RAMOS VS.

RAMOS
61 SCRA 284

FACTS: Spouses Martin Ramos and Candida Tanate died on October 4, 1906 and October 26, 1880, respectively. They were survived by their 3
children. Moreover, Martin was survived by his 7 natural children. In December 1906, a special proceeding for the settlement of the intestate
estate of said spouses was conducted. Rafael Ramos, a brother of Martin, administered the estate for more than 6 years. Eventually, a partition
project was submitted which was signed by the 3 legitimate children and 2 of the 7 natural children. A certain Timoteo Zayco signed in
representation of the other 5 natural children who were minors. The partition was sworn to before a justice of peace.

The conjugal hereditary estate was appraised at P74,984.93, consisting of 18 parcels of land, some head of cattle and the advances to the
legitimate children. ½ thereof represented the estate of Martin. 1/3 thereof was the free portion or P12,497.98. The shares of the 7 natural
children were to be taken from that 1/3 free portion. Indeed, the partition was made in accordance with the Old Civil code. Thereafter, Judge
Richard Campbell approved the partition project. The court declared that the proceeding will be considered closed and the record should be
archived as soon as proof was submitted that each he3ir had received the portion adjudicated to him.

On February 3, 1914, Judge Nepumoceno asked the administrator to submit a report showing that the shares of the heirs had been delivered to
them as required by the previous decision. Nevertheless, the manifestation was not in strict conformity with the terms of the judge’s order and
with the partition project itself. 8 lots of the Himamaylan Cadastre were registered in equal shares in the names of Gregoria (widow of Jose
Ramos) and her daughter, when in fact the administrator was supposed to pay the cash adjudications to each of them as enshrined in the partition
project. Plaintiffs were then constrained to bring the suit before the court seeking for the reconveyance in their favor their corresponding
participations in said parcels of land in accordance with Article 840 of the old Civil Code. Note that 1/6 of the subject lots represents the 1/3 free
portion of martin’s shares which will eventually redound to the shares of his 7 legally acknowledged natural children. The petitioners’ action was
predicated on the theory that their shares were merely held in trust by defendants. Nonetheless, no Deed of Trust was alleged and proven.
Ultimately, the lower court dismissed the complaint on the grounds of res judicata, prescription and laches.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs’ action was barred by prescription, laches and res judicata to the effect that they were denied of their right
to share in their father’s estate.

RULING: YES, there was inexcusable delay thereby making the plaintiffs’ action unquestionably barred by prescription and laches and also by
res judicata. Inextricably interwoven with the questions of prescription and res judicata is the question on the existence of a trust. It is
noteworthy that the main thrust of plaintiffs’ action is the alleged holding of their shares in trust by defendants. Emanating from such, the
Supreme Court elucidated on the nature of trusts and the availability of prescription and laches to bar the action for reconveyance of property
allegedly held in trust. It is said that trust is the right, enforceable solely in equity to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which
is vested in another. It may either be express or implied. The latter ids further subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts. Applying it now
to the case at bar, the plaintiffs did not prove any express trust. Neither did they specify the kind of implied trust contemplated in their action.
Therefore, its enforcement maybe barred by laches and prescription whether they contemplate a resulting or a constructive trust.

CUAYCONG VS. CUAYCONG

FACTS
The surviving children and grandchildren of Lino Cuaycong, brother of deceased Eduardo Cuaycong filed a suit against Justo, Luis and
Benjamin Cuaycong for conveyance of inheritance and accounting alleging that Eduardo Cuaycong had on several occasions, made known to his
brothers and sisters that he and his wife Clotilde de Leon (died in 1940) had an understanding and made arrangements with Luis Cuaycong and
his father Justo Cuaycong, that it was their desire to divide Haciendas Sta. Cruz and Pusod among his brothers and sister and his wife Clotilde.
As the two haciendas were the subject of transactions between the spouses and Justo and Luis Cuaycong, Eduardo told Justo and Luis, and the
two agreed, to hold in trust what might belong to his brothers and sister as a result of the arrangements and deliver to them their share when the
proper time comes. And as far back as 1936 Lino demanded from Justo and Luis his share and especially after Eduardo's and Clotilde's death, the
plaintiffs demanded their shares.

ISSUES
Whether or not an express trust was made over the properties in question

RULING
Yes. An express trust was made over the properties in question.

