PEOPLE vs REGALA y ABRIOL Case Digest

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO REGALA y ABRIOL

FACTS: Armando Regala appeals from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 7929 rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 46, 5th Judicial Region, convicting him of the crime of Robbery
with Rape.

That on or about September 11, 1995, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Bangon, Municipality of
Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines, the said accused confederating together and helping one
another, with intent to gain, violence and intimidation upon persons, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter the kitchen of the house of Consuelo Arevalo and when inside, hogtied
said Consuelo Arevalo and granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic), take, steal, rob and carry away cash
amount of P3,000.00 and two (2) gold rings worth P6,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of owner
Consuelo Arevalo in the total amount of P9,000.00, Philippine Currency; and in pursuance of the
commission of the crime of robbery against the will and consent of the granddaughter Nerissa Regala
(sic) wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously accused Armando Regala y Abriol has for two times sexually
abused and/or intercoursed with her, while hogtied on the bed and in the kitchen.

Accused-appellant was apprehended by the police four days after the incident. He was identified at a
police line-up by Nerissa and her grandmother.

The defense presented accused-appellant who testified that on September 11, 1995, he was staying in
the house of Antonio Ramilo at barangay Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate. Ramilo was the manager in the
gold panning business where accused-appellant was employed. Antonio Ramilo testified and
corroborated his defense and stated that accused-appellant was in his house, which is about 5
kilometers away from Barangay Bangon.

The trial court held that the defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive identification of the accused.
The Court found accused Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Rape.

ISSUE: W/N the accused is guilty of Robbery with Rape.

HELD: We are not persuaded by the contention of accused-appellant that the contradictory replies of
Consuelo Arevalo when asked whether Regala removed his mask "before" or "after" she and Nerissa
were hogtied exposed the fact that she was not able to identify the accused-appellant. The
contradiction referred to a minor detail and cannot detract from the fact that both Nerissa and Consuelo
positively identified Regala as there was a flashlight used to focus at the money while it was being
counted and there was a reflection on the face of Regala. Both Nerissa and Consuelo remembered the
earring on his left ear, which he was still wearing at the time of the police line-up inside the police
station. Misoedp

The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was already in force. Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code as amended now provides, under paragraph 1 thereof: Edpmis

"1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason of or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape or intentional mutilation or arson."

The victim in the case at bar was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery. There are cases holding
that the additional rapes committed on the same occasion of robbery will not increase the penalty. In
People vs. Martinez, accused Martinez and two (2) other unidentified persons, who remained at large,
were charged with the special complex crime of robbery with rape where all three raped the victim. The
Court imposed the penalty of death after considering two (2) aggravating circumstances, namely,
nocturnidad and use of a deadly weapon. However, the Court did not consider the two (2) other rapes
as aggravating holding that "(T)he special complex crime of robbery with rape has, therefore, been
committed by the felonious acts of appellant and his cohorts, with all acts or rape on that occasion being
integrated in one composite crime.

In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should not be
considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper.
Supreme

Judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Rape, is hereby AFFIRMED.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 181444, July 17, 2013

BOBBY “ABEL” AVELINO Y BULAWAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal are the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02297 which affirmed
petitioner’s conviction for murder in Criminal Case No. 01-189130,2 and the CA’s Resolution3 denying
his motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Bobby “Abel” Avelino y Bulawan, together with Ricardo Tolentino, Alias Sonny Muslim, Farouk
Musa a.k.a. Boy Muslim, Alias Bubut Tuwad, Alias Angkol, Alias Mon, Renato Meneses a.k.a. Nato,
Benjamin Elbona a.k.a. Toto Mata, and Dominic Apan a.k.a. Domeng Bakukang, was charged with
murder4 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with the qualifying circumstances of treachery
and evident premeditation.

Upon arraignment, petitioner and his co-accused Renato Meneses, Benjamin Elbona, and Farouk Musa
entered a plea of not guilty. The other accused remain at-large.

At the trial, the prosecution presented eight witnesses: Delia Hispano, the wife of the victim; Diana
Espinosa; Alfredo Manalangsang (Manalangsang); Mary Ann Cañada (Cañada); Renato Sosas; Dr. Romeo
T. Salen; P/Insp. Mario Prado; and National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent Rizaldi Jaymalin.5
The facts, as culled from the CA Decision which cited the brief of the Office of the Solicitor General, are
as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of September 2000, Renato Sosas y Verzosa, an employee of
appellant Bobby Avelino y Bulawan in his wood business, was directed by appellant to summon Toto
Mata, Nato, Domeng Bakukang, Bobot Tuwad, Boy Muslim, Angkol, Charlie, Sonny Muslim and Mon
(TSN, January 29, 2002, pp. 5-6). An hour later, the group called by Renato Sosas met at appellant’s
warehouse in Tagaytay, Baseco Compound, Tondo, Manila. Renato Sosas, who was just a step away
from the group, was astounded when he heard appellant utter “Papatayin si Chairman.” Bobot Tuwad
reacted by asking appellant “Sino pong chairman?”, to which appellant Avelino replied “Sino pa, Ninong
Chairman Gener.” Terrified, Sosas kept mum about what he discovered (TSN, January 29, 2002, pp.10-
12).

On October 5, 2000, around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Alfredo Manalangsang was riding on a tricycle
going to Baseco Compound, Tondo, Manila. Since Manalangsang was the last passenger to board the
tricycle, he sat behind the driver. Upon reaching a certain point between Muelle Del Rio and 2nd Street,
Port Area, Manila, the tricycle which Manalangsang was riding on passed at the left lane instead of the
right lane of the road to give way to the owner-type (sic) jeep owned by the barangay and driven by its
Chairman[,] Generoso Hispano, herein victim (TSN, September 26, 2001, pp. 11-17, Exhs. “R-1” and “4”).

While Chairman Hispano was entering the nearest route near the center island, a man suddenly
emerged and blocked Chairman Hispano’s vehicle. Instantaneously, Manalangsang heard bursts of
gunshot which prompted him to jump from the tricycle. Manalangsang instinctively hid behind the
center island of the road (TSN, September 26, 2001, pp. 17-21).

