Abayon vs HRET
House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo
These two cases are about the authority of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to pass
upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list
groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.
The Facts and the Case
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the
first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of
Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela
Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters, filed
a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET
against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner
Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that
Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the
House of Representatives, since it did not represent
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further
pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was not
qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee
since she did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an
incumbent congressional district representative. She
moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of
the party-list organization called An Waray in the
immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.
Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) had already confirmed the
status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral
party-list organization representing the workers,
women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she
belonged to the women sector. Abayon also claimed
that although she was the second nominee of An
Waray party-list organization during the 2004
elections, she could not be regarded as having lost a
bid for an elective office.
Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that
respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the
petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban
and the others with him collaterally attacked the
registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list
organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a
seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon
who was just its nominee. All questions involving her
eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal
concerns of Aangat Tayo.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order,
dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but
upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of
petitioner Abayon.1 The latter moved for
reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on
September 17, 2009,2 prompting Abayon to file the
present petition for special civil action of certiorari.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the
first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won
a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the
Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr.,
Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez
are members of some other party-list groups.
Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the
others with him filed with respondent HRET a petition
for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee,
petitioner Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and
the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in
the House of Representatives as party-list nominee
because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented,
namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian
Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former
rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said
that Palparan committed gross human rights
violations against marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no
jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the
party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and
assumed membership in the House of
Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just
Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question
involving his eligibility as first nominee was an
internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be
brought, he said, before that party-list group, not
before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order
dismissing the petition against Bantay for the reason
that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the
party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act.
HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the
question of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications.3
Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET
denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009,4
hence, the recourse to this Court through this petition
for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court
has caused their consolidation.
The Issue Presented
The common issue presented in these two cases is:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction
over the question of qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and
Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who
took the seats at the House of Representatives that
such organizations won in the 2007 elections.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common
theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List
System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to
determine which parties or organizations have the
qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of
Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the
HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed
with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of
Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon
and Palparan were not elected into office but were
chosen by their respective organizations under their
internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire
into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.
If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority
belongs to the COMELEC which already upheld her
qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the
women sector. For Palparan, Bantay’s personality is
so inseparable and intertwined with his own person
as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the
quo warranto action against Bantay without
dismissing the action against him.
But, although it is the party-list organization that is
voted for in the elections, it is not the organization
that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution,5 identifies who the "members" of that
House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party‑ list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives
are of two kinds: "members x x x who shall be elected
from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations." This means that, from the
Constitution’s point of view, it is the party-list
representatives who are "elected" into office, not their
parties or organizations. These representatives are
elected, however, through that peculiar party-list
system that the Constitution authorized and that
Congress by law established where the voters cast
their votes for the organizations or parties to which
such party-list representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the
party-list representatives are treated in like manner.
They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and
emoluments. They can participate in the making of
laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts
or sectors. They are also subject to the same term
limitation of three years for a maximum of three
consecutive terms.
It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List
System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as
"members of the House of Representatives," thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible. (Underscoring supplied)
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-
RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections,6 a party-list
representative is in every sense "an elected member
of the House of Representatives." Although the vote
cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such
vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees,
who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the
House of Representatives.
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act
set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification
of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing
the Constitution, states:
Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. – No
person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and
write, bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.1avvphi1
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at
least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until
the expiration of his term.
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged
the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan
claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors that they ought to
represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a
nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent."7
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this
particular qualification of a nominee—the need for
him or her to be a bona fide member or a
representative of his party-list organization—in the
context of the facts that characterize petitioners
Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and
Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and
underrepresented interests that they presumably
embody.

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out

that the authority to determine the qualifications of a
party-list nominee belongs to the party or
organization that nominated him. This is true, initially.
The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees
and, eventually, to choose five from among them after
all belongs to the party or organization that
nominates them.8 But where an allegation is made
that the party or organization had chosen and allowed
a disqualified nominee to become its party-list
representative in the lower House and enjoy the
secured tenure that goes with the position, the
resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.

Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act

does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe,
when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon,
that it has the power to do so as an incident of its
authority to approve the registration of party-list
organizations. But the Court need not resolve this
question since it is not raised here and has not been
argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the

Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to, among other things,
the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-
list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear
and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with
the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been
proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends
and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.10

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not

gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-
list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction
over the question of the qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated

petitions and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16, 2009
and Resolution 09-183 dated September 17, 2009 in
HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23,
2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated September 10,
2009 in HRET Case 07-040.

SO ORDERED.
Reyes vs COMELEC
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order
dated 7 June 2013 filed by petitioner Regina Ongsiako
Reyes, assailing the Resolutions dated 27 March 2013
and 14 May 2013 issued by public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-
053. The assailed Resolutions ordered the
cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of
petitioner for the position of Representative of the
lone district of Marinduque.
On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan,
a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of
Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an
Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel
the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the
ground that it contained material misrepresentations,
specifically: (1) that she is single when she is married
to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of
Batangas;1 (2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac,
Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan,
Batangas which is the residence of her husband, and
at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135
J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in
the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House
of Representatives;2 (3) that her date of birth is 3 July
1964 when other documents show that her birthdate
is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;3 (4) that she is
not a permanent resident of another country when
she is a permanent resident or an immigrant4 of the
United States of America;5 and (5) that she is a
Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American
citizen.6
In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is
publicly known to be the wife of Congressman
Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas),
there is no valid and binding marriage between them.
According to petitioner, although her marriage with
Congressman Mandanas was solemnized in a religious
rite, it did not comply with certain formal
requirements prescribed by the Family Code,
rendering it void ab initio.7 Consequently, petitioner
argues that as she is not duty-bound to live with
Congressman Mandanas, then his residence cannot be
attributed to her.8 As to her date of birth, the
Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National
Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964.9
Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a
permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United
States of America is not supported by evidence.10
During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February
2013, respondent filed a "Manifestation with Motion
to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended
List of Exhibits"11 consisting of, among others: (1) a
copy of an article published on the internet on 8
January 2013 entitled "Seeking and Finding the Truth
about Regina O. Reyes" with an Affidavit of
Identification and Authenticity of Document executed
by its author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a
database record of the Bureau of Immigration
indicating that petitioner is an American citizen and a
holder of a U.S. passport; (2) a Certification of Travel
Records of petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez,
Acting Chief, Verification and Certification Unit of the
Bureau of Immigration which indicates that petitioner
used a U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad.
On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued
a Resolution12 cancelling petitioner’s COC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is
hereby CANCELLED.
The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to
the declarations that she made in her COC, petitioner
is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure
to comply with the requirements of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2)
to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the
COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have
the oneyear residency requirement under Section 6,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.13 Thus, she is
ineligible to run for the position of Representative for
the lone district of Marinduque.
Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC
First Division, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration14 on 8 April 2013 claiming that she
is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not
lost such status by simply obtaining and using an
American passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised
that the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of
her marriage to an American citizen in concluding
that she is a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner
averred, however, that such marriage only resulted
into dual citizenship, thus there is no need for her to
fulfill the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225. Still,
petitioner attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public
on 24 September 2012. As to her alleged lack of the
one-year residency requirement prescribed by the
Constitution, she averred that, as she never became a
naturalized citizen, she never lost her domicile of
origin, which is Boac, Marinduque.
On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated
a Resolution15 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner
was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections.
On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
Certificate of Finality16 declaring the 14 May 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and
executory, considering that more than twenty-one
(21) days have elapsed from the date of promulgation
with no order issued by this Court restraining its
execution.17
On same day, petitioner took her oath of office18
before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House
of Representatives.
Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which
officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013.
In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order, petitioner
raises the following issues:19
31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without
jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed
winner and who has already taken her oath of office
for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the lone congressional district of
Marinduque.
32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of Respondent
Tan’s alleged "newly-discovered evidence" without
the same having been testified on and offered and
admitted in evidence which became the basis for its
Resolution of the case without giving the petitioner
the opportunity to question and present
controverting evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s
right to due process of law.
33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a
Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency
requirement for the position of Member of the House
of Representatives.
34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on
Elections committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by
enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, it
imposed additional qualifications to the qualifications
of a Member of the House of Representatives as
enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines.
The petition must fail.
At the outset, it is observed that the issue of
jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC vis-a-vis that of
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
appears to be a non-issue. Petitioner is taking an
inconsistent, if not confusing, stance for while she
seeks remedy before this Court, she is asserting that it
is the HRET which has jurisdiction over her. Thus, she
posits that the issue on her eligibility and
qualifications to be a Member of the House of
Representatives is best discussed in another tribunal
of competent jurisdiction. It appears then that
petitioner’s recourse to this Court was made only in
an attempt to enjoin the COMELEC from
implementing its final and executory judgment in SPA
No. 13-053.
Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and
consider each of the issues raised by petitioner. The
need to do so, and at once, was highlighted during the
discussion En Banc on 25 June 2013 where and when
it was emphasized that the term of office of the
Members of the House of Representatives begins on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of
its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed20
because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction
to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications" of the Members of
the House of Representatives.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is
duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not
averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after
the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. x x x
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,21 the HRET does not
have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a
member of the House of Representatives, to wit:
As to the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over
the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8,
1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications of members
of Congress begins only after a candidate has become
a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner
not being a member of the House of Representatives,
it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate
considered a Member of the House of
Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,22 citing Aggabao v.
COMELEC23 and Guerrero v. COMELEC,24 the Court
ruled that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins. (Emphasis supplied.)
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of
Limkaichong v. COMELEC,25 wherein the Court,
referring to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-a-vis
the HRET, held that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins. (Emphasis supplied.)
This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC,26 to
wit:
After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of
office by Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the matter of his
qualifications, as well as questions regarding the
conduct of election and contested returns – were
transferred to the HRET as the constitutional body
created to pass upon the same. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath,
and (3) assumption of office.
Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the
pronouncement that once a proclamation has been
made, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and,
thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to
elections, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. However, it must be
noted that in these cases, the doctrinal
pronouncement was made in the context of a
proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath
of office, but who had also assumed office.
For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC,27
the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the HRET against
that of the COMELEC only after the candidate had
been proclaimed, taken his oath of office before the
Speaker of the House, and assumed the duties of a
Congressman on 26 September 2007, or after the start
of his term on 30 June 2007, to wit:
On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte
filed his comment in which he brought to Our
attention that on September 26, 2007, even before the
issuance of the status quo ante order of the Court, he
had already been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly
elected Member of the House of Representatives of
the First Congressional District of Lanao del Norte. On
that very same day, he had taken his oath before
Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, Jr. and assumed
his duties accordingly.
In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case
has already been transferred to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
(Emphasis supplied.)
Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the
questioned candidate had already assumed office, and
hence, was already considered a Member of the House
of Representatives, unlike in the present case.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member
of the House of Representatives because, primarily,
she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has
earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the
House of Representatives begins only "at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election."28
Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains
jurisdiction.
In her attempt to comply with the second
requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath Of
Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5
June 2013. However, this is not the oath of office
which confers membership to the House of
Representatives.
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the
House of Representatives provides:
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members
shall take their oath or affirmation either collectively
or individually before the Speaker in open session.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking
of the oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session.
Here, although she made the oath before Speaker
Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made
during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains
unclear whether the required oath of office was
indeed complied with.
More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in
this controversy – that before the proclamation of
petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had
already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner’s
lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its
Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013,
there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any
pending case on petitioner’s qualifications to run for
the position of Member of the House of
Representative. We will inexcusably disregard this
fact if we accept the argument of the petitioner that
the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction when she
was proclaimed, which was four days after the
COMELEC En Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser
which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be
allowed to render nugatory a decision of the
COMELEC En Banc which affirmed a decision of the
COMELEC First Division.
Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division which was promulgated on 27 March 2013,
and the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
which was promulgated on 14 May 2013, became final
and executory on 19 May 2013 based on Section 3,
Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which
provides:
Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. Decisions in
pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due
course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to
declare nuisance candidate or to disqualify a
candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall
become final and executory after the lapse of five (5)
days from their promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court.
To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013
from becoming final and executory, petitioner should
have availed herself of Section 1, Rule 3729 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule 6430 of the
Rules of Court by filing a petition before this Court
within the 5-day period, but she failed to do so. She
would file the present last hour petition on 10 June
2013. Hence, on 5 June 2013, respondent COMELEC
rightly issued a Certificate of Finality.
As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove
her Filipino citizenship, as well as her one-year
residency in Marinduque, suffice it to say that the
COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
finding her ineligible for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion when it took cognizance of "newly-
discovered evidence" without the same having been
testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She
assails the admission of the blog article of Eli
Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the
Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She
likewise contends that there was a violation of her
right to due process of law because she was not given
the opportunity to question and present
controverting evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not
bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under
Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
"shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Commission." In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to
cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature,
then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly
admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in
the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC.
From 10 October 2012 when Tan’s petition was filed
up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division
rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five
(5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did
not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due
process only requires that the party be given the
opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of
Sahali v. COMELEC:31
The petitioners should be reminded that due process
does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but
simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may
be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also,
and perhaps many times more creditably and
predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In
administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules
of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed,
deprivation of due process cannot be successfully
invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis
supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for
office on the ground of citizenship, the COMELEC First
Division, discoursed as follows:
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino
citizenship and become eligible for public office, the
law requires that she must have accomplished the
following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General
of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent
complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on in
the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner’s
lack of proof regarding her American citizenship,
contending that it is petitioner’s burden to present a
case. She, however, specifically denied that she has
become either a permanent resident or naturalized
citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered
evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013,
however, establishing the fact that respondent is a
holder of an American passport which she continues
to use until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to
substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to
respondent to present substantial evidence to prove
otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do,
leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent
falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can
establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA
9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen,
and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of
her American citizenship, she remains to be an
American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for
and hold any elective public office in the
Philippines."32 (Emphasis supplied.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In
moving for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC,
respondent submitted records of the Bureau of
Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a
US passport, and that her status is that of a
"balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted
to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove
that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not
lost the same, or that she has reacquired such status
in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225.
Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-
born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof
to support such contention. Neither did she submit
any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to
her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc, petitioner admitted that she is a
holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is
only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her.33
Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24
September 2012.34 Petitioner explains that she
attached said Affidavit "if only to show her desire and
zeal to serve the people and to comply with rules,
even as a superfluity."35 We cannot, however,
subscribe to petitioner’s explanation. If petitioner
executed said Affidavit "if only to comply with the
rules," then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225
applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that she
executed it to address the observations by the
COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were
promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was
executed in September 2012.
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a
footnote to her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, to this effect: "This does not mean that
Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of
office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of
allegiance for purposes of reacquisition of natural-
born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in
the proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of
oath of office is in order to make reference to what is
already part of the records and evidence in the
present case and to avoid injecting into the records
evidence on matters of fact that was not previously
passed upon by Respondent COMELEC."36 This
statement raises a lot of questions – Did petitioner
execute an oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of
natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she
not present it at the earliest opportunity before the
COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has
indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance
as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends that,
since she took her oath of allegiance in connection
with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of
Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her
status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is
being presented for the first time before this Court, as
it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another,
said oath of allegiance cannot be considered
compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain
requirements have to be met as prescribed by
Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise
known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No.
AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative
Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of
Immigration. Thus, petitioner’s oath of office as
Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the
oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a
doubt was clearly cast on petitioner’s citizenship.
Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.
As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the
finding that petitioner has lost her natural-born
status, we quote with approval the ruling of the
COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot be
considered a resident of Marinduque:
"Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized
elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin.
Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to
RA 9225, he must still show that he chose to establish
his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts,
and the period of his residency shall be counted from
the time he made it his domicile of choice.
In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that
petitioner had already re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that
she has regained her domicile in the Philippines.
There being no proof that petitioner had renounced
her American citizenship, it follows that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
The only proof presented by petitioner to show that
she has met the one-year residency requirement of
the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in
Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as
Provincial Administrator of the province from January
18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is not
sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For,
petitioner has never regained her domicile in
Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen.
No amount of her stay in the said locality can
substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA."37 (Emphasis
supplied.)
All in all, considering that the petition for denial and
cancellation of the COC is summary in nature, the
COMELEC is given much discretion in the evaluation
and admission of evidence pursuant to its principal
objective of determining of whether or not the COC
should be cancelled. We held in Mastura v.
COMELEC:38
The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies
will not be disturbed by courts of justice except when
there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial
evidence in support of such findings should be applied
with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as
the framers of the Constitution intended to place the
COMELEC — created and explicitly made independent
by the Constitution itself — on a level higher than
statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has
broad powers to ascertain the true results of the
election by means available to it. For the attainment of
that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of
evidence.1âwphi1
Time and again, We emphasize that the "grave abuse
of discretion" which warrants this Court’s exercise of
certiorari jurisdiction has a welldefined meaning.
Guidance is found in Beluso v. Commission on
Elections39 where the Court held:

x x x A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave

abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist.
"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a
specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or
personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an
evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined
by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an
act to be struck down as having been done with grave
abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross. (Emphasis supplied.)

Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to

adequately and substantially show that grave abuse of
discretion exists.

Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act

of the COMELEC in enforcing the provisions of R.A. No.
9225, insofar as it adds to the qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives other than
those enumerated in the Constitution, is
unconstitutional, We find the same meritless.

The COMELEC did not impose additional

qualifications on candidates for the House of
Representatives who have acquired foreign
citizenship. It merely applied the qualifications
prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and must have one-
year residency prior to the date of elections. Such
being the case, the COMELEC did not err when it
inquired into the compliance by petitioner of Sections
3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine if she
reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino
citizen. It simply applied the constitutional provision
and nothing more.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is

DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane affirming
the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division is upheld.

