SECOND DIVISION respond to the resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr.
Masilungan noticed a big contusion hematoma on the left side of the
G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015
DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The fraternal contract should not be signed in blood, celebrated with
pain, marred by injuries, and perpetrated through suffering. That is
the essence of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law of
1995.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set
aside the April 26, 2013 Decision1 and the October 8, 2013
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
05046, which affirmed the February 23, 2011 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba City (RTC). The RTC found
petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr. (Sibal),
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4
of R.A. No. 8049, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The Facts
On February 1, 2006, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba,
Laguna, filed the Information4 against the petitioners before the R TC,
the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about 2:30 in the
early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba ,City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, during an initiation rite
and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present
thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and
officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one
M4-RLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as
condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to
physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On February 7, 2006, upon motion, the RTC admitted the Amended
Information5 which reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at
Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-name
accused, during a planned initiation rite and being then officers and
members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in
conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers,
whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one
MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition
for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical
harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.
On February 7, 2006, Dungo filed a motion to quash for lack of
probable cause,6 but it was denied by the trial court because the
ground cited therein was not provided by law and jurisprudence.
When arraigned, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.7 Thereafter, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented twenty (20) witnesses to prove the crime
charged. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
At around 3:20 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, the victim
Marlon Villanueva (Villanueva) was brought to the emergency room of
Dr. Jose P. Rizal District Hospital (JP Rizal Hospital). Dr. Ramon
Masilungan (Dr. Masilungan), who was then the attending physician
at the emergency room, observed that Villanueva was motionless, not
breathing and had no heartbeat. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive
Villlanueva for about 15 to 30 minutes. Villanueva, however, did not
CRIM REV
victim's face and several injuries on his arms and legs. He further
attested that Villanueva 's face was cyanotic, meaning that blood was
no longer running through his body due to lack of oxygen; and when
he pulled down Villanueva's pants, he saw large contusions on both
legs, which extended from the upper portion of the thighs, down to
the couplexial portion, or back of the knees.
Dr. Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men brought Villanueva to the
hospital. The two told him that they found Villanueva lying motionless
on the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, and brought
him to the hospital. When he asked them where they came from, one
of them answered that they came from Los Baños, Laguna, en route
to San Pablo City. He questioned them on how they found Villanueva,
when the latter was in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City. One of the men
just said that they were headed somewhere else.
Dr. Masilungan reduced his findings in a medico-legal report.8 Due to
the nature, extent and location of the injuries, he opined that
Villanueva was a victim of hazing. He was familiar with hazing injuries
because he had undergone hazing himself when he was a student,
and also because of his experience in treating victims of hazing
incidents.
Dr. Roy Camarillo (Dr. Camarillo), Medico-Legal Officer of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory (PNP-CL) in Region IV,
Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he
performed an autopsy on the body of Villanueva on January 14, 2006
and placed down his findings in an autopsy report.9 Upon
examination of the body, he found various external injuries in the
head, trunk and extremities. There were thirty-three (33) external
injuries, with various severity and nature. He concluded that the
cause of death was subdural hemorrhage due to head injury
contusion-hematoma. Based on multiple injuries and contusions on
the body, and his previous examinations of hazing injuries, Dr.
Camarillo opined that these injuries were hazing-related. During the
autopsy, he retrieved two (2) matchsticks from the cadaver with the
marking of Alpha Phi Omega (APO) Fraternity.10
Susan Ignacio (Ignacio) was the owner of the sari-sari store located
at Purok 5, Pansol, Calamba City, in front of Villa Novaliches Resort,
which was barely ten steps away. On January 13, 2006, at around
8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, she was tending her store when
she saw a jeepney with more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the
resort. Ignacio identified Dungo as the person seated beside the
driver of the jeepney.11 She estimated the ages of these persons in
the group to be between 20 to 30 years old. They were in civilian
clothes, while the other men wore white long-sleeved shirts. Before
entering the resort, the men and women shook hands and embraced
each other. Three (3) persons, riding on a single motorcycle, also
arrived at the resort.
Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace of
the resort who looked like they were praying, and then the lights of
the resort were turned off. Later that evening, at least three (3) of
these persons went to her store to buy some items. During her
testimony, she was shown photographs and she identified Christopher
Braseros and Sibal as two of those who went to her store.12 It was
only on the morning of January 14, 2006 that she learned from the
policemen visiting the resort that the deceased person was Villanueva.
Donato Magat (Magat), a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol,
Calamba City, testified that at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of
January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at the comer of Villa
Novaliches Resort. A man approached him and told him that someone
inside the resort needed a ride. Magat went to the resort and asked
the two (2) men at the gate who needed a ride. Afterwards, he saw
three (3) men in their 20's carrying another man, who looked very
weak, like a vegetable, towards his tricycle. Magat touched the body
of the man being carried and sensed it was cold.
Magat asked the men what happened to their companion. They
replied that he had too much to drink. Then they instructed Magat to
go to the nearest hospital. He drove the tricycle to JP Rizal Hospital.
Upon their arrival, two of his passengers brought their unconscious
companion inside the emergency room, while their other companion
paid the tricycle fare. Magat then left to go home. Several days after,
he learned that the person brought to the hospital had died.
1st Set Fulltext Page 1 of 74
Abelardo Natividad (Natividad) and Seferino Espina y Jabay (Espina)
were the security guards on duty at JP Rizal Hospital, from 11 :00
o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006 until 7:00 o'clock in the
morning of January 14, 2006. In the early morning of January 14,
2006, two men, who signed on the logbook13 under the names
Brandon Gonzales and Jerico Paril, brought the lifeless body of a
person. Pursuant to the standard operating procedure of the hospital,
the security guards did not allow the two men to leave the hospital
because they called the police station .so that an investigation could
be conducted. Two policemen arrived later at the hospital. During his
testimony, Natividad identified Sibal and Dupgo as the two persons
who brought Villanueva to the hospital.
PO2 Alaindelon Ignacio (P02 Ignacio). testified that on January 14,
2006 at around 3:30 o'clock in the early morning, Natividad called up
the PNP Calamba City Station to report that a lifeless body of a man
was brought to JP Rizal Hospital. When P02 Ignacio arrived, he saw
Villanueva' s corpse with contusions and bite marks all over his body.
P02 Ignacio and his policemen companions then brought Dungo and
Sibal to the police station. He asked them about what happened, but
they invoked their right to remain silent. The policemen then
proceeded to Brgy. Pansol at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning.
After finding Villa Novaliches Resort, they knocked on the door and
the caretaker, Maricel Capillan (Capillan), opened it.
The police asked Capillan if there were University of the Philippines
Los Baños (UP Los Baños) students who rented the resort on the
evening of January 13, 2006. Capillan said yes and added that about
twenty (20) persons arrived onboard a jeepney and told her that they
would be renting the resort from 9:30 o'clock in the evening up to
7:00 o'clock the following morning.
Gay Czarina Sunga (Sunga) was a food technology student at UP Los
Baños during the academic year of 2005-2006 and a member of the
Symbiosis UPLB Biological Society. Around 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of January 13, 2006, she was at their organization's
tambayan in the UPLB Biological Sciences Building, when she noticed
three (3) men seated two meters away from her. She identified the
two of the three men as Sibal and Dungo.14 They were wearing black
shirts with the logo of APO. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two
more men arrived and, with their heads bowed, approached the three
men. One of them was Villanueva, who was carrying a 5-gallon water
container. Dungo then stood up and asked Villanueva why the latter
did not report to him when he was just at their tambayan. Dungo
then punched Villanueva twice, but the latter just kept quiet with his
head bowed. Fifteen minutes later, all the men left.
Joey Atienza (Atienza) had been a good friend of Villanueva since
2004. They were roommates at the UP Los Baños Men's Dormitory
and housemates at the DPS Apartment in Umali Subdivision, Los
Baños, Laguna. According to Atienza, on January 9, 2006, Villanueva
introduced him to Daryl Decena (Decena) as his APO - Theta Chapter
batchmate, who was also to undergo final initiation rites on January
13, 2006.
Severino Cuevas, Director of the Students Affairs at UP Los Baños,
testified that Dungo and Sibal were both members of the APO
Fraternity, and that there was no record of any request for initiation
or hazing activity filed by the said fraternity.
McArthur Padua of the Office of the Registrar, UP Los Baños, testified
that Villanueva was a B.S. Agricultural Economics student at the UP
Los Baños,15 as evidenced by his official transcript of record.16
Atty. Eleno Peralta and Dina S. Carlos, officers of the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) of the UP Los Baños, testified that an
administrative disciplinary case was filed on March 31, 2006 against
the APO Fraternity regarding the death of Villanueva. They confirmed
that Capilla of Villa Novaliches Resort and Irene Tan (Tan) of APO
Sorority Theta Chapter appeared as witnesses for the complainant.17
Roman Miguel De Jesus, UP - Office of the Legal Aid (UP-OLA)
supervising student, testified that he met Tan of the APO Sorority
sometime between July and August 2006 in UP Diliman: to convince
her to testify in the criminal case. Tan, however, refused because she
feared for her safety. She said that after testifying in the SDT hearing,
her place in Imus, Cavite was padlocked and vandalized.
Evelyn Villanueva, mother of victim Villanueva, testified that, as a
result of the death of her son, her family incurred actual damages
CRIM REV
consisting of medical, burial and funeral expenses in the aggregate
amount of ₱140,000.00 which were evidenced by receipts.18 Her
husband also incurred travel expenses in the amount of ₱7,000.00 in
returning to the Philippines to attend his son's wake and burial, as
supported by a plane ticket.19 She further attested that she
experienced mental anguish, sleepless nights, substantial weight loss,
and strained family relationship as a result of her son's death.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented seven (7) witnesses to prove the innocence of
the petitioners. Their testimonies are summarized as follow:
Richard Cornelio (Cornelio), an APO Fraternity member, testified that
on January 13, 2006, around 4:00 to 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon,
he met Dungo at the UP Los Baños Graduate School. Dungo asked
him if he would attend the initiation ceremony, and Cornelio
answered in the negative because he had other things to do. At 10:00
o'clock in the evening of the same day, Cornelio again met Dungo and
his girlfriend while eating a hamburger at the Burger Machine along
Raymundo Street, Umali Subdivision, Los Baños, Laguna (Raymundo
Street). He asked Dungo if he would attend the initiation ceremony.
Dungo replied that he would not because he and his girlfriend had
something to do.
Ana Danife Rivera (Rivera), the girlfriend of Dungo, testified that on
January 13, 2006 at around 1 :00 o'clock in the afternoon, Dungo
came and visited her at her boarding house on Raymundo Street.
Around 4:00 o'clock of the same afternoon, they went to the UP Los
Baños Graduate School and saw Cornelio. Afterwards, they went back
to her boarding house and stayed there from 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon to 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Then, they went to Lacxo
Restaurant for dinner and left at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening.
On their way back to her boarding house, they encountered Cornelio
again at the Burger Machine. Dungo then stayed and slept at her
boarding house. Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January
14, 2006, they were roused from their sleep by a phone call from
Sibal, asking Dungo to go to a resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo
then left the boarding house.
Dungo testified that around 1:00 o'clock in the early afternoon of
January 13, 2006, he arrived at the boarding house of his girlfriend,
Rivera, on Raymundo Street. At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
they went to the UP Los Baños Graduate School and inquired about
the requirements for a master's degree. They walked back to the
boarding house and met Cornelio. They talked about their
fraternity's ,final initiation ceremony for that night in Pansol, Calamba
City. Dungo and Rivera then reached the latter's boarding house
around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, they went out for dinner at the Lacxo Restaurant, near
Crossing Junction, Los Baños. They ate and stayed at the restaurant
for at least one and a half hours. Then they walked back to the
boarding house of Rivera and, along the way, they met Cornelio again
at the Burger Machine along Raymundo Street. Cornelio asked Dungo
if he would attend their fraternity's final initiation ceremony, to which
he replied in the negative. Dungo and Rivera reached the boarding
house around 9:00 o'clock in the evening and they slept there.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, Dungo
was roused from his sleep because Sibal was palling him on his
cellphone. Sibal asked for his help, requesting him to go to Villa
Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Upon Dungo 's arrival at
the resort, Sibal led him inside. There, he saw Rudolfo Castillo
(Castillo), a fellow APO fraternity brother, and Villanueva, who was
unconscious. Dungo told them that they should bring Villanueva to
the hospital. They all agreed, and Castillo called a tricycle that
brought them to JP Rizal Hospital. He identified himself before the
security guard as Jerico Paril because he was scared to tell his real
name.
Gilbert Gopez (Gopez) testified that he was the Grand Chancellor of
the APO -Theta Chapter for years 2005-2006. At around 7:00 o'clock
in the evening of January 13, 2006, he was at the tambayan of their
fraternity in UP Los Baños because their neophytes would be initiated
that night. Around 8:30 o'clock in the evening, they met their
fraternity brothers in Bagong Kalsada, Los Baños. He noticed that
their neophyte, Villanueva, was with Castillo and that there was a
bruise on the left side of his face. Then they boarded a jeepney and
proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. There,
Gopez instructed Sibal to take Villanueva to the second floor of the
1st Set Fulltext Page 2 of 74
resort. He confronted Castillo as to what happened to Villanueva.
Around 11:00 or 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Gopez decided to
cancel the final rites. He told Sibal to stay at the resort and
accompany Villanueva and Castillo. Together with the other
neophytes, Gopez left the resort and went back to UP Los Baños.
Sibal testified that he was a DOST Scholar at the UP Los Baños from
2002 to 2006, taking up B.S. Agricultural Chemistry. He was a
Brother Actuary of the APO - Theta Chapter, and was in charge of
fraternity activities, such as tree planting, free medical and dental
missions, and blood donations. On January 13, 2006, at around 6:00
o'clock in the evening, he was at the fraternity's tambayan for the
final initiation rites of their neophytes. After preparing the food for the
initiation rites, Sibal, together with some neophytes, went to Bagong
Kalsada, Los Baños, where he saw fellow fraternity brother Castillo
with their neophyte Villanueva, who had a bruised face. Thereafter,
they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in
Pansol, Calamba City. Once inside the resort, he accompanied
Villanueva upstairs for the latter to take a rest. A few minutes later,
he went down and confronted Castillo about the bruises on
Villanueva's face. He was angry and irritated with Castillo. He then
stayed outside the resort until Gopez and the other neophytes came
out and told him that the final initiation rite was cancelled, and that
they were returning to UP Los Baños. Sibal wanted to go with them
but ;he was ordered to stay with Villanueva and Castillo.
After the group of Gopez left, Sibal checked on the condition of
Villanueva, who was sleeping on the second; floor of the resort. Then
he went outside for one hour, or until 1 :00 o 'dock in the early
morning of January 14, 2006. Sibal entered the resort again and saw
Villanueva, who looked unconscious, seated in one of the benc6es on
the ground floor. Sibal inquired about Villanueva's condition but he
was ignored by Castillo. He then called Dungo for help. After Dungo
arrived at the resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to
JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false name to the security guard
as he heard that Dungo had done the same.
The RTC Ruling
On February 23, 2011, the RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the
crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court stated
that the prosecution established the presence of Dungo and Sibal (1)
at the UP Los Banos Campus on January 13, 2006 around 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon, by the testimony of Sunga and (2) at the
Villa Novaliches Resort around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the
same day by the testimony of Ignacio. With the extensive testimonies
of Dr. Masilungan and Dr. Camarillo, the prosecution also proved that
Villanueva died from hazing injuries.
According to the RTC, the evidence of the prosecution undeniably
proved that Villanueva, a UP Los Bafios student, was a neophyte of
the APO - Theta Chapter Fraternity; that Dungo and Sibal were
members of the said fraternity; that on the evening of January 13,
2006, Dungo and Sibal, together with the other fraternity members,
officers and alumni, brought and transported Villanueva and two
other neophytes to Villa Novaliches Resort at Barangay Pansol,
Calamba City, for the final initiation rites; that the initiation rites were
conducted inside the resort, performed under the cover of darkness
and secrecy; that due to the injuries sustained by Villanueva, the
fraternity members and the other two neophytes haphazardly left the
resort; and that Dungo and Sibal boarded a tricycle and brought the
lifeless body of Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital, where Villanueva was
pronounced dead.
The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and
Sibal participated to bodily assault and harm the victim, it was
irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort for their final
initiation rites. Clearly, they did not merely induce Villanueva to
attend the final initiation rites, but they also brought him to Villa
Novaliches Resort.
The RTC held that the defense of denial and alibi were self-serving
negative assertions. The defense of denial and alibi of Dungo, which
was corroborated by the testimony of his girlfriend Rivera and his co-
fraternity brother, could not be given credence. The witnesses
presented by the defense were partial and could not be considered as
disinterested parties. The defense of denial of Sibal likewise failed.
The corroborative testimonies of his fraternity brothers were suspect
CRIM REV
because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the criminal
action.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Dandy Dungo and Gregorio
Sibal GUILTY of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and
order them to jointly and severally pay the family /heirs of Deceased
Marlon Villanueva the following sums of money:
1. ₱141,324.00 for and as actual damages;
2. ₱200,000.00 for and as moral damages;
3. ₱100,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and
4. ₱50,000.00 for the death of Marlon Villanueva.
SO ORDERED.20
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In their brief, they
contended that the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for violating R.A. No. 8049. They also assailed the
constitutionality of Section 4 of the said law, which stated that mere
presence in the hazing was prima facie evidence of participation
therein, because it allegedly violated the constitutional presumption
of innocence of the accused.
The CA Ruling
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit.
It stated that, in finding them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049, the
RTC properly relied on circumstantial evidence adduced by the
prosecution. The CA painstakingly discussed the unbroken chain of
circumstantial evidence to convict Dungo and Sibal as principals in
the crime of hazing.
It further found that the defense of denial and alibi of Dungo and
Sibal failed to cast doubt on the positive identification made by the
prosecution witnesses; and that denial, being inherently weak, could
not prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrators of the crime. The CA also stated that Dungo and Sibal
were not only convicted based on their presence in the venue of the
hazing, but also in their act of bringing the victim to Villa Novaliches
Resort for the final initiation rites.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2011 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba City in CRIM. Case No.
13958-2006-C, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of R.A. 8049 is hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.
SO ORDERED.21
Dungo and Sibal moved for reconsideration but their motion was
denied by the CA in the assailed October 8, 2013 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR HE JUDGMENTS OF THE RTC AND THE
CA A QUO CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST THEM BECAUSE THE OFFENSE
PROVED AS FOUND AND PRONOUNCED THEREBY IS DIFFERENT
FROM THAT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION, NOR DOES ONE
INCLUDE OR NECESSARILY INCLUDE THE OTHER.22
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal argue that the amended information
charged them as they "did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one Marlon
Villanueva y Mejilla."23 Yet, both the RTC and the CA found them
guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049 because they "[i]nduced the victim to
be present"24 during the initiation rites. The crime of hazing by
inducement does not necessarily include the criminal charge of hazing
by actual participation. Thus, they cannot be convicted of a crime not
stated or necessarily included in the information. By reason of the
foregoing, the petitioners contend that their constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them has
been violated.
1st Set Fulltext Page 3 of 74
In its Comment,25 filed on May 23, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor
General (DSG) asserted that Dungo and Sibal were charged in the
amended information with the proper offense and convicted for such.
The phrases "planned initiation" and "in conspiracy with more or less
twenty members and officers" in the amended information sufficiently
cover "knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing
the victim to be present thereat." The planned initiation rite would not
have been accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners in
inducing the victim to be present thereat and it was obviously
conducted in conspiracy with the others.26 In their Reply27 filed on
September 10, 2014, Dungo and Sibal insisted that there was a
variance between the, offense charged of "actually participated in the
infliction of physical harm," and the offense "knowingly cooperated in
carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present
thereat."28 The prosecution, moreover, failed to establish conspiracy
because no act or circumstance was proved pointing to a joint
purpose and design between and among the petitioners and the other
twenty accused.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Procedural Matter
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered
by bringing it to a higher court authority.29 The right to appeal is
neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a
mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law.30
Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated October 15, 2004, governs
the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court when the
penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.31
According to the said provision, "[i]n cases where the Court of
Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser
penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty.
The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of
appeal filed with the Court of Appeals."
Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment had been imposed by the CA, can simply file a
notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of right
before the Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case
for review on any question including one not raised by the parties.32
Section 13(c), Rule 124 recognizes the constitutionally conferred
jurisdiction of the Court in all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.33
An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal
by certiorari to the Court via Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An
appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise only
questions of law.34 Moreover, such review is not a matter of right,
but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there
are special and important reasons.35 In other words, when the CA
imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an
accused may: (1) file a notice of appeal under Section 13( c ), Rule
124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before the Court and
open the entire case for review on any question; or (2) file a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a
matter of discretion and raise only questions of law.
In this case, the CA affirmed the R TC decision imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua upon the petitioners. The latter opted to appeal
the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Consequently, they could only raise questions of law. Oddly, the
petitioners began to assail the existence of conspiracy in their
reply,36 which is a question of fact that would require an examination
of the evidence ;presented. In the interest of justice, however, and
due to the novelty of the issue presented, the Court deems it proper
to open the whole case for review.37 Substantive Matter
In our contemporary society, hazing has been a nightmare of parents
who send their children to college or university. News of deaths and
horrible beatings primarily among college students due to hazing
injuries continue to haunt us. Horrid images of eggplant-like buttocks
and thighs and pounded arms and shoulders of young men are
depicted as a fervent warning to those who dare undergo the hazing
rites. The meaningless death of these promising students, and the
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agony, cries and ordeal of their families, resonate through the very
core of our beings. But no matter how modem and sophisticated our
society becomes, these barbaric acts of initiation of fraternities,
sororities and other organizations continue to thrive, even within the
elite grounds of the academe.
The history and phenomenon of hazing had been thoroughly
discussed in the recent case of Villareal v. People.38 It is believed
that the fraternity system and its accompanying culture of hazing
were transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th
century.39 Thus, a study of the laws and jurisprudence of the United
States (US) on hazing can enlighten the current predicament of
violent initiations in fraternities, sororities and other organizations.
United States Laws and
Jurisprudence on Hazing
There are different definitions of hazing, depending on the laws of the
states.40 In the case of People v. Lenti,41 the defendant therein
challenged the constitutionality of the state law defining hazing on the
ground of vagueness. The court rejected such contention and held
that it would have been an impossible task if the legislature had
attempted to define hazing specifically
because fraternal organizations and associations never suffered for
ideas in contriving new forms of hazing. Presently, the acceptable
definition of hazing is the practice of physically or emotionally abusing
newcomers to an organization as a means of initiation.42
Hazing can be classified into various categories including, but not
limited to, acts of violence, acts of humiliation, sexual-related acts,
and alcohol-related acts.43 The physical form of hazing may include
beating, branding, paddling, excessive exercise, drinking, and using
drugs. Sexual hazing have included simulated sex acts, sodomy and
forced kissing.44 Moreover, hazing does not only result in physical
injuries and hospitalization, but also lead to emotional damage and
traumatic stress.45
Based on statistics and alarming frequency of hazing, states have
attempted to combat hazing through the passage of state laws that
prohibit such acts.46 Forty-four states, with the exception of Alaska,
Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming, have
passed anti-hazing laws.47 The severity of these laws can range from
minor penalties to a prison sentence for up to six years.48 In the
states of Illinois, Idaho, Missouri, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, hazing
that result in death or "great bodily harm" is categorized as a
felony.49
In Florida, the Chad Meredith Act,50 a law named after a student who
died in a hazing incident, was enacted on July 1, 2005. It provides
that a person commits a third degree felony when he or she
intentionally or recklessly commits any act of hazing and the hazing
results in serious bodily injury or death. If a person only creates
substantial risk of physical injury or death, then hazing is categorized
as a first degree misdemeanor. A similar provision can be observed in
the Penal Law of New York.51
Interestingly, some states included notable features in their anti-
hazing statute to increase its effectiveness. In Alabama, Arkansas,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Texas, the law
imposes a duty on school personnel to report hazing.52 In fact, in
Alabama, no person is allowed to knowingly permit, encourage, aid,
or assist any person in committing the offense of hazing, or willfully
acquiesces in its commission.53
Also, some states enacted statutes that have been interpreted to
mean that persons are guilty of hazing even if they have the consent
of the victim.54 In New Jersey, consent is not a defense to a hazing
charge, and its law permits the prosecution of offenders under other
applicable criminal statutes.55 By including these various provisions
in their anti-hazing statutes, these states have removed the
subjective inquiry of consent from consideration, thus, presumably
allowing courts to effectively and properly adjudicate hazing cases.56
In the US, hazing victims can either file a criminal action, based on
anti-hazing statutes, or a civil suit, arising from tort law and
constitutional law, against the members of the local fraternity, the
national fraternity and even against the university or college
concerned.57 Hazing, which threatens to needlessly harm students,
must be attacked from whatever legal means are possible.58
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In State v. Brown,59 a member of the Alpha Kappa Alpha at Kent
State University was indicted for complicity to hazing. The group
physically disciplined their pledges by forcing them to stand on their
heads, beating them with paddles, and smacking and striking initiates
in the face and head. The Ohio court held that evidence presented
therein was more than sufficient to sustain a conviction.
Excessive intake of alcohol in the fraternity initiations can be
considered as hazing. In Oja v. Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity
Inc.,60 a 17-year old college freshman died as a result of aspirating
his own vomit after consuming excessive amounts of alcohol in a
fraternity initiation ritual. The defendants in the said case contended
that they only furnished the alcohol drinks to the victim. The court
denied the defense because such acts of the fraternity effectively
contributed to the death of the victim as part of their hazing.
Even in high school, hazing could exist. In Nice v. Centennial Area
School District,61 a tenth-grade wrestler at William Tennet High
School was subjected to various forms of hazing, including; a ritual
where the victim was forcibly held down, while a teammate sat on his
face with his buttocks exposed. The parents of the student sued the
school because it failed to prevent the incident despite its knowledge
of the hazing rites. The court approved the settlement of the parties
in the amount ofUS$151,000.00.
More recently, the case of Yost v. Wabash College62 involved the
hazing of an 18-year old freshman, who suffered physical and mental
injuries in the initiation rites conducted by the Phi Kappa Psi fraternity.
As a pledge, the victim was thrown into a creek and was placed in a
chokehold, until he lost consciousness. The court upheld that action
against the local fraternity because, even if the student consented,
the fraternity had the duty to ensure the safety of its activities.
The US anti-hazing laws and jurisprudence show that victims of
hazing can properly attain redress before the court. By crafting laws
and prosecuting offenders, the state can address the distinct dilemma
of hazing.
Anti-Hazing Law in the
Philippines
R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law .of 1995, has been enacted to
regulate hazing and other forms of initiation rites in fraternities,
sororities, and other organizations. It was in response to the rising
incidents of death of hazing victims, particularly the death of
Leonardo "Lenny" Villa.63 Despite its passage, reports of deaths
resulting from i hazing continue to emerge. Recent victims were
Guillo Servando of the College of St. Benilde, Marc Andre Marcos and
Marvin Reglos of the San', Beda College - Manila, and Cris Anthony
Mendez of the University of the Philippines - Diliman. With the
continuity of these senseless tragedies, one question implores for an
answer: is R.A. No. 8049 a sufficient deterrent against hazing?
To answer the question, the Court must dissect the provisions of the
law and scrutinize its effect, implication and application.
Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves
called acts mala in se; and acts which would not be wrong but for the
fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita. This
distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a
wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se,
the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has
the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the
offender is immaterial.64 When the doing of an act is prohibited by
law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the doing of the
prohibited act is the crime itself.65
A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are
provided by special penal laws. In reality, however, there may be
mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No.
7080, as amended.66 Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes
defined in the RPC, such as technical malversation.67
The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala
prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or
vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or .omission is
immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se,- on the contrary, if it is
not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission
b)". reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita. In the final
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analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately
a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances
surrounding the violation of the statute.68
The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The
Senate deliberations would show that the lawmakers intended the
anti-hazing statute to be ma/um prohibitum, as follows: SENATOR
GUINGONA: Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under
the Revised Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA If hazing is done at present and it results in
death, the charge would be murder or homicide.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be
frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse
does so it can be penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new
offense under this definition of the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either
composing a sorority, fraternity or any association from making this
requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these specific
acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the
land that no group or association can require the act of physical
initiation before a person can become a member without being held
criminally liable.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that
imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not
punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of
an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment
of certain acts that resulted in death, etcetera as a result of hazing
which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage
hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for
invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very same
acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling
difference: When a person or group of persons resort to hazing as a
requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to
commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President.
Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is
death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the
intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of
hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the act of
hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or
deter the sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun this
activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these fraternities or
sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or
that acts of lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage, is the so-called initial innocent act.
That is why there is need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po
ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala
talaga silang intensiybng makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at
buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong
nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte.
So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng
murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung
sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong
hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang
penalty sa inyo."
xxx xxx xxx
1st Set Fulltext Page 5 of 74
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the
distinguished Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his statement
that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in
the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted
in the acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to
prove the willful intent of the accused in proving or establishing the
crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create
the special crime without having to go into the intent, which is one of
the basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to
initiate, then there is no offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor
admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have
a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are
punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are
not going to be proven by intent, but just because there was hazing, I
am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised Penal
Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being
criminalized because in the context of what is happening in the
sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will
admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already
criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a
criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the
masters intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What is
important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or
those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and
say, "We did not have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation
rites. This is normal. We do not have any intention to kill or maim."
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged
therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, etcetera,
where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if
they are separate offenses.
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR LINA. x x x
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out
the idea of intent or whether it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There
can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a
special law on hazing. We will not include this anymore under the
Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that
suggestion, Mr. President.69
[Emphases Supplied]
Having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and
the core principle of mala in se adhered to under the RPC, the
Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it
created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala
prohibita.70 In Vedana v. Valencia,71 the Court noted that in our
nation's very recent history, the people had spoken, through the
Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, an act previously
considered harmless by custom, as criminal.72 The act of hazing itself
is not inherently immoral, but the law deems the same to be against
public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the existence of
criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense
of good faith cannot be raised in its prosecution.73
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or
practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or
applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as
forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological
suffering or injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime
of hazing can be determined:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite
for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or
organization;
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2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the
fraternity, sorority or organization; and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him
to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury.
From the said definition of hazing, it is apparent that there must be
an initiation rite or practice performed by the fraternities, sororities or
organization. The law, however, did not limit the definition of these
groups to those formed within academic colleges and universities.74
In fact, the second paragraph of Section 1 provides that the term
"organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Philippine Military
Academy (PMA), or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military
Training and Citizen's Army Training. Even the president, manager,
director or other responsible officer of a corporation engaged in
hazing as a requirement for employment are covered by the law.75
R.A. No. 8049 qualifies that the physical, mental and psychological
testing and training procedure and practices to determine and
enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective
regular members of the AFP and the PNP, as approved by the
Secretary of National Defense and the National Police Commission,
duly recommended by the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director
General of the PNP, shall not be considered as hazing.
And not all forms of initiation rites are prohibited by the law. Section
2 thereof provides that initiation rites of fraternities, sororities or
organizations shall be allowed provided that the following requisites
are met:
1. That the fraternity, sorority or organization has a prior
written notice to the school authorities or head of
organization;
2. The said written notice must be secured at least seven (7)
days before the conduct of such initiation;
3. That the written notice shall indicate:
a. The period of the initiation activities, which shall
not exceed three (3) days;
b. The names of those to be subjected to such
activities; and
c. An undertaking that no physical violence be
employed by anybody during such initiation rites.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 8049 imposes an obligation
to the head of the school or organization or their
representatives that they must assign at least two
(2) representatives, as the case may be, to be
present during these valid initiations. The duty of
such representative ,is to see to it that no physical
harm of any kind shall be inflicted upon a recruit,
neophyte or applicant.
Noticeably, the law does not provide a penalty or sanction to
fraternities, sororities or organizations that fail to comply with the
notice requirements of Section 2. Also, the school and organization
administrators do not have a clear liability for non-compliance with
Section 3.
Any person who commits the crime of hazing shall be liable in
accordance with Section 4 of the law, which provides different classes
of persons who are held liable as principals and accomplices.
The first class of principals would be the actual participants in the
hazing. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation
rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers
and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually
participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as
principals. Interestingly, the presence of any person during the hazing
is prima facie evidence of actual participation, unless he prevented
the commission of the acts punishable herein.76
The prescribed penalty on the principals depends on the extent of
injury inflicted to the victim.77 The penalties appear to be similar to
1st Set Fulltext Page 6 of 74
that of homicide, serious physical injuries, less serious physical
injuries, and slight physical injuries under the RPC,78 with the
penalties for hazing increased one degree higher. Also, the law
provides several circumstances which would aggravate the imposable
penalty.79
Curiously, although hazing has been defined as consisting of those
activities involving physical or psychological suffering or injury, the
penalties for hazing only covered the infliction of physical harm. At
best, the only psychological injury recognized would be causing
insanity to the victim. Conversely, even if the victim only sustained
physical injuries which did not incapacitate him, there is still a
prescribed penalty.80
The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers,
or alumni of the organization, group, fraternity or sorority who
actually planned the hazing.81 Although these planners were not
present when the acts constituting hazing were committed, they shall
still be liable as principals. The provision took in consideration the
non-resident members of the organization, such as their former
officers or alumni.
The third class of principals would ht; officers or members of an
organization group, fraternity or sorority who knowingly cooperated in
carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present
thereat.82 These officers or members are penalized, not because of
their direct participation in the infliction of harm, but due to their
indispensable cooperation in the crime by inducing the victim to
attend the hazing.
The next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's
adviser who was present when the acts constituting hazing were
committed, and failed to take action to prevent them from
occurring.83 The liability of the adviser arises, not only from his mere
presence in the hazing, but also his failure to prevent the same.
The last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or
members of the fraternity, group, or organization.84 The hazing must
be held in the home of one of the officers or members. The parents
must have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted in their homes
and failed to take any action to avoid the same from occurring.
The law also provides for accomplices in the crime of hazing. The
school authorities, including faculty members, who consented to the
hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any
action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as
accomplices.85 Likewise, the owner of the place where the hazing
was conducted can also be an accomplice to the crime.86 The owner
of the place shall be liable when he has actual knowledge of the
hazing conducted therein and he failed to take any steps to stop the
same. Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the
law provides that any person charged with the said crime shall not be
entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to
commit so grave a wrong.87 Also, the framers of the law intended
that the consent of the victim shall not be a defense in hazing. During
the discussion of whether sodomy shall be included as a punishable
act under the law, the issue of consent was tackled: SENATOR LINA x
xx
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such
that the act may even be entered into with consent. It is not only
sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the consent of the
neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing
not punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain
upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator
said, "Well, he allowed it upon himself. He consented to it." So, if we
allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of the
victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no
significance if we pass this bill, because it will always be a defense
that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted
it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to
prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply because the very
act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a
punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical
injuries merely aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the
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defense of consent is not going to nullify the criminal nature of the
act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the
offense if it is committed without consent of the victim, then the
whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment?
(Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same is approved.88
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, the law acknowledges that the offended party in the crime of
hazing can seek different courses of action. n '.'provides that the
responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or citizen's
army training organization, may impose the appropriate
administrative sanctions on the person or the persons charged under
this provision even before their conviction.89 Necessarily, the
offended party can file either administrative, civil, or criminal actions
against the offenders.90
The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049 shows that, on paper, it
is complete and robust in penalizing the crime of hazing. It was made
malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and disallow the
defense of good faith. It took into consideration the different
participants and contributors in the hazing activities. While not all
acts cited in the law are penalized, the penalties imposed therein
involve various and serious terms of imprisonment to discourage
would-be offenders. Indeed, the law against hazing is ideal and
profound. As to whether the law can be effectively implemented, the
Court begs to continue on the merits of the case.
The Information properly
charged the offense proved
The petitioners claim that the amended ,information avers a criminal
charge of hazing by actual participation, but the only offense proved
during the trial was hazing by inducement. Their1 contention must fail.
The Amended Information reads:
That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at
Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, Province of Laguna and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, during a planned initiation rite and being then officers and
members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in
conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers,
whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one
MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition
for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical
harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.91
On the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, is enlightening:
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and
not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of
the statute in alleging the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of
common understanding to know the charge against him, and the
court to render judgment properly.92
The Court agrees with the OSG that the "planned initiation rite" as
stated in the information included the act of inducing Villanueva to
attend it. In ordinary parlance, a planned event can be understood to
have different phases. Likewise, the hazing activity had different
stages and the perpetrators had different roles therein, not solely
1st Set Fulltext Page 7 of 74
inflicting physical injury to the neophyte. One of the roles of the
petitioners in the hazing activity was to induce Villanueva to be
present. Dungo and Sibal not only induced Villanueva to be present at
the resort, but they actually brought him there. They fulfilled their
roles in the planned hazing rite which eventually led to the death of
Villanueva. The hazing would not have been accomplished were it not
for the acts of the petitioners that induced the victim to be present.
Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of
hazing.93 To require the prosecutor to indicate every step of the
planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of the
criminal case, when details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil,
would be an arduous task, if not downright impossible. The law does
not require the impossible (lex non cognit ad impossibilia).
The proper approach would be to require the prosecution to state
every element of the crime of hazing, the offenders, and the
accompanying circumstances in the planned initiation activity which
has been satisfied in the present case. Accordingly, the amended
information sufficiently informed the petitioners that they were being
criminally charged for their roles in the planned initiation rite.
Conspiracy of the
offenders was duly proven
The petitioners assail that the prosecution failed to establish the fact
of conspiracy.
The Court disagrees.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To
determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a
felony.94 The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may
consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to
execute or implement the criminal plan.95
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came
together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a
common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of
some complete whole.96 Responsibility of a conspirator is not
confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy
but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing
out of the purpose intended.97
The lawmakers deliberated on whether the prosecution was still
obliged to prove the conspiracy between the offenders under R.A.
8049, to wit:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group
that initiated and a person died. The charge is murder. My question is:
Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to
prove conspiracy or not anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x
xx
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution
have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if
that occurs, there is no need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It
should be hazing, Mr. President.98
The Court does not categorically agree that, under R.A. No. 8049, the
prosecution need not prove conspiracy. Jurisprudence dictates that
conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive
and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship
and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself
amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to
a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the
crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose.99
R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that
introduces a disputable presumption of actual participation; and
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which modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 4, paragraph 6
thereof provides that the presence of any person during the hazing is
prima facie evidence of participation as principal, unless he prevented
the commission of the punishable acts. This provision is unique
because a disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of
the offender during the hazing, which can be rebutted by proving that
the accused took steps to prevent the commission of the hazing.
The petitioners attempted to attack the constitutionality of Section 4
of R.A. No. 8049 before the CA, hut did not succeed. "[A] finding of
prima facie evidence x x x does not shatter the presumptive
innocence the accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence
arises, certain facts have still to be proved; the trial court cannot
depend alone on such evidence, because precisely, it is merely prima
facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense
the latter may adduce."100
Penal laws which feature prima facie evidence by disputable
presumptions against the offenders are not new, and can be observed
in the following: (1) the possession of drug paraphernalia gives rise to
prima facie evidence of the use of dangerous drug;101 (2) the
dishonor of the check for insufficient funds is prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit;102 and (3) the
possession of any good which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.103
Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No. 8049 can be
related to the conspiracy in the crime of hazing. The common design
of offenders is to haze the victim. Some of the overt acts that could
be committed by the offenders would be to (1) plan the hazing
activity as a requirement of the victim's initiation to the fraternity; (2)
induce the victim to attend the hazing; and (3) actually participate in
the infliction of physical injuries.
In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the petitioners'
participation in the hazing because of their presence in the venue. As
correctly held by the RTC, the presence of Dungo and Sibal during the
hazing at Villa Novaliches Resort was established by the testimony of
Ignacio. She testified that she saw Sibal emerge from the resort and
approach her store, to wit:
MR. DIMACULANGAN
Q: And how many persons from this group did you see again?
WITNESS
A: Three (3), sir.
Q: Where did they come from, did they come out from the resort?
Where did this 3 people or this group of people coming from?
A: Inside the resort, sir.
Q: And around what time was this?
A: Around 9:00, sir.
Q: And what did they do if any if they came out of the resort?
A: They went to my store, sir.
xxxx
Q: Did you have any other visitors to your store that night?
xxxx
A: "Meron po".
Q: Who were these visitors?
A: I don't know their names but I recognize their faces, sir.
Q: If I show you pictures of these people, will you be able to identify
them before this Court.
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Mrs. Ignacio, I am showing you this picture of persons marked as
Exhibit "L" in the Pre-Trial, can you please look over this document
carefully and see if any of the persons whom you said visited your
store is here?
xxxx
A: "Siya rin po."
COURT:
Make it of record that the witness pinpointed to the first picture
appearing on the left picture on the first row.
xxxx
ATIY. PAMAOS:
For the record, your Honor, we manifest that the picture and the
name pointed by the witness has been previously marked as Exhibit
"L-3" and previously admitted by the defense as referring to Gregorio
Sibal, Jr., accused in this case…104
Ignacio, also positively identified Dungo as among the guests of Villa
Novaliches Resort on the night of the hazing, to wit:
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COURT
Q: xx x Now, when you say other people you could identify who are
not in the pictures then how would you know that these people are
indeed those people you could identify?
WITNESS
A: "Iyon pong ... di ba po nagkuwento ako na dumating sila tapos
nag shake hands at saka iyong nagyakapan po ... "
Q: And what will be the significance of the alleged embrace and shake
hands for you to say that you could identify those people?
A: "Hindi po. Noong dumating po sila nasa isang jeep, meron pong
lalaki doon sa may tabi ng driver bumaba siya tapos po noong
bumaba siya tapos iyong mga kasamahan nya sa likod nagbaba-an
din, iyon po nagbati-an po sila."
Q: And from these greeting, how could you identify these people?
A: "Ngayon ko lang po napag masdan ang taong iyon, hindi ko po
alam na akusado po sa kabila iyon."
Q: And who was that person?
A: "Siya po, iyon po."
Q: Who are you pointing to?
A: "Iyon pong naka-dilaw na ... " (Witness pointing to Dandy Dungo)
Q: So, are you telling the Court that this person you positively saw
seated beside the driver came out and subsequently embraced and
shook hands with the other people from the jeepney, is that your
testimony?
A: Yes, your Honor.105
The testimony of Ignacio was direct and straightforward. Her
testimony was given great weight because she was a disinterested
and credible witness. The prosecution indubitably established the
presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing. Such gave rise to the
prima facie evidence of their actual participation in the hazing of
Villanueva. They were given an opportunity to rebut and overcome
the prima facie evidence of the prosecution by proving that they
prevented the commission of the hazing, yet they failed to do so.
Because of the uncontroverted prima facie evidence against the
petitioners, it was shown that they performed an overt act in the
furtherance of the criminal design of hazing. Not only did they induce
the victim to attend the hazing activity, the petitioners also actually
participated in it based on the prima facie evidence. These acts are
sufficient to establish their roles in the conspiracy of hazing.
Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in
itself amount to conspiracy.106 Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049,
the participation of the offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be
proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the
hazing, unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.
The guilt of the
petitioners was proven
beyond reasonable doubt
Aside from inducing Villanueva to attend the initiation rites and their
presence during the hazing, the petitioners? guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the sequence of circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution. Their involvement in the hazing of
Villanueva is not merely based on prima facie evidence but was also
established by circumstantial evidence.
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own
starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal
prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.107 In criminal law,
proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof
that produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.108
While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable
doubt is required for a conviction, this exacting standard does not
preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not
available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the
guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of
direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing
circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually
committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is
highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all
circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous
crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to
prove.109 Needless to state, the crime of hazing is shrouded in
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secrecy. Fraternities and sororities, especially the Greek organizations,
are secretive in nature and their members are reluctant to give any
information regarding initiation rites.110 The silence is only broken
after someone has been injured so severely that medical attention is
required. It is only at this point that the secret is revealed and the
activities become public.111 Bearing in mind the concealment of
hazing, it is only logical and proper for the prosecution to resort to
the presentation of circumstantial evidence to prove it.
The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an
accused through circumstantial evidence require the existence of the
following requisites: (1) there are more than one circumstance; (2)
the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.112 To justify a
conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the
mind as to the criminal liability of the accused. Jurisprudence requires
that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken
chain of events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the
crime.113
The CA meticulously wrote in detail the unbroken chain of
circumstantial evidence which established the petitioners' gult in the
death of Villanueva as follows:
1. Marlon Villanueva is a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega, as
testified by his roommate Joey Atienza.
2. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 13,
2006, Sunga was staying at their tambayan, talking to her
organization mates. Three men were seated two meters way
from her. She identified two of the men as appellants Sibal
and Dungo, while she did not know the third man. The three
men were wearing black shirts with the seal of the Alpha Phi
Omega.
3. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men
coming from the entomology wing arrived and approached
the three men. Among the men who just arrived was the
victim, Marlon Villanueva. One of the men wearing black
APO shirts handed over to the two fraternity neophytes
some money and told the men "Mamalengke na kayo." He
later took back the money and said, "Huwag na, kami na
lang."
4. One of the men wearing a black APO shirt, who was later
identified as appellant Dungo, stood up and asked Marlon if
the latter already reported to him, and asked him why he
did not report to him when he was just at the tambayan.
Dungo then continuously punched the victim on his arm.
This went on for five minutes. Marlon just kept quiet with
his head bowed down. Fifteen minutes later, the men left
going towards the Entomology wing.
5. The deceased Marlon Villanueva was 'last seen alive by
Joey Atienza at 7:00 in the evening of 13 January 2006,
from whom he borrowed the shoes he wore at the initiation
right [sic]. Marlon told Joey that it was his "finals" night.
6. On January 13, 2006 at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in
the evening, Susan Ignacio saw more than twenty (20)
persons arrive at the Villa Novaliches Resort onboard a
jeepney.1âwphi1 She estimated the ages of these persons
to be between 20 to 30 years old. Three (3) persons riding a
single motorcycle likewise arrived at the resort.
7. Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of
the terrace at the resort who looked like they were praying.
Later that evening, at least three (3) of these persons went
to her store to buy some items. She did not know their
names but could identity [sic] their faces. After she was
shown colored photographs, she pointed to the man later
identified as Herald Christopher Braseros. She also pointed
out the man later identified as Gregorio Sibal, Jr.
8. Donato Magat, a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol,
Calamba City, testified that around 3:00 o'clock in the
morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers
1st Set Fulltext Page 9 of 74
 at the corner of Villa Novaliches Resort when a man
approached him and told him that someone inside the resort
needed a ride. Magat then went to the resort and asked the
two (2) men standing by the gate who will be riding his
tricycle.
9. The four (4) men boarded his tricycle but Magat noticed
that when he touched the body of the man who was being
carried, it felt cold. The said man looked very weak like a
vegetable.
10. Seferino Espina y Jabay testified that he worked as a
security guard at the J.P. Rizal Hospital and was assigned at
the emergency room. At around 3:00 o'clock in the early
morning of January 14, 2006, he was with another security
guard, Abelardo Natividad and hospital helper Danilo Glindo
a.k.a. Gringo, when a tricycle arrived at the emergency
room containing four (4) passengers, excluding the driver.
He was an arm's length away from said tricycle. He
identified two of the passengers thereof as appellants Dungo
and Sibal. Espina said he and Glinda helped the passengers
unload a body inside the tricycle and brought it to the
emergency room.
11. Afterwards, Espina asked the two meq for identification
cards. The latter replied that they did not bring with them
any I.D. or wallet.1âwphi1 Instead of giving their true
names, the appellants listed down their names in the
hospital logbook as Brandon Gonzales y Lanzon and Jericho
Paril y Rivera. Espina then told the two men not to leave,
not telling them that they secretly called the police to report
the incident which was their standard operating procedure
when a dead body was brought to the hospital.
12. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was then the attending
physician at the emergency room, observed that Marlon was
motionless, had no heartbeat and already cyanotic.
13. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Marlon for about 15 to 20
minutes. However, the latter did not respond to
resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan
noticed a big contusion hematoma on the left side of the
victim's face and several injuries on his arms and legs. He
further attested that Marlon's face was already cyanotic.
14. When Dr. Masilungan pulled down Marlon's pants, he
saw a large contusion on both legs which extended from the
upper portion of his thigh down to the couplexial portion or
the back of the knee.
15. Due to the nature, extent and location of Marlon's
injuries, Dr. Masilungan opined that he was a victim of
hazing. Dr. Masilungan is familiar with hazing injuries,
having undergone hazing when he was a student and also
because of his experience treating victims of hazing
incidents.
16. Dr. Roy Camarillo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP
Crime Laboratory in Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim,
Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he performed an
autopsy on the cadaver of the victim on January 14j 2006;
that the victim's cause of death was blunt head trauma.
From 1999 to 2006, he was able to conduct post-mortem
examination of the two (2) persons whose deaths were
attributed to hazing. These two (2) persons sustained
multiple contusions and injuries on different parts of their
body, particularly on the buttocks, on both upper and lower
extremities. Both persons died of brain hemorrhage.
Correlating these two cases to the injuries found on the
victim's body, Dr. Camarillo attested that the victim, Marlon
Villanueva, sustained similar injuries to those two (2)
persons. Based on the presence of multiple injuries and
contusions on his body, he opined that these injuries were
hazing-related.114
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal, on the other hand, presented the
defense of denial and alibi. These defenses, however, must fail. Time
and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the
weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct and
fabricate.115 As properly held by the RTC, these defenses cannot
CRIM REV
prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of the
petitioners by prosecution witnesses Sunga and Ignacio. The
testimonies of the defense witnesses also lacked credibility and
reliability. The corroboration of defense witness Rivera was suspect
because she was the girlfriend of Dungo, and it was only logical and
emotional that she would stand by the man she loved and cared for.
The testimonies of their fellow fraternity brothers, likewise, do not
hold much weight because they had so much at stake in the outcome
of the case. Stated differently, the petitioners did not present credible
and. disinterested witnesses to substantiate their defenses of denial
and alibi.
After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA
and the R TC that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution was overwhelming enough to establish the guilt of the
petitioners beyond a reasonable doubt. The unbroken chain of events
laid down by the CA leaves us no other conclusion other than the
petitioners' participation in the hazing. They took part in the hazing
and, together; with their fellow fraternity officers and members,
inflicted physical injuries to Villanueva as a requirement of his
initiation to the fraternity. The physical injuries eventually took a toll
on the body of the victim, which led to his death. Another young life
lost.
With the fact of hazing, the identity ,of the petitioners, and their
participation therein duly proven, the moral certainty that produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind has been satisfied.
Final Note
Hazing has been a phenomenon that has beleaguered the country's
educational institutions and communities. News of young men beaten
to death as part of fraternities' violent initiation rites supposedly to
seal fraternal bond has sent disturbing waves to lawmakers. Hence,
R.A. No. 8049 was signed into to law on June 7, 1995. Doubts on the
effectiveness of the law were raised. The Court, however, scrutinized
its provisions and it is convinced that the law is rigorous in penalizing
the crime of hazing.
Hopefully, the present case will serve as a guide to the bench and the
bar on the application of R.A. No. 8049. Through careful case-build up
and proper presentation of evidence before the court, it is not
impossible for the exalted constitutional presumption of innocence of
the accused to be overcome and his guilt for the crime of hazing be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must bear in mind
the secretive nature of hazing, and carefully weave its chain of
circumstantial evidence. Likewise, the defense must present a
genuine defense and substantiate the same through credible and
reliable witnesses. The counsels of both parties must also consider
hazing as a malum prohibitum crime and the law's distinctive
provisions.
While the Court finds R.A. No. 8049 adequate to deter and prosecute
hazing, the law is far from perfect. In Villareal v. People,116 the
Court suggested that the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-
resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing should be
considered as aggravating circumstances that would increase the
applicable penalties. Equally, based on the discussion earlier, this
Court suggests some further amendments to the law. First, there
should be a penalty or liability for noncompliance with Section 2, or
the written notice requirement, and with Section 3, or the
representation requirement. Second, the penalties under Section 4
should also consider the psychological harm done to the victim of
hazing. With these additional inputs on R.A. No. 8049, the movement
against hazing can be invigorated. R.A. No. 8049 is a democratic
response to the uproar against hazing. It demonstrates that there
must, and should, be another way of fostering brotherhood, other
than through the culture of violence and suffering. The senseless
deaths of these young men shall never be forgotten, for justice is the
spark that lights the candles of their graves.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 26, 2013 Decision and
the October 8, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-
H.C. No. 05046 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Let copies of this
Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice as
guidance for the proper implementation and prosecution of violators
of R.A. No. 8049; and to the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives for possible consideration of the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the penalty for
1st Set Fulltext Page 10 of 74
noncompliance with its Section 2 and 3, and the :penalty for the
psychological harms to the surviving victims of hazing.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011
ARNEL COLINARES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove
all that it takes; b) what distinguishes frustrated homicide from
attempted homicide; and c) when an accused who appeals may still
apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.
The Facts and the Case
The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel
Colinares (Arnel) with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.1
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in
the evening on June 25, 2000, he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out
to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak
by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel
sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge
stone, about 15 ½ inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as
Jesus fled.
Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when
he saw Rufino lying by the roadside. Ananias tried to help but
someone struck him with something hard on the right temple,
knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.
Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since
he happened to be smoking outside his house. He sought the help of
a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate2 showing that
Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the
hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious and
potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel
claimed self-defense. He testified that he was on his way home that
evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite
drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon
was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus
and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried
to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending
himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he
charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was
able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel
then fled and hid in his sister’s house. On September 4, 2000, he
voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a
pre-wedding party on the night of the incident. His three companions
were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the three engaged in
heated argument with Arnel.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to
suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor,
as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under
the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense
and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of
attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty
imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but
deleted the award for lost income in the absence of evidence to
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support it.3 Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for
review.
In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel
and the Solicitor General to submit their respective positions on
whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of
attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of
four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four
months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for
probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be
entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new
penalty on him that makes his offense probationable. The language
and spirit of the probation law warrants such a stand. The Solicitor
General, on the other hand, argues that under the Probation Law no