At this juncture, Manalangsang peeped at the direction of Chairman Hispano’s jeep and saw three (3)
men wearing bonnets, two of whom were strategically blocking the jeep of Chairman Hispano. The third
man, who was wearing a green jacket and positioned himself near the gutter, fired successive shots at
Chairman Hispano and thereafter approached the jeep of Chairman Hispano. He pulled down from the
jeep the almost lifeless body of Chairman Hispano. Since Manalangsang was situated near the third
assailant, he failed to identify the other two assailants. However, Manalangsang positively identified the
third assailant as appellant Bobby “Abel” Avelino, whom he saw stooping down at the Chairman’s body
and pulling the opening of his bonnet down to his chin to ascertain if the Chairman was still alive.
Sensing that it was safe for him to leave the scene, Manalangsang boarded a tricycle again and went
home (TSN, September 26, 2001, pp. 22-26).
Thereafter, appellant and the other assailants drove away using the owner-type jeep of Chairman
Hispano. However, on their way towards Divisoria, the jeep was incidentally blocked by a tricycle and a
white car which prompted the companion of appellant to shout “tabi-tabi.” At that moment, Mary Ann
Ca[ñ]ada saw appellant, who was wearing a green jacket and a bonnet rolled up to his forehead, driving
the owner-type (sic) jeep of Chairman Hispano. Ca[ñ]ada readily recognized appellant as she was
familiar with the face of appellant having seen him driving the jeep of the Chairman on several occasions
before (TSN, November 19, 2001, pp. 17-28).

When the police arrived at the crime scene, Chairman Hispano was already dead. The owner-type (sic)
jeep of Chairman Hispano was recovered in front of house No. 440, Orbiztondo Street, Binondo, Manila,
with several pieces of empty shells of 9 mm caliber gun scattered on its floor (TSN, May 7, 2003, pp. 6-7)
(Rollo, pages 120-123).6

Denying the accusation, the defense presented as evidence the testimonies of petitioner, PO2 Anthony
P. Galang, Adonis T. Bantiling and Scene of the Crime Operative (SOCO) PSI Lito D. Cabamongan
(Cabamongan).7

Petitioner advanced the defense of denial and alibi. He testified that on October 5, 2000, he and his wife
went to the Land Transportation Office in Pasay City to renew his license as they planned to go to Baguio
that day. But as he was issued a temporary license late in the afternoon, instead of going home, he and
his wife checked in at the Pharaoh Hotel in Sta. Cruz, Manila to spend the night. He parked his car along
Dasmariñas Bridge and slept. Later, he woke up to transfer his car but his car was gone. Thus, he and his
wife went to the police station in Sta. Cruz, Manila then to the Anti-Carnapping Unit along U.N. Avenue
to report the incident. At the latter location, they learned from a certain Tata Randy, an acquaintance
and former police officer, that the victim had been gunned down. Around 1:00 a.m., he and his wife
returned to the hotel. On October 23, 2000, he was arrested by agents of the NBI.8

After trial, the RTC, on April 28, 2006, found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder qualified by treachery, and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC
likewise ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Generoso Hispano (Hispano) the sum of
P50,000 and to pay them an additional sum of P50,000 as moral damages, the sum of P158,471.75 as
actual damages, and costs.9
For failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused Farouk Musa,
Benjamin Elbona, and Renato Meneses were acquitted of the crime charged.10

As aforesaid, the CA, in its assailed decision, denied petitioner’s appeal and upheld the RTC decision with
modification by increasing the award of actual damages to P171,128.75.11 Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by the appellate court on January 25, 2008.12

Aggrieved, petitioner now seeks to reverse his conviction, arguing that the CA erred in relying on the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Manalangsang and Cañada and disregarding the
inconsistencies between the statements of Manalangsang and the findings of the medico-legal and
SOCO PSI Cabamongan as to the position of the gunman. He also reiterated his defense of denial and
alibi.

We have carefully studied the records of this case and find no cogent reason to overturn the ruling of
the CA which is in accord with law and jurisprudence.

As for the defense of the petitioner which is grounded, firstly, upon denial and alibi, basic is the rule that
the defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the witness’ positive identification of the accused-
appellants.13 Moreover, as oft-repeated in jurisprudence

For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else when the crime was
committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof,
such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Denial, like alibi, as an
exonerating justification[,] is inherently weak and if uncorroborated regresses to blatant impotence. Like
alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.14

In this case, the defense failed to establish that it was physically impossible for the petitioner to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Pharaoh Hotel, where petitioner claims to
have stayed with his wife at the time of the commission of the crime, is in Sta. Cruz, Manila.15 The said
hotel is not so far from the scene of the crime, which is in Baseco Compound in Tondo, Manila, so as not
to afford the petitioner an opportunity to easily go to the place of the shooting at the time Hispano was
killed. Indeed, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove (a) that he was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime. These, the defense failed to do.

The defense of the petitioner is based, secondly, on his allegations that prosecution witnesses
Manalangsang and Cañada failed to positively identify him as the gunman who mortally wounded
Hispano, and that Manalangsang’s testimony as to the locations and number of gunshot wounds, as well
as the position of the gunman, is inconsistent with the physical evidence as provided by the medico-
legal officer and the testimony of SOCO PSI Cabamongan.

These allegations cannot exculpate the petitioner from criminal liability.

