CRUZ VS SECRETARY OF DENR

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.[1] In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP),
the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998
their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the
petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor
General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples
and prays that the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the
IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and
members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene.
They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or
to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae
and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a
serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene
with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is
consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and
during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules
on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in
turn, defines ancestral lands;

(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable
public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private
but community property of the indigenous peoples;

(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;

(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
lands;

(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable
for not more than 25 years; and

(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and
conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.
[2]

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
violate the rights of private landowners.[3]

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.[4]

These provisions are:

(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains
and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral
domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner
of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement
of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor
of the indigenous peoples;

(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and

(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the
indigenous peoples.[5]

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program
coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.[6]

Petitioners pray for the following:

(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of
R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to
cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;

(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and
desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources.[7]

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of
R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with
the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza
voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law,
which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by
the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of
R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant
to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

---------------

THE SECRETARY OF DENR VS YAP

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure
titles over their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo,
Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et
al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064[3] issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm
crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003
inhabitants[4] who live in the bone-shaped islands three barangays.[5]

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National
Reservation Survey of Boracay

Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.[7]

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801[8] declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine
reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82[9] dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No.
1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants

Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory
relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial.
They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.[10]

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place
Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through
judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed
part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,[11] as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was
misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot
ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-
claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were
planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or
less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-
claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.[12]

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No.
1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to
forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective
memoranda.[13]

The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1
and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of
the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the
RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.[15] The titles were issued on

August 7, 1933.[16]

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their
lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to
have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the
approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land. SO ORDERED

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled
that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were
inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.[18] The Circular itself recognized private
ownership of lands.[19] The trial court cited Sections 87[20] and 53[21] of the Public Land Act as basis
for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public
lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.[22]

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[23] The Republic then appealed to the
CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal
filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.[24]

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they
occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.[25] Hence, the present petition under
Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest
land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural
land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on
each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the
area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,[27] Wilfredo Gelito,[28] and other
landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.[30] They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior
vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in
Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and
building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.[31]

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into
agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural
pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32] Thus,
their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their
occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of
PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the
subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts,
which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is
a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally
involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.[33]

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any
legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in
Boracay Island.[34]

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.

AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR
RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO
THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED
BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.

HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR
OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.

IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141
[AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.

IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS
TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR
SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.

CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE
SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN
BORACAY?[35] (Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and
petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.

Our Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902[36] in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or
superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;[37] (b) Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President
Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064[39] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall
proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws
and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public
domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber.[40]
Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes
as may be provided by law,[41] giving the government great leeway for classification.[42] Then the 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks.[43] Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.[44] Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,
Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand
divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.[46]

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to
determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as
the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall
be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such
privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.[49]

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish
Crown.[50] The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies
and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.[51]

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish
Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.
[52]

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the
Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of
vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree.[54] Under Section 393
of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,[55] when duly inscribed in
the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of
uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,[56] from the date of its inscription.
[57] However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the
Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.[58]

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal concessions
which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant;
(3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5)
informacion posesoria or possessory information title.[59]
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was
embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands.[61] The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant
(freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).[62] It also provided the definition by exclusion of
agricultural public lands.[63] Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under the Philippine Bill of
1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:[64]

x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x[65] (Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute,
indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.[66]

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first
Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted
corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase
lands of the public domain.[67] Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.[68]

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second
Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to
Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For
judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or
since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To
this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands,[70] and privately owned
lands which reverted to the State.[71]

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation
of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was
superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive
period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,[73]
which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
[74]

The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence
in land registration proceedings.[76] Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should
apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the
decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed by
Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property.[78] It
governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel
mortgages.[79]

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes.[81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable
lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and classified.[82]

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[83] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.[84] There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.[85] The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that
the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
[86]

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006,
the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that
the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before
2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.[87]

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands.
Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).[89]
These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a
statement in these old cases that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands
are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.[90]

Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of
converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration
courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber,
mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were
free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do
so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.[91] This was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the
Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,[92] in which it stated,
through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of the
Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands. x x x x

Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These
cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the
Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.[93]

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a
presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that the courts have a right to
presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands
until the contrary is shown.[94]

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands
of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands.
By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural
lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have
automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land,
alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be
utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under the
provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative
confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative
conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as
private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act
No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued
to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in the
end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the
courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that
whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere
fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that
one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or
future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been
given for agriculture, forestry, and mineral lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it
is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for
the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It
is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land
may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral,
be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or
the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently classified
tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its
present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is
a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands
that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the
lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for
one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact
that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land.
The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide
for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have
intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry,
or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of
the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the public domain shall be set
aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs.
Director of Forestry, supra)[95] (Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each
case, except those that have already became private lands.[96] Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and
reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President, the
exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public domain.[97]

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933,[98] did not
present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the propertys land
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay
occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874
in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the propertys land
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of
Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to
classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.[103]

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent
issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of agricultural
lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien,
Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land, which included
residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically
deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided
prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.[105] As We have already
stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the
authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.

Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land
is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island
for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926[106] ipso facto converted the island into
private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.[107] Collado,
citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources,107-a ruled:

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations
for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the
Islands. It also provided for the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands, for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land
Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other
subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term public land referred to all lands of
the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar
lands.

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act
No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are
alienable and disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain
prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
The DENR[109] and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority[110] certify that Boracay
Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public
forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which
has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are
needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those
in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already
existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out
of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest
cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and
foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island;
[111] that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of
Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as public
forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution[112] classifying lands of the
public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily
refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.
[113] The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry[114] is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest
lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land.
The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what
the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.[115] (Emphasis supplied)
 There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as a
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.[116] At any rate,
the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout.
Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial
establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants
argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist
zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural
land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The
reference in Circular No. 3-82 to private lands[117] and areas declared as alienable and disposable[118]
does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not
only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:

No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas in
public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the island
can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5
of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the
island as alienable and disposable when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island
as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and
disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did
in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of
Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and
marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and
private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance
in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for
tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.[119]

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other
islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port
Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and
surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few.
If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private
disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened
the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141[120] provide that it is only the President,
upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of
the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.[121]

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority
granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights.
Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office
of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.[122] Absent such classification, the land remains
unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.[123]

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares
of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the
center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.

Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation
No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants
further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that
since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an
agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No
reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of
this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall
have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.
 That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from
later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public
domain despite PD No. 705.

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,[124] the Court stated
that unclassified lands are public forests.

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public
forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered
open to disposition.[125] (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification of land. If the land had never
been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the
agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice[126] on this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word
reclassification. Where there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to
the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for
purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest
or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
reclassification of forest lands to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to
agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot,
apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as public forest under the Revised Forestry
Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.[127]

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141.
Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.[128]

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert
portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the
public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.

Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act
No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of
alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land
Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear
from the wording of the law itself.[129] Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of
the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.[130]

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No.
1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to
prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private claimants
complied with the requisite period of possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of
possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were
issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that
the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island
for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say
their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally
rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give
them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are
presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence
presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to
apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their
continued possession and considerable investment in the island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island,
making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a
number of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates
with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it
should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote
their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable
lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can
take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of
applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the
conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied
lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such
bill[133] now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a
law is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the island to
private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the
classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by
trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy
balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and protection are not
just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction
of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez
in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:[134]

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed
with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often,
about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and
reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural
resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands
produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up;
rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas
become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the
fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that
wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious
human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue.
[135]

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

----------------

REPUBLIC VS CA
This is a petition for review[1] of the 21 May 2001[2] and 25 September 2002[3] Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The

21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) amended complaint
for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September
2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No. 381928[4] in
favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private
respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a parcel of
land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject
property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of
Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11585[5] (OCT No. 11585) in the name of
spouses Carag.