SO ORDERED.
VINZONS-CHATO vs COMELEC
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 filed by
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato seeking to nullify the
Resolution2 dated March 17, 2006 of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in SPC No. 04-096.
The assailed resolution affirmed the Resolution3
dated April 13, 2005 of the COMELEC (First Division)
dismissing petitioner Chato’s "petition to
correct/nullify the election returns in the municipality
of Labo, Camarines Norte, due to illegality of the
proceedings before respondent Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Labo and for manifest errors in the
election returns; to declare null and void and without
legal effect the proclamation of respondent candidate;
and to declare and proclaim petitioner as the
candidate with the highest number of votes received
for the lone congressional district of the Province of
Camarines Norte."
The factual and procedural antecedents are as
follows:
Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were
among the candidates for the lone congressional
district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections.
In her petition filed with the COMELEC, petitioner
Chato alleged that during the canvassing of the
election returns before the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Labo (MBC Labo) from May 10 to 12,
2004, her counsel raised several objections and
pointed to manifest errors or obvious discrepancies in
the election returns from various precincts of the
municipality of Labo. Prior to the suspension of
proceedings on May 12, 2004, the MBC Labo gave her
twenty-four (24) hours, or until 6:00 p.m. of May 13,
2004, to prove her allegations.
Allegedly in violation of the procedure prescribed in
Section 204 of Republic Act No. 7166 (An Act
Providing for Synchronized National and
Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms,
Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and For Other
Purposes), before the expiration of the period granted
and without notice to petitioner Chato or her counsel,
the MBC Labo concluded the canvassing of votes and
hastily forwarded the results of its canvass to the
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Camarines
Norte. At that time, which was around 4:00 p.m. of
May 13, 2004, petitioner Chato’s counsel was
supposed to deliver to the MBC Labo her letter
enumerating the election returns allegedly containing
manifest errors and discrepancies.
Petitioner Chato’s counsel was thus constrained to
appear before the PBC and moved for the suspension
of its proceedings on the ground that there were still
pending incidents before the MBC Labo. The PBC,
however, denied the said motion. Upon instruction of
the PBC, petitioner Chato filed therewith a letter-
petition for reconsideration of the denial of her
request to remand the matter to the MBC. However,
on May 14, 2004, at around 10:00 a.m., petitioner
Chato’s counsel received a Resolution, of even date, of
the PBC denying with finality her letter-petition for
reconsideration. In so ruling, the PBC stated that pre-
proclamation controversy was not allowed for the
election of Members of the House of Representatives.
It noted that the matters raised by petitioner Chato,
which formed part of the proceedings of the PBC,
were proper for an election protest before the
competent tribunal. Further, according to the PBC, it
had no authority to direct the MBC Labo to reconvene
for the purpose of receiving petitioner Chato’s written
objections and supporting documents and re-
canvassing the election returns.
Likewise on May 14, 2004, at 11:30 a.m., the PBC
proclaimed respondent Unico as representative-elect
of the lone congressional district of Camarines
Norte.1awphi1.nét
Petitioner Chato forthwith filed with the COMELEC a
Petition alleging manifest errors in that –
1) Total number of ballots found in the compartment
for valid ballots is more than the number of voters
who actually voted in Barangays Anamea[m], Bagong
Silang III, Bakiad, Malangcao Basud and Submakin;
2) Total number of votes counted is less than the
number of voters who actually voted in Barangays
Gumamela, Pinya, Dalas, Anameam, Baay, Bagacay,
Bagong Silang I, II & III, Bakiad, Bautista, Bayan-
Bayan, Bulhao, Cabusay, Calabasa, Cabatuhan,
Canapwan, Daguit I, Dumagmang, Exciban, Fundado,
Gumacutan, Guisican, Iberica, Lugui, Mabilo I & II,
Macogon, Mahan-hawan, Malanggan Masalong,
Napaod, Pag-asa, Pangpang, San Antonio, Sta. Cruz,
Submakin, Talobalib and Tulay na Lupa;
3) The entries in some election returns coming from
different precincts in Barangays Tulay na Lupa, Baay
and Lugui, all of Labo, Camarines Norte, appear to
have been written by one person;1a\^/phi1.net
4) No data on number of voters who actually voted
and of ballots found in compartment for valid ballots
from Barangays Bulhao, San Antonio, Tulay na Lupa,
Daguit, Pinya, Cabusay, Napaod, Pag-asa and Dalas;
and
5) One election return is supposedly an election
return from Barangay Del Carmen, Labo, but there is
apparently no Barangay Del Carmen and does not
appear to be part of the series of election returns
assigned to Labo.5
Petitioner Chato insisted that correction of manifest
errors in the certificates of canvass or election
returns, questions affecting the composition or
proceedings of the boards of canvassers, or noting of
objections on election returns or certificates of
canvass were allowed before the MBC. She further
claimed that with all the manifest errors and obvious
discrepancies appearing on the face of the election
returns, it could not be said that the canvassing of
votes in Labo reflected the true and correct number of
votes that she received in the said municipality.

On July 2, 2004, the COMELEC (First Division) ordered
the suspension of the effects of the proclamation of
respondent Unico. On July 23, 2004, it lifted the said
order on the ground that respondent Unico’s
proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only
divested the Commission of any jurisdiction to pass
upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also
automatically conferred jurisdiction to another
electoral tribunal.
Subsequently, the COMELEC (First Division) issued
the Resolution dated April 13, 2005, dismissing the
petition for lack of merit. It stated preliminarily that
the MBC is precluded from entertaining pre-
proclamation controversies on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and
appreciation of the election returns or certificates of
canvass involving the positions of President, Vice-
President, Senators, and Members of the House of
Representatives and Party-List.
The COMELEC (First Division) found that the relief
sought by petitioner Chato was actually for the re-
counting of votes, not merely correction of manifest
errors in the election returns. Further, in seeking to
nullify respondent Unico’s proclamation, petitioner
Chato alleged manifest errors in the election returns
and that they were tampered with and prepared
under duress.
Addressing these contentions, the COMELEC (First
Division) explained that a re-count of votes is not
within the province of a pre-proclamation
controversy, which is generally limited to an
examination of the election returns on their face. It
observed that under Section 316 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 6669 (General Instructions for
Municipal/City/Provincial and District Board of
Canvassers in connection with the May 10, 2004
Elections), objections to the election returns or
certificates of canvass were to be specifically noted in
the minutes of the board. With respect to the manifest
errors alleged by petitioner Chato, the COMELEC
(First Division) stated that her objections were
general in character as they failed to specify the
election return(s) containing these alleged manifest
errors as well as the precinct(s) from which they
came. Under the circumstances, the MBC Labo could
not immediately rule on petitioner Chato’s bare
allegations for to do so would have resulted in a
fishing expedition.
The COMELEC (First Division) mentioned that even
her petition for reconsideration filed with the PBC
was bereft of evidence to support her claim of
manifest errors. It was only in her petition filed with
the COMELEC that petitioner Chato specifically
enumerated the election returns that allegedly
contained infirmities or manifest errors. However,
according to the COMELEC (First Division), the
resolution of the matters raised by petitioner Chato,
e.g., correction of the votes garnered by the
candidates and reflected in the election returns,
would require the opening of the ballots. This could
only be done in an election protest considering that
petitioner Chato likewise alleged fraud, substitution,
and vote padding.
The COMELEC (First Division) also held that the MBC
or PBC had no discretion on matters pertaining to the
proclamation of the winning candidates because they
were simply performing a ministerial
function.1ªvvphi1.nét Absent a lawful order from the
COMELEC to suspend or annul a proclamation, the
PBC of Camarines Norte, in particular, was mandated
to comply with its duties and functions including the
proclamation of respondent Unico as the winning
candidate for the lone congressional district of
Camarines Norte. The decretal portion of the
Resolution dated April 13, 2005 of the COMELEC
(First Division) stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED for utter LACK OF
MERIT.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved, petitioner Chato filed a motion for
reconsideration thereof which was elevated to the
COMELEC en banc for resolution.
In the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006, the
COMELEC en banc denied petitioner Chato’s motion
for reconsideration ruling that the Commission
already lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the
fact that respondent Unico had already taken his oath
as a Member of the Thirteenth (13th) Congress. It
reasoned, thus:
In Pangilinan vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No.
105278, November 18, 1993), the Supreme Court
made a categorical pronouncement that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives now
have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are
the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members, thereby divesting the Commission on
Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973
Constitution over election cases pertaining to the
election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa
(Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is now bereft
of jurisdiction to hear and decide the pre-
proclamation controversies against members of the
House of Representatives as well as of the Senate.
The Honorable Court reiterated the aforequoted
ruling in the recent case of Aggabao vs. COMELEC, et
al. (G.R. No. 163756, January 26, 2005), where it held
that:
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relative to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office
as a Member of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating
to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

Considering that private respondent Renato Unico
had already taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the 13th Congress, the Commission had
already lost jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The Resolution of this Commission (First
Division) promulgated last April 13, 2005 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner Chato now seeks recourse to the Court
alleging that:
THE SOLE ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT IS WHETHER OR NOT THE
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PROMULGATING THE
QUESTIONED RESOLUTION ON MARCH 17, 2006.9
Petitioner Chato essentially contends that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when
it ruled that it had already been divested of
jurisdiction upon respondent Unico’s assumption of
office as a Member of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner Chato vigorously asserts that respondent
Unico’s proclamation was void because it was based
on doctored election documents and not through the
legitimate will of the electorate. As such, it can
allegedly be challenged even after respondent Unico
had assumed office.
Petitioner Chato further submits that the COMELEC
possesses the authority to pass upon issues involving
manifest errors in the certificates of canvass and the
composition of the board or its proceedings. It also
has the authority to pass upon the nullity of what
otherwise is a null and void proclamation.
With respect to petitioner Chato’s case, the MBC
allegedly violated Section 20 of RA 7166 by failing to
rule on her objections during the canvassing of votes.
The PBC allegedly confounded this error by refusing
to correct the alleged manifest errors in the election
returns or certificate of canvass before it. The
COMELEC, for its part, allegedly committed grave
abuse of discretion when it did not annul the
proclamation of respondent Unico even as it allegedly
possessed such authority as well as to correct
manifest errors in the election returns and certificates
of canvass, and order the re-counting of the ballots.
Petitioner Chato emphasized that the COMELEC has
the power of supervision and control over boards of
canvassers, including the power to review, revise
and/or set aside their rulings. Although the COMELEC,
through the First Division in its earlier order
suspending the effects of respondent Unico’s
proclamation, ordered the examination of the
evidence and documents submitted by the parties,
petitioner Chato avers that the COMELEC never
disclosed the outcome of this supposed examination.
She thus urges the Court to order the COMELEC to
direct the examination of the election returns of the
municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte, or release the
results thereof if one had already been undertaken;
constitute and convene a new MBC, and direct the
same to prepare a new election return, accomplish a
new certificate of canvass and submit it to the PBC;
direct the PBC to reconvene and canvass the new
certificate of canvass, and subsequently proclaim the
winning candidate for the lone congressional district
of Camarines Norte.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed
of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Construing this provision in Pangilinan v. Commission
on Elections,10 the Court held that:
x x x The Senate and the House of Representatives
now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which
are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members," thereby divesting the Commission on
Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973
Constitution over election cases pertaining to the
election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa
(Congress). x x x
With respect to the House of Representatives, it is the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over
contests relative to the election, returns and
qualifications of its members. The use of the word
"sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and
in Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code
underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its
members.11
Further, the phrase "election, returns, and
qualifications" has been interpreted in this wise:
The phrase "election, returns, and qualifications"
should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title.
But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that
"election" referred to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of
votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including questions
concerning the composition of the board of
canvassers and the authenticity of the election
returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be
raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the
proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or
ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy.12 (Emphasis supplied).
House of Representatives. On the contrary, it
demonstrated fealty to the constitutional fiat that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of its
members.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The Court has invariably held that once a winning SO ORDERED.

candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins.13 Stated in another manner, where the
candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the
congressional elections, the remedy of the petitioner
is to file an electoral protest with the HRET.14

In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent

Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath
of office as a Member of the House of Representatives
(Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly
ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over
petitioner Chato’s petition. The issues raised by
petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of
returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico’s
proclamation. These are matters that are best
addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of
the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent
Unico’s proclamation is null and void does not divest
the HRET of its jurisdiction:

x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the

proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken
his oath of office and assumed his post as
Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to
the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for
it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of
jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due
regard to the people’s mandate.15

Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner

Chato’s election protest against respondent Unico
would be to usurp the constitutionally mandated
functions of the HRET.16 Petitioner Chato’s remedy
would have been to file an election protest before the
said tribunal, not this petition for certiorari. The
special civil action of certiorari is available only if
there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit:
(1) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and (b) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law to annul or modify the
proceeding. There must be capricious, arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of power for certiorari to
prosper.17