RATIO
The intention of the trustor may be seen in the complaint that “on several occasions during the later years of Eduardo and Lino Cuaycong, the
former made known to the latter and to their brothers and sister, that he and his wife, Clotilde de Leon, who died in 1941, had an understanding
and made arrangements with defendant Luis D. Cuaycong and his father, Justo Cuaycong, that it was their (Eduardo's and Clotilde's) wish and
desire, that Hdas. "Sta. Cruz," and "Pusod" above-referred to, should be divided between the brothers and sister of Eduardo Cuaycong, namely,
Justo, Meliton, Lino and Basilisa, all surnamed Cuaycong, and his wife, Clotilde de Leon.” Said complaint also provides “pursuant to such wish
and desire and arrangements, the said Eduardo Cuaycong, with the knowledge and consent of his wife, Clotilde de Leon, and as an agreement
with the latter to effectuate their wish and desire had directed his brothers and sister to pay his wife the sum of P75,000.00, the value of the two
haciendas above-mentioned being P150,000.00, and then divide the same among themselves share and share alike; or, at all events, should his
brothers and sister fail to do just that, they should divide only the one-half (1/2) portions proindiviso thereof appertaining to him (Eduardo) in the
conjugal properties.” Such being the case, it is clear that the trustor expressly told the defendants of his intention to establish the trust.
FABIAN VS. FABIAN

FACTS: Pablo Fabian bought from the Philippine Government lot 164 of the Friar Lands Estate in Muntinlupa, Rizal. By virtue of this
purchase, he was issued sale certificate 547. He died on August 2, 1928, survived by four children, namely, Esperanza, Benita I, Benita II, and
Silbina. On October 5, 1928 Silbina Fabian and Teodora Fabian, niece of the deceased, executed an affidavit. On the strength of this affidavit,
sale certificate 547 was assigned to them.

The acting Director of Lands, on behalf of the Government, sold lot 164 to Silbina Fabian Teodora Fabian. The vendees spouses forthwith took
physical possession thereof, cultivated it, and appropriated the produce. In that same year, they declared the lot in their names for taxation
purposes. In 1937 the RD of Rizal issued a TCT over lot 164 in their names. They later subdivided the lot into 2 equal parts.

The plaintiffs filed the present action for reconveyance against the defendants spouses, averring that Silbina and Teodora, through fraud
perpetrated in their affidavit aforesaid. That by virtue of this affidavit, the said defendants succeeded in having the sale certificate assigned to
them and thereafter in having lot 164 covered by said certificate transferred in their names; and that by virtue also of these assignment and
transfer, the defendants succeeded fraudulently in having lot 164 registered in their names. They further allege that the land has not been
transferred to an innocent purchaser for value. A reconveyance thereof is prayed for.

In their answer, the defendants spouses claim that Pablo Fabian was not the owner of lot 164 at the time of his death on August 2, 1928 because
he had not paid in full the amortizations on the lot; that they are the absolute owners thereof, having purchased it from the Government, and from
that year having exercised all the attributes of ownership thereof up to the present; and that the present action for reconveyance has already
prescribed. The dismissal of the complaint is prayed for.

The lower court rendered judgment declaring that the defendants spouses had acquired a valid and complete title to the property by acquisitive
prescription, and accordingly dismissed the complaint. The latter’s motion for reconsideration was thereafter denied. Hence, the present
recourse.

ISSUE:

(1) Was Pablo Fabian the owner of lot 164 at the time of his death, in the face of the fact, admitted by the defendants-appellees, that he had not
then paid the entire purchase price thereof?

(2) May laches constitute a bar to an action to enforce a constructive trust?

(3) Has title to the land vested in the appellees through the mode of acquisitive prescription?

HELD: The judgment a quo, dismissing the complaint, is affirmed

1. YES. Lot 164 was a part of the Friar Lands Estate of Muntinlupa, Rizal; its sale to Pablo Fabian was therefore governed by Act 1120,
otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act. While under section 15 of the said Act, title to the land sold is reserved to the Government until the
purchaser makes full payment of all the required installments and the interest thereon, this legal reservation refers to the bare, naked title.
The equitable and beneficial title really went to the purchaser the moment he paid the first installment and was given a certificate of
sale. The reservation of the title in favor of the Government is made merely to protect the interest of the Government so as to preclude or prevent
the purchaser from encumbering or disposing of the lot purchased before the payment in full of the purchase price. Outside of this protection
the Government retains no right as an owner. For instance, after issuance of the sales certificate and pending payment in full of the purchase
price, the Government may not sell the lot to another. It may not even encumber it. It may not occupy the land to use or cultivate; neither may it
lease it or even participate or share in its fruits. In other words, the Government does not and cannot exercise the rights and prerogatives of
owner. And when said purchaser finally pays the final installment on the purchase price and is given a deed of conveyance and a certificate of
title, the title at least in equity, retroacts to the time he first occupied the land, paid the first installment and was issued the corresponding
certificate of sale. In other words, pending the completion of the payment of the purchase price, the purchaser is entitled to all the
benefits and advantages which may accrue to the land as well as suffer the losses that may befall it.