On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree
No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277,[6]
issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278,[7] issued in the name of the private respondents, covering
Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.

On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition
requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the
ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which
was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928.

The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground
verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.

The investigating team reported that:

A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag, and covered under
LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the
issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was
only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the
NAMRIA on 27 May 1994.

B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and occupied by themselves
and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC
Map 2999, since time immemorial.[8]
Thus, the investigating team claimed that a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 was only released as alienable
and disposable on 22 February 1982.

In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau
recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as
its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation.

On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles[9] on the
ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property,
which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was
allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was
not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion was classified as
alienable and disposable.

On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss.[10] Private respondents alleged that
petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the real ground for the complaint
was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could
have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a
certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the
complaint was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No.
496.[11] Private respondents also stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the
Court of Appeals for an effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that the real
party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind against private
respondents.[12]

On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree,
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.[13]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared:

The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions which this court may
annul are those which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available. The Amended Complaint contains no such allegations which are
jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be divined from its allegations. Furthermore, such actions
for Annulment may be based only on two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither
ground is alleged in the Amended Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation
and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland
area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio Carag
and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19,
1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is
null and void ab initio under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the Motion to
dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with
Section 101 of the Public Land Act.[14] (Citations omitted)

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer available;

2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction;

3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended complaint and in the
motion to dismiss;

4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of
timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan;

5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings changed the
nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance over the land;

6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and

7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.

The Ruling of the Court

While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will still deny
the petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit.

Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court

First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of extrinsic fraud or
lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree.[15]

We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated:

11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government had the
authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the public domain, the Court did not, therefore,
have the power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan
the said tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the Decree
and the Original Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree and Title
issued covering the timberland area is null and void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Philippine constitution.

xxxx

15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of spouses Antonio Carag and
Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in the name of the Heirs and said spouses,
specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland area, by the then Court of First Instance
(now the Regional Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for
the reason that said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or
jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently, the
same are null and void ab initio, and of no force and effect whatsoever.[16] (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)

Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul Decree
No. 381928 on the ground of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over
the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not alienable
and disposable.

Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of petitioners failure to allege
that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available.

In Ancheta v. Ancheta,[17] we ruled:

In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over
the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary
remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer
available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by
the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct
action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,
unless barred by laches.[18]

Since petitioners complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action, petitioner
need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.

Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioners complaint were factual in nature
and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land
Act.[19]
Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be necessary,
the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the complete and
proper determination of the case.

However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, we shall
decide the case on the merits.

Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit

Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the disputed
portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still classified as timber
land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect,
petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject property, outside of the
disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only
the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify
lands of the public domain.

Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.[20] Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action.
[21]

Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular Government,[22]
we ruled:

From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception of those
comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation
are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public
in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private
or juridical person x x x[23] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public
purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable.

In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest
zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or
thereafter. The land classification maps[24] petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that in
1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The
certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994,
contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.[25]
The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874,[26] which provides:

SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into -

(a) Alienable or disposable

(b) Timber and

(c) Mineral lands

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes
of their government and disposition.

Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the subject
property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.

It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared
alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides:

SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for
public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private
property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law
may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the
Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to
disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the
same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the
Legislature. (Emphasis supplied)

However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a
private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8
for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown
lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some
public purpose in accordance with law.

Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts had
jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed
portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner
alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed under any
existing law at that time.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Republic sought to annul the judgment of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, because when the application for
land registration was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also
alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or
agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided
in Act Nos. 926[28] and 2874. The Court ruled:

We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the Governor
General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have become private
property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874
or any valid law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above, those who
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an
application with the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration
court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title
to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and that the
applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed
number of years. It was the land registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the
land applied for was agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each
particular case. (Emphasis supplied)

As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930,
the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the disputed
portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land
was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of
title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law,
did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial
court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years
ago, is now final and beyond review.

The finality of the trial courts decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935
Constitution which provides:

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public
domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were subject to any existing right, grant, lease
or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.[29]
When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had
already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No.
381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines complaint for
reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit. SO
ORDERED.

