POLITICAL LAW

TIPS FROM ATTY. SANDOVAL

(1) Appointing power

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until after disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise functions of a given office.

The six categories of officials who are subject to the appointing power of the President:
1. The heads of the executive departments;
2. Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
3. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain;
4. Those other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the Constitution;
5. All other officers of the government whose appointments are not provided for by law;
6. Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint

(2) Ad interim appointment vs regular appointment Midnight appointment

A regular appointment is one made by the President while Congress is in session, takes effect only after
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and once approved, continues until the end of the
term of the appointee. An ad interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress is not in
session, takes effect immediately, but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or upon the next adjournment of Congress. In the latter case, the ad interim appointment is
deemed ―by-passed‖ through inaction. The ad interim appointment is intended to prevent interruptions in
vital government services that would otherwise result from prolonged vacancies in government offices.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment [Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 22]. It is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into
office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character [Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002].

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution: disapproval of
the appointment by the Commission on Appointments, or adjournment by Congress without the
Commission on Appointments acting on the appointment. There is no dispute that when the Commission
on Appointments disapproves an ad interim appointment, the appointee can no longer be extended a new
appointment, inasmuch as the disapproval is a final decision of the Commission in the exercise of its

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checking power on the appointing authority of the President. Such disapproval is final and binding on
both the appointee and the appointing power. But when an ad interim appointment is by-passed because
of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize, there is no final decision by
the Commission to give or withhold its consent to the appointment. Absent such decision, the President is
free to renew the ad interim appointment [Matibag v. Benipayo, supra.].

A regular appointment is one made by the President while Congress is in session after the nomination is
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and continues until the end of the term. An adinterim
appointment is one made while Congress is not in session, before confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, is immediately effective, and ceases to be valid if disapproved or bypassed by the
Commission on Appointments upon the next adjournment of Congress.

An ad-interim appointment is a permanent appointment, and its being subject to confirmation does not
alter its permanent character [Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140
SCRA 22].

Classification of appointments into regular and ad interim can be used only when referring to the four (4)
categories of appointments made by the President of the Philippines in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art.
VIII of the Constitution, which require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, viz: (ia) Heads
of executive departments; (ib) Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; (ic) Officers of the
armed forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and (id) Officers whose
appointments are vested in the President under the Constitution. See Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549;
Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 169; Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions,
Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259; Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254

Midnight appointments — the president shall not make appointments 2 months immediately before the
next presidential elections, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. (Art. VII, Sec. 15)

The prohibition against midnight appointments does not apply to the judiciary. See De Castro v. JBC,
(G.R. No. 191002, Mar. 17, 2010)

In De Rama v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001, it was held that the constitutional
prohibition on so-called ―midnight appointments‖, specifically those made within two months
immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or to the Acting
President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last
days of their tenure absent fraud on their part, when such appointments are not tainted by irregularities or
anomalies which breach laws and regulations governing appointments.

(3) Two Immunities of Congress

SECTION 11, ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION

SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

Two Immunities of Congress

1. Freedom from arrest

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Elements:
 Congress must be in session, whether regular or special.
 The crime for which the member is to be arrested is punishable by 6 years of imprisonment or
less.

People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Feb. 3, 2000

Accused-appellant Congressman Romeo G. Jalosjos filed a motion before the Court asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. He
contended that his reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling,
giving priority to any right or interest – not even the police power of the State. Resolve.

HELD: The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives
x x x arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege
cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one.

The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six
years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

2. Speech and debate clause

This privilege protects the member concerned from any libel suit that may be filed against him for a
speech made "in" the halls of Congress or in any of its committees. Speech is not confined to traditional
speech but even to the casting of votes, the making of reports, a debate or discussion, even
communicative actions, and any other form of expression.

Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 (1966)

HELD: Scope of Parliamentary Freedom of Speech and Debate.-- "Said expression refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen,
either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as
members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such,
at the time of the performance of the acts in question."

(4) Pardoning power vis Estrada's Pardon

A pardon is an act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment
which the law inflicts for the crime he has committed.

Kinds of Pardon:
- Pardon may be classified into absolute or conditional; and plenary or partial.