application for probation can be entertained once the accused has
perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
The Issues Presented
The case essentially presents three issues:
1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he
struck Rufino on the head with a stone;
2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not
Arnel is guilty of frustrated homicide; and
3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a
lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty, whether
or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the
case to the trial court.
The Court’s Rulings
One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first
and that he merely acted in self-defense when he hit Rufino back with
a stone.
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of
showing that he was legally justified in killing the victim or inflicting
injury to him. The accused must establish the elements of self-
defense by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, the
otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the
lack of criminal intent of the accused.4
In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-
defense requires (1) that the person whom the offender killed or
injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender
employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself did
not act with sufficient provocation.5
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused,
the latter has nothing to prevent or repel and the other two requisites
of self-defense would have no basis for being appreciated. Unlawful
aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or
an imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or
intimidating attitude is not enough. The victim must attack the
accused with actual physical force or with a weapon.6
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of
unlawful aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained
fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No
one corroborated Arnel’s testimony that it was Rufino who started it.
Arnel’s only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw
those involved having a heated argument in the middle of the street.
Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to prove his point that he
suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions.7
In contrast, the three witnesses—Jesus, Paciano, and Ananias—
testified that Arnel was the aggressor. Although their versions were
mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract from their core
story. The witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how
he did it. Compared to Arnel’s testimony, the prosecution’s version is
more believable and consistent with reality, hence deserving
credence.8
1st Set Fulltext Page 11 of 74
Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor,
would he be liable for frustrated homicide when the wounds he
inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could not have
resulted in death as in fact it did not?
The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the
accused’s intent to take his victim’s life. The prosecution has to prove
this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt
regarding homicidal intent.9 And the intent to kill is often inferred
from, among other things, the means the offender used and the
nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.10
Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow
was so forceful that it knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size
of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the location of the wounds
that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he
intended to kill him.
The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted,
not frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v. People,11 we ruled that
when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a
deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die
because of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder
or frustrated homicide. If the victim’s wounds are not fatal, the crime
is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent,
depth, and severity of the victim’s wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified
that "head injuries are always very serious,"12 he could not
categorically say that Rufino’s wounds in this case were "fatal." Thus:
Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?
A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.
Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the
wounds actually are not fatal on that very day?
A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from
becoming fatal. But on that case the patient preferred to go
home at that time.
Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only
refers to the length of the wound not the depth of the wound?
A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the
layer of scalp.
Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?
A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is
broken up the label of the frontal lo[b]e, we always call it
lacerated wound, but in that kind of wound, we did not
measure the depth.13
Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no
indication that his skull incurred fracture or that he bled internally as
a result of the pounding of his head. The wounds were not so deep,
they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven or
eight days. Dr. Belleza further testified:
Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require
surgery?
A: Yes, Madam.
Q: The injuries are slight?
A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give
antibiotics and antit[e]tanus – the problem the contusion that
occurred in the brain.
xxxx
Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?
A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing
the wounds.
Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?
A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some
of them would rather go home and then come back.
Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?
A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up.14
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record
to support the prosecution’s claim that Rufino would have died
without timely medical intervention. Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable
only for attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
CRIM REV
Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for
probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC
convicting him for frustrated homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted
homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him
should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as
maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the
right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere
privilege granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders.
Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: "That no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction."15 Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated
homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from
applying for probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the
point is not that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly
does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege.
The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years
and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because
of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide
whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into
account the full circumstances of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who
appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing
himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a
conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set
aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme
Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it
will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s
annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation
because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him.
More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense
and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s
judgment—even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will
now also be made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with
the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang
nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao
gets the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing
Arnel to apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in
Francisco v. Court of Appeals16 that the probation law requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail
himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco
and this case.
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the
accused guilty of grave oral defamation and sentenced him to a
prison term of one year and one day to one year and eight months of
prision correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was
his to ask! Still, he chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence
clearly waiving his right to apply for probation. When the acquittal did
not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of course let
him. It served him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it
too. He certainly could not have both appeal and probation.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail
himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accused—to wager on the result of his
appeal—that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the
moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence
inevitable, he now applies for probation as an ‘escape hatch’ thus
rendering nugatory the appellate court’s affirmance of his
conviction."17
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have
allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between
appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, "By taking this
appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the
1st Set Fulltext Page 12 of 74
trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that
would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly
diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It
remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction,
when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to
apply for that privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of
the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best
warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide,
which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore,
Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the
level where the law would allow him to apply for probation.
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of
frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original
conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have
found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right
penalty of two years and four months maximum.lavvphil This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to
probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of
probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is
not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory
provisions.18 As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in
Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere
privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he
comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in
many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the
accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent
purpose.19
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing
Arnel to apply for probation after he appealed from the trial court’s
judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the provision of
Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to "provide an
opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender." An accused
like Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed,
shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct
judgment of conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the
wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of
6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime,
which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only committed
attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4
months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation
under the reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind
bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead undergo
reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the
probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right
and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four
months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation.
No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of
the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have
crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not
probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to
deny Arnel the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that
the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by
the trial court, subject to probation?
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES
the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as
maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount of ₱20,000.00 as
moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation
within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has been
remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.
CRIM REV
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 206513 October 20, 2015
MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA MARUHOM, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHIILPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The Court is now faced with one of the predicaments I discussed in
my Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in Colinares v. People.1 The
question regarding the application of the Probation Law is again
inescapably intertwined with the present petition. Consequently, I
must reiterate my assertions and arguments in Colinares to the case
at bar.
In the present controversy, petitioner Mustapha Dimakuta y Maruhom
alias Boyet was indicted for Violation of Section 5 Paragraph (b),
Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 or the Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discriminatory Act. The
Information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of September 2005, in the City of Las
Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit a lascivious conduct upon
the person of one AAA, who was then a sixteen (16) year old minor,
by then and there embracing her, touching her breast and private
part against her will and without her consent and the act complained
of is prejudicial to the physical and psychological development of the
complainant.2
After trial, the RTC promulgated its Decision3 which convicted
petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. In addition,
he was directed to pay a fine of ₱20,000.00, civil indemnity of
₱25,000.00, and moral damages of ₱25,000.00.4
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA) arguing, among other things, that even assuming he
committed the acts imputed, still there is no evidence showing that
the same were done without the victim’s consent or through force,
duress, intimidation or violence upon her. Surprisingly, when asked to
comment on the appeal, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
relying heavily on People v. Abello,5 opined that petitioner should
have been convicted only of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in view of the prosecution’s failure to
establish that the lascivious acts were attended by force or coercion
because the victim was asleep at the time the alleged acts were
committed.
On June 28, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision6 adopting the
recommendation of the OSG. In modifying the RTC Decision,
petitioner was found guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336
of the RPC and was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. Likewise, he
was ordered to pay ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as
moral damages.
Petitioner received a copy of CA Decision on July 6, 2012.7 Instead of
further appealing the case, he filed on July 23, 2012 before the CA a
manifestation with motion to allow him to apply for probation upon
remand of the case to the RTC.8 Petitioner invoked the case of
Colinares v. People9 which allowed petitioner therein to apply for
probation after his sentence was later reduced on appeal by the
Supreme Court.
The CA issued a Resolution on September 3, 2012 denying
petitioner’s manifestation with motion.10 It was ruled that Colinares
is inapplicable since petitioner therein raised as sole issue the
correctness of the penalty imposed and claimed that the evidence
1st Set Fulltext Page 13 of 74
presented warranted only a conviction for the lesser offense.1âwphi1
Instead, the appellate court viewed as appropriate the case of
Lagrosa v. People,11 wherein the application for probation was denied
because petitioners therein put in issue on appeal the merits of their
conviction and did not simply assail the propriety of the penalties
imposed.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,12 but it was denied in a
Resolution13 dated March 13, 2013; hence, this petition.
The petition should be denied.
At the outset, tracing the evolution of the present Probation Law is
warranted in order to better understand and apply the wisdom of its
framers to cases invoking its application.
In this jurisdiction, the concept of probation was introduced during
the American colonial period.14 For juvenile delinquents, Act No.
320315 was enacted on December 3, 1924. It was later amended by
Act Nos. 3309,16 3559,17 and 3725.18 As to offenders who are
eighteen years old and above, Act No. 422119 was passed by the
legislature and took effect on August 7, 1935. Said Act allowed
defendants who are convicted and sentenced by a Court of First
Instance or by the Supreme Court on appeal, except those who are
convicted of offenses enumerated in Section 8 thereof,20 to be placed
on probation upon application after the sentence has become final
and before its service has begun.21 However, We declared in People
v. Vera22 that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional and void as it
constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative
authority to the provincial boards.
During the martial law period, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 96823 on July 24, 1976.
Originally, P.D. No. 968 allowed the filing of an application for
probation at any time after the defendant had been convicted and
sentenced. Section 4 of which provides:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. – Subject to the provisions of this Decree,
the court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant and upon application at any time of said defendant,
suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it
may deem best.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed
with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has
been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the
automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal. An order granting or
denying probation shall not be appealable.24
Later, the filing of an application for probation pending appeal was
still allowed when Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 was amended by P.D. No.
125725 on December 1, 1977 by providing that such application may
be made after the defendant had been convicted and sentenced but
before he begins to serve his sentence. Thus:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. – Subject to the provisions of this Decree,
the court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence and upon
his application, suspend the execution of said sentence and place
the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best.
The prosecuting officer concerned shall be notified by the court of the
filing of the application for probation and he may submit his comment
on such application within ten days from receipt of the notification.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial
court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken
from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal
of a pending appeal. In the latter case, however, if the application is
filed on or after the date of the judgment of the appellate court, said
application shall be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of the
judgment of the appellate court.
CRIM REV
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.26
On October 5, 1985, Section 4 was subsequently amended by P.D. No.
1990.27 Henceforth, the policy has been to allow convicted and
sentenced defendant to apply for probation within the 15-day period
for perfecting an appeal. As modified, Section 4 of the Probation Law
now reads:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. – Subject to the provisions of this Decree,
the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, that
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed
with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.28
The reason for the disallowance may be inferred from the preamble of
P.D. No. 1990, thus:
WHEREAS, it has been the sad experience that persons who are
convicted of offenses and who may be entitled to probation still
appeal the judgment of conviction even up to the Supreme Court,
only to pursue their application for probation when their appeal is
eventually dismissed;
WHEREAS, the process of criminal investigation, prosecution,
conviction and appeal entails too much time and effort, not to
mention the huge expenses of litigation, on the part of the State;
WHEREAS, the time, effort and expenses of the Government in
investigating and prosecuting accused persons from the lower courts
up to the Supreme Court, are oftentimes rendered nugatory when,
after the appellate Court finally affirms the judgment of conviction,
the defendant applies for and is granted probation;
WHEREAS, probation was not intended as an escape hatch and
should not be used to obstruct and delay the administration of justice,
but should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are
willing to be reformed and rehabilitated;
WHEREAS, it becomes imperative to remedy the problems
abovementioned confronting our probation
system[.]
Observing the developments in our Probation Law, the Court settled
in Llamado v. Court of Appeals:29
Examination of Section 4, after its amendment by P.D. No. 1257,
reveals that it had established a prolonged but definite period during
which an application for probation may be granted by the trial court.
That period was: "After [the trial court] shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence."
Clearly, the cut-off time – commencement of service of sentence –
takes place not only after an appeal has been taken from the
sentence of conviction, but even after judgment has been rendered
by the appellate court and after judgment has become final. Indeed,
in this last situation, Section 4, as amended by P.D. No. 1257
provides that "the application [for probation] shall be acted upon by
the trial court on the basis of the judgment of the appellate court";
for the appellate court might have increased or reduced the original
penalty imposed by the trial court. x x x
xxxx
In sharp contrast with Section 4 as amended by PD No. 1257, in its
present form, Section 4 establishes a much narrower period during
which an application for probation may be filed with the trial court:
"after [the trial court] shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant and – within the period for perfecting an appeal –." As if to
provide emphasis, a new proviso was appended to the first paragraph
of Section 4 that expressly prohibits the grant of an application for
1st Set Fulltext Page 14 of 74
probation "if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the
judgment of conviction." It is worthy of note too that Section 4 in its
present form has dropped the phrase which said that the filing of an
application for probation means "the automatic withdrawal of a
pending appeal." The deletion is quite logical since an application for
probation can no longer be filed once an appeal is perfected; there
can, therefore, be no pending appeal that would have to be
withdrawn.
xxxx
We find ourselves unable to accept the eloquently stated arguments
of petitioner's counsel and the dissenting opinion. We are unable to
persuade ourselves that Section 4 as it now stands, in authorizing the
trial court to grant probation "upon application by [the] defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal" and in reiterating in the
proviso that
"no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction."
did not really mean to refer to the fifteen-day period established, as
indicated above, by B.P. Blg. 129, the Interim Rules and Guidelines
Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 and the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, but rather to some vague and undefined time, i.e., "the
earliest opportunity" to withdraw the defendant's appeal. The
whereas clauses invoked by petitioner did not, of course, refer to the
fifteen-day period. There was absolutely no reason why they should
have so referred to that period for the operative words of Section 4
already do refer, in our view, to such fifteen-day period. Whereas
clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly speaking; they are not
part of the operative language of the statute. Nonetheless, whereas
clauses may be helpful to the extent they articulate the general
purpose or reason underlying a new enactment, in the present case,
an enactment which drastically but clearly changed the substantive
content of Section 4 existing before the promulgation of P.D. No.
1990. Whereas clauses, however, cannot control the specific terms of
the statute; in the instant case, the whereas clauses of P.D. No. 1990
do not purport to control or modify the terms of Section 4 as
amended. Upon the other hand, the term "period for perfecting an
appeal" used in Section 4 may be seen to furnish specification for the
loose language "first opportunity" employed in the fourth whereas
clause. "Perfection of an appeal" is, of course, a term of art but it is a
term of art widely understood by lawyers and judges and Section 4 of
the Probation Law addresses itself essentially to judges and lawyers.
"Perfecting an appeal" has no sensible meaning apart from the
meaning given to those words in our procedural law and so the law-
making agency could only have intended to refer the law-making
agency could only have intended to refer to the meaning of those
words in the context of procedural law.30
In Sable v. People, et al.,31 this Court stated that Section 4 of the
Probation Law was amended precisely to put a stop to the practice of
appealing from judgments of conviction even if the sentence is
probationable, for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying
for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid.32 The Probation
Law "expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This outlaws the
element of speculation on the part of the accused – to wager on the
result of his appeal – that when his conviction is finally affirmed on
appeal, the moment of truth well nigh at hand and the service of his
sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an ‘escape hatch,’
thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his
conviction."33
Verily, Section 4 of the Probation Law provides that the application for
probation must be filed with the trial court within the 15-day period
for perfecting an appeal. The need to file it within such period is
intended to encourage offenders, who are willing to be reformed and
rehabilitated, to avail themselves of probation at the first
opportunity.34 If the application for probation is filed beyond the 15-
day period, then the judgment becomes final and executory and the
lower court can no longer act on the application for probation. On the
other hand, if a notice of appeal is perfected, the trial court that
rendered the judgment of conviction is divested of any jurisdiction to
act on the case, except the execution of the judgment when it has
become final and executory.
In view of the latest amendment to Section 4 of the Probation Law
that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
CRIM REV
the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of
conviction," prevailing jurisprudence35 treats appeal and probation as
mutually exclusive remedies because the law is unmistakable about
it.36 Indeed, the law is very clear and a contrary interpretation would
counter its envisioned mandate. Courts have no authority to invoke
"liberal interpretation" or "the spirit of the law" where the words of
the statute themselves, and as illuminated by the history of that
statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation.37 To be sure, the
remedy of convicted felons who want to avail of the benefits of
probation even after the remedy of an appeal is to go to the Congress
and ask for the amendment of the law. To surmise a converse
construal of the provision would be dangerously encroaching on the
power of the legislature to enact laws and is tantamount to judicial
legislation.
With due respect, however, to the ponente and the majority opinion
in Colinares,38 the application of the Probation Law in the said case
deserves a second hard look so as to correct the mistake in the
application of the law in that particular case and in similar cases
which will be filed before the courts and inevitably elevated to Us like
this petition.
To refresh, Colinares concluded that since the trial court imposed a
penalty beyond what is allowed by the Probation Law, albeit
erroneously, the accused was deprived of his choice to apply for
probation and instead was compelled to appeal the case. The
reprehensible practice intended to be avoided by the law was,
therefore, not present when he appealed the trial court’s decision.
Taking into account that the accused argued in his appeal that the
evidence presented against him warranted his conviction only for
attempted, not frustrated, homicide, the majority of the Court opined
that the accused had purposely sought to bring down the impossible
penalty in order to allow him to apply for probation.
It was obvious then, as it is now, that the accused in Colinares should
not have been allowed the benefit of probation. As I have previously
stated and insisted upon, probation is not a right granted to a
convicted offender; it is a special privilege granted by the State to a
penitent qualified offender,39 who does not possess the
disqualifications under Section 9 of P.D. No. 968, as amended.40
Likewise, the Probation Law is not a penal law for it to be liberally
construed to favor the accused.41
In the American law paradigm, probation is considered as an act of
clemency and grace, not a matter of right.42 It is a privilege granted
by the State, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.43
In City of Aberdeen v. Regan,44 it was pronounced that:
The granting of a deferred sentence and probation, following a plea or
verdict of guilty, is a rehabilitative measure and, as such, is not a
matter of right but is a matter of grace, privilege, or clemency
granted to the deserving.
As such, even in the American criminal justice model, probation
should be granted only to the deserving or, in our system, only to
qualified "penitent offenders" who are willing to be reformed and
rehabilitated. Corollarily, in this jurisdiction, the wisdom behind the
Probation Law is outlined in its stated purposes, to wit:
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by
providing him with individualized treatment;
(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent
offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison
sentence; and
(c) prevent the commission of offenses.45
As I have previously indicated in Colinares, if this Court will adopt as
jurisprudential doctrine the opinion that an accused may still be
allowed to apply for probation even if he has filed a notice of appeal,
it must be categorically stated that such appeal must be limited to the
following grounds:
1. When the appeal is merely intended for the correction of the
penalty imposed by the lower court, which when corrected would
entitle the accused to apply for probation; and
2. When the appeal is merely intended to review the crime for which
the accused was convicted and that the accused should only be liable
1st Set Fulltext Page 15 of 74
to the lesser offense which is necessarily included in the crime for
which he was originally convicted and the proper penalty imposable is
within the probationable period.
In both instances, the penalty imposed by the trial court for the crime
committed by the accused is more than six years; hence, the
sentence disqualifies the accused from applying for probation. The
accused should then be allowed to file an appeal under the afore-
stated grounds to seek a review of the crime and/or penalty imposed
by the trial court. If, on appeal, the appellate court finds it proper to
modify the crime and/or the penalty imposed, and the penalty finally
imposed is within the probationable period, the accused should still be
allowed to apply for probation.
In addition, before an appeal is filed based on the grounds
enumerated above, the accused should first file a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the trial court anchored on the
above-stated grounds and manifest his intent to apply for probation if
the motion is granted. The motion for reconsideration will give the
trial court an opportunity to review and rectify any errors in its
judgment, while the manifestation of the accused will immediately
show that he is agreeable to the judgment of conviction and does not
intend to appeal from it, but he only seeks a review of the crime
and/or penalty imposed, so that in the event that the penalty will be
modified within the probationable limit, he will immediately apply for
probation. Without such motion for reconsideration, the notice of
appeal should be denied outright.
The notice of appeal should contain the following averments:
(1) that an earlier motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied
by the trial court;
(2) that the appeal is only for reviewing the penalty imposed by the
lower court or the conviction should only be for a lesser crime
necessarily included in the crime charged in the information; and
(3) that the accused-appellant is not seeking acquittal of the
conviction.
To note, what Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits is an appeal
from the judgment of conviction, which involves a review of the
merits of the case and the determination of whether the accused is
entitled to acquittal. However, under the recommended grounds for
appeal which were enumerated earlier, the purpose of the appeal is
not to assail the judgment of conviction but to question only the
propriety of the sentence, particularly the penalty imposed or the
crime for which the accused was convicted, as the accused intends to
apply for probation upon correction of the penalty or conviction for
the lesser offense. If the CA finds it proper to modify the sentence,
and the penalty finally imposed by the appellate court is within the
probationable period, or the crime for which the accused is eventually
convicted imposes a probationable penalty, application for probation
after the case is remanded to the trial court for execution should be
allowed.
It is believed that the recommended grounds for appeal do not
contravene Section 4 of the Probation Law, which expressly prohibits
only an appeal from the judgment of conviction. In such instances,
the ultimate reason of the accused for filing the appeal based on the
afore-stated grounds is to determine whether he may avail of
probation based on the review by the appellate court of the crime
and/or penalty imposed by the trial court. Allowing the afore-stated
grounds for appeal would give an accused the opportunity to apply for
probation if his ground for appeal is found to be meritorious by the
appellate court, thus, serving the purpose of the Probation Law to
promote the reformation of a penitent offender outside of prison.
On the other hand, probation should not be granted to the accused in
the following instances:
1. When the accused is convicted by the trial court of a crime where
the penalty imposed is within the probationable period or a fine, and
the accused files a notice of appeal; and
2. When the accused files a notice of appeal which puts the merits of
his conviction in issue, even if there is an alternative prayer for the
correction of the penalty imposed by the trial court or for a conviction
to a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the crime in which
he was convicted where the penalty is within the probationable period.
CRIM REV
Both instances violate the spirit and letter of the law, as Section 4 of
the Probation Law prohibits granting an application for probation if an
appeal from the sentence of conviction has been perfected by the
accused.
In this case, petitioner appealed the trial court’s judgment of
conviction before the CA alleging that it was error on the part of the
RTC to have found him guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610. He argued that the RTC should not have given much
faith and credence to the testimony of the victim because it was
tainted with inconsistencies. Moreover, he went on to assert that even
assuming he committed the acts imputed on him, still there was no
evidence showing that the lascivious acts were committed without
consent or through force, duress, intimidation or violence because the
victim at that time was in deep slumber. It is apparent that petitioner
anchored his appeal on a claim of innocence and/or lack of sufficient
evidence to support his conviction of the offense charged, which is
clearly inconsistent with the tenor of the Probation Law that only
qualified penitent offender are allowed to apply for probation. The CA,
therefore, did not err in applying the similar case of Lagrosa v.
People46 wherein the protestations of petitioners therein did not
simply assail the propriety of the penalties imposed but meant a
profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence.
To be sure, if petitioner intended in the first instance to be entitled to
apply for probation he should have admitted his guilt and buttressed
his appeal on a claim that the penalty imposed by the RTC was
erroneous or that he is only guilty of a lesser offense necessarily
included in the crime for which he was originally convicted.
Unfortunately for him, he already perfected his appeal and it is late in
the day to avail the benefits of probation despite the imposition of the
CA of a probationable penalty.
As regards the CA Decision convicting petitioner of the crime of Acts
of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, such conclusion
clearly contravenes the law and existing jurisprudence.
Petitioner was charged and convicted by the trial court with violation
of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 based on the complaint of
a sixteen (16)-year-old girl for allegedly molesting her by touching
her breast and vagina while she was sleeping. The provision reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abus; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended,
the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, That the penalty for lasciviousconduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal I
its medium period; x x x(Emphasis supplied)
The elements of sexual abuse are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.47
Under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a child is deemed
subjected to other sexual abuse when he or she indulges in lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.48 This statutory
provision must be distinguished from Acts of Lasciviousness under
Articles 336 and 339 of the RPC. As defined in Article 336 of the RPC,
Acts of Lasciviousness has the following elements:
1st Set Fulltext Page 16 of 74
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived or reason or otherwise
unconscious; or
c. When the offended party os under 12 years of age; and
That the offended party is another person of either sex.49
Article 339 of the RPC likewise punishes acts of lasciviousness
committed with the consent of the offended party done by the same
persons and under the same circumstances mentioned in Articles 337
and 338 of the RPC, to wit:
1. if committed against a virgin over twelve years and under
eighteen years of age by any person in public authority, priest,
home-servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in
any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the
woman; or
2. if committed by means of deceit against a woman who is single or
a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen
years of age.
Therefore, if the victim of the lascivious acts or conduct is over 12
years of age and under eighteen (18) years of age shall be liable for:
1. Other acts of lasciviousness under Art. 339 of the RPC, where the
victim is a virgin and consents to the lascivious acts through abuse
of confidence or when the victim is single or a widow of good
reputation and consents to the lascivious acts through deceit, or;
2. Acts of lasciviousness is not covered by lascivious conduct as
defined in R.A. No. 7610. In case the acts of lasciviousness is covered
by lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610 and it is done through
coercion or influence, which established absences or lack of consent,
the Art.336 of the RPC is no longer applicable
3. Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where there was no
consent on the part of the victim to the lascivious conduct, which was
done through the employment of coercion or influence. The offender
may likewise be liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 if the
victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she is unable to fully take
care of herself or protect herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.50
Article 226-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, punishes inserting of the penis
into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person if the victim
did not consent either it was done through force, threat or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse
of authority as sexual assault as a form of rape. However, in
instances where the lascivious conduct is covered by the definition
under R.A. No 7610, where the penalty is reclusion temporal medium,
and the act is likewise covered by sexual assault under Article 266-A,
paragraph 2 of the RPC, which is punishable by prision mayor, the
offender should be liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, where the law provides for the higher penalty of
reclusion temporal medium, if the offended party is a child victim. But
if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years of age, the offender
should be liable under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the RPC and not R.A. No.
7610, unless the victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she is
unable to fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical
or mental disability or condition, in which case, the offender may still
be held liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610.
There could be no other conclusion, a child is presumed by law to be
incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act, taking into
account the constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote the
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the
youth, as well as, in harmony with the foremost consideration of the
child’s best interests in all actions concerning him or her.51 This is
equally consistent with the with the declared policy of the State to
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provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for
their commission and carry out a program for prevention and
deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse,
exploitation, and discrimination.52 Besides, if it was the intention of
the framers of the law to make child offenders liable only of Article
266-A of the RPC, which provides for a lower penalty than R.A. No.
7610, the law could have expressly made such statements.
As correctly found by the trial court, all the elements of sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are present in the
case at bar.1âwphi1
First, petitioner’s lewd advances of touching the breasts and vagina of
his hapless victim constitute lascivious conduct as defined in Section
32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
R.A. No. 7610:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of a person.53
Second, petitioner clearly has moral ascendancy over the minor
victim not just because of his relative seniority but more importantly
due to the presumed presence of mutual trust and confidence
between them by virtue of an existing employment relationship, AAA
being a domestic helper in petitioner’s household. Notably, a child is
considered as sexually abused under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
when he or she is subjected to lascivious conduct under the coercion
or influence of any adult. Intimidation need not necessarily be
irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to
intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the
offended party.54 The law does not require physical violence on the
person of the victim; moral coercion or ascendancy is sufficient.55 On
this point, Caballo v. People56 explicated:
As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides
that when a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any
lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, the child is deemed to be a "child exploited in prostitution
and other sexual abuse." In this manner, the law is able to act as
an effective deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination against children, prejudicial as they
are to their development.
In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists
when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to
intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended
party’s free will. Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on
Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element
of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined
as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in,
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,
prostitution, or incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or
trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes
another’s objective." Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use of x
x x power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who
wields it."57
Finally, the victim is 16 years of age at the time of the commission of
the offense. Under Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7610, "children" refers to
"persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but unable
to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical
or mental disability or condition."
The decision of the trial court finding the petitioner guilty of Violation
of Section 5(b), Article III R.A. No. 7610 should have been upheld by
the CA instead of erroneously adopting the recommendation of the
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OSG, which inaccurately relied on People v. Abello.58 In said case,
the decisive factor for the acquittal of the accused was not the
absence of coercion or intimidation on the offended party, who was
then sleeping at the time the lascivious act was committed, but the
fact that the victim could not be considered as a "child" under R.A. No.
7610. This Court held that while the twenty-one year old woman has
polio as a physical disability that rendered her incapable of normal
function, the prosecution did not present any testimonial or
documentary evidence - any medical evaluation or finding from a
qualified physician, psychologist or psychiatrist - attesting that the
physical condition rendered her incapable of fully taking care of
herself or of protecting herself against sexual abuse.
Thus, it is clear that petitioner could not have been entitled to apply
for probation in the first place. Regrettably, since neither the accused
nor the OSG questioned the CA Decision, it has attained finality and
to correct the error at this stage is already barred by the right of the
accused against double jeopardy.
Based on the above disquisitions, the petitioner should be denied the
benefit of the Probation Law and that the Court should adopt the
recommendations above-stated in situations where an accused files
an appeal for the sole purpose of correcting the penalty imposed to
qualify him for probation or where he files an appeal specifically
claiming that he should be found guilty of a lesser offense necessarily
included with the crime originally filed with a prescribed penalty which
is probationable.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 125108 August 3, 2000
ALEJANDRA PABLO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, Presiding Judge, Branch 43,
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Dagupan City and
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan
City, for denying petitioner’s application for probation and the motion
for reconsideration of two Orders dated March 25, 1996 and April 29,
1996, respectively.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On January 12, 1994, petitioner Alejandra Pablo was charged with a
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law, in three separate Informations, for issuing
three bad checks in the total amount of ₱2,334.00 each to
complainant Nelson Mandap.
All three Informations alleged that on or about the 25th of May, 1993,
petitioner did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally draw,
issue and deliver various checks to Nelson Mandap, in partial payment
of a loan she obtained from him, knowing that at the time of the
issuance of such checks, she did not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the bank. Subject checks were dishonored by the drawee bank
upon presentment for payment, it appearing that the current account
of petitioner had been closed, and she failed to pay the amount or
make arrangements for the payment thereof, despite notice of
dishonor.
Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00197-D, 94-00198-D and 94-
00199-D, respectively, the three cases were not consolidated. The
first two were raffled and assigned to Branch 43 while the third case
to Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court in Dagupan City.
On June 21, 1995, Branch 41 of the said lower court rendered
judgment in Criminal Case No. 94-0199-D, convicting petitioner of the
crime charged and imposing upon her a fine of ₱4, 648.00.
CRIM REV
On November 28, 1995, Branch 43 promulgated its decision in
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00197-D and 94-00198-D, finding petitioner
guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, and sentencing her to pay the amount
of ₱4, 668.00 and to serve a prison term of thirty (30) days in each
case.
Petitioner applied for probation in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00197-D
and 94-00198-D. Her application was given due course and the
probation office was required to submit a post-sentence investigation
report.
On March 25, 1996, the probation office arrived at a favorable
evaluation on the suitability of petitioner for probation. However, the
recommendation of the local probation office was overruled by the
National Probation Office. It denied petitioner’s application for
probation on the ground that the petitioner is disqualified under
Section 9 of P.D. 968 (Probation Law). Respondent judge denied
petitioner’s application for probation in the Order dated March 25,
1996. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but to no avail. The same
was denied on April 29, 1996.
Undaunted, petitioner brought the present petition.
The sole issue for resolution here is whether or not the respondent
court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
application for probation on the ground of disqualification from
probation under Section 9 of P.D. 968.
Under Section 9 of the Probation Law, P.D. 968, the following
offenders cannot avail of the benefits of probation:
a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years;
b) those convicted of subversion or any crime against the
national security or the public order;
c) those who have previously been convicted by final
judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or fine of not less
than two hundred pesos;
d) those who have been once on probation under the
provisions of this Decree; and
e) those who are already serving sentence at the time the
substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable
pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
The National Probation Office denied petitioner’s application for
probation under Section 9 paragraph (c) P.D. 968 because a prior
conviction was entered against the petitioner on June 21, 1995 in
Criminal Case No. 94-0199, penalizing her with a fine of ₱4,648.00;
thereby placing her within the ambit of disqualification from probation
under Section 9 paragraph (c) of P.D. 968.
Petitioner assails the denial of her application for probation; invoking
the ruling of this Court in several cases favoring liberal interpretation
of the provisions of P.D. 968 so as to afford first offenders a second
chance to reform in consonance with the avowed purpose and
objective of the Probation Law. She theorized that "previous
conviction" under Section 9 paragraph (c) should not be literally and
strictly interpreted but should rather be understood as referring to a
situation wherein the accused was previously convicted of a crime
that arose differently, or was done on a different date, from the
conviction of a crime for which probation is applied for. It is
contended by petitioner that Section 9 paragraph (c) should not refer,
as in her particular case, where several crimes arose out of a single
act or transaction.
To buttress her stance, petitioner placed reliance on this Court’s
ruling in Rura vs. Lopeña1 . In the said case, the accused was
convicted of five counts of estafa committed on different dates. He
was able to consolidate the five cases in a single sala such that the
judgment of conviction against him in all the five cases was embodied
in a single decision entered on the same date. When the accused
applied for probation, the same was denied but on appeal, this Court
granted the application for probation; ratiocinating thus:
1st Set Fulltext Page 18 of 74
"xxx applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final
judgment.1âwphi1 When he applied for probation the only conviction
against him was the judgment which was the subject of his
application. The statute relates "previous" to the date of conviction,
not the date of the commission of the crime." (emphasis ours)
Precisely because of the aforecited ruling in Rura vs. Lopeña the
petition under scrutiny cannot prosper.
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that if a statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without any interpretation.2 Not only that; in the matter of
interpretation of laws on probation, the Court has pronounced that
"the policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot prevail against
the categorical provisions of the law."3
Section 9 paragraph (c) is in clear and plain language, to the effect
that a person who was previously convicted by final judgment of an
offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one month and
one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos, is
disqualified from applying for probation. This provision of law is
definitive and unqualified. There is nothing in Section 9, paragraph (c)
which qualifies "previous conviction" as referring to a conviction for a
crime which is entirely different from that for which the offender is
applying for probation or a crime which arose out of a single act or
transaction as petitioner would have the court to understand.
In the case of Rura vs. Lopeña relied upon by petitioner, the Court
declared that "previous" refers to conviction, and not to commission
of a crime. At the time Rura was convicted of the crime for which he
was applying for probation, he had no prior conviction. In the present
case of petitioner, when she applied for probation in Criminal Cases
Nos. 94-00197-D and 94-00198-D, she had a previous conviction in
Criminal Case No. 94-00199-D, which thereby disqualified her from
the benefits of probation.
It is well-settled that the probation law is not a penal statute;4 and
therefore, the principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. And
when the meaning is clearly discernible from the language of the
statute, there is no room for construction or interpretation.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-69810-14 June 19, 1985
TEODULO RURA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. GERVACIO A. LEOPENA, Presiding Judge of the 2nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This case involves the application of the Probation Law (P.D. No. 968,
as amended), more specifically Section 9 thereof which disqualifies
from probation those persons:
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of
an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one
month and one day and or a fine of not less than Two
Hundred Pesos.
Petitioner Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5)
counts of estafa committed on different dates in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, denominated as
Criminal Case Nos. 523, 524, 525, 526 and 527.
The five cases were jointly tried and a single decision was rendered
on August 18, 1983. Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of
seventeen (17) months and twenty-five (25) days. In each criminal
case the sentence was three (3) months and fifteen (15) days.
Rura appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bohol but said court
affirmed the decision of the lower court. When the case was
remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, Rura
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applied for probation. The application was opposed by a probation
officer of Bohol on the ground Chat Rura is disqualified for probation
under Sec. 9 (c) of the Probation law quoted above. The court denied
the application for probation. A motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Hence the instant petition.
The question which is raised is whether or not the petitioner is
disqualified for probation.
In denying the application for probation, the respondent judge said:
Though the five estafa cases were jointly tried and decided
by the court convicting the accused thereof, yet the dates of
commission are different. Upon conviction he was guilty of
said offenses as of the dates of commission of the acts
complained of. (Rollo, p, 58.)
Upon the other hand, the petitioner argues:
We beg to disagree. There is no previous conviction by final
judgment to speak of. The five (5) cases of Estafa were tried
jointly and there is only one decision rendered on the same
date—August 18. 1983. It could not be presumed that
accused-petitioner had been convicted one after the other
for the five cases of Estafa because the conviction in these
cases took place within the same day, August 18, 1983 by
means of a Joint Decision, and not in a separate decision.
Previous conviction, we submit, presupposes that there is a
prior sentence or that there was already a decision rendered
which convicted the accused. In this instant cases, however,
there is only one decision rendered on the five (5) counts of
Estafa which was promulgated on the same date. In other
words the effects of conviction does not retract to the date
of the commission of the offense as the trial court held. (Id.,
pp, 8-9.)
We hold for the petitioner. When he applied for probation he had no
previous conviction by final judgment. When he applied for probation
the only conviction against him was the judgment which was the
subject of his application. The statute relates "previous" to the date of
conviction, not to the date of the commission of the crime.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondent judge is
directed to give due course to the petitioner's application for
probation. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
November 20, 2017
G.R. No. 215748
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
PAUL DURAN, JR. y MIRABUENO, Accused-appellant
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal1 filed under Section 13, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court from the Decision2 dated June 2, 2014 (assailed
Decision) of the Court of Appeals (CA), First Division in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 05496. The assailed Decision affirmed the Decision3 dated
February 22, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch
88 (RTC), in Crim. Case No. 160-09, finding herein accused-appellant
Paul M. Duran, Jr. (Duran) guilty of the crime of Murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Information charging Duran with Murder states as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of January, 2009, in the Municipality of
Rosario, Cavite, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, using
an unlicensed firearm, employing treachery and nocturnity, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot GILBERT
GRIMALDO Y NERA on the back of his head and thereafter as the
victim lay helpless and wounded on the ground with abuse of superior
1st Set Fulltext Page 19 of 74
strength shot him another three times, inflicting upon the latter
multiple gunshot wounds which cause (sic) his instantaneous death,
to the damage and prejudice of the latter's heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon his arraignment, Duran entered a plea of "not guilty."5
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Beverly C.
Quilana (Quilana), eyewitness; Berly L. Grimaldo (Mrs. Grimaldo), the
widow of the victim, Gilbert N. Grimaldo (Grimaldo), and Dr. Jocelyn
Dignos (Dr. Dignos), the municipal health officer who performed the
autopsy on the victim.
Quilana's testimony, as summarized by the RTC, is as follows:
Beverly C. Quilana testified that on January 9, 2009 at around 1:48 in
the morning, she was awakened by someone calling for her, uttering
"Ninang". At that time she was inside her house located in Ligtong 3,
Rosario, Cavite. She recognized the voice of the person as her godson
named Gilbert Grimaldo. She then asked why. Grimaldo replied from
outside saying "Ninang tulungan mo ako yung taong ito ay
kinukursunada ako," "kinukursunada ako ng taong ito, me dala siyang
baril". Then she opened the door for her godson. She then saw the
accused Paul Duran shot Grimaldo with a .38 caliber revolver from
behind at a distance of 2 1/2 feet. Grimaldo was hit at the nape, and
then fell to the ground lying with his face down. Duran then left the
place passing between their houses. Moments later accused returned
and shot Grimaldo three more times to make sure that the latter was
dead. Witness then started shouting and asking for help. At this point
in time, witness saw the accused Duran ran away. They then called
the police. According to this witness, Grimaldo was hit on the nape,
back and head.
Witness further clarified that Grimaldo did not know that Duran was
behind him because he was surprised when he was shot.
Witness identified the accused in open court. She is familiar with the
accused for they were neighbors for six (6) years. She clarified, that
she was able to see the accused because the place was illuminated by
a fluorescent bulb placed outside the house.6
Mrs. Grimaldo's testimony was stipulated upon and dispensed with as
her testimony covered only her claim for damages.7 Dr. Dignos'
testimony regarding the autopsy, the findings as to the cause of
death and nature, location, and gravity of the injuries sustained by
the victim, and the preparation and issuance of the death certificate,
were also stipulated upon and admitted by the defense.8
Version of the Defense
Duran invoked self-defense. His testimony, as summarized by the
RTC, is as follows:
Witness testified that he used to peddle fish in Rosario, Cavite. On
January 9, 2009 at around 2:15 to 2:45 a.m. while on his way to buy
fish in Parañaque, he was blocked by two persons whose identity he
did not know. One of this (sic) men who turned out to be the victim
Gilbert Grimaldo poked a gun at him, and said that they only needed
his money. That when Grimaldo attempted to get the money from his
belt bag, he was able to hold the victim's right hand which was then
holding the gun. Grimaldo then used his left hand to box his nape.
Then they wrestled for the possession of the gun for more or less
thirty seconds. Then he (Duran) was able to take the gun away from
Grimaldo. When Grimaldo moved backward, he pulled the trigger of
the gun and hit Grimaldo. At that time he was worried that the other
guy might retaliate and that's the reason why he was able to pull the
trigger of the .38 caliber revolver gun.9
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC found Duran guilty of the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.10 In arriving at
its decision, the trial court ruled:
Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense and can easily be
fabricated. When the accused interposes self-defense, he thereby
CRIM REV
admits having caused the injuries of the victim. The burden of proof
then shifts on him to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the
confluence of the essential requisites for such a defense, namely: a.)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; b.) reasonable
necessity of the means employed and to prevent or repel it; and c.)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the prosecution's, for even if the latter is weak, it cannot
be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing xxx.
xxxx
This Court is convinced that there was no unlawful aggression.
Assuming that Grimaldo and his unidentified companion really tried to
hold-up Duran, the latter's testimony shows that the aggression had
already ceased when he (Duran) was able to successfully take the
gun from the possession of Grimaldo.
Having now the possession of the gun, there was obviously no reason
for him to shoot the victim successively because the unlawful
aggression from the victim has stopped. Duran by his own admission
stated that he shot Grimaldo four times. Hence, no unlawful
aggression by the victim was shown. Be it remembered that the
presence of said primary requisite is a condition sine qua non of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Absent such, there could be
no self[-] defense to speak of. The other two requisites need not be
discussed.
On the part of the prosecution, it clearly proved the presence of
intent to kill on the part of the accused. The fact that the shots fired
by the accused were directed to the vital body parts of the victim,
namely on the head and the chest, shows intent to kill.
In addition thereto, the testimony of eye witness Quilana is very
credible. Witness saw vividly how the shooting incident happened,
who the victim was - Gilbert Grimaldo and the perpetrator of the
crime - herein accused Paul Duran.
xxxx
The qualifying circumstance of treachery is present in this case
because accused shot the victim in a manner that the latter would not
be able to defend himself, and the location and severity of the
wounds inflicted on the victim belies the claim of self-defense.11
Duran was further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim One Hundred
Thousand (₱100,000.00) as moral damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) in exemplary damages.12
Duran appealed to the CA via Notice of Appeal13 dated March 12,
2012. Duran then filed his Brief14 dated September 25, 2012, while
the plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed its Brief15 dated February 4, 2013. Thereafter, the
appeal was submitted for decision.16
Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed Duran's conviction in toto.17 On June 26, 2014,
Duran brought the instant case before this Court via Notice of
Appeal18 of even date.
In lieu of supplemental briefs, Duran and plaintiff-appellee filed
separate manifestations respectively dated April 13, 201519 and April
15, 2015,20 foregoing their right to file the same.
Issue
Whether or not Duran's guilt for the crime of Murder was proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
There was no unlawful aggression
An accused who pleads self-defense admits the commission of the act
charged as a crime. The burden of proving self-defense rests on the
accused. He must prove by clear and convincing evidence the
concurrence of the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
1st Set Fulltext Page 20 of 74
unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself or at least any provocation executed
by the accused claiming self-defense was not the proximate and
immediate cause of the victim's aggression.21
Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense.
Without unlawful aggression, self-defense cannot and will not be
appreciated, even if the other elements are present.22 As held in
People v. Dolorido23 :
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat
to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.1âwphi1 In case of
threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the
wrongful intent to cause injury. It "presupposes actual, sudden,
unexpected or imminent danger - not merely threatening and
intimidating action." It is present "only when the one attacked faces
real and immediate threat to one's life." x x x24
In People v. Nugas,25 the Court expounded on the kinds of unlawful
aggression:
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful
aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material
unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a
weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means
an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not
consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely
imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and
making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must
not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his
right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by
an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.26
The Court agrees with the RTC and CA that Duran was unable to
prove the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
Even if Duran's account of an attempted robbery against him is to be
believed, his testimony also shows that Grimaldo, albeit the initial
aggressor, ceased to be the aggressor as Duran had successfully
wrested the weapon from him. Thereafter, Duran shot the gun at
Grimaldo four times; three of which hit Grimaldo on vital parts of his
body.27 At this moment, actions of the accused were already done in
retaliation and not self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression initiated
by the victim had already ceased when the accused attacked him; in
self-defense, the aggression from the victim is continuing.28
Duran's own testimony is illustrative of the absence of unlawful
aggression:
[Atty. Marjorie Ann C. Toledo (on direct examination)]
Q Before the killing incident, do you recall any unusual event that
transpired?
A Yes, Ma'am, there was.
Q And, what was that?
A When my way was blocked by two persons, Ma'am.
Q Do you know these two persons?
A No, Ma'am.
Q What did they do when they blocked you?
A One of them poked the gun at me, Ma'am.
Q Who poked the gun at you?
A That Grimaldo, I think, Grimaldo, Ma'am.
Q And that was the victim in this case?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q When he poked the gun at you, what happened next?
A He said that he only needed my money, Ma'am.
Q And then, what was your reply when he uttered those words?
A I was not able to immediately reply, Ma'am.
Q What happened next?
A When he was about or attempting to get the money from my belt
bag, that was the time when I was able to hold to the gun, Ma'am.
Q Meaning to say that, he was the one who was getting your belt bag,
you did not voluntarily give it to him?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q And then you were able to grab the gun?
A Yes, Ma'am.
xxxx
[Prosecutor Ferdinand H. Palafox (cross-examination)]
Q So, Mr. Witness, it is now your testimony indeed on January 9,
2009, you met the victim in this case Gilbert Grimaldo y Nera?
CRIM REV
A If he is the victim, then he is the one that I was able to meet that
night, Sir.
Q It is your version, however, that it was him who actually tried to
hold you up and was armed with a firearm?
A Yes, Sir, that is the truth.
Q When he tried to grab your belt bag, which according to you
contained money, you fought back and tried to take away his gun?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you were able to successfully take away this firearm from your
hold upper?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Can you describe the type of weapon which you got from your
attacker?
A 38 revolver, Sir.
Q 38 revolver?
A Yes, Sir.
Q So, after you got the 38 revolver, you shot this person?
A I was able to shoot him, Sir.
Q Where was he initially hit?
A I am not sure but it was frontal, Sir.
Q After you shot this person, what happened then?
A After shooting him twice, he turned around and then I shot him
again, Sir.
xxxx
COURT:
xxxx
Q What you are trying to say to the Court is that, this Grimaldo tried
to rob you?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q But you were able to grab the gun away from him?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q After you grabbed the gun from Grimaldo, he was no longer armed?
A After I was able to grab the gun away from him and then he moved
a little backward and he was in the act of attacking me again, that
was the time I was able to shoot him successively, your Honor.29
(Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
[Prosecutor Ferdinand H. Palafox (continued)]
Q You mentioned that the reason you panicked and started squeezing
your trigger was that you were afraid that the companion of Grimaldo
would also attack you, what happened to him?
A He disappeared, Sir.30 (Emphasis supplied)
Duran's claim of self-defense is belied by his own testimony. As
admitted by Duran himself, the unlawful aggression from Grimaldo
had ceased when he had been disarmed and had been shot. Moreover,
the alleged companion of Grimaldo had already run away, posing no
threat to Duran. In the similar case of People v. Escarlos,31 the Court
held:
Even assuming arguendo that there was an altercation before the
stabbing incident and that some danger did in fact exist, the
imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment appellant
disarmed the victim by wresting the knife from the latter. After the
former had successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful
aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill
the latter. Hence, appellant became the unlawful aggressor when he
stabbed the victim.
When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists,
the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even
to wound the former aggressor. x x x32 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, after Grimaldo was disarmed, he had attempted to escape
from Duran and sought help from his godmother, Quilana, as the
altercation took place on the street in front of her house.
Quilana, the sole eyewitness to the shooting, testified:
[Prosecutor Ferdinand H. Palafox (direct examination)]
Q Madame witness, if you can recall where were you on January 9,
2009 at around 1:48 in the morning?
A At home, Sir.
Q And where is your house located?
A In Ligtong 3, Rosario, Cavite, Sir.
xxxx
Q What time did you wake up, Madame witness?
A I was awakened by the call of somebody at the house, Sir.
Q You heard someone calling you?
A Yes, Sir.
1st Set Fulltext Page 21 of 74
Q What exactly were the words you heard? aggression that has begun has ceased to exist, the one who resorts to
A I was called "Ninang", Sir self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former
Q You are named Beverly C. Quilana, Madame witness, and you heard aggressor.34 Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute
the word "Ninang", why are you now claiming that when you heard aggression warranting defense of one's self.35 The condition sine qua
the word "Ninang" that person shouting was calling you? non of unlawful aggression being absent, self-defense cannot be
A I recognized the voice, Sir. appreciated in favor of the accused.
Q And when you heard the voice, to whom does it belong?
A Gilbert Grimaldo, Sir. The prosecution failed to prove treachery
Q Who is Gilbert Grimaldo?
A My godson, Sir. The Court modifies the findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA,
Q That is why he was referring to you as "Ninang"? with regard to the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Under Article
A Yes, Sir. 14, paragraph 16 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender
Q So when you heard the word "Ninang" and you were assuming that commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and
the person shouting the word "Ninang" was Gilbert Grimaldo, what methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and
did you do? specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
A I asked him why, Sir. defense which the offended party might make. To qualify an offense,
Q You were inside your house then when you heard Gilbert Grimaldo the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means,
shouting the word "Ninang", calling you "Ninang", where was Gilbert methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the
at the time he was shouting? person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and
A By my door, Sir. (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or
Q And your door was closed or open at that time? consciously adopted by the assailant.36 The essence of treachery is
A Closed, Sir. the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
Q While shouting the word "Ninang", what else was Gilbert shouting? unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend
A "Meron po sa aking kumukursunada sa labas'', Sir. himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of
Q And according to you, you asked him why, or what is it he wants, himself.37
when you asked Gilbert and Gilbert answered back, you were still
inside your home? It was error for the RTC to rule that treachery was present as said
A Yes, Sir. finding is not supported by the evidence. Moreover, the RTC did not
COURT: fully discuss its appreciation of the circumstance of treachery. The
Q Gilbert was still outside the door of your house? trial court merely held:
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And what was the reply of Gilbert when you asked him why? x x x [T]reachery is present in this case because accused shot
A "Meron po sa kanyang kumukurs[ u ]nada sa labas, Barangay the victim in a manner that the latter would not be able to
Tanod po namen na nagtitinda ng isda", Sir. defend himself, and the location and severity of the wounds inflicted
Q What were the exact words of Gilbert? on the victim belies the claim of self-defense.38 (Emphasis supplied)
A His words were, "Ninang tulungan mo ako yung taong ito ay
kinukursunada ako", your Honor. Treachery must be unequivocally proven as the crime itself. As held in
xxxx the case of People v. Obzunar39 :
Q What words did he say?
x x x It is an almost immutable rule of evidence that treachery
A What he said was, "Kinursunada ako ng taong ito, me dala siyang
must be proven as clearly as the crime itself, and "absent any
baril", your Honor.
particulars as to the manner in which the aggression
xxxx
commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the
Q Then what did you do?
victim unfolded, as in this case, treachery cannot be
A I opened the door for him, your Honor.
appreciated." The prosecution's sole eyewitness Lydia Zilmar saw
COURT:
what transpired only from the time the victim was already being
Continue.
chased by the accused-appellants. Hence, not having seen how the
[Prosecutor Ferdinand H. Palafox (continuation):]
assailants commenced the execution of the felony, she gave no
Q And when you opened the door, did you ask any other question to
testimony as to, and there is no sufficient evidence available to prove
Gilbert?
conclusively, the use of treachery in the commission thereof. x x x40
A No more, your Honor.
(Emphasis supplied)
Q What happened then?
A And then I saw this Paul Duran shoot this Gilbert Grimaldo, Sir.
The prosecution did not prove that Duran intentionally sought the
Q When you opened the door of your house, Madame witness, were
victim for the purpose of killing him. The confrontation between
(sic) was Gilbert Grimaldo then?
Duran and Grimaldo appears to have been a chance encounter. It was
A Still by my door, Sir.
also not proven that Duran deliberately and consciously employed
Q And according to you, you also saw the accused Paul Duran?
means, methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act to
A Yes, your Honor.
ensure that Grimaldo could not defend himself.
Q When you saw Paul Duran where was he in relation to Gilbert
Grimaldo? In People v. Caratao,41 the Court held:
A In front, your Honor.
COURT: Repeatedly upheld has been the rule that chance encounters, impulse
Q In front of Gilbert Grimaldo? killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment, x x x are
A Behind, your Honor. generally not attended by treachery, for lack of opportunity of the
Q How far behind? accused deliberately to employ a treacherous mode of attack. x x x42
A About this, your Honor.
Q Only about 2 1h feet away? Notably, eyewitness Quilana only witnessed the moment of the actual
A Yes, your Honor. shooting but did not witness the inception of the fatal altercation. The
COURT: prosecution failed to establish that Duran had deliberately adopted a
Alright, continue. treacherous mode of attack for the purpose of depriving the victim of
[Prosecutor Ferdinand H. Palafox (continuation):] a chance to fight or retreat. In this case, Grimaldo was aware of the
Q And when you opened the door and you saw Gilbert and also Duran impending attack and was even able to seek help from eyewitness
just feet away, what happened then, Madame witness? Quilana.
A He already shot him, Sir.
Q Who shot who? As the Court held in People v. Latag43 :
A Paul Duran shot Gilbert Grimaldo, Sir.33
Treachery cannot be presumed where the lone witness has not
As can be gleaned from the above testimonies, at the time that Duran actually seen the commencement of the attack, as we held in People
shot Grimaldo, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the v. Narit:
latter. Time and again, this Court has held that when an unlawful