----------------

LEGARD VS SALEEBY

From the record the following facts appear:

First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in
the city of Manila.

Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall
is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.

Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th
day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the
original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the
wall.

Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for
the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the
registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The
description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.

Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which
had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to
the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an
adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of
said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the
theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed
to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.

Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the
adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.

Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of
the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties
who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not
opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even
though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and
granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his
predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to
him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same
registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to
regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration
of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the
proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the same,
registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of
the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land;
to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the
time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of
the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing
his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the
torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the
forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta
vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep.,
31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)

While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All
the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and there
exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world
are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice
to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the
world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered
title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system,
does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can
not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration
accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its
owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest
of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned,
altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law.
Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified,
enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of
the period prescribed by law.

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles
under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief
under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner
of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is
a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world
are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons
who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the
certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed
at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious
possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46,
Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can
plead ignorance of the registration.

The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been
presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been
adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by
the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The
general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier
in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised
in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs.
Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1
W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of
construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of
prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to
be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the
excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the
general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date
prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular
estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or
interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose
claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate
issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of
two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the
effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the
holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).

Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned
by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may
concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one
year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason,
in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of
registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose,
may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a
subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person
could be deprived of his registered title in that way.

We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of
land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the
Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two
different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule,
of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real
ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the
general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no
objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a
persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act.
Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of
the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the
Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.

In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He
says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the
predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to
foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their
failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against
them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day
in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly
entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with
torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".

As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the
holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If
those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the
registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his
registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six
years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right,
what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur
cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to
adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into
consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the
present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not
the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He
was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the
appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent
entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such
land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions
as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to
oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever
closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the
doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the
earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be
applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the
parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The
general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he
acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would
be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.

We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the
vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the
vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections
speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an
"innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included
in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by
virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall,
registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent
purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by
reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by
virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to
an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the
same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the
same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to
be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said sections? These
questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase
"innocent purchaser," in said sections.

May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as
an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his
heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued
until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of
what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged
with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the
record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established
that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman,
171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all
interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs.
Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe
vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the
record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed.
This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose
and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by
proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show
that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts
which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to
endless confusion and useless litigation.

While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real
property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the
Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that
statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of
ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land,
subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance
have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be
relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide
purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the
mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in
just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead
ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of
men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and
obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence
and contents of a public record.

In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the second
original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore been
registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and
112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser
should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the
facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the
purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his
successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in
another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of
innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a
prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to
minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent
purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been
wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the
torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all
the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the
land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had
never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and
had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded
as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip?
Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the
appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor?
Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be
answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose
of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the
owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages,
in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has
been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be
permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who
had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original
certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is
charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase,
rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.

The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double
registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now
attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration
under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the
torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing
with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens system,
that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same
thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the
law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction
heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises
as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in
favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.

-------

BISHOP VS CA

The question presented in this case is not novel. As in previous cases resolving the same issue, the
answer will not change.

In dispute are certain portions of a parcel of land situated in Calapacuan, Subic, Zambales, with a total
area of 1,652 square meters. These portions are in the possession of the petitioners. The entire parcel is
registered in the name of the private respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29018.

On January 22, 1985, the private respondents sued the petitioners for recovery of possession of the lots
in question. The plaintiffs invoked their rights as registered owners of the land. In their answer, the
defendants claimed that the lots were part of the public domain and could not have been registered
under the Torrens system. All alleged long and continuous possession of the lots and produced tax
declarations in their names. Two of them maintained that they had acquired their respective lots by
virtue of valid contracts of sale. Another based her claim on inheritance.

After trial, Judge Nicias O. Mendoza of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs. 1 He held in part as follows:

The plaintiffs, being the registered owners in fee simple of the land in question, necessarily have the
lawful right to the physical possession of the land. The owner of a land has a right to enjoy and possess
it, and he has also the right to recover and repossess the same from any person occupying it unlawfully.

