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PICART vs. SMITH, JR. of negligence.

The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined


FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him.
said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the
opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The
a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience
successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
was not observing the rule of the road.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed
he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before
instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said
automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant
horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think
diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he
turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to
the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the
was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a threatened harm.
result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which
caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he
days. was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the
road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly
appealed. responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
obligation to repair the damage done circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences,
HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
rendered that the Picart recover of Smith damages. YES
Amado Picard vs. Frank Smith Jr.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case FACTS:
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act • Plaintiff Amado Picart appealed because the Court of First Instance absolved
use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty defendant Frank Smith Jr.
• Picart was riding on his pony on the bridge. The defendant was riding on his we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case,
car from the opposite directions when he approached Picart. Smith blew his the problem is always to discover which agent is immediately and directly
horn to give warnings but Picart moved his horse to the right instead of responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
moving to the left because he thought that he had no sufficient time to move contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
to the right direction. negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval.
• Defendant continued to move towards the left side but when he got near the
plaintiff and the horse, the animal became frightened that it turned its body Under the circumstances, the law is that the person who has the last clear
across the bridge. chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do it is chargeable with the
• The limb of the horse was broken and it died. The plaintiff was thrown off and consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
suffered injuries. He also required medical attention for several days.
• The plaintiff filed an action for damages against the defendant. The last clear chance rule of the law of negligence is particularly applied to
automobile accidents. This rule cannot be invoked where the negligence of the
ISSUE: plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant.
Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner described
was guilty of negligence such as it gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done.

HELD:
Yes, the defendant Frank Smith Jr. was guilty of negligence.

As Smith started to across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse
and the rider would pass over the proper side. But as he approached toward
the center of the bridge, he can see to his eyes that this won’t be done; and he
must in a moment have known that it was too late for the horse to cross with
safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things, this change of
situation occurred while it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to
escape being run don by going to a place of a greater safety. The control of the
situation had then passed to the defendant.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case


may be stated as follows.

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen than
an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
the conduct or guarding against its consequences.

It goes without saying that Plaintiff was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself in the wrong side of the road. But as
Jarco Marketing V. CA (1999) brought to the attention of the management the danger the counter could
Lessons Applicable: Good Father of a Family (Torts and Damages) cause. But the latter ignored their concern.

FACTS: ISSUE: W/N Jarco marketing was negligent or it was an accident


• May 9 1983: Criselda and her 6 year-old daughter Zhieneth were at the 2nd
floor of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. HELD: YES. CA affirmed
• While Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the counter, she felt a
sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. As she looked behind her, she Accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence
saw Zhieneth's body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping attaches to the defendant a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening an
counter/structure. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help. Although event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly
shocked, Criselda was quick to ask the assistance of the people around in through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or
lifting the counter and retrieving Zhieneth from the floor. Zhieneth was quickly unexpected by the person to whom it happens occurs when the person
rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on. concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any
• Next day: Zhieneth lost her speech and communicated by writing on a magic person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by
slate. common prudence negligence omission to do something which a reasonable
• 14 days after: She died on the hospital bed. The cause of her death was man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
attributed to the injuries she sustained. human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
• After the burial of their daughter, Criselda demanded upon Jarco Marketing reasonable man would not do the failure to observe, for the protection of the
the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which
expenses which they had incurred. But, they refused to pay. the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury
• Criselda filed a complaint for damages
• Jarco Marketing: answered with counterclaim and denied any liability. Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with
• Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by the other. Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for
allowing her to freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and Zhieneth, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor
appliances. Zhieneth too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she whom she trusted with her life. Without doubt, Panelo and another store
climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse on her. Petitioners also supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable
emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong support; counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor
it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction. ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and
• maintained that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation
selection, supervision and control of its employees. petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good
• trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim father of a family.
• proximate cause of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth was her act of clinging
to it. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive
• CA: favored Criselda judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in presumption that favors children below 9 years old in that they are incapable of
maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like contributory negligence. In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age
an inverted "L" with a top wider than the base. It was top heavy and the weight is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that
of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor supported by its narrow account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like
base. Thus, the counter was defective, unstable and dangerous; a downward exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and
pressure on the overhanging portion or a push from the front could cause the under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with
counter to fall. Two former employees of petitioners had already previously discernment.
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to Zhieneth and assume that she In their defense, petitioners claimed that Criselda was negligent for allowing her
climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept daughter to freely roam around the Department Store. They also claimed that
petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. Zhieneth was guilty of contributory negligence by climbing onto the counter
which later fell on her causing her untimely death.
Criselda too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially,
Zhieneth held on to CRISELDA's waist, and only momentarily released the Respondents on the other hand claim that Criselda was not guilty of negligence
child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise as it was natural for her to leave Criselda when she was signing her credit card
moment, it was reasonable and usual for her to let go of her child. slip. The yargue that Zhieneth is not presumed to be guilty of contributory
negligence as she was only 6 years old at that time and that her dying
Further, at the time Zhieneth was pinned down by the counter, she was just a declaration as testified to by the doctor was that the counter just fell on her
foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just 4 meters without her climbing onto it. Respondents also argue that the structure should
away - time and distance were both significant. have been nailed to the floor to prevent incidents like this.