CRIM REV 1st Set Fulltext Page 22 of 74

"x x x [Treachery] cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. For, as
held in U.S. vs. Perdon where no particulars are known as to the
manner in which aggression was made or how the act which resulted
in the death of the victim began and developed, it can in no way be
established from mere suppositions, drawn from circumstances prior
to the very moment of the aggression, that an accused perpetrated
the killing with treachery. Accordingly, treachery cannot be
considered where the lone witness did not see the
commencement of the assault."44 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of People v. Rapanut,45 the Court held:
xxx [W]here the lone eyewitness did not see how the attack
was carried out and he can not testify on how it began, the
trial court cannot merely surmise from the circumstances of
the case that treachery attended the commission of the
crime.46 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, there was no other circumstance attendant to the
shooting that shows that Duran carefully and deliberately planned the
killing in a manner that would ensure his safety and success. It was
not proven that he had deliberately chosen the place, time, and
method of killing, or that the meeting between him and Grimaldo was
planned. In fact, the location was disadvantageous to him, as it was
right in front of the house of Quilana, Grimaldo's godmother.
The prosecution had attempted to prove treachery with the testimony
of Quilana who stated that Duran had shot Grimaldo from behind.
Thereafter, he left the crime scene yet returned to shoot Duran three
more times. However, upon questions from the Court, the statement
was clarified:
COURT [(clarificatory questions for eyewitness Quilana)]:
Q What do you mean returned, you mean to say that after shooting
Gilbert Grimaldo this Paul Duran left away and then returned later on?
A Yes, your Honor, he made sure that this Gilbert was already dead.
Q Where did Paul Duran go after shooting Gilbert Grimaldo at the
nape?
A In between our houses, your Honor.
xxxx
Q Between your house and whose house?
A And my nephew's house, your Honor.
Q And how far is that spot from the place where he shot Gilbert
Grimaldo?
A One step away only, your Honor.
Q So Paul Duran made one step back and then moved forward again
to shoot Gilbert Grimaldo?
A Yes, your Honor.47 (Emphasis supplied)
Quilana's testimony that Duran left and "returned" after shooting
Grimaldo is contradicted by her own testimony that Duran only made
one step. Duran could not have left the scene of the crime by only
taking one step backward.
In this regard, Duran's testimony as to the manner in which he shot
Grimaldo is more credible as it is corroborated by the Post Mortem
Report. Duran testified:
Q So, after you got the 38 revolver, you shot this person?
A I was able to shoot him, Sir.
Q Where was he initially hit?
A I am not sure but it was frontal, Sir.
Q After you shot this person, what happened then?
A After shooting him twice, he turned around and then I shot him
again, Sir.
COURT:
Q How many times?
A Once only, your Honor.
Q So, all in all you shot Grimaldo 3 times?
A 4 times, your Honor.
Q When did you fire the fourth shot?
A 3 times frontally, your Honor.
Q And one at the back?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And after firing him 4 times, what happened to Grimaldo?
A I saw him fall down, your Honor.48 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
CRIM REV
Meanwhile, the Post-Mortem Report49 prepared by Dr. Dignos states
that Duran was hit by three bullets. One bullet hit his face near his
lower lip and exited at the back of his head; another bullet hit his
chest and exited his back; and another bullet hit his back, near his
right shoulder, which exited near his right neck. Thus, Duran's
testimony that he was able to wound Grimaldo twice in the front and
once in the back is consistent with the Post-Mortem Report.
Generally, findings of fact of the trial courts are accorded great
weight, particularly in the determination of credibility of witnesses as
said courts have the opportunity to observe the witness and the
manner in which they testified. However, this can be disregarded
when it appears on the record that the trial court may have
overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied some significant fact or
circumstance which if considered, would have altered the result.50
This is axiomatic in appeals in criminal cases where the whole case is
thrown open for review on issues of both fact and law, and the court
may even consider issues which were not raised by the parties as
errors.51
With the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the
crime is Homicide and not Murder. The penalty for Homicide under
Article 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal. In the absence of any
modifying circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next
lower in degree is prision mayor with a range of six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years.52
Thus, the appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.53
Finally, in view of the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta,54 the
damages awarded in the questioned Decision are hereby modified to
civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages of
₱50,000.00 each.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court DECLARES
accused-appellant Paul M. Duran, Jr. GUILTY of HOMICIDE, for
which he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Gilbert N.
Grimaldo the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as civil
indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages, and
Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as temperate damages. All
monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
March 15, 2017
G.R. No. 224900
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs
NESTOR M. BUGARIN, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This case seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated July 31,
2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 01530.
The CA affirmed and modified the Joint Judgment2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 12, dated July 5, 2012 in
Criminal Case Nos. CBU-83610, CBU-83611, and CBU-83613, which
found accused-appellant Nestor Bugarin y Martinez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of double murder and attempted
murder.
Informations were filed charging Bugarin with two (2) counts of
murder and one (1) count of attempted murder, which read:
Criminal Case No. CBU-83610
1st Set Fulltext Page 23 of 74
For: Murder
That on the 30th day of May 2008 at about 8:50 o'clock in the evening,
in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with an unlicensed firearm
of undetermined caliber, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and
unexpectedly attack, assault and use personal violence upon one
ESMERALDO B. PONTANAR by shooting him repeatedly with the use
of said firearm and hitting him on the different parts of his body as a
consequence of which said ESMERALDO B. PONTANAR died [a] few
minutes thereafter due to "HYPOVOLEMIC SHOCK SECONDARY TO
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS."
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. CBU-83611
For: Murder
That on the 30th day of May 2008 at about 8:50 o'clock in the evening,
in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with an unlicensed firearm
of undetermined caliber, after having just shot one Esmeraldo B.
Pontanar with the use of said firearm for which the accused is also
being separately charged with Murder, with deliberate intent, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, and without
regard to rank and age of victim did then and there suddenly and
unexpectedly attack, assault and use personal violence upon one
CRISTITO C. PONTANAR, a 72-year old father-in-law of the accused,
by shooting him with the use of said firearm when the latter came to
the rescue of his said son, Esmeraldo B. Pontanar, by pleading to the
accused to stop the shooting, thereby hitting him on the abdomen as
a consequence of which said CRIS TITO C. PONT ANAR died [a] few
minutes thereafter due to "HEMORRHAGIC SHOCK SECONDARY TO
GUNSHOT WOUND."
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. CBU-83613
For: Attempted Murder
That on the 30th day of May 2008 at about 8:50 o'clock in the evening,
in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with an unlicensed firearm
of undetermined caliber, after having just shot one Esmeraldo B.
Pontanar with the use of said firearm for which the accused is also
being separately charged with murder and frustrated murder, with
deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly attack,
assault and use personal violence upon one Maria Glen Neis Pontanar
by shooting her, thereby inflicting upon her the following injuries:
"THROUGH & THROUGH GUNSHOT WOUND DISTAL THIRD, LEFT
THIGH thus, commencing the commission of the felony directly by
overt acts but which nevertheless did not perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of murder by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance,
that is, by the timely act of said Maria Glen Neis Pontanar in running
away and taking shelter inside a nearby house.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Upon arraignment, Bugarin pleaded not guilty to the charges. He
admitted having shot Esmeraldo, Cristito, and Maria Glen, all
surnamed Pontanar, but insisted that he acted in self-defense. Hence,
pursuant to Section 11 (e), Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, a reverse
trial ensued.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Bugarin contended that what he had done was merely an act of
selfdefense. At the time of the incident, he was watching television at
home when his wife, Anecita went out to walk their dogs. Then he
heard her having an altercation with Maria Glen. At first, he did not
want to intervene but then he saw his brother-in-law and Maria Glen's
husband, Esmeraldo, approaching and carrying a 9 mm pistol, a .45
caliber gun, and an M16 rifle. Then Esmeraldo started shouting in
front of their house, challenging him to go out. Bugarin hesitated to
CRIM REV
go out at first since Esmeraldo could easily shoot him with his
firearms. He changed his mind when his son convinced him to go out
and help his mother. So Bugarin went out and shouted angrily at
Esmeraldo, then the latter began to draw his gun. This prompted
Bugarin to draw his own gun and shoot Esmeraldo twice. Esmeraldo
was thrown backwards and when he was about to fall to the ground,
Bugarin shot him one more time. Thereafter, his father-in-law,
Cristito, came rushing towards his son. He confronted Bugarin and
tried to slap him, but he was able to avoid getting hit. Cristito then
looked at his son's body on the ground. Believing that Cristito would
get his son's firearm and shoot him, Bugarin acted quickly and shot
him first. Then Esmeraldo's son, Paulo, threw stones at Bugarin. This
angered him so he likewise shot him. Thereafter, he saw Maria Glen
with a pipe, who was about to strike Anecita with it, so he also shot
her, hitting her in the leg.
On the other hand, the prosecution alleged that the Pontanars and
the Bugarins had been harboring ill-feelings towards each other. On
the evening of May 30, 2008, the spouses Esmeraldo and Maria Glen
were on their way to the house of their father, Cristito, which was
likewise near the house of the Bugarins. When they were close to the
house of the Bugarins, Esmeraldo's sister, Anecita, then started
throwing gravel and sand at them. Esmeraldo asked her to stop but
she refused to listen. Thereafter, Bugarin, Anecita' s husband, came
out of their house and suddenly shot Esmeraldo several times.
Esmeraldo sustained two (2) gunshot wounds in the back and one (1)
in his left side, which later took his life. Maria Glen immediately ran
and hid behind a parked car to save herself. She then saw her father-
in-law, Cristito, running out of his house towards Esmeraldo's
direction. Cristito raised his hands and begged Bugarin to stop
shooting. But Bugarin also shot him, causing his death. Bugarin then
looked for Maria Glen and when he finally found her, he also shot her.
Fortunately, Maria Glen was only hit in her thigh.
On July 5, 2012, the RTC of Cebu City found Bugarin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of double murder and attempted murder in Criminal
Case
Nos. CBU-83610, CBU-83611, and CBU-83613, with the special
aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm in all three
(3) cases, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. CBU-83610, the court finds the accused
NESTOR MARTINEZ BUGARIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Murder defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Sec. 6 of Republic Act 7659 as charged in
the Information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Esmeraldo
B. Pontanar the sum of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death
and ₱50,000.00 as Moral Damages for the pain and anguish suffered
by the heirs as a result of his death; Exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱25,000.00 and actual damages in the total sum of
₱245,490.00, all indemnifications are without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
2. In Criminal Case No. CBU-83611, the court finds the accused
NESTOR MARTINEZ BUGARIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of Murder defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Sec. 6 of Republic Act 7659 as
charged in the Information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Cristito C. Pontanar the sum of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for his
death and ₱50,000.00 as Moral Damages for the pain and anguish
suffered by the heirs as a result of his death, all indemnifications are
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
3. In Criminal Case No. CBU-83613, the court finds the accused
NESTOR MARTINEZ BUGARIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Attempted Murder as charged in the Information, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of an
indeterminate sentence ranging from six (6) years prision
correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
maximum to indemnify the offended party Maria Glen Neis Pontanar
the amount of ₱l0,000.00 as
Moral damages; and actual damages in the amount of ₱30,909.48, all
indemnifications are without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
1st Set Fulltext Page 24 of 74
In the service of his sentence, accused, who is a detention prisoner,
shall be credited with the entire period during which he has
undergone preventive imprisonment.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.4
This prompted Bugarin to appeal before the CA. On July 31, 2015, the
CA denied Bugarin's appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision with
modifications, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Joint
Judgment dated July 5, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 12 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. CBU-83610, the guilt of Nestor M. Bugarin for
the crime of murder and the corresponding penalty imposed upon him
are AFFIRMED. The grant of civil indemnity, actual damages, and
moral damages, in the amount determined by the trial court, is
AFFIRMED. The award of exemplary damages is INCREASED to
₱30.000.00.
2. In Criminal Case No. CBU-83611, Nestor M. Bugarin is found
GUILTY of HOMICIDE and accordingly imposed an indeterminate
penalty often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Bugarin is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cristito the amount of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3. In Criminal Case No. CBU-83613, Nestor M. Bugarin is found
GUILTY of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and accordingly imposed an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum
to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum. The awards for
actual damages and moral damages as imposed by the trial court
AFFIRMED.
4. The aggregate amount of the monetary awards awarded herein
shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this Decision until the same is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.5
Bugarin is now before the Court, maintaining his innocence in all the
instant cases.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from
liability for crimes only if satisfactorily proved.6 Having admitted the
shooting of the victims, the burden shifted to Bugarin to prove that
he indeed acted in self-defense by establishing the following with
clear and convincing evidence: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on his part.7 Bugarin, however, miserably failed to discharge this
burden. One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name
of self-defense bears the burden of proving the aforementioned
elements. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies
first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be
successfully pleaded.8 Contrary to his claims, the evidence of the
case shows that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the
victims. His version of the events was found to be less credible by the
trial court. His testimony is incoherent, incredible, and specious. On
the other hand, the trial court found Maria Glen's testimony to be
more convincing. As the lone surviving victim, she affirmed that
Bugarin suddenly fired at them, without any provocation on their part.
As a rule, the appellate courts must give full weight and respect to
the determination by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses,
since the trial judge has the best opportunity to observe their
demeanor. While it is true that this rule admits of certain exceptions,
none of such are extant in this case.9
Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is extremely
doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of
evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution.10 In the case at bar, Bugarin likewise failed to
CRIM REV
sufficiently establish that Esmeralda was actually carrying three (3)
firearms and that he attempted to pull out one of his guns to shoot
him. However, when asked what happened to the other firearms or
where they went when Esmeraldo pulled out one of the guns, Bugarin
answered that he did not know. Also, Anecita herself testified that she
did not see Esmeraldo carrying anything. He merely held the railings
of their gate when Bugarin went out of their house and shot him.
Indeed, nothing in this act would reveal that there was unlawful
aggression on Esmeraldo' s part. Maria Glen also never actually struck
or attempted to strike Anecita with the steel pipe. Neither can
Cristito's alleged act of trying to slap Bugarin and thereafter staring at
the wounded body of his son on the ground be considered unlawful
aggression that he must necessarily repel. Bugarin simply assumed
and imagined that Cristito would get his son's gun to shoot him.
Murder is committed by any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another with treachery, taking
advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to
insure or afford impunity.11 There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms which tend directly and specially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. Treachery is not presumed but must be
proved as conclusively as the crime itself.12 Bugarin suddenly fired at
Esmeraldo without reason or warning. According to the medical report,
Esmeraldo' s wounds would establish that he was shot in the back
twice and also in his left side, giving him no means of retaliation or
escape, and without any risk to Bugarin. In fact, Bugarin himself said
that when Esmeraldo was thrown backwards and was about to fall to
the ground, he shot him again to make sure he was "finished."13 A
finding of the existence of treachery should be based on clear and
convincing evidence. Such evidence must be as conclusive as the fact
of killing itself and its existence cannot be presumed.14 In the
absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that treachery attended
the killing of the victim, the crime is homicide, not murder.15
As to the shooting of Cristito and Maria Glen, however, the Court has
arrived at the conclusion that the trial court was correct in
appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance. While the CA
found Bugarin guilty for the lesser crimes of homicide and attempted
homicide, respectively, the Court is constrained to review the entire
records of the case pursuant to the well-settled rule that when an
accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives his
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the
entire case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then
called upon to render such judgment as the law and justice dictate,
whether favorable or unfavorable to him.16 The essence of treachery
is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on the
unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to
defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to
the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of
the victims.17
Here, Bugarin' s attack on Cristito was sudden and unexpected. The
alleged provocation on Cristito's part was uncorroborated and not
proven.1âwphi1 While Bugarin claims that Cristito attempted to slap
him, Anecita testified that she did not see this as she was already
inside their house when Bugarin shot her father. The trial court gave
more credence to Maria Glen's narration that Cristito was raising his
hands and pleading for Bugarin to stop when the latter shot him at
close range. More importantly, Bugarin himself stated that when he
shot Cristito in the chest, the latter was looking down at the dead
body of his son sprawled on the ground. He shot him "dahil
konsintidor, hindi marunong makisama, magsama na silang mag-ama,
because he is siding (sic) his son,"18 clearly manifesting that he
knowingly chose his mode of attack and intended it to accomplish his
wicked intent of likewise killing the father rather than a mere
impulsive reaction to a surprising turn of events. In order for the
qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following
requisites must be shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or
manner of execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from
the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being
given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) the
means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted by the offender. The qualifying circumstance of
treachery or alevosia does not even require that the perpetrator
attack his victim from behind. Even a frontal attack could be
treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would
be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it. The essence of
1st Set Fulltext Page 25 of 74
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed,
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden
blow. Indubitably, Cristito was unarmed and had no inkling that an
attack was forthcoming. He neither had a chance to mount a defense.
In such a rapid motion, Bugarin shot Cristito, affording the latter no
opportunity to defend himself or fight back. The deliberate swiftness
of Bugarin's attack significantly diminished the risk to himself that
may be caused by the retaliation of the victim.19 The evidence
sufficiently established that Bugarin deliberately and consciously
adopted the means of executing the crime against his defenseless 72-
year-old father-in-law.
Lastly, with respect to Maria Glen, it is true that after having seen
what Bugarin had done to her husband and father-in-law, she was
already forewarned of the danger to her life. She actually managed to
flee and hide after she was shot. While such ability to avoid greater
harm by running away may be an indicator that no treachery
exists,20 treachery may still be appreciated where the victim was
unarmed, defenseless, and unable to flee at the time of the infliction
of the coup de grace,21 as in this case. Bugarin already commenced
his attack with a manifest intent to kill Maria Glen but failed to
perform all the acts of execution by reason of causes independent of
his will, i.e., poor aim. Maria Glen was likewise not in any position to
defend herself or repel the attack since she was unarmed. Thus, the
trial court aptly appreciated treachery as a circumstance to qualify
the crimes to murder and attempted murder.
With respect to the penalties in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-83610 and
CBU-83611, the Court upholds the ones that the RTC imposed, but
modifies the amount of damages according to the most recent
jurisprudence.22 Bugarin admitted that he used an unlicensed .45
caliber gun in shooting the victims. Presidential Decree No. 1866,23
as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, treats the unauthorized
use of a licensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of homicide
or murder as a special aggravating circumstance. Thus, the same
cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance24 such as
voluntary surrender, as in the instant case. In both Criminal Case Nos.
CBU-83610 and CBU-83611, Bugarin must pay Esmeraldo and
Cristito's heirs ₱l00,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱l00,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱l00,000.00 as exemplary damages. In Criminal Case
No. CBU-83613, however, the lower court should not have
appreciated the use of the unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating
circumstance since at the time the tragic incident took place, R.A. No.
8294 on illegal possession of firearm was then the applicable law, and
as held in the case of People v. Ladjaalam,25 the use of unlicensed
firearm may only be considered if the same is used in the killing.
Hence, in the absence of the special aggravating circumstance of the
use of unlicensed firearm and any other aggravating circumstance,
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
appreciated in favor of Bugarin. The penalty for attempted murder is
prision mayor, which is two (2) degrees lower from the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death for consummated murder. Since the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is present in this case,
the maximum penalty shall be taken from the minimum period of
prision mayor which is six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8)
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
penalty shall be taken from any of the periods of the penalty next
lower in degree which is prision correccional. Thus, the penalty of four
(4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, would be
appropriate. Also, Bugarin must pay Maria Glen ₱25,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱25,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as exemblary
damages, and actual damages in the amount of ₱30,909.48.
WHEREFORE,PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court ADOPTS the
findings and conclusions of law in the Decision dated July 31, 2015 of
the Court of Appeal in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 01530 and AFFIRMS
with MODIFICATION said Decision finding accused-appellant Nestor
Bugarin y Martinez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. CBU-83610, Bugarin is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and
ordered to pay Esmeraldo Pontanar's heirs ₱l00,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages,26 and actual damages in the amount of
₱245,490.00;
CRIM REV
2. In Criminal Cease No. CBU-83611, Bugarin is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua,without eligibility for parole, and
ordered to pay Cristito Pontanar's heirs ₱l00,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱l00,000.00 as moral damages, ₱l00,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and
3. In Criminal Case No. CBU-83613, Bugarin is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Murder and is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months,
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordered to pay Maria Glen
Neis Pontanar ₱25,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱25,000.00 as moral
damages, ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and actual damages in
the amount of ₱30,909.48.
All of the monetary awards shall incur an interest rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
December 13, 2017
G.R. No. 218945
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
LORETO DAGSIL y CARITERO, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Accused-appellant Loreto Dagsil y Caritero is interposing this appeal
upon a lone assignment of error, to wit:
THE COURT AQUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TEMPORARY
INSANITY INF A VOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.1
Accused-appellant was charged with the felony of murder committed,
according to the Information2 instituted therefor, as follows:
That on or about 6:00 o’clock in the morning of December 2, 2008, at
Barangay San Pedro, Municipality of Sto. Domingo, Province of Albay,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, armed with a knife, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence
upon the person of AMEAN R. BANZUELA, a 14-year old minor girl by
then and there stabbing her chest, thereby inflicting upon her [a]
mortal and fatal stab wound which was the direct and immediate
cause of her death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
Amean R. Banzuela.
The aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation attended the commission of the crime as the attack
perpetrated by the accused was so sudden, unexpected and
treacherous as the victim was asleep at the time and he deliberately
planned to take the life of the said victim having been seen roaming
outside the house prior to the stabbing and [waiting] for an
opportune time to get inside the victim's house and he [had]
sufficient time to reflect upon the consequences of his unlawful act.
The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, abuse of superior strength
and disregard of age and sex also attended the commission of the
crime. The crime took place inside the house of the victim after [the]
accused gained unlawful entry [and] stabbed the sleeping victim,
[who was] a minor 14 years of age and a female.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.3
This indictment was docketed as Criminal Case No. FC-08-0361 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City.
During his arraignment, the accused-appellant refused to enter any
plea, hence the Court entered a plea of not guilty for him.
1st Set Fulltext Page 26 of 74
Since it accords with the records, we take the liberty of quoting the
statement of facts as thoroughly and comprehensively narrated in the
brief for the accused-appellant, thus:
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION:
In the morning of 01 December 2008, Amelita Banzuela (Amelita for
brevity) was rousing her fourteen (14)-year old daughter Amean
Banzuela (Amean for brevity) to prepare for school. The latter
complained of [a] headache. It was then that Amean told her that
accused Loreto C. Dagsil raped her. Amelita then proceeded to the
police station to report what happened to Amean.
The next day, 02 December 2008, at about 6:00 o'clock in the
morning, while Amelita was ironing their clothes, she noticed the
accused lurking outside their house and so she directed her son,
Angelo, to close the front door. At that time, Amean was still asleep in
her room.
Thereafter, Amelita was shocked when Amean came to her, with
blood all over her and said that the accused just stabbed her. She
(Amelita) suddenly went hysterical and began shouting for help. Her
other daughter rushed to help Amean while Amelita asked for help. It
was then that she saw the accused heading towards his house
carrying a knife.
In court, Amelita testified that she incurred the amount of about
Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) for funeral expenses but was
only able to present receipts worth Twelve Thousand Six Hundred
Fifty Pesos (Php12,650.00).
Meanwhile, on 02 December 2008, at around 5:00 o’clock in the
morning, Angelo Banzuela (Angelo for brevity) was watching
television while waiting for his sister to finish taking a bath when he
heard his mother asking him to close their front door since the latter
spotted the accused outside their house.
After closing the door, he (Angelo) went to check on the boiling pot in
the kitchen. It was at that time that he saw his sister Amean, with
blood all over her body, telling their mother that she was stabbed by
the accused
Fearing that the accused might come back, Angelo locked the back
door while his mother was shouting for help. He then saw the accused
getting out of their house and into their yard. Thereafter, his other
sister Jeca brought Amean to the hospital for treatment.
Dr. James Margallo Belgira conducted an autopsy of Amean’s body. In
Medico Legal Report No. MLB-150-08, Dr. Belgira declared that the
cause of death is hemorrhagic shock secondary to a stab wound of
the trunk. He, likewise, found clear signs of blunt vaginal penetrating
trauma on her genitals.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE:
For his part, accused Loreto C. Dagsil interjected that although he
indeed stabbed Amean, he was, however, confused and did not know
what he was doing at that time. In the early morning of 02 December
2008, the accused took a stroll in his yard and then went to the store
to buy cigarettes. On his way back to his house, he passed by
Amean's house and he remembered her taunting him that he was
going to be killed and her threatening gestures at him. He was
suddenly overcome with confusion and he was not conscious of what
was going on.
Not really certain of what happened, the accused then found himself
seated inside his bedroom. When he saw the policemen, confusion
prevailed over him and he started stabbing himself with the knife he
was holding. Thereafter, his bedroom door was forced open and he
was brought to the hospital. Afterwards, he was brought to the
precinct for processing.4
In rejecting the accused-appellant's argument that he should be
declared criminally exempt of the murder charge because he was in a
state of temporary insanity when he stabbed the now deceased
Amean, the RTC ruled:
Accused, while admitting the commission of the act complained of,
wants to impress upon this court that he was somewhat not in his
CRIM REV
right senses at the time, or to borrow his words, he was "confused"
and "lost [my] mind" (TSN, June 13, 2011, page 6). The Court held - :
Insanity is the exception rather than the rule in the human condition.
While Art. 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that an imbecile
or insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless that person
has acted during a lucid interval, the presumption, under Art. 800 of
the Civil Code, is that every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it
with clear and convincing evidence. It is in the nature of confession
and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity admits to have
committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of
insanity. The testimony or proof of an accuseds insanity must,
however, relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with
the commission of the offense with which he is charged
xxx
There is a vast difference between a genuinely insane person and one
who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to
use reason or good judgment in what he does. We reiterate
jurisprudence which has established that only when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of
the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be
considered
It is apt to recall x x x where this Court ruled that the professed
inability of the accused to recall events before and after the stabbing
incident, as in the instant case, does not necessarily indicate an
aberrant mind but is more indicative of a concocted excuse to
exculpate himself. It is simply too convenient x x x to claim that he
could not remember anything rather than face the consequences of
his terrible deed.
The requirements for a finding of insanity have not been met by the
defense. x x x The presumption of sanity has not been overcome
(People of the Philippines vs. Honoria Tibon y Dieso, G.R. No. 188320,
June 29, 2010).
Except for his self-serving testimony, no other corroborative, much
less medical and/or expert, evidence was presented by the defense to
prove the professed mental aberration of the accused.5
With regard to the civil aspect of the case, the RTC held:
As to actual damages, the official receipts that the prosecution
presented showed experises that amounted to ₱12,650.00 only
(Exhibits F to F-3).
‘However, we have held that when actual damages proven by receipts
amount to less than ₱25,000.00, the award of temperate damages
[amounting] to ₱25,000.00 is justified, inlieu of actual damages for a
lesser amount. This is based on the sound reasoning that it would be
anomalous and unfair to the heirs of the victim who tried but
succeeded only in proving actual damages of less than ₱25, 000. 00.
They would be in a worse situation than another who might have
presented no receipts at all, but is entitled to ₱25, 000. 00 temperate
damages (People of the Philippines [v]s. Alvin Del Rosario, G.R. No.
189580, February 9, 2011).
Thus, considering that expenses in the amount of ₱12,650.00 were
proven by Amean’s heirs, an award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages in lieu of this lesser amount of actual damages, is proper.6
The RTC thereafter disposed as follows:
ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the guilt of the accused having
been proved beyond peradventure of doubt, LORETO DAGSIL y
CARITERO is hereby found guilty of murder. Accordingly, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusionperpetua without eligibility
of parole, pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346, and
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Amean Banzuela, the following
amounts:
(a) Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) Php50,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) Php25,000.00 as temperate damages; and
(d) Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
1st Set Fulltext Page 27 of 74
SO ORDERED.7
The accused-appellant elevated the RTC's verdict to the Court of
Appeals (CA) whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR. HC. No. 05536;
and in support of his appeal, the accused-appellant insisted that the
RTC committed a reversible error in not pronouncing him criminally
exempt of the murder charge since he was in the state of temporary
insanity at the time he committed the crime. But the CA rejected this
argument, and reasoned out viz.:
Thus, this Court is only faced with the issue raised by accused-
appellant that he should be exculpated from the crime since he
committed the same while he was in a state of temporary insanity.
We are not convinced.
Article 12 of the RPC provides for one of the circumstances which will
exempt one from criminal liability which is when the perpetrator of
the act was an imbecile or insane, unless the latter has acted during a
lucid interval. This circumstance, however, is not easily available to
an accused as a successful defense. Insanity is the exception rather
than the rule in the human condition. Under Article 800 of the Civil
Code, the presumption is that every human is sane. Anyone who
pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of
proving it with clear and convincing evidence. It is in the nature of
confession and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity admits to
have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty
[thereof] because of insanity. The testimony or proof of an accused’s
insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is
charged.
In order for insanity to be an acceptable defense to exempt an
accused from criminal liability, the same must have been proven with
clear and convincing evidence. In the instant case, as aptly observed
by the RTC, the accused-appellant failed to present any corroborative
medical evidence to support his claim. What he presented were mere
statements that he was 'confused' when he committed the horrible
act which are, at best, self-serving and devoid of credence. As such,
the accused-appellant failed to overthrow the presumption that he
was sane during the commission of the offense.8
The foregoing finding was evidently based upon the following
testimony-in-chief of the accused-appellant taken during the hearing
before the RTC on June 13, 2011:
ATTY. CIMANES [defense counsel]
Q You said x x x you were in yom residence [at Sto. Domingo].
xxxx
Q After you woke up, Mr. Witness, what did you do?
A x x x I took a stroll [in] the yard.
Q x x x [D]o you have any Companion in your residence?
A My wife.
xxxx
Q x x x [A]fter [taking] a stroll in your yard, what did you do next x x
x?
A I went to a store to buy cigarettes.
Q Were you able to buy cigarettes?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do after [buying] cigarettes?
A I went back home.
Q xxx
A x x x [O] n my way home I happened to pass by the house [of] this
person who filed a case against me. I saw the victin1 and at that time
I x x x felt so confused. It seems that l lost my mind. I stabbed that
girl.
Q x x x [W]ho filed a case against you x x x?
A Amelita Banzuela.
Q You said that you were able to stab a person, how is this person
related to Amean Banzuela?
A A daughter of [Amelita].
Q x x x [W]hy [did] you x x x stab the daughter of [Amelita]?
A Because she x x x told me that I will be killed and even [placed] her
hand across her neck which I interpreted as I will be killed.
Q x x x [W]ere you conscious x x x [of] your actuation at the time
you [stabbed] the child of Mrs. Amelita Banzuela?
A I [was] not conscious of what I did then. I [was] confused. I [was]
seeing my face as so blurred.
Q You said that you [stabbed] the daughter of Amelita Banzuela,
where did you get the knife?
CRIM REV
A From my residence. From my house.
Q [When you bought cigarettes, did] you already have that knife with
you?
A I cannot recall.
Q [After stabbing] the daughter of Amelita Banzuela, [could] you
recall where you proceed[ed] at that time?
A I went back to my residence and took a seat inside our bedroom.
Q What did you do after you entered your x x x bedroom?
A While waiting in my bedroom I noticed the presence of policemen. x
x x I [was] confused of the situation and I decided to also stab myself
using the same knife which [I was holding].
Q After you stabbed yourself x x x what happened next?
A I noticed that the door [to] my bedroom was being forced open x x
x. The policeman came and x x x they placed me in the porch.
Q What happened after the policeman brought you to the porch, x x x?
A From the porch the policeman took me to the municipal police
station of Sto. Domingo, Albay.
Q Were you treated [of] the injuries you sustained considering that
you also stabbed yourself?
A I was also brought to the hospital.
Q You mentioned that you were able to stab the daughter of Amelita
Banzuela, her daughter Amean A Banzuela, who is the victim in this
case?
Yes, sir.
Q [Did] you know x x x that this Amean Banzuela died because of the
stabbing incident?
A I did not know earlier.9
Like the RTC, the CA adjudged that the crime committed by the
accusedappel1ant in this case was, indeed, murder, qualified by
treachery and by evident premeditation. The CA declared thus:
Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder is committed when the killing of
a person by another is attended by the qualifying circumstances [of]
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength.
In People v. Isla, the Supreme Court clarified that for treachery to
exist the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.’ It is important in ascertaining the existence of treache1y that
it be proven that the attack was made swiftly, deliberately,
unexpectedly, and without a warning, thus affording the unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape the attack. In the instant case,
Loreto killed Amean while the latter was sleeping and had no chance
to resist or escape the attack. Clearly, there was treachery.
Meanwhile, the circumstance of abuse of superior strength is deemed
absorbed in treachery.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the
criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the
resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. In the case before Us, the
accused-appellant went home after taking a stroll and after buying
cigarettes, then he took the knife from his residence and used same
to kill the victim. Thus, We are one with the RTC in its findings that
there was evident premeditation in the commission of the crime.10
The CA, however, modified the civil indemnity awarded by the RTC,
as well as imposed interest on the damages awarded, to wit:
Lastly, in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in People v. Malicdem
and People v. Lauria, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of
Amean is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00. The award of
civil indemnity in the instant case is, thus modified accordingly.
Further, in accordance with the current policy, We also impose on all
the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of six
(6%1) percent from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.11
Ultimately, the CA decreed dispositively as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, instant appeal is hereby
DENIED. The Decision dated February 24, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 8 in Criminal Case No. FC-08-
0361, convicting accused-appellant Loreto Dagsil y Caritero of the
crime of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The civil indemnity imposed in the RTC's Decision, contained in its
dispositive portion, is hereby modified to read as follows:
1st Set Fulltext Page 28 of 74
ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the guilt of the accused having
been proved beyond peradventure of doubt, LORETO DAGSIL y
CARITERO is hereby found guilty of murder. Accordingly, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusionperpetua without eligibility
for parole, pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346, and
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Amean Banzuda, the following
amounts:
(a) Php75;000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) Php50,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) Php25,000.00 as temperate damages; and
(d) Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In addition, interest shall be imposed on all the monetary awards for
damages assessed at the legal rate of six (6%) percent from the date
of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SOORDERED.12
As already stated, given that the instant appeal before this Court is
anchored on the same ground as the appeal before the CA, a premise
that the CA correctly spurned and rejected because it is utterly devoid
of merit, it stands to reason that the instant appeal must now suffer
the same fate that befell it before the appellate court.
A simple reading of the aforequoted testimony of the accused-
appellant shows that he was hardly the mentally deranged or insane
(whether temporarily or permanently) person that he claimed he was
when he stabbed Amean Banzuela (Amean) to death. His answers to
the questions propounded to him by his counsel were intelligent,
responsive, and straightforward; they were not the answers of an
unintelligent person or nitwit that he says he is. In fact, he knew
where he lives - at Sto. Domingo; he knew what he did when he woke
up that morning when the incident happened - he took a stroll in the
yard; he knew that he has a wife who is still alive; he remembered
that after taking a stroll in the yard, he went to a store to buy
cigarettes; he recalled that after buying cigarettes, he went back
home; he also mentioned that on the way home, he happened to
pass by the house of Amelita Banzuela (Amelita) who filed a rape
case against him because he violated her daughter Amean; he
admitted that when he saw Amean, he felt "confused" and stabbed
the girl; he acknowledged that Amean was a daughter of Amelita; he
stabbed Amean because she told him that he would be killed, and
even made the gesture of placing her hand across her neck; he knew
that the knife he used in the stabbing of Amean came from his
residence: he also recalled what transpired after the stabbing, i.e., he
went back to his residence, and while inside his bedroom, he stabbed
himself using the same knife which he used in stabbing Amean; he
also recalled that the policeman forced open the door to his bedroom,
which he himself locked after entering; placed him in the porch, and
thereafter took him to the municipal police station in Sto. Domingo,
Albay. Against this factual backdrop, which convincingly showed that
he is an intelligent, cognitive, rational and thinking person at the time
of the stabbing, the accused-appellant's plea of insanity must be
rejected because it has no leg to stand on.
It must be stated, however, that in view of the attendant
circumstance of treache1y which qualified the killing to murder, as
well as the presence of evident premeditation, and the ordinary
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty would
have been death if not for the proscription for its imposition under
Republic Act No. 9346. 11ms, both the RTC and the CA correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant.
However, there is a need to modify the damages awarded. Pursuant
to People v. Jugueta,13 the awards for civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages are increased to ₱100,000.00
each.14 The award of temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages,
is a]so increased to ₱50,000.00.15 The interest of 6o/o per annum
imposed on all damages awarded is proper.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The June
19, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC. No.
05536, finding accused-appellant Loreto Dagsil y Caritero guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusionperpetua is AFFIRMEDwith
furtherMODIFICATIONS that the awards for civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplaiy damages are increased to ₱100,000.00 each
CRIM REV
while temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, is increased to
₱50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 216021, March 02, 2016
SOLOMON VERDADERO Y GALERA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The expectations of a person possessed with full control of his
faculties differ from one who is totally deprived thereof and is unable
to exercise sufficient restraint on his. Thus, it is but reasonable that
the actions made by the latter be measured under a lesser stringent
standard than that imposed on those who have complete dominion
over their mind, body and spirit.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside
the July 10, 2014 Decision1 and the December 15, 2014 Resolution2
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35894 which affirmed
the May 30, 2013 Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 03,
Tuguegarao City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 13283, finding accused
Solomon Verdadero y Galera (Verdadero) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
In an Information,4 dated September 9, 2009, Verdadero was
charged with the crime of murder for killing Romeo B. Plata (Romeo),
the accusatory portion of which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about March 12, 2009, in the municipality of Baggao,
Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused SOLOMON VERDADERO armed with a
Rambo knife, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and with
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab ROMEO B. PLATA, thereby inflicting upon
him stab wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his
death.
Contrary to law.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On June 3, 2011, Verdadero was arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty."
During the pre-trial, he invoked the defense of insanity but did not
consent to a reverse trial. Thereafter, trial ensued.6
Evidence of the Prosecution
The evidence of the prosecution tended to establish the following:
On March 12, 2009, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Maynard
Plata (Maynard) and his father Romeo were at the Baggao Police
Station. Together with Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there to
report that Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation
pump.7
After a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three
men made their way home on a tricycle but stopped at a drugstore as
Maynard intended to buy some baby supplies. Romeo proceeded
towards a store near the drugstore while Ronnie stayed inside the
tricycle. From the drug store, Maynard saw Verdadero stabbing
Romeo, after he was alerted by the shouts of Ronnie.8
Verdadero stabbed Romeo on the left side of the latter's upper back
with the use of a Rambo knife. He again struck Romeo's upper back,
just below the right shoulder. Maynard tried to help his father but
Verdadero attempted to attack him as well. He defended himself
using a small stool, which he used to hit Verdadero in the chest.9
Meanwhile, Ronnie ran towards the police station to seek assistance.
The responding police officers arrested Verdadero, while Maynard and
Ronnie brought Romeo to a clinic but were advised to bring him to
1st Set Fulltext Page 29 of 74
the Cagayan Valley Medical Center (CVMC). Romeo, however, died
upon arrival at the CVMC. Based on the Post-Mortem Examination
Report, his cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to
severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and hack
wounds.10
Evidence of the Defense
The evidence for the defense did not refute the material allegations
but revolved around Verdadero's alleged insanity, to wit:
Since 1999, Verdadero had been an outpatient of CVMCs Psychiatric
Department as he claimed to hear strange voices and had difficulty in
sleeping. Sometime in 2001, Miriam Verdadero (Miriam), Verdadero's
sister, again brought him to the Psychiatric Department of CVMC after
he became violent and started throwing stones at a tricycle with a
child on board. Verdadero was confined for two (2) months and was
diagnosed to be suffering from mental depression.
On July 21, 2003, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia and was
given medications to address his mental illness. Verdadero would
irregularly consult with his doctors as he had a lifelong chronic
disease. Then, in 2009, he was again confined for the fourth (4th)
time at CVMC due to a relapse.
On March 12, 2009, Miriam proceeded to CVMC, after she heard of
the stabbing incident. There, she saw Verdadero removing the IV
tubes connected to his body and, thereafter, locked himself inside the
comfort room. Eventually, Verdadero was given sedatives and was
transferred to an isolation room after Miriam informed the nurses of
the incident.11
On March 20, 2009, he was transferred to the Psychiatry Department
after Dr. Leonor Andres-Juliana (Dr. Andres-Juliana) had diagnosed
that he was having difficulty sleeping. Dr. Andres-Juliana opined that
Verdadero suffered a relapse, as evidenced by his violent behaviour.
Acting on the January 4, 2011 Order of the RTC, Dr. Ethel Maureen
Pagaddu (Dr. Pagaddu) conducted a mental examination on
Verdadero. She confirmed that as early as 1999, he was already
brought to CVMC and that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on
July 21, 2003. Dr. Pagaddu agreed with Dr. Andres-Juliana that
Verdadero had suffered a relapse on the day of the stabbing
incident.12
The RTC Ruling
On May 30, 2013, the RTC rendered a decision finding Verdadero
guilty for the crime of homicide. The dispositive portion of which
reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused
SOLOMON VERDADERO y Galera GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the felony of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences
him:
1. To suffer an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from twelve
(12) years of prision mayor [as maximum] as minimum to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum; and,
2. To pay the heirs of Romeo Plata the amounts of:
�� �a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
�� �b. P50,000.00 as moral damages and
�� �c. P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages; and,
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC ruled that the crime committed was only homicide, as the
prosecution failed to establish the presence of treachery and evident
premeditation to qualify the killing to murder. The trial court, however,
opined that Verdadero failed to establish insanity as an exempting
circumstance. The trial court posited that Verdadero was unsuccessful
in establishing that he was not in a lucid interval at the time he
CRIM REV
stabbed Romeo or that he was completely of unsound mind prior to or
coetaneous with the commission of the crime.
Aggrieved, Verdadero appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its July 10, 2014 Decision, the CA upheld Verdadero's conviction of
homicide. The appellate court agreed that the defense was able to
establish that Verdadero had a history of schizophrenic attacks, but
was unable to prove that he was not lucid at the time of the
commission of the offense. The decretal portion of the decision states:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED. The
Judgment, dated May 30, 2013, rendered by the Regional Trial Court
of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3 in Criminal Case No. 13283, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Verdadero moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by
the CA in its resolution, dated December 15, 2014.
Hence, this present petition, raising the following
ISSUE
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION DESPITE THE
FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT
WAS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
Verdadero insists that he was able to fully support his defense of
insanity. He claims that Maynard even admitted that he was not in
the proper state of mind when they were at the police station before
the stabbing took place. Further, it appeared that Verdadero was
having hallucinations after the stabbing incident as testified to by Dr.
Andres-Juliana. Verdadero notes that Dr. Pagaddu concluded that he
had a relapse at the time of the stabbing incident on March 12, 2009.
In its Comment,15 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended
that the present petition presented a question of fact, which could not
be addressed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Moreover, it asserted that the CA did not misapprehend the
facts as the evidence presented failed to completely establish
Verdadero's insanity at the time of the stabbing.
In his Manifestation (in Lieu of Reply),16 Verdadero indicated that he
would no longer file a reply as his petition for review already
contained an exhaustive discussion of the issues.
The Court's Ruling
The present petition primarily assails the conviction despite his
defense of insanity. Before delving into the merits of the case, a
discussion of the procedural issue is in order.
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under
Rule 45; Exceptions
The OSG argues that the Court should not entertain Verdadero's
petition for review as it principally revolves around the issue of his
insanity � a question of fact which should no longer be addressed in
a petition for review. The Court disagrees.
Generally, questions of fact are beyond the ambit of a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as it is limited to reviewing
only questions of law. The rule, however, admits of exceptions
wherein the Court expands the coverage of a petition for review to
include a resolution of questions of fact. In Laborte v. Pagsanjan
Tourism Consumers' Cooperative et al.,17 the Court reiterated the
following exceptions to the rule that only questions of law may be
raised under Rule 45, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3)
when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
1st Set Fulltext Page 30 of 74
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
The present petition mainly delves into Verdadero's state of mind at
the time of the stabbing incident. Obviously, it is a question of fact,
which, ordinarily is not entertained by the Court in a petition for
review. As will be discussed below, the Court, nevertheless, finds that
the circumstances in the case at bench warrant the application of the
exception rather than the rule.
Insanity must be present at the time the crime had been committed
To completely evade culpability, Verdadero raises insanity as a
defense claiming that he had suffered a relapse of his schizophrenia.
Under Article 12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane person is
exempt from criminal liability, unless the latter had acted during a
lucid interval. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly
proved for there is a presumption that the acts penalized by law are
voluntary.18
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999,
Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric Department of CVMC for
treatment; (2) he was diagnosed with depression in 2001; (3) he was
diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (4) he was confined
in the psychiatric ward sometime in 2009 due to a relapse; (5) he
was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of his first
confinement in 1999 until the stabbing incident; and (6) he was
diagnosed to have suffered a relapse on March 20, 2009.
Thus, it is without question that he was suffering from schizophrenia
and the only thing left to be ascertained is whether he should be
absolved from responsibility in killing Romeo because of his mental
state.
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability
to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions.19 A showing that an accused is suffering
from a mental disorder, however, does not automatically exonerate
him from the consequences of his act. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties will not exclude imputability.20
In People v. Florendo,21 the Court explained the standard in upholding
insanity as an exempting circumstance, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when
there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts without the
least discernment because of complete absence of the power to
discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will. The
onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.
[Emphasis Supplied]
In People v. Isla,22 the Court elucidated that insanity must relate to
the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission
of the offense with which the accused is charged. Otherwise, he must
be adjudged guilty for the said offense. In short, in order for the
accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity,
he must categorically demonstrate that: (1) he was completely
deprived of intelligence because of his mental condition or illness; and
(2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the
time or immediately before the commission of the offense.
In raising the defense of insanity, Verdadero admits to the
commission of the crime because such defense is in the nature of a
confession or avoidance.23 As such, he is duty bound to establish with
certainty that he was completely deprived, not merely diminished, of
intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime. Failing which,
Verdadero should be criminally punished for impliedly admitting to
have stabbed Romeo to death.
Proving insanity is a tedious task for it requires an examination of the
CRIM REV
mental state of the accused. In People v. Opuran24 the Court
explained how one's insanity may be established, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the
usual means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the
mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be
measured and judged by his behavior. Thus, the vagaries of the mind
can only be known by outward acts, by means of which we read the
thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine
whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the
mental faculties which is manifested in language and conduct. xxx
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion
testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the
accused was insane based on his own perception; or is qualified as an
expert, such as a psychiatrist.
In the earlier case of People v. Austria,25 the Court elucidated that
evidence of the mental condition of the accused during a reasonable
period before and after the commission of the offense is material, to
wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the
act, it is permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition
during a reasonable period before and after. Direct testimony is not
required nor are specific acts of disagreement essential to establish
insanity as a defense. A person's mind can only be plumbed or
fathomed by external acts. Thereby his thoughts, motives and
emotions may be evaluated to determine whether his external acts
conform to those of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, clear
and convincing circumstantial evidence would suffice.
Guided by the precepts laid out by the above-mentioned
jurisprudence, the Court finds that Verdadero sufficiently proved that
he was insane at the time of the stabbing. Thus, the Court takes a
view different from that of the CA as the latter concluded that
Verdadero's insanity was not clearly proven.
It is true that there is no direct evidence to show Verdadero's mental
state at the exact moment the crime was committed. This, however,
is not fatal to the finding that he was insane. His insanity may still be
shown by circumstances immediately before and after the incident.
Further, the expert opinion of the psychiatrist Dr. Pagaddu may also
be taken into account.
Dr. Pagaddu categorically testified that Verdadero was suffering a
relapse at the time of the stabbing incident. During her testimony,
she stated as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On direct examination
Atty. Tagaruma
Q: By the way what was the mental condition of the accused referred
which involved your diagnosis as a life long chronic disease?
Witness
A: The accused was diagnosed schizophrenia, sir.
Q: When for the first time Solomon Verdadero was diagnosed with
schizophrenia?
A: It was on July 21, 2003, sir. xxx
Q: As an expert witness tell the Honorable Court if a person who has
relapse of schizophrenia could distinguish his act?
A: This mental disorder influence (sic) the impulse. It could at the
time of the commission of the crime that the impulse control and
judgment of an individual was affected sir.
Q: Could it be accurate to state that a person who has the relapse of
schizophrenia could not distinguish any act from right or wrong?
A: There is a possibility, sir.
Court
Q: Why did you say that Solomon Verdadero has the possibility of
1st Set Fulltext Page 31 of 74
relapse upon admission on March 19, 2009?
A: There was a period of relapse meaning the symptom was present
and there must be a remission if the symptom is abated, your Honor.
xxx
Atty. Tagaruma
Q: You have read for the record the report of Dr. Juliana on the
alleged violent behavior of Solomon Verdadero on March 12,
2009 which is the date of the incident, as an expert
psychiatrist is it possible that the violent behavior of Solomon
Verdadero on March 12, 2009 was the basis of Dr. Juliana in
diagnosing that the accused was in relapse upon admission on
March 12, 2009?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Following the remark of scientific conclusion of Dr. Juliana,
Dr. Janet Taguinod and the conclusion made by you, is it also
your conclusion that Solomon Verdadero was in relapse on
March 12, 2009 due to violent behavior?
A: Yes, sir.
On cross examination
Prosecutor Aquino
Q: But definitely during the disorder of the patient, the relapse would
somewhat be continued even when medications is administered to
him?
A: The symptom is controlled although there is a circumstances (sic)
that the patient may have relapse (sic) even with medication, sir.
Q: If a continuous medication was undertaken by the accused-patient
in this case could that have a long effect on his mental condition?
A: Continuous medication could somehow control the symptom and
not absolutely eradicate the symptom.
Q: On March 12 , 2009 the accused-patient was on a lucid interval, in
view of the medication undertaken as of January 19, 2009?
A: It's haphazard, sir.
xxx
Court
Q: Madam witness what type of schizophrenia the accused was
diagnosed?
A: Undifferentiated, your honor.26
[Emphases Supplied]
Dr. Paggadu, without any reservations, stated that Verdadero was
suffering a relapse of his schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing
incident. In contrast, she was hesitant to opine that Verdadero might
have been in a lucid interval because of the medications taken. Thus,
it is reasonable to conclude, on the basis of the testimony of an
expert witness, that Verdadero was of unsound mind at the time he
stabbed Romeo.
Further, the finding of Verdadero's insanity is supported by the
observations made by Maynard, a witness for the prosecution. In his
testimony, Maynard gave his opinion on Verdadero's behavior and
appearance when they met at the police station, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On cross examination
Atty. Tagurama
Q: Having made the report against Solomon Verdadero, do I (sic)
correct to say that you are familiar with Solomon Verdadero even
before March 12, 2009?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Tell us why you are familiar to him even prior to March 12, 2009?
A: We are neighbors, sir.
Q: You are immediate neighbors?
A: Yes, sir
Q: Since you are neighbors with Solomon Verdadero you see him
almost a (sic) time?
CRIM REV
A: Yes, sir. I saw him daily.
Q: When you see Solomon Verdadero daily you see his actuation?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: Sometimes he boxes when he is not in his proper mind, what
aberrant behavior did you observe from him?
A: That's the only thing I observed and sometimes he steal (sic), sir.
Q: For a long time that Solomon Verdadero is your neighbor does his
relapse or what you called not in his proper mind occurred often?
A: It occurred once in a while, sir.
Q: When you said it occurred once in a while, this relapse may occur
once a week?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Prior to March 12, 2009, when did you first observe that
Solomon Verdadero appears not in his proper mind?
A: He was not in his proper mind for a long time, sir.
Q: Maybe it could be 5 months before March 12, 2009?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Court
Q: You testified that you observed the accused not in his proper mind
for the passed (sic) years before this incident was he also violent like
what happened on March 12, 2009?
Witness
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: When you went to the police station you allegedly reported the
stolen fan belt do I get you right that Solomon Verdadero was with
you at the police station?
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: When he was with you at the police station what did you
observe?
A: He was not again in his proper mind (sumro manen), your
Honor.
xxx
Q: Can you describe his appearance?
A: His eyes was (sic) very sharp and reddish.
xxx
Q: As far as his appearance is concern (sic) do you remember his
actuation or how he was reacting?
A: Yes, your honor. He was somewhat drank (sic).
Q: You said that he was not on his proper mind for the passed
(sic) years?
A: Yes, your honor.27cralawred
[Emphases Supplied]
Maynard was familiar with Verdadero as the latter was his neighbor
for a long time. He had observed that there were times that
Verdadero appeared to be of unsound mind as he would sometimes
become violent. On the day of the stabbing incident, Maynard
perceived that Verdadero was again of unsound mind noting that he
had reddish eyes and appeared to be drunk. Moreover, he was
immediately transferred to the psychiatry department because of his
impaired sleep and to control him from harming himself and others.28
These circumstances are consistent with Dr. Paggadu's testimony that
drinking wine, poor sleep and violent behavior were among
the symptoms of a relapse, the same testimony that was used as
basis for his previous diagnosis.29 The evidence on record supports
the finding that Verdadero exhibited symptoms of a relapse of
schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. Thus, Dr. Pagaddu
reiterated Dr. Andre-Juliana's conclusion that Verdadero was having a
1st Set Fulltext Page 32 of 74
relapse of his illness on that fateful day.
Further, on March 22, 2009, he was officially diagnosed to have
suffered a relapse of schizophrenia. Generally, evidence of insanity
after the commission of the crime is immaterial. It, however, may be
appreciated and given weight if there is also proof of abnormal
behavior before or simultaneous to the crime.30
Indeed, the grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be
done with utmost care and circumspection as the State must keep its
guard against murderers seeking to escape punishment through a
general plea of insanity.31 The circumstances in the case at bench,
however, do not indicate that the defense of insanity was merely used
as a convenient tool to evade culpability.
The Court notes that at the very first opportunity, Verdadero already
raised the defense of insanity and remained steadfast in asserting
that he was deprived of intelligence at the time of the commission of
the offense. He no longer offered any denial or alibi and, instead,
consistently harped on his mental incapacity. Unlike in previous
cases32 where the Court denied the defense of insanity as it was
raised only when the initial defense of alibi failed to prosper,
Verdadero's alleged insanity was not a mere afterthought.
In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does
not totally free him from the responsibilities and consequences of his
acts. Article 12(1) of the RPC expressly states that "[w]hen an insane
person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony, the
court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted
to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court."
Instead of incarceration, Verdadero is to be confined in an institution
where his mental condition may be addressed so that he may again
function as a member of society. He shall remain confined therein
until his attending physicians give a favorable recommendation for his
release.
Verdadero still liable for damages in spite of his exoneration
In appreciating insanity in favor of Verdadero, the Court absolves him
from criminal responsibility. He is, nevertheless, responsible to
indemnify the heirs of Romeo for the latter's death. An exempting
circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities
exist, but the accused is freed from the criminal liability.33
The amount of damages awarded, however, must be modified in
order to conform to recent jurisprudence.34 The P50,000.00 civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages awarded by the RTC must
each be increased to P75,000.00. In addition, an interest at the rate
of six per cent (6%) per annum should be imposed on all damages
awarded computed from the finality of the decision until the same
have been fully paid.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition and ACQUITS accused-
appellant Solomon Verdadero y Galera of Homicide by reason of
insanity. He is ordered confined at the National Center for Mental
Health for treatment and shall be released only upon order of the
Regional Trial Court acting on a recommendation from his attending
physicians from the institution.
He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Romeo B. Plata the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and
P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages, plus interest on all
damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this decision until the same shall have been fully paid.
SO ORDERED
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 208719 June 9, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ROGER RINGOR UMAWID, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
CRIM REV
Assailed in this ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Roger
Ringor Umawid (Umawid) is the Decision2 dated February 28, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05332 which
affirmed the Joint Decision3 dated November 8, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos.
