RULING  RATIO:  NO    

 
Hidalgo
 v.
 Balandan
 1952
  1. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to

  bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of
Petitioner:
 Hidalgo v. Balandan some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere
Respondent:
 Guillermo
 Balandan,
 Anselma
 Anila,
 and
 CA
 
  water and its location.
Ponencia:
 Reyes,
 J.
 B.
 L.,
 J.
 
  2. Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract

  children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of
DOCTRINE:
 
 Attractive
 nuisance
 doctrine
 -­‐
 One
 who
 maintains
 on
 his
  drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so
premises
 dangerous
 instrumentalities
 or
 appliances
 of
 a
 character
  that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the
likely
 to
 attract
 children
 in
 play,
 and
 who
 fails
 to
 exercise
 ordinary
  owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own
care
 to
 prevent
 children
 from
 playing
 therewith
 or
 resorting
 thereto,
  property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding
is
 liable
 to
 a
 child
 of
 tender
 years
 who
 is
 injured
 thereby,
 even
 if
 the
  any new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created
child
 is
 technically
 a
 trespasser
 in
 the
 premises.
  an "attractive nuisance.
FACTS:
 
  3. Therefore, as water tanks are not classified as attractive
1. Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. owned an ice plant factory wherein nuisance, the question whether the petitioner had taken
there were 2 tanks full of water 9 feet deep for cooling of its reasonable precautions becomes immaterial
engine
 
2. Factory was fenced but the tanks were not covered and the The
 appealed
 decision
 is
 reversed
 and
 the
 Hidalgo
 Enterprises,
 Inc.
 is
 
compound was easily accessible. absolved
 from
 liability.
 No
 costs.
 
3. There was no guard assigned on the gate.
 
4. Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, while playing with and
 
 
in company of other boys of his age entered the factory premises
through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks; and while
thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be
fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died of
"asphyxia secondary to drowning."
5. CFI and CA applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance.
a. One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to
attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary
care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who
is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises.
b. The principle reason for the doctrine is that the condition
or appliance in question although its danger is apparent
to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of
tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or
use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to
such children

 
ISSUES:
 
 
1. W/N the water tank is considered as an attractive nuisance?

 
 S ARMIENTO
 V .
 S PS.
 L UIS
 &
 R OSE
 S UN -­‐C ABRIDO
 ( 2003)
  ISSUE:
 WoN
 Sps.
 Cabrido
 can
 be
 held
 liable
 

 
 
Petitioner:
 TOMASA
 SARMIENTO
  RULING
 +
 RATIO:
 YES
 
 
Resondent:
 SPS.
 LUIS
 &
 ROSE
 SUN-­‐CABRIDO
 and
 MARIA
 LOURDES
 SUN
 
 
Ponente:
 Corona,
 J.
  Clearly
  the
  dismounting
  of
  the
  diamond
  from
  the
  original
  setting
  was
 

  included
  in
  the
  contract
  of
  service
  as
  shown
  by
  the
  contemporaneous
  and
 
DOCTRINE:
 The
 fault
 or
 negligence
 of
 the
 obligor
 consists
 in
 the
 omission
  subsequent
 acts
 of
 the
 parties.
 
of
  that
  diligence
  which
  is
  required
  by
  the
  nature
  of
  the
  obligation
  and
  • Marilou expressed no reservation regarding the dismounting of
corresponds
  with
  the
  circumstances
  of
  the
  persons,
  of
  the
  time
  and
  of
  the
  the diamonds.
place.
  • She should have instructed Payag to have them dismounted first

  if Marilou had actually intended to spare the jewelry shop of the
FACTS:
  task but she did not.
1. Tomasa Sarmiento helped her friend, Dra. Lao, to find somebody
 
to reset a pair of diamond earrings into two gold rings. Obligations
  arising
  from
  contracts
  have
  the
  force
  of
  law
  between
  the
 
Accordingly, Tomasa sent Tita Payag with the pair of earrings to contracting
  parties.
  Corollarily,
  those
  who
  in
  the
  performance
  of
  their
 
Dingdings Jewelry Shop, owned and managed by spouses obligations
  are
  guilty
  of
  fraud,
  negligence
  or
  delay
  and
  those
  who
  in
  any
 
Cabrido, which accepted the job order for P400. manner
 contravene
 the
 tenor
 thereof,
 are
 liable
 for
 damages.
 The
  fault
  or
 

  negligence
  of
  the
  obligor
  consists
  in
  the
  omission
  of
  that
  diligence
 
2. Tita Payag brought the earring to the shop, Marilou (employee) which
  is
  required
  by
  the
  nature
  of
  the
  obligation
  and
  corresponds
 
tried to dismount the diamond from its original setting. with
 the
 circumstances
 of
 the
 persons,
 of
 the
 time
 and
 of
 the
 place.
 