That Pablo Fabian had paid five annual installments to the Government, and in fact been issued a sale certificatein his name, are conceded. He
was therefore the owner of lot 164 at the time of his death. He left four daughters, namely, Esperanza, Benita I, Benita II and Silbina to whom all
his rights and interest over lot 164 passed upon his demise.

In case a holder of a certificate dies before the giving of the deed and does not leave a widow, then the interest of the holder of the certificate
shall descend and deed shall issue to the person who under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have taken had the title been perfected
before the death of the holder of the certificate, upon proof of the holders thus entitled of compliance with all the requirements of the certificate.

2.
The assignment and sale of the lot to the defendants Silbina and Teodora were therefore null and void. To the extent of the participation of the
appellants, application must be made of the principle that if property is acquired through fraud, the person obtaining it is considered a trustee of
an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

Laches may bar an action brought to enforce a constructive trust such as the one in the case at bar. Illuminating are the following excerpts from
a decision penned by Mr. Justice Reyes:
But in constructive trusts, . . . the rule is that laches constitutes a bar to actions to enforce the trust, and repudiation is not required, unless there is
a concealment of the facts giving rise to the trust …

The assignment of sale certificate was effected in October 1928; and the actual transfer of lot 164 was made on the following November 14. It
was only on July 8, 1960, 32 big years later, that the appellants for the first time came forward with their claim to the land. The record does not
reveal, and it is not seriously asserted, that the appellees concealed the facts giving rise to the trust. Upon the contrary, paragraph 13 of the
stipulation of facts of the parties states with striking clarity “that defendants herein have been in possession of the land in question since 1928 up
to the present publicly and continuously under claim of ownership; they have cultivated it, harvested and appropriated the fruits for themselves.”

3. it is already settled in this jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trusts, resulting
from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations. the discovery in that case being deemed to have taken place when new certificates of title
were issued exclusively in the names of the respondents therein.

[A]lthough, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the
property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates, as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted
by the possessor of the property

Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of “extra-judicial settlement” upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof,
the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Upon the undisputed facts in the case at bar, not only had
laches set in when the appellants instituted their action for, reconveyance in 1960, but as well their right to enforce the constructive trust had
already prescribed.

It logically follows from the above disquisition that acquisitive prescription has likewise operated to vest absolute title in the appellees, pursuant
to the provisions of section 41 of Act 190 that:

Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly
continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall
vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title

Upon the foregoing disquisition, we hold not only that the appellants’ action to enforce the constructive trust created in their favor has
prescribed, but as well that a valid, full and complete title has vested in the appellees by acquisitive prescription.

CARANTES VS. CA

Facts: Mateo Carantes, original owner of Lot No. 44 situated at Loakan, Baguio City, died in 1913 leaving his widow Ogasia, and six children,
namely, Bilad, Lauro, Crispino, Maximino, Apung and Sianang,. In 1930, the government, in order to expand the landing field of the Loakan
Airport, filed for the expropriation of a portion of Lot. No. 44. Said lot was subdivided into Lots. No. 44A to 44E for the purpose.

In 1913, Maximino Carrantes (MAX) was appointed the judicial administrator of the estate of Mateo. Four heirs, namely, Bilad, Lauro,
Sianang, and Crisipino, executed a deed denominated “Assignment of Right to Inheritance” assigning to Max their rights over said lot in 1939.
The stated monetary consideration is P1.00. On same date, Max sold Lot Nos. 44B and 44C to the government. One year later the Court of First
Instance, upon joint petition of the Carrantes heirs, issued an order cancelling O.C.T. No. 3 and TCT No. 2533 was issued in its place.

On 16 March 1940, Max registered the deed of “Assignment of Right to Inheritance”. Thus, TCT No. 2533 was cancelled and TCT
2540 was issued in the name of Max. A formal deed of Sale was also executed by Max on the same date in favor of the government. Hence, TCT
2540 was cancelled and new TCTs were issued in favor of the government and Max, respectively. On 4 Sept. 1958, Bilad, Lauro, and Crispino,
along with the surviving heirs of Apung and Sianang filed complaint in the CFI.

They claimed that the execution of the deed of assignment was attended by fraud. The trial court decided that the action of the heirs had already
prescribed since an action on fraud prescribes on four years from discovery of such, in this case, on 16 March 1940 when Max registered the
deed of assignment. The Court of Appeals reversed and found that a constructive trust was created. Hence, the present petition.

Issue: 1. whether a constructive trust involves a fiduciary relationship? 2. Whether action had already prescribed?

Held: 1. The court, assuming that there was fraud, and in turn, a constructive trust in favor of the other heirs, said that constructive trust does not
involve a promise nor fiduciary relations. Hence, the respondent court’s conclusion that the rule on constructive notice does not apply because
there was a fiduciary relationship between the parties lacks the necessary premise.