23-04714 and 23-0543, finding Umawid guilty of the crimes of
Murder and Frustrated Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC). The Informations5
therefor read as follows:
Criminal Case No. Br. 23-0471
That on or about the 26th day of November, 2002, in the municipality
of San Manuel, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to
kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and hack with a
long bolo (panabas) one Maureen Joy Ringor, a two year old baby girl,
inflicting upon her body mortal wounds, which directly and
instantaneously caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Roxas, Isabela, November 27, 2002.6
Criminal Case No. 23-0543
That on or about the 26th day of November, 2002, in the municipality
of San Manuel, province of Isabela, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to
kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and hack for
several times with a long bolo (Panabas) one, Jeffrey R. Mercado,
inflicting upon him, incised wounds on the (R) and (L), hand and on
the parietal area, which injuries would ordinarily cause the death of
the said Jeffrey R. Mercado, thus, performing all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of Murder, as a consequence,
but nevertheless, did not produce it, by reason of causes independent
of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered
to the said Jeffrey R. Mercado, which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Ilagan for Roxas, Isabela, April 3, 2003.7
The Facts
The prosecution presents the following version of the facts:
At around 4 o’clock in the afternoon of November 26, 2002, Vicente
Ringor (Vicente) was staying with his two (2)-year old granddaughter,
Maureen Joy Ringor (Maureen), at the terrace of their house located
at Villanueva, San Manuel, Isabela. Suddenly, Umawid appeared and
started attacking Vicente with a panabas with neither reason nor
provocation. While Vicente was able to evade Umawid’s blows, the
latter nevertheless hit Maureen on her abdomen and back, causing
her instantaneous death. Upon seeing Maureen bloodied, Umawid
walked away.8
Thereafter, Umawid went to a nearby house which was only five (5)
meters away from Vicente’s house9 where his nephew, Jeffrey R.
Mercado (Jeffrey), was sleeping. Awakened by the commotion, Jeffrey
went outside only to see his uncle charging at him with his panabas.
Instinctively, Jeffrey, along with his sister and cousin, rushedinside
the house to seek for safety. However, Umawid was able to prevent
Jeffrey from closing the door of the house, and, as such, the former
was able to barge into the said house. Cornered and nowhere else to
go, Jeffrey crouched and covered his head with his arms to shield him
from Umawid’s impending attacks. Eventually, Umawid delivered fatal
hacking blows to Jeffrey, causing the mutilation of the latter’s fingers.
Umawid only stopped his barrage upon seeing Jeffrey, who was then
pretending to be dead, leaning on the wall and blood-stained.10
For his part, Umawid set up the defense of insanity, but did not,
however, take the witness stand to attestto the same. Instead, he
presented the testimonies of Dr. Arthur M. Quincina (Dr. Quincina)
and Dr. Leonor Andres Juliana (Dr. Juliana) to bolster his claim. Dr.
Quincina testified that he evaluated Umawid’s psychiatric condition in
May 2002, February 2003, and on March 24, 2003 and found that the
latter was manifesting psychotic symptoms. However, he could not
1st Set Fulltext Page 33 of 74
tell with certainty whether Umawid was psychotic at the time of the
commission of the crimes. On the other hand, Dr. Juliana failed to
testify on Umawid’s mental state since she merely referred the latter
to another doctor for further evaluation.11
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision12 dated November 8,2011, the RTC found Umawid
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal
Case No. 23-0471, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the heirs of Maureen the
amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages. Umawid was also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 23-0543, and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
period of six (6) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay
Jeffrey the sum of ₱10,000.00 as moral damages.13
The RTC found that Umawid committed the acts complained of in the
informations and that they were done in a treacherous manner,
considering that Maureen was only two (2) years old at the time of
the attack and thus, cannot be expected to put up a defense,and that
Jeffrey was never given an opportunity to defend himself. Further, it
did not lend credence to Umawid’s alleged insanity as the defense
failed to show that he was indeed of unsound mind at the time of the
commission of the crimes.14
Aggrieved, Umawid appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision15 dated February 28, 2013, the CA affirmed Umawid’s
conviction. It held that by invoking the defense of insanity, Umawid
had, in effect, admitted the commission of the crimes but
nevertheless pleaded to be exonerated from criminal liability.
However, he failed to prove by clear and positive evidence that he
was actuallyinsane immediately preceding the time of the commission
of the crimes or during their execution.
Dissatisfied with the CA’s ruling, Umawid filed the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not Umawid’s
conviction for the crimes of Murderand Frustrated Murder should be
upheld.
The Court's Ruling
Umawid’s appeal is bereft of merit.
A. The Defense of Insanity
Umawid’s plea of insanity as an exempting circumstance to exonerate
himself from criminal liability rests on Article 12 of the RPC which
provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.– The
following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during
a lucid interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which
the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave
without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
xxxx
As case law instructs, the defense of insanity is in the nature of
confession and avoidance because an accused invoking the same
admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not
guilty because of such insanity. As there is a presumption in favor of
sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense bears the burden of
proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the
evidence on this matter must relate to the time immediately
CRIM REV
preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense/s with
which he is charged.16
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence
while committing the act, i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason,
he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete
absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom
of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough,
especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the
mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. Thus, in
order to lend credence to a defense of insanity, it must be shown that
the accused had no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequences of his or her acts.17
In this case, Umawid solely relied on the testimonies of Dr. Quincina
and Dr. Juliana to substantiate his plea of insanity. Records, however,
reveal that Dr. Quincina’s testimony only showed that he evaluated
Umawid’s mental condition in May 2002, February 2003, and March
2003.18 In other words, he only examined Umawid six (6) months
before the latter committed the crimes and three (3) months and four
(4) months thereafter. Notably, he admitted that his findings did not
include Umawid’s mental disposition immediately before or at the
very moment when he committed such crimes.19 As such, Dr.
Quincina’s testimony cannot prove Umawid’s insanity. Neither would
Dr. Juliana’s testimony shore up Umawid’s cause as the former failed
to attest to the latter’s mental condition and even referred him to
another doctor for further evaluation. Given these circumstances,
Umawid’s defense of insanity remained unsubstantiated and, hence,
he was properly adjudged by the RTC and the CA as criminally liable.
With Umawid’s criminal liability having been established, the Court
now proceeds to examine whether or not treachery was correctly
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance for the crimes charged.
B. The Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery
Under Article 248 of the RPC, treachery qualifies the killing of a
person to the crime of Murder: Art. 248. Murder. Any person who, not
falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be
guiltyof murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death
if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid
of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity; (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
xxxx
The concept of treachery in criminallaw is well-established – there is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.20 Based on the foregoing, it may then be deduced thattwo (2)
conditions must concur for treachery to be appreciated: first, the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and, second, the means
of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.21
In this relation, jurisprudence states that an unexpected and sudden
attack which renders the victim unable and unprepared to put up a
defense is the essence of treachery.22 Likewise, it has been held that
the killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner
of the assault is not shown because the weakness of the victim due to
her tender age results in the absence of any danger to the accused.23
With these principles in mind, the Court agrees with the findings of
the RTC and the CA that treachery was attendant in the killing of
Maureen. The facts of this case show that Umawid suddenly appeared
at the terrace of Vicente’s house and started attacking Vicente with
panabas. However, the latter was able to evade Umawid’s attacks,
resulting in Maureen being inadvertently hit and killed in the process.
While it was not shown that Umawid consciously employed treachery
so as to insure the death of Maureen, who was then just two (2)
years old at the time, it is well to reiterate that the killing by an adult
of a minor child is treacherous,24 and thus, qualifies Maureen’s killing
to Murder.
1st Set Fulltext Page 34 of 74
In the same manner, treachery exists in Umawid’s attack on Jeffrey,
albeit the Court disagrees with the RTC and the CA’s finding that
Umawid employed means, methods, and forms that rendered Jeffrey
incapable of raising a credible defense.25 While it is true that
treachery may also be appreciated even when the victim was warned
of the danger to his person and what is decisive is that the execution
of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to
retaliate,26 a review of the factual circumstances herein would reveal
thatit was not impossible for Jeffrey to put up a defense against
Umawid’s attacks. In fact, Jeffrey was sufficiently informed of
Umawid’s impending assault upon him as he saw the latter charging
at him. Jeffrey even attempted to prevent Umawid from entering the
house, albeit he was unsuccessful in doing so. Despite this, Jeffrey
was still capable of mounting a defense against Umawid’s attacks –
but it was simply unfortunate that he chose not to do so when he
crouched and covered his head with his arms. Nevertheless, treachery
may still be appreciated on account of Jeffrey’s minority, considering
that he was just 15 years of age when Umawid attacked him.
Instructive on this point is the case of People v. Guzman,27 where it
was held that treachery attended the killing of a 17-year old victim
due to his minority, viz:28
As viewed from the foregoing, the suddenness and unexpectedness of
the attack of appellant and his two companions rendered Michael
defenseless, vulnerable and without means of escape. It appears that
Michael was unarmed and alone at the time of the attack. Further, he
was merely seventeen years of agethen. In such a helpless situation,
it was absolutely impossible for Michael to escape or to defend
himself against the assault of appellant and his two companions.
Being young and weak, Michael is certainly no match against adult
persons like appellant and his two companions. Michael was also
outnumbered since he had three assailants, and, was unarmed when
hewas stabbed to death. Appellant and his two companions took
advantage of their size, number, and weapon in killing Michael. They
also deliberately adopted means and methods in exacting the cruel
death of Michael by first surrounding him, then grabbing his shoulders
and overpowering him. Afterwards, each of them repeatedly stabbed
Michael with a knife at the stomach until the latter fell lifeless to the
ground. The stab wounds sustained by Michael proved to be fatal as
they severely damaged the latter’s large intestine. The fact that the
place where the incident occurred was lighted and many people were
walking then in different directions does not negate treachery. It
should be made clear that the essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest
provocation on his part. This is even more true if the assailant is an
adult and the victim is a minor. Minor children, who by reason of their
tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. Thus, when an
adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists.As we earlier
found, Michael was peacefullywalking and not provoking anyone to a
fight when he was stabbed todeath by appellant and his two
companions. Further, Michael was a minor at the time of his death
while appellant and his two companions were adult persons.1âwphi1
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this light, there is no reason not to appreciate the qualifying
circumstance of treachery in an attackagainst a minor, asin this case.
C. Aberratio Ictus; Due Process Considerations
As a final point, the Court observes that Maureen’s death is a case of
aberratio ictus, given that the fatal blow therefor was only delivered
by mistake as it was actually Vicente who was Umawid’s intended
target. In this regard, Umawid’s single deed actually resulted in the:
(a) Attempted Murder of Vicente; and (b) Consummated Murder of
Maureen. This may be classified as species of complex crime defined
under Article 4829 of the RPC, particularly, a delito compuesto, or a
compound crime where a single act produces two (2) or more grave
or less grave felonies.30 Based on the foregoing, Umawid should have
been punished for committing the complex crime of Murder and
Attempted Murder, pursuant to Article 48 in relation to Article 4(1)31
of the RPC. However, considering that the information in Criminal
Case No. 23-0471 only charged him with the Murder of Maureen,
Umawid cannot be convicted of a complex crime because to do so
would be violative of his right to due process.32 As held in the case of
Burgos v. Sandiganbayan:33
In criminal cases, where the life and liberty of the accused is at stake,
due process requires that the accused be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. An accused cannot be convicted
of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or
CRIM REV
information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in
the complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional
right.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
All told, the Court hereby finds Umawid guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of Murder in Criminal Case No. 23-0471 and
Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 23-0543, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the RPC.
In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall
be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of
judgement until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.35
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated February 28,
2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05332 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded
from the date of finality of judgment, until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
March 22, 2017
G.R. No. 225599
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs
CHRISTOPHER MEJARO ROA, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
VELASCO. JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision1 promulgated on August 27, 2015,
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06456, which affirmed accused-appellant's
conviction for the offense of murder, punished under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32,
Pili, Camarines Sur, in its Decision in Criminal Case No. P-4100,
promulgated on September 3, 2013.
The present case stems from an Information filed against accused-
appellant Christopher Mejaro Roa (Roa) on June 5, 2007, charging
him for the murder of Eliseo Delmiguez (Delmiguez), committed as
follows:
That on or about 16 March 2007 at around 3:30 in the afternoon at
Barangay San Miguel, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab
Eliseo Delmiguez with the use of a bladed weapon, locally known as
"ginunting," hitting and injuring the body of the latter, inflicting
multiple mortal hack wound[s] thereon, which were the immediate
and direct cause of his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount that may be
proven in court.
That the killing was committed 1) with treachery, as the qualifying
circumstance or which qualified the killing to murder, and 2) [w]ith
taking advantage of superior strength, as aggravating circumstance.2
The Facts
The facts surrounding the incident, as succinctly put by the RTC, are
as follows:
A resident of Brgy. San Miguel, Bula, Camarines Sur, accused [Roa] is
known to have suffered mental disorder prior to his commission of the
crime charged. While his uncle, Issac [Mejaro ], attributes said
condition to an incident in the year 2000 when accused was
reportedly struck in the head by some teenagers, SPOl [Nelson]
Ballebar claimed to have learned from others and the mother of the
accused that the ailment is due to his use of illegal drugs when he
was working in Manila. When accused returned from Manila in 2001 ,
Issac recalled that, in marked contrast to the silent and formal
deportment with which he normally associated his nephew, the latter
1st Set Fulltext Page 35 of 74
became talkative and was observed to be "always talking to himself'
and "complaining of a headache."
On September 27, 2001, accused had a psychotic episode and was
brought to the [Don Susana J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital] DSJRM by
his mother and Mrs. Sombrero. Per the October 10, 2005 certification
issued by Dr. Benedicto Aguirre, accused consulted and underwent
treatment for schizophrenia at the [Bi col Medical Center] BMC in the
years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. In her Psychiatric
Evaluation Report, Dr. [Edessa Padre-]Laguidao also stated that
accused was prescribed antipsychotic medication which he was,
however, not able to continue taking due to financial constraints.
Edgar [Sapinoso] and Rico [Ballebar], who. knew accused since
childhood, admitted hearing about the latter's mental health issues
and/or his treatment therefor. Throughout the wake of an unnamed
aunt sometime in March 2007, it was likewise disclosed by Issac that
accused neither slept nor ate and was known to have walked by
himself all the way to Bagumbayan, Bula.
On March 16, 2007, Issac claimed that accused was unusually silent,
refused to take a bath and even quarreled with his mother when
prompted to do so. At about 3 :30 p.m. of the same day, it appears
that Eliseo, then 50 years old, was walking with Edgar on the street in
front of the store of Marieta Ballecer at Zone 3, San Miguel, Bula,
Camarines Sur. From a distance of about 3 meters, the pair was
spotted by Rico who, while waiting for someone at the roadside, also
saw accused sitting on the sidecar of a trimobile parked nearby. When
Eliseo passed by the trimobile, he was approached from behind by
accused who suddenly stabbed him on the left lower back with a bolo
locally known as ginunting of an approximate length of 8 to 12 inches.
Taken aback, Eliseo exclaimed "Tara man, " before falling to the
ground. Chased by both Edgar and Rico and spotted running by Mrs.
Sombrero who went out of the Barangay Hall upon hearing the
resultant din, accused immediately fled and took refuge inside the
house of his uncle, Camilo Mejaro.
With the incident already attracting people's attention, Barangay
Captain Herminion Ballebar called for police assistance even as Isaac
tried to appease Eliseo's relatives. Entering Camilo's house, Issac saw
accused who said nothing when queried about what he did. Shortly
thereafter, SPO 1 Hermilando Manzano arrived on board a motorcycle
with SPO 1 Ballebar who called on accused to surrender. Upon his
voluntary surrender and tum over of the jungle knife he was holding
to the police officers, accused was brought to the Bula Municipal
Police Station for investigation and detention. In the meantime, Eliseo
was brought to the Bula Municipal Health Center where he was
pronounced dead on arrival and, after the necropsy examination, later
certified by Dr. Consolacion to have died of Hypovolemia secondary to
multiple stab wounds.3 (citations omitted)
When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty," but in the
certificate of arraignment, he signed his name as "Amado M.
Tetangco." Trial on the merits ensued. There was no contest over the
fact that accused-appellant, indeed, stabbed the victim, but he
interposed the defense of insanity.
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision promulgated on September 3, 2013, the RTC of Pili,
Camarines Sur found that accused-appellant is guilty of the offense of
Murder. The RTC ruled that the defense of insanity was not
sufficiently proven as to exculpate accused-appellant from the offense
charged. The RIC noted that as an exempting circumstance, insanity
presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or
discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the
crime. Thus, the RTC said, the accused must be shown to be deprived
of reason or that he acted without the least discernment because
there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a
total deprivation of the will. It is the accused who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity that has the burden of proving
the same with clear and convincing evidence. This entails, the RTC
added, opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who has
rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the
witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.4
In the case of accused-appellant, the RTC ruled, he failed to discharge
the burden of proving the claim of insanity. First, while Isaac Mejaro's
testimony was able to sufficiently prove that accused-appellant
started having mental health issues as early as 2001 , the trial court
CRIM REV
ruled that his past medical history does not suffice to support a
finding that he was likewise insane at the time that he perpetrated
the killing of Delmiguez in 2007. To the trial court, the lack of
showing of any psychotic incidents from the time of his discharge in
2002 until March 2007 suggests that his insanity is only occasional or
intermittent and, thus, precludes the presumption of continuity.5
Second, the trial court acknowledged that accused-appellant exhibited
abnormal behavior after the incident, particularly in writing the name
of Amado M. Tetangco in his certificate of arraignment. It also noted
that midway through the presentation of the prosecution's evidence,
accused-appellant's mental condition worsened, prompting his
counsel to file another motion for psychiatric evaluation and
treatment, and that he was subsequently diagnosed again to be
suffering from schizophrenia of an undifferentiated type. The trial
court, however, cited the rule that the evidence of insanity after the
fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if
there is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or
simultaneous to the commission of the crime. The trial court then
ruled that the witnesses' account of the incident provides no clue
regarding the state of mind of the accused, and all that was
established was that he approached Delmiguez from behind and
stabbed him on his lower back. To the trial court, this actuation of the
accused, together with his immediate flight and subsequent surrender
to the police authorities, is not indicative of insanity.
Finally, while the accused was reputed to be "crazy" in his community,
the trial court ruled that such is of little consequence to his cause. It
said:
The popular conception of the word "crazy" is to describe a person or
act that is unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may, therefore,
behave in a crazy manner but it does not necessarily or conclusively
prove that he is legally so. The legal standard requires that the
accused must be so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a
criminal intent.6
Hence, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder,
and sentenced him as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered finding
accused Christopher Mejaro Roa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Accused is ordered to pay the Heirs of Eliseo Delmiguez the following
sums: (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of said victim;
(b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Aggrieved, accused-appellant appealed his conviction to the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its presently assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the finding of
conviction by the trial court. The CA first noted that all the elements
of the crime of murder had been sufficiently established by the
evidence on record. On the other hand, the defense of insanity was
not sufficiently proven by clear and convincing evidence. The CA said:
Record shows that the accused-appellant has miserably failed to
prove that he was insane when he fatally stabbed the victim on March
16, 2007. To prove his defense, accused-appellant's witnesses
including Dr. Edessa Padre-Laguidao testified that they knew him to
be insane because he was brought and confined to the Bicol Medical
Center, Department of Psychiatry for treatment in the year 2001 .
However, such fact does not necessarily follow that he still suffered
from schizophrenia during the time he fatally attacked and stabbed
the victim, Eliseo Delmiguez. No convincing evidence was presented
by the defense to show that he was not in his right mind, or that he
had acted under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity, or that
he had generally been regarded as insane around the time of the
commission of the acts attributed to him.
An inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the
period immediately before or at the very moment the act under
prosecution was committed. Mere prior confinement in a mental
institution does not prove that a person was deprived of reason at the
time the crime was committed. It must be noted that accused-
1st Set Fulltext Page 36 of 74
appllant was discharged from the mental hospital in 2002, or long
before he committed the crime charged. He who relies on such plea of
insanity (proved at another time) must prove its existence also at the
time of the commission of the offense. This, accused-appellant failed
to do.7 (citations ommitted)
Moreover, the CA ruled that the testimonies of the defense witnesses
that purport to support the claim of insanity are based on
assumptions, and are too speculative, presumptive, and conjectural
to be convincing. To the CA, their observation that accused-appellant
exhibited unusual behavior is not sufficient proof of his insanity,
because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency
constitutes insanity.8 On the contrary, the CA found that the
circumstances of the attack bear indicia that the killing was done
voluntarily, to wit: (1) the use of a long bolo locally known as
ginunting, (2) the location of the stab wounds, (3) the attempt of
accused-appellant to flee from the scene of the crime, and (4) his
subsequent surrender upon being called by the police authorities.
Thus, the CA dismissed the claim of insanity, and affirmed the
conviction of the RTC for the offense charged. The CA merely
modified the award of damages, and dispositively held, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Judgment dated
September 3, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur,
Branch 32, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant Christopher Mejaro Roa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Eliseo
Delmiguez, the amount of: (1) P7 5, 000. 00 as civil indemnity for the
death of the said victim, (b) P50,000 .00 as moral damages, and (c)
P30,000 .00 as exemplary damages as provided by the Civil Code in
line with recent jurisprudence, with costs. In addition, all awards for
damages shall bear legal interest at the rate of six [percent] (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.9
Aggrieved by the ruling of the CA, accused-appellant elevated the
case before this Court by way of a Notice of Appeal.10
The Issue
The sole issue presented in the case before the Court is: whether
there is sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction of accused-
appellant for the offense of Murder, punishable under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, there being no contest that
accused-appellant perpetrated the stabbing of the victim, which
caused the latter's death, the resolution of the present issue hinges
on the pleaded defense of insanity.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no reversible error in the findings of fact and law by
the CA. Hence, the assailed Decision affirming the conviction of
accused-appellant for murder must be upheld.
Insanity as an exempting circumstance is provided for in Article 12,
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - The
following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during
a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which
the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave
without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
In People v. Fernando Madarang,11 the Court had the opportunity to
discuss the nature of the defense of insanity as an exempting
circumstance. The Court there said:
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity
cannot be punished as an offense. The insanity defense is rooted on
the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed
with the faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the
will is that which renders human actions laudable or culpable. Hence,
CRIM REV
where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act
of the will. An insane accused is not morally blameworthy and should
not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is served by
punishing an insane accused because by reason of his mental state,
he would have no control over his behavior and cannot be deterred
from similar behavior in the future.
xxxx
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent
criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must
be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e.,
the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of
the mind, not susceptible of the usual means of proof As no man can
know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition
of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.
Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony
which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with
the accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the
accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the
accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist. The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must
relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the
offense with which he is charged. (citations omitted)
In this jurisdiction, it had been consistently and uniformly held that
the plea of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance.12
Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone, and if found
to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on
the issue of guilt, because the accused had already admitted
committing the crime.13 This Court had also consistently ruled that
for the plea of insanity to prosper, the accused must present clear
and convincing evidence to support the claim.
Insanity as an exempting circumstance is not easily available to the
accused as a successful defense. It is an exception rather than the
rule on the human condition. Anyone who pleads insanity as an
exempting circumstance bears the burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity
must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with
the commission of the offense with which he is charged.14
In the case at bar, the defense of insanity of accused-appellant Roa
was supported by the testimony of the following witnesses: (1) his
uncle, Isaac Mejaro (Mejaro), (2) municipal health worker Mrs.
Lourdes Padregon Sombrero (Sombrero), and (3) Dr. Edessa Padre-
Laguidao (Dr. Laguidao).
Dr. Laguidao testified that in 2001, accused-appellant was admitted
at the Bicol Medical Center, and was discharged in 2002. She
examined accused-appellant on March 15, 2012 and August 15, 2012.
She evaluated his mental condition and found out that his answers to
her queries were unresponsive, and yielding a meaningless
conversation. She then diagnosed him as having undifferentiated type
of Schizophrenia, characterized by manifest illusions and auditory
hallucinations which are commanding in nature. She also
recommended anti-psychotic drug maintenance.15
Mejaro testified that accused-appellant's mental illness could be
attributed to an incident way back in May 8, 2000, when he was
struck on the head by some teenager. After that incident, accused-
appellant, who used to be silent and very formal, became very
talkative and always talked to himself and complained of headaches.
On September 27, 2001, accused-appellant had a psychotic episode,
prompting his mother to confine him at Don Suzano Rodriguez Mental
Hospital (DSRMH). He was observed to be well after his confinement.
The illness recurred, however, when he failed to maintain his
medications. The symptoms became worse in March 2007, when his
aunt died. He neither slept nor ate, and kept walking by himself in the
morning until evening. He did not want to take a bath, and even
quarreled with his mother when told to do so.16
The foregoing testimonies must be examined in light of the quantum
of proof required, which is that of clear and convincing evidence to
1st Set Fulltext Page 37 of 74
prove that the insanity existed immediately preceding or
simultaneous to the commission of the offense.
Taken against this standard, the testimonies presented by accused-
appellant unfortunately fail to pass muster. First, the testimony of Dr.
Laguidao to the effect that accused-appellant was suffering from
undifferentiated schizophrenia stems from her psychiatric evaluation
of the accused in 2012, or about five years after the crime was
committed. His mental condition five years after the crime was
committed is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether he was
also insane when he committed the offense. While it may be said that
the 2012 diagnosis of Dr. Laguidao must be taken with her testimony
that the accused was also diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2001, it is
worth noting that the testimony of Dr. Laguidao as to the 2001
diagnosis of the accused is pure hearsay, as she had no personal
participation in such diagnosis. Even assuming that that portion of her
testimony is admissible, and even assuming that it is credible, her
testimony merely provides basis for accused-appellant's mental
condition in 2001 and in 2012, and not immediately prior to or
simultaneous to the commission of the offense in 2007.
Second, the testimony of Mejaro also cannot be used as a basis to
find that accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the
offense in 2007. His testimony merely demonstrated the possible
underlying reasons behind accused-appellant's mental condition, but
similar to Dr. Laguidao's testimony, it failed to shed light on accused-
appellant's mental condition immediately prior to, during, and
immediately after accused-appellant stabbed the victim without any
apparent provocation.
Accused-appellant further argues that the presumption of sanity must
not be applied in his case, because of the rule that a person who has
been committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the insane is
presumed to continue to be insane. In this case, however, it is
noteworthy that while accused-appellant was confined in a mental
institution in 2001, he was properly discharged therefrom in 2002.
This proper discharge from his confinement clearly indicates an
improvement in his mental condition; otherwise, his doctors would
not have allowed his discharge from confinement. Absent any
contrary evidence, then, the presumption of sanity resumes and must
prevail.
In fine, therefore, the defense failed to present any convincing
evidence of accused-appellant's mental condition when he committed
the crime in March 2007. While there is evidence on record of his
mental condition in 2001 and in 2012, the dates of these two
diagnoses are too far away from the date of the commission of the
offense in 2007, as to altogether preclude the possibility that
accused-appellant was conscious of his actions in 2007. Absent any
supporting evidence, this Court cannot sweepingly conclude that
accused-appellant was mentally insane for the whole 11-year period
from 2001 to 2012, as to exempt him criminal liability for an act
committed in 2007. It was the defense's duty to fill in the gap in
accused-appellant's state of mind between the 2001 diagnosis and
the 2012 diagnosis, and unfortunately, it failed to introduce evidence
to paint a full picture of accused-appellant's mental condition when he
committed the crime in 2007. With that, the Court has no other
option but to adhere to the presumption of sanity, and conclude that
when accused-appellant attacked the victim, he was conscious of
what he was doing, and was not suffering from an insanity.
This conclusion is based not merely on the presumption of sanity, but
bolstered by the circumstances surrounding the incident.1âwphi1 As
the prosecution correctly argued in its Appellee's Brief, there are
circumstances surrounding the incident that negate a complete
absence of intelligence on the part of accused-appellant when he
attacked the victim. First, he surprised the victim when he attacked
from behind. This is supported by the companion of the victim, who
testified that while they were walking, they did not notice any danger
when they saw accused-appellant standing near the trimobile. Second,
accused-appellant's attempt to flee from the scene of the crime after
stabbing the victim indicates that he knew that what he just
committed was wrong. And third, when the police officers called out
to accused-appellant to surrender, he voluntarily came out of the
house where he was hiding and voluntarily turned himself over to
them.
The foregoing actions of accused-appellant immediately before,
during, and immediately after he committed the offense indicate that
he was conscious of his actions, that he intentionally committed the
CRIM REV
act of stabbing, knowing the natural consequence of such act, and
finally, that such act of stabbing is a morally reprehensible wrong. His
actions and reactions immediately preceding and succeeding the act
of stabbing are similar if not the same as that expected of a fully sane
person.
Therefore, the Court finds no reasonable basis to reverse the findings
of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that accused-appellant's culpability
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
As to the award of damages, however, the Court finds the need to
modify the same, in line with the rule enunciated in People v. Jugueta,
where the Court laid down the rule that in cases where the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua, the proper amounts of awarded
damages should be ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000 as moral
damages and ₱75,000 as exemplary damages, regardless of the
number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on August 27, 2015, in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 06456, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, the fallo of the
Decision must read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Judgment dated
September 3, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur,
Branch 32, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant Christopher Mejaro Roa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Accusedappellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Eliseo
Delmiguez, the amount of: (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of the said victim, (b) ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and (c)
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages as provided by the Civil Code in
line with recent jurisprudence, with costs. In addition, all awards for
damages shall bear legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200793 June 4, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MILAN ROXAS y AGUILUZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 03473 dated August 16, 2011, which affirmed with
modification the Judgment2 of Branch 94, Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City dated December 11, 2007 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-
91967 to Q-00-91971 finding accused-appellant Milan Roxas y Aguiluz
guilty of five counts of rape against AAA,3 a minor who was 9 years
old at the time of the first rape and 10 years old at the time of the
succeeding four rapes.
Five Informations were filed against accused-appellant Roxas,
charging him as follows:
1. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91967: That on or about the 9th
day of August 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused with force and intimidation did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
sexual assault at knifepoint upon the person of [AAA] his
own niece a minor 10 years of age by then and there
blindfolding her, then removed her shorts and underwear
then accused inserted his penis inside her vagina and
thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will and
without her consent.4
2. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91968:
That on or about the 28th day of July 1998 in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused with force and intimidation did then and
1st Set Fulltext Page 38 of 74
 there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the
person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of
age by then and there blindfolding her and
removing her shorts and underwear and inserting
his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had
carnal knowledge of her against her will and
without her consent.5
3. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91969:
That on or about the 16th day of September 1997
in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused with force and intimidation did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the
person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 9 years of
age by then and there laying her on the chairs
inside the bathroom, then blindfolded her and then
removed her shorts and underwear then accused
inserted his penis inside her vagina and thereafter
had carnal knowledge of her against her will and
without her consent.6
4. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91970:
That on or about the 20th day of March 1998 in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused with force and intimidation did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the
person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of
age by then and there laying her down on a bed
inside his grandparents’ room then blindfolded her,
then removed her shorts and underwear, then
accused inserted his penis inside her vagina and
thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her
will and without her consent.7
5. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91971:
That on or about the 11th day of May 1998 in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused with force and intimidation did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon the
person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of
age by then and there removing her shorts and
underwear and inserting his penis inside her
vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her
against her will and without her consent.8
Accused-appellant Roxas entered a plea of Not
Guilty to all the crimes charged.9
The prosecution’s factual account based on the testimony of AAA was
concisely stated by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Appellee’s
Brief, as follows:
On 16 September 1997, [AAA], who was then 9 years of age, was at
her grandmother [CCC]’s house located on [XXX], Quezon City. In the
morning of said date, she was at the dirty kitchen with her aunt [ZZZ]
who was then washing clothes. Her aunt asked her if she had already
taken a bath, she replied in the negative.
Her uncle, accused-appellant, overheard their conversation so he
volunteered to give [AAA] a bath. Subsequently, he brought her
upstairs to the bathroom.
While inside the bathroom, accused-appellant told [AAA] to turn
around. After she complied with his directive, he blindfolded her.
[AAA] started to wonder what the accused-appellant was doing so she
told him that he was supposed to give her a bath. Accused-appellant
told her that they would play first for a while.
He turned her around three (3) times and then, removed her shorts
and underwear. After that, he sat on a chair, which was inside the
bathroom, and raised both of her legs.
Thereafter, she felt him on top of her. She also felt accused-
appellant’s penis enter her vagina which she found painful.
CRIM REV
She cried and shouted the name of her aunt, but accused-appellant
got angry and poked a sharp instrument on her neck. [AAA] did not
report the incident because accused-appellant threatened to cut her
tongue and to kill her and her mother.
[AAA] was raped again on 20 March 1998 while she was at the same
house of her paternal grandparents. She was on the terrace on the
second floor of the house when accused-appellant, who was in her
grandparents’ bedroom at that time, called her. She hesitated to go
near him because she was afraid that he might rape her again.
Accused-appellant then went to the terrace and dragged her to the
bedroom of her grandparents. She could not run anymore nor shout
for help because aside from the fact that there was nobody else in the
room, accused-appellant was holding a pointed weapon.
While [AAA] and accused-appellant were inside the room, he
blindfolded her, removed her shorts and underwear, and then laid her
down the bed. Thereafter, he moved on top of her and inserted his
penis in her vagina. Again, she did not report the incident because of
accused-appellant’s threats should she report the incident to anybody.
Another incident of rape took place on 11 May 1998while [AAA] was
again at her paternal grandparents’ house. On the said date, she was
alone in the living room on the second floor of the house when
accused-appellant called her. She did not accede to his bidding
because she was scared of him. Thereafter, he shouted at her and
demanded that she come near him, so she went to him.
He brought her inside her grandmother’s bedroom and upon reaching
the room, he immediately blindfolded her and poked a bladed weapon
on her neck. He turned her around three (3) times, removed her
shorts and underwear, laid her down the bed, moved on top of her,
and inserted his penis in her vagina. Again, the accused-appellant
threatened her so she did not report what had happened.
[AAA]’s ordeal did not stop there. She was raped for the fourth time
on 28 July 1998 at her paternal grandparents’ house.1âwphi1 She
and the accused were incidentally alone in the living room on the
second floor of the house. He asked her to go with him inside the
bedroom of her grandparents, but she did not get up from her seat.
So accused-appellant pulled her toward the bedroom. She tried to
free herself, but he poked a pointed instrument at her.
Accused-appellant committed the same acts he had perpetrated on
[AAA] during her three [previous] rape incidents: he removed her
shorts and underwear, laid her on the bed, moved on top of her and
thereafter, inserted his penis in her vagina. She was again threatened
by the accused-appellant not to tell anybody about the incident or
else he would cut her tongue and kill her and her mother.
The fifth and last incident of rape happened on 09 August 1998. At
that time, [AAA] was at the terrace on the second floor of her
paternal grandparents’ house; and accused-appellant also happened
to be there. He pulled her and brought her inside the room,
blindfolded her, and turned her around three (3) times. He employed
the same method in raping her: he removed her shorts and
underwear, laid her on the bed and moved on top of her. She tried to
push him and raise her shorts and panty, but she did not succeed
because he poked a pointed instrument on her neck. Thereafter, he
inserted his penis in her vagina. Again, she did not report the incident
to anyone because she was scared of his threats.10 (Emphases
supplied, citations omitted.)
In contrast, the defense presented four witnesses: AAA’s mother
(BBB), AAA’s two brothers (DDD and EEE), and Dr. Agnes Aglipay,
Regional Psychiatrist of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.
The defense’s statement of the antecedent facts as contained in the
Appellant’s Brief is reproduced here:
Accused Milan Roxas denied having raped [AAA] on all the five (5)
counts of rape.
[DDD], brother of herein private complainant, testified that his aunt
in the maternal side, [Tita YYY], induced him by giving toys if he
would tell his father that the accused was raping his sister, [AAA].
Upon prodding of his maternal aunt, [DDD],who was only eight (8)
years old then, told his father that he saw the accused rape his sister.
His father ran amuck which led to the filing of the instant case.
1st Set Fulltext Page 39 of 74
On subsequent days, while [DDD]and [AAA] were in a grocery store
buying something, their [Tito XXX], [Tito WWW] and [Tita YYY]
arrived on board an FX vehicle. [Tita YYY] told [DDD] that they will be
going to buy toys. [DDD] said that he will first ask permission from
his grandfather, but [Tita YYY] said that it would only take a few
minutes and they will bring them home afterwards. [AAA] was
brought to SSDD, a place under the administration of the DSWD,
while [DDD] was brought to Caloocan. On the following day, he was
brought to Muñoz, in a rented house of his [Tita YYY] and her
husband. [DDD] stayed there for almost a year. He was forbidden to
go outside as the door was always locked. When [his Tita VVV]
arrived from Japan they went to Tarlac where his paternal
grandmother fetched him.
[EEE], brother of herein private complainant, likewise testified that
when [his Tita VVV] arrived, they went to North Olympus, Quezon
City where [his] maternal relatives reside. On one occasion, he saw
his sister, [AAA] and his maternal uncle [Tito XXX] entered one of the
bedrooms. He tried to open the door to see what the duo were doing,
but it was locked. [EEE] looked for a wire and was able to open the
door. He saw private complainant on top of his [TitoXXX], both naked.
When the duo saw him, private complainant and his [Tito XXX] stood
up. The latter threatened him not to tell anybody or he will cut off his
tongue.
On November 26, 1999, [BBB], mother of the private complainant
testified that her two (2) children, [AAA] and [DDD], were missing.
She looked for them, but to no avail. So she went to the police station
to have it blottered. Later did she know when she called her sister
who resides in Project 6, Quezon City that [DDD] was brought to
Ilocos and [AAA] at the SSDD in Kamuning by her 3 brothers and
sister. She filed a case of kidnapping against his brother [Tito WWW].
[Tito WWW], however, promised to return her children if she will have
the said case dismissed which she did.
She denied the allegations that[her] brother-in-law, herein accused,
raped her daughter, [AAA]. In fact, before the filing of the present
rape cases there was one rape case filed on September 22, 1999
which was dismissed because [AAA] retracted her statements. As told
to [BBB] by her daughter [AAA], she was not raped by herein accused.
She told a lie and made the false accusation against the accused,
because she does not want to put the blame on any of her maternal
relatives. [AAA] was greatly indebted to her maternal grandmother
and her maternal uncles and aunts because they had taken care of
her since she was three (3) years old.
Dr. Agnes Aglipay, Regional Psychiatrist of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology testified that based on her examination of
the accused, she concluded that he is suffering from a mild mental
retardation with a mental age of nine (9) to ten (10) years old. She
observed that the subject was aware that he was being accused of
rape, but he had consistently denied the allegations against him.11
(Citations omitted.)
The RTC of Quezon City rendered its Judgment on December 11,
2007, finding accused-appellant Roxas guilty as charged in each of
the five Informations filed against him. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in all five (5)
counts of rape as recited in the information[s] and sentences accused
MILAN ROXAS:
1) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91967 – to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended party [AAA]
the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum
of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;
2) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91968 – to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended party [AAA]
the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum
of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;
3) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91969 – to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended party [AAA]
the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum
of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;
4) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91970 – to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended party [AAA]
CRIM REV
the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum
of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs; and
5) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91971 – to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended party [AAA]
the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum
of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs.
To credit in favor of the herein accused the full period of his detention
in accordance with law. Resultantly, all pending incidents are deemed
moot and academic.12
The RTC held that accused-appellant Roxas is not exempt from
criminal responsibility on the ground that he cannot be considered a
minor or an imbecile or insane person, since Dr. Aglipay merely
testified that he was an eighteen-year old with a mental development
comparable to that of children between nine to ten years old. The RTC
found the testimony of AAA credible, and found the testimonies of the
defense witnesses to be "flimsy."
Accused-appellant Roxas elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03473.
Accused-appellant Roxas submitted the following Assignment of
Errors in the appellate court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S
TESTIMONY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME CHARGED.13
On August 16, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision, modifying the Judgment of the RTC as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Judgment dated 11 December
2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, in the
case entitled People of the Philippines vs. Milan Roxas y Aguiluz",
docketed therein as Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-91967 to Q-00-91971,
is AFFIRMED with modification that accused-appellant is ordered to
pay private complainant on each count civil indemnity in the amount
of ₱75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00, and
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00, for each count of
rape.14 Hence, accused-appellant Roxas interposed this appeal,
where he, in his Supplemental Brief, presented an Additional
Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY.15
Accused-appellant Roxas claims that the testimony of AAA is replete
with inconsistencies and narrations that are contrary to common
experience, human nature and the natural course of things.16
Accused-appellant Roxas likewise points out that under Republic Act
No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, minors
fifteen (15) years old and below are exempt from criminal
responsibility. Accused-appellant Roxas claims that since he has a
mental age of nine years old, he should also be "exempt from criminal
liability although his chronological age at the time of the commission
of the crime was already eighteen years old."17
In the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 934418 is explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15)
years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this
Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the
fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
1st Set Fulltext Page 40 of 74
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis supplied.)
In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability,
Section 6 clearly refers to the age as determined by the anniversary
of one’s birth date, and not the mental age as argued by accused-
appellant Roxas. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Only
when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court
interpret or construe its true intent.19
On the matter of the credibility of AAA, we carefully examined AAA’s
testimony and found ourselves in agreement with the assessment of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals. As observed by the appellate
court:
We note that she recounted her ordeal in a logical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner, without any artificialities or
pretensions that would tarnish the veracity of her testimony. She
recalled the tragic experience and positively identified accused-
appellant as the one who ravished her on five occasions. Her
testimony was unshaken by a grueling cross-examination and there is
no impression whatsoever that the same is a mere fabrication. For
her to come out in the open and publicly describe her harrowing
experience at a trial can only be taken as a badge of her sincerity and
the truth of her claims.20
We further underscore that AAA was merely 14 years old at the time
she testified.21 We have repeatedly held that testimonies of child-
victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says
in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been
committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature,
courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to
which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not
true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity.22
It is likewise axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the
credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses, great respect is
accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better position
to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying
of witnesses, and to decide who among them is telling the truth.23 As
the trial court further observed, the defense witnesses were not
eyewitnesses. A witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his
own perception, except as provided in the Rules of Court.24 AAA’s
mother and brothers were not present when the five rapes allegedly
occurred, and therefore any testimony on their part as to whether or
not the complained acts actually happened is hearsay.
We shall now discuss the criminal liability of accused-appellant Roxas.
As stated above, the trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape.
The first rape incident was committed in July 1997, and therefore the
law applicable is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659 which provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
CRIM REV
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim.
The succeeding counts of rape were committed after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 8353 on October 22,1997, which transported the
rape provision of the Revised Penal Code to Title 8 under Crimes
against Persons, and amended the same to its present wording:
Article 266-A. Rape, When And How Committed. — Rape is committed
—
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
Article 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or
by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim[.]
While it appears that the circumstance of minority under Article 335
(old rape provision) and Article 266-B was sufficiently proven, the
allegation of the relationship between AAA and accused-appellant
Roxas is considered insufficient under present jurisprudence. This
Court has thus held:
However, as regards the allegation in the Information that appellant
is an uncle of the victim, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
same did not sufficiently satisfy the requirements of Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, i.e., it must be succinctly stated that appellant is
a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or affinity. It is
immaterial that appellant admitted that the victim is his niece. In the
same manner, it is irrelevant that "AAA" testified that appellant is her
uncle. We held in People v. Velasquez:
However, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on
accused-appellant, applying Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7659.1âwphi1 We have consistently held that the circumstances
under the amendatory provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, the
attendance of which could mandate the imposition of the single
indivisible penalty of death, are in the nature of qualifying
circumstances which cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the
information. Even in cases where such circumstances are proved, the
death penalty cannot be imposed where the information failed to
allege them. To impose the death penalty on the basis of a qualifying
circumstance which has not been alleged in the information would
1st Set Fulltext Page 41 of 74
violate the accused's constitutional and statutory right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
While the informations in this case alleged that accused-appellant is
the uncle of the two victims, they did not state that he is their relative
within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. The
testimonial evidence that accused-appellant's wife and Luisa de
Guzman are sisters is immaterial. The circumstance that accused-
appellant is a relative of the victims by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree must be alleged in the information. In the case
at bar, the allegation that accused-appellant is the uncle of private
complainants was not sufficient to satisfy the special qualifying
circumstance of relationship. It was necessary to specifically allege
that such relationship was within the third civil degree. Hence,
accused-appellant can only be convicted of simple rape on two counts,
for which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in each case.25
In the case at bar, the allegation that AAA was accused-appellant
Roxas’s "niece" in each Information is therefore insufficient to
constitute the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.
Instead, the applicable qualifying circumstance is that of the use of a
deadly weapon, for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
Since there was no other aggravating circumstance alleged in the
Information and proven during the trial, the imposed penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count of rape is nonetheless proper even
as we overturn the lower courts’ appreciation of the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship.
For consistency with prevailing jurisprudence, we reduce the awards
of civil indemnity and moral damages to ₱50,000.00 each, for each
count of rape. The award of exemplary damages in the amount of
₱30,000.00 for each count, on the other hand, is in line with recent
jurisprudence.26 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03473 dated August 16, 2011 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of civil indemnity
and moral damages awarded to the complainant are reduced to
₱50,000.00 each, for each count of rape, plus legal interest upon the
amounts of indemnity and damages awarded at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 216671, October 03, 2016
JERWIN DORADO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse and set
aside the August 8, 2014 Decision1 and the January 29, 2015
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33581,
which affirmed the July 5, 2010 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court,
Taguig City, Branch 163 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 127784, finding
accused Jerwin Dorado (Dorado) guilty of the crime of Frustrated
Murder.
The Antecedents
Dorado, Julius Ramos (Ramos), Jeffrey Confessor (Confessor) and
Jayson Cabiaso (Cabiaso) were charged with the crime of frustrated
murder, defined under Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) committed against Ronald Bonion (Ronald)
before the RTC. They were also charged with violation of Section 10(a)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, committed against
Raniel Parino (Raniel). These cases were docketed, as Criminal Case
Nos. 127784-85. The respective Informations read as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Criminal Case No. 127784
xxxx
CRIM REV
That on or about the 15th day of March 2004, in the Municipality of
Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with one
another and with Jerwin Dorado y Felipe @ Ewing who is a 16 year
old minor, and with two (2) unidentified companions whose true
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown, with intent to
kill by means of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation, aggravated by the circumstances of nighttime and
with the use of an improvised shotgun (sumpak), a deadly weapon
and unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said deadly weapon, one
Ronald Bonion y Bozar, thus performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence,
but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent
of the will of the accused, that is due to the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said victim which prevented his death.
Contrary to law.4chanrobleslaw
Criminal Case No. 127785
xxxx
That on or about the 15th day of March 2004, in the Municipality of
Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with one
another and with Jeffrey Confessor, Jayson Cabiaso, Jerwin Dorado y
Felipe @ Ewing who is a 16 year old minor, and with two (2)
unidentified companions whose true identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit acts of cruelty upon the person of
complainant Raniel Parino, a 15 year old minor by then and there
hurling stones at the latter, which act is prejudicial to the normal
growth and development of said child.
Contrary to law.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On November 9, 2004, Dorado and his co-accused were arraigned
and they all pleaded "not guilty" to the charges. Thereafter, the trial
ensued.
Evidence of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the victims, Ronald, Ronald's brother,
Robert Bonion (Robert), Raniel Parino (Raniel) and Dr. Ronaldo Artes
(Dr. Artes), as its witnesses. Their combined testimonies tended to
establish the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn April 15, 2004, at around 11:00
o'clock in the evening, Ronald was talking to his friends Raniel, Delon
Busar, Annan Luna, Jerome Amergo and a certain Erwin (Ronald's
group) along A. Reyes Street, Lower Bicutan, Taguig. At that very
time, Dorado, carrying a sumpak, and his friends, Confessor and
Cabiaso (Dorado's group), arrived and threw stones and bottles at
Ronald's group.
Ronald's group scampered for shelter toward the talipapa and hid
inside to avoid being hit by the stones and bottles. When Ronald
thought that Dorado's group was no longer-in the vicinity, they came
out of hiding. Dorado's group, however, was out there waiting for
them. When they finally surfaced, Dorado's group resumed throwing
stones at Ronald's group. During the commotion, Dorado fired his
sumpak and hit Ronald between the eyes. Ronald fell unconscious for
about ten (10) minutes while Dorado's group ran away. Thereafter,
Ronald was brought to the Rizal Medical Center by Raniel and Delon
Busan. He sustained the following injuries:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Xxx Ruptured Globe, OU; S/P Excision of prolapsed Uvea + Repair of
Corneal & Scleral laceration, OD; S/P Enucleation & Evacuation of
Foreign body's + Repair of Lower lid margin laceration, OS
xxx.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ronald was operated on his forehead and was confined for a month at
the Rizal Medical Center. As a result of the shooting incident, Ronald
1st Set Fulltext Page 42 of 74
lost his left eye while his right eye could only see some light. Dr.
Artes, the operating surgeon, testified that without medical
intervention, Ronald could have died.
Evidence of the Defense
The defense presented the accused Dorado and Ramos; Gloria
Confessor and Jessie Confessor, the mother and brother of accused
Confessor; Mark Matuguina; Jeffrey Quijano; Aurin Reyes, and Ofelia
Ramos (Ofelia) as its witnesses, who collectively narrated the
following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn April 15, 2004, between 8:00 o'clock
and 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Dorado was at home watching
television with his siblings and his mother. Suddenly, the barangay
tanods arrived and blamed him for the shooting of Ronald. Dorado
denied any participation in the incident and did not go with the tanods.
No sumpak was taken from his house. He also denied that he was a
gang member and that he went into hiding.
The witnesses for Ramos, Confessor and Cabiaso testified that they
were not present in the crime scene when Ronald was shot.
Ofelia, on the other hand, testified that on April 15, 2004, between
10:00 and 10:30 o'clock in the evening, she was on her way to see
her friend when she noticed five persons running in the opposite
direction. Four of them entered an alley, while one stayed and shot
the face of another teenager. She added that she would be able to
recognize the assailant, but it was not Dorado.
The RTC Ruling
On July 5, 2010, the RTC rendered its decision. In Criminal Case No.
127784, the trial court found Dorado guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of frustrated murder; while in Criminal Case No. 127785,
accused Dorado, Ramos, Confessor and Cabiaso were all acquitted as
the crime was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It noted that
their participation in the crime was limited to the throwing of stones
and bottles and there was no indication that they Singled out Ronald
as their target. The RTC also acquitted all the accused for the charge
of violation of R.A. No. 7610 because the prosecution failed to
establish Ronald's minority.
In finding Dorado guilty of frustrated murder, as defined under Article
248, in relation to Article 6, paragraph 2, of the RPC, the RTC gave
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that it was
Dorado who shot Ronald with a sumpak. The trial court considered
the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation because of the
following: Dorado's group had an ongoing feud with Ronald's group;
when the assault began, Dorado was already holding a sumpak; after
Ronald fled, Dorado waited intently for an opportunity to shoot him;
and when Ronald came out, Dorado shot him on the face. The RTC,
nevertheless, appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority in Dorado's favor as he was still a minor at the time of the
incident. It, however, stated that Dorado was not entitled to a
suspension of sentence because he was above twenty-one (21) years
old at the time of the pronouncement of guilt. Thus, it disposed the
case in this wise:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, taking all the foregoing into consideration, it is hereby
adjudged that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. In Criminal Case No. 127784, CICL Jerwin Dorado y Felipe is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Frustrated Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248, in relation to Article 6, 2nd paragraph, 2nd phrase of
the Revised Penal Code and, taking into consideration the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of
prision correctional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of
prision mayor, as maximum, with all the effects thereof as
provided" by law. He is further ordered to pay the victim
Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php50,000.00 by way of
moral damages; and to pay the costs, at the legal rate of
interest from the time of the filing of the Information until
CRIM REV
fully paid. Accused Julius Ramos y Labanero, Jeffrey
Confessor and Jayson� Cabiaso� are ACQUITTED� on�
ground� of reasonable doubt.
2. In Criminal Case No. 127785, CICL Jerwin Dorado y Felipe,
accused Julius Ramos y Labanero, Jeffrey Confessor and
Jayson Cabiaso are ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable
doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Aggrieved, Dorado elevated an appeal before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed decision, dated August 8, 2014, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision, finding that Dorado committed the crime of frustrated
murder because he had the intent to kill Ronald when he fired his
sumpak hitting the portion between the two eyes of the victim. It
noted that Ronald would have died were it not for the timely medical
attention. The appellate court also agreed with the RTC that Dorado's
act of waiting for Ronald to come out of the talipapa, where the latter
was hiding, indicated evident premeditation.
The CA did not give credence to Dorado's defense of alibi because his
house was merely one block away from the talipapa. It opined that it
was not physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the
time in question.
Dorado moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the
CA in its assailed resolution, dated January 29, 2015.
Hence, this petition.
SOLE ISSUE
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER FOR
THE CRIME CHARGED.8
Dorado argues that his defenses of alibi and denial should be fully
appreciated by the Court as there was enough evidence to support
them; that he was at his home at the time of the incident; that
defense witness Ofelia testified that he was not the one who shot
Ronald; and that the barangay officials did not find the sumpak in his
possession.
In its Comment,9 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered
that Dorado had the intent to kill when he fired the sumpak and hit
Ronald between the eyes; that the felony would have caused the
death of the victim, were it not for the timely medical intervention;
and that Dorado's defenses of denial and alibi could not overcome the
positive identification by the prosecution witnesses.
In his Reply,10 Dorado reiterated that his defense was supported by
Ofelia's testimony and that the CA committed a misapprehension of
facts when it did not consider his defenses.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Dorado was a minor at the
time of the commission of
the crime
A perusal of the records will readily show that Dorado was a sixteen
(16) year old minor at the time of the commission of the crime on
March 15, 2004. The Informations filed against him consistently
stated his minority.11 For said reason, he must benefit from the
provisions of R.A. No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006, as amended. Even though the said law was enacted on April 28,
2006, the same must still be retroactively applied for the benefit of
Dorado pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law �
favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are
favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect).12chanrobleslaw
1st Set Fulltext Page 43 of 74