An absolute pardon is one given without any conditions attached. Whereas, a conditional pardon is one
under which the convict is required to comply with certain requirements. In conditional pardon, the
offender has the right to reject the pardon if he feels that the conditions imposed are more onerous than
the penalty sought to be remitted. On the other hand, in case of absolute pardon, it is complied even

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without the acceptance of the pardonee.

A plenary pardon extinguishes all the penalties imposed upon the offender, including accessory
disabilities, whereas a partial pardon does not.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that
the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive
clemency, to wit: Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress.
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Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President
may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a
final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there
was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act
of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.

The pardon granted to former President Estrada was an absolute pardon as expressed by the phrase ―he is
restored to his political and civil rights.‖ The rule that the pardon does not necessarily include restoration
of political rights has no application to the case because such was restored by virtue of express declaration
of President GMA. Furthermore, the whereas clause invoked by the President or the preamble is not that
important. It merely served as introductory statement. It does not change the nature of the pardon granted.
Also, even if it is taken into consideration, it was already ruled out by the clear, unambiguous, and
categorical language of the pardon in restoring Estrada’s political rights which include the right to hold
public office. (Risos-Vidal vs. COMELEC and Estrada; G.R. No. 206666; January 21, 2015)

(5) Ombudsman Act vis Condonation doctrine

The Supreme Court (SC) upheld its decision striking down a provision in the Ombudsman law that
prohibits any court, aside from the SC, from issuing orders that would delay investigations conducted by
the Ombudsman.

Section 14 of Republic Act 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 was struck as unconstitutional.
Section 14 read: "No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman."
The Supreme Court discussed that Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this
Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every
court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested
by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued
therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.

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The Supreme Court pointed out that despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle,
the Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770,
as well as other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to
adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it
proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing
provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is
adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.
Condonation Doctrine
Pursuant to the 1992 case of Aguinaldo v Santos, a public official cannot be removed for misconduct
committed during a prior or previous term; his reelection operates as a condonation of the officer’s
previous misconduct, reiterated in Malinao v Reyes, 1996 (see Provincial Board of Zamboanga del Norte
v Guzman, 1967). This Aguinaldo ruling was based on the fact that the term of office during which the
misconduct was committed expired before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative
decision removing the respondent could be decided (Reyes v Comelec). Reyes v Comelec explains the
rationale: If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be
removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during
which the alleged misconduct was committed.the doctrine of condonation is a limited empowerment of
the electorate over the accountabilities of their elective local officials. It is limited because it does not
cover criminal accountabilities. It is a legal fiction grounded upon a presumed knowledge of all the
activities and behavior of the elective local official. It is presumed that when the electorate exercised their
right to choose, they were all aware of ―all‖ the misconducts of the public official

In the case of Carpio Morales v. CA, the Court finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation
doctrine in this jurisdiction. It was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959
and thus, out of touch from – and now rendered obsolete by – the current legal regime. It should,
however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in
application.

(6) Requisites of a valid check point and plain view search

Searches at Checkpoints

People v. Usana, 323 SCRA 754, Jan. 28, 2000, 1st Div. [Davide]
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of
public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine
checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’ right to ―free passage without interruption,‖ but
it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle’s
occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor
its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search,
said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. In
fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.

Requisites of a valid check point

In the case of Caballes vs. CA (G.R. No. 136292), one such form of search of moving vehicles is the
"stop-and-search" without warrant at military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not
illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an
extensive search. Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search.

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The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances:
(1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds;
(2) simply looks into a vehicle;
(3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors;
(4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
(5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where
the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

Plain View Search

People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, Jan. 22, 1999, En Banc [Puno]
The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent.
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises
when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the
object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the
package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents
are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.

People v. Abe Valdez, G.R. No. 129296, Sept. 25, 2000, En Banc[Quisumbing]
For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
a) A prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;
b) The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and
c) The evidence must be immediately apparent; and
d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

Requisites of Plain View Doctrine

In the case of Unilab vs. Isip (G.R. No. 163858), objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant
but on plain view of the executing officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of
objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view.