Manalangsang unequivocally identified the petitioner as the gunman. Manalangsang was able to identify
the petitioner because the latter revealed his face when he pulled down the bonnet he was wearing,
thereby exposing his eyes, nose, mouth, and chin.16 Moreover, the certainty of Manalangsang in
identifying the petitioner as the one who shot Hispano is bolstered by the fact that he and petitioner
were neighbors for five years in Baseco.17 The RTC cites the following statement by Manalangsang as an
added indication of his certainty – “Si Avelino, kahit ubod ng layo, kahit naglalakad lang, kilala ko na.
Dahil unang-una, matagal ko na siyang kilala, dahil ako hindi niya ako gaanong kilala, pero sila kilala ko,
kahit nakatagili[d], kilala ko siya.”18 It cannot be denied that once a person gains familiarity of another,
identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance.19

Even the theory of the defense that identification of the petitioner by Manalangsang and Cañada is
unlikely due allegedly to the lack of sufficient illumination at the scene of the crime, has been overcome
by the fact that there are lampposts and signboards in the subject area which can provide illumination
despite the black of night. Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the lampposts were not functioning at
the time, the headlights of passing vehicles provided sufficient illumination at the crime scene.20 “The
Court has previously held that the light from the stars or the moon, an oven, or a wick lamp or gasera
can give ample illumination to enable a person to identify or recognize another.”21 Similarly, the
headlights of vehicles are sufficient to enable eyewitnesses to identify individuals at a distance of four to
ten meters,22 and it should be noted that the distance between Manalangsang and the jeep where
Hispano was felled was only 31 feet23 or a little over nine meters.24

The identification made by Manalangsang was likewise sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of
Cañada, that she saw the petitioner, with whom she was familiar, drive away in Hispano’s owner-type
jeep, wearing a green jacket and black bonnet rolled up to his forehead.25
Further, as can be gleaned from the excerpt below, the petitioner’s defense that Manalangsang’s
testimony contradicts with the medical findings, and should then be disregarded, must fail. Petitioner
claims that Manalangsang’s statements that Hispano was shot in a downward direction conflict with the
findings of the medico-legal that the trajectory of the bullets is in an upward direction. The testimony of
Dr. Salen is pertinent and enlightening:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Q:

[T]he trajectory of the bullet is upward?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

[S]o the gunman must be at a lower level from the decease[d]?

A:

We can not [sic] say that, sir.

Q:

But the trajectory of the bullet is upward?

A:

It depends on the matter of the position of the head when the head was hit. It could be when the
trajectory is upward it [sic] could be lying down with his back and the gunman and the barrel of the gun
is here and if we will put the normal position of the body it is still upward but the normal position is like
that so…

COURT:

Make of record that the witness is demonstrating a slightly incline position of the head and the body.

WITNESS:

A:
So we can not [sic] determine the position of the gunman when it was related [sic] the gunshot wound
of the entry and the victim it will depend on the position of the gunman but likewise the position of the
victim during the infliction [sic] of the gun.

ATTY. VARGAS:

Q:

Mr. Witness[,] if the gunman is standing on an elevated floor of about three feet do you think that the
trajectory of a bullet is upward?

A:

It is possible also.26

Clearly, the fact that the trajectory of the bullets is in an upward direction does not negate the veracity
of Manalangsang’s statement that Hispano was shot by the gunman from an elevated plane.

The CA was also correct in not giving credence to the opinion of SOCO PSI Cabamongan as regards the
position of the gunman when the latter shot Hispano. Cabamongan asserted that the gunman was on
board the owner-type jeep when Hispano was shot, which is opposed to Manalangsang’s testimony.
However, case records reveal that Cabamongan was presented as an ordinary witness. Hence, his
opinion regarding the location of the gunman in relation to the place where the empty shells were
found is immaterial.

Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise, and
(b) the witness has been qualified as an expert.27 In this case, counsel for the petitioner failed to make
the necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial.

Jurisprudence further provides that minor inconsistencies in immaterial details do not destroy the
probative value of the testimony of a witness regarding the very act of the accused. The case of Madali
v. People28 elucidates thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its incapacity to assimilate all material details of a
given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their
probative value. It is well settled that immaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on
the very material and significant point bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the
testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein
cannot destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a
prosecution witness. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Thus, the positive identification of the petitioner as the gunman by Manalangsang, as corroborated by
Cañada, must stand. Indeed, it has been consistently held by this Court that in criminal cases the
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose
conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to
observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not. Absent any
showing that the lower courts overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered,
would change the result of the case, this Court gives deference to the trial court’s appreciation of the
facts and of the credibility of witnesses, especially since Manalangsang and Cañada’s testimony meets
the test of credibility.29 The Court also notes that other than his claim of denial, petitioner failed to
show how the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of innocence.

The qualifying circumstance of treachery or alevosia was additionally properly appreciated in this case.

The two elements that must be proven to establish treachery are: (a) the employment of means of
execution which would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive and retaliatory acts of the
victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the means, method and manner of
execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender.30 The two elements are present
in this case.

These elements are established by the testimony of Manalangsang showing the unexpected attack by
the petitioner on the unsuspecting Hispano whose vehicle was suddenly blocked by three men, at least
one of whom was armed with a firearm.31 The victim was then unarmed and had no opportunity to
defend himself.

Thus, considering all the above-mentioned facts, we uphold the conviction of the petitioner for the
crime of murder.

Regarding the award of damages, we affirm the trial court and CA in ordering the petitioner to pay the
heirs of Generoso Hispano the amount of P50,000 as moral damages. In cases of murder and homicide,
the award of moral damages is mandatory, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of
the victim.32 Similarly, the CA correctly awarded his heirs the amount of P171,128.75 as actual
damages, as said amount which was spent for funeral and burial expenses was duly supported by
receipts. However, as regards the award of civil indemnity, the same should be increased to P75,000 to
conform with recent jurisprudence.33 Also, the heirs of the victim are entitled to exemplary damages
which recent jurisprudence pegs at P30,00034 considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance
of treachery. Lastly, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6%
per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid, consistent with current policy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 22, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02297 is AFFIRMED. Petitioner BOBBY “ABEL” AVELINO y BULAWAN is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of MURDER and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further
ordered to pay the heirs of Generoso Hispano the amounts of P171,128.75 as actual damages,
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All
monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality
of this Decision until fully paid.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO DURANAN, a.k.a. Kalbo,accused-appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision[i][1] of the Regional Trial Court, xxx, finding accused-appellant
Emiliano Duranan, a.k.a. Kalbo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape and to indemnify private
complainant AAA in the amount of P50,000.00.