2. Action had already prescribed because there was constructive notice to the heirs when Maximino registered the deed of assignment with the
register of deeds on 16 March 1940. Such date is the reckoning point of counting prescription based on fraud.

Anent respondent court’s contention that constructive trust is imprescriptible, the court said that it is untenable. It is already settled that
constructive trusts prescribes in 10 years. In this case, the ten year period started on 16 March 1940. And since the respondents commenced the
action only on 4 Sept. 1958, the same is barred by prescription.
CARAGAY-LAYNO VS. CA

Mariano De Vera died in 1951. His widow administered his property until her death in 1966. De Vera’s nephew (Salvador Estrada) took over as
administrator of De Vera’s estate. Prior to the widow’s death, she made an inventory showing that De Vera’s property (located in Calasiao,
Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq. m (more or less). Estrada however noticed that the Torrens title under De Vera indicated that his property
measures 8752 sq. m. He learned that the discrepancy is the 3732 sq. m. being occupied by Juliana. Estrada sued to evict Juliana.

Juliana averred that she and her father have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and in the concept of an owner of the
land since 1921; that they’ve been paying taxes; that the title held by Estrada was registered in 1947 but it only took them to initiate an action in
1967 therefore laches has set in.

ISSUE: Whether or not the period of reconveyance has already prescribed based on Juliana’s implied trust.

HELD: No. Prescription cannot be invoked against JULIANA for the reason that as lawful possessor and owner of the Disputed Portion, her
cause of action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to the property, falls within settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title
to property in one’s possession is imprescriptible. 5 Her undisturbed possession over a period of fifty two (52) years gave her a continuing right
to seek the aid of a Court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the effect on her own title. 6

Besides, under the circumstances, JULIANA’s right to quiet title, to seek reconveyance, and to annul OCT. No. 63 accrued only in 1966 when
she was made aware of a claim adverse to her own. It was only then that the statutory period of prescription may be said to have commenced to
run against her.The only portion that can be adjudged in favor of de Vera’s estate is that which was being claimed by the widow (in her
inventory). A recalculation must however be made to specify the exact measure of land belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be retained by
Juliana (portion which she actually occupies) and 5020 sq. m. should go to de Vera’s estate.

DUQUE VS. DOMINGO

Facts: The complaint alleged that plaintiff, Julia Duque, is a niece of Juana Duque who died in 1928. Juana
Duque, through her other nephew, Faustino Duque, whom she had employed as her agent, purchased from the
government Lot 1083 of the Malinta Estate at Polo, Bulacan. Faustino Duque, the agent, caused the document
of purchase, to be issued by the government in his name with the consent of his principal, Juana Duque. On
June 22, 1915, Faustino Duque transferred his Sale Certificate No. 1138 with the permission of Juana Duque to
his brother, Mariano Duque, who later received in 1931 Transfer Certificate No. 7501 for Lot 1083 from the
government; it was alleged that since then, Juana Duque had been in the exclusive possession of Lot 1083 as
owner paying the installments stipulated in the contract to the government through Faustino Duque and Mariano
Duque or reimbursing their advances therefor; that in 1927, Juana Duque verbally donated and delivered Lot
1083 to plaintiff Julia Duque, her niece; that from then on up to the present, the plaintiff Julia Duque has been
the exclusive and the beneficial owner thereof.

However, when Mariano Duque, the title holder, died and in 1957, his children, Emilio Duque, Potenciana
Duque, Amadeo Duque and Arsenic Duque registered Lot 1083 in their names in the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan. Then the plaintiff, Julia Duque, requested the defendants to reconvey to her the title of Lot 1083 but
they refused to comply with her request.

Issue: W/N there was implied trust between Juana Duque and either Faustino Duque or Mariano Duque?

Held: No implied trust between Juana Duque and either Faustino Duque or Mariano Duque has been established
by sufficient evidence. The alleged possession by the private respondents of the land in question did not divest
the petitioners, as registered owners, of their rights to Lot 1083. Adverse possession under claim of ownership
for the period fixed by law is ineffective against a Torrens title. There is no adequate showing that Mariano
Duque consented in 1927 to a verbal partition made by Juana Duque wherein she gave the property in question,
Lot 1083, to Julia Duque. On the contrary, in 1931, after full payment of the purchase price, Mariano Duque
obtained in his name Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot 1083 from the government.

The alleged oral donation by Juana Duque in favor of Julia Duque did not transfer any right over Lot 1083 to
the donee. Both under the Spanish Civil Code and the Civil Code of the Philippines, a donation of an
immovable, to be valid must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the
value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.

At any rate, granting, that such an implied or constructive trust existed, the right of action upon the same has
prescribed. From 1931 when Transfer Certificate of Title covering the land in question was issued to Mariano
Duque until 1966 when the present case was commenced a period of 35 years had passed