As to the claim that the counter should have been nailed, they claim that it was
Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals unnecessary as it had been in existence for many years without incident.
Facts: Further, petitioners claim that the criminal case for simple negligence filed
Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel’s Department against them has been dismissed and that a verdict of acquittal issued in their
Store,Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are favour.
the store’s branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Trial court dismissed the complaint but the Court of Appeals reversed.
Privater respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar
(Zhieneth). Issue: WON petitioners may be held liable for the death of Zhieneth.

In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Held:
Syvel’s Department Store, Makati City. Criselda was signing her credit card slip YES. An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or
at the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind negligence attaches to the defendant. It is “a fortuitous circumstance, event or
and heard aloud thud. She looked behind her. She then saw Zhieneth on the happening; anevent happening without any human agency, or if happening
floor crushed by bulk of the store’s gift-wrapping counter/structure. Although wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
shocked, Criselda was quick to ask the assistance of the people around in lifting circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.
the counter and retrieving Zhieneth from the floor.
While negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
Zhieneth was rushed to the hospital. She lived through the operation but lost guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
her ability to speak. She then died two weeks later due to the injuries she affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
sustained. man would not do. Negligence is “the failure to observe, for the protection of
the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
Respondents demanded the reimbursement of hospitalization, medical bills which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
and wakeand funeral expenses they incurred from the petitioners. The injury.” The test of is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
petitioners refused to pay. Thus, respondents filed a civil case to recover that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
P157522.86 as actual damages,P300,000.00 as moral damages and have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
P20,000.00 in attorney’s fees.
Zhieneth’s dying statement before being rushed to into the operating room that
she did not do anything but merely approached the counter forms part of the
res gestate in accordance with Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It
is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and
statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and
admissions.

Further, the negligence of the petitioners was proven by the testimony of their
employees who testified that the counter was heavy, shaky and could collapse
at anytime. It was verified that the counter was not nailed which further
aggravated the counter’s instability. Worse, such condition was brought to the
attention of the store supervisor but no action was taken to address it. Verily,
such shows a blatant failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family.