All told, the COMELEC en banc clearly did not commit

grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed
Resolution dated March 17, 2006 holding that it had
lost jurisdiction upon respondent Unico’s
proclamation and oath-taking as a Member of the
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs COMELEC
A constitutional provision should be construed as to
give it effective operation and suppress the mischief
at which it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution
mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of
Representatives be "a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for
a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the election."2 The mischief which this
provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973
Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter, from an elective office to
serve that community."3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the
Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995,
providing the following information in item no. 8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK
TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy
Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position,
filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. In his petition, private
respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for
candidates for the House of Representatives on the
evidence of declarations made by her in Voter
Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her
Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be
issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and
canceling the certificate of candidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since
childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.8
On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the
aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the
ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the
filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20,
1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of
Candidacy should have been filed on or before the
March 20, 1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's
petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the
head office on the same day. In said Answer,
petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven"
in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result
of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought
to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in
her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and
that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's
motive in filing the petition seeking her
disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that
she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban
City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte,
petitioner immediately opposed her intended
registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not
a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in
Tolosa following completion of her six month actual
residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the
COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the
First District to the Second District and pursued such
a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to
remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the
congressional election in the First District. He also
filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen,
seeking the creation of another legislative district to
remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to
achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass
the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner
now filed the instant petition for the same objective,
as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the
electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest,
orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8,
1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to
1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private
respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-
009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March
31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues,
namely, the validity of amending the original
Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline
for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's
compliance with the one year residency requirement,
the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her
Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a
result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment
should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she
thought that what was asked was her "actual and
physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of
origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to
which she could have responded "since childhood." In
an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her
domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, to which she always intended to return
whenever absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she
tried to discredit petitioner's theory of
disqualification by alleging that she has been a
resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood, although she only became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts
that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a
component of the First District, before coming to the
Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to
her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that
she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she
can be a candidate for the District. However, this
intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the
Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent
since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She
never disputed this claim and instead implicitly
acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the
Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE.
Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware
of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be
Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite
Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her
explanation that she thought what was asked was her
actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to
believe because there is none in the question that
insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the
Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency
in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election." Thus, the
explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest
mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of
merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an
amendment may be made, she cited the case of Alialy
v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent
on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only
applies to the "inconsequential deviations which
cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations
from provisions intended primarily to secure timely
and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court
in that case considered the amendment only as a
matter of form. But in the instant case, the
amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form
or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the
number of years of residence in the place where
respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter
which determines her qualification as a candidacy,
specially those intended to suppress, accurate
material representation in the original certificate
which adversely affects the filer. To admit the
amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by
the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the
detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven
(7) month period of her residency in order to prolong
it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an
untruthfulness to be committed before this
Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7
months residency the respondent indicated in her
certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry
in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on
January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident
of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of
the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy
is further buttressed by her letter to the election
officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24,
1994, requesting for the cancellation of her
registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so
that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3)
different documents show the respondent's consistent
conviction that she has transferred her residence to
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such
limited period of time, starting in the last week of
August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up
to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be
persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention
that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this
Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing
discussion, it is clear that respondent has not
complied with the one year residency requirement of
the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always
been considered as synonymous with "domicile"
which imports not only the intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in-that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for
like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon
vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-
Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when
she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence
she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro
Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to
Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been
a resident of the First District since childhood is
nothing more than to give her a color of qualification
where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It
cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by
the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time
that she studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected
Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro
Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she
lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a
registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of
the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the
City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of
Metro Manila. She could not have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of the City of
Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of
candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she
claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As
a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote
a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila requesting for the cancellation of her
registration in the permanent list of voters that she
may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not
have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood
up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places,
including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that
prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a
resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of
intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She
registered as a voter in different places and on several
occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila.
Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is
considered to have abandoned such place when she
chose to stay and reside in other different places. In
the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the
Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by
choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain
there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile.
In other words there must basically be animus
manendi with animus non revertendi. When
respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in
Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by
registering as a voter there and expressly declaring
that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to
have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient,
there must likewise be conduct indicative of such
intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that
she has always intended to return to Tacloban,
without the accompanying conduct to prove that
intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence.
Respondent has not presented any evidence to show
that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed
intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was
evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she
had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was
not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since
childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have
not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for
more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out
that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a
voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In
doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record
that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a
period of six months. This may be inconsequential as
argued by the respondent since it refers only to her
residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove
that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte
prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a
convincing proof that she had been a resident of the
district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8,
1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the
April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified
to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration,
the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new
substantial matters having been raised therein to
warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the
petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution
allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results
of the canvass show that she obtained the highest
number of votes in the congressional elections in the
First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second
Resolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains
the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995,
petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections for the congressional seat in
the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on
the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that
the canvass showed that she obtained a total of
70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received
by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of
Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner
from running for the congressional seat of the First
District of Leyte and the public respondent's
Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner
comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and
Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be
classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election
purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of
one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the
period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said
Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over
the question of petitioner's qualifications after the
May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second
Division reveals a startling confusion in the
application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and
"Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC
seems to be in agreement with the general
proposition that for the purposes of election law,
residence is synonymous with domicile, the
Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake
the concept of domicile for actual residence, a
conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's qualifications for election
to the House of Representatives as required by the
1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the
purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective
position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the
exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their
place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20
this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which,
whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one
intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."
21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin
elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence
in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention
of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the
factual relationship of an individual to a certain place.
It is the physical presence of a person in a given area,
community or country. The essential distinction
between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the
purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode
ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as
pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to
remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to
leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an
individual to have different residences in various
places. However, a person can only have a single
domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully
abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of
choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this
distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence.
"Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent,
one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited
time. A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence. His place of residence is generally
his place of domicile, but it is not by any means
necessarily so since no length of residence without
intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and
domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of
political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our
election law, what has clearly and unequivocally
emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term
residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place,
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs.
Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case
involving the qualifications of the respondent therein
to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete,
Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the
absence from residence to pursue studies or practice
a profession or registration as a voter other than in
the place where one is elected does not constitute loss
of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile)
in our election law that in these and other election law
cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of
an individual from his permanent residence without
the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or
change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the
residence qualification for certain elective positions
have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the
Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it
actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I
remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
there was an attempt to require residence in the place
not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for
the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the
regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the
district for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation
given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on
Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has
raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather
than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman
consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some
difficulty especially considering that a provision in the
Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that
Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So,
we have to stick to the original concept that it should
be by domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to
the definition given to the term residence in election
law, regarding it as having the same meaning as
domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has
petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the
residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6
of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the
questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of
Candidacy stating her residence in the First
Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not and individual has
satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material
only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to
deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely
committed an honest mistake in jotting the word
"seven" in the space provided for the residency
qualification requirement. The circumstances leading
to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted
in the subsequent confusion which prompted
petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay
in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in
the First district, which was "since childhood" in the
space provided. These circumstances and events are
amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's
questioned resolution, albeit with a different
interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban
City to make her eligible to run in the First District,
private respondent Montejo opposed the same,
claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not
Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place
of actual residence in the First District, which is
Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted
down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at
said certificate would reveal the possible source of the
confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is
followed immediately by the entry for residence in the
constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES:
Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE
I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register
in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of
petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that
petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her
legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of
entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring
actual residence and the second requiring domicile —
coupled with the circumstances surrounding
petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously
led to her writing down an unintended entry for
which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake
should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of
residence in the First District if such fact were
established by means more convincing than a mere
entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's
domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's
domicile could not possibly be in the First District of
Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its
assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that
"except for the time when (petitioner) studied and
worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban
City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution
additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact
that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where
she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban,
Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in
1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she
was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the
election of her husband to the Philippine presidency,
she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter.
In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila.
"She could not, have served these positions if she had
not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC
stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an
individual does not lose his domicile even if he has
lived and maintained residences in different places.
Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual
relationship to a given place for various purposes. The
absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
profession, to study or to do other things of a
temporary or semi-permanent nature does not
constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the
COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of
Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed
her certificate of candidacy because she became a
resident of many places" flies in the face of settled
jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made
distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile
for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33
supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a
person who has his own house wherein he lives with
his family in a municipality without having ever had
the intention of abandoning it, and without having
lived either alone or with his family in another
municipality, has his residence in the former
municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as
an elector in the other municipality in question and
having been a candidate for various insular and
provincial positions, stating every time that he is a
resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We
explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for
"greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his
lot, and that, of course includes study in other places,
practice of his avocation, or engaging in business.
When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his
birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to
his native town to cast his ballot but for professional
or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may
not absent himself from his professional or business
activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he
has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to
give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials
who are to run the government especially in national
elections. Despite such registration, the animus
revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of
origin has not forsaken him. This may be the
explanation why the registration of a voter in a place
other than his residence of origin has not been
deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss
of such residence. It finds justification in the natural
desire and longing of every person to return to his
place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the
place of one's birth must be overcome by positive
proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its
above-cited statements supporting its proposition
that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's
various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence
on residence in election law and the deliberations of
the constitutional commission but also the provisions
of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of
facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile,
which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second
Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8
years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant
Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she
graduated from high school. She pursued her college
studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word
University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree
in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte
Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she
went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House
of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President
Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman
of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When
her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in
1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan,
Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when
her husband was elected President of the Republic of
the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her
family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu,
Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila.
In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of
the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy
wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found
by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner
held various residences for different purposes during
the last four decades. None of these purposes
unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while
petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she
naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She
grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and
eventually established residence in different parts of
the country for various reasons. Even during her
husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos
Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her
domicile of origin by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important personal milestones in her home province,
instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of
her province and hometown, and establishing a
political power base where her siblings and close
relatives held positions of power either through the
ballot or by appointment, always with either her
influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her
domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of
the quarter century of Marcos power in our country.
Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S
Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not
know what the rest of the country always knew: the
fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that
Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin
because she did not live there until she was eight
years old. He avers that after leaving the place in
1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for
many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her
domicile in said place by merely expressing her
intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As
domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is
gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's
being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her
domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile
was not established only when her father brought his
family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's
averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of
domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on
these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing
concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted,
for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two
legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at
bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent
plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to
convince this court that an abandonment of domicile
of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed
occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former
domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that
petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of
law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly
established distinction between the Civil Code
concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The
presumption that the wife automatically gains the
husband's domicile by operation of law upon
marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term
"residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because
the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are
well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this
specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference
between domicile and residence. Both terms imply
relations between a person and a place; but in
residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile
it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of
physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the
family. But the court may exempt the wife from living
with the husband if he should live abroad unless in
the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to
the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect
the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing
which would suggest that the female spouse
automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of
the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde
quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin
embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta
obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a
ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de
residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means
wherever (the husband) wishes to establish
residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates
only actual residence because it refers to a positive act
of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this
interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase
"cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the
same provision which means, "when the husband
shall transfer his residence," referring to another
positive act of relocating the family to another home
or place of actual residence. The article obviously
cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a
fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the
possibility of transferring from one place to another
not only once, but as often as the husband may deem
fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent
with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is
in harmony with the intention of the law to
strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact
that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage
different domiciles (of origin). This difference could,
for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by
allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual
residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is
found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109
which obliges the husband and wife to live together,
thus:
Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live
together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and
render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the
husband and wife are physically together. This takes
into account the situations where the couple has
many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If
the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of
their residences, the wife should necessarily be with
him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is
illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile"
and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced
with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile
while the husband, for professional or other reasons,
stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr.
Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile — Whether the word
"residence" as used with reference to particular
matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question
of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be
made from a consideration of the purpose and intent
with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used
synonymously, at other times they are distinguished
from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring
to the physical presence of a person in a place. A
person can have two or more residences, such as a
country residence and a city residence. Residence is
acquired by living in place; on the other hand,
domicile can exist without actually living in the place.
The important thing for domicile is that, once
residence has been established in one place, there be
an intention to stay there permanently, even if
residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence
between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases
applying the Civil Code on the question of a common
matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has
recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses
could not be compelled to live with each other such
that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence
different from that of her husband or, for obviously
practical reasons, revert to her original domicile
(apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De
la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a]
married woman may acquire a residence or domicile
separate from that of her husband during the
existence of the marriage where the husband has
given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court
allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to
choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances
where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to
live separately from her husband either by taking new
residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the
Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to
live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo
vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are
convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to,
the other. Of course where the property rights of one
of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of
such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined
to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic)
by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal right of consortium.
At best such an order can be effective for no other
purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the
same roof; and he experience of those countries
where the courts of justice have assumed to compel
the cohabitation of married people shows that the
policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus
in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court
entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights
at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the
facts were found to warrant it, that court would make
a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of
contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the
delinquent party to live with the other and render
conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes
criticized even by the judges who felt bound to
enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D.
52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in
the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the
High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the
English law on the subject was not the same as that
which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of
adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution
of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the
injured spouse, but could not be enforced by
imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the
growing sentiment against the practice, the
Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy
of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution
of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the
basis of an order for the periodical payment of a
stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States,
only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever
attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one
of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a
case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with
her husband, who had changed his domicile to the
City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v.
Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of
the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the
Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago,
and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even
in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the
American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by
process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of
Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the
Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to
return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative,
upon her failure to do so, to make a particular
disposition of certain money and effects then in her
possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income,
rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the
property which she had brought to the marriage. (113
Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this
order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile
was sanctioned by any other penalty than the
consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it
does not appear that her disobedience to that order
would necessarily have been followed by
imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then
Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged
— by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to
follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by
him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos
had several places of residence, among which were
San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no
showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as
his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos
had fixed any of these places as the conjugal
residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was
actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of
origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of
"matrimonial domicile" appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential
experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code
and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has
been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely
new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning
and spirit from that found in Article 110. The
provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the
concept of women's rights in the intervening years by
making the choice of domicile a product of mutual
agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term
residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under
the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law.
What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is
concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of
husband and wife — the term residence should only
be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The
inescapable conclusion derived from this
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that
when petitioner married the former President in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that
petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage
and only acquired a right to choose a new one after
her husband died, petitioner's acts following her
return to the country clearly indicate that she not only
impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin
(assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her
domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed
in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to
"rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and
Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the
Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47
Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in
her brother's house, an act which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters
to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone
straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of
disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals.
Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in
various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as
temporary or "actual residences," not domicile.
Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion
pointing out specific situations where the female
spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or
chooses a new one during the subsistence of the
marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume
that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the
death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting
a new one where situations exist within the
subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains
a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence
and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point,
we are persuaded that the facts established by the
parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion
supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the
assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995,
fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48
Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the
COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of
members of the House of Representatives in
accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution.
This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring
rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so
that non-compliance with them does not invalidate
the judgment on the theory that if the statute had
intended such result it would have clearly indicated
it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a
directory provision is often made on grounds of
necessity. Adopting the same view held by several
American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz
held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory
provision is often determined on grounds of
expediency, the reason being that less injury results to
the general public by disregarding than enforcing the
letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the
interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of
thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered
without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the
statutory provisions which may be thus departed
from with impunity, without affecting the validity of
statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate
to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to
effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some
incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the
statute under examination was construed merely to
be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the
COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a
decision after the period stated in the Omnibus
Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the
fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies
would then refuse to render judgments merely on the
ground of having failed to reach a decision within a
given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7
of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it
is evident that the respondent Commission does not
lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even
after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over
the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8,
1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications of members
of Congress begins only after a candidate has become
a member of the House of Representatives. 53
Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this
point has no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals

enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to
ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely
on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case.
Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground
here. Surely, many established principles of law, even
of election laws were flouted for the sake
perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We
renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning
and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established
principles of principles of law to deny an individual
what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in
doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the
mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner

possesses the necessary residence qualifications to
run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May
25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED.
PGBI vs COMELEC
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI)
seeks in this petition for certiorari[1] and in the
motion for reconsideration it subsequently filed to
nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar
as it relates to PGBI, and the Resolution dated
December 9, 2009 denying PGBIs motion for
reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). Via these
resolutions, the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the
roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-
list system.
BACKGROUND
Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941),
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act,
provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of
Registration. The COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
xxxx
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC
Resolution No. 2847 the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Election of the Party-List
Representatives through the Party-List System which
it promulgated on June 25, 1996.
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC
en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No.
8679 deleting several party-list groups or
organizations from the list of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected
was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of
the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the
2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in
this Resolution that any national, regional sectoral
party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected
can personally or through its authorized
representative file a verified opposition on October
26, 2009.
PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but
likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission
ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-
list organization under the Party-List System Act.
Among other arguments, PGBI asserted that:
(1) The assailed resolution negates the right of
movant and those similarly situated to invoke Section
4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party,
organization and coalition already registered with the
Commission to no longer register anew; the party
though is required to file with the Commission, not
later than ninety (90) days before the election, a
manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-
list system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation
seeking a deferment of its participation in the 2007
elections within the required period prior to the 2007
elections, it has the option to choose whether or not to
participate in the next succeeding election under the
same conditions as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed;
(2) The Supreme Courts ruling in G.R. No.
177548 Philippine Mines Safety Environment
Association, also known as MINERO v. Commission on
Elections cannot apply in the instant controversy for
two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is
removed from PGBIs; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting,
was afforded the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI
and the 25 others similarly affected by Resolution No.
8679 were not. Additionally, the requirement of
Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Courts ruling in
G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v. COMELEC) and the
exclusion of PGBI and the 25 other party-list is a
denial of the equal protection of the laws;
(3) The implementation of the challenged
resolution should be suspended and/or aborted to
prevent a miscarriage of justice in view of the failure
to notify the parties in accordance with the same
Section 6(8) or R.A. No. 7941.[2]
The COMELEC denied PGBIs motion/opposition for
lack of merit.
First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly
misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A.
7941.[3] The provision simply means that without the
required manifestation or if a party or organization
does not participate, the exemption from registration
does not arise and the party, organization or coalition
must go through the process again and apply for
requalification; a request for deferment would not
exempt PGBI from registering anew.
Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as
MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did
not participate at all in the 2004 elections.
Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or
to seek the reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of the essence of due process; this is clear
from Resolution No. 8679 which expressly gave the
adversely affected parties the opportunity to file their
opposition.
As regards the alternative relief of application for
accreditation, the COMELEC found the motion to have
been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the
deadline for accreditation provided in Resolution
8646. The motion was obviously filed months after
the deadline.
PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing
the same positions it raised with the COMELEC when
it moved to reconsider its delisting.
We initially dismissed the petition in light of our
ruling in Philippine Mines Safety Environment
Association, also known as MINERO v. Commission on
Elections (Minero);[4] we said that no grave abuse of
discretion exists in a ruling that correctly applies the
prevailing law and jurisprudence. Applying Section
6(8) of RA 7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under
the following reasoning:
Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2%
of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in
the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in the two
preceding elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty
bound to certify it.
PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal
of its petition. Among other arguments, PGBI claimed
that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law,
the evidence and existing jurisprudence. Essentially,
PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not
apply if one is to follow the tenor and import of the
deliberations inclusive of the interpellations in Senate
Bill No. 1913 on October 19, 1994. It cited the
following excerpts from the Records of the Senate:
Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President,
under ground no. (7), Section 5 there are actually two
grounds it states: Failure to participate in the last two
(2) preceding elections or its failure to obtain at least
ten percent (10%) of the votes case under the party-
list system in either of the last two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered
In short, the first ground is that, it failed to participate
in the last two (2) preceding elections. The second is,
failure to obtain at least 10 percent of the votes cast
under the party-list system in either of the last two
preceding elections, Mr. President,
Senator Tolentino: Actually, these are two separate
grounds.
Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr.
President.
Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.[5]
[Underscoring supplied.]
PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to
its situation, as it is obvious that it failed to participate
in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections.
Implied in this is that it also failed to secure the
required percentage in one (1) but not in the two (2)
preceding elections.
Considering PGBIs arguments, we granted the motion
and reinstated the petition in the courts docket.
THE ISSUES
We are called upon to resolve: (a) whether there is
legal basis for delisting PGBI; and (b) whether PGBIs
right to due process was violated.
OUR RULING
We find the petition partly impressed with merit.
a. The Minero Ruling
Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of
Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain
PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system.
First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio
or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in
the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.[6] The word or is a disjunctive term
signifying disassociation and independence of one
thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as
a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies, as a disjunctive word.[7] Thus, the plain, clear
and unmistakable language of the law provides for
two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the
legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs
cited congressional deliberations clearly show.
Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect
lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a
party-list organization in an election as similar to a
failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote.
What Minero effectively holds is that a party list
organization that does not participate in an election
necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-
list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation
of the law, given the laws clear and categorical
language and the legislative intent to treat the two
scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture
or fusion of these two different and separate grounds
for delisting is therefore a strained application of the
law in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not
within the contemplation of the framers of the law
and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the
law.[8]
What we say here should of course take into account
our ruling in Barangay Association for Advancement
and National Transparency v. COMELEC[9] (Banat)
where we partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote
requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows:
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional
seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats
as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.
No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the
two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available
party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation
of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.
The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list
votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore
be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-
list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of
the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the
allocation of additional seats.
We need not extensively discuss Banats significance,
except to state that a party-list group or organization
which qualified in the second round of seat allocation
cannot now validly be delisted for the reason alone
that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections.
In other words, the application of this disqualification
should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of
party-list votes garnered by the last party-list
organization that qualified for a seat in the House of
Representatives, a percentage that is less than the 2%
threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification
should now necessarily be read to apply to party-list
groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat
in the two preceding elections for the constituency in
which it registered.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for
two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds
cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting;
and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2%
party-list votes in two preceding elections should now
be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean
failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA
7941 should be understood and applied. We do so
under our authority to state what the law is,[10] and
as an exception to the application of the principle of
stare decisis.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to
adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which
are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents.
It requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed
in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The
doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument.[11] The doctrine is grounded on
the necessity for securing certainty and stability of
judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very
desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a
court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to
a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle
and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta
movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what
is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake
of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should
be applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may
be different. It proceeds from the first principle of
justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.
Thus, where the same questions relating to the same
event have been put forward by the parties similarly
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by
a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[12]
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a
showing that circumstances attendant in a particular
case override the great benefits derived by our
judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the
Court is justified in setting it aside.[13]
As our discussion above shows, the most compelling
reason to abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an
erroneous application of the law an application that
the principle of stability or predictability of decisions
alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary
violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly,
we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the
continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we
now abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling
case law.
We are aware that PGBIs situation a party list group
or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior
election and immediately thereafter did not
participate in the preceding election is something that
is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this
perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law
and as such is a matter for Congress to address. We
cannot and do not address matters over which full
discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to
the legislature; to do so will offend the principle of
separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the
present case should bring this concern to the
legislatures notice.
b. The Issue of Due Process
On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC
that PGBIs right to due process was not violated for
PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek,
a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence
of due process, we have consistently held, is simply
the opportunity to be heard; as applied to
administrative proceedings, due process is the
opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at
all times and in all instances essential. The
requirement is satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned
upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x.[14]
We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances
that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case,
given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer
any cause for complaint on due process grounds.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the

petition and accordingly ANNUL COMELEC Resolution
No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the
petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the Resolution
dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBIs motion
for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). PGBI is
qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or
organization in the coming May 2010 elections.