The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential
requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely:
(a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise
properly in a position from which he can view a particular order;
(b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and
(c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

(7) The Rome Statute

It is a multilateral treaty that established/created the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Philippines
is the 117th State that ratified this Rome Statute. It is called a statute because it created a tribunal,
according to Dean Raul Pangalangan of UP Law.

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The offenses falling under the jurisdiction of this ICC are; genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes
and the crime of aggression.

The Principle of Complementarity is an important principle. It states that the ICC shall be complementary
to national criminal jurisdiction. It gives primacy to national courts, meaning to say that if the court of one
State already assumed jurisdiction over a person accused of having committed any of the four offenses,
the ICC will no longer assume jurisdiction. Exceptions: first, If the proceeding in the national court is
conducted to protect the accused from liability; or second, if it is not conducted independently or
impartially, in which case, the ICC may still assume jurisdiction.

(8) Impeachment

Who are the impeachable officers under the Constitution?

1. President
2. Vice president- highest elective officials of the land
3. Members of the Supreme court
4. Members of Constitutional commissions
a. COMELEC
b. Commission on audit
c. Civil service commission (2012 Bar)

*CHR is not a constitutional commission

5. Ombudsman- highest appointive officials of the land

Note: Administrator of the SC are not impeachable officers.

All other officials may be removed by means provided by law, except by impeachment Thus, this list is
exclusive.

Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Who has the Exclusive power to initiate impeachment?

A: House of Representatives has the exclusive power

Q: Who shall try? A: Senate. Section 3, par. 6

The senate has to take an oath, not as senators but as judges. That is why, we address them as senator-
judges. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report
to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

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- A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
- In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.
- No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.
- The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation.
- When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside,
but shall not vote.
- No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
- Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law. -The Congress
shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

What are the grounds in case of impeachment?

A: 1. culpable violation of the Constitution;
2. Treason;
3. Bribery;
4. graft and corruption;
5. other high crimes, or
6. betrayal of public trust.

NOTE: Finding of probable cause of HoR: cannot be done. The HoR has the exclusive power to initiate.
The senate cannot question the finding of probable cause by the house of representatives. As long as it is
signed by 1/3 of the house of representatives, the same shall constitute as the articles of impeachment and
trial shall proceed. -―by verified complaint and resolution‖

(9) Amendments or Revisions of the Constitution

AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION

Art. XVII, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right.
(*RA No. 6735 is now a valid law for people’s initiative)
SECTION 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such
a convention.
SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days

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nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision. Any amendment under
Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be
held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on
Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

·Amendment vs. Revision

AMENDMENT REVISION

-piecemeal or isolated change in the - revamp or rewriting of the entire

Constitution. It is the generic term used to Constitution. It means overhauling of the
denote change in the Constitution. government.

**Lambino vs. COMELEC -changing the form of government from presidential to

parliamentary involves a revision and not amendment.

2 Stages of Amendment:

1. Proposal (Secs. 1-3, Art. XVII)-the adoption of the suggested change in the Constitution. A proposed
amendment may come from—(3 ways of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution under
Article XVII):
(a) Congress—
i. (Sec. 1, Art. XVII) Acting as Constitutional Assembly and not as a legislative body. -One of the non-
legislative powers;
ii. By a vote of 3/4 of all its members. (3/4 of the Senate, 3/4 of the House of Representatives

(b) Constitutional Convention- which may be called into existence either:

i. By directly calling a Constitutional Convention by a 2/3 vote of all the Members of Congress, or;
ii. By submitting the issue to the people in a plebiscite [if the two-thirds (2/3) vote is not obtained] by a
majority vote of all the members of Congress— with the question of whether or not to call a Convention
to be resolved by the people in a plebiscite. (Sec.3, Art. XVII)
*superior- people; Theory of Conventional Sovereignty
*inferior- it is a mere creation of Congress;
*co-equal to and independent of the 3 branches
Occena vs. COMELEC 104 SCRA 1, the choice of method of proposal, i.e., whether made directly by
Congress or through a Constitutional Convention, is within the full discretion of the legislature.

(c) People, through the Power of Initiative (Sec.2, Art. XVII)- A petition of at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein --This is not a self-executing provision, it will require an enactment of law.