Art. 428 –– New Civil Code

The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established
by law.

The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.

There is, therefore, no doubt in law, that the plaintiffs being the registered owners of the land in
question have also the corresponding right to the recovery and possession of the same. The defendants
who are in physical occupancy of the land belonging to the plaintiffs have no right whatsoever to unjustly
withhold the possession of the said land from the plaintiffs. The defendants' occupancy of the land in
question is unlawful and in violation of plaintiffs right to the recovery and possession of the land they
owned. The evidence presented by the defendants claiming as per certifications of the Bureau of
Forestry that the land occupied by them is within the alienable and disposable public land, deserves
scant consideration as the said certification are without basis in law. The moment the land in question
was titled in the name of the plaintiffs, it ceased to become a part of the public domain as the same
became the private property of the registered owner, the herein plaintiffs. Tax declarations of the land
made in the names of the defendants are not evidence of title, it appearing that the land is already titled
to the plaintiffs. The registration of the land in the names of the defendants with the Assessor's Office for
taxation purposes and the payments of real property taxes by the defendants can not and does not
defeat the title of the plaintiffs to the land. The fact that the defendants have been in occupancy of the
land in question for quite a period of time is of no moment as prescription will not ripen into ownership
because the land is covered by a torrens title. Acquisitive prescription will not be available to land titled
under Art. 496.

PREMISED THEREFORE on the foregoing consideration, the Court finds and so holds that the plaintiffs
being the registered owners of the land in question are entitled to the possession of the same, and that
the defendants who are occupying the land belonging to the plaintiffs in violation of the right of the
latter, are duty-bound to restore possession of the same to the titled owners, the herein plaintiffs.

On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the respondent court on August 22, 1988. 2 Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners then came to this Court, urging reversal of the
courts below.

They allege that:

1. The land in question is part of the public domain and could not have been validly registered
under the Torrens system.

2. The petitioners have acquired title to their respective lots by laches.

3. In the alternative, they should be considered builders in good faith entitled to the rights granted
by Articles 448, 546, 547 and 548 of the Civil Code.

The petition has no merit.

On the first ground, the Court notes that the private respondents' title is traceable to an Original
Certificate of Title issued way back in 1910 or eighty-two years ago. That certificate is now
incontrovertible and conclusive against the whole world. The resumption of regularity applies to the
issuance of that certificate. This presumption covers the finding that the land subject of the certificate
was private in nature and therefore registrable under the Torrens system.

To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for being void ab initio, it must be shown that
the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction over the case and that there was actual fraud in
securing the title. 3 Neither of these requirements has been established by the petitioners. All they
submitted was the certification of the Bureau of Forestry that the land in question was alienable and
disposable public land. The trial court was correct in ruling that this deserved scant consideration for lack
of legal basis. To be sure, a certification from an administrative body cannot prevail against court
decision declaring the land to be registrable.

Significantly, it does not appear in the record that the Director of Forestry, or any other representative of
the Government for that matter, entered any opposition to the land registration proceedings that led to
the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title. No less importantly, an action to invalidate a certificate of
title on the ground of fraud prescribes after the expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the decree of
registration 4 and cannot now be resorted to by the petitioners at this late hour. And collaterally at that.

The strange theory submitted by the petitioners that the owner of registered land must also possess it
does not merit serious attention. The non-presentation by the private respondents of their tax
declarations on the land is no indication that they have never acquired ownership thereof or have lost it
by such omission.

The second ground must also be rejected.

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person
illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were
aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the
lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession
was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.

In urging laches against the private respondents for not protesting their long and continuous occupancy
of the lots in question, the petitioners are in effect contending that they have acquired the said lots by
acquisitive prescription. It is an elementary principle that the owner of a land registered under the
Torrens system cannot lose it by prescription. 5

As the Court observed in the early case Legarda v. Saleeby: 6

The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quite title to land; to put a stop forever
to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration in
the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem
that once the title was registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

Applied consistently these many years, this doctrine has been burnished bright with use and has long
become a settled rule of law.