Curiously, neither the RTC nor the CA paid much attention to
Dorado's minority and how it affected his criminal responsibility. Thus,
the Court deems it proper to lay down the salient provisions of R.A.
No. 9344 regarding the prosecution of a Child In Conflict with the Law
(CICL).13chanrobleslaw
One of the significant features of R.A. No. 9344 is the increase of the
minimum age of criminal responsibility, to wjt:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. � A child fifteen (15)
years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this
Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the
fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.14
In sum, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the following minors
shall be exempt from criminal liability:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Those below fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime; and ,
2. Those above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age who acted without discernment.
Thus, if a child falls under the above-cited ages, he or she shall be
released and shall be subjected to an intervention program as may be
determined by a local social welfare and development officer,
pursuant to Section 20 of the said law.
Consequently, under R.A. No. 9344, only a child above fifteen (15)
years but below eighteen (18) years of age who acted with
discernment shall not be exempted from criminal responsibility.15
Nevertheless, the said child does not immediately proceed to trial.
Instead, he or she may undergo a diversion, which refers to an
alternative, child-appropriate process of determining the responsibility
and treatment of the CICL without resorting to formal court
proceedings. If the diversion is unsuccessful or if the other grounds
provided by law16 are present, then the CICL shall undergo the
appropriate preliminary investigation of his or her criminal case, and
trial before the courts may proceed.
Once the CICL is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
not immediately execute its judgment; rather, it shall place the CICL
under suspended sentence. Notably, the suspension shall still be
applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his or her guilt. During the
suspension, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition
measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law. If the disposition measures are successful, then
the court shall discharge the CICL. Conversely, if unsuccessful, then
the court has the following options: (1) to discharge the child, (2) to
order execution of sentence, or (3) to extend the suspended sentence
for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum
age of twenty-one (21) years.17chanrobleslaw
In other words, aside from increasing the minimum age of criminal
responsibility, R.A. No. 9344 also provides for alternative measures to
address the criminal tendencies of a minor. The law endeavors that a
minor should be given several opportunities to mend his or her ways
without resorting to detention and incarceration. A judgment for
CRIM REV
conviction shall only be executed if all the alternative measures prove
to be ineffective. Indeed, the emphatic policies of R.A. No. 9344
emulate the right of every child alleged, accused of, adjudged, or
recognized, as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a
manner consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity
and worth, taking into account the child's age and desirability of
promoting his or her reintegration.18chanrobleslaw
The Prosecution did not
determine the discernment
of Dorado at the time of
the commission of the crime
To recapitulate, R.A. No. 9344 provides that only those minors above
fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age who acted
with discernment shall not be exempted from criminal responsibility.
During the deliberations for Senate Bill No. 1402, the following
discussions transpired:
Senator Pangilinan: xxx there is no criminal responsibility below 18
and above 15, provided that it can be shown that the individual did
not act with discernment.
The President: Can we have it again?
Senator Pimentel: Yes, Mr. President.
The President: Beyond 15 up to below...
Senator Pangilinan: Up to below 18, yes, Mr. President.
The President: Is there an exemption from criminal liability?
Senator Pangilinan: Provided that the individual did not act with
discernment, Mr. President.
The President: So we are actually raising the age to 18?
Senator Pangilinan: Yes, Mr. President. However, if he is above 15
and below 18 and he committed a criminal offense and it is shown
that he acted with discernment, then he is criminally liable.
The President: So that there is no presumption that if he
committed a crime when he is 15 and above, that he has acted
with discernment.
Senator Pangilinan: There is no presumption, Mr. President. It has to
be shown that discernment was in fact]..
Senator Pimentel: Which means, Mr. President, in actual law practice,
that the prosecutor is under obligation to establish by competent
evidence that this accused who is above 15 but below 18 acted with
discernment as a separate circumstance.
Senator Pangilinan: That is correct.
The President: All right.19 [Emphases supplied]
Based on the above-cited discussion, when a minor above fifteen (15)
but below eighteen (18) years old is charged with a crime, it cannot
be presumed that he or she acted with discernment. During the trial,
the prosecution must specifically prove as a separate circumstance
that the CICL committed the alleged crime with discernment.
Notably, R.A. Np. 9344 was enacted while Dorado's trial was pending
before the RTC. Consequently, Resolution No. 03-2006, dated July 11,
2006, of the Juvenile Justice Welfare Council (JJWC)20 must apply in
the present case. It established the guidelines for the implementation
of the transitory provisions of R.A. No. 9344 and it stated that one of
the duties of the prosecution during the trial regarding the CICL was
as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
4. For above 15 but below 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense, with pending case but
released on bail or on recognizance or under detention
1st Set Fulltext Page 44 of 74
 �� Trial may proceed for the prosecution to prove
discernment.
JJWC Resolution No. 03-2006 is in accordance with Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9344 because only those minors above fifteen (15) but below
eighteen (18) years old who acted with discernment may be
subjected to criminal prosecution. Hence, in the present case, the
Court must decide whether the prosecution made a determination of
discernment on the part of Dorado during the trial.
"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from
criminal liability of a minor x x x who commits an act prohibited by
law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right
and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances accorded by the records in each case, the very
appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of
said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but
also after and even during the trial."21chanrobleslaw
"The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete
absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an
essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence
is the power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to
distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is
the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong."22 As earlier stated, the "prosecution is burdened to prove that
the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical
appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The
surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew
what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes
the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's cunning and
shrewdness."23 In an earlier case, it was written:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is
burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or
circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning
that he knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such
circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his
overt acts before, during and after the commission of the crime
relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the commission of
the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence
or his hiding the corpus delicti.24
After a judicious study of the records, the Court finds that the
prosecution did not make an effort to prove that Dorado, then a
sixteen (16)-year old minor, acted with discernment at the time of
the commission of the crime. The RTC decision simply stated that a
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of Dorado must
be appreciated as it was proven that he was a minor at the time of
the incident. Glaringly, there was no discussion at all on whether
Dorado acted with discernment when he committed the crime
imputed against him.
Discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado intended to do away
with Ronald. Discernment is different from intent. The distinction was
elaborated in Guevarra v. Almodovar.25cralawred Thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a
corollary controversy with respect to the first issue raised is evident,
that is, whether the term "discernment," as used in Article 12(3) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the
position of the petitioner that "discernment" connotes "intent" (p. 96,
Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People vs. Nieto, G.R. No.
11965, 30 April 1958. In that case We held that the allegation of
"with intent to kill..." amply meets the requirement that discernment
should be alleged when the accused is a minor between 9 and 15
years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in
the information that the accused acted with discernment and willfully
CRIM REV
unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a reckless
and imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is an inherent
contradiction tantamount to failure of the information to allege a
cause of action or constitute a legal excuse or exception."
(Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)
If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of
9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasi-offense under Article 265 of
the,RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and
intent are two different concepts. We agree with the Solicitor
General's view; the two terms should not be confused.
The word "intent" has been defined as:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim the
purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such
intent; . . .; the design resolve, or determination with which a person
acts." (46 CJS Intent, p. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means
of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being the other two.
On the other hand, We have defined the term "discernment," as used
in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68
Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from
criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine,
who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong ..." (italics Ours)
p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and
"discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are products
of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the
desire of one's act while the latter relate to the moral significance that
person ascribes to the said act. Hence, a person may not intend to
shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent
act which may cause injury to the same person in .negligently
handling an air rifle. It is not correct, therefore, to argue, as
petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below
fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done.
He may negligently shoot his friend, thus, did not intend to shoot him,
and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his
negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and
"discernment," it is worthy to note the basic reason behind the
enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of
the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or
intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In
expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert has
stated:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power,
necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a
licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant
(has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability. 26"
(Emphasis Ours)
Considering that there was no determination of discernment by the
trial court, the Court cannot rule with certainty that Dorado was
criminally responsible. As earlier stated, there can be no presumption
of discernment on the part of the CICL. In the absence of such
determination, it should be presumed that the CICL acted without
discernment. This is in accordance with Section 3 of R.A. No. 9344, to
wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 3. Liberal Construction of this Act. � In case of doubt, the
interpretation of any of the provisions of this Act, including its
implementing rules and regulations (IRRs), shall be construed
liberally in favor of the child in conflict with the law.
1st Set Fulltext Page 45 of 74