RA 6735 Initiative and Referendum Law

INITIATIVE - the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not
have the power under RA 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC’s power under Section 2 (1), Article IX-C is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under
Section 3 of Article IX-C or a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
―completeness‖ and the ―sufficient standard tests‖. (Santiago vs. COMELEC, 270SCRA 106)

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2. Ratification- (Sec. 4, Art. XVII) The proposed amendment shall become part of the Constitution
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held not earlier than 60 nor later than 90 days
after the approval of the proposal by Congress or the Constitutional Convention, or after the certification
by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition for initiative under Sec. 2, Art. XVII.

REFERENDUM - the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called
for that purpose.

Two (2) Classes:

1. Referendum on Statutes- refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress
2. Referendum on Local Law- refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance
enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative
bodies

Judicial Review of Amendments - The question is now regarded as subject to judicial review because
invariably, the issue will boil down to whether or not the constitutional provisions had been followed.
(Sanidad vs. Comelec, 78 SCRA 333; Javellana vs. Exec. Secretary, 50 SCRA 50)

Prohibited Measures: The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or

referendum—
1. No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
2. Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which is specifically vested in Congress by
the Constitution, cannot be subject of referendum until ninety (90) days after the effectivity. (Sec. 10, RA
6735)

Local Initiative: not less than 2,000 registered voters in case of autonomous regions, 1,000 in case of
provinces and cities, 100 in case of municipalities, and 50 in case of barangays, may file a petition with
the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal,
or amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution. (Sec. 13, RA 6735)

Limitations on Local Initiative:

a. The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year;
b. Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local
legislative bodies to enact; and
c. If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition
presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire,
apply for initiative.

Limitation on Local Legislative Body vis-.-vis Local Initiative

Sec. 125, RA 7160—any proposition or ordinance approved through an initiative and referendum shall
not be repealed, modified or amended by the Sangggunian within 6 months from the date of approval
thereof, and may be amended, modified or repealed within 3 years thereafter by a vote of . of all its
members. In case of barangays, the period shall be 18 months after approval.
Revision—
In the case of Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, the SC held that a
people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to
its revision. Certainly, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment.
Quantitatively, the Lambino Group’s proposed changes overhaul two articles—Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive—affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire

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Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from
presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

(10) Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege
of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

Notes:
 The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
 Whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call out such Armed forces to prevent or
suppress: lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
 The President may also suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

Grounds of suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and declaration of martial law:
1. Invasion; or
2. Rebellion; and
3. When the public safety requires it.
Note: The invasion or rebellion must be actual and not merely imminent.

Limitations:
1. Suspension or declaration is effective for only sixty (60) days.
2. Within forty eight (48) hours from the suspension or declaration, the President must submit a
report to the Congress.

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 3. The Congress, by majority vote and voting jointly, may revoke the same and the President cannot
set aside the said revocation.
4. In the same manner, at the President’s initiative, the Congress can extend the same.

Martial Law does not:

 Suspend the operation of the Constitution
 Supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies
 Authorize conferment of jurisdiction on military courts over civil courts are able to function
 Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ

Suspension of the writ:

 Applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion
 Anyone arrested or detained during suspension must be charged within there (3) days, otherwise,
he should be released.

(11) DAP

What is the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP)?

It is a program devised by the Department of Budget and Management(DBM), under Former President
Benigno Aquino and his DBM Secretary Florencio Abad.

The DAP was meant to stimulate economic expansion by encouraging public spending. Under this
scheme, funds were taken from (1) unreleased appropriations; (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over
appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that
had been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects. These funds were then transferred from one item
of the General Appropriations Act to augment another. At times they were transferred from the Executive
Department to other offices outside the Executive and even used to fund projects, activities and programs
that were not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.

Does the DAP violate Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution wherein no money should be
paid out of the Treasury without an appropriation law?
No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. The DAP is neither a fund nor an
appropriation. It was only an administrative system to prioritize spending. The money that was used in the
implementation of the DAP had already been set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the
General Appropriations Acts. No additional funds were withdrawn, they were merely realigned. (Araullo,
et. al. v. Aquino, et. al., G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 )

Are the DAP realignments considered as executive impoundments?