In light of the observations already made, it is obvious that the petitioners cannot invoke the status of
builders in good faith to preserve their claimed rights to the constructions they have made on the lots in
dispute.

A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on
it. 7 This definition cannot apply to the petitioners because they knew at the very outset that they had
no right at all to occupy the subject lots.

The petitioners have consistently insisted that the lots were part of the public domain and even
submitted a certification to that effect from the Bureau of Forestry. The land was in fact registered under
the Torrens system and such registration was constructive notice to the whole world, including the
petitioners. Apparently, the petitioners did not take the trouble of checking such registration. At any rate,
the point is that, whether the land be public or private, the petitioners knew they had no right to occupy
it and build on it. The Court of Appeals was correct in calling them squatters for having entered, without
permission or authority, land that did not belong to them.

In urging reversal of the trial court and the respondent court, the petitioners are asking us to overturn
long established doctrines guaranteeing the integrity of the Torrens system and the indefeasibility of
titles issued thereunder for the protection and peace of mind of the registered owner against illegal
encroachments upon his property. We are not disposed to take this drastic step on the basis alone of
their feeble arguments.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

-------

MCIAA VS IJORDAN

A sale of jointly owned real property by a co-owner without the express authority of the others is
unenforceable against the latter, but valid and enforceable against the seller.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Case

This appeal assails the decision promulgated on February 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 61509,1 whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, in Lapu-Lapu
City (RTC) on September 2, 1997,2 and March 6, 1998.

Antecedents

On October 14, 1957, Julian Cuizon (Julian) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale4 (Deed)
covering Lot No. 4539 (subject lot) situated in Ibo, Municipality of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) in favor of
the Civil Aeronautics Administration ((CAA), the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Manila Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA). Since then until the present, MCIAA rejmained in material,
continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the subject lot through the CAA, later renamed the
Bureau of Air Transportation (BAT), and is presently known as the Air Transportation Office (ATO). The
subject lot was transferred and conveyed to MCIAA by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958.

In 1980, the respondents caused the judicial reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering the
subject lot (issued by virtue of Decree No. 531167). Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
RO-2431 of the Register of Deeds of Cebu was reconstituted for Lot No. 4539 in the names of the
respondents' predecessors-in-interest, namely, Gavina Ijordan, and Julian, Francisca, Damasina,
Marciana, Pastor, Angela, Mansueto, Bonifacia, Basilio, Moises and Florencio, all surnamed Cuison.5 The
respondents' ownership of the subject lot was evidenced by OCT No. RO-2431. They asserted that they
had not sold their shares in the subject lot, and had not authorized Julian to sell their shares to MCIAA's
predecessor-in-interest.

The failure of the respondents to surrender the owner's copy of OCT No. RO-2431 prompted MCIAA to
sue them for the cancellation of title in the RTC,7 alleging in its complaint that the certificate of title
conferred no right in favor of the respondents because the lot had already been sold to the Government
in 1957; that the subject lot had then been declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No.
00387 in the name of the BAT; and that by virtue of the Deed, the respondents came under the legal
obligation to surrender the certificate of title for cancellation to enable the issuance of a new one in its
name.

At the trial, MCIAA presented Romeo Cueva, its legal assistant, as its sole witness who testified that the
documents pertaining to the subject lot were the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale and Tax Declaration
No. 00387 in the name of the BAT; and that the subject lot was utilized as part of the expansion of the
Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority I.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

After MCIAA's presentation of evidence, the respondents moved to dismiss the complaint upon the
Demurrer to Evidence dated February 3, 1997,9 contending that the Deed and Tax Declaration No. 00387
had no probative value to support MCIAA's cause of action and its prayer for relief. They cited Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provided that "when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself." They argued that
what MCIAA submitted was a mere photocopy of the Deed; that even assuming that the Deed was a true
reproduction of the original, the sale was unenforceable against them because it was only Julian who
had executed the same without obtaining their consent or authority as his co-heirs; that Article 1317 of
the Civil Code provided that "no one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by
the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him;" and that the tax declaration had no
probative value by virtue of its having been derived from the unenforceable sale.