Unsuccessful, she asked their goldsmith, Zenon Santos, to do it. • In the case at bar, it is beyond doubt that Santos acted
Santos removed the diamond by twisting the setting with a pair negligently in dismounting the diamond from its original setting
of pliers, breaking the gem in the process. since the jewelry shop failed to perform its obligation with the

  ordinary diligence required by the circumstances.
3. Tomasa required Sps. Cabrido to replace the diamond with the o It appears to be the practice of the trade to use a
same size and quality. When they refused, the petitioner was miniature wire saw in dismounting precious gems,
forced to buy a replacement in the amount of P30,000. such as diamonds, from their original settings.

  However, Santos employed a pair of pliers in clipping the
4. Tomasa claims that the dismounting of the diamond from its original setting, thus resulting in breakage of the
original setting was part of the obligation assumed by Sps. diamond.
Cabrido under the contract of service. Thus, they should be held o Its subsequent breakage in the hands of Santos could
liable for damages arising from its breakage. only have been caused by his negligence in using the
a. Sps. Cabrido contend, on the other hand, that their wrong equipment.
agreement with Tomasa was for crafting two gold rings
 
mounted with diamonds only and did not include the Damages
 awarded:
 
dismounting of the said diamonds from their original • Actual damages in favor of Tomasa for the damaged diamong in
setting. the amount of P30,000.

  • P10,000 as moral damages due to the gross negligence of
5. MTCC ruled in favor of Tomasa, but RTC and CA later reversed their employee.
and absolved Sps. Cabrido from liability because there exists o Although as a general rule, moral damages are not
no agreement between the Tomasa and Sps. Cabrido that recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a
the latter would answer for any liability should the diamond breach of contract for it is not one of the items
be damaged in the process of dismounting them from the enumerated under Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Moral
earrings. damages may be awarded in a breach of contract
only when there is proof that defendant acted in bad
 faith, or was guilty of gross negligence amounting to
bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligation.
o Santos was a goldsmith for more than 40 years. Given
his long experience in the trade, he should have known
that using a pair of pliers instead of a miniature wire saw
in dismounting a precious stone like a diamond would
have entailed an unnecessary risk of breakage. He went
on with it anyway. Hence, respondent spouses are liable
for P10,000 as moral damages due to the gross
negligence of their employee.
• No Attorney’s Fees
o Sps. Cabrido refusal to pay the value of the damaged
jewelry emanated from an honest belief that they were
not responsible therefor, hence, negating any basis for
the award of attorneys fees.

 

 

 

 
 
 Francisco
 v.
 Chemical
 Bulk
 Carriers,
 Inc.
 (2011)
  6. CBCI asserted that Francisco violated Articles 19, 20, 21, and
22 of the Civil Code and that he should be held liable. In the

 
alternative, CBCI claimed that Francisco, in receiving CBCIs
Petition:
 Petition
 for
 Review
 
diesel fuel, entered into an innominate contract of do ut des (I
Petitioner:
 Antonio
 Francisco
 substituted
 by
 his
 heirs
 
give and you give) with CBCI for which Francisco is obligated to
Respondent:
 Chemical
 Bulk
 Carriers,
 Inc.
 
pay CBCI for the value ofthe fuel. CBCI also prayed for
Ponente:
 Carpio,
 J.
 
exemplary damages.

 
7. Francisco explained in his answer that he lost his eyesight in

 
1978 hence it was his son Jovito who verified the identity of
DOCTRINE:
 
  Bacsa who introduced himself as a radio operator and

  confidential secretary of Inawat, CBCI's manager for operations.
One
  who
  is
  physically
  disabled
  is
  required
  to
  use
  the
  same
  degree
  of
  care
  Bacsa allegedly said that they were selling the fuel since CBCI
that
 a
 reasonably
 careful
 person
 who
 has
 the
 same
 physical
 disability
 would
  was in immediate need of cash for the salary of its daily paid
use.
  workers and for petty but that there was assurance that the fuel

  was not stolen since CBCI enjoyed a big credit line with Petron.