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-55711 alleged

That on or about the 8th of March 1994, in xxx, Philippines, said accused with lewd designs and by
means of force and intimidation, to wit, by then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously taking
advantage of undersigned complainant, AAAs feeblemindedness and thereafter have carnal knowledge
with (sic) the undersigned complainant against her will and without her consent.

Contrary to law.[ii][2]

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-55712 averred

That on or about the 7th of March 1994, in xxx, Philippines, the said accused with lewd designs and by
means of force and intimidation, to wit, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously taking
(sic) advantage of the undersigned (sic) feeblemindedness, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with
(sic) the undersigned complainant against her will and without her consent.

Contrary to law.[iii][3]

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to each charge of rape against him, whereupon
he was tried.

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, complainant AAA, complainants mother BBB, and
the attending medico-legal officer at Camp Crame, Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon.

Complainant AAA, who was 25 years old at the time of the incidents in question, is considered to be
retarded and finished up to the sixth grade only. She is unemployed and simply does household chores
for her family. Accused-appellant lived with the complainants family in the same apartment in xxx where
he rented a room that he shared with several other people.

The first rape took place in the afternoon of March 7, 1994.[iv][4] AAA was standing by the door of her
grandfathers house when accused-appellant suddenly placed his arm on her neck and dragged her
inside the common bathroom.[v][5] Complainant said that accused-appellant kissed her and then
removed her shorts and underwear as he held her hands with his other hand. She did not cry for help
because accused-appellant threatened her that he would get angry if she did.[vi][6] She claimed that
accused-appellant was able to rape her while standing up despite her resistance.[vii][7] After the
incident, complainant was sent out of the bathroom and went directly home.[viii][8]

The second incident occurred in the early morning of March 8, 1994,[ix][9] according to complainant.
She said she was cleaning the premises of her family residence when accused-appellant pulled her from
her house and took her to his room. According to complainant, accused-appellant asked his brother,
who was then cooking, to leave the room. As soon as his brother had left, accused-appellant laid her on
the floor and raped her.[x][10] Complainant said she was forced to submit to accused-appellants lust
because of his threats.[xi][11] After the incident, accused-appellant sent her letters professing love for
her and telling her how beautiful she was. Complainant said she tore up the letters after reading
them.[xii][12]

In another incident, on March 12, 1994, accused-appellant asked complainant to let him use their
bathroom. However, after being given permission, he grabbed complainant by the hand, pulled her
inside the bathroom, and started kissing her on the lips and neck after closing the door behind them. He
only stopped molesting her when he heard somebody coming.[xiii][13]

BBB testified that she saw her daughter leave the bathroom, quickly followed by accused-appellant. BBB
noticed that her daughters lower lip was bruised. When she confronted her daughter about it, the latter
revealed for the first time what had happened to her. BBB went to Camp Karingal, together with
complainant and her other children, CCC and DDD, where they filed affidavits and two informations.
They then took complainant to Camp Crame for examination.[xiv][14] Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon, who
examined complainant, submitted a report which contained the following findings:

GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are hemispherical with pale
brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
There is injury noted at the head;

Contusion, mucosa of the lower lip, measuring 1.2 x 0.3 cm, and 1 cm left of the anterior midline.

GENITAL

There is an abundant growth of pubic hair. Labia minora are full, convex and gaping with the pinkish
brown and congested labia minor presenting in between. On separating, the same is disclosed an
abraded posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type hymen with shallow healing laceration at 5
oclock position. External vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the examining
index finger and the virgin-sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities.

CONCLUSION

Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.

Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity.

Barring unforeseen complications, it is estimated that the above injury will resolve in 7 to 9 days

REMARKS

Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative diplococci and for spermatozoa.[xv][15]

Dr. Cosidon explained that the term congested used in reference to the labia minora meant that there
was some inflammation that could have been caused by friction due to intercourse.[xvi][16] Taken
together with the presence of a shallow hymenal laceration, this finding indicates the possibility of
intercourse that caused complainants loss of virginity within the last five days.[xvii][17]

Accused-appellant filed a demurrer to the evidence, but the trial court denied it in its November 17,
1995 order.[xviii][18] The defense thereafter presented its witnesses, namely, accused-appellant
Emiliano Duranan, accused-appellants alleged roommates, Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig, and his
wife Carlita Duranan.

With respect to the first incident of rape, which allegedly took place in the afternoon of March 7, 1994,
it is contended that accused-appellant could not have committed such, because his daily schedule was
such that he was not at home at that time. He said that because of his work, he used to leave the house
at 3 a.m., arrive home at 1 p.m., and leave for work again at 3 p.m. and arrive home at 6:30 p.m.[xix][19]
He also alleged that on March 7, 1994 he left and was with Rico Bariquit throughout the day.[xx][20] As
to the second incident of rape, accused-appellant contends that it was impossible for him to commit
rape in his room because there were at least six other people there at the time (i.e., morning of March
8, 1994) of the alleged rape.[xxi][21] He charged that the complaints were filed against him because
complainants family wanted to evict him and his housemates from their house.[xxii][22]

Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig confirmed accused-appellants schedule.[xxiii][23] Bariquit claimed that
he was always with accused-appellant and knew where he was all the time. Both witnesses said rape
could not have been committed in a room where at least five other people were sleeping.[xxiv][24]

BBB and complainant denied seeing Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig before the two testified in
court.[xxv][25]

Based on the evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision on April 22, 1998, finding the
accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:[xxvi][26]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal for two (2) counts of rape punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 11 of R. A. 7659, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) counts
of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to indemnify the private complainant the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50, 000.00).
SO ORDERED.

Hence this appeal.

Accused-appellant assigns two errors as having been allegedly committed by the trial court:

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IS DEPRIVED OF
REASON DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF TESTIMONY BY A COMPETENT MEDICAL EXPERT TO THAT EFFECT
AND DESPITE STRONG EVIDENCE ON THE RECORD TO THE CONTRARY.