MCIAA opposed the Demurrer to Evidence in due course.

In its order dated September 2, 1997,11 the RTC dismissed MCIAA's complaint insofar as it pertained to
the shares of the respondents in Lot No. 4539 but recognized the sale as to the 1/22 share of Julian,
disposing as follows:

Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing considerations, defendants' demurrer to evidence is granted
with qualification. Consequently, plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed insofar as it pertains to
defendants' shares of Lot No. 4539, as reflected in Original Certificate of Title No. RO 2431. Plaintiff,
however, is hereby declared the owner of 1/22 share of Lot No. 4539. In this connection, the Register of
Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City is hereby directed to effect the necessary change in OCT No. RO-2431 by
replacing as one of the registered owners, "Julian Cuizon, married to Marcosa Cosef", with the name of
plaintiff. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC observed that although it appeared from the Deed that vendor Julian was the only heir of the
late Pedro Cuizon, thereby adjudicating unto himself the whole of Lot No. 4539, it likewise appeared
from the same Deed that the subject lot was covered by Cadastral Case No. 20, and that Decree No.
531167 had been issued on July 29, 1930; that having known that the subject lot had been covered by
the decree issued long before the sale took place, the more appropriate thing that MCIAA or its
representatives should have done was to check the decreed owners of the lot, instead of merely relying
on the tax declaration issued in the name of Pedro Cuizon and on the statement of Julian; that the
supposedly uninterrupted possession by MCIAA and its predecessors-in-interest was not sufficiently
established, there being no showing of the improvements introduced on the property; and that even
assuming that MCIAA had held the material possession of the subject lot, the respondents had remained
the registered owners of Lot No. 4539 and could not be prejudiced by prescription.

MCIAA moved for reconsideration,13 but the RTC denied its motion on March 6,
1998.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

MCIAA appealed to the CA, submitting that:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ONLY THE SHARE OF JULIAN CUIZON WAS SOLD TO
PLAINTIFF- APPELLANT WAY BACK IN 1957.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE UN � EXPLAINED, UNREASONABLE AND TEDIOUS
INACTION OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEES WHICH CONSTITUTE THEIR IMPLIED RATIFICATION OF THE SALE
WHICH THEY CANNOT NOW CONVENIENTLY IMPUGN IN ORDER TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE
PHENOMENAL RISE IN LAND VALUES IN MACTAN ISLAND.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF- APPELLANT HAS NOT PROVEN POSSESSION
OVER SAID LOT.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING MOTO- PROPRIO DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES AS GUILTY
OF LACHES AND/OR ESTOPPEL IN THE FACE OF CLEAR EVIDENCE FROM THE VERY FACTS OF THE CASE
ITSELF; IT SHOULD BE NOTED, MOREVER THAT IT WAS PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO INITIATED THE
COMPLAINT HENCE THE SAME COULD NOT PROPERLY BE RAISED AS DEFENSES HEREIN BY PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT.

V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE VALID PROVISION OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT AND SALE THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES MERELY HOLD THE TITLE IN TRUST FOR
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND ARE THEREFORE. OBLIGATED TO SURRENDER THE SAME TO PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT SO THE TITLE COULD BE TRANSFERRED TO IT AS THE VENDEE WAY BACK IN 1957.

In the assailed decision promulgated on February 22, 2006,16 the CA affirmed the orders of the RTC
issued on September 2, 199717 and March 6, 1998.

The CA subsequently denied MCIAA's motion for reconsideration19 on June 15, 2006.

Issues

In this appeal, MCIAA submits the following grounds:21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING:

RESPONDENTS WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN 1957 AND PETITIONER'S
CONTINUOUS POSSESSION THEREOF.

RESPONDENTS' INACTION FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE LOT
AMOUNTS TO AN IMPLIED RATIFICATION OF THE SALE.

PETITIONER'S POSSESSION OF THE LOT SINCE 1957 IS BORNE BY THE CASE RECORD.