Both Criselda and Zhieneth are not guilty of contributory negligence. Zhieneth,
a 6year old enjoys the presumption that she is incapable of committing
contributory negligence. Petitioners failed to rebut such presumption. Further,
Criselda was not guilty of contributory negligence as it was only natural for her
to let go of Zhieneth to sign her credit card slip.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirmed
People v. Delos Santos college graduate with a pregnant wife and three very young children who were
Facts: dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group with his truck.
On the early morning of October 5, 1995, at the Maitum Highway in Cagayan
de Oro City, a team of PNP members undergoing a Special Training Course We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number
were performing an Endurance Run. They were jogging at the right side of the of persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an intentional
lane. A speeding Isuzu Elf ran into them, resulting to deaths and injuries. The felony. It is significant to note that there is no shred of evidence that GLENN
accused surrendered to the Governor, and was eventually convicted of Multiple had an axe to grind against the police trainees that would drive him into
Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder. He was deliberately hitting them with intent to kill. Glenn’s offense is in failing to apply
sentenced to death by the Trial Court. Hence, this automatic review. the brakes, or to swerve his vehicle to the left or to a safe place the movement
he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he done so, many trainees would
Issue: have been spared.
Whether there was intentional killing or attempt to kill the policemen, or a mere
reckless imprudence The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Could a
Held: prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed,
From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course
tragic event was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that
intent on Glenn’s part. First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the
Danilo Olarita, the place of the incident was "very dark," as there was no moon. failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed
And according to PAGASA’s observed weather report within the vicinity of by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is always necessary
Cagayan de Oro City covering a radius of 50 kilometers, at the time the event before negligence can be held to exist.
took place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there was absolutely no break in the thick
clouds covering the celestial dome globe; hence, there was no way for the GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the Revised
moon and stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without
highway. Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards were all wearing malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by
black T-shirts, black short pants, and black and green combat shoes, which reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
made them hard to make out on that dark and cloudy night. The rear guards or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his employment or
had neither reflectorized vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving hand signals. occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his physical condition; and (3)
Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
other hand, the jogging trainees were occupying the wrong lane, the same lane
as Glenn’s vehicle was traversing. Worse, they were facing the same direction GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver,
as Glenn’s truck such that their backs were turned towards the oncoming should have known to apply the brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately
vehicles from behind. Fourth, no convincing evidence was presented to rebut upon hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other trainees.
Glenn’s testimony that he had been momentarily blinded by the very bright and By his own testimony, it was established that the road was slippery and slightly
glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at the opposite direction as his truck going downward; and, worse, the place of the incident was foggy and dark. He
rounded the curve. He must have been still reeling from the blinding effect of should have observed due care in accordance with the conduct of a reasonably
the lights coming from the other vehicle when he plowed into the group of police prudent man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his brakes, or turning
trainees. Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one “to stop or to the left side even if it would mean entering the opposite lane (there being no
swerve to a safe place the moment he sees a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in evidence that a vehicle was coming from the opposite direction). It is highly
order to avoid bumping or killing the same"; and more so if the one on the road probable that he was driving at high speed at the time. And even if he was
is a person. It would therefore be inconceivable for GLENN, then a young
driving within the speed limits, this did not mean that he was exercising due
care under the existing circumstances and conditions at the time.

Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather
the result of a single act of reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with
serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.
Singson v. BPI garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille &
Facts: Co., et al, prepared a letter informing Singson of the garnishment of his deposits
Singson was one of the defendants in a civil case filed before the CFI Manila. by the plaintiff in that case.
Judgment was rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants Celso Lobregat
and Villa-Abrille & Co. to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to Philippine Milling Co. Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor
Singson and Lobregat appealed, while the decision became final and executory of B. M. Glass Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were
as to Villa-Abrille. A writ of garnishment was issued to BPI against the Villa- dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass Service then wrote to Singson that the
Abrille’s account. check was not honored by BPI because his account therein had already been
garnished and that they are now constrained to close his credit account with
The clerk of BPI who received the writ saw the petitioner’s name and, without them.
reading the full text, wrote a letter for the signature of the bank President,
informing Singson of the garnishment. Subsequently, Singson issued two Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of
checks. The one issued in favor of B.M. Glass Service was dishonoured, and Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The
so petitioner’s account with the latter was closed. Singson wrote a letter to the defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently
bank, claiming that his account is not included in the writ of garnishment. Having committed. Thus this action for damages.
confirmed so, the bank President Santiago Friexas apologized to Singson and
rectified the mistake. Singson filed a claim for damages. The lower court ruled ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars a plaintiff’s
that damages for quasi-delict cannot be sustained because the relationship claim for damages based on torts?
between the parties is contractual. Petitioner and his wife appealed the case.
HELD: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
Issue: commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery
Whether damages based on torts can be awarded based on a contract of damages therefore. Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a
comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an
Held: airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted
The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist
of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon
therefor. The act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. the ground of tort on the latter’s part, for, although the relation between a
passenger and a carrier is “contractual both in origin and nature … the act that
Singson vs BPI breaks the contract may also be a tort”.

FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering,
had been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied
Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff therein. Said judgment as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his
became final and executory as only against Ville-Abrille for its failure to file an subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal
appeal. A writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI — in which damages — the amount of which need not be proven — in the sum of P1,000,
the Singsons had a current account — insofar as Villa-Abrille’s credits against in addition to attorney’s fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate
the Bank were concerned. plaintiff’s rights.

Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading
the name of the Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party
defendants, without further reading the body and informing himself that said
PEOPLE’S BANK vs DAHICAN LUMBER concession and that they were purchased in addition to, or in replacement of
those already existing in the premises on July 13, 1950. In Law, therefore, they
FACTS must be deemed to have been immobilized, with the result that the real estate
mortgages involved herein ³ which were registered as such ³ did not have to be
Dahican lumber company (DAMCO) obtained several loans amounting to registered a second time as chattel mortgages in order to bind the "after
250,000pesos from People·s bank (BANK) and ,together with DALCO, another acquired properties" and affect third parties.Under the fourth paragraph of both
loan amounting to$250,000 from Export-Import bank secured by five deeds of mortgage, it is crystal clear that all property of every nature and
promissory notes through people·s bank. In both loans, DAMCO executed and description taken in exchange or replacement, as well as all
registered respective mortgages with inclusion of ´after acquired propertiesµ. buildings,machineries, fixtures, tools, equipments, and other property that the
DAMCO and DALCO failed to satisfy the fifth promissory note in favor ofExport mortgagor may acquire,construct, install, attach; or use in, to upon, or in
bank so People·s bank paid it and subsequently filed an action for the connection with the premises ³ that is, its lumber concession ³ "shall
foreclosure ofthe mortgaged properties of DAMCO including the after acquired immediately be and become subject to the lien" of both mortgage sin the same
machinery, equipment and spare parts upon the latter's failure to fulfill its manner and to the same extent as if already included therein at the time of their
obligation. execution. As the language thus used leaves no room for doubt as to the
intention of the parties,
Contention of the Petitioner
We see no useful purpose in discussing the matter extensively. Suffice it to say
People·s bank asserted that the ´after acquiredµ machinery and equipment that the stipulation referred to is common, and
ofDAMCO are subject to the deed of mortgage executed by DAMCO. Hence,
these can beincluded in the foreclosure proceedings. We might say logical, in all cases where the properties given as collateral are
perishable or subject to inevitable wear and tear or were intended to be sold,
Contentions of the Respondent or to be used ³ thus becoming subject to the inevitable wear and tear ³ but with
the understanding³ express or implied ³ that they shall be replaced with others
DALCO argued that the mortgages were void as regards the after acquired to be thereafter acquired by the mortgagor. Such stipulation is neither unlawful
propertiesbecause they were not registered in accordance with the chattel nor immoral, its obvious purpose being to maintain, to the extent allowed by
mortgage law. Moreover,provision of the fourth paragraph of each of said circumstances, the original value of the properties given as security. Indeed, if
mortgages did not automatically make subject to such mortgages the "after such properties were of the nature already referred to, it would be poor
acquired properties", the only meaning thereof being that the mortgagor was judgment on the part of the creditor who does not see to it that a similar
willing to constitute a lien over such properties. provision is included in the contract.