SO ORDERED.
AQUINO III vs COMELEC Siruma
372,548

This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition 4th District Iriga
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Baao
Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Balatan
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Bato Buhi
Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, Bula
seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Nabua
Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the 429,070
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the
and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently reconfigured in order to create an additional
pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be legislative district for the province. Hence, the first
restrained from making any issuances and from district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
taking any steps relative to the implementation of Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined
Republic Act No. 9716. with the second district municipalities of Milaor and
Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. following table3 illustrates the reapportionment
4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria made by Republic Act No. 9716:
Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect
on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its District Municipalities/Cities Population
publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of 1st District Del Gallego
general circulation.1 In substance, the said law Ragay
created an additional legislative district for the Lupi
Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the Sipocot
existing first and second legislative districts of the Cabusao
province. 176,383

Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of 2nd District Libmanan
Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of Minalabac
1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative Pamplona
districts in this wise: Pasacao San Fernando
Gainza
District Municipalities/Cities Population Milaor
1st District Del Gallego 276,777
Ragay
Lupi 3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga
Sipocot Pili
Cabusao Libmanan Ocampo
Minalabac CanamanCamaligan
Pamplona Magarao
Pasacao Bombon
San Fernando Calabanga 439,043
417,304 4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan
Garchitorena
2nd District Gainza Goa
Milaor Lagonoy
Naga Presentacion Sangay
Pili San Jose
Ocampo Canaman Tigaon
Camaligan Tinamba
Magarao Siruma 372,548
Bombon 5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga
Calabanga Baao
474,899 Balatan
Bato Buhi
3rd District Caramoan Bula
Garchitorena Nabua 429,070
Goa Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The
Lagonoy factual recitals by both parties of the origins of the bill
Presentacion Sangay that became the law show that, from the filing of
San Jose House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on
Tigaon a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against,
Tinamba the process progressed step by step, marked by public
hearings on the sentiments and position of the local
officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new
congressional district, as well as argumentation and
debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the
stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of
at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for
such new district.4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who
voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate.
His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City,
which was a part of the former second district from
which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were
taken for inclusion in the new second district. No
other local executive joined the two; neither did the
representatives of the former third and fourth
districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment
introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.5
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts
of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of
less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard.6 The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure
appearing in the above-cited provision is the
minimum population requirement for the creation of
a legislative district.7 The petitioners theorize that,
save in the case of a newly created province, each
legislative district created by Congress must be
supported by a minimum population of at least
250,000 in order to be valid.8 Under this view,
existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and
severed to form new districts, provided each resulting
district will represent a population of at least 250,000.
On the other hand, if the reapportionment would
result in the creation of a legislative seat representing
a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the
reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for
non-compliance with the minimum population
requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to
what they claim is the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of
250,000 in the creation of additional legislative
seats.9 The petitioners argue that when the
Constitutional Commission fixed the original number
of district seats in the House of Representatives to
two hundred (200), they took into account the
projected national population of fifty five million
(55,000,000) for the year 1986.10 According to the
petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200
district representatives translates to roughly 250,000
people for every one (1) representative.11 Thus, the
250,000 population requirement found in Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually
based on the population constant used by the
Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial
200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning
legislative districts independently from the creation of
a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000
population threshold, in the same manner that the
Constitutional Commission did in the original
apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the
newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur
failed to meet the population requirement for the
creation of the legislative district as explicitly
provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and
(3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of
proportional representation as provided in Article VI,
Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the
Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided
in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of
the present petition based on procedural and
substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that
the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical
defects: first, petitioners committed an error in
choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the
petitioners have no locus standi to question the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention
to an apparent distinction between cities and
provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the
existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue
that a plain and simple reading of the questioned
provision will show that the same has no application
with respect to the creation of legislative districts in
provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum
population is only a requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed
population requirement for the reapportionment of
districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No.
9716, which only creates an additional legislative
district within the province of Camarines Sur, should
be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail
themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and
Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal
procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following
reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that
the respondents had acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be
directed against a tribunal, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in
implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not
acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were
they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Considering that the main
thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same
could have been ventilated through a petition for
declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has
only appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners
had failed to show that they had sustained, or is in
danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result
of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The
respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners
lack the required legal standing to question the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural
debates when confronted with issues that, by reason
of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of
the arguments on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion,
tempered the application of procedural rules,14 as
well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi
whenever confronted with an important issue of
overreaching significance to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v.
PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned momentary
deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts,
and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of
paramount public importance. The Jaworski case
ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be
properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition
at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein
have potentially pervasive influence on the social and
moral well being of this nation, specially the youth;
hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has
already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. Guingona,18
Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that
absence of direct injury on the part of the party
seeking judicial review may be excused when the
latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental
importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this
Court held that in cases of transcendental importance,
the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and
so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This
liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent
decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant
petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The
beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the
determination of whether or not a population of
250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by
Congress carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality.24 Before a law may be declared
unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear
showing that a specific provision of the fundamental
law has been violated or transgressed. When there is
neither a violation of a specific provision of the
Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such
a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will
prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to
sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that
fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the
second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be
the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a
minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative
district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction
between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on
the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a
representative, with nothing mentioned about
population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to
separate the phrase "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or
each province" point to no other conclusion than that
the 250,000 minimum population is only required for
a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires
a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for
legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of
interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v.
COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was
the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into
a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act
No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for
Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The
petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an
additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article
VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts
would be supported by a population of less than
250,000, considering that Makati had a total
population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court
sustained the constitutionality of the law and the
validity of the newly created district, explaining the
operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,"
to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati
stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even
granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased
since it has met the minimum population requirement
of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact,
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population
has increased to more than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the
250,000 minimum population requirement for cities
only to its initial legislative district. In other words,
while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution
requires a city to have a minimum population of
250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not
have to increase its population by another 250,000 to
be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which
involves the creation of an additional district within a
city, should not be applied to additional districts in
provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district
created within a city is not required to represent a
population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid,
neither should such be needed for an additional
district in a province, considering moreover that a
province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact
of its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local
Government Code on the creation of a province which,
by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a
legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local
Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be
created if it has an average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand
(2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an
indispensable requirement, but is merely an
alternative addition to the indispensable income
requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the
pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on
the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population
requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand"
may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional
Commission which, upon framing the provisions of
Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an
ordinance that would be appended to the final
document. The Ordinance is captioned
"APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would
show that the 250,000 population benchmark was
used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of
legislative districts among provinces, cities and
Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure
was used to determine how many districts a province,
city, or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply
discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose,
population had to be the determinant. Even then, the
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as
an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And,
closer to the point herein at issue, in the
determination of the precise district within the
province to which, through the use of the population
benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned,
population as a factor was not the sole, though it was
among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional
Commission originally divided the entire country into
two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to
the original number of district representatives. The
200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional
Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each
was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the
ten (10) cities with a population of at least 250,000;30
second, the remaining seats were then redistributed
among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area
"in accordance with the number of their inhabitants
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio."31
Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member
and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in
his sponsorship remark32 for the Ordinance to be
appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the
number of legislative seats which are, in turn,
apportioned among provinces and cities with a
population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan
Area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. The population is based on the
1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration
as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates
that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking
into account the mandate that each city with at least
250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at
least one representative, we first allotted one seat for
each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities
with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the
Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo,
Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga.
Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase
whenever appropriate the number of seats for the
provinces and cities in accordance with the number of
their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each
province and city. Differentiated from this, the
determination of the districts within the province had
to consider "all protests and complaints formally
received" which, the records show, dealt with
determinants other than population as already
mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the
Constitutional Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including
Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was
more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan,
Batarasa, Brooke’s Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos.
He stated that the First District has a greater area than
the Second District. He then queried whether
population was the only factor considered by the
Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the
Committee took into account the standards set in
Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department,
namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned
among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2)
the legislative district must be compact, adjacent and
contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not
met when Puerto Princesa was included with the
northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance
between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa
has a population of 75,480 and based on the
apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns
would result in a combined population of 265,000 as
against only 186,000 for the south. He added that
Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the
northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the
capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto
Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more
potential candidates in the north and therefore if
Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron
are lumped together, there would be less candidates
in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not
interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto
Princesa be included in the south or the Second
District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be
considered during the period of amendments. He
requested that the COMELEC staff study said
proposal.33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out
that it was explained in the interpellations that
District I has a total population of 265,358 including
the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District
has a total population of 186,733. He proposed,
however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the
Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity
requirement in the Constitution considering that said
City is nearer the southern towns comprising the
Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsod’s query, Mr. Nolledo explained
that with the proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa
City to the Second District, the First District would
only have a total population of 190,000 while the
Second District would have 262,213, and there would
be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledo’s proposal to insert
Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality of
Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members
the same was approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND
DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr.
Davide, there being no objection, the apportionment
and districting for the province of Palawan was
approved by the Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000
population figure. It was decided by the importance of
the towns and the city that eventually composed the
districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The
Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that
Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the Committee
for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I
with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the
Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in one
district. He stated that he was toying with the idea
that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio
because it is the summer capital of the Philippines,
Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it
could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba
could be transferred to the Second District together
with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the
population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of
Baguio may be lower during certain times of the year,
but the transient population would increase the
population substantially and, therefore, for purposes
of business and professional transactions, it is beyond
question that population-wise, Baguio would more
than qualify, not to speak of the official business
matters, transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Lima’s statement
that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united, Tuba will
be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can
only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He
stated that the Committee would submit the matter to
the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on
his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the Body
should have a say on the matter and that the
considerations he had given are not on the
demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City
is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many
government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the
Body approved the reconsideration of the earlier
approval of the apportionment and districting of
Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no
objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to
a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none
against, the amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of
the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will have
two seats. The First District shall comprise of the
municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan,
Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La
Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District
shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the
apportionment and districting of Region I.35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed
as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of
Cavite was divided into districts based on the
distribution of its three cities, with each district
having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing
area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third,
a rice growing area," because such consideration
"fosters common interests in line with the standard of
compactness."36 In the districting of Maguindanao,
among the matters discussed were "political stability
and common interest among the people in the area"
and the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering
the "accepted regional, political, traditional and
sectoral leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned
that municipalities in the highland should not be
grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu,
Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should
"balance the area and population."38
new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted
upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on
House Bill No. 4264, were:

Consistent with Mariano and with the framer
deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the
population sizes of the districts. The Constitution,
however, does not require mathematical exactitude or
rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation
through commonality of interests and ease of access
by the representative to the constituents, all that the
Constitution requires is that every legislative district
should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against
the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an
additional provincial legislative district, which does
not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed
by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear
lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find
support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the
implementation of the provision, nay, even the
Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a
population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non
for the formation of an additional legislative district in
a province, whose population growth has increased
beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated
population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─ based on the
formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the
Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning
legislative districts among provinces and cities ─
entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4)
that it was given in the 1986 apportionment.
Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40
In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly
written allows and does not prohibit an additional
district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that
provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that
of the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality
subject of the discussion from the reconfigured
District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts
resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and
Two.41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others
considered together, with the increased population of
the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter
absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse
of discretion,42 that would warrant the invalidation
of Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in
the reapportionment of the first and second legislative
districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants
in the resulting additional district should not be
considered. Our ruling is that population is not the
only factor but is just one of several other factors in
the composition of the additional district. Such
settlement is in accord with both the text of the
Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly
given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact
issue presented by this petition.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and
Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New
Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a
VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.

