
property. And where the lease has been formally entered into, the court cannot, in the same
proceeding, annul the same. The proper remedy would be a separate action by the administrator
or the heirs to annul the lease.

(6) On appeal to the SC, petitioner contends that Art. 1878(8) limits the right of a judicial
administrator to lease the real property without prior court authority and approval, if it exceeds 1
year. The lease in favor of Escalanlar, being 3 years and without court approval, is therefore void.

Issue: W/N the provisions on Agency should apply in this case. (NO)

Held:

The provisions on agency should not apply to a judicial administrator. A judicial administrator is appointed
by the court. He is not only the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate.
Before entering into his duties, he is required to file a bond. These circumstances are not required in
agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal. The protection which law gives the principal in
limiting the powers and rights of an agent stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be
through agreements. Whereas, the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of law
and orders of the appointing court.

Fallo: The decision of the CA was affirmed.