ISSUE:

Whether the after acquired machinery and equipment of DAMCO are included
as subject of the Real Estate mortgage, thus can be foreclosed.

RULING:

Judgment rendered in favor of Plaintiff People·s bank. The after acquired


machinery and equipment are included in the executed mortgages.It is not
disputed in the case at bar that the "after acquired properties" were purchased
by DALCO in connection with, and for use in the development of its lumber People’s Bank and Trust Co. vs. Dahican Lumber, Co., 20 SCRA 384
Article/ Topic: Liability of third person responsible for breach of Contract and Atlantic commenced foreclosure proceedings against DALCO and
DAMCO.
Facts:
Issue:
Atlantic sold and assigned all its right to DALCO for the sum of $500,000.00 of
which only the amount of $50,000.00 was paid. DALCO obtained various loans Whether or not DALCO and DAMCO have the right to rescind the contract on
from the People's Bank & Trust Company amounting, as of July 13, 1950, to the ground that Connell is the possessor of some equipment, spare parts and
P200, 000.00. DALCO also obtained, through the Bank, a loan of $250,000.00 supplies which were covered in the lien of the mortgages.
from the Export-Import Bank of Washington D.C., evidenced by five promissory
notes of $50,000.00 each, maturing on different dates, payable to the BANK or Decision:
its order.
Expenses of receivership should be shouldered by the defendants, jointly and
As security for the payment of the loans, DALCO executed in favor of PBTC a severally, in the same manner that all of them should pay to the plaintiffs, jointly
deed of mortgage, covering live parcels of land situated in the province of and severally, attorney's fees awarded in the appealed judgment. In
Camarines Norte, with all the buildings and other improvements existing consonance with the portion of this decision concerning the damages that the
thereon and all the personal properties of the mortgagor located in its place of plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the defendants, the record of this case
business in the municipalities of Mambulao and Capalonga, Camarines Norte. shall be remanded for the corresponding proceedings. With costs.
DALCO also executed a second mortgage on the same properties in favor of
Atlantic in order to secure payment of the unpaid balance of the lumber Ratio Decidendi:
concession amounting to $450,000.00. The deeds contained a provision which
stated that it included essential after-acquired properties such as machineries, The court found that Dahican America Lumber Corporation and Connell Bros.
fixtures, tools and equipment and these mortgages were registered in the Office Company were not even the sellers of various machineries, equipment, etc.
of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte. The rescission was nothing more than an attempt by Dahican Lumber to
defraud the bank and Atlantic, that is to remove such machineries, equipment,
Upon DALCO's and DAMCO's failure to pay the fifth promissory note upon its etc. from the reach of the bank. Simply put, the rescission was a fake and was
maturity, PBTC paid the same to the Export-Import Bank of Washington D.C. just a ploy by DALCO conspired along with DAMCO and Connell.
and the Export-Import Bank of Washington D.C assigned to PBTC its credit and
the first mortgage securing it. Subsequently, PBTC gave DALCO and DAMCO “On the question of plaintiffs' right to recover damages from the defendants, the
another date, which is April 1, 1953 to pay the overdue promissory note. law (Articles 1313 and 1314 of the New Civil Code) provides that creditors are
DALCO purchased machineries, equipment, spare parts and supplies in protected in cases of contracts intended to defraud them; and that any third
addition to, or in replacement of some of those already owned and used by it person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages
on the date aforesaid. Pursuant to the provision of the mortgage deeds quoted to the other contracting party. Similar liability is demandable under Arts. 20 and
heretofore regarding "after acquired properties," PBTC requested DALCO to 21— which may be given retroactive effect (Arts. 225253)—or under Arts. 1902
submit complete lists of said properties but DALCO failed to do so. On and 2176 of the Old Civil Code.
December 16, 1952, the Board of Directors of DALCO in a special meeting
called for the purpose, passed a resolution to rescind the alleged sales of The facts of this case, as stated heretofore, clearly show that DALCO and
equipment, spare parts and supplies by CONNELL and DAMCO to it. DAMCO, after failing to pay the fifth promissory note upon its maturity,
conspired jointly with CONNELL to violate the provisions of the fourth
On January 23, 1953, PBTC and ATLANTIC demanded that said agreements paragraph of the mortgages under foreclosure by attempting to defeat plaintiffs'
be cancelled but CONNELL and DAMCO refused to do so. As a result, PBTC mortgage lien on the "after acquired properties". As a result, the plaintiffs had
to go to court to protect their rights thus jeopardized. Defendants' liability for
damages is therefore clear. However, the measure of the damages suffered by
the plaintiffs is not what the latter claim, namely, the difference between the
alleged total obligation secured by the mortgages amounting to around
P1,200,000.00, plus the stipulated interest and attorney's fees, on the one
hand, and the proceeds obtained from the sale of "after acquired properties",
and of those that were not claimed neither by DAMCO nor CONNELL, on the
other. Considering that the sale of the real properties subject to the mortgages
under foreclosure has not been effected, and considering further the lack of
evidence showing that the true value of all the properties already sold was not
realized because their sale was under stress.”
AIR FRANCE vs. CARRASCOSO et al. Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible
error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same.
FACTS:
Air France v. Carascoso and CA
Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino
pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes. FACTS

Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to a On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized
"first class" round trip airplane ticket for Carrascoso from Manila to Rome. From agent,Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip
Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled
the airline forced him to vacate the "first class" seat because, in the words of in "first class", but atBangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced
the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager plaintiff to vacate the “first class"seat that he was occupying because, in the
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,there was a "white man", who, the
seat he refused, and told the Manager that his seat would be taken over his Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat.When asked to vacate his "first
dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Cuento, "many of the class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused,and told defendant's
Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued,
Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the manager, they came all and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got
across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was
white man" and he reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane. having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to
Mr.Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man"
The CFI ordered Air France to pay Carrascoso moral damages, exemplary and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
damages, and the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the
trip Bangkok-Rome. The CA affirmed the decision. ISSUES: Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims and therefore
entitles to damages?
ISSUE: WON moral damages could be recovered from AirFrance, granted that
their employee was accused of the tortuous act. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

HELD: Yes. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its Yes. It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and
employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law.For the willful received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket
malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties;
Article 21 of the Civil Code says: that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first
class on any specific flight, although hehadtourist class protection; that,
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first
latter for the damage. class seats.If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled
to a first class seat,notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific
flights is therein confirmed,the nan air passenger is placed in the hollow of the
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held hands of an airline. What security thencana passenger have? It will always be
that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very
recoverable. stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement tothe
contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned
that,as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane."- both TC and CA
could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations decided in favor of Carrascoso
between passenger andair carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is
desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral ISSUES:
evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.Why, then, was he
allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat or, 1.WON Carrascoso was entitled to the “first class” sea the claims, as proved by
if another had a better right to the seat?To authorize an award for moral written documents (tickets…)
damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith. It is true that there is
no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint.But, the inference of 2.WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages,when his action is planted
bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth upon breach of contract and thus, there must be an averment of fraud or bad
therein. The contract was averred to establish the relation between the faith which the CA allegedly failed to find
parties.But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion. It is, therefore,
unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the 3.WON moral damages could be recovered from Air France, granted that their
complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if employee was accused of the tortuous act
any, was cured by the evidence.An amendment thereof to conform to the
evidence is not even required.Passengers do not contract merely for 4. WON damages are proper in a breach contract
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be 5. WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso regarding the account made
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and by the air-carrier’s purser is admissible in evidence as hearsay
abuses from such employees. So it is that any rule or discourteous conduct on
the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for 6. WON Carrascoso was entitled to exemplary damages
damages against the carrier.
7. WON Carrascoso was entitled to attorney’s fees
AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso, Et. Al)
8. WON the amounts awarded to Carrascoso was excessive
FACTS
HELD
Carrascoso, a civil engineer, left Manila for Lourdes w/48 other Filipino pilgrims.
Air France, through PAL,issued plaintiff a “first class” round trip airplane ticket 1. YES. the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any
from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,Carrascoso traveled in “first reservation whatever.
class” but at Bangkok, theManager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the Ratio: A written document speaks a uniform language;that spoken word could
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man', who, the Manager alleged, be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between