2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the

Ordinance on the protests and complaints against
strict conformity with the population standard, and
more importantly based on the final districting in the
Ordinance on considerations other than population,
the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first
and second legislative districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new
legislative district is valid even if the population of the
Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed
not only to give more law to the great masses of our
people who have less in life, but also to enable them to
become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered
to participate directly in the enactment of laws
designed to benefit them. It intends to make the
marginalized and the underrepresented not merely
passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but
active participants in the mainstream of
representative democracy. Thus, allowing all
individuals and groups, including those which now
dominate district elections, to have the same
opportunity to participate in party-list elections
would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize
the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer
for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1
issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on
March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties,
including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-
list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of
private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political
parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec
received several Petitions for registration filed by
sectoral parties, organizations and political parties.
According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made
as to the status and capacity of these parties and
organizations and hearings were scheduled day and
night until the last party w[as] heard. With the
number of these petitions and the observance of the
legal and procedural requirements, review of these
petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer
process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result
the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate
Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on
political parties. These numerous petitions and
processes observed in the disposition of these
petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus
Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated
only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline
prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated
December 22, 2000, the registered parties and
organizations filed their respective Manifestations,
stating their intention to participate in the party-list
elections. Other sectoral and political parties and
organizations whose registrations were denied also
filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with
Manifestations of their intent to participate in the
party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed
their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the
Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and
organizations, but denied those of several others in its
assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No.
3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters,
having in mind that this system of proportional
representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan
[sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or
sectoral parties or organization to directly participate
in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system'
is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the
election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters
at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need
to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations
and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping
only those who substantially comply with the rules
and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency
of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for
Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed
before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names
of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the
'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the
Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and
that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also
asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that
the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April
11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also
filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the
respondents in the two disqualification cases to file
Comments within three days from notice. It also set
the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but
subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the
hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion
merely directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec,
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9
before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition,
docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated
April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to
comment on the Petition within a non-extendible
period of five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed
before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No.
147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9,
2001, 13 the Court ordered the consolidation of the
two Petitions before it; directed respondents named
in the second Petition to file their respective
Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and
called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17,
2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the
counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list
elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner
therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were
received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral
Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order
given in open court, the parties were directed to
submit their respective Memoranda simultaneously
within a non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court
directed the parties to address the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper
under the premises. More specifically, is there no
other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in
the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to
'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and
organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases
should be remanded to the Comelec which will
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings,
whether the 154 parties and organizations
enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both
petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there
are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor
General argues that petitioners should have filed
before the Comelec a petition either for
disqualification or for cancellation of registration,
pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec
Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000.
19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity
of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it
allowed respondents to participate in the party-list
elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution
20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be
brought before this Court in a verified petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was
promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc;
hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it
being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule
13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had
filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on
that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections,
Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court,
for there was no other adequate recourse at the time.
Subsequent events have proven the urgency of
petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not
yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a
resolution may just be a formality because the
Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the
rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has
been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding
the presence of other remedies, "where the issue
raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the
instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest
and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves
the composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental
constitutional issues on the party-list system, which
this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its
duty to "formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed
over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the
issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when
the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when
the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is
the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the
party-list system is the most objectionable portion of
the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner
Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major
political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of
the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political
parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No.
7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-
list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in
fact, open to all "registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and
RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified
from the party-list elections, merely on the ground
that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution provides that members of the House
of Representatives may "be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of
the Constitution, political parties may be registered
under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for
those registered under the party-list system as
provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions
registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters' registration boards, boards
of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to
appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional
Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out
that the participants in the party-list system may "be a
regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO, 31 Magsasaka, or a regional party in
Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following
exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas
Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay
pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP,
Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list
system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the
purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system, in order to give a chance to parties that
consistently place third or fourth in congressional
district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He
explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system.
In the past elections, we found out that there were
certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes.
But they were always third or fourth place in each of
the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly.
But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would
not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is
essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives
of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a
party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is
"either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines
"political party" as "an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of
its leaders and members as candidates for public
office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt
as to the participation of political parties in the party-
list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five
(5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the
start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not
be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties – even the
major ones -- may participate in the party-list
elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list
elections does not mean, however, that any political
party -- or any organization or group for that matter --
may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of
the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution
and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list.
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors
as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision,
a distinguished member of the Constitutional
Commission declared that the purpose of the party-
list provision was to give "genuine power to our
people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was
discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day
of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new
chapter to our national history, by giving genuine
power to our people in the legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not
self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases
like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided
by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite
the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941
was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this
wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall
promote proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become
Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of
promoting proportional representation by means of
the Filipino-style party-list system, which will
"enable" the election to the House of Representatives
of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional
representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack of well-defined
constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to
the number of people in a particular district, because
the party-list election is national in scope. Neither
does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or
oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration
in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim
representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to
claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party
must factually and truly represent the marginalized
and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in
Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by
the party-list candidate-organization must be
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to
the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral
group, like voters of a congressional district or
territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again
to those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that
only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress
under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine
power to the people, not only by giving more law to
those who have less in life, but more so by enabling
them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.
Consistent with this intent, the policy of the
implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
x x x, to become members of the House of
Representatives." Where the language of the law is
clear, it must be applied according to its express
terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be
represented under the party-list system are
enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of
persons may register as a party, organization or
coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing
with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days
before the election a petition verified by its president
or secretary stating its desire to participate in the
party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral
party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-
laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided,
that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all
sectors can be represented under the party-list
system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the
phrases with which they are associated or related.
Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be
limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate
association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG
Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy,
the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No.
7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list
system to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that any
party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6
40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence,
it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an
organization representing the super rich of Forbes
Park or Dasmariñas Village could participate in the
party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the
position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable
certain Filipino citizens – specifically those belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties – to be elected to the House
of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the
party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized
and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory
policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and
overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit
of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar
disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park.
The interests of these two sectors are manifestly
disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them
similarly defies reason and common sense. In
contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna
Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral
Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and
sugar planters could not join the party-list system as
representatives of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are,
numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark
reality is that their economic clout engenders political
power more awesome than their numerical limitation.
Traditionally, political power does not necessarily
emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it
is likely to arise more directly from the number and
amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and
underrepresented in our midst are the majority who
wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for
them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give
them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to
give them the opportunity to be elected and to
represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice
in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its
noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers
the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine
change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and
underrepresented in the past – the farm hands, the
fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the
underground movement – to come out and
participate, as indeed many of them came out and
participated during the last elections. The State
cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by
disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had
not been able to win in the congressional district
elections normally dominated by traditional
politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats
in the House of Representatives were set aside for the
party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors
who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the
House could participate in the party-list elections for
the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec
disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list
elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list
provision was to open up the system, 44 in order to
enhance the chance of sectoral groups and
organizations to gain representation in the House of
Representatives through the simplest scheme
possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been
opened to those who have never gotten a foothold
within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular
elections and who therefore need the "simplest
scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be
illogical to open the system to those who have long
been within it -- those privileged sectors that have
long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more
vividly understood when compared to a student
dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows
outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open
house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the
dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory
even without such special privilege. In the same vein,
the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders"
who cannot get elected through regular elections
otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of
Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and
overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under
the party-list system would not only dilute, but also
prejudice the chance of the marginalized and
underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law
to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the
benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have
given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the
intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list
system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are
neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot
let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state
policy must permeate every discussion of the
qualification of political parties and other
organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished
colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V.
Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent
of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their
deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional
construction, however, is that the primary source
from which to ascertain constitutional intent or
purpose is the language of the provision itself. The
presumption is that the words in which the
constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words,
verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of
the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort
be made to extraneous aids of construction and
interpretation, such as the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to
shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose
of the provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice
Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be
consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when
other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to
vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning
is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are
of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reason for their votes,
but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or
our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the framers' understanding
thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the
party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the
mechanics of the system shall be provided by law.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In
understanding and implementing party-list
representation, we should therefore look at the law
first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous
should the use of extraneous aids of construction be
resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is
obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2
thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system
of electing congressional representatives was
designed to "enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x
x." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus,
there is no need for recourse to constitutional
deliberations, not even to the proceedings of
Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations
merely express their individual opinions and are, at
best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and
purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity
of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here.
Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be
applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest
that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear
policy of the law and the Constitution. On the
contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the
party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its
counsel admitted before the Court that any group,
even the non-marginalized and overrepresented,
could field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the
Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down
by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of all judicial and
quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as
they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna
passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of
the major political parties – Respondents Lakas-
NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP – on the ground that
under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been
accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban)
major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It
argues that because of this, they have the "advantage
of getting official Comelec Election Returns,
Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x."
We note, however, that this accreditation does not
refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the
election of district representatives for the purpose of
determining which parties would be entitled to
watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances,
however, is a factual determination of whether
respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154
previously approved groups, have the necessary
qualifications to participate in the party-list elections,
pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out
Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
because "it is a government entity using government
resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not
a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive
evidence and determine the truth of such factual
allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that
respondents should first be given an opportunity to
show that they qualify under the guidelines
promulgated in this Decision, before they can be
deprived of their right to participate in and be elected
under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the
case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154
parties and organizations allowed to participate in the
party-list elections comply with the requirements of
the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to
lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law
and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or
coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA
7941. In other words, it must show -- through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history,
platform of government and track record -- that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose
the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are
expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply
with the declared statutory policy of enabling
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the
House of Representatives." In other words, while they
are not disqualified merely on the ground that they
are political parties, they must show, however, that
they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon
Demokratiko and other similarly situated political
parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument,
as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my
question. All I am saying is, the political party must
claim to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is
yes."52
Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the
registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which
is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the
express constitutional provision that the religious
sector may not be represented in the party-list
system. The extent of the constitutional proscription
is demonstrated by the following discussion during
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with
nationwide and even international networks of
members and supporters, in order to circumvent this
prohibition, decides to form its own political party in
emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as
deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-
established religious faiths, will that also not fall
within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention
is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the
Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction."54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed
"EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course,
prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be
elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to
represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody
who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic
Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered."56
The prohibition was explained by a member57 of the
Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he
prohibition is on any religious organization
registering as a political party. I do not see any
prohibition here against a priest running as a
candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the
registration of a religious sect as a political party."58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be
disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as
follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its
goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered."59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which
disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure
to comply with election laws and regulations. These
laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that
the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become
members of the House of Representatives." A party or
an organization, therefore, that does not comply with
this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct
of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the
party-list system, the party or organization must be a
group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated
by citizens. It must be independent of the government.
The participation of the government or its officials in
the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal60
and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the
objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations to be elected to the House of
Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the
requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise
do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. – No
person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and
write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at
least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in
office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization
must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under
Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino
citizens "who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully
represented by a retiree; neither can those of the
urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist.
To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give
genuine representation to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-
defined political constituency, the nominee must
likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained
during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the
nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going
to represent a particular district x x x."61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of
the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the
fundamental social justice principle that those who
have less in life should have more in law. The party-
list system is one such tool intended to benefit those
who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our
people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a
message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even
to those in the underground, that change is possible. It
is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo
and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the
submissions of the Comelec and the other
respondents that the party-list system is, without any
qualification, open to all. Such position does not only
weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would
gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of
generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of
enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken
them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the
party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941
are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a
mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on
the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could
not have been the intention of the framers of the
Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec,
which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of
the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme
urgency of determining the winners in the last party-
list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its
hearings for the parties and organizations that appear
to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify
for seats in the House of Representatives. The
Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court
its compliance report within 30 days from notice
hereof.1âwphi1.nêt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001,
directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming
any winner" during the last party-list election, shall
remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have
complied and reported its compliance with the
foregoing disposition.