Accordingly, Dorado is deemed exempted from criminal liability.
Nevertheless, he is not excused from the civil liability that arose from
the act.27 Thus, the Court is tasked to determine the crime committed
and the civil liability that results from it.
Only Frustrated Homicide
was committed as Evident
Premeditation was not
duly proven
The crime of murder is committed when there is an unlawful killing of
any person, which is not parricide or infanticide, and any of the
qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the RPC exists. On the
other hand, a felony is in its frustrated stage when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as
a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason
of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.28chanrobleslaw
The prosecution witnesses positively identified Dorado as the person
who shot Ronald between the eyes with a sumpak. The crime was not
consummated as Ronald survived because of the medical assistance
provided to him after he was immediately brought to the hospital by
his friends. Dr. Artes testified that without the timely medical
intervention, the shooting of Ronald could have led to his death.
Accordingly, the CA and the RTC properly ruled that the crime
committed was at its frustrated stage.
The Court is of the view, however, that the prosecution was unable to
establish the element of evident premeditation to qualify the crime to
frustrated murder. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the
following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time
when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and
(3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution
to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.29 For this
aggravating circumstance to be considered, it is indispensable to
show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time
had elapsed before it was carried out.30chanrobleslaw
In this case, evident premeditation was not established because, first,
the prosecution evidence only referred to the matters that happened
during the incident, and not to the preparations undertaken by
Dorado beforehand to kill Ronald. There was no evidence on record
which would indicate how and when Dorado hatched his plan to kill
Ronald. The mere fact that Dorado was seen with a sumpak at the
beginning of the . altercation does not unequivocally establish that he
earlier devised a deliberate plot to murder Ronald. In order to be
considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not
merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident
premeditation."31chanrobleslaw
Second, the prosecution failed to show a sufficient lapse of time
between such determination and execution to allow Dorado to reflect
upon the circumstances of his act. Raniel simply testified that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: Jerwin Dorado only? Did he had (sic) companions?
A: Also Jeffrey Confessor, Jayson Cabiaso, and I don't know the other
who came, ma'am.
Q: Can you estimate how many they were?
A: About seven (7) up, ma'am.
Q: When they came, what did you do?
A: We ran because they were armed with sumpak ma'am.
Q: Who was armed with a sumpak?
A: Jerwin Dorado, (witness pointing to accused Jerwin Dorado)
Q: You said you ran, what did you do after you ran?
A: We hid, ma'am.
Q: Where did you hide?
A: We hide (sic) at the back of the talipapa, ma'am.
Q: After you hid, what happened?
CRIM REV
A: When we came out, stones were hurled to us and they fired
the sumpak to Ronald.32 [Emphasis supplied]
As can be gleaned above, the prosecution witness did not testify on
how long they hid at the back of the talipapa or how long Dorado's
group waited for them to come out. As the lapse of time between the
determination until the execution of the unlawful deed was unclear, it
cannot be established that Dorado had sufficient time to reflect on his
actions.
Lastly, Dorado did not have a cool thought and reflection when he
shot Ronald. The RTC observed that there was an ongoing feud
between Dorado's group and Ronald's group.33 Certainly, Dorado
would not have a calm and reflective mind - from the time Ronald's
group hid inside the talipapa market until they moved out of hiding -
as he was obscured by the heat or anger of the moment. The essence
of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry
out the criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a
calm judgment.34chanrobleslaw
The OSG itself, in its Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee (With
recommendation for reduction of penalty)35 filed before the CA,
submitted that "the shooting of Ronald was not attended by evident
premeditation.36 For said reason, the crime committed was only
frustrated homicide.
Civil Liabilities
Pursuant to the recent case of People v. Jugueta,37 the crime of
frustrated homicide entails the following awards of damages:
P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral damages. In
addition, the damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of
6% per annum from date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The judgment of conviction
of Jerwin Dorado is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE by reason of
the exempting circumstance of minority. He is hereby referred to the
local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the
appropriate intervention program.
He is also ordered to pay the private complainant, Ronald B onion,
civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 and moral damages in
the amount of P30,000.00.,
The amounts of damages awarded shall have an interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the two houses of Congress
for their information and guidance in future legislation regarding
children in conflict with the laws.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 197925, November 09, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDWIN
DALAWIS Y HIDALGO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is theDecision1 dated January 28, 2011
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02438 affirming,
with modification, the Decision2 dated May 23, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTQ, Branch 84, Batangas City, in Criminal Case No.
13739, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In an Information filed with the RTC, Branch 84, of Batangas City,
appellant Edwin Dalawis y Hidalgo was charged with Violation of
Article II of RA No. 9165, the accusatory portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1st Set Fulltext Page 46 of 74
That on or about November 1, 2004, at around 5:10 o'clock in the
afternoon at Brgy. Sta. Clara, Batangas City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell, dispense, or deliver 0.14 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, which is
a clear violation of the above-cited law.
That the accused has been previously convicted by final judgment
under the following, to wit:
Case Offense Court Date of
No. Conviction
5061 Viol, of Sec. 8 Art. II, RA RTC-8 March 3, 1992
6425
10477 Viol, of Sec. 15 Art. II, RA RTC-8 June 19, 2000
6425
CONTRARY TO LAW.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.4
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the witnesses of the
prosecution, are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon of November 1, 2004, an asset of
PO2 Christian Boy Garcia Aranza arrived at the police station with
information that shabu could be purchased from a certain Edwin
Dalawis of Barangay (Brgy.) Sta. Clara, Batangas City. Acting on said
information, Aranza, together with SPO4 Delfm Alea, PO3 Nestor
Dimaano, PO3 Jayn Gonda, PO2 Villas, PO2 De Chavez and PO2
Lindbergh Yap, formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. Upon
the orders of Alea, Aranza marked a P500 bill with his initials "CGA"
to be used as the marked money for the operation. They then
proceeded to Brgy. Sta. Clara, Batangas City, with Aranza, Alea,
Dimaano, De Chavez, Yap and the asset, aboard a tinted van, while
Villas and Gonda were on motorcycles. Their departure was recorded
in the police blotter.5
At Brgy. Sta. Clara, Aranza frisked the asset to ensure that he did not
have anything illegal in his possession, gave him the marked money,
and told him to walk towards the place where he would meet the
appellant, a Shell Gasoline Station. The policemen followed the asset
thereto, and watched from the opposite portion of the station in the
tinted van. Aside from appellant who was already thereat, they also
saw the notorious drug pusher named Robert Lagmay operating
under the alias "Tagpi" coming out from Villa Anita. Thereafter, at a
distance of more or less seven (7) meters, the policemen saw the
asset hand the marked money to appellant who, in turn, handed a
small transparent plastic sachet they suspected to contain shabu.
Their asset, then, signalled to the policemen the consummation of the
transaction by scratching his head. Upon seeing the signal, they
immediately alighted from the van to apprehend the appellant. PO2
Aranza confiscated the marked money from appellant's right hand,
while his asset turned over to him the plastic sachet. At the same
time, PO2 De Chavez was also able to confiscate a sachet filled with
what they suspected was shabu from the notorious drug pusher,
Lagmay.6
The policemen then informed appellant and Lagmay of their
constitutional rights and brought them to the barangay hall of Sta.
Clara where their arrest was recorded in the barangay blotter. From
there, they proceeded to the police station where appellant and
Lagmay, together with the marked money and confiscated plastic
sachet, were presented to the desk officer, SPO1 Martin Calingasan.
SPO1 Calingasan recorded the buy-bust operation in the police blotter,
prepared the complaint sheet, and turned over the suspects and
seized items to the duty investigator, PO2 Santiago Matibag, Jr. In
the latter's presence, PO2 Aranza marked the plastic sachet with his
CRIM REV
initials and the date of confiscation, executed his sworn statement,
and signed the arrest report. PO2 Matibag then prepared the request
for laboratory examination of the seized items and brought the same
to the crime laboratory, where PO1 Malaluan, the duty receiving clerk,
received said items and turned them over to Senior Inspector Jupri C.
Delantar, who conducted the laboratory examination. The findings on
the seized items tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride,
otherwise known as shabu.7
Against the foregoing charges, appellant testified on his own version
of facts, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the afternoon of November 1, 2004, appellant stated that he was
at his house in Villa Anita when he heard a commotion nearby. He
peeped through the door and saw that the commotion was coming
from outside the house of Fe Abag. He then approached the persons
thereat and uttered the words "putang ina niyo, ano gang gulo yan?"
All of a sudden, a man turned his back and poked a gun at him. He
panicked and retreated to his house, realizing that the persons at the
commotion were policemen. He was then called upon by one of them
to go out of his house. He went out and apologized. However, a
policeman cursed at him saying, "putang ina ka, gusto mo pa yatang
harangin ang paghuli namin dito kay Fe."8
The policemen then forcibly took appellant into custody, together with
the other arrested persons, one of whom was the notorious drug
pusher, Robert Lagmay, and brought them first, to the barangay hall,
and then next, to the police headquarters. Inside the intelligence
section, appellant was asked if he had any previous involvement in
illegal drugs, to which he replied in the positive.9 Appellant then
overheard the conversation of the police with Lagmay, wherein they
said that since Lagmay is the son of Sgt. Lagmay and the brother of a
certain Liklik, they would file a lesser charge so as to enable him to
post bail, while they would instead file the case against appellant.
Thereafter, the policemen brought out two (2) plastic sachets
containing a white substance, which appellant claimed he has never
seen before. They asked appellant and Lagmay to point to the plastic
sachet while they took a photograph thereof. Afterwards, appellant
and Lagmay were put in jail. On cross-examination, appellant
admitted that he had been twice convicted of offenses involving illegal
drugs.10
Appellant's testimony was corroborated by his neighbors, Julius Javier
and Lorna Catipan, who were watching from inside their respective
houses, particularly as to how appellant was forcibly brought out of
his house by the policemen.11
In its Decision dated May 23, 2006, the trial court gave credence to
the testimonies of the police officers as they were given in a direct
and positive manner, replete with details as to the manner in which
the offense was committed. It took note of the fact that the police
were in a clear position to witness the transaction, being merely
seven (7) meters away, and also found that the custody and chain of
delivery up to the Police Crime Laboratory were duly established. On
the contrary, the RTC was not impressed with appellant's defense
that he was forcibly abducted from his residence in view of the fact
that the witnesses did not report such a serious offense to the proper
authorities. It, therefore, disposed of the case as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the offense charged he is hereby sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment to be served by him at the National Penitentiary
Muntinlupa City with recommendation of no parole for habitual
delinquency and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00).
The shabu subject matter of this case consisting of one (1) plastic
sachet shall be delivered by Branch Sheriff Rolando D. Quinio to the
PDEA, Quezon City within fifteen (15) days from today.
SO ORDERED.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
Appellant appealed his conviction arguing that: (1) the existence of
the marked money prior to the alleged buy bust was not duly proven
in court as the police officer who recorded the pre-operation events
made no mention of any marking on the buy-bust money; (2) the
1st Set Fulltext Page 47 of 74
prosecution failed to prove the legitimacy of the operation considering
the absence of any document that would prove that there was indeed
a report by the confidential informant of the police officers; (3) the
trial court erroneously failed to appreciate his defense that based on
the conversation he heard between the police and Lagmay, he was
merely being set up considering that a certain Fe Abag, who was
originally the target of the arrest, was actually detained for a drug-
related crime and that Lagmay was allowed to post bail; (4) there are
infirmities in the pre and post operation reports; (5) there is no
evidence which shows that the buy-bust operation was exercised in
coordination with the PDEA or the barangay authorities; (6) the police
officers failed to physically inventory the seized items in the presence
of the accused; (7) there was no proper identification of the specimen
actually examined; (8) the chain of custody of the seized items was
not established; (9) he could not be adjudged as a habitual
delinquent because he was charged not of any of the crimes
enumerated by law for which one could be considered as such, but of
violation of the drugs law.13
On January 28, 2011, the appellate court sustained the appellant's
conviction with a correction as to the trial court's recommendation of
no parole for its finding of habitual delinquency. It found too trivial
appellant's imputation as to the failure of the policemen to record in
the pre-operation report the markings on the P500 bill, citing the
ruling in People v. Conception, et al.14 that the recording of the buy-
bust money in the police blotter is immaterial to the prosecution of
illegal drugs. Neither is it required that the confidential informant put
his tip down in writing. The CA ruled that what is material in the
prosecution of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs is proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in the court of the corpus delicti of the crime.15
Great weight was likewise accorded to the trial court's factual finding
that the testimonies given by the police officers were unequivocal,
detailed, and straightforward, prevailing over appellant's mere
allegation of frame-up and forcible abduction. The appellate court
cites the oft-repeated rule that unless there appears on record some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which the trial court has
overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted, it shall not interfere
with the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.16 As to the
conduct of a buy-bust operation, moreover, People v. Ahmad17 ruled
that police officers are assumed to have the expertise to determine
which specific approaches are necessary to enforce their entrapment
operation.
Furthermore, contrary to appellant's asseverations, the CA was
content as to how the identity of the seized drugs and the chain of
custody of the same were established. There was direct testimonial
evidence of the identity of the drugs as shown by the markings on its
container and of the fact that the seizing officers turned over the
items to the duty investigator who then delivered them personally to
the laboratory. Thus, the appellate court, citing People v. Naquita,18
ruled that the failure, by itself, of the police officers to strictly observe
all the requirements laid down in the drugs law, particularly Section
21 of RA No. 9165, will not invalidate the arrest of the accused and
seizure of illegal drugs in the course thereof, for as long as there is
showing that the integrity and evidentiary value of the same has been
preserved.
As to the trial court's finding of the appellant's habitual delinquency
which therefore bars him from any future parole, however, the
appellate court found the same to be without any legal basis. This is
due to the fact that the crime for which appellant has prior
convictions is not that of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo,
hurto, estafa or falsification as provided by Article 62 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).
Aggrieved, appellant now seeks his acquittal before the Court,
adopting the arguments he invoked in his appellant's brief filed before
the appellate court.19
The appeal is unmeritorious.
As previously alleged in his Appellant's Brief, appellant calls for his
acquittal, insisting on several irregularities in the buy-bust operation
conducted by the police officers who apprehended him. Particularly,
appellant notes the absence of evidence which shows that the buy-
bust operation was exercised in coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) or the barangay authorities, and the
CRIM REV
failure of the police officers to properly identify and to physically
conduct an inventory of the seized items in his presence, as
mandated by Section 21, Paragraph 1, Article II of RA No. 9165 which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA
shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof[.]cralawlawlibrary
It bears stressing however, that failure to strictly comply with the
foregoing procedure will not render an arrest illegal or the seized
items inadmissible in evidence20 in view of the qualification permitted
by Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
RA No. 9165, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control
of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items[.]21cralawlawlibrary
Thus, it has been held that for as long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved pursuant to the
chain of custody rule, non-compliance with Section 21 of RA No. 9165
does not automatically render illegal the arrest of an accused or
inadmissible the items seized.22 The rule on chain of custody
expressly demands the identification of the persons who handle the
confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized
movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the
time they are seized from the accused until the time they are
presented in court. Moreover, as a method of authenticating evidence,
the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item
was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and
the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same.23
In the instant case, appellant simply stated that "the chain of custody
of the alleged shabu is highly questionable" without presenting any
evidence which would substantiate his allegation. Yet, on the contrary,
the records of the case reveal that the police officers were able to
maintain the integrity of the seized plastic sachet and that the links in
its chain of custody were sufficiently established. The police officers,
1st Set Fulltext Page 48 of 74
who were merely at a distance of seven (7) meters away,
convincingly testified that they personally saw their asset hand the
marked money to appellant who, in turn, handed the plastic sachet
containing the white crystalline substance. Immediately thereafter,
they alighted from the van and moved towards appellant. PO2 Aranza
himself confiscated the marked money from appellant's right hand,
who was duly informed of his constitutional rights before he was
brought to the barangay hall, and then to the police station. There,
the confiscated sachet was presented to PO1 Calingasan who
recorded the operation in the police blotter and then turned over the
seized item to PO2 Matibag, the duty investigator. In the latter's
presence, PO2 Aranza marked the plastic sachet with his initials.
Thereafter, PO2 Matibag brought the same to the crime laboratory
where PO1 Malaluan, the duty receiving clerk, received said items and
turned them over to Senior Inspector Jupri C. Dilantar, who
conducted the laboratory examination. Based on said examination,
Senior Inspector Dilantar found that the plastic sachet seized from
appellant contains methamphetamine hydrochloride, which finding he
reduced into writing in Chemistry Report No. BD-143-04. Thus,
contrary to appellant's bare allegation, there is no showing that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item had been
compromised in any way.
Apart from the foregoing allegations, appellant proceeded to impute
additional lapses in the buy-bust operation. According to him, the
existence of the marked money prior to the alleged buy bust was not
duly proven in court as the police officer who recorded the pre-
operation events made no mention of any marking on the buy-bust
money. Moreover, appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to
prove the legitimacy of the operation considering the absence of any
document that would prove that there was indeed a report by the
confidential informant of the police officers. Yet, nowhere in his
appellant's brief did he provide any basis, jurisprudential or otherwise,
to support his conclusions that these alleged lapses are fatal to his
prosecution. In fact, as aptly ruled by the CA, the recording of
marked money used in a buy-bust operation is not one of the
elements for the prosecution of sale of illegal drugs. Neither is it
required that the confidential informant put his tip down in writing.
For as long as the sale of the prohibited drug is adequately proven,
the recording or non-recording thereof in an official record will not
necessarily lead to an acquittal.24
It must be emphasized, at this point, that for a successful prosecution
of offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs
under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, all of the following
elements must be satisfied: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. Succinctly stated, the
delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the
marked money by the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the
transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti, as evidence.25cralawred
In the instant case, the Court finds that the foregoing requisites were
sufficiently met. As aptly found by the courts below, evidence for the
prosecution adequately established beyond reasonable doubt the
identity of the seller and buyer as well as the exchange of the plastic
sachet of shabu and the marked money. There was direct proof that
the sale of shabu actually transpired, the chain of custody having
been duly preserved, establishing the corpus delicti in court. This
Court, therefore, finds no compelling reason to diverge from the trial
court's findings, especially since such were affirmed by the appellate
court.
It is a well-entrenched rule that the findings of facts of the trial court,
as affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court,
absent any evidence that both courts ignored, misconstrued, or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if
considered, would warrant a modification or reversal of the outcome
of the case.26 Since prosecutions involving illegal drugs largely
depend on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the
buy-bust operation, reliance may be made on the findings of fact of
the trial court, which is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.27 Thus, in view
of the clear and straightforward evidence of the prosecution vis-a-vis
appellant's unsubstantiated defenses, this Court shall accord a high
degree of respect to the factual findings of the courts below.
CRIM REV
As to the trial court's finding of habitual delinquency, the Court is in
agreement with appellant, the CA, as well as the prosecution that the
trial court erred in withholding the benefit of parole from appellant on
the ground of habitual delinquency in spite of the express mandate of
Article 62 of the RPC, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and of habitual delinquency. � Mitigating or
aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken
into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty
in conformity with the following rules:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following
effects:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty
and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods;
(b)� Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to
the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced
to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty
and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two
penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith,
shall in no case exceed 30 years.
For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be
habitual delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the
date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or
less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or
falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third
time or oftener.28cralawlawlibrary
It is clear, therefore, that habitual delinquency is considered only with
respect to the crimes specified in the aforequoted Article. In the
instant case, appellant was charged with violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Law, the same crime adjudged in his two (2) prior convictions,
and not of crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo,
hurto, estafa or falsification, as required by the RPC. Hence, the law
on habitual delinquency is simply inapplicable to appellant.29
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED.
The Decision dated January 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 02438 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 204891, September 14, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. REYNALDO ABAYON
Y APONTE, Appellant.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal of accused-appellant Reynaldo Abayon y
Aponte (Abayon) assailing the July 20, 2012 decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03195. The CA
decision affirmed the July 31, 2007 decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 275, Las Pi�as City, and ordered him to pay
death indemnity to the heirs of Lourdes Chokilo, Aiza Delos Angeles,
and Zenaida Velos.
THE CASE
1st Set Fulltext Page 49 of 74