had a 'better right' to the seat. When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, the passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable.
plaintiff,as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his
seat would betaken over his dead body; a commotion ensued,and, according
Reasoning : Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and
to said Ernesto G. Cuento, many of theFilipino passengers got nervous in the complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that
tourist class;when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having ahot he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight,
discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr.
although he had tourist class protection; that,accordingly, the issuance of a first
Carrascoso and pacified Mr.Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man; and
class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such
would depend upon the availability of first class seats. However, CA held that
Air France should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored 3. YES
or not. The trial court also accepted as evidence the written documents
submitted by Carrasco and even the testimony of the air-carrier’s employees The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not.
attested that indeed, Carrasco was issued a “first class ticket”.- If, as petitioner be essayed. For the wilful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, employer, must answer.5. YES- Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso, is one
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's. action as we have said,
confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an is placed upon his wrongful expulsion.This is a violation of public duty by the
airline.-Also, when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat inBangkok, he petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.(note: it was
was granted the “first class” seat. If there had been no seat, and if the “white held that it was a case of quasi-delict even though it was a breach of contract)
man” had a better right to the seat, then why did they confirm Carrasco his
seat? Ratio: A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree
from any other contractual relation. And is, because of the relation which an air
2. YES carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public.
It invites people to avail of the comforts and I advantages it offers. The contract
Ratio: It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty.
sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground
damages.Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An for an action for damages.
amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required.
Reasoning: Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.They have a
Reasoning: There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy
covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, said contract and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal
was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees.
atBangkok; and Third, there was bad faith when petitioner's employee So it is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards
compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which
he suffered inconvenience,embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing 5.YES, if forms part of theres gestae
him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
resulting in moral damages.- Air France did not present evidence that the “white Ratio:Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best
man” made a prior reservation, nor proved that the“white man” had “better right” evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. - also…From a reading of the
over the seat; also, if the manager’s actions could be justified, they should have transcript just quoted,when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling
presented the manager to testify in court – but they did not do so- occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as
yet died down.Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of
The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and
class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his physical condition of the declarant".
seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class
compartment-just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not Reasoning: Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carrier made an entry
been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has in his notebooks reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist
assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" class agains this will, and that the captain refused to intervene". The petitioner
contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with contents that it should not be admitted as evidence, as it was only hearsay.
some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes However, the subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Also,the
said entry was made outside the Philippines and by an employee of petitioner.
It would have been easy for Air France to contradict Carrascoso’s testimony if
they had presented the purser.

6. YES

Ratio: The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to grant exemplary
damages-in contracts and quasi contracts.The only condition is that defendant
should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,oppressive, or malevolent
manner".

Reasoning : The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first


class seat fits into this legal precept

7. YES

Ratio: The grant of exemplary damages justifies asimilar Judgment for


attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is
but justand equitable that attorneys' fees be given.

8. NO

Ratio: The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. The
dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because,
the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.