  8. Francisco maintained that he acquired the diesel fuel in good
FACTS:
  faith and for value. Francisco also filed a counterclaim for

  exemplary damages, moral damages and attorney's fees.
1. Antonio Francisco (Francisco) was the owner and manager of a 9. TC Ruling: Francisco was not liable for damages because the
Caltex station in Teresa, Rizal. 17 deliveries were covered by original and genuine invoices. TC
2. Four persons including Gregorio Bacsa (Bacsa) came to the declared that Bacsa was an authorized representative to receive
Caltex Station as employees of Chemical Bulk Carriers, full payment for the diesel fuel. TC said that if Bacsa was not
Incorporated (CBCI) wherein Bacsa offered to sell Francisco a authorized, CBCI should sue Bacsa and not Francisco.
certain quantity of CBCI's diesel fuel. Francisco was a buyer in good faith who is afforded protection.
3. Francisco accepted the offer with the conditions that: Since CBCI was bound by the acts of Bacsa, it was liable to pay
• Petron Corporation (Petron) should deliver the diesel damages to Francisco.
fuel to Francisco at his business address which should 10. The case was dismissed. CBCI appealed to the CA arguing that
be properly indicated in Petron's invoice Francisco acquired the diesel fuel from Petron without legal
• The delivery tank be sealed ground because Bacsa was not authorized to deliver and sell
• Bacsa should issue a separate receipt to Francisco CBCIs diesel fuel. CBCI added that Francisco acted in bad faith
4. There were 17 deliveries to Francisco with all his conditions because he should have inquired further whether Bacsa's sale of
complied with. CBCI sent a demand letter for Francisco to pay in CBCIs diesel fuel was legitimate. CA reversed the case in which
which Francisco rejected this demand. Francisco was ordered to pay CBCI the amount of the fuel as
5. CBCI filed a complaint for sum of money and damages actual damages.
against Francisco and other unnamed defendants. According to 11. CA Ruling: Bacsa's selling of the diesel fuel did not bind CBCI.
CBCI Petron sold diesel fuel to CBCI but these were delivered to Francisco has been in the business of selling petroleum products
and received by Francisco. Francisco then sold the diesel to third for a considerable number of years, therefore his blindness was
persons from whom he received payment. Francisco acquired not a hindrance for him to transact business and to verify
possession of the diesel fuel without authority from CBCI, which whether CBCI was indeed selling him their diesel fuel. There
deprived them of the diesel fuel it had paid for. CBCI argued that was no good faith since he already had doubts about the
Francisco should have known that since only Petron, Shell and authority of Bacsa, he did not confirm with CBCI and relied on a
Caltex are authorized to sell and distribute petroleum products in mere improvised receipt. Failure to verify authority showed
the Philippines, the diesel fuel came from illegitimate, if not illegal ulterior motive. Also the receipts were on a plain sheet of bond
or criminal, acts. paper with no letterhead or any indication that it came from
CBCI. CA ruled that Francisco cannot invoke estoppel since he
 was at fault for not exercising prudence. CBCI being deprived of failed
 to
 exercise
 the
 standard
 of
 conduct
 expected
 of
 a
 reasonable
 person
 
the diesel fuel they had paid for has the right to recover. Since who
 is
 blind.
 
such cannot be returned, Francisco was ordered to give back the
 
actual amount. Additional
 information:
 
12. Francisco died and was substituted by his heirs who filed for an
 
MR. MR was denied hence, this petition. The
  heirs
  of
  Francisco
  argue
  that
  CBCI
  was
  bound
  as
  principal
  and
 

  solidarily
 liable
 because
 Bacsa
 was
 given
 authority
 by
 Inawat.
 
ISSUES:
 
 

  The
  general
  principle
  is
  that
  a
  seller
  without
  title
  cannot
  transfer
  a
  better
 
Whether
  Francisco
  exercised
  the
  required
  diligence
  of
  a
  blind
  person
  in
  the
  title
  than
  he
  has.
  Only
  the
  owner
  of
  the
  goods
  or
  one
  authorized
  by
  the
 
conduct
 of
 his
 business
  owner
  to
  sell
  can
  transfer
  title
  to
  the
  buyer.
  Therefore,
  a
  person
  can
  sell
 

  only
  what
  he
  owns
  or
  is
  authorized
  to
  sell
  and
  the
  buyer
  can,
  as
  a
 

  consequence,
 acquire
 no
 more
 than
 what
 the
 seller
 can
 legally
 transfer.
 