II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ALTERNATIVELY HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF
RAPING THE PRIVATE OFFENDED WOMAN THROUGH FORCE AND INTIMIDATION.

First. Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victims mental age was
not proven. He argues that under Art. 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential element for the
prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the complainants mental age to
determine if her mental age is under twelve.[xxvii][27] He further claims that only in cases where the
retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical deformities symptomatic of mental retardation
can the mental evaluation be waived.

The contention has no merit.

Rule 130, 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be
received in evidence regarding ---

(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and

(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

Discussing this provision of the Rules on Evidence, Sen. Vicente J. Francisco writes in his treatise:

The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical
and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her
attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.

....

It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a
person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and
conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and
reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of
Vermont said: A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when
based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or
upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness own knowledge and observation, he
having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for
his opinion.[xxviii][28]

In the case at bar, BBB testified on the mental condition of her daughter, thus:

Q: How would you described your daughter? (sic)

A: When she was still a child while walking she accidentally bumped her head and then on she acted
quite not normal from then on we noticed changes because she acted like a child.
Q: How old is (sic) AAA when this happened?

A: 3 to 4 years old.

Q: At the age of 25, how would you described? (sic)

A: She still thinks like a child but from her narration or statement we can see that her declaration are
(sic) true or believable.

Q: You mean to say that she could be intelligent.

A: Yes, ma'am. She finished her elementary and I can say she is quite intelligent.

Q: So she can somewhat understand what is happening around us?

A: Yes, she can understand things around as along as she would be provided some basis and some
reference inorder (sic) to establish time, places and incident (sic).

Q: At your house do you still assigned (sic) household chores(?)

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Could she relied (sic) upon madam witness?

A: Yes maam.[xxix][29]
To rebut this, accused-appellant points to the mothers statement that complainant is quite intelligent.
The statement that complainant is quite intelligent must be read in the context of BBBs previous
statement that complainant thinks like a child but from her narration or statement we can see that her
declaration are (sic) true or believable. Thus, what complainants mother meant was that complainant,
although she thought like a child, nevertheless could tell others what happened to her. Indeed, even the
trial court admonished the defense counsel not to use inculpatory questions because complainant might
give inculpatory answers.[xxx][30] At another stage of the trial, the trial court reminded counsel, The
witness [complainant] is not very intelligent. I think the witness cannot even distinguish dates.[xxxi][31]

Thus, the trial court itself found in dealing with complainant that she was mentally deficient. The rule
that findings of fact of the trial court should not be disturbed since the trial court is in the best position
to determine the findings of fact[xxxii][32]cannot be more apt than in this case.

Accused-appellant cites the medico-legal report which describes complainant as coherent and contends
that this is an evaluation of the mental state of complainant. This contention is totally without basis. The
medicolegal report categorically states that the purpose of the medical examination is limited to
determining whether the complainant had been sexually abused.[xxxiii][33] In other words, the purpose
of the examination was to determine her physical, not her mental, state.

Second. On the alternative, accused-appellant argues that indeed, complainant could not be a
competent witness if she is a retardate. Under Rule 130, 20, any person who can perceive and make
known his/her perception is qualified to be a witness. In this case, although complainant is a retardate,
she was nevertheless able to tell the court what accused-appellant had done to her and to answer the
questions of both the prosecutor and the defense counsel. This is clear from her testimony, thus:

Q: Now, you said that you were raped by Emiliano Duranan. Where did this happen?

A: In the bathroom of my Tiya Ineng.

Q: Where is this bathroom of your Tiya Ineng?

A: This bathroom is located at an alley, a pasillo towards our house.

Q: Where is your house, Miss Witness?

A: Our house is located at xxx.

Q: You said that you were raped inside the bathroom of your Tiya Ineng. How were you able to get
inside that bathroom of your Tiya Ineng?

A: I was able to get inside the bathroom of Tiya Ineng because Emiliano Duranan pulled me inside.

Q: How did Emiliano Duranan pulled you? (sic)

A: He pulled me inside the bathroom by holding his arm against my neck, pulling me towards the
bathroom.

....

Q: When Emiliano Duranan pulled you inside the bathroom, what happened after that?

A: He kissed me.

(Witness is gesturing his (sic) hands towards her neck)

And he had my panty removed.

Q: Now, you said that when you were inside the bathroom of your Tiya Ineng, Emiliano Duranan kissed
you in (sic) your lips?
A: Yes, maam.

Q: Aside from kissing you, what did Emiliano do, if any?

A: Aside from kissing me on my lips and my neck, he removed my underwear, my panty and he inserted
his sex organ into my sex organ.

Q: When Kalbo inserted his sex organ in your sex organ, what position were you then?

A: We were standing.

Q: Inside the bathroom?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: AAA, do you know how to tell the days of the week?

A: No, maam.

Q: How about the dates?

A: No, maam.

Q: Do you know what day is today?

A: Wednesday.

Q: How about yesterday, what date was that?

A: Tuesday.

Q: Do you know what date is today?

COURT:

She knows that today is Wednesday but she doesnt know the exact date.[xxxiv][34]

....

Q: You also testified before that you were rape (sic) by Kalbo twice, is that correct?

A: Yes, Maam.

Q: When was the second time?

A: The second time at their house that was Tuesday.

Q: Is that the next day? After the incident in the bathroom?

A: Yes, Maam.
....

Q: So you said that you were laid down by Kalbo on the floor and then Kalbo kissed you, where did Kalbo
kiss you?

A: From (sic) my lips.

Q: After that what did Kalbo do if any?

A: Proceeded to removed (sic) my panty and inserted his organ to mine.[xxxv][35]

At all events, any objection to the competency of complainant to testify should have been raised by the
defense at the outset. It cannot be raised for the first time in this appeal. It has been held:

A party may waive his objections to the competency of a witness and permit him to testify.... [I]f, after
such incompetency appears, there is failure to make timely objection, by a party having knowledge of
the incompetency, the objection will be deemed waived, whether it is on the ground of want of mental
capacity or for some other reason. If the objection could have been taken during the trial, a new trial will
be refused and the objection will not be available on writ of error.[xxxvi][36]

Third. Accused-appellant contends that the absence of injury sustained by complainant negates the
presence of any force and intimidation. This contention is likewise without merit. The presence or
absence of injuries is not essential in proving rape. What is essential is proof that sexual intercourse with
a woman was accomplished without her consent. In this case, the absence of consent is shown by the
fact that complainant is a mental retardate vulnerable to intimidation by accused-appellant.