DISPOSITION

On balance, we, say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer
from ‘reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against
petitioner.
MARGARITA AFIALDA vs. BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, The defendant's liability is made to
rest on article 1905 of the Civil Code. but action under that article is not tenable.
Facts: On the other hand, if action is to be based on Article 1902 of the Civil Code, it
is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as
Loreto Afialda was employed by the Basilio Hisole and Francisco Hisole as owners of the animal that caused the damage. But the complaint contains no
caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation. On March 21, 1947, while allegation on those points. There being no reversible error in the order appealed
tending the animals, without any fault from Afialda or any force majeure, he was from, the same is hereby affirmed, but without costs in view of the financial
gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries. Plaintiff situation of the appellant.
herein, who is the sister of the deceased, filed an action a civil action for
damages from injury caused by the animal. Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants MARGARITA AFIALDA VS BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE
liable under Article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads: The possessor of an
animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, Facts:
even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall
cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the Deceased Loreto Afialda was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker
fault of the person who may have suffered it. (Art. 2182 of the New Civil Code) of their carabaos at a fixed compensation. On March 21, 1947, while he was
Before filing their answer, defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint tending the animals, he was gored by one of them and consequently died of his
for lack of a cause of action, and the motion was granted by the lower court. injuries. Thus, herein appellant, Loreto’s elder sister who depended on him for
The lower court ruled that in Art. 1905 of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal support, filed the action for damages. The complaint was dismissed by the trial
is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage court upon granting a motion to dismiss filed by spouses Hisole. Subsequently,
caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had the plaintiff had taken the present appeal.
been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code. (Art. 2176 of the
New Civil Code). Thus, plaintiff filed an appeal. Issue: Whether or not defendants may be held liable for damages when
damage is caused to the animal’s caretaker.
Issue: Whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its
caretaker Ruling :

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Art. 1905 of the Civil Code names the Under Article 1905 of the old Civil Code, the owner of an animal is answerable
possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for "any damages it may only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the
cause," and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent
custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to or at fault under Article 1902 of the same code. In the case at hand, the animal
prevent it from causing damage. was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his
work as such. Thus, it was his business to try to prevent the animal from causing
In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the injury or damage to anyone, including himself. Being injured by the animal
caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he
business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, Deceased does not fall within the ambit of “stranger”, which is significant for the
was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and claim for damages under the said article. Moreover, under the said
for which he must take the consequences. In a decision of the Spanish circumstances, the action should not come under Article 1905 of the Civil Code
Supreme Court, cited by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 12, p. 578), It is a but under the labor laws, i.e. Workmen’s Compensation Act. The complaint
veritable accident of labor" which should come under the labor laws rather than contained no allegation as to constitute liability under the Civil Code nor the
under article 1905 of the Civil Code. However, the present action not brought
Workmen’s Compensation Act. Hence, it alleges no cause of action. The order In November 1922, Onrubia was driving his car in Calle Ascarraga, Manila and
appealed from was affirmed. he overrun the 9 year old son of Francisco which led to his son’s death.
Francisco sued Onrubia for homicide through reckless imprudence. The lower
court acquitted Onrubia as it ruled that Onrubia did not drive the automobile he
was operating at an exaggerated or unreasonable speed, was not responsible
for any imprudence, fault, carelessness or negligence whatsoever, and did not
violate any regulation in connection with said death. Now Francisco filed a
separate civil suit for damages against Onrubia for P4.5k. Onrubia assailed the
civil suit arguing that Francisco did not reserve the right to file a separate civil
case against him. Francisco grounded the civil suit on Article 1902 which states
that “Any person who by an act or omission causes damages to another by his
fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Onrubia is civilly liable.

HELD:

No. In order to establish the civil liability in a criminal case, it is necessary that
the same spring from, or be a consequence of, the criminal liability, and,
therefore, if a defendant is acquitted of a crime, a judgment, sentencing him to
pay a determinate indemnity by reason of the same crime is not possible. A
person not criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor cannot be civilly liable.
The full and complete acquittal of Onrubia necessarily implies his innocence of,
and freedom from responsibility for, the crime of which he was accused.

Though there is another provision of the Civil Code (Article 1093) which states
that “Those arising from wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not punishable
by law shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter Second of Title Sixteen of
this book.”, and said chapter contains Article 1902, it is necessary that the
negligence or fault in question be not punished by law. This is not the case in
the case at bar; the negligence complained of in this case is punishable by law,
however, said negligence does not exist on the part of Onrubia.

Francisco vs Onrubia

Torts and Damages– When Liability for Quasi Delict Arises