RESPONDENTS ARE CLEARLY GUILTY OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES, WHICH LEGALLY BARS THEM FROM
RECOVERING POSSESSION OF THE LOT.

In other words, was the subject lot validly conveyed in its entirety to the petitioner?

In support of its appeal, MCIAA insists that the respondents were fully aware of the transaction with
Julian from the time of the consummation of the sale in 1957, as well as of its continuous possession
thereof;22 that what was conveyed by Julian to its predecessor-in-interest, the CAA, was the entirety of
Lot No. 4539, consisting of 12,012 square meters, not just his share of 1/22 of the whole lot; that the
respondents were guilty of inexplicable inaction as to the sale, which manifested their implied
ratification of the supposedly unauthorized act of Julian of selling the subject lot in 1957; that although
the respondents were still minors at the time of the execution of the sale, their ratification of Julian's act
became evident from the fact that they had not impugned the sale upon reaching the age of majority;
that they asserted their claim only after knowing of the phenomenal rise in the value of the lot in the
area despite their silence for more than 30 years; and that they did not assert ownership for a long
period, and did not exercise physical and constructive possession by paying the taxes or declaring the
property for taxation purposes.

On their part, the respondents aver that they were not aware of the sale of the subject lot in 1957
because the sale was not registered, and because the subject lot was not occupied by MCIAA or its
lessee;23 that they became aware of the claim of MCIAA only when its representative tried to intervene
during the reconstitution of the certificate of title in 1980; and that one of the co-owners of the
property, Moises Cuison, had been vigilant in preventing the occupation of the subject lot by other
persons.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal has no merit.

Firstly, both the CA and the RTC found the Deed and the Tax Declaration with which MCIAA would
buttress its right to the possession and ownership of the subject lot insufficient to substantiate the right
of MCIAA to the relief sought. Considering that possession was a factual matter that the lower courts
had thoroughly examined and based their findings on, we cannot undo their findings. We are now
instead bound and concluded thereby in accordance with the well-established rule that the findings of
fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive. Indeed, the Court is not a trier
of facts. Moreover, this mode of appeal is limited to issues of law; hence, factual findings should not be
reviewed unless there is a showing of an exceptional reason to review them. Alas, that showing is not
made.

Secondly, the CA and the RTC concluded that the Deed was void as far as the respondents' shares in the
subject lot were concerned, but valid as to Julian's share. Their conclusion was based on the absence of
the authority from his co-heirs in favor of Julian to convey their shares in the subject lot. We have no
reason to overturn the affirmance of the CA on the issue of the respondents' co-ownership with Julian.
Hence, the conveyance by Julian of the entire property pursuant to the Deed did not bind the
respondents for lack of their consent and authority in his favor. As such, the Deed had no legal effect as
to their shares in the property. Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that no person could contract in
the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he had by law a right to represent
him; the contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, is unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or
impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other
contracting party. But the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and effect with respect
to his share of 1/22 of the entire property consisting of 546 square meters by virtue of its being a
voluntary disposition of property on his part. As ruled in Torres v. Lapinid24:

x x x even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because the sale or other
disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would
correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.

MCIAA's assertion of estoppel or ratification to bar the respondents' contrary claim of ownership of their
shares in the subject lot is bereft of substance. The doctrine of estoppel applied only to those who were
parties to the contract and their privies or successors-in-interest.25 Moreover, the respondents could
not be held to ratify the contract that was declared to be null and void with respect to their share, for
there was nothing for them to ratify. Verily, the Deed, being null and void, had no adverse effect on the
rights of the respondents in the subject lot.

Lastly, MCIAA's contention on acquisitive prescription in its favor must fail. Aside from the absence of the
satisfactory showing of MCIAA's supposed possession of the subject lot, no acquisitive prescription could
arise in view of the indefeasibility of the respondents' Torrens title. Under the Torrens System, no
adverse possession could deprive the registered owners of their title by prescription.26 The real purpose
of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop any question as to its legality forever. Thus,
once title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court, or sitting on the mirador su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on February 22, 2006.