Indeed, the degree of force or intimidation required for the act to constitute rape is relative, and must
be viewed in the light of the complainants perception and judgment at the time of the commission of
the offense.[xxxvii][37] What is vital is that such force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the
purpose that accused-appellant had in mind.[xxxviii][38] In this case, due to the complainants mental
retardation, the force or intimidation required is not very great since it does not take much to force a
child into submission. Indeed, complainant said she submitted to accused-appellants demands because
she was afraid he would get angry at her if she refused them. In People v. Rosare,[xxxix][39] it was held
that, in the instances where the victim is so weak in intellect that she is incapable of rational consent,
the force applied may be constructive.

In sum, the mental retardation of the complainant is proven by the testimony of her mother,[xl][40] the
trial courts observations during the trial of her demeanor, behavior, and her intelligence,[xli][41] while
the fact of sexual intercourse is proven by the medico-legal certificate.[xlii][42] In addition, the
prosecution proved the presence of force and intimidation, and the court appreciated such.[xliii][43]
The intimidation, in this case, is constituted by the threats that accused-appellant made to the
complainant,[xliv][44] not to mention the force employed by accused-appellant in placing his arm on the
complainants neck[xlv][45] and holding her hands while undressing her.[xlvi][46]

However, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity should be doubled because there are two counts of
rape. In addition, complainant should also be awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of
rape, or a total of P100,000.00 in accordance with our rulings.[xlvii][47]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, xxx, finding accusedappellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity is increased to P100,000.00 and, in addition, accused-appellant is ordered to pay
complainant AAA the further sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 130601. December 4, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN, accused-appellant.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN appeals from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City finding
him guilty of Robbery with Rape, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him
to pay the victim, Dominga Pikit-pikit, P8,500.00 for actual damages and P50,000.00 for moral
damages.[1]

Culled principally from the testimonies of Dominga Pikit-pikit and PO3 Steve dela Cruz, the inculpatory
facts follow: At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of 16 April 1995 complaining witness Dominga Pikit-
pikit, 24 years old, was walking towards Emiville Subdivision, Diversion Road, Sasa, Davao City, on her
way home from work. Suddenly, a man appeared from behind, looped his arm around her neck and
warned her not to shout or else she would die.[2] The man then dragged her through the banana
plantation towards the cornfields where the plants were a meter high and far apart.[3] When Dominga
shouted for help, the man pushed her to the ground and punched her on the stomach saying, "Leche ka,
why are you shouting? What do you want me to do, make you unconscious?"[4]

Dominga Pikit-pikit got a good look at the man, who turned out to be accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y
Guzman, as he sat on her thighs and proceeded to divest her of her belongings - ladies watch, bracelet,
ring with russian diamonds, wedding ring and P1,000.00 cash. With the full moon shining on his face, the
victim clearly saw Diopita place the items on the right pocket of his shorts.[5]

Thereafter, accused-appellant Diopita announced his desire to have carnal knowledge of Dominga.
Forthwith, he pulled up her t-shirt and unfastened her brassiere. He also loosened her belt, unzipped
her pants and struggled to pull it down, nearly ripping her zipper. Annoyed at the tightness of her pants,
Diopita hit her and ordered her to help him pull them down.[6] Dominga, fearing for her life and
thinking of Diopitas punches, obeyed. She pulled her pants to her hips. Then accused-appellant forcibly
pulled them down further and got irritated in fact when he was told that she was wearing a girdle and
panty. In frustration, he punched her repeatedly and kept on muttering, "Why is this very tight? What
kind of panty is this?" Finally, he succeeded in pulling the girdle and panty down.[7]

Accused-appellant Diopita then took off his shorts. He kissed the victim, lasciviously caressed her
breasts, bit her nipples, and fornicated with her. As he was sexually assaulting her, Dominga made
desperate struggles and frantic calls for help but her efforts proved futile until he finally satiated his lust.
He then warned Dominga not to tell anyone and that should he hear that she told anybody about the
incident he would shoot her to death. Then he dressed up and left, walking casually to the opposite
direction of the subdivision before disappearing in the darkness.[8]

Exhausted, Dominga slowly stood up, put on her clothes and walked away in the direction of her house.
Finding it locked, she asked help from her neighbors who called the police. Thereafter, Dominga was
brought to Precinct No. 4 of Sasa, Davao City, where SPO1 Stephen Batacan entered her complaint in
the police blotter. Later, she was examined by Dr. Floranne Lam-Vergara at the Davao Medical Center
who found her "positive for spermatocytes."[9]

PO3 Steve dela Cruz, who was on duty at the Intelligence and Investigation Section, made a follow-up on
the case. He went to the victims house and interviewed her between the hours of 1:00 oclock and 3:00
oclock in the morning of the following day, 17 April 1995. Dominga gave a description of the suspect and
his possible whereabouts.[10] Acting on that information, PO3 dela Cruz went to the scene of the crime
to investigate and there he recovered a colored white/yellow, size ten (10) slipper. Since the victim
earlier disclosed that the suspect headed north after committing the crime, he proceeded to that
direction where he came upon four (4) houses about fifteen (15) to fifty (50) meters away from the
scene of the crime. A back-up team was called and they rounded up all the residents therein.
Afterwards, four (4) men who fitted the description of the suspect were invited to the police station for
questioning. They were Placido Laput, William Silvano, Vicente Silvano and accused-appellant Rafael
Diopita y Guzman.[11]

At about 6:00 oclock in the morning of 17 April 1995, the police invited Dominga to identify the suspect
at the police station. Thereat, Dominga saw the four (4) men in a police line-up and readily pointed at
accused-appellant.[12] The police then had him try on the recovered slipper; it easily fitted him.[13]
Thus, Diopita was detained while the others were released.