In an information dated July 29, 2002,3 Abayon was formally charged
as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"That on or about the 26th day of July 2002, in the City of Las Pi�as,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to cause damage to property, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and deliberately
burn or set fire to the house and/or dwelling of ROBERTO IGNACIO Y
ANTONIO and TEODORO DELOS ANGELES Y GOIS causing it to be
burned and turned into ashes and as a result of said fire, victims
Lourdes Chokilo, Zenaida Velos and Aiza Delos Angeles who were
then sleeping inside the said house were also burned to death.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Abayon entered a plea of not guilty when he was arraigned on August
20, 2002.
Trial on the merits followed the pre-trial where Abayon entered into
stipulations regarding specified documentary evidence presented by
the prosecution.
The evidence for the prosecution showed that in the evening of July
25, 2002, Abayon and his wife, Arlene, quarreled outside their
residence. Since they rented an apartment adjacent to others, their
neighbors witnessed the entire incident. When Arlene shouted for help
because Abayon was strangling her, Corazon Requitillo (Corazon) and
her husband pacified them. Thereafter, Corazon took Arlene's two (2)
children and offered them the safety of her apartment as Abayon was
still drunk.
At around 11:00 P.M. of the same day, Abayon's neighbors heard a
hissing sound and smelled leaking gas. When they came out of their
houses to check, they saw Abayon holding an LPG gas tank outside
his apartment. Robert Ignacio Antonio (Robert), one of his neighbors
and his best friend, approached Abayon to ask what he was doing. He
heard Abayon say, "Putang ina, wala pala ako silbi! Inutil pala ako!"4
He also noticed that Abayon was holding an unlit cigarette inserted
between his left index and middle fingers, that a match was on his
left palm, and that his right hand was turning on and off the gas tank.
When he figured out what Abayon was trying to do, Robert scolded
him and said, "Putang ina mo, Boy! Magsusunog ka, idadamay mo pa
kami!"5 After that, he turned off the regulator of the gas tank and
brought it to Corazon's house for safekeeping.
At past midnight of July 26, 2002, the house (containing the units
where Abayon and his neighbors live) started to catch fire. The
neighbors came out of their respective units because of the thick
smoke and the heat coming from the fire. As a result, the house was
completely burned down along with the personal effects of the
residents. Three (3) persons also died because of the fire,-namely:
Lourdes Chokilo, the owner of the house; Aiza Delos Angeles; and
Zenaida Velos.
Expectedly, Abayon denied that he had caused the fire and raised the
defense of alibi. He admitted that he had an altercation with his wife
and that he had left after he was pacified by his neighbors. When he
came back, Abayon realized that his wife and children were not at
home, so he decided to look for them at his sister-in-law's place at
Trece. Before he left, he brought inside his apartment the LPG tank
and the kitchen stove that had been placed outside. When Abayon
saw Robert, he asked him to look after his house while he searched
for his family.
Abayon allegedly left for Trece at around 9 p.m. only to find out when
he got there that his family was not there. He then proceeded to his
sister's house in Makati at around 4 a.m. Again, he did not find his
family there. He opted to stay at his sister's place until 8:00 p.m. of
July 26, 2002. He was arrested later when he showed up at his
residence.
In its July 31, 2007 decision, the RTC found Abayon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of arson resulting in multiple homicide,
defined and punished under Sec. 1, in relation to Sec. 5 of P.D. No.
1613, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The trial court held that the
prosecution successfully established the elements of the crime
charged through circumstantial evidence. It gave no credence to
Abayon's denial because his neighbors � especially his best friend �
CRIM REV
positively identified him as the person who had earlier attempted to
burn his place down using an LPG gas tank; the fire broke out later
and razed the rooms they were renting.
On appeal, Abayon assailed the RTC decision on the ground that there
was no direct evidence showing that he had started the fire that
burned down the house.
In its July 20, 2012 decision, the CA upheld Abayon's conviction
based on the RTC's appreciation of the circumstances proven by the
prosecution. The CA held that the proven circumstantial evidence
sufficiently pointed to Abayon as the perpetrator of the crime charged.
The CA included an award of death indemnity worth P50,000.00 each
in favor of the heirs of the three (3) victims.
Abayon filed the present appeal to challenge the CA decision.
OUR RULING
We affirm the conviction of Abayon and order him to pay civil
damages on top of the death indemnity.
There is no complex crime of arson with (multiple) homicide.
In People v. Malngan,6 we held that there is no complex crime of
arson with homicide because the crime of arson absorbs the resultant
death or is a separate crime altogether, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryAccordingly, in cases where both burning
and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were
perpetrated - whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder,
it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a)
if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but
death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is
simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the
other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may
be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to
accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c)
if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the
offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to
cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes
committed � homicide/murder and arson.
From the body of the information filed, Abayon is charged with the
crime of arson because his intent was merely to destroy his family's
apartment through the use of fire. The resulting deaths that occurred,
therefore, should be absorbed by the crime of arson and only
increases the imposable penalty to reclusion perpetua to death,
pursuant to Section 5 of P.D. No. 1613.
The prosecution established the elements of the crime of
simple arson through circumstantial evidence.
Simple arson, defined and punished under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1613,
is essentially the destruction of property by fire that is not under the
circumstances enumerated under Article 320 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. In prosecuting arson, whether
destructive or simple, the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by
proof that a fire occurred, and that it was intentionally
caused.7chanrobleslaw
We point out that no one among the prosecution's witnesses actually
saw Abayon start the fire. The lower courts had to resort to
circumstantial evidence since there was no direct evidence proving his
guilt.
It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to sustain a conviction provided that: "(a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of
all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.
Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be interwoven in a way that
would leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused."8chanrobleslaw
In the present case, the RTC enumerated the following circumstances
1st Set Fulltext Page 50 of 74
leading to the unavoidable conclusion that Abayon set the fire that
engulfed not only his apartment but his neighbors' as
well:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. The quarrel of the accused with his wife who must have hurt
the accused when she told him that he was good-for-
nothing "walang silbi, inutil;" and shouting at him to leave
the house (lumayas ka);
2. His having muttered audibly, "walang silbi pala ako, inutil
pala," indicative of his having harbored intense hatred for
his wife against whom he evidently wanted to get back at by
burning the house;
3. While holding a match, and having opened the gas tank,
such that leaking gas smelled strongly, indicating that
plenty of it leaked out when he opened the gas tank;
4. His having been berated by his neighbor and best friend
about his intention to burn the house and his fear that his
house, too, will be burned;
5. The failure of the accused's sister to corroborate his defense
of alibi;
6. The fact that his best friend, Robert Ignacio, not only did not
corroborate his claim that he entrusted his house to Ignacio,
but also and most importantly the testimonial of his best
friend that he opened the gas tank while muttering the
words already mentioned, and while holding a match and
unlighted cigarette.9
The CA, for its part, enumerated the following circumstances pointing
to Abayon's guilt, as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. On July 25, 2002, at about 9:00 in the evening,
neighbors/witnesses heard accused Reynaldo Abayon y
Aponte and his wife Arlene by the road of Block 5, Lot 4,
Champaca Street, Paramount Village, Las Pi�as, having a
heated argument with the latter shouting at the accused:
"Putang ina mo! Walang silbi! Inutil ka! Lumayas ka dito."
2. Neighbors Corazon Requyitillo and her husband Eduardo
came to the aid of the distressed Arlene when she yelled
"saklolo!", as the accused began to strangle her.
3. Thereafter, at around 11:00 in the evening, next room-
neighbor Roberto Ignacio y Antonio and his wife Helen heard
a hissing sound and� sensed a robust� stench of leaking�
gas� indicating that an abundance of such had indeed
seeped out.
4. Roberto Ignacio then proceeded to the place of the accused
and saw the latter holding an unlit cigarette and a match at
his left hand while twisting on and off the valve of the gas
tank with his right and slurring the words: "Putang ina, wala
pala akong silbi! Inutil pala ako!" Seeing this, Roberto
scolded the latter and took the gas tank away.
5. A few moments later, at about twelve o'clock midnight of
the same night, a fire broke out. Said fire began at the room
occupied by the accused Reynaldo Abayon. The fire engulfed
the whole house, killing Lourdes Chokilo, Zenaida Veluz and
Aiza delos Angeles.
6. During the trial, accused put up an alibi. However, he failed
to produce any witnesses to corroborate his defense
notwithstanding the fact that said witness were supposed to
be with his own sister and sister-in-law. To make matters
worse, his "supposed best friend", Roberto Ignacio, testified
against him.
���������
x x x x10
We note that these circumstances all point out to the incidents from
around 9:00 p.m. (when the quarrel between Abayon and his wife
started) until 11 p.m. (the time when Abayon's alleged attempt to
burn the houses was thwarted). The courts a quo did not mention any
circumstance that clearly links Abayon to the fire that broke out at
CRIM REV
past midnight.
The records, however, also revealed that Abayon bought a match
from Edmund Felipe at around 12:15 a.m. When Edmund
asked what the match was for, Abayon uttered, "Wala, may
susunugin lang ako."11chanrobleslaw
To our mind, Edmund's statement clinches the case against Abayon
insofar as establishing his clear link to the fire that broke out at past
12 a.m.; it also makes all the more significant the pieces of
circumstantial evidence enumerated by both the RTC and the CA
especially in proving the motive for the crime, i.e., what led Abayon
to burn his and his neighbors' houses. The combination of all these
circumstances, vis-a-vis the statement of Edmund, leads to no other
conclusion than that Abayon deliberately started the fire that resulted
in the death of three (3) innocent victims. There could be no doubt on
this conclusion: Abayon had the motive (i.e., he was
characterized as a 'good-for-nothing husband' by his wife
during a violent quarrel); he had made a previous attempt to
start a fire (by turning on and off the gas tank's regulator,
while holding an unlighted cigarette and match); and he
bought a match at past midnight, stating to the vendor that he
will use it to burn something.
Denial cannot prevail over positive and categorical
identification of the accused.
On the credibility of witnesses, we note the well-settled rule that the
trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses.
In the absence of any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which would appear to have been overlooked and, if
considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings
and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court
remain binding on an appellate tribunal.12chanrobleslaw
In People v. Gallarde,13 we distinguished the two types of positive
identification of a perpetrator of a crime and discussed their legal
importance, thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not
per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of
the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A
witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as
the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act
of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct
evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a
witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission
of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect
or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when
the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with
the victim immediately before and right after the commission
of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification,
which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when
taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken chain, leads to the only fair and reasonable
conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the
crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are
the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or
accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be
convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and
elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an
accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely
absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of
a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to� circumstantial
evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the
accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would
go free and the community would be denied proper protection.
[Emphasis supplied]
Without any showing of ill motive on the part of his neighbors
(especially Robert, who is his best friend) to falsely testify against
Abayon, their categorical and positive identification should prevail
over alibi and denial. Corazon testified that he was a neighbor of
Abayon and that she saw him fighting with his wife before seeing him
outside her house holding an LPG tank. Robert, who was able to
retrieve the LPG tank from Abayon, actually tried to talk him out of
what he was doing. Two (2) other witnesses for the prosecution, who
were likewise his neighbors, corroborated what Corazon and Robert
1st Set Fulltext Page 51 of 74
narrated.
As the RTC and the CA did, we view Abayon's denial to be self-serving
and undeserving of any credence in view of the testimonies of the
eyewitnesses' categorical, positive, and forthright identification of him
the night the burning incident happened.
The proper penalty and the awarded indemnities
The penalty for arson resulting to death under Section 5 of P.D. No.
1613 is reclusion perpetua to death. Since there was no aggravating
circumstance alleged in the information, the CA correctly sentenced
Abayon to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua only.
We also point out that the CA awarded P50,000.00 death indemnity in
favor of the heirs of the three (3) victims. We increase this award to
P75,000.00 pursuant to People v. Jugueta;14 we also direct Abayon to
further pay the victim's heirs P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P75,0000.00 as exemplary damages.15chanrobleslaw
The records show rough estimates of the properties the families lost
during the fire.16 In the absence of a showing that these estimated
amounts had been actually expended in a manner capable of
substantiation by any document or receipt, the valuation remains a
mere estimate, and could not be the measure of an award for actual
damages.17 The failure to present competent proof of actual damages
should not deprive Abayon's neighbors of some degree of indemnity
for the substantial economic damage and prejudice they had
suffered.18chanrobleslaw
According to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages,
which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages,
may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty. For this purpose, the determination of the
temperate damages rests in the sound discretion of the
courts.19chanrobleslaw
Thus, we find it proper to award temperate damages to the Chokilo
family in the amount of P100,000.00; to the Ignacio family in the
amount of P50,000.00; and to the Balbas family in the amount of
P50,000.00.
In addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages,
and temperate damages payable by the appellant are subject to
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
this decision until fully paid
WHEREFORE, the July 20, 2012 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03195 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) the awarded civil indemnity is
INCREASED from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00;
(b) Reynaldo Abayon is directed to FURTHER PAY each of the
victims' heirs the amounts of P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(c) he is also DIRECTED to PAY temperate damages in the amounts
of P100,000.00 to the Chokilo Family; P50,000.00 to the Ignacio
Family; and P50,000.00 to the Balbas Family; and cralawlawlibrary
(d) Reynaldo Abayon is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision
until fully paid,
SO ORDERED.c
SECOND DIVISION
January 11, 2016
G.R. No. 209387
ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
CRIM REV
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although
done without search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se.
Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally
understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety
of the traveling public.
For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the
Decision2 dated September 28, 2012 and the Resolution3 dated
August 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City.4 The Court of
Appeals affirmed5 the trial court’s Judgment6 finding petitioner Erwin
Libo-on Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
possessing unlicensed firearms under Commission on Elections
Resolution No. 77647 in relation to Section 2618 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 8819 during the 2007 election period.10
Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel.11 He
frequently traveled, "coming back and forth taking a vessel."12 At
around 12:00 noon of May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the
Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo.13 While buying a ticket, he
allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter.14 It took him around
15 minutes to purchase a ticket.15
Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed
his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for inspection.16 The operator
of the x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag.17
Cutie Pie Flores (Flores) was the x-ray machine operator-on-duty on
May 11, 2007.18 She saw the impression of what appeared to be
three (3) firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag.19 Upon seeing the
suspected firearms, she called the attention of port personnel Archie
Igot (Igot) who was the baggage inspector then.20
Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the owner of the bag.21 Dela
Cruz answered Igot in the affirmative and consented to Igot’s manual
inspection of the bag.22
"Port Police Officer Adolfo Abregana [(Officer Abregana)] was on duty
at the terminal of the Cebu Domestic Port in Pier 1-G when his
attention was called by . . . Igot."23 Igot told Officer Abregana that
there were firearms in a bag owned by a certain person.24 Igot then
pointed to the person.25 That person was later identified as Dela
Cruz.26
Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of the bag.27 The bag was
then inspected and the following items were found inside: three (3)
revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman’s book; other personal items; and
four (4) live ammunitions placed inside the cylinder.28 When asked
whether he had the proper documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz
answered in the negative.29
Dela Cruz was then arrested and informed of his violation of a crime
punishable by law.30 He was also informed of his constitutional
rights.31
In the Information dated November 19, 2003, Dela Cruz was charged
with violation of Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession of
firearms:32
Criminal Case No. CBU -80084
That on or about the 11th day of May 2007, at about 12:45 p.m. in
the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with the deliberate intent and
without being authorized by law, did then and there possess and
carry outside his residence one (1) Cal. 38 Simith [sic] & Wesson
revolver without serial number; one (1) .22 Smith & Wesson Magnum
revolver without serial number; one (1) North American Black Widow
magnum revolver without serial number and four rounds of live
ammunitions for cal. 38 without first securing the necessary license to
possess and permit to carry from the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.33
Subsequently, another Information was filed charging Dela Cruz with
the violation of Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in
relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881:34
1st Set Fulltext Page 52 of 74
Criminal Case No. CBU 80085
That on or about the 11th day of May 2007, at about 12:45 in the
afternoon, which is within the election period for the May 14, 2007
National and Local Elections, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
deliberate intent, did then and there possess and carry outside his
residence the following:
One (1) cal. .38 Simith [sic] & Wesson revolver without
serial number;
One (1) cal. .22 Smith & Wesson Magnum revolver without
serial number;
One (1) North American Black Widow magnum revolver
without serial number and four (4) rounds of live
ammunitions for cal. 38.
CONTRARY TO LAW.35
Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during
arraignment.36
After trial, Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City found
Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Gun Ban
under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to
Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 in Criminal Case No. CBU
80085.37 Dela Cruz was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1)
year with disqualification from holding public office and the right to
suffrage.38
According to the trial court, the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Dela Cruz committed illegal possession of
firearms.39 It proved the following elements: "(a) the existence of
the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the license or permit to possess the
same."40 The prosecution presented the firearms and live
ammunitions found in Dela Cruz’s possession.41 It also presented
three (3) prosecution witnesses who testified that the firearms were
found inside Dela Cruz’s bag.42 The prosecution also presented a
Certification that Dela Cruz did not file any application for license to
possess a firearm, and he was not given authority to carry a firearm
outside his residence.43
The trial court also held that the search conducted by the port
authorities was reasonable and, thus, valid:44
Given the circumstances obtaining here, the court finds the search
conducted by the port authorities reasonable and, therefore, not
violative of the accused’s constitutional rights. Hence, when the
search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and
ammunitions, accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante
delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and
ammunitions obtained in the course of such valid search are thus
admissible as evidence against [the] accused.45
The trial court did not give credence to Dela Cruz’s claim that the
firearms were "planted" inside his bag by the porter or anyone who
could have accessed his bag while he was buying a ticket.46
According to the trial court, Dela Cruz’s argument was "easy to
fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove."47 Dela Cruz also did not
show improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to
discredit their testimonies.48
The trial court dismissed the case for violation of Republic Act No.
8294.49 It held that "Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested committed
‘no other crime.’"50 Dela Cruz, who had been charged with illegal
possession of firearms, was also charged with violating the Gun Ban
under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764.51
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Consolidated Judgment
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 7764 in relation to
Section 261 of BP Blg. 881 in Criminal Case No. CBU-80085, and
hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment for a period of one
CRIM REV
(1) year, and to suffer disqualification to hold public office and
deprivation of the right to suffrage.
While Criminal Case No. CBU-80084 for Violation of RA 8294 is
hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the cash bond posted by accused
therein for his provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled and
released to said accused.
The subject firearms (Exhs. "H", "I" & "J"), and the live ammunitions
(Exhs. "K to K-2"") shall, however, remain in custodia legis for proper
disposition of the appropriate government agency.
SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the original)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
Judgment.53 It held that the defense failed to show that the
prosecution witnesses were moved by improper motive; thus, their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.54 The acts of
government authorities were found to be regular.55
The Court of Appeals did not find Dela Cruz’s defense of denial
meritorious.56 "Denial as a defense has been viewed upon with
disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be
concocted."57 Dela Cruz did not present any evidence "to show that
he had authority to carry outside of residence firearms and
ammunition during the period of effectivity of the Gun Ban [during]
election time."58 The prosecution was able to prove Dela Cruz’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
The assailed January 27, 2010 Consolidated Judgment of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12 of Cebu City in Criminal Case CBU-
59434 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs on accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.59 (Emphasis in the original)
Dela Cruz filed a Motion for Reconsideration,60 which was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated August 23, 2013.61
Dela Cruz filed this Petition on November 4, 2013.62 In the
Resolution63 dated December 9, 2013, this court required respondent,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, to submit its Comment on
the Petition. Respondent submitted its Comment64 on March 6, 2014,
which this court noted in the Resolution65 dated March 19, 2014.
Dela Cruz claims that he was an on-the-job trainee for an inter-island
vessel.66 He was "well[-]acquainted with [the] inspection scheme [at
the] ports."67 He would not have risked placing prohibited items such
as unlicensed firearms inside his luggage knowing fully the
consequences of such an action.68
According to Dela Cruz, when he arrived at the port on May 11, 2007,
he left his luggage with a porter to buy a ticket.69 "A considerable
time of fifteen minutes went by before he could secure the ticket
while his luggage was left sitting on the floor with only the porter
standing beside it."70 He claims that someone must have placed the
unlicensed firearms inside his bag during the period he was away
from it.71 He was surprised when his attention was called by the x-
ray machine operator after the firearms were detected.72
Considering the circumstances, Dela Cruz argues that there was no
voluntary waiver against warrantless search:73
In petitioner’s case, it may well be said that, with the circumstances
attending the search of his luggage, he had no actual intention to
relinquish his right against warrantless searches. He knew in all
honest belief that when his luggage would pass through the routine x-
ray examination, nothing incriminating would be recovered. It was
out of that innocent confidence that he allowed the examination of his
luggage. . . . [H]e believed that no incriminating evidence
w[ould] be found. He knew he did not place those items. But what
is strikingly unique about his situation is that a considerable time
interval lapsed, creating an opportunity for someone else to place
inside his luggage those incriminating items.74 (Emphasis in the
original)
Respondent argues that there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz’s right
to unreasonable search and seizure, thus warranting his conviction.75
1st Set Fulltext Page 53 of 74
Dela Cruz was "caught in flagrante delicto carrying three (3) revolvers
and four (4) live ammunitions when his bag went through the x-ray
machine in the Cebu Domestic Port on May 11, 2007, well within the
election period."76 The firearms were seized during a routine
baggage x-ray at the port of Cebu, a common seaport security
procedure.77
According to respondent, this case is similar to valid warrantless
searches and seizures conducted by airport personnel pursuant to
routine airport security procedures.78
Records are also clear that Dela Cruz voluntarily waived his right to
unreasonable searches and seizure.79 The trial court found that Dela
Cruz voluntarily gave his consent to the search.80
Dela Cruz’s claim that his bag was switched is also baseless.81 The
witnesses categorically testified that Dela Cruz was "in possession of
the bag before it went through the x-ray machine, and he was also in
possession of the same bag that contained the firearms when he was
apprehended."82
Dela Cruz raised the lone issue of "whether the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in finding [him] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt[.]"83
The issues for resolution in this case are:
First, whether petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz was in possession of
the illegal firearms within the meaning of the Commission on
Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881;
Second, whether petitioner waived his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures; and
Lastly, assuming that there was no waiver, whether there was a valid
search and seizure in this case.
We deny the Petition.
I Section 261(q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 states:
The present criminal case was brought to this court under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The penalty imposed on petitioner by the trial
court is material in determining the mode of appeal to this court. A
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 must be differentiated
from appeals under Rule 124, Section 1384 involving cases where the
lower court imposed on the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
life imprisonment, or, previously, death.85
In Mercado v. People:86
Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable penalty in a
criminal case brought to it on appeal is at least reclusion perpetua,
death or life imprisonment, then it should impose such penalty,
refrain from entering judgment thereon, certify the case and elevate
the entire records to this Court for review. This will obviate the
unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases
between this Court and the Court of Appeals, for by then this Court
will acquire jurisdiction over the case from the very inception and can,
without bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully completed the
exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.
On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty less
than reclusion perpetua, a review of the case may be had only by
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 where only errors or
questions of law may be raised.87 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
It is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of
law are reviewed by this court.88 The rule that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 is based on
sound and practical policy considerations stemming from the differing
natures of a question of law and a question of fact:
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or
when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being
admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference
CRIM REV
arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole,
and the probability of the situation.89
Concomitantly, factual findings of the lower courts as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals are binding on this court.90
In contrast, an appeal in a criminal case "throws the whole case open
for review[.]"91 The underlying principle is that errors in an appealed
judgment, even if not specifically assigned, may be corrected motu
propio by the court if the consideration of these errors is necessary to
arrive at a just resolution of the case.92 Nevertheless, "the right to
appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it being
merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the
manner provided for by law[.]"93
II
Petitioner argues that the firearms found in his bag were not his.
Thus, he could not be liable for possessing the contraband. Key to the
resolution of this case is whether petitioner possessed firearms
without the necessary authorization from the Commission on
Elections. Petitioner was charged under special laws: Republic Act No.
8294 and Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to
Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
The law applicable is Section 2(a) of Commission on Elections
Resolution No. 7764, which provides:
SECTION 2. Prohibitions. During the election period from January 14,
2007 it shall be unlawful for:
a. Any person, including those possessing a permit to carry firearms
outside of residence or place of business, to bear, carry or transport
firearms or other deadly weapons in public places including any
building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance. For the
purpose firearm includes airgun, while deadly weapons include hand
grenades or other explosives, except pyrotechnics[.]
Section 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
....
(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. – Any
person who, although possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries
any firearms outside his residence or place of business during the
election period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission:
Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall not be
considered a residence or place of business or extension hereof. (Par.
(l), Id.)
This prohibition shall not apply to cashiers and disbursing officers
while in the performance of their duties or to persons who by nature
of their official duties, profession, business or occupation habitually
carry large sums of money or valuables.
For a full understanding of the nature of the constitutional rights
involved, we will examine three (3) points of alleged intrusion into the
right to privacy of petitioner: first, when petitioner gave his bag for x-
ray scanning to port authorities; second, when the baggage inspector
opened petitioner’s bag and called the Port Authority Police; and third,
when the police officer opened the bag to search, retrieve, and seize
the firearms and ammunition.
III
The first point of intrusion occurred when petitioner presented his bag
for inspection to port personnel—the x-ray machine operator and
baggage inspector manning the x-ray machine station.94 With regard
to searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is
different from that imposed on state agents or authorized
government authorities.
In People v. Marti,95 the private forwarding and shipping company,
following standard operating procedure, opened packages sent by
accused Andre Marti for shipment to Zurich, Switzerland and detected
1st Set Fulltext Page 54 of 74
a peculiar odor from the packages.96 The representative from the
company found dried marijuana leaves in the packages.97 He
reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation and
brought the samples to the Narcotics Section of the Bureau for
laboratory examination.98 Agents from the National Bureau of
Investigation subsequently took custody of the illegal drugs.99 Andre
Marti was charged with and was found guilty of violating Republic Act
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.100
This court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure.101
The evidence obtained against the accused was not procured by the
state acting through its police officers or authorized government
agencies.102 The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between
individuals; it cannot be invoked against the acts of private
individuals:103
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant
must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention
of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not
the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.104
Hence, by virtue of Marti, items seized pursuant to a reasonable
search conducted by private persons are not covered by the
exclusionary rule.105
To determine whether the intrusion by the port personnel in this case
was committed by private or public persons, we revisit the history
and organizational structure of the Philippine Ports Authority.
Port security measures are consistent with the country’s aim to
develop transportation and trade in conjunction with national and
economic growth. In 1974, the Philippine Ports Authority was created
for the reorganization of port administration and operation
functions.106 The Philippine Ports Authority’s Charter was later
revised through Presidential Decree No. 857. The Revised Charter
provided that the Authority may:
after consultation with relevant Government agencies, make rules or
regulations for the planning, development, construction, maintenance,
control, supervision and management of any Port or Port District and
the services to be provided therein, and for the maintenance of good
order therein, and generally for carrying out the process of this
Decree.107
The Philippine Ports Authority was subsequently given police authority
through Executive Order No. 513,108 which provides:
Sec. 2. Section 6 is hereby amended by adding a new paragraph to
read as follows:
Section 6-c. Police Authority – The Authority shall have such police
authority within the ports administered by it as may be necessary to
carry out its powers and functions and attain its purposes and
objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the
Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area.
Such police authority shall include the following:
a) To provide security to cargoes, port equipment, structure,
facilities, personnel and documents: Provided, however,
That in ports of entry, physical security to import and export
cargoes shall be exercised jointly with the Bureau of
Customs;
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within
the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement
within the port of watercraft;
c) To maintain peace and order inside the port, in
coordination with local police authorities;
d) To supervise private security agencies operating within
the port area; and
CRIM REV
e) To enforce rules and regulations promulgated by the
Authority pursuant to law. (Emphasis supplied)
In 1992, the Cebu Port Authority was created to specifically
administer all ports located in the Province of Cebu.109 The Cebu Port
Authority is a "public-benefit corporation . . . under the supervision of
the Department of Transportation and Communications for purposes
of policy coordination."110 Control of the ports was transferred to the
Cebu Port Authority on January 1, 1996, when its operations officially
began.111
In 2004, the Office for Transportation Security was designated as the
"single authority responsible for the security of the transportation
systems [in] the country[.]"112 Its powers and functions included
providing security measures for all transportation systems in the
country:
b. Exercise operational control and supervision over all units
of law enforcement agencies and agency personnel
providing security services in the transportation systems,
except for motor vehicles in land transportation, jointly with
the heads of the bureaus or agencies to which the units or
personnel organically belong or are assigned;
c. Exercise responsibility for transportation security
operations including, but not limited to, security screening
of passengers, baggage and cargoes, and hiring, retention,
training and testing of security screening personnel;
d. In coordination with the appropriate agencies and/or
instrumentalities of the government, formulate, develop,
promulgate and implement comprehensive security plans,
policies, measures, strategies and programs to ably and
decisively deal with any threat to the security of
transportation systems, and continually review, assess and
upgrade such security plans, policies, measures, strategies
and programs, to improve and enhance transportation
security and ensure the adequacy of these security
measures;
e. Examine and audit the performance of transportation
security personnel, equipment and facilities, and, thereafter,
establish, on a continuing basis, performance standards for
such personnel, equipment and facilities, including for the
training of personnel;
f. Prepare a security manual/master plan or programme
which shall prescribe the rules and regulations for the
efficient and safe operation of all transportation systems,
including standards for security screening procedures, prior
screening or profiling of individuals for the issuance of
security access passes, and determination of levels of
security clearances for personnel of the OTS, the DOTC and
its attached agencies, and other agencies of the government;
g. Prescribe security and safety standards for all
transportation systems in accordance with existing laws,
rules, regulations and international conventions;
h. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the DOTC,
issue Transportation Security Regulations/Rules and amend,
rescind or revise such regulations or rules as may be
necessary for the security of the transportation systems of
the country[.]113 (Emphasis supplied)
The Cebu Port Authority has adopted security measures imposed by
the Office for Transportation Security, including the National Security
Programme for Sea Transport and Maritime Infrastructure.114
The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to
oversee the security of persons and vehicles within its ports. While
there is a distinction between port personnel and port police officers
in this case, considering that port personnel are not necessarily law
enforcers, both should be considered agents of government under
Article III of the Constitution. The actions of port personnel during
routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-related
function.
In People v. Malngan,115 barangay tanod and the Barangay
Chairman were deemed as law enforcement officers for purposes of
1st Set Fulltext Page 55 of 74
applying Article III of the Constitution.116 In People v. Lauga,117 this
court held that a "bantay bayan," in relation to the authority to
conduct a custodial investigation under Article III, Section 12118 of
the Constitution, "has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional
rights[.]"119
Thus, with port security personnel’s functions having the color of
state-related functions and deemed agents of government, Marti is
inapplicable in the present case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to
port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security
measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin
to routine security procedures in airports.
In People v. Suzuki,120 the accused "entered the pre-departure area
of the Bacolod Airport Terminal."121 He was "bound for Manila via
flight No. 132 of the Philippine Airlines and was carrying a small
traveling bag and a box marked ‘Bongbong’s piaya.’"122 The accused
"proceeded to the ‘walk-through metal detector,’ a machine which
produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the presence of
metallic substance or object."123 "Thereupon, the red light switched
on and the alarm sounded, signifying the presence of metallic
substance either in his person or in the box he was carrying."124
When the accused was asked to open the content of the box, he
answered "open, open."125 Several packs of dried marijuana fruiting
tops were then found inside the box.126 Suzuki argued that the box
was only given to him as "pasalubong" by a certain Pinky, whom he
had sexual relations with the night before.127 He did not know the
contents of the box.128
This court in Suzuki found that the search conducted on the accused
was a valid exception to the prohibition against warrantless searches
as it was pursuant to a routine airport security procedure:129
It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by
any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each
case. Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the search
conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not
violative of his constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the
box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is
deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest
even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The packs of marijuana obtained in the course of
such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against
appellant.130 (Citations omitted)
The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation
of privacy when coming into airports or ports of travel:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an
aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable,
given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs and notices in their airline tickets that they
are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances
are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements
place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections
against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine
airport procedures.131 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This rationale was reiterated more recently in Sales v. People.132
This court in Sales upheld the validity of the search conducted as part
of the routine security check at the old Manila Domestic Airport—now
Terminal 1 of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.133
Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when it
used x-ray scanning machines for inspection of passengers’ bags.134
When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the existence of firearms
in the bag, the port authorities had probable cause to conduct a
CRIM REV
search of petitioner’s bag. Notably, petitioner did not contest the
results of the x-ray scan.
IV
Was the search rendered unreasonable at the second point of
intrusion—when the baggage inspector opened petitioner’s bag and
called the attention of the port police officer?
We rule in the negative.
The port personnel’s actions proceed from the authority and policy to
ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles within the port. At this
point, petitioner already submitted himself and his belongings to
inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine.
The presentation of petitioner’s bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary.
Petitioner had the choice of whether to present the bag or not. He
had the option not to travel if he did not want his bag scanned or
inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon
showing of probable cause that a crime is being or has been
committed are part of reasonable security regulations to safeguard
the passengers passing through ports or terminals. Probable cause is:
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to
the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by
law are in the place to be searched.135
It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary
person’s right to travel if weighed against the safety of all passengers
and the security in the port facility.
As one philosopher said, the balance between authority and an
individual’s liberty may be confined within the harm that the
individual may cause others. John Stuart Mill’s "harm principle"
provides:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so,
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others,
to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for
remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or
entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any
evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it
is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone
else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is
amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.136
Any perceived curtailment of liberty due to the presentation of person
and effects for port security measures is a permissible intrusion to
privacy when measured against the possible harm to society caused
by lawless persons.
V
A third point of intrusion to petitioner’s right to privacy occurred
during petitioner’s submission to port security measures. This court
should determine whether the requirements for a valid waiver against
unreasonable searches and seizures were met.
After detection of the firearms through the x-ray scanning machine
and inspection by the baggage inspector, Officer Abregana was called
to inspect petitioner’s bag.
The Constitution safeguards a person’s right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.137 A warrantless search is presumed to be
unreasonable.138 However, this court lays down the exceptions
where warrantless searches are deemed legitimate: (1) warrantless
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search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure in "plain view"; (3)
search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5)
customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances.139
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals:140
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional
guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to
constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2)
that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.141
Petitioner anchors his case on the claim that he did not validly
consent to the search conducted by the port authorities. He argues
that he did not have an actual intention to relinquish his right against
a warrantless search.
In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, events must be weighed in its entirety. The
trial court’s findings show that petitioner presented his bag for
scanning in the x-ray machine.142 When his bag went through the x-
ray machine and the firearms were detected, he voluntarily submitted
his bag for inspection to the port authorities:
Prosecutor Narido:
Q. What did he tell you?
A. I asked him if I can check his bag?
Q. What was his response?
A. He consented and cooperated. I checked the bag.143
It was after the port personnel’s inspection that Officer Abregana’s
attention was called and the bag was inspected anew with petitioner’s
consent.144
"[A]ppellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment of
witnesses’ credibility by the trial court, because the latter was in a
better position to observe their demeanor and deportment on the
witness stand."145 We do not find anything erroneous as to the
findings of fact of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
There was probable cause that petitioner was committing a crime
leading to the search of his personal effects. As the trial court found:
Given the circumstances obtaining here, the court finds the search
conducted by the port authorities reasonable and, therefore, not
violative of the accused’s constitutional rights. Hence, when the
search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and
ammunitions, accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante
delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and
ammunitions obtained in the course of such valid search are thus
admissible as evidence against [the] accused.146
Similar to the accused in People v. Kagui Malasugui147 and People v.
Omaweng148 who permitted authorities to search their persons and
premises without a warrant, petitioner is now precluded from claiming
an invalid warrantless search when he voluntarily submitted to the
search on his person. In addition, petitioner’s consent to the search at
the domestic port was not given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances.149
This case should be differentiated from that of Aniag, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections,150 which involved the search of a moving
vehicle at a checkpoint.151 In that case, there was no implied
acquiescence to the search since the checkpoint set up by the police
authorities was conducted without proper consultation, and it left
motorists without any choice except to subject themselves to the
checkpoint:
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the
search constitutes an implied waiver of petitioner’s right to question
the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the
firearms.
CRIM REV
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it
however stressed that "guidelines shall be made to ensure that no
infringement of civil and political rights results from the
implementation of this authority," and that "the places and manner of
setting up of checkpoints shall be determined in consultation with the
Committee on Firearms Ban and Security Personnel created under
Sec. 5, Resolution No. 2323." The facts show that PNP installed the
checkpoint at about five o’clock in the afternoon of 13 January 1992.
The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It was
not shown that news of impending checkpoints without necessarily
giving their locations, and the reason for the same have been
announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal
checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the
purpose of its operation. As a result, motorists passing that place did
not have any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the instant
exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and search passing
vehicles, the motorists did not have any choice but to submit to the
PNP’s scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout albeit innocent
would raise suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to
arrest the motorist and to conduct an extensive search of his vehicle.
In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it
was stopped for inspection. As conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano
did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of fourteen
(14) armed policemen conducting the operation, driver Arellano being
alone and a mere employee of petitioner could not have marshalled
the strength and the courage to protest against the extensive search
conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied
acquiescence," if there was any, could not be more than a mere
passive conformity on Arellano’s part to the search, and "consent"
given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent
within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.152 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
We also cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that there was no
valid consent to the search because his consent was premised on his
belief that there were no prohibited items in his bag. The defendant’s
belief that no incriminating evidence would be found does not
automatically negate valid consent to the search when incriminating
items are found. His or her belief must be measured against the
totality of the circumstances.153 Again, petitioner voluntarily
submitted himself to port security measures and, as he claimed
during trial, he was familiar with the security measures since he had
been traveling back and forth through the sea port.
Consequently, we find respondent’s argument that the present
petition falls under a valid consented search and during routine port
security procedures meritorious. The search conducted on petitioner’s
bag is valid.
VI
The consented search conducted on petitioner’s bag is different from
a customs search.
Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search
warrant, are allowed when "persons exercising police authority under
the customs law . . . effect search and seizure . . . in the enforcement
of customs laws."154 The Tariff and Customs Code provides the
authority for such warrantless search, as this court ruled in Papa, et
al. v. Mago, et al.:155
The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section
2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search
any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling
house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft
and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or
stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected
of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced
into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a
search warrant in said cases.156 (Citation omitted)
The ruling in Papa was echoed in Salvador v. People,157 in that the
state’s policy to combat smuggling must not lose to the difficulties
posed by the debate on whether the state has the duty to accord
constitutional protection to dutiable articles on which duty has not
been paid, as with a person’s papers and/or effects.158
Hence, to be a valid customs search, the requirements are: (1) the
person/s conducting the search was/were exercising police authority
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under customs law; (2) the search was for the enforcement of
customs law; and (3) the place searched is not a dwelling place or
house. Here, the facts reveal that the search was part of routine port
security measures. The search was not conducted by persons
authorized under customs law. It was also not motivated by the
provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code or other customs laws.
Although customs searches usually occur within ports or terminals, it
is important that the search must be for the enforcement of customs
laws.
VII
In violations of the Gun Ban, the accused must be "in possession of a
firearm . . . outside of his residence within the period of the election
gun ban imposed by the COMELEC sans authority[.]"159
In Abenes v. Court of Appeals,160 this court enumerated the
elements for a violation of the Gun Ban: "1) the person is bearing,
carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons; 2) such
possession occurs during the election period; and, 3) the weapon is
carried in a public place."161 This court also ruled that under the
Omnibus Election Code, the burden to show that he or she has a
written authority to possess a firearm is on the accused.162
We find that the prosecution was able to establish all the requisites
for violation of the Gun Ban. The firearms were found inside
petitioner’s bag. Petitioner did not present any valid authorization to
carry the firearms outside his residence during the period designated
by the Commission on Elections. He was carrying the firearms in the
Cebu Domestic Port, which was a public place.
However, petitioner raised the following circumstances in his defense:
(1) that he was a frequent traveler and was, thus, knowledgeable
about the security measures at the terminal; (2) that he left his bag
with a porter for a certain amount of time; and (3) that he voluntarily
put his bag on the x-ray machine for voluntary inspection. All these
circumstances were left uncontested by the prosecution.
This court is now asked to determine whether these circumstances
are sufficient to raise reasonable doubt on petitioner’s guilt.
When petitioner claimed that someone planted the illegal firearms in
his bag, the burden of evidence to prove this allegation shifted to him.
The shift in the burden of evidence does not equate to the reversal of
the presumption of innocence. In People v. Villanueva,163 this court
discussed the difference between burden of proof and burden of
evidence, and when the burden of evidence shifts to the accused:
Indeed, in criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove
beyond reasonable doubt not only the commission of the crime but
likewise to establish, with the same quantum of proof, the identity of
the person or persons responsible therefor. This burden of proof does
not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution throughout the
trial. However, when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging
the burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient to convince the
court of the truth of the allegations in the information or has
established a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of
evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him to
adduce evidence in order to meet and nullify, if not to overthrow, that
prima facie case.164 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Petitioner failed to negate the prosecution’s evidence that he had
animus possidendi or the intent to possess the illegal firearms. In
People v. De Gracia,165 this court elucidated on the concept of
animus possidendi and the importance of the intent to commit an act
prohibited by law as differentiated from criminal intent.166 The
accused was charged with the qualified offense of illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No.
1866 resulting from the coup d’etat staged in 1989 by the Reform
Armed Forces Movement - Soldiers of the Filipino People.167 This
court held that the actions of the accused established his intent to
possess the illegal firearms:
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to
commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender
has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law.
Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be
distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit
a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the
very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit
CRIM REV
the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to
perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely
and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal
intent and intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal
intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a
firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an
intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is,
however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent
which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm.
Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit
an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important
in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in
order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is
sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a
firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such
possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless
possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of
a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or
constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is
absent, there is no offense committed.
Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds
that appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of having intentionally
possessed several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the
requisite license or authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar
Abenia categorically testified that he was the first one to enter the
Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same,
and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding the several
explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. At first, appellant
denied any knowledge about the explosives. Then, he alternatively
contended that his act of guarding the explosives for and in behalf of
Col. Matillano does not constitute illegal possession thereof because
there was no intent on his part to possess the same, since he was
merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of
impersonal or indifferent material possession does not and cannot
inspire credence.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a
case to case basis, taking into consideration the prior and coetaneous
acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. What exists
in the realm of thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is
not controverted that appellant De Gracia is a former soldier, having
served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his separation from
the service for going on absence without leave (AWOL). We do not
hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude that he is familiar with
and knowledgeable about the dynamites, "molotov" bombs, and
various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military
from his possession. As a former soldier, it would be absurd for him
not to know anything about the dangerous uses and power of these
weapons. A fortiori, he cannot feign ignorance on the import of
having in his possession such a large quantity of explosives and
ammunition. Furthermore, the place where the explosives were found
is not a military camp or office, nor one where such items can
ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or
armory. Even an ordinarily prudent man would be put on guard and
be suspicious if he finds articles of this nature in a place intended to
carry out the business of selling cars and which has nothing to do at
all, directly or indirectly, with the trade of firearms and
ammunition.168 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The disquisition in De Gracia on the distinction between criminal
intent and intent to possess, which is relevant to convictions for illegal
possession of firearms, was reiterated in Del Rosario v. People.169
This court ruled that "[i]n the absence of animus possidendi, the
possessor of a firearm incurs no criminal liability."170
In this case, petitioner failed to prove that his possession of the illegal
firearms seized from his bag was "temporary, incidental, casual, or
harmless possession[.]"171 As put by the trial court, petitioner’s
claim that anyone could have planted the firearms in his bag while it
was unattended is flimsy.172 There are dire consequences in
accepting this claim at face value, particularly that no one will be
caught and convicted of illegal possession of firearms.
1st Set Fulltext Page 58 of 74
Courts must also weigh the accused’s claim against the totality of the
evidence presented by the prosecution. This includes determination of:
(1) the motive of whoever allegedly planted the illegal firearm(s); (2)
whether there was opportunity to plant the illegal firearm(s); and (3)
reasonableness of the situation creating the opportunity.
Petitioner merely claims that someone must have planted the
firearms when he left his bag with the porter. He did not identify who
this person could have been and he did not state any motive for this
person to plant the firearms in his possession, even if there was
indeed an opportunity to plant the firearms.
However, this court is mindful that, owing to the nature of his work,
petitioner was a frequent traveler who is well-versed with port
security measures. We cannot accept that an average reasonable
person aware of travel security measures would leave his belongings
with a stranger for a relatively long period of time. Also, records show
that petitioner had only one (1) bag. There was no evidence to show
that a robust young man like petitioner would have need of the
porter’s services. The defense did not identify nor present this porter
with whom petitioner left his bag.
VIII
The trial court was correct when it dismissed Criminal Case No. CBU-
80084 for violation of Republic Act No. 8294, otherwise known as
illegal possession of firearms. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294
provides:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended,
is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. –
The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine
of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition:
Provided, That no other crime was committed. (Emphasis supplied)
Agote v. Judge Lorenzo173 already settled the question of whether
there can be a "separate offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition if there is another crime committed[.]"174 In that case,
the petitioner was charged with both illegal possession of firearms
and violation of the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections
Resolution No. 2826.175 This court acquitted petitioner in the case
for illegal possession of firearms since he simultaneously violated the
Gun Ban.176 This court also held that the unlicensed firearm need
not be actually used in the course of committing the other crime for
the application of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294.177
Similarly, Madrigal v. People178 applied the ruling in Agote and held
that Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294 is express in its terms that a
person may not be convicted for illegal possession of firearms if
another crime was committed.179
IX
We note that the trial court imposed the penalty of imprisonment for
a period of one (1) year and to suffer disqualification to hold public
office and deprivation of the right to suffrage. Under Section 264 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, persons found guilty of an election offense
"shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but
not more than six years and shall not be subject to probation."180
The Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to offenses punished by both
the Revised Penal Code and special laws.181
The penalty to be imposed is a matter of law that courts must follow.
The trial court should have provided minimum and maximum terms
for petitioner’s penalty of imprisonment as required by the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.182 Accordingly, we modify the penalty
imposed by the trial court. Based on the facts, we deem it reasonable
that petitioner be penalized with imprisonment of one (1) year as
minimum to two (2) years as maximum.183
X SALVADOR ALAPAN, Respondent
CRIM REV
The records are unclear whether petitioner is currently detained by
the state or is out on bail. Petitioner’s detention is relevant in
determining whether he has already served more than the penalty
imposed upon him by the trial court as modified by this court, or
whether he is qualified to the credit of his preventive imprisonment
with his service of sentence.
Article 29184 of the Revised Penal Code states:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of
imprisonment. – Offenders or accused who have undergone
preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during
which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention
prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the
effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in
the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted
previously twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their
sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in
writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the
service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he
has undergone preventive imprisonment.1âwphi1
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30) years.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a
period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense
charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet
terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the
same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for
purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the
actual period of detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided,
however, That if the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any
stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of
the accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents,
escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from
the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the
accused may be sentenced is lestierro [sic], he shall be released after
thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
In case credit of preventive imprisonment is due, petitioner must first
signify his agreement to the conditions set forth in Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.185 If petitioner has already served more than
the penalty imposed upon him by the trial court, then his immediate
release from custody is in order unless detained for some other lawful
cause.186
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated September 8, 2012 and the Resolution dated August 23, 2013
in CA-GR CEB CR No. 01606 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Petitioner Erwin Libo-On Dela Cruz is sentenced to imprisonment of
one (1) year as minimum to two (2) years as maximum in accordance
with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The period of his preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in his favor if he has given his written
conformity to abide by the disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and if he is not out on bail.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
January 10, 2018
G.R. No. 199527
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru Private Complainant BRIAN
VICTOR BRITCHFORD, Petitioner
vs.
1st Set Fulltext Page 59 of 74
 DECISION
MARITRES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution,
dated 22 November 2011, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 118333, which dismissed the petition seeking the imposition of
subsidiary imprisonment for nonpayment of fine in eight (8) cases of
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22).
THE FACTS
In an Information, dated 26 May 2006, respondent Salvador Alapan
(respondent) and his wife Myrna Alapan (Myrna) were charged with
eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Upon arraignment on 1
September 2006, they pleaded not guilty to the charges.
In August 2005, the Spouses Alapan borrowed ₱400,000.00 from
petitioner Brian Victor Britchford (petitioner) with a promise that they
would pay the said amount within three (3) months. To secure the
indebtedness, respondent issued eight (8) postdated checks.
When the checks matured, petitioner deposited then at the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), Olongapo City branch. One week thereafter,
PNB informed petitioner that the checks were dishonored for the
reason that the account against which the checks were drawn was
closed. Petitioner immediately informed respondent of the dishonor of
the checks.
On their part, the Spouses Alapan averred that their account was
closed only on the last week of October 2005 because they suffered
business reverses. They nonetheless stated that they were willing to
settle their monetary obligation.
The MTC Ruling
In a decision,1 dated 4 February 2009, the Municipal Trial Court, San
Felipe, Zambales (MTC), convicted respondent of eight (8) counts of
violation of B.P. Big. 22. It imposed a penalty of fine instead of
imprisonment considering that respondent's act of issuing the
bounced checks was not tainted with bad faith and that he was a
first-time offender. On the other hand, the MTC acquitted Myrna
because she did not participate in the issuance of the dishonored
checks. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the evidence of the prosecution to have
established the guilt of Accused Salvador Alapan of the eight (8)
counts of Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and imposes upon the aforenamed
accused to pay a fine of ₱30,000.00 for each case or total of
₱240,000.00 and to indemnify the offended party, Mr. Brian Victor
Britchford the sum of FOUR HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND
(₱411,000.00) Philippine Currency, representing the face value of the
dishonored checks, with legal interest per annum commencing from
March 8, 2006, when demand was made, until fully paid, and to pay
attorney's fees of ₱15,000.00 and to pay the costs.2
After the MTC judgment became final and executory, a writ of
execution was issued. The writ, however, was returned unsatisfied.
Petitioner thus filed a Motion to Impose Subsidiary Penalty3 for
respondent's failure to pay the fine imposed by the MTC.
In its Order,4 dated 24 September 2010, the MTC denied the motion
on the ground that subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency was
not imposed in the judgment of convicion.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 69, Iba, Zambales (RTC).
The RTC Ruling
In a decision,5 dated 25 January 2011, the RTC dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. It held that respondent could not be made to
undergo subsidiary imprisonment because the judgment of conviction
did not provide for such penalty in case of non-payment of fine. The
RTC further opined that the MTC decision which already attained
finality could no longer be altered or modified. It disposed the case in
this wise:
IN VIEW THEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.6
Undeterred, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA.
CRIM REV
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution, dated 22 November 2011, the CA dismissed the
petition. It ruled that the petition was filed without the intervention of
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which was contrary to
Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code.
The dispositive portion reads:
In view of the foregoing and finding the Manifestation (in lieu of
Comment) filed by the OSG to be well-founded, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED pursuant to Section 3, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Court.7
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
I. WHETHER PETITIONER MAY ASSAIL THE PENALTY IMPOSED IN THE
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT MAY UNDERGO SUBSIDIARY
IMPRISONMENT FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE FINE.
Petitioner argues that Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
Administrative Code is applicable only in cases wherein the
government or any of its branches or instrumentalities is directly
involved; that the said law does not cover matters wherein it is the
interest of the private complainant that is directly affected; and that
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 expressly states that there is no
legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should only a fine be imposed
and the accused be unable to pay the fine.8
In his comment, respondent counters, citing Gonzales v. Chavez, 9
that it is mandatory upon the OSG to represent the Government of
the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of a lawyer; that it is only the State, through its
appellate counsel, the OSG, which has the sole right and authority to
institute criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court;10 that the imposition or the non-imposition of
subsidiary penalty is a matter that involves the interest of the State,
thus, the private offended party is without legal personality to bring
an appeal on the criminal aspect of the case; and that the imposition
of subsidiary imprisonment must be clearly stated in the judgment.11
In his reply, petitioner avers that Administrative Circular No. 13-2001
categorically implies that subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted
to even if the penalty provided by the trial court is limited only to fine;
and that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment would emphasize
the gravity of the offense committed by respondent and would serve
as a deterrent to others not to emulate this malicious act.12
OUR RULING
Petitioner lacks legal standing to question the trial court's
order.
In the appeal of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely
in the Solicitor General. This power is expressly provided in Section
35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 of the Revised Administrative
Code.13 Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.14
Jurisprudence has already settled that the interest of the private
complainant is limited only to the civil liability arising from the
crime.1âwphi1 Thus, in Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan, 15 the Court
ruled:
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which
the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil
liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial
court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may
be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through
the solicitor general. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may
represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private
offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.16
1st Set Fulltext Page 60 of 74
In this case, respondent was convicted of eight (8) counts of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 for which he was imposed the penalty of fine instead of
imprisonment pursuant to Administrative Circulars No. 12-2000 and
13- 2001. Thus, the penalty of fine and the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment in case of nonpayment thereof pertain to the criminal