This Decision is immediately executory upon the

Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
ATONG PAGLAUM vs COMELEC
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
(Abang Lingkod Party-List ABANG LINGKOD)
assailing the Resolution1 dated May 10, 2013 issued
by the Commission on Elections COMELEC) En Bane
in SPP No. 12-238 PLM}, which, alia, affirmed the
cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a
party-list group.
The Facts
ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that
represents the interests of peasant fanners and
fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list
system on December 22, 2009. It participated in the
May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of
votes needed for a seat in the House of
Representatives.
On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before
the COMELEC its intent to participate in the May 2013
elections. On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 9513,2 which, inter alia required
previously registered party-list groups that have filed
their respective Manifestations of Intent to undergo
summary evidentiary hearing for purposes of
determining their continuing compliance with the
requirements under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 79413
and the guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.4
Accordingly, on August 9 2012, the COMELEC issued a
Resolution, which set the summary evidentiary
hearing of previously registered party-list groups. The
COMELEC scheduled three (3) dates -August 17, 31
and September 3, 2012 -for the summary hearing of
ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of Intent to enable it
to show proof of its continuing qualification under the
party-list system.
On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance
with the COMELEC's August 9, 2012 Resolution, filed
with the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its
continuing compliance with the requirements under
R.A. No. 7941.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Bane in a
Resolution dated November 7 2012, cancelled ABANG
LINGKOD's registration as a party list group. The
COMELEC En Bane pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD
failed to establish its track record in uplifting the
cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that
it merely offered photographs of some alleged
activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections.
The COMELEC En Bane further opined that ABANG
LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are
themselves marginalized and underrepresented or
that they have been involved in activities aimed at
improving the plight of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
ABANG LINGKOD then filed with this Court a petition5
for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in cancelling its registration
under the party-list system. The said petition was
consolidated with the separate petitions filed by fifty-
one (51) other party-list groups whose registration
were cancelled or who were denied registration
under the party-list system. The said party-list groups,
including ABANG LINGKOD, were able to obtain status
quo ante orders from this Court.
On April 2, 2013, the Court, in Atong Paglaum Inc. v.
Commission on Elections,6 laid down new parameters
to be observed by the COMELEC in screening parties,
organizations or associations seeking registration
and/or accreditation under the party-list system, viz:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-
list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional
parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector. 3. Political
parties can participate in party-list elections provided
they register under the party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
"marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in
"well-defined political constituencies." It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interests and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are marginalized and underrepresented include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the ''marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" must belong to the sector
they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" or that represent those who lack
"well-defined political constituencies," either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record or advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at
least one nominee who remains qualified.
Thus, the Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases
of previously registered party-list groups, including
that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether they
are qualified under the party-list system pursuant to
the new parameters laid down by the Court and, in the
affirmative, be allowed to participate in the May 2013
party-list elections.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein
assailed Resolution,7 which, inter alia affirmed the
cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration under
the party-list system. The COMELEC issued the
Resolution dated May 10, 2013 sans any summary
evidentiary hearing, citing the proximity of the May
13 2013 elections as the reason therefor.
In maintaining the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's
registration, the COMELEC held that:
The Commission maintains its position in the previous
en bane ruling cancelling the registration of ABANG
LINGKOD. To reiterate, it is not enough that the party-
list organization claim representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented because
representation is easy to claim and to feign. It is but
reasonable to require from groups and organizations
consistent participation and advocacy in the sector it
seeks to represent, and not just seasonal and sporadic
programs which are unrelated to its sector.
ABANG LINGKOD submitted pictures showing a
seminar held on 10 July 2010, Medical Mission on 11
November 2010, Disaster Management Training on 21
October 2011, Book-giving on 28 June 2011, and
Medical Mission on 1 December 2011.
And as if to insult the Commission, the photographs
submitted appear to have been edited to show in the
banners that ABANG LINGKOD participated in the
activities. ABANG LINGKOD's name and logo was
superimposed on some banners to feign participation
in the activities (Joint Medical Mission, Book-giving).
Under the party-list System Act, a group s registration
may be cancelled for declaring unlawful statements in
its petition. Photoshopping images to establish a fact
that did not occur is tantamount to declaring unlawful
statements. It is on this ground that the Commission
cancels ABANG LINGKOD s registration.8
On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a
reconsideration of the COMELEC s Resolution dated
May 10, 2013. However, on May 15, 2013, ABANG
LINGKOD withdrew the motion for reconsideration it
filed with the COMELEC and, instead, instituted the
instant petition9 with this Court, alleging that there
may not be enough time for the COMELEC to pass
upon the merits of its motion for reconsideration
considering that the election returns were already
being canvassed and consolidated by the COMELEC.
In support of the instant petition, ABANG LINGKOD
claims that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it affirmed the cancellation of its
registration sans a summary evidentiary hearing for
that purpose, asserting that the COMELEC should
have allowed it to present evidence to prove its
qualification as a party-list group pursuant to Atong
Paglaum. It claims that there was no valid justification
for the COMELEC to cancel its registration considering
that it complied with the six-point parameters m
screening party-list groups laid down in Atong
Paglaum.
On the other hand, the COMELEC avers that the
instant petition should be dismissed for utter lack of
merit. It asserts that ABANG LINGKOD was not denied
due process when the COMELEC affirmed the
cancellation of its registration since it was given every
reasonable opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC
further claims that it did not abuse its discretion when
it cancelled ABANG LINGKOD’s registration on the
ground that it failed to establish a track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
Further, the COMELEC alleges that its finding of facts
may not be passed upon by this Court as the same is
supported by substantial evidence.
The Issues
In sum, the issues presented for the Court s resolution
are the following: first whether ABANG LINGKOD was
denied due process when the COMELEC affirmed the
cancellation of its registration under the patiy-list
system sans any summary evidentiary hearing; and
second whether the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s
registration under the party-list system.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Due Process
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity
to be heard or as applied to administrative or quasi-
judicial proceedings, an opportunity to explain one s
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirements are satisfied when the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What
is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or
hearing.10
In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it
was denied due process, the Court finds that the
COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient
opportunity to present evidence establishing its
qualification as a party-list group. It was notified
through Resolution No. 9513 that its registration was
to be reviewed by the COMELEC. That ABANG
LINGKOD was able to file its Manifestation of Intent
and other pertinent documents to prove its continuing
compliance with the requirements under R.A. No.
7941, which the COMELEC set for summary hearing
on three separate dates, belies its claim that it was
denied due process.
There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct
further summary evidentiary hearing to assess the
qualification of ABANG LINGKOD pursuant to Atong
Paglaum. ABANG LINGKOD’s Manifestation of Intent
and all the evidence adduced by it to establish its
qualification as a party-list group are already in the
possession of the COMELEC. Thus, conducting further
summary evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of
determining ABANG LINGKOD s qualification under
the party-list system pursuant to Atong Paglaum
would just be a superfluity.
Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD’s claim, the Court, in
Atong Paglaum, did not categorically require the
COMELEC to conduct a summary evidentiary hearing
for the purpose of determining the qualifications of
the petitioners therein pursuant to the new
parameters for screening party-list groups. The
dispositive portion of Atong Paglaum reads:
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are
GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted
Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory
injunction to include the names of the petitioners in
the printing of ballots, are remanded to the
Commission on Elections only for determination
whether petitioners are qualified to register under the
party-list system under the parameters prescribed in
this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections. The 41 petitions, which
have been granted mandatory injunctions to include
the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission on Elections for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to
register under the party-list system and to participate
in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the
parameters prescribed in this Decision. The
Commission on Elections may conduct summary
evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, the cases of previously registered party-list
groups, including ABANG LINGKOD, were remanded
to the COMELEC so that it may reassess, based on the
evidence already submitted by the former, whether
they are qualified to participate in the party-list
system pursuant to the new parameters laid down in
Atong Paglaum. The Court did not require the
COMELEC to conduct a hearing de novo in reassessing
the qualifications of said party-list groups.
Nevertheless, the Court gave the COMELEC the option
to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing
should it deem appropriate to do so.
The records also disclose that ABANG LINGKOD was
able to file with the COMELEC a motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 10, 2013,
negating its claim that it was denied due process. As it
has been held, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given a
chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.12
Second Issue: Cancellation of
ABANG LINGKOD’s Registration
However, after a careful perusal of the factual
antecedents of this case, pinned against the new
parameters in screening party-list groups laid down
in Atong Paglaum the Court finds that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the
registration of ABANG LINGKOD under the party-list
system.
The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG
LINGKOD's registration on the ground that it declared
untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a
party-list group in the May 2013 elections, pointing
out that it deliberately submitted digitally altered
photographs of activities to make it appear that it had
a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's
registration was cancelled on the ground that it failed
to adduce evidence showing its track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the fact
that it insists on requiring party-list groups to present
evidence showing that they have a track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
Track record is a record of past performance often
taken as an indicator of likely future performance.13
As a requirement imposed by Ang Bagong Bayani for
groups intending to participate in the party-list
elections, track record pertains to the actual activities
undertaken by groups to uplift the cause of the
sector/s, which they represent.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 however provides:
Sec. 5 Registration. Any organized group of persons
may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-
list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-
laws, platform or program of government list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided,
That the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
(Emphasis ours)
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to
register under the party-list system to submit proof of
their track record as a group. The track record
requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani
where the Court held that national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations seeking registration
under the party-list system must prove through their,
inter alia track record that they truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, thus:
xxx
In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down
the following guidelines, culled from the law and the
Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political pat1y, sector, organization or
coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Secdon 5 of RA
7941. In other words, it must show -- through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history,
platform of government and track record -- that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose
the interest of such sectors. (Emphasis ours)
Track record is not the same as the submission or
presentation of "constitution, by-laws, platform of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and
other relevant information as may be required by the
COMELEC," which are but mere pieces of
documentary evidence intended to establish that the
group exists and is a going concern. The said
documentary evidence presents an abstract of the
ideals that national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations seek to achieve.
This is not merely a matter of semantics; the
delineation of what constitutes a track record has
certain consequences in a group's bid for registration
under the party-list system. Under Section 5 of R.A.
No. 7941, groups intending to register under the
party-list system are not required to submit evidence
of their track record; they are merely required to
attach to their verified petitions their "constitution,
by-laws, platform of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement, and other relevant information
as may be required by the COMELEC."
In Atong Paglaum the Court has modified to a great
extent the jurisprudential doctrines on who may
register under the party-list system and the
representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented. For purposes of registration under
the party-list system, national or regional parties or
organizations need not represent any marginalized
and underrepresented sector; that representation of
the marginalized and underrepresented is only
required of sectoral organizations that represent the
sectors stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that
are, by their nature, economically marginalized and
underrepresented.
There was no mention that sectoral organizations
intending to participate in the party-list elections are
still required to present a track record, viz:
x x x In determining who may participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:
xxxx
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in
well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that
their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interests and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are marginalized and underrepresented include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political
constituencies'' include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth. (Emphasis ours)
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or
organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer
required to adduce evidence showing their track
record, i.e. proof of activities that they have
undertaken to further the cause of the sector they
represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns
of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that
the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations
are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which
they represent.
If at all, evidence showing a track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented who do not
factually belong to the sector represented by their
party or organization.
Dissenting, my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice
Leonen, however, maintains that parties or
organizations intending to register under the party-
list system are still required to present a track record
notwithstanding the Court's pronouncement in Atong
Paglaum that the track record that would have to be
presented would only differ as to the nature of their
group/organization. He opines that sectoral
organizations must prove their links with the
marginalized and underrepresented while national or
regional parties or organizations must show that they
have been existing as a bona fide organization.
To submit to the dissent's insistence on varying track
records, which are required of those intending to
register under the party-list system, depending on the
nature of their group, would result into an absurd and
unjust situation. Under the varying track record
requirement, sectoral organizations must present
evidence showing their track record in representing
the marginalized and underrepresented, i.e. actual
activities conducted by them to further uplift the
cause of the sector/s they represent. On the other
hand, national and regional parties or organizations
need only prove that they exist as bona fide
organizations which, as the dissent suggests, may be
done through the submission of their constitution, by-
laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement, and other relevant information required
by the COMELEC.
However, submission of a group's constitution, by-
laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement, and other relevant information required
by the COMELEC, as explained earlier, is not
synonymous with the track record requirement. In
such case, only sectoral organizations would be
required to present a track record (actual activities
conducted by them to further the cause of the
marginalized and underrepresented); while national
and regional organizations need not present their
track record as they are only required to submit
documentary evidence showing that they are bona
fide organizations.
There is no logic in treating sectoral organizations
differently from national and regional parties or
organizations as regards their bid for registration
under the party-list system. The varying track record
requirement suggested by the dissent would
unnecessarily put a premium on groups intending to
register as national and regional parties or
organizations as against those intending to register as
sectoral organizations The imposition of an additional
burden on sectoral organizations, i.e. submission of
their track record, would be plainly unjust as it
effectively deters the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors from organizing themselves
under the party-list system.
Likewise, that there was no explicit reversal of the
guidelines in ng Bagong Bayani in tong Paglaum does
not mean that groups intending to register under the
party-list system are still required to submit a track
record. The track record of groups intending to
register under the party-list system was required
under the first guideline of Ang Bagong Bayani for a
very specific purpose to show that the national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations that
would be allowed to participate in the party-list
elections are truly representative of the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors It was necessary-then
to require groups seeking registration under the
party-list system since representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented, as understood in
the context of Ang Bagong Bayani is easy to claim and
feign.
There exists no reason to further require groups
seeking registration under the party-list system to
submit evidence showing their track record. Pursuant
to Atong Paglaum not all groups are required to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and, accordingly, there is no longer any
incentive in merely feigning representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
In the case of sectoral organizations, although they are
still required to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, they are likewise not required to
show a track record since there would be no reason
for them to feign representation of the marginalized
and underrepresented as they can just register as a
national or regional party or organization. Thus, the
Court, in Atong Paglaum stated that, for purposes of
registration under the party-list system, it is enough
that the principal advocacy of sectoral organizations
pertains to the sector/s they represent.
There is thus no basis in law and established
jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking
registration under the party-list system still comply
with the track record requirement. Indeed, nowhere
in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking
registration thereunder must submit evidence to
show their track record as a group.
The dissent likewise suggests that the deceit
committed by ABANG LINGKOD goes into its
qualification as a party-list group since it seriously
puts in question the existence of ABANG LINGKOD as
a group per se and the genuineness of its
representation of the farmers and fisherfolk.
It must be stressed that the COMELEC cancelled
ABANG LINGKOD s registration solely on the ground
of the lack of its track record -that it falsely
represented, by submitting digitally altered
photographs of its supposed activities, that it had a
track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. The existence of ABANG LINGKOD
as a party-list group per se and the genuineness of its
representation of the farmers and fisherfolks were
never raised in the proceedings before the COMELEC.
It would thus be the height of injustice in the Court, in
this certiorari action, would scrutinize the legitimacy
of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group and the
genuineness of its representation of the farmers and
fisherfolk, and affirm the cancellation of its
registration, when the issue is limited only to the
track record of ABANG LINGKOD.
Moreover, ABANG LINGKOD had been previously
registered as a party-list group, as in fact it
participated in the May 2010 party-list elections, and
it was able to obtain a sufficient number of votes in
the May 2013 party-list elections to obtain a seat in
the House of Representatives. These are
circumstances, which clearly indicate that ABANG
LINGKOD is indeed a legitimate party-list group.
ABANG LINGKOD, notwithstanding the cancellation of
its registration three days prior to the May 13, 2013
elections, was able to obtain a total of 260 215 votes
out of the 26 722 131 votes that were cast for the
party-list,14 thus entitling it to a seat in the House of
Representatives. This is indicative of the fact that a
considerable portion of the electorate considers
ABANG LINGKOD as truly representative of peasant
farmers and fisherfolk.
Anent the photographs submitted by ABANG
LINGKOD, these only show book-giving and medical
missions, which are activities it conducted. Suffice it
to state, however, that said activities do not
specifically or directly pertain to the interest or
advocacy espoused by ABANG LINGKOD. As such, the
misrepresentation committed by ABANG LINGKOD
with regard to said activities would not necessarily
militate against its representation of the farmers and
fisherfolk.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court does not condone
the deceit perpetrated by ABANG LINGKOD in
connection with its bid for continued registration
under the party-list system. That ABANG LINGKOD, to
establish its track record, submitted photographs that
were edited to make it appear that it conducted
activities aimed at ameliorating the plight of the
sectors it represents is a factual finding by the
COMELEC, which the Court, considering that it is
supported by substantial evidence, will not disturb.
The Court does not tolerate ABANG LINGKOD s resort
to chicanery and its shabby treatment of the
requirements for registration under the party-list
system.
Nevertheless, considering that track record is no
longer a requirement, a group’s misrepresentation as
to its track record cannot be used as a ground to deny
or cancel its registration -it is no longer material to its
qualification under the party-list system. In this case,
ABANG LINGKOD s submission of digitally altered
photographs cannot be considered material to its
qualification as a party-list group. Section 6 of R.A. No.
7941, in part, reads:
Sec. 6 Refusal and/or Cancellation o Registration The
COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
Declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition
for registration, or in any other document pertinent to
the registration and/or accreditation under the party-
list system, as a ground for the refusal or cancellation
of registration under Section 6(6) of R.A. No. 7941, is
akin to material misrepresentation in the certificate of
candidacy filed by an individual candidate under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Both
provisions disallow prospective candidates from
participating in an election for declaring false
statements in their eligibility requirements. Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
Sec. 78. A verified petition seeking to deny due course
to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any
material misrepresentation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition
may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Elucidating on what constitutes material
misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Court, in
Lluz v. Commission on Elections,15 explained that:
From these two cases several conclusions follow. First
a misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is
material when it refers to a qualification for elective
office and affects the candidate s eligibility. x x x Third
a misrepresentation of a non-material fact, or a non-
material misrepresentation, is not a ground to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
under Section 78. In other words, for a candidate s
certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or
canceled by the COMELEC, the fact misrepresented
must pertain to a qualification for the office sought by
the candidate.16 (Emphasis ours)
In Velasco v. Commission on Elections,17 the Court
further clarified that a false representation under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in order to
be a ground to deny due course or cancel a certificate
of candidacy, must consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Thus:
The false representation that [Sections 74 and 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code] mention must necessarily
pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous
mistake. This is emphasized by the consequences of
any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a
material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected,
cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be
prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
Obviously, these facts are those that refer to a
candidate s qualification for elective office, such as his
or her citizenship and residence. The candidate's
status as a registered voter similarly falls under this
classification as it is a requirement that, by law (the
Local Government Code), must be reflected in the
COC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if
he or she wins, will work for and represent the local
government under which he is running.
Separately from the requirement of materiality, a false
representation under Section 78 must consist of a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible." In other words, it must be made with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be
candidate's qualifications for public office.18 (Citation
omitted and emphasis ours)
Similarly, a declaration of an untruthful statement in a
petition for registration under Section 6(6) of R.A. No.
7941, in order to be a ground for the refusal and/or
cancellation of registration under the party-list
system, must pertain to the qualification of the party,
organization or coalition under the party-list system.
In order to justify the cancellation or refusal of
registration of a group, there must be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which
would otherwise render the group disqualified from
participating in the party-list elections.
The digitally altered photographs of activities
submitted by ABANG LINGKOD to prove its continuing
qualification under R.A. No. 7941 only pertain to its
track record, which, as already discussed, is no longer
a requirement under the new parameters laid down in
Atong Paglaum Simply put, they do not affect the
qualification of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group
and, hence, could not be used as a ground to cancel its
registration under the party-list system. Further, the
Court notes that the COMELEC, in its Resolution dated
November 7 2012, asserted that ABANG LINGKOD
failed to adduce evidence that would show the track
record of its five nominees, composed of a non-
government organization worker, an employee and
three farmers, in uplifting the cause of the sector that
the group represents.1âwphi1 The COMELEC opined
that the failure of ABANG LINGKOD to present a track
record of its nominees justified the cancellation of its
registration as a party-list group.
The Court does not agree. Assuming arguendo that the
nominees of ABANG LINGKOD, as opined by the
COMELEC, indeed do not have track records showing
their participation in activities aimed at improving the
conditions of the sector that the group represents, the
same would not affect the registration of ABANG
LINGKOD as a party-list group.
To stress, in Atong Paglaum the Court pointed out that
[t]he nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the 'marginalized and
underrepresented,' or that represent those who lack
'well-defined political constituencies,' either must
belong to their respective sectors or must have a track
record o advocacy for their respective sectors. Stated
otherwise, the nominee of a party-list groups may
either be: first one who actually belongs to the sector
which the party-list group represents, in which case
the track record requirement does not apply; or
second one who does not actually belong to the sector
which the party-list group represents but has a track
record showing the nominee's active participation in
activities aimed at uplifting the cause of the sector
which the group represents."
In the case under consideration, three of the five
nominees of ABANG LINGKOD are farmers and, thus,
are not required to present a track record showing
their active participation in activities aimed to
promote the sector which ABANG LINGKOD
represents, i.e. peasant farmers and fisherfolk. That
two of ABANG LINGKOD's nominees do not actually
belong to the sector it represents is immaterial and
would not result in the cancellation of ABANG
LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group. This is
clear from the sixth parameter laid down by the Court
in tong Paglaum which states that "national, regional
and sectoral organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that
they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified." At the very least, ABANG LINGKOD has
three (3) qualified nominees, being farmers by
occupation.
Indeed, the disqualification of one or some of the
nominees of a party-list group should not
automatically result in the disqualification of the
group.1avvphi1 Otherwise it would accord the
nominees the same significance, which the law holds
for the party-list groups; it is still the fact that the
party-list group satisfied the qualifications of the law
that is material to consider. The disqualification of the
nominees must simply be regarded as failure to
qualify for an office or position. It should not, in any
way, blemish the qualifications of the party-list group
itself with defect. The party-list group must be treated
as separate and distinct from its nominees such that
qualifications of the latter must not be considered
part and parcel of the qualifications of the former.
In sum, that ABANG LINGKOD's registration must be
cancelled due to its misrepresentation is a conclusion
derived from a simplistic reading of the provisions of
R.A. No. 7941 and the import of the Court's
disposition in tong Paglaum. Not every
misrepresentation committed by national, regional,
and sectoral groups or organizations would merit the
denial or cancellation of their registration under the
party-list system. The misrepresentation must relate
to their qualification as a party-list group. In this
regard, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
when it insisted on requiring ABANG LINGKOD to
prove its track record notwithstanding that a group s
track record is no longer required pursuant to the
Court s pronouncement in Atong Paglaum
Likewise, upholding the cancellation of ABANG
LINGKOD s registration, notwithstanding that it was
able to obtain sufficient number of votes for a
legislative seat, would serve no purpose other than to
subvert the will of the electorate who voted to give
ABANG LINGKOD the privilege to represent them in
the House of Representatives.
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing disquisitions,
the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolution dated May 10, 2013 issued by the
Commission on Elections in SPP Case No. 12-238
(PLM), insofar as it affirmed the cancellation of
ABANG LINGKOD s registration and disallowed it to
participate in the May 13, 2013 elections is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Commission on Elections is hereby ORDERED to
PROCLAIM ABANG LINGKOD as one of the winning
party-list groups during the May 13, 2013 elections
with the number of seats it may be entitled to based
on the total number of votes it garnered during the
said elections.
SO ORDERED.
BANAT vs COMELEC
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association
for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and
mandamus,[1] assails the Resolution[2] promulgated
on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELECs
resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of
the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group,
to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT
filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a
Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts
Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat
Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior
Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono,
and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through
Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for
certiorari with mandamus and prohibition,[3] assails
NBC Resolution No. 07-60[4] promulgated on 9 July
2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of
parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at
least two percent of the total votes cast under the
Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that,
upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results, it would determine the total number of seats
of each winning party, organization, or coalition in
accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.
COMELEC[5] (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and
First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a
motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and
179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for
the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted
15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-
List System.[6]
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim
the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-
041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition
because [t]he Chairman and the Members of the
[COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national
papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall
implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply
the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list
seats.[7] There were no intervenors in BANATs
petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum
on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC,
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties
as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay
Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women
Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens
Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers
Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party
(COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural
Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en
banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-
Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had
officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a
total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three
thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes
under the Party-List System of Representation, in
connection with the National and Local Elections
conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and
Tabulation Groups of the National Board of
Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total
party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen
million seven hundred twenty three thousand one
hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the
following statistical data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007
Elections
i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated
15,283,659
ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/
untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)
1,337,032
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100%
outcome) from areas not yet submitted for canvass
(Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and
Pagalungan, Maguindanao)
102,430
Maximum Total Party-List Votes
16,723,121
WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941
(Party-List System Act) provides in part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each:
provided, that those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes: provided,
finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above
projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive
two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three
hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two
(334,462) votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle
Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC,
reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party
versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the
additional seats of each party, organization or
coalition receving more than the required two percent
(2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-
only after all party-list ballots have been completely list system of representation in the meantime.
canvassed;
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,
that have thus far garnered at least three hundred Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646,
thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission
(334,462) votes are as follows: on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of
Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY
RANK PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth
PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ below, the following parties, organizations and
COALITION coalitions participating under the Party-List System:
VOTES
RECEIVED 1
1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong
BUHAY BUHAY
1,163,218 2
2 Bayan Muna
BAYAN MUNA BAYAN MUNA
972,730 3
3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption
CIBAC CIBAC
760,260 4
4 Gabriela Womens Party
GABRIELA GABRIELA
610,451 5
5 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
APEC APEC
538,971 6
6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
A TEACHER Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
476,036 Reforms, Inc.
7 A TEACHER
AKBAYAN 7
470,872 Akbayan! Citizens Action Party
8 AKBAYAN
ALAGAD 8
423,076 Alagad
9 ALAGAD
BUTIL 9
405,052 Luzon Farmers Party
10 BUTIL
COOP-NATCO 10
390,029 Cooperative-Natco Network Party
11 COOP-NATCCO
BATAS 11
386,361 Anak Pawis
12 ANAKPAWIS
ANAK PAWIS 12
376,036 Alliance of Rural Concerns
13 ARC
ARC 13
338,194 Abono
14 ABONO
ABONO
337,046 This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other
parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later
WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang on be established to have obtained at least two
Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the
against which an URGENT PETITION FOR Party-List System.
CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With The total number of seats of each winning party,
Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has organization or coalition shall be determined
been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus
No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of
coalitions included in the aforementioned list are the party-list results.
 492,369
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang 7
Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) AKBAYAN
is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07- 462,674
250, in order not to render the proceedings therein 8
moot and academic. ALAGAD
423,190
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned 9
parties, organizations and coalitions with pending BUTIL
disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final 409,298
resolution of their respective cases. 10
COOP-NATCO
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this 412,920
Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of 11
the House of Representatives of the Philippines. ANAKPAWIS
370,165
SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphasis in the original) 12
ARC
375,846
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, 13
acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07- ABONO
72, which declared the additional seats allocated to 340,151
the appropriate parties. We quote from the
COMELECs interpretation of the Veterans formula as WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan
found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72: Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of
votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions, making it the first party
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on in accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus
Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of COMELEC, reiterated in Citizens Battle Against
Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
organization[s] and coalitions based on the WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and
presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 coalitions participating under the party-list system of
votes from the projected maximum total number of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1)
party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats
one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each; based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Court in Veterans;
Supervisory Committee of the National Board of WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the
Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list first party, the correct formula as expressed in
votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually Veterans, is:
canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report
No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of
maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, first
is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = party relative to total
votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, votes for
organizations and coalition[s] are as follows: Total votes for party-list system party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first

Party-List party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to
Projected total number of votes additional seats:
1
BUHAY Proportion of votes received
1,178,747 by the first party
2 Additional seats
BAYAN MUNA Equal to or at least 6%
977,476 Two (2) additional seats
3 Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6%
CIBAC One (1) additional seat
755,964 Less than 4%
4 No additional seat
GABRIELA
621,718 WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay
5 obtained the following percentage:
APEC
622,489 1,178,747
6 - - - - - - - - = 0.07248 or 7.2%
A TEACHER 16,261,369
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.
Party List
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the Additional Seats
other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, BUHAY
the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and 2
reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows: BAYAN MUNA
1
No. of votes of CIBAC
concerned party No. of additional 1
Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats allocated GABRIELA
to 1
a concerned party No. of votes of first party APEC
first party 1