The defense denied the charge and invoked alibi. Accused-appellant claimed that between 8:30 to 12:00
oclock in the evening of 16 April 1995 he was with his wife Flora, son Ryan and fellow Jehovahs
Witnesses Roger Custorio and Ruben Suarez at the house of Eulalio Nisnisan for an informal Bible
session upon the invitation of Juan Nisnisan.[14] Accused-appellant also claimed that during those
hours, he never left the place. Flora, Roger, Ruben, Eulalio and Juan corroborated his alibi and testified
on his good moral character as a ministerial servant of their faith.
On 18 June 1997, the trial court formally rejected his defense of alibi and convicted him of the crime
charged; consequently, accused-appellant is now before us on appeal. The trial court ruled -

Alibi is a weak defense because it can easily be fabricated that it is so easy for witnesses to get confused
as to dates and time. The precision with which the witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members
in the Jehovahs Witnesses, quoted the respective hours when the participants in the Bible sharing
session supposedly arrived is, at best, self-serving and deserves scant consideration because of the
facility with which it may be concocted and fabricated.

On the other hand, private complainant Dominga Pikit-Pikit positively identified Rafael Diopita as the
person who robbed and raped her on April 16, 1995. She testified in a clear, straightforward and
convincing manner and no ill-motive on her part had been shown to have prompted her to testify
falsely. The failure of the defense to attribute any ill-motive on the part of Pikit-Pikit to pin responsibility
on Diopita adds more credence to complainants testimony.

In a long line of cases, it has been held that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by the victim. Pikit-Pikit testified that she was able to see the face of her
attacker because the moon was shining brightly that evening. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that in the month of April 1995 the full moon came out on April 15, 1995, a day before the date of the
crime.

We affirm his conviction; the guilt of accused-appellant has been established by the evidence beyond
reasonable doubt.

First. Complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit positively and categorically identified accused-appellant
as her assailant, first during the police line-up where she singled him out from among the four (4)
suspects and, later during the trial where she pointed at accused-appellant as the one who robbed and
sexually molested her -

Q: Where did you go?

A: To the Police Station, there were four persons who lined up for identification.
Q: And then?

A: First, when I arrived, I peeped behind the place where there were four persons lining up. After that I
went to the place where they were receiving visitors and I saw the four persons who were there already
and lined up.

Q: And then?

A: After that the police told me to identify the person who molested me, and I pointed to that person
there (witness pointing to the accused whom she previously identified).[15]

From the circumstances of this case, it cannot be denied that complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit
had a good look at the face and physical features of accused-appellant during the commission of the
crime. While the robbery was in progress, the moonlight sufficiently illumined his face and clothes, thus
making it possible for private complainant to identify him.[16] During the rape, private complainant was
as close to accused-appellant as was physically possible, for a man and a woman cannot be more
physically close to each other than during a sexual act.[17] Victims of criminal violence naturally strive to
know the identity of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was perpetrated, creating a
lasting impression which may not be erased easily in their memory.[18] There is therefore no reason to
doubt the accuracy of private complainants visual perception of accused-appellant as the criminal. Nor is
there any reason to doubt her honesty of intention for there is no showing that she implicated accused-
appellant due to an evil or corrupt motive.

We do not subscribe to accused-appellants contentions that the complaining witness hesitated to point
at him during the police line-up, and that she was just forced by the police to choose him from among
the four (4) suspects. The identification was made with such certainty by the complaining witness that
even accused-appellant had to comment on it -

Atty. Galicia: What made you say she was hesitant to point at you? x x x x
Rafael Diopita: Because during that time, sir, when we confronted each other in the police station, she
was looking at me when there were four of us there. So, I asked why x x x x[19]

The foregoing testimony belied the allegation of hesitancy on the part of Dominga Pikit-pikit to pinpoint
accused-appellant during the line-up. His very own words project his guilt as well. Only the guilty
experiences neurotic fear in the face of imminent discovery of his malefaction. His paranoia colors his
interpretation of the events during the line-up. Consider accused-appellants assertion that Dominga
Pikit-pikit was forced by the police to point at him, and Prosecutor Esparagoza's objection thereto -

Sur-rebuttal of Atty. Galicia: Mr. Diopita, according to private complainant Dominga Pikit-pikit during her
rebuttal testimony that she was not forced by the police to point at you when you were in the police
station. What can you say to that?

Rafael Diopita: That woman hesitated to point at me but the police said you point at him.

Q: What made you say she was hesitant to point at you?

Prosecutor Esparagoza: The witness said ITUDLO! ITUDLO! (YOU POINT! YOU POINT!). He did not say he
was the one pointed to, your Honor.[20]

Gleaned from the aforequoted testimony was the absence of suggestiveness in the identification
process. There were four (4) men in the line-up and the police did not specifically suggest to Dominga to
point particularly at accused-appellant. Not even the shodding of the slipper recovered from the scene
of the crime could provide any suggestiveness to the line-up as it came after accused-appellant was
already identified by Dominga Pikit-pikit.

Second. In light of this positive and direct evidence of accused-appellants culpability, the trial court
correctly discarded his defense of alibi. It is an elementary rule that alibi cannot prevail over the clear
and positive identification of the accused as the very person who committed the crime. Moreover, in
order to justify an acquittal based on this defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that (a) he was in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and, (b) it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.[21] This,
accused-appellant miserably failed to do.
Accused-appellant admitted that at the time in question he was with his wife, son and fellow members
of the Jehovahs Witnesses at the house of one Eulalio Nisnisan supposedly attending Bible studies,
which is merely fifteen (15) to fifty (50) meters away from the crime scene. Considering the short and
insignificant distance, it was not impossible for accused-appellant to surreptitiously slip away from the
house of Nisnisan, commit the crime and then return without arousing the suspicion of his companions
who were then busy with their Bible session. This is obviously the situation in this case and, taken
together with the preceding considerations, we likewise reject this poor and discredited defense as did
the trial court. Verily, even if the defense of alibi is corroborated by the testimony of the friends of
accused-appellant, it deserves the barest consideration and will not be given weight if it would not
preclude any doubt that he could have been physically present at the locus criminis or its immediate
vecino at the time of its commission.[22]

Third. Perhaps aware of the crushing impact of complainants positive identification of accused-
appellant, the defense attacked the supposed inconsistencies and discrepancies in her testimony in a
vain attempt to make it completely unreliable, claiming that: (a) the victim declared that the culprit
wore short pants with a zipper, and he had no short pants with zipper; (b) the yellow slipper retrieved by
the police did not belong to him as his slippers were colored blue, with his initials inscribed thereon;
and, (c) the description given by complainant in the police blotter did not fit the physical appearance of
accused-appellant.