No, there are no executive impoundments involved in the realignments. Impoundment refers to a refusal
by the President to spend funds made available by Congress. (Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994). Impoundment is generally prohibited under the General
Appropriations Acts. However, in the case of DAP, the funds were merely transferred and spent
elsewhere. The appropriations were not retained nor deducted. (Araullo, et. al. v. Aquino, et. al., G.R. No.
209287, July 1, 2014 )

Does the DAP violate Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution?

Yes. The DAP violates Section 25 (5), Art. VI of the Constitution in so far as it allowed cross-border
transfers. The provision of Constitution prohibits transfer of appropriations through law and only allows

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the heads of the three branches of government and constitutional commissions to augment items in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.

In the implementation of DAP, the Executive made cross-border transfers from the Executive Department
to the Legislative which is a clear violation of what the Constitution provides. Each head of office may
only augment the appropriations for their own respective offices. (Araullo, et. al. v. Aquino, et. al., G.R.
No. 209287, July 1, 2014 )

Are unreleased or unalloted appropriations considered as savings under the purview of Section 25
(5), Article VI of the Constitution?
No. Unreleased or unalloted appropriations have not yet ripened into savings. Appropriations need to be
released first and used by the agencies concerned before any savings can be generated. To consider
unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these met the statutory definition of savings, would seriously
undercut the congressional power of the purse. (Araullo, et. al. v. Aquino, et. al., G.R. No. 209287, July 1,
2014)

Does the Doctrine of Operative Fact apply to DAP?

Yes. The adoption and implementation of DAP is covered by the operative fact doctrine. The doctrine
recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as
an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. It
nullifies the law or executive act but sustains its effects. This applies only to extraordinary cases such as
the case of DAP. The positive economic effects of the program are undeniable such as in the form of
public infrastructure. To attempt to undo such results would lead to undesirable wastefulness. (Araullo, et.
al. v. Aquino, et. al., G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 )

(12) PDAF

The Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), also known as ―Pork Barrel‖, is a yearly lump
sum or discretionary fund or regular allocation of public funds for the members of Congress (Philippine
Senate and Philippine House of Representative- district representatives and party representatives) in the
Philippines (Belgica vs. Ochoa).

Originally established as the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) in 1990, it is designed to allow
legislators to fund small-scale infrastructure or community projects which fell outside the scope of the
national infrastructure program, which was often restricted to large infrastructure items (Lagman, P. &
Nograles, E. 2012)

The Congress then uses this fund for government programs that can benefit the people (fund the priority
development programs and government projects) without going through the normal budgetary process or
the Executive branch. Its main purpose is to give legislators easy access to capital so that they can have
projects that can improve their constituents. PDAF involves people’s money which means that it should
be used for the benefit of the people.

The "pork barrel", and has been the subject of much public criticism following exposés on abuses
perpetuated by members of Congress on use of the fund in 1996 and 2013.
Every year Philippine House of Representative (district representatives and party representatives) is
allotted 15,000 pesos to 1 million pesos (commonly around 35,000) per recipient.
Every year Philippine Senators is allotted 15,000 pesos to 100,000,000 million pesos (commonly around
50,000 to 100,000) per recipient (Philippine Country, 2014).

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Greco Belgica vs Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa 710 SCRA 1
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251. The pork barrel system started in
the year of 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members
of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from ―Congressional Pork Barrel‖ to the latest
―Priority Development Assistance Fund‖ or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the
annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).

PDAF’s allocation, since 2011:

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for ―hard projects‖
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for ―soft projects‖
(scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for
soft projects.

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
―presidential pork barrel‖ comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas
Project (since 1976) and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR
(since 1983).

In July 2013, Benhur Luy and other 6 whistle blowers, exposed Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles, and that she
had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-
government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in
legitimate existing projects but are in fact going to ―ghost‖ projects. An audit was then conducted by the
Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al. Greco Belgica et
al., filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel
system.

ISSUES:
I. Is the congressional pork barrel system constitutional?
II. Is the presidential pork barrel system constitutional?

HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it
violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The
executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part
of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was
that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their
PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the
principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that
pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

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As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned).
That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which
was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power
to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact
that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his
PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, ―Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.‖

d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives,
what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy
embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork
barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to
wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related
ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance
energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be
allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.

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These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

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