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other
as follows: parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on
be established to have obtained at least two per cent
Party List (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list
Percentage system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or
Additional Seat to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them
BAYAN MUNA to one (1) additional seat.
1.65 Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned
1 parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
CIBAC disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final
1.28 resolution of their respective cases.
1
GABRIELA Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat
1.05 implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to
1 the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
APEC Philippines.
1.05
1 SO ORDERED.[9]
A TEACHER
0.83 Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC
0 Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads
AKBAYAN as follows:
0.78
0
ALAGAD This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full
0.71 Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
0 Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for
BUTIL National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
0.69
0 Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay
COOP-NATCO Association for National Advancement and
0.69 Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D.
0 Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal
ANAKPAWIS Group submitted his comments/observations and
0.62 recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which
0 reads:
ARC
0.63 COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:
0
ABONO Petitioner Barangay Association for National
0.57 Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its
0 Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it for the following reliefs, to wit:
by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive
Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of
and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections Party-List representatives as mandated by Section 5,
en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.
hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
proclaim the following parties, organizations or 2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which
coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit: prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be
harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941
in that it should be applicable only to the first party-
list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of
their initial/first ranking.
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans
formula is violative of the Constitution and of
Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same
day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the
proceedings of the NBC.[11]

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations
applied; and proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed
three other party-list organizations as qualified
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the
number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the
votes they received and the additional seats shall be Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),[12] Anak Mindanao
allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, (AMIN),[13] and An Waray.[14] Per the
that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes certification[15] by COMELEC, the following party-list
obtained by each party-list group in relation to the organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May
total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, 2008:
after deducting the corresponding votes of those
which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold
rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the Party-List
ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX A of No. of Seat(s)
COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, 1.1
shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how Buhay
many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list 3
groups are entitled to representative seats and how 1.2
many of their nominees shall seat [sic]. Bayan Muna
2
5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional 1.3
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the CIBAC
procedure in allocating seats for party-list 2
representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 1.4
shall be followed. Gabriela
2
RECOMMENDATION: 1.5
APEC
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic. 2
1.6
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 A Teacher
promulgated July 9, 2007 re In the Matter of the 1
Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the 1.7
Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Akbayan
Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 1
National and Local Elections resolved among others 1.8
that the total number of seats of each winning party, Alagad
organization or coalition shall be determined 1
pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus 1.9
COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of Butil
the party-list results. 1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National 1.10
Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby Coop-Natco [sic]
RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the 1
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC 1.11
Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT Anak Pawis
for being moot and academic. 1
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this 1.12
resolution. ARC
SO ORDERED.[10] 1
1.13
Abono
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus 1
assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. 1.14
BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of AGAP
NBC Resolution No. 07-88. 1
1.15
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher AMIN
asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its 1
decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang
Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS),
against which an Urgent Petition for
Cancellation/Removal of Registration and
Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for
the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed
before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final
resolution of SPC No. 07-250.
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of
RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes
prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be
allocated?[16]
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other
hand, raised the following issues in their petition:
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as
National Board of Canvassers, committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No.
07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations
as said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional
representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in
allocating additional seats for the First Party violates
the principle of proportional representation under RA
7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of
additional seats, one for the First Party and another
for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA
7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First
Party Rule are different from those required under RA
7941;
C. Violates the Four Inviolable Parameters of the
Philippine party-list system as provided for under the
same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v.
COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did
not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the
First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified
party-list organizations, the same being merely in
consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations
Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a
justiciable case as the issues involved herein are
constitutional in nature, involving the correct
interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and
are of transcendental importance to our nation.[17]
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the
comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the
following issues in our advisory for the oral
arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section
11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be
allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections? If
not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?[18]
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a
Philippine-style party-list election has at least four
inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans.
For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined
number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected under the
party list;
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to
have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
qualifying and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation the additional
seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of
votes.[19]
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws
in its mathematical interpretation of the term
proportional representation, this Court is compelled
to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional
seats to party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list.
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors
as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941
reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The
party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of
the House of Representatives including those under
the party-list.
xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that
the House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives
shall be composed of district representatives and
party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the
legislature to modify the number of the members of
the House of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the
other hand, states the ratio of party-list
representatives to the total number of
representatives. We compute the number of seats
available to party-list representatives from the
number of legislative districts. On this point, we do
not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats available to legislative districts
x .20 =
Number of seats available to
party-list representatives
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in
the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is
created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the
Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are
55 seats available to party-list representatives.
220
x .20 =
55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list
representatives to the total number of
representatives, the Constitution left the manner of
allocating the seats available to party-list
representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent
Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the
maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-
List System, as well as on the formula to determine
the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates
garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list
votes. However, there are numerous interpretations
of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of
additional seats under the Party-List System. Veterans
produced the First Party Rule,[20] and Justice Vicente
V. Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys
Niemeyer formula[21] as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of
the manner of allocating the seats for party-list
representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941,
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of
which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x
x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second
vote,[22] the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving
at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each:
Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-
List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the
votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis, rank them according to the number
of votes received and allocate party-list
representatives proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization, or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.
(Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two
interpretations through three formulas to allocate
party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the
provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement
with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described
this procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the
House of Representatives including those from the
party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI
of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941
and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996.
Since there are 220 District Representatives in the
14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List
Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one
(1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total
party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no
party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats
(Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the
seats obtained by the party-list groups under the
immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting
from their total the votes corresponding to those
seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted
proportionately to all the party-list groups which have
not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the
2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of
RA 7941.[23]
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under
BANATs first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT
assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared
unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-
list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No.
7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes
received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately
according to the percentage of votes obtained by each
party, organization or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.[24]
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results:
one is based on the proportional percentage of the
votes received by each party as against the total
nationwide party-list votes, and the other is by
making the votes of a party-list with a median
percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the
allocation of seats.[25] Thirty-four (34) party-list
seats will be awarded under BANATs second
interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A
Teacher criticize both the COMELECs original 2-4-6
formula and the Veterans formula for systematically
preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up.
They claim that both formulas do not factor in the
total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List
System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the
three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After
determining the qualified parties, a second percentage
is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party
by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The
number of seats allocated to a qualified party is
computed by multiplying the total party-list seats
available with the second percentage. There will be a
first round of seat allocation, limited to using the
whole integers as the equivalent of the number of
seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all
the qualified parties are given their seats, a second
round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or
remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from
highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis
of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are
filled up.[26]
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate
seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking
of the participating parties from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
garnered during the elections.[27]
Rank
Party
Votes Garnered
Rank
Party
Votes Garnered
1
BUHAY
1,169,234
48
KALAHI
88,868
2
BAYAN MUNA
979,039 370,261
49 60
APOI AKSA
79,386 57,012
3 14
CIBAC ABONO
755,686 339,990
50 61
BP BAGO
78,541 55,846
4 15
GABRIELA AMIN
621,171 338,185
51 62
AHONBAYAN BANDILA
78,424 54,751
5 16
APEC AGAP
619,657 328,724
52 63
BIGKIS AHON
77,327 54,522
6 17
A TEACHER AN WARAY
490,379 321,503
53 64
PMAP ASAHAN MO
75,200 51,722
7 18
AKBAYAN YACAP
466,112 310,889
54 65
AKAPIN AGBIAG!
74,686 50,837
8 19
ALAGAD FPJPM
423,149 300,923
55 66
PBA SPI
71,544 50,478
9 20
COOP-NATCCO UNI-MAD
409,883 245,382
56 67
GRECON BAHANDI
62,220 46,612
10 21
BUTIL ABS
409,160 235,086
57 68
BTM ADD
60,993 45,624
11 22
BATAS KAKUSA
385,810 228,999
58 69
A SMILE AMANG
58,717 43,062
12 23
ARC KABATAAN
374,288 228,637
59 70
NELFFI ABAY PARAK
57,872 42,282
13 24
ANAKPAWIS ABA-AKO
218,818 162,647
71 82
BABAE KA AAWAS
36,512 22,946
25 36
ALIF COCOFED
217,822 155,920
72 83
SB SM
34,835 20,744
26 37
SENIOR CITIZENS AGHAM
213,058 146,032
73 84
ASAP AG
34,098 16,916
27 38
AT ANAK
197,872 141,817
74 85
PEP AGING PINOY
33,938 16,729
28 39
VFP ABANSE! PINAY
196,266 130,356
75 86
ABA ILONGGO APO
33,903 16,421
29 40
ANAD PM
188,521 119,054
76 87
VENDORS BIYAYANG BUKID
33,691 16,241
30 41
BANAT AVE
177,028 110,769
77 88
ADD-TRIBAL ATS
32,896 14,161
31 42
ANG KASANGGA SUARA
170,531 110,732
78 89
ALMANA UMDJ
32,255 9,445
32 43
BANTAY ASSALAM
169,801 110,440
79 90
AANGAT KA PILIPINO BUKLOD FILIPINA
29,130 8,915
33 44
ABAKADA DIWA
166,747 107,021
80 91
AAPS LYPAD
26,271 8,471
34 45
1-UTAK ANC
164,980 99,636
81 92
HAPI AA-KASOSYO
25,781 8,406
35 46
TUCP SANLAKAS
97,375 2.92%
93 1
KASAPI 8
6,221 ALAGAD
47 423,149
ABC 2.65%
90,058 1
9
TOTAL COOP-NATCCO
15,950,900 409,883
2.57%
1
The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 10
states that parties, organizations, and coalitions BUTIL
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes 409,160
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one 2.57%
seat each. This clause guarantees a seat to the two- 1
percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 11
party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The BATAS[29]
percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived 385,810
at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each 2.42%
party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for 1
all party-list candidates. 12
ARC
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their 374,288
respective percentage of votes garnered over the total 2.35%
votes for the party-list.[28] 1
13
Rank ANAKPAWIS
Party 370,261
Votes Garnered 2.32%
Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Party-List, in % 1
Guaranteed Seat 14
1 ABONO
BUHAY 339,990
1,169,234 2.13%
7.33% 1
1 15
2 AMIN
BAYAN MUNA 338,185
979,039 2.12%
6.14% 1
1 16
3 AGAP
CIBAC 328,724
755,686 2.06%
4.74% 1
1 17
4 AN WARAY
GABRIELA 321,503
621,171 2.02%
3.89% 1
1
5 Total
APEC
619,657
3.88% 17
1 18
6 YACAP
A TEACHER 310,889
490,379 1.95%
3.07% 0
1 19
7 FPJPM
AKBAYAN 300,923
466,112 1.89%
0 In determining the allocation of seats for party-list
20
UNI-MAD
245,382
1.54%
0 shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list
candidates received at least 2% from the total number
of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified
party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the
party-list candidates that are entitled to one seat each,
or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat
allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
provides that those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes. This is
where petitioners and intervenors problem with the
formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the
clause in proportion to their total number of votes to
be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This
interpretation is contrary to the express language of
R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional
seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats
as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.
No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the
two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available
party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of
the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats.
Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has
two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes,
gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50
parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats.
Because of the operation of the two percent threshold,
this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if
the maximum number of parties get two percent of
the votes for every party, it is always impossible for
the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50
seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold
only in relation to the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives.[30]
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed
seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-
percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in
the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing
for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold
unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-
percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each
party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the
number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-
list candidates. There are two steps in the second
round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is
multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which
is the difference between the 55 maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole
integer of the product of the percentage and of the
remaining available seats corresponds to a partys
share in the remaining available seats. Second, we
assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in
rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38
seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally,
we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number
of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
Rank
Party N.A.
Votes Garnered 4
Votes Garnered over GABRIELA
Total Votes for Party List, in % 621,171
3.89%
1
1.48
(A) 2
Guaranteed Seat N.A.
5
APEC
619,657
3.88%
1
(First Round) 1.48
2
(B) N.A.
Additional 6
Seats A Teacher
490,379
3.07%
1
1.17
2
(Second Round) N.A.
7
(C) AKBAYAN
(B) plus (C), in whole integers 466,112
2.92%
1
1.11
2
N.A.
8
(D) ALAGAD
Applying the three seat cap 423,149
2.65%
1
1.01
2
N.A.
9[31]
(E) COOP-NATCCO
1 409,883
BUHAY 2.57%
1,169,234 1
7.33% 1
1 2
2.79 N.A.
3 10
N.A. BUTIL
2 409,160
BAYAN MUNA 2.57%
979,039 1
6.14% 1
1 2
2.33 N.A.
3 11
N.A. BATAS
3 385,810
CIBAC 2.42%
755,686 1
4.74% 1
1 2
1.80 N.A.
2 12
ARC 1.54%
374,288 0
2.35% 1
1 1
1 N.A.
2 21
N.A. ABS
13 235,086
ANAKPAWIS 1.47%
370,261 0
2.32% 1
1 1
1 N.A.
2 22
N.A. KAKUSA
14 228,999
ABONO 1.44%
339,990 0
2.13% 1
1 1
1 N.A.
2 23
N.A. KABATAAN
15 228,637
AMIN 1.43%
338,185 0
2.12% 1
1 1
1 N.A.
2 24
N.A. ABA-AKO
16 218,818
AGAP 1.37%
328,724 0
2.06% 1
1 1
1 N.A.
2 25
N.A. ALIF
17 217,822
AN WARAY 1.37%
321,503 0
2.02% 1
1 1
1 N.A.
2 26
N.A. SENIOR CITIZENS
18 213,058
YACAP 1.34%
310,889 0
1.95% 1
0 1
1 N.A.
1 27
N.A. AT
19 197,872
FPJPM 1.24%
300,923 0
1.89% 1
0 1
1 N.A.
1 28
N.A. VFP
20 196,266
UNI-MAD 1.23%
245,382 0
1 N.A.
1 Total
N.A.
29
ANAD
188,521 17
1.18%
0 55
1
1
N.A.
30 Applying the procedure of seat allocation as
BANAT illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list
177,028 representatives from the 36 winning party-list
1.11% organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are
0 filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties
1 with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in
1 no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party,
N.A. are shown in column (D).
31
ANG KASANGGA Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List
170,531 Elections
1.07%
0 The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party
1 system that allowed all political parties to participate
1 in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the
N.A. Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
32
BANTAY MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say
169,801 that we suggested or proposed the party list system
1.06% because we wanted to open up the political system to
0 a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x
1 We are for opening up the system, and we would like
1 very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one
N.A. of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number
33 of representatives from any single party that can sit
ABAKADA within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x
166,747 x.
1.05%
0 xxx
1
1 MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the
N.A. 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My
34 question is this: Are we going to classify for example
1-UTAK Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political
164,980 parties? Can they run under the party list concept or
1.03% must they be under the district legislation side of it
0 only?
1
1 MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these
N.A. parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field
35 candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of
TUCP Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
162,647 candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent,
1.02% whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are
0 allocating under the party list system.
1
1 MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian
N.A. Democrats can field district candidates and can also
36 participate in the party list system?
COCOFED
155,920 MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the
0.98% party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral
0 candidates.
1
1
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO
participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they
field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run
under BAYAN group and says that he represents the
farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not
qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under
the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a
farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or
not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko
lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly
minority political parties, are not prohibited to
participate in the party list election if they can prove
that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is
that all political parties can participate because it is
precisely the contention of political parties that they
represent the broad base of citizens and that all
sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan
mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din
yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang
party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang
reserve. Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved
din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody
can run there. But my question to Commissioner
Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo
is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned
from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field
sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO
may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner
Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa
sectoral lines.
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the
stimulus for political parties and mass organizations
to seek common ground. For example, we have the
PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they
should not be able to make common goals with mass
organizations so that the very leadership of these
parties can be transformed through the participation
of mass organizations. And if this is true of the
administration parties, this will be true of others like
the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed.
There is no question that they will be attractive to
many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to
which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to
contact mass organizations so that with their
participation, the policies of such parties can be
radically transformed because this amendment will
create conditions that will challenge both the mass
organizations and the political parties to come
together. And the party list system is certainly
available, although it is open to all the parties. It is
understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the
COMELEC the names of representatives of mass
organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in
time, develop this excellent system that they have in
Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives,
for example, distribute themselves either in the Social
Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party
in Germany, and their very presence there has a
transforming effect upon the philosophies and the
leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United
States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic
Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote
with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no
reason at all why political parties and mass
organizations should not combine, reenforce,
influence and interact with each other so that the very
objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral
representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting,
and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support
this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs
sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at
the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the
majesty of being elected representatives later on
through a party list system; and even beyond that, to
become actual political parties capable of contesting
political power in the wider constitutional arena for
major political parties.
x x x [32] (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts
put forward by the Constitutional Commission.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a
mechanism of proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a
coalition may participate independently provided the
coalition of which they form part does not participate
in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government
and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread
over the geographical territory of at least a majority of
the regions. It is a regional party when its
constituency is spread over the geographical territory
of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of
citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to
the special interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of
citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share
similar physical attributes or characteristics,
employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly
registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat
cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-
list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits
major political parties from participating in the party-
list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any
permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral
groups.[33] In defining a party that participates in
party-list elections as either a political party or a
sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in
party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially
legislate the exclusion of major political parties from
the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission state that major
political parties are allowed to establish, or form
coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or
political purposes. There should not be a problem if,
for example, the Liberal Party participates in the
party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng
Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other
major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate
with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further
illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a
fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election,
and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk
nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI)
can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are
prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall
be nominated as party-list representative unless he is
a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding
the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at
least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until
the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary
that the party-list organizations nominee wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity[34] as there is no
financial status required in the law. It is enough that
the nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,[35] that
is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she
must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the
senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates
the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The
Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI,
left the determination of the number of the members
of the House of Representatives to Congress: The
House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of
party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives. However,
we cannot allow the continued existence of a
provision in the law which will systematically prevent
the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap,
as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified
party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid
statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance
with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to
continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to
continue disallowing major political parties from the
party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to
allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in
concurring with this ponencia.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We

SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3
August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the
Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We
declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in
the distribution of additional party-list seats. The
allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System shall be in accordance with the procedure
used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties
are disallowed from participating in party-list
elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
LICO vs COMELEC
The pivotal and interrelated issues before Us in this
case involve the seemingly elementary matter of the
Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction
over the expulsion of a sitting party-list
representative: from the House of Representatives, on
the one hand; and from his party-list organization, on
the other.
The instant case involves two rival factions of the
same party-list organization, the Adhikaing
Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating Koop). One group
is headed by petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico (the Lico
Group), who represents the organization in the House
of Representatives, and the other group by Amparo T.
Rimas (respondents herein, or the Rimas Group).
THE CASE
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 641 in
relation to Rule 65,2 seeking to annul the Resolutions
in E.M. No. 12-039 dated 18 July 2012 and 31 January
2013 of the COMELEC.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization
which was registered on 16 November 2009 under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, also known as the Party-
List System Act (Party-List Law).
Under Ating Koop's Constitution and By-Laws, its
highest policymaking body is the National Convention.
The Central Committee, however, takes over when the
National Convention is not in session.3
On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its
Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List
System of Representation for the 10 May 2010
Elections.4 On 6 March 2010, it filed with the
COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico
as first nominee and Roberto Mascarina as second
nominee.
On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating
Koop as one of the winning party-list groups.5 Based
on the procedure provided in BANAT Party-List v.
COMELEC,6 Ating Koop earned a seat in the House of
Representatives. Petitioner Lico subsequently took his
oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives,7
and thereafter assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the
winning party-list organizations, or on 9 June 2010,
Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution
2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing
agreement signed by its nominees.8 Under the
agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list
Representative for the first year of the three-year
term.9
On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National
Convention, during which it introduced amendments
to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient
changes was the composition of the Central
Committee,10 which would still be composed of 15
representatives but with five each coming from
Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-5-5 equal
representation).11 The amendments likewise
mandated the holding of an election of Central
Committee members within six months after the
Second National Convention.12
In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year
term of the incumbent members (referred to
hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the
Central Committee.13 The Interim Central Committee
was dominated by members of the Rimas Group.
On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after
petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim
Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for
disloyalty.14 Apart from allegations of malversation
and graft and corruption, the Committee cited
petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing
agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause
for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended
Constitution and By-laws.15
On 8 December 2011, Congressman Lico filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with the Interim Central
Committee,16 which subsequently denied the same in
a Resolution dated 29 December 2011.17
While petitioner Lico's Motion for Reconsideration
was pending, the Lico Group held a special meeting in
Cebu City (the Cebu meeting) on 19 December 2011.
At the said meeting, new members of the Central
Committee, as well as a new set of officers, were
elected.18 The election was purportedly held for the
purpose of implementing the 5-5-5 equal
representation amendment made during the Second
National Convention.19
On 21 January 2012, the Rimas Group held a Special
National Convention in Para�aque City20 (the
Para�aque convention), at which a new Central
Committee and a new set of officers were
constituted.21 Members of the Rimas Group won the
election and occupied all the corresponding seats.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMELEC
SECOND DIVISION
On 16 March 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to
represent Ating Koop, filed with COMELEC a Petition
against petitioner Lico docketed as E.M. No. 12-039.22
The said Petition, which was subsequently raffled to
the Second Division, prayed that petitioner Lico be
ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the
House of Representatives, and for the succession of
the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina as Ating
Koop's representative in the House.
The Rimas Group thereafter filed an Amended
Petition with the COMELEC on 14 May 2012, this time
impleading not only petitioner Lico but the entire Lico
Group. The Amended Petition also prayed that the
COMELEC nullify the election conducted at the Cebu
meeting and recognize the Paranaque convention.
In both the Petition and the Amended Petition, the
Rimas Group alleged that Ating Koop had expelled
Congressman Lico for acts inimical to the party-list
group, such as malversation, graft and corruption, and
that he had "boldly displayed his recalcitrance to
honor party commitment to be upright and
consistently honest, thus violating basic principles of
the Ating Koop."23 The Amended Petition stated
further that the Cebu meeting held by the Lico Group
violated notice and quorum requirements.24
In a Resolution dated 18 July 2012,25 the COMELEC
Second Division upheld the expulsion of petitioner
Lico from Ating Koop and declared Mascarina as the
duly qualified nominee of the party-list group.26 The
Second Division characterized the issue of the validity
of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop as
an intra-party leadership dispute, which it could
resolve as an incident of its power to register political
parties.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMELEC
EN BANC
Consequently, the Lico Group filed a Motion for
Reconsideration from the Second Division's
Resolution, which the COMELEC En Banc denied on 31
January 2013. The dispositive portion of its
Resolution reads:cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission
(En Banc) RESOLVES, as it hereby RESOLVED, to:
a. DISMISS the instant Petition to Expel Respondent
Atty. Isidro Q. Lico in the House of Representatives
and to Sanction the Immediate Succession of the
Second Nominee of ATING KOOP Party List, Mr.
Roberto C. Mascarina as its Party Representative, for
lack of jurisdiction;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
b. UPHOLD the Expulsion of Respondent Atty. Isidro
Lico from ATING KOOP Party-list Group; [and]
c. UPHOLD the ATING KOOP Party-list Group
represented by its President, Amparo T. Rimas, as the
legitimate Party-list Group accredited by the
Commission on Elections, to the exclusion of
respondents Atty. Isidro Q. Lico, Rafael A.
Puentespina, Proculo T. Sarmen, Amelito L. Revuelta,
William C. Ybanez, Silverio J. Sanchez, Gloria G.
Futalan, Hilario De Guzman, Eugene M. Pabualan,
Rodolfo E. Perez, Hipolito R. Quillan, Mario Arenas,
Tirso C. Buenaventura, Lydia B. Tubella, and Jonathan
Dequina.28
chanrobleslaw
In arriving at its Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc
held that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman
Lico from the House of Representatives, considering
that his expulsion from Ating Koop affected his
qualifications as member of the House, and therefore
it was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) that had jurisdiction over the Petition.
At the same time, the COMELEC upheld the validity of
petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop,
explaining that when the Interim Central Committee
ousted him from Ating Koop, the said Committee's
members remained in hold-over capacity even after
their terms had expired;29 and that the COMELEC
was not in a position to substitute its judgment for
that of Ating Koop with respect to the cause of the
expulsion.30
Finally, the COMELEC En Banc recognized the Rimas
Group as the legitimate representative of Ating Koop
considering that: 1) it found nothing in the records to
show that the Lico Group made a valid call for the
special election of Central Committee members as
required under the Amended Constitution and By-
Laws;31 2) there is nothing on record indicating that
a minimum of 100 attended the Cebu meeting;32 and
3) the Para�aque convention was in accordance with
Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-Laws.33
Hence, this Petition: the Lico Group now comes before
Us, praying for a review of the COMELEC Resolutions.
The Court's Ruling
On the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
the expulsion of a Member of the House
of Representatives from his party-list
organization
We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed
the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House of
Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it
nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of
his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its
purview.
The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for
expulsion of petitioner Lico from the House of
Representatives and for the succession of the second
nominee as party-list representative as a
disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, insofar
as it relates to the question of unseating petitioner
Lico from the House of Representatives.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution34
endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve
questions on the qualifications of members of
Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the
HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification
case upon proclamation of the winning party-list
group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office
as member of the House of Representatives.35 In this
case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a
winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his
oath; and he assumed office in the House of
Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the
COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the
disqualification case.
What We find to be without legal basis, however, is
the action of the COMELEC in upholding the validity of
the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop,
despite its own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction
over the disqualification issue. These findings already
touch upon the qualification requiring a party-list
nominee to be a bona fide member of the party-list
group sought to be represented.
The COMELEC justified its Resolution on the merits of
the expulsion, by relying on the rule that it can decide
intra-party matters as an incident of its
constitutionally granted powers and functions. It cited
Lokin v. COMELEC, where We held that when the
resolution of an intra-party controversy is necessary
or incidental to the performance of the
constitutionally-granted functions of the COMELEC,
the latter can step in and exercise jurisdiction over the
intra-party matter.36 The Lokin case, however,
involved nominees and not incumbent members of
Congress. In the present case, the fact that petitioner
Lico was a member of Congress at the time of his
expulsion from Ating Koop removes the matter from
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
The rules on intra-party matters and on the
jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that
do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on
intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence
on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The
jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full
authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter
touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed
winner.37
In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's
expulsion from the House of Representatives is
anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which
necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A
party-list nominee must have been, among others, a
bona fide member of the party or organization for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election. Needless to say, bona fide membership in the
party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have
ruled that qualifications for public office, whether
elective or not, are continuing requirements. They
must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election, or of assumption of office,
but during the officer's entire tenure.39
This is not the first time that this Court has passed
upon the issue of HRET jurisdiction over the
requirements for bona fide membership in a party-list
organization. In Abayon v. HRET,40 it was argued that
the petitioners did not belong to the marginalized and
under-represented sectors that they should
represent; as such, they could not be properly
considered bona fide members of their respective
party-list organizations. The Court held that it was for
the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement
of bona fide membership in a party-list organization.
It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests
when it comes to qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives.41
Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize that
the issue on the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion
from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his
qualifications to sit in Congress. This is not merely an
error of law but an error of jurisdiction correctible by
a writ of certiorari;42 the COMELEC should not have
encroached into the expulsion issue, as it was outside
its authority to do so.
Distinguished from Reyes v. COMELEC
Our ruling here must be distinguished from Regina
Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on Elections.43 In that
case, We upheld the disqualification by the COMELEC
of petitioner Reyes, even as she was already
proclaimed winner in the elections at the time she
filed her petition with the High Court. In doing so, We
rejected the argument that the case fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.
In Reyes, the petitioner was proclaimed winner of the
13 May 2013 Elections, and took her oath of office
before the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
However, the Court ruled on her qualifications since
she was not yet a member of the House of
Representatives: petitioner Reyes had yet to assume
office, the term of which would officially start at noon
of 30 June 2013, when she filed a Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status
Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 assailing the
Resolutions ordering the cancellation of her
Certificate of Candidacy. In the present case, all three
requirements of proclamation, oath of office, and
assumption of office were satisfied.
Moreover, in Reyes, the COMELEC En Banc Resolution
disqualifying petitioner on grounds of lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency had become final and
executory when petitioner elevated it to this Court.44
It should be mentioned that when petitioner Reyes
filed her petition with the Court, the COMELEC En
Banc had, as early as 5 June 2013, already issued a
Certificate of Finality over its 14 May 2013 Resolution
disqualifying her. Therefore, there was no longer any
pending case on the qualifications of petitioner Reyes
to speak of. Here, the question of whether petitioner
Lico remains a member of the House of
Representatives in view of his expulsion from Ating
Koop is a subsisting issue.
Finally, in Reyes, We found the question of
jurisdiction of the HRET to be a non-issue, since the
recourse of the petitioner to the Court appeared to be
a mere attempt to prevent the COMELEC from
implementing a final and executory judgment. We said
that the petitioner therein took an inconsistent, if not
confusing, stance, considering that she sought remedy
before the Court, and yet asserted that it is the HRET
which had jurisdiction over the case.45 In this case,
the question on the validity of petitioner Lico's
expulsion from Ating Koop is a genuine issue that falls
within the jurisdiction of the HRET, as it unmistakably
affects his qualifications as party-list representative.
On which group legitimately represents
Ating Koop
We now pass upon the question of which, between the
two contending groups, is the legitimate leadership of
Ating Koop.
At the outset, We reject the Lico Group's argument
that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide which
of the feuding groups is to be recognized, and that it is
the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over
intra-corporate controversies. Indeed, the COMELECs
jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within
the party is well established. This power to rule upon
questions of party identity and leadership is exercised
by the COMELEC as an incident of its enforcement
powers.46
That being said, We find the COMELEC to have
committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the
Rimas Group as the legitimate set of Ating Koop
officers for the simple reason that the amendments to
the Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop were not
registered with the COMELEC. Hence, neither of the
elections held during the Cebu meeting and the
Paranaque conference pursuant to the said
amendments, were valid.
Both the Lico Group and the Rimas Group indeed
assert that their respective elections were conducted
pursuant to the amendment introduced in the Second
National Convention held on 14 May 2011. In
particular, Section 1 of Article VI of Ating Koop's By-
laws called for the conduct of an election of Central
Committee members within six months after the
Second National Convention.47
There is no showing, however, that the amendments
were actually filed with the COMELEC.
A party-list organization owes its existence to the
State and the latter's approval must be obtained
through its agent, the COMELEC. In the 2013 case of
Dayao v. COMELEC,48 We declared that it is the State,
acting through the COMELEC, that breathes life to a
party-list organization. The implication, therefore, is
that the State, through the COMELEC, is a party to the
principal contracts entered into by the party-list
organization and its members - the Constitution and
By-laws - such that any amendment to these contracts
would constitute a novation requiring the consent of
all the parties involved. An amendment to the
by�laws of a party-list organization should become
effective only upon approval by the COMELEC.
Such a prerequisite is analogous to the requirement of
filing of the amended by-laws and subsequent
conformity thereto of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) under corporation law. Under the
Corporation Code, an amendment to a by-law
provision must be filed with the SEC. The amendment
shall be effective only upon the issuance by the SEC of
a certification that it is not inconsistent with the
Corporation Code.49
There being no showing that the amendments on the
by-laws of Ating Koop were filed with and
subsequently approved by the COMELEC, any election
conducted pursuant thereto may not be considered
valid. Without such requisite proof, neither the Lico
Group nor the Rimas Group can claim to be the
legitimate set of officers of Ating Koop.
Even assuming arguendo that the amendment calling
for a special election were effective, this Court still
cannot declare any of the feuding groups as the
legitimate set of officers considering that the
respective sets of evidence presented were evenly
balanced. With respect to the Lico Group's Cebu
meeting, the COMELEC correctly found - and the
records bear out - that the notices sent were deficient
and that there was no sufficient proof of quorum.
Hence, the Cebu meeting was held to be invalid. On
the other hand, the COMELEC failed to appreciate the
fact that the Paranaque convention suffered from the
same infirmity, the records of the said convention,
consisting merely of the Minutes thereof, likewise fail
to establish due notice and a quorum.50
Accordingly, as neither group can sufficiently lay
claim to legitimacy, the equipoise doctrine comes into
play. This rule provides that when the evidence in an
issue of fact is in equipoise, that is, when the
respective sets of evidence of both parties are evenly
balanced, the party having the burden of proof fails in
that issue. Since neither party succeeds in making out
a case, neither side prevails. The courts are left with
no other option but to leave them as they are. The
consequence, therefore, is the dismissal of the
complaint/petition.51
The Rimas Group, being the petitioner before the
COMELEC, had the burden of proving that it is the
petitioner, and not the Lico Group, that is the
legitimate group. As the evidence of both parties are
in equipoise, the Rimas Group failed to discharge its
burden. The COMELEC should have dismissed the
petition of the Rimas Group insofar as it sought to be
declared the legitimate group representing Ating
Koop.
Yet, the COMELEC held that the Paranaque convention
"appeared to be in conformity" with Ating Koop's
Amended Constitution and By-Laws.52 It should be
stressed that the COMELEC did not even substantiate
this conclusion.53
The Court ordinarily refrains from reviewing the
COMELEC s appreciation and evaluation of the
evidence.54 But when the COMELECs assessment of
the evidence is so grossly unreasonable that it turns
into an error of jurisdiction, the Court is compelled to
intervene and correct the error.55
As seen in the above discussions, neither of the
parties was able to establish its legitimacy. The
evaluation of the evidence by the COMELEC in
deciding the issue of which group legitimately
represents Ating Koop was therefore grossly
unreasonable, which amounts to a jurisdictional error
that may be remedied by certiorari under Rule 65.
The final, and most important question to be
addressed is: if neither of the two groups is the
legitimate leadership of Ating Koop, then who is?
We find such legitimate leadership to be the Interim
Central Committee, whose members remain as such in
a hold-over capacity.

In Seneres v. COMELEC,56 the validity of the

Certificate of Nomination filed by Buhay Party-List
through its President, Roger Robles, was questioned
on the ground that his term had expired at the time it
was filed. The Court applied by analogy the default
rule in corporation law to the effect that officers and
directors of a corporation hold over after the
expiration of their terms until such time as their
successors are elected or appointed.57Se�eres ruled
that the hold-over principle applies in the absence of a
provision in the constitution or by-laws of the party-
list organization prohibiting its application.

In the present case, We have gone through the

Constitution and By�laws of Ating Koop and We do
not see any provision forbidding, either expressly or
impliedly, the application of the hold-over rule. Thus,
in accordance with corporation law, the existing
Interim Central Committee is still a legitimate entity
with full authority to bind the corporation and to
carry out powers despite the lapse of the term of its
members on 14 November 2011, since no successors
had been validly elected at the time, or since.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is

GRANTED. The COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated
31 January 2013 and the COMELEC Second Division
Resolution dated 18 July 2012 in E.M. No. 12-039 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE insofar as it
declares valid the expulsion of Congressman Lico
from Ating Koop and it upholds the ATING KOOP
Party-list Group represented by its President, Amparo
T. Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group.

A new one is entered DECLARING that the legitimate

Central Committee and set of officers legitimately
representing Ating Koop are the Interim Central
Committee and set of officers prior to the split of
Ating Koop.

SO ORDERED.