aspect of the case. On the other hand, the indemnification for the
face value of the dishonored checks refers to the civil aspect of the
case. Consequently petitioner could not appeal the imposition of fine
as penalty which was not even questioned by the People through the
OSG. "While a private prosecutor may be allowed to intervene in
criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, his participation is subordinate to the interest of the
People, hence, he cannot be permitted to adopt a position contrary to
that of the Solicitor General. To do so would be tantamount to giving
the private prosecutor the direction and control of the criminal
proceeding, contrary to the provisions of law."17 Hence, the CA
properly dismissed the petition for review.
Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly
stated in the judgment of conviction.
Another reason which militates against petitioner's position is the lack
of provision pertaining to subsidiary imprisonment in the judgment of
conviction. People v. Fajardo, 18 in relation to Republic Act. No. 5465
which amended Article 39 of the RPC, discusses the rationale behind
the necessity for expressly imposing subsidiary imprisonment in the
judgment of conviction, viz:
The first paragraph of article 39 of the Revised Penal Code reads as
follows:
ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. - If the convict has no property with
which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next
preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability
at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following
rules: ...
Article 78 of Chapter V of the same Code, in its pertinent part, which
deals with the execution and service of penalties, provides:
ART. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. - No penalty
shall executed except by virtue of a final judgment.
A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that
prescribed by law, nor with any other circumstances or incidents than
those expressly authorized thereby.
It is a fundamental principle consecration in section 3 of the Jones
Law, the Act of Congress of the United States of America approved on
August 29, 1916, which was still in force when the order appealed
from was made, that no person may be deprived of liberty without
due process of law. This constitutional provision was in a sense
incorporated in article 78 of the Revised Penal Code prescribing that
no penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment. As
the fact show that there is no judgment sentencing the accused to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvent to pay the fine
imposed upon him, because the said subsidiary imprisonment is not
stated in the judgment finding him guilty, it is clear that the court
could not legally compel him to serve said subsidiary imprisonment. A
contrary holding would be a violation of the laws aforementioned.
That subsidiary imprisonment is a penalty, there can be no doubt, for,
according to article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, it is imposed upon
the accused and served by him in lieu of the fine which he fails to pay
on account of insolvency. There is not a single provision in the Code
from which it may be logically inferred that an accused may
automatically be made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in a case
where he has been sentenced merely to pay a fine and has been
found to be insolvent. Such would be contrary to the legal provisions
above-cited and to the doctrine laid down in United States vs.
Miranda (2 Phil., 606, 610), in which it was said: "That judgment of
the lower court fails to impose subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency for indemnification to the owner of the banca, but only
imposes subsidiary punishment as to the costs. In this respect the
judgment is erroneous and should be modified."
We, therefore, conclude that an accused who has been sentenced by
final judgment to pay a fine only and is found to be insolvent and
could not pay the fine for this reason, cannot be compelled to serve
the subsidiary imprisonment provided for in article 39 of the Revised
Penal Code. [emphasis supplied]19
CRIM REV
Indeed, Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 provides that "should
only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine,
there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment." However, the Circular does
not sanction indiscriminate imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for
the same must still comply with the law.
Here, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary
imprisonment in case of failure to pay the penalty of fine. Thus,
subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed without violating the
RPC and the constitutional provision on due process.
The final and executory decision of the MTC can no longer be
modified.
Finally, the time-honored doctrine of immutability of judgment
precludes modification of a final and executory judgment:
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of
a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true
whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by
the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice
requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by
the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all.
This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which
there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to
this principle must always be maintained by those who exercise the
power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must
immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness
of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments
of what are ordinarily known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon
which judicial powers had been conferred.
The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments
are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro
tune entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void
Judgments.20
There is no doubt that the MTC decision has long attained finality and
that none of the aforementioned exceptions finds application in this
case. Hence, the MTC decision stands and any other question
involving the said decision must now be put to rest.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 22 November 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 118333 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 201092 January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,
vs.
JOEL AQUINO y CENDANA @ "AKONG," Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from a Decision1 dated July 29, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04265, entitled People
of the Philippines v. Joel Aquino y Cendana alias Akong, which
affirmed with modifications the Decision2 dated September 18 2009
of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12 which
convicted appellant Joel Aquino y Cendana alias Akong for the felony
of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal
Case No. 483-M-2003 and for the crime of violation of Republic Act
No. 6539 otherwise known as the Anti-Camapping Act of 1972 in
Criminal Case No. 484-M-2003.
The pertinent portion of the lnformation3 dated December 9, 2002
charging appellant with Murder in Criminal Case No. 483-M-2003 is
reproduced here:
1st Set Fulltext Page 61 of 74
That on or about the 6th day of September, 2002, in San Jose del
Monte City, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with an ice pick and with intent to kill one Jesus O. Lita, with evident
premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the
said ice pick the said Jesus O. Lita, hitting him on the different parts
of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which directly
caused his death.
On the other hand, the accusatory portion of the Information4 also
dated December 9, 2002 accusing appellant with violating Republic
Act No. 6539 in Criminal Case No. 484-M-2003 reads:
That on or about the 6th day of September, 2002, in San Jose del
Monte City, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with an ice pick and by means of force, violence and intimidation,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent [to] gain
and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take,
steal and carry away with them one (1) tricycle with Plate No. TP-
9198 valued at ₱120,500.00, belonging to Jesus Lita and Sisinio
Contridas, to the damage and prejudice of the said owners in the said
amount of ₱120,500.00; and that on the occasion or by reason of
said carnapping, the said accused, pursuant to their conspiracy and
with intent to kill, attack, assault and stab Jesus Lita, owner and
driver of the said tricycle, hitting him on the different parts of his
body which directly caused his death.
Arraignment for the two criminal cases was jointly held on February
13, 2004 wherein appellant pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to both charges.5
As indicated in the Appellee’s Brief, the following narration constitutes
the prosecution’s summation of this case:
On September 5, 2005, at around 8:30 in the evening, the victim
Jesus Lita, accompanied by his ten-year old son, Jefferson, went out
aboard the former’s black Kawasaki tricycle. Upon reaching San Jose
del Monte Elementary School, appellant Joel Aquino together with
Noynoy Almoguera a.k.a. Negro, Rodnal, Bing, John Doe and Peter
Doe boarded the tricycle. Noynoy Almoguera instructed the victim to
proceed to the nipa hut owned by appellant.
Upon reaching the said nipa hut, Jesus Lita, appellant and his
companions had a shabu session while Jefferson was watching TV.
After using shabu, Noynoy Almoguera demanded from the victim to
pay Five Hundred Pesos (₱500.00), but the victim said that he had no
money. Appellant shouted at the victim demanding him to pay. Bing
suggested to her companions that they leave the nipa hut. Thus, the
victim mounted his tricycle and started the engine. Noynoy
Almoguera and John Doe rode in the tricycle behind the victim while
appellant and Rodnal rode in the sidecar with Jefferson [sitting] at the
toolbox of the tricycle. Inside the tricycle, appellant pointed a knife at
Jefferson while Noynoy Almoguera stabbed the victim’s side. After the
victim was stabbed, he was transferred inside the tricycle while
appellant drove the tricycle to his friend’s house where they again
stabbed the victim using the latter’s own knife. Then they loaded the
victim to the tricycle and drove to a grassy area where appellant and
his companions dumped the body of the victim. Thereafter, they
returned to appellant’s residence. Jefferson told the sister of appellant
about the death of his father but the sister of appellant only told him
to sleep.
The next day, Jefferson was brought to the jeepney terminal where
he rode a jeepney to get home. Jefferson told his mother, Ma.
Theresa Calitisan-Lita, about the death of his father.
In the meantime, SPO3 Servillano Lactao Cabading received a call
from Barangay Captain Danilo Rogelio of Barangay San Rafael IV, San
Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan thru the two (2) way radio, that the
body of a male person with several stab wounds was found dead on a
grassy area beside the road of the said barangay. Immediately, SPO3
Cabading together with a police aide proceeded to the area. Thereat,
they found the dead body whom they identified thru his Driver’s
License in his wallet as Jesus Lita, the victim. Also recovered were a
big stainless ice pick about 18 inches long including the handle and a
tricycle key. The police officers brought the body of the victim to the
CRIM REV
Sapang Palay District Hospital. Thereafter, they proceeded to the
address of the victim.
Ma. Theresa Calitisan-Lita and Jefferson were about to leave for the
morgue when they met SPO3 Cabading outside their residence. SPO3
Cabading informed Ma. Theresa that the body of the victim was found
in Barangay San Rafael IV. Jefferson told SPO3 Cabading that he was
with his father at the time of his death and he brought the police
officers to the place where his father was stabbed and to the hut
owned by appellant. Thereat, the police officers recovered a maroon
colored knife case and the sandals of the victim. Appellant was invited
to the police station for questioning but he refused alleging that he
does not know anything about the incident. The police officers were
able to obtain a picture of appellant which was shown to Jefferson and
he positively identified the same as "Akong" one of those who
stabbed his father. Likewise, a video footage of Noynoy Almoguera
alias "Negro" was shown to Jefferson and he likewise identified the
person in the video footage as the same "Negro" who also stabbed his
father.
Dr. Richard Ivan Viray, medico-legal, who conducted an autopsy on
the victim, concluded that cause of death is Hemorrhagic Shock due
to multiple stab wounds.6
However, appellant held a different version of the events of this case.
In his Appellant’s Brief, the succeeding account is entered:
[Appellant] denied the accusations against him. On September 6,
2002, he was working as a laborer/mason in the construction of his
uncle’s (Rene Cendana) house located at Area C, Acacia Homes,
Cavite, together with Paul Maglaque, Eman Lozada, Raul Lozada and
Lorenzo Cendana. They worked from 7:30 x x x in the morning until
4:30 x x x in the afternoon, with lunch and "merienda" breaks from
11:30 x x x to 12:00 o’clock noon and 3:00 o’clock to 3:15 x x x in
the afternoon, respectively. After work, they just stayed in their
barracks located within their workplace. They would prepare their
food and take supper at around 7:00 o’clock to 7:30 x x x in the
evening, after which, they would smoke cigarettes. They would go to
bed at around 8:00 o’clock to 9:00 o’clock in the evening.
He goes home to Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan
every Saturday. During Mondays, he would leave their house at
around 4:00 o’clock to 5:00 o’clock in the morning and would arrive
at his workplace at around 8:00 o’clock or 9:00 o’clock in the morning.
[Appellant] does not know either Ma. Theresa Lita, his son Jefferson,
or the victim Jesus Lita. Also, he does not know a certain Noynoy
Almoguera and alias Rodnal. Likewise, he denied using illegal drugs
(i.e., shabu).
[Appellant] knew SPO3 Cabading because the former had served as a
police aide to him since he was seventeen (17) years old. He had no
misunderstanding with the police officer. He cannot think of any
reason why Ma. Theresa Lita and Jefferson pointed to him as one of
the perpetrators of the subject crimes.
Paul Maglague (Paul) corroborated [appellant’s] testimony. On
September 6, 2002, a Friday, [appellant] was working with him,
together with Roldan Lozada and Oweng Cendana, at Area C,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, in the construction of Boy Cendana’s house,
Paul’s brother-in-law. Paul was the cement mixer while [appellant],
being his partner, carries it to wherever it is needed. Their work ends
at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon. After their work, they just stayed in
their barracks located within their workplace. [Appellant] was their
cook. They usually sleep at around 8:00 o’clock to 9:00 o’clock in the
evening. They get their pay only during Saturdays. Hence, they would
go home to Bulacan every Saturday.
At around 6:00 o’clock to 7:00 o’clock in the evening of September 7,
2002, they left Cavite and went to their respective homes in Bulacan.
On the night of September 5, 2002, [appellant] slept together with
Paul and their other co-workers inside their barracks. Paul woke up in
the middle of the night to urinate and was not able to see whether
the accused was there, as there were no lights in the place where
they were sleeping. The following morning, [appellant] was the one
who cooked their food.7 (Citations omitted.)
1st Set Fulltext Page 62 of 74
At the conclusion of trial, a guilty verdict was handed down by the
trial court on both criminal charges. The dispositive portion of the
assailed September 18, 2009 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 483-M-2003, the Court finds the
Accused JOEL AQUINO alias "Akong" guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The Court hereby orders the accused
JOEL AQUINO to pay the heirs of Jesus Lita, the expenses incurred in
his burial and funeral services in the total amount of Sixty Thousand
One Hundred (₱60,100.00) Pesos as actual damages, the sum of Fifty
Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 484-M-2003, the Court likewise finds the
accused JOEL AQUINO alias "Akong" guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating R.A. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Law,
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment
pursuant to Section 14 of the said R.A. 6539. The said accused is also
ordered to pay the amount of Sixty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred
Seventy-Five (₱65,875.00) Pesos representing the total installment
payments of the Motorcycle.
The accused is also ordered to pay costs of this suit.8
Insisting on his innocence, appellant filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. However, the appellate court upheld the judgment of the
trial court along with some modifications. The dispositive portion of
the assailed July 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in turn,
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
a) In Criminal Case No. 483-M-2003, appellant is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim actual damages in
the sum of ₱60,100.00, duly proven during the trial, ₱75,000.00 civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 moral damages and ₱30,000.00 exemplary
damages.
b) In Criminal Case No. 484-M-2003, appellant is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8)
months, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months,
as maximum and to pay the sum of ₱65,875.00 representing the total
installment payments of the motorcycle.9
Hence, appellant seeks the Court’s favorable action on the instant
appeal. In his Brief, appellant reiterated the following errors allegedly
committed by the trial court when it adjudged him guilty of the
charges leveled against him:
I A Our tricycle, sir.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED
LONE EYEWITNESS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AS ONE OF THE PERPETRATORS OF THE CRIMES.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT TREACHERY
ATTENDED THE KILLING.10
Appellant challenges his conviction by arguing that the trial court was
not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because it only
relied on the incredible and inconsistent testimony of Jefferson Lita –
the sole eyewitness presented by the prosecution. He contends that if
Jefferson was indeed present during the murder of his father, Jesus
Lita, then it would be highly inconceivable that Jefferson would have
lived to tell that tale since he would most likely be also killed by the
perpetrators being an eyewitness to the crime. Furthermore,
appellant maintains that he cannot possibly have committed the
crimes attributed to him because, on the night that Jesus was
murdered, he was asleep in the barracks of a construction site
somewhere in Dasmariñas City, Cavite.
CRIM REV
We are not persuaded.
It is settled in jurisprudence that, absent any showing that the lower
court overlooked circumstances which would overturn the final
outcome of the case, due respect must be made to its assessment
and factual findings, moreover, such findings, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are generally binding and conclusive upon this
Court.11 After a thorough examination of the records of this case, we
find no compelling reason to doubt the veracity of the findings and
conclusions made by the trial court.
With regard to appellant’s inquiry into the credibility of the lone
eyewitness of the prosecution, we depend upon the principle that the
trial court is in a better position to adjudge the credibility of a witness.
In People v. Vergara,12 we elaborated on this premise in this wise:
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the
guiding rules some of which are that (1) the appellate court will not
disturb the factual findings of the lower court, unless there is a
showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case, which showing is absent herein; (2)
the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of a witness
is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to examine his
demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can
discern if such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness
who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank
manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible
witness.13
Jurisprudence also tells us that when a testimony is given in a candid
and straightforward manner, there is no room for doubt that the
witness is telling the truth.14 A perusal of the testimony of Jefferson
indicates that he testified in a manner that satisfies the
aforementioned test of credibility. More importantly, during his time
at the witness stand, Jefferson positively and categorically identified
appellant as one of the individuals who stabbed his father.
We quote the relevant portions of Jefferson’s detailed testimony:
[PROSECUTOR CARAIG]
Q Why do you know that your father died on the early morning of
September 6, 2002, in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte?
xxxx
A Because we left the house together at 8:30 in the evening, and my
father looked at the calendar.
Q You said you were with your father. Do you know where were you
going at that time?
A To the house of Akong.
Q And what mode of transportation did you take, as you said, you
were going to the house of Akong?
Q Do you know the trade mark of that tricycle of your father?
A Kawasaki, sir.
Q Do you know the color of that tricycle?
A Black, sir.
Q While on your way to the residence of Akong, could you please tell
us if there was any unusual incident that took place?
A Yes, sir, there was.
Q What was that?
A My father was being stabbed. x x x x
Q Did you see who stabbed your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many?
A There were three (3) of them.
Q If you will see those three (3) persons again, can you still identify
them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are they inside the courtroom?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please look around and point to them.
INTERPRETER
Witness pointed to accused Joel Aquino inside the courtroom.
[PROSECUTOR CARAIG]
Q Who else?
A The others are not here.
Q Now, prior to the stabbing incident and you were able to recognize
the three, one of them you identified here inside the courtroom. What
was Joel Aquino doing when you first saw him?
A He was inside our tricycle sitting.
1st Set Fulltext Page 63 of 74
Q You are referring to the sidecar of your tricycle?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said a while ago that you and your father were only the one[s]
on board the tricycle. Why was he, that Joel, now inside the tricycle?
A They rode in our tricycle.
Q You are referring to Aquino together with his two (2) companions?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where in particular did these three (3) persons ride in your tricycle?
A Joel Aquino was inside the sidecar of our tricycle while the other
two (2) rode at the back of my father.
Q At that precise moment, where were you seated?
A Also inside the sidecar, sir.
Q You are sitting side by side with Aquino? Is that what you mean?
A No, sir.
Q While inside the tricycle, what did Aquino do, if any?
A He pointed his knife at me.
Q What else?
A Nothing else.
Q What about the two (2) companions, what did they do, if any?
A Inunahan nila agad ang Tatay ko sa tagiliran.
Q What do you mean by "inunahan"?
A They stabbed my father on his side.
Q Did you see what part of the body of your father was stabbed?
COURT:
Witness pointing to the right side of his stomach.
[PROSECUTOR CARAIG]
Q What happened to your father when he was stabbed?
A He appeared dizzy and he was placed inside the sidecar.
Q And who brought your father inside the sidecar?
A The two (2) other persons previously at the back of my father.
Q And at that time, what did Joel do?
A He started driving the tricycle.
Q Did Aquino drive the tricycle after he started it?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q And did you come to know where did Joel Aquino proceed?
A To their house, sir.
Q How far was that house of Aquino from the place where your father
was stabbed?
A Quite far, sir.
Q Were you able to reach the house of Joel Aquino?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did Aquino and these two (2) persons do to your father when
you reached his house?
A They brought him down from the tricycle.
Q Where did these three (3) persons bring your father?
A They brought my father to their friend.
Q Did you come to know who was that friend where your father was
brought?
A I do not know the name of their friend.
Q What happened to your father when he was brought to their friend?
A My father was already dying and they went back to him and
stabbed him several times.
Q How many times was your father stabbed at that time?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you see who stabbed him again?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A The three (3) of them.
Q Do you mean to say that Aquino at that time stabbed your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you see what kind of weapon did these three (3) persons use in
stabbing your father? A My father’s own knife.
Q Who among the three (3) used your father’s knife?
A Akong po.
Q That Akong was the friend of the three (3) persons to where these
three (3) persons brought your father?
A No, sir.
Q You are referring to one of the two (2) companions of Joel?
A Yes, sir.
Q And after that what else transpired next?
A They boarded my father to the tricycle.
Q How about you?
A While they were boarding my father to the tricycle, Akong pointed
his knife at my stomach.
Q Were the three (3) persons able to board your father inside your
tricycle?
A Yes, sir.
CRIM REV
Q And what did the three (3) persons do after your father was already
inside the tricycle?
A They started the tricycle.
Q And then what happened next?
A After they started the motorcycle, they drove the tricycle and threw
away my father.
Q Did you see the act of these three (3) persons throwing your father
away from the tricycle?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far were you from them when they threw your father?
A More or less about 5 to 6 meters, sir.
Q Describe the place where your father was thrown.
A It was a grassy area.
Q The grass are tall?
A Short grass, sir.
Q And after your father was thrown away, what did the three (3)
persons do?
A They started our tricycle and left my father.15
In the face of this serious accusation, appellant puts forward the
defense of alibi. We have held that for the defense of alibi to prosper,
the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at
the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its
immediate vicinity.16 These requirements of time and place must be
strictly met. A review of the evidence presented by appellant reveals
that it falls short of the standard set by jurisprudence. Appellant
failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to be at San Jose Del Monte City,
Bulacan when Jesus was murdered. His own testimony revealed that
the distance between the locus delicti and Dasmariñas City, Cavite is
only a four to five hour regular commute.17 Thus, it would not be
physically impossible for him to make the round trip between those
two points from dusk till dawn of September 5-6, 2002 and still have
more than enough time to participate in the events surrounding the
murder of Jesus.
Furthermore, the only person that could corroborate appellant’s alibi
is his friend and former co-worker, Paul Maglaque. However, we have
consistently assigned less probative weight to a defense of alibi when
it is corroborated by friends and relatives since we have established in
jurisprudence that, in order for corroboration to be credible, the same
must be offered preferably by disinterested witnesses.18 Clearly, due
to his friendship with appellant, Maglaque cannot be considered as a
disinterested witness.
Nevertheless, it is jurisprudentially settled that positive identification
prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is
inherently unreliable.19 It is likewise settled that where there is
nothing to indicate that a witness for the prosecution was actuated by
improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and
his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.20 In the case at bar,
no allegation was made nor proven to show that Jefferson had any ill
motive to falsely testify against appellant.
With regard to appellant’s argument that Jefferson would surely have
also been killed by his father’s murderers had he indeed witnessed
the crime, we can only surmise and speculate on this point. Whatever
may be the killers’ motivation to spare Jefferson’s life remains a
mystery. Nonetheless, it does not adversely affect what has been
clearly established in this case and that is the cold-blooded murder of
Jesus by a group of assailants which includes herein appellant.
According to jurisprudence, to be convicted of murder, the following
must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed
him; the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying
circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4)
the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.21
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the qualifying circumstance of
treachery did attend the killing of Jesus.1âwphi1 We have consistently
held that treachery is present when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.22 On this point, we quote with approval
the Court of Appeals’ discussion of this aspect of the case, to wit:
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the
aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real
1st Set Fulltext Page 64 of 74
chance to defend himself. Even when the victim was forewarned of
the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since
what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible
for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Records disclose that
Jesus was stabbed by the group on the lateral part of his body while
he was under the impression that they were simply leaving the place
where they had [a] shabu session. Judicial notice can be taken that
when the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle, his head is
usually higher or at the level of the roof of the side car which leaves
his torso exposed to the passengers who are seated in the side car.
Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the
intended stabbing of his body both from the people seated in the side
car and those seated behind him. Thus, the trial court’s finding of
treachery should be affirmed. There is treachery when the means,
methods, and forms of execution gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and such means,
methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused without danger to his person. What is
decisive in an appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the
attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself.23
(Citations omitted.)
However, in contrast to the pronouncements of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, we cannot consider abuse of superior
strength as an aggravating circumstance in this case. As per
jurisprudence, when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength
concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.24 Since
there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, the
proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, in accordance with Article 63
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code,25 it being the lesser penalty
between the two indivisible penalties for the felony of murder which is
reclusion perpetua to death.
However, we concur with the modification made by the Court of
Appeals with respect to the penalty of life imprisonment for
carnapping originally imposed by the trial court. Life imprisonment
has long been replaced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659. Furthermore, the said
penalty is applicable only to the special complex crime of carnapping
with homicide which is not obtaining in this case. Jurisprudence tells
us that to prove the special complex crime of carnapping with
homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of
carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the
culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.26 The
appellate court correctly observed that the killing of Jesus cannot
qualify the carnapping into a special complex crime because the
carnapping was merely an afterthought when the victim’s death was
already fait accompli. Thus, appellant is guilty only of simple
carnapping.
It is enshrined in jurisprudence that when death occurs due to a
crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
temperate damages.27
There being no aggravating circumstance since, as discussed earlier,
abuse of superior strength is absorbed in the qualifying circumstance
of treachery, the award of ₱75,000.00 as moral damages should be
decreased to ₱50,000.00. Such an amount is granted even in the
absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s
heirs.28
Pursuant to current jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity in the
amount of ₱75,000.0029 and exemplary damages in the amount of
₱30,000.0030 is correct. The amount of actual damages duly proven
in court in the sum of ₱60,100.00 is likewise upheld. Finally, we
impose interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages from the
date of finality of this ruling until fully paid.31
With regard to appellant’s conviction for simple carnapping, we affirm
the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the Court of Appeals which is
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months, as maximum. Likewise, we uphold
the order upon appellant to pay the sum of ₱65,875.00 representing
the total amount of the installment payments made on the motorcycle.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 29, 2011
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04265, affirming the
CRIM REV
conviction of appellant Joel Aquino Cendana alias "Akong" in Criminal
Cases No. 483-M-2003 and 484-M-2003, is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS that:
(1) The amount of moral damages to be paid by appellant Joel Aquino
Cendana alias "Akong" in Criminal Case No. 483-M-2003, is
decreased from Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) to Fifty
Thousand Pesos (PS0,000.00); and
(2) Appellant Joel Aquino Cendana alias Akong is ordered to pay
interest on all damages at the legal rate of six percent ( 6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City,
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge
Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on
February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio
respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to
hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme
Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect
of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its
comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the
death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a
result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General,
relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal
should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by
the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the
view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused
while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his
criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel
invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and
Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes
root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is
extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was
settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased
thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal
responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged
crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling
statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties
liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no
question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is
unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
1st Set Fulltext Page 65 of 74
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is
it final judgment as contradistinguished from an
interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and
executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained
in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore
transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El
Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas
personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias,
solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido
sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term
"sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old
statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the
ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la
fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado
por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella
dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos
al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which
is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that,
as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en
condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the
guilt of the accused becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior
thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay
legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad
criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well
explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes
executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil
action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there
is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-
860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly
reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of
that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the
sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind
Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence
has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the
defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to
appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here
collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term
final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means
judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has
not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against
him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without
reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a
separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be
rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and
the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9,
1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll,
68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed.,
Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed
that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony
CRIM REV
committed and of which the offender might be found guilty,
the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's
criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be
enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we
dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil
aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous
situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil
liability in a case where the source thereof — criminal
liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista,
et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found
and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would
remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted
by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v.
Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al.
5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal
in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been
established, and considering that there is as yet no final
judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the
criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant
Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal
Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing
People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of
Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos
v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former,
the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one
accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is
extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim
therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the
administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to
final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting
from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became
operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As
pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code
establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical
injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's
civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both
proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the
civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet
be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability
follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89,
only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its
only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does
not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the
1st Set Fulltext Page 66 of 74
 former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before
final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant
case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor
originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil
liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could
likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and
second vendees of the property subject matter of the
contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently,
while the death of the accused herein extinguished his
criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the
laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability
of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability
due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the
court relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims
against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final
judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred
that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on
appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI
had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the
name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case as
plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the
deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to
Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability
depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil
liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were
solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10
departed from this long-established principle of law. In this case,
accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower
court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal
of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss
Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability.
His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such
claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action
already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the
court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire
appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction
despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of
determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a
Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil
liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred
after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three
complex crimes of malversation through falsification and
ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of
P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express
waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil
liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action
(People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De
la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
CRIM REV
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued
on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October
24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for
the funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal
liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National
Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of
the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his
criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible
civil liability for the money claims of the Province of
Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted
against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil
liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that
purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within
ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's
heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration
and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs
or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar
as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16
and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained
adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a
reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil
liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is
extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of
the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-
examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the
old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The
resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action
can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the
Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the
ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of
authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the
accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during
appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil
action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event
that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of
said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal
act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that
is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival
of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect
merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives
upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto
is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on
appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. —
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
1st Set Fulltext Page 67 of 74
 xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed
intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to
survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with
the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal
proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This
had the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent
on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate
one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of
criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the
statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in
mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce
to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to
render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action
due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the
concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death
dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the
final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to
the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action
is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal
thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability
springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would
constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of
the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal
proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is
contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the
institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a
criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977,
however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it
allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to
under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary
judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action
to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply
Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was
held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose
of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil
liability for which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability,
concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the
basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld
Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of
his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in
the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as
basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as
the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as
another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing
Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference
that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of
money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if
defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate
liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
CRIM REV
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued
on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the
standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot
be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew
the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of
Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component
criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement,
which has been followed in the Court's judgments
subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego,
should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly
erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in
ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor
justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil
actions instituted together with and as part of criminal
actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary
conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil
action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding
for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an
ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3
enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be
viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims
against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of
Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money
claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include
even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule
86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed
against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last
illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts,
expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict
do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be
no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary
contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before
the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished
upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the
accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of
the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same
act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111
16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate
civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged
but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon
which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom
the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-
delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or
property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused
pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought
against executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim
for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall
be commenced against the executor or administrator; but
actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest
therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
1st Set Fulltext Page 68 of 74
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held
that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent
civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be
filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased
accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because
this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses,
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money
and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual
money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations
other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises
from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the
estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above,
an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction,
the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death
of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil
liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED
with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
August 15, 2017
G.R. No. 226679
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
CRIM REV
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the
constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any
provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be
allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.3
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in
Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or
otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding
license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and custody,
one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP
03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance,
which when examined were found to be positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to
Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not
guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs)
with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1)
the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2)
the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of
separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.
In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution
moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress'
prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining.
Later, in a Comment or Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it
manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into
plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in
paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express
mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining,
[it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the
accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order
denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which
prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure
because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea
bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly
under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules
of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its
constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea bargaining.
It cannot be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act
No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the
operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea
bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal
cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also
the intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused
of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use
1st Set Fulltext Page 69 of 74
of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by
case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused
charged with possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous
drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December
2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the
relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No.
9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is,
to rehabilitate the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might
be plausible basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165,
which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed the
inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive
constitutional power of the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from
resolving, whenever warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is
not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower
courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court
to declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the
potential ramifications that such declaration might have on the
prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this judicial station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an
Order9 dated July 26, 2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as
follows:
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH
PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW,
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE
SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON.
FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), contends that the petition should be dismissed
outright for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the
Congress should have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2)
the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be
attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a
petition for declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for
certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition
fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona
lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there
is no actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe
correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be
underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to
the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full
and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions
despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged
procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of
constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to
determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching
implications.11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a
backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental importance
are present.12 We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem
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on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and
"harrowing" proportions,13 and that its disastrously harmful social,
economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the
hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young
citizens.14 At the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent
as the campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as
urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of
the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of
excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly
accused and convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug
menace that has beset our country and its direct link to certain
crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the
all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence
of drug lords, pushers and users.16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this
petition, technical matters should not deter Us from having to make
the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for
enlightenment and guidance.17 When public interest requires, the
Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a
constitutional issue.18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the
application of the rules of procedure as a necessary complement of its
power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla
discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to
suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling
as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be
final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination
of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and
again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied
rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
now Our exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive
and Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,
21 then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced
the history of the Court's rule-making power and highlighted its
evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to
this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice
Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that
popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as
champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested
this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the
1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it
appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to
1st Set Fulltext Page 70 of 74
the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its
Section 13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure,
and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may
appear on its surface. In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of
its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission
to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which
considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the
1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as
unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x
the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the
bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can
revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less
certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case
with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is
obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed
by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license."
By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of
Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the
1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of
this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed,
altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More
completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of
the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented
by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened
the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power
to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more
independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making
power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
CRIM REV
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. "
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the
first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was
also granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress
to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x.22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23
further elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress,
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court.
Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
xxxx
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced
the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing
scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution
textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent
power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one
body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers'
vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and more independent
judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
would show that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's
rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There was an
initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may
repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the phrase
"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of
the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed
to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word
"[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase
with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a
compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee
members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the
phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the
said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and
(b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal
to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly."
The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present
lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional
participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing
consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and
the Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.x x
x.24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
province of this Court.25 The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the
Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous
attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative
power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules
1st Set Fulltext Page 71 of 74
instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section
27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The Cooperative Code provisions on notices
cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from
Payment of Legal Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In Re:
Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of
Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al.
32 - Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC
are not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141
of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first
paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts
except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes
Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this
Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new
rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive
branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive
and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.34
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our
jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect.
Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the
consent of the court and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser
offense than that charged which is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same
provision was retained under Rule 118 (Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently,
with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the
provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was amended. Section 2,
Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the
consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the
trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or
not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by
a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of
the complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly
required during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall
consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2,
Rule 118 was retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A
second paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this
plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for
purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35
Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2
of the law required that plea bargaining and other matters36 that will
promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during pre-
trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial
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Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional
Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000
Rules37 are quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the
accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,
may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After
arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead
guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty.
No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4,
Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and
within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for
in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge
but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal
procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive rights,
i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.38
"Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give
rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law,
which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for
their invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those
rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this
Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact,
a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in
another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is
substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not,
however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic
approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and
jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for
the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or
modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule
takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a
right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive
matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing
right then the rule deals merely with procedure.41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural
rule violates substantive rights. For example, in People v. Lacson, 42
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as
a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to
prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an
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inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish the
right of the State to prosecute the accused.43 Speaking through then
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has
fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal
cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused
and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may
appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the
time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the
accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with
minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account
the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due
process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period
for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent
of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed
by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is
manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of
justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or
insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance
the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due
process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious
practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on
motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with
no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period
for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such
criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond
the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence,
apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the
prejudice of the State and the accused despite the mandate to public
prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay
as it usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the
consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the
hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may
impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the
disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence
may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or
have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult.
The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another
crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to
the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a
criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that
the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not
derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him
and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of
community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer
those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may
fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his
capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire
criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the
malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system
for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused
only.44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section
6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed
to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose
the remedies available against the judgment, does not take away
substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an
existing right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se
the right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the
Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable
cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of
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conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies
against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court
diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only
works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to "provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy
disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple
expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled
promulgation of the judgment of conviction.46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all
courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way
of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea
bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly
desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of
justice.48 Some of its salutary effects include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the
advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are
obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can
begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated.
For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain
the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce
judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in
which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which
there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of
proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt
and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of
the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement
for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public
from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal
conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time
between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the
rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately
imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the
anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of
his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in
realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges
and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is
protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal
offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal
proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval."49
There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The
essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the
defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.51 Properly
administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief
virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on
plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right.
Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the
defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by
the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be
offered and accepted.54 In any case, whether it be to the offense
charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering
occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental
rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be
heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to
bail (except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself.55
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Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic SO ORDERED.
rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of
guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.56
Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is
not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended
party57 and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid
plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the
offense charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full
control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always
prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on
what the evidence on hand can sustain.59

[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to

prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference are well known.
Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to
assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also
must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as
government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide
how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system
that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious
criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible
to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we
have been "properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to
prosecute. "60

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which
is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes
an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the
accused to make such plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in
mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually
charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or
compromise for the convenience of the accused.62

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or

even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its case.63
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's
exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.64
"Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.65

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to

a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow
such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.66 The only basis
on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing
change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and
nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor
has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it
behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused
made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of
the public will be served.67 The ruling on the motion must disclose
the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any
finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance
of the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.69

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.

9165 violates the equal protection
clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of

R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal
protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by
the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory
provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to
declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug
cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.

Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for
being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court
under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

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