We are not persuaded. Suffice it to say that these are mere trifles which do not detract from
complainants straightforward and consistent identification of accused-appellant as the one who robbed
and raped her. Trivial inconsistencies do not shake the pedestal upon which the complainants credibility
rests. On the contrary, they are taken as badges of truth rather than as indicia of falsehood for they
manifest spontaneity and erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[23] Furthermore, entries in
police blotters should not be given undue significance or probative value for they are normally
incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestion or want of suggestion or
inquiry.[24]

Fourth. We now deal with the more substantial arguments raised by accused-appellant in his brief. He
tenaciously maintains that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime charged since he is a
person of good moral character, holding as he does the position of "Ministerial Servant" in the
congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible
family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God.
We are not impressed. The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly
justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the
position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and
plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is
not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an
acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance
or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had
discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the
crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of
accused-appellant is unavailing.

Accused-appellant likewise bewails and assigns as reversible error the failure of the trial court to give
credence to the testimonies of the defense witnesses. He argues that these are Jehovahs Witnesses, and
as such, they are God-fearing people who would never lie as to his whereabouts at the time in question.
This argument is as puerile as the first. We quote once more, and with approval, the pertinent portion of
the trial courts ruling on this point -

x x x x it is so easy for witnesses to get confused as to dates and time. The precision with which the
witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members in the Jehovahs Witnesses, quoted the respective
hours when the participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at best, self-serving and
deserves scant consideration because of the facility with which it may be concocted and fabricated
(underscoring supplied).

The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best and most competently performed
by the trial court who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while
testifying, and to assess their credibility using various indicia available but not reflected in the
records.[25] Hence, the court a quo's appraisal on the matter is entitled to the highest respect, and will
not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the
case.[26] There is no compelling reason in the present case to depart from this rule.

In sum, we find that all the elements of robbery with rape are present in this case. There was
asportation of the jewelry and cash of the victim by means of force and violence on her person, showing
the initial animus lucrandi of accused-appellant,[27] and then his lecherous intent when he raped his
victim. Accordingly, we hold that the court below did not commit any reversible error in ruling that the
requisite quantum of evidence for a finding of guilt has been sufficiently met by the prosecution as to
call for our affirmance of the judgment of the court a quo.[28]

However, in addition to the actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court in the amounts of
P8,500.00 and P50,000.00, respectively, another amount of P50,000.00 should have also been awarded
to the victim Dominga Pikit-pikit for civil indemnity, as it is mandatory upon a conviction of rape. Such
indemnity is distinct from moral damages and based on different jural foundations.[29]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, convicting accused-
appellant RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN of ROBBERY WITH RAPE, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua,
and ordering him to pay DOMINGA PIKIT-PIKIT the sums of P8,500.00 for actual damages and
P50,000.00 for moral damages, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that, in addition, civil indemnity of
another P50,000.00 is further awarded to her. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

IBAAN RURAL BANK V. CA (EVIDENCE)

Essentially, 2 issues are raised for resolution:

What was the period of redemption: 2 years as unilaterally fixed by the sheriff in the contract, or 1 year
as fixed by law?

May respondent court properly award attorney's fees solely on the basis of the refusal of the bank to
allow redemption?

When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale in the Register of Deeds, it had actual and
constructive knowledge of the certificate and its contents. For 2 years, it did not object to the 2-year
redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said that petitioner consented to the 2-
year redemption period especially since it had time to object but did not.
When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is
proposed, his silence can be construed as consent. By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private
respondents to believe that they had 2 years within which to redeem the mortgage.

After the lapse of 2 years, petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period of redemption was only
1 year and that the period had already lapsed.

ESTOPPEL IN PAIS arises when one, by his acts, representations, or admissions, or by his own silence
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe
certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced
if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.

In affirming the decision of the trial court, CA relied on Lazo v. Republic Surety where the court held that
the 1-year period of redemption provided in Act 3135 is only directory and can be extended by
agreement of the parties. True, but it bears noting that in Lazo, the parties voluntarily agreed to extend
the redemption period. This is not so in the instant case. There was no voluntary agreement. In fact, the
sheriff unilaterally and arbitrarily extended the period of redemption to 2 years in the certificate of sale.
The parties were not even in privy to the extension made by the sheriff. Nonetheless, as above
discussed, the bank cannot after the lapse of 2 years insist that the redemption period was 1 year only.

Additionally, the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of a property.
The fact alone that he is allowed the right to redeem clearly demonstrates the solicitousness of the law
in giving him another opportunity, should his fortune improve, to recover his lost property.

Lastly, petitioner is a banking institution on whom the public expects diligence, meticulousness, and
mastery of its transactions. Had petitioner diligently reviewed the certificate of sale, it could have easily
discovered that the period was extended 1 year beyond the usual period of redemption. Banks, being
greatly affected with public interest, are expected to exercise a degree of diligence in the handling of its
affairs higher than that expected of an ordinary business firm.

On the second issue, the award of attorney's fees must be disallowed for lack of legal basis. The fact that
private respondents were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect and enforce their claim
does not justify the award of attorney's fees. The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be
recovered as part of damages because of the public policy that no premium should be placed on the
right to litigate. The award of attorney's fees must be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary
damages are eliminated.