RULING
 +
 RATIO:
 
 

  The
  owner
  can
  recover
  the
  goods
  even
  from
  a
  purchaser
  in
  good
  faith.
 
  The
 
NO
  purchaser
 who
 acquired
 the
 stolen
 goods
 from
 the
 owner
 has
 been
 held
 to
 

  have
  acquired
  no
  title
  to
  the
  goods
  even
  if
  bought
  in
  good
  faith.
  The
 
Standard
 of
 conduct
 is
 the
 level
 of
 expected
 conduct
 that
 is
 required
 by
 the
  exception
 to
 the
 general
 rule
 is
 the
 doctrine
 of
 estoppel
 wherein
 the
 owner
 
nature
  of
  the
  obligation
  and
  corresponding
  to
  the
  circumstances
  of
  the
  by
  his
  word
  or
  conduct
  has
  caused
  it
  to
  appear
  that
  the
  seller
  had
  authority
 
person,
 time
 and
 place.
 The
 most
 common
 standard
 of
 conduct
 is
 that
 of
 a
  to
 sell.
 This
 precludes
 him
 from
 denying
 the
 seller's
 authority
 to
 sell.
 
good
 father
 of
 a
 family
 or
 that
 of
 a
 reasonably
 prudent
 person.
 
 

  In
  this
  case,
  it
  is
  clear
  that
 Bacsa
 was
  not
  the
  owner
  of
  the
  diesel
  fuel.
 
However,
 one
 who
 is
 physically
 disabled
 is
 required
 to
 use
 the
 same
 degree
  Francisco
  was
  aware
  of
  this
  but
  he
  claimed
  that
 Bacsa
 was
  authorized
  by
 
of
  care
  that
  a
  reasonably
  careful
  person
  who
  has
  the
  same
  physical
  CBCI
  to
  sell
  the
  diesel
  fuel.
  However,
  the
  heirs
  of
  Francisco
  claim
 
disability
  would
  use.
  Physical
  handicaps
  and
  infirmities,
  such
  as
  blindness
  that
 Bacsa
 was
  authorized
  is
 not
  supported
 by
 any
 evidence
  except
 his
 self-­‐
or
  deafness,
  are
  treated
  as
  part
  of
  the
  circumstances
  under
  which
  a
  serving
 testimony.
 There
 was
 no
 confirmation
 with
 CBCI
 nor
 any
 sign
 that
 
reasonable
  person
  must
  act.
  Thus,
  the
  standard
  of
  conduct
  for
  a
  blind
  Bacsa
 had
 authority
 to
 sell.
 The
 receipt
 provided
 was
 typewritten
 on
 half
 a
 
person
 becomes
 that
 of
 a
 reasonable
 person
 who
 is
 blind.
  sheet
 of
 plain
 bond
 paper
 with
 no
 indication
 that
 it
 came
 from
 CBCI.
 
 CBCI
 is
 

  not
 precluded
 given
 that
 it
 had
 no
 manifestations
 that
 Bacsa
 had
 authority
 
We
  note
  that
  Francisco,
  despite
  being
  blind,
  had
  been
  managing
  and
  to
 sell.
 
operating
  the
  Caltex
  station
  for
  15
  years
  and
  this
  was
  not
  a
  hindrance
  for
 
 
him
 to
 transact
 business
 until
 this
 time.
 In
 this
 instance,
 however,
 we
 rule
  Since
  CBCI
  was
  unlawfully
  deprived
  of
  its
  property,
  it
  may
  recover
  from
 
that
  Francisco
  failed
  to
  exercise
  the
  standard
  of
  conduct
  expected
  of
  a
  Francisco,
 even
 if
 Francisco
 pleads
 good
 faith.
 
reasonable
  person
  who
  is
  blind.
  First,
  Francisco
  merely
  relied
  on
  the
 
 
identification
  card
  of
 Bacsa
 to
  determine
  if
  he
  was
  authorized
  by
  CBCI.
 
 
Francisco
  did
  not
  do
  any
  other
  background
  check
  on
  the
  identity
  and
  DISPOSITION:
 
authority
  of
 Bacsa.
  Second,
  Francisco
  already
  expressed
  his
  misgivings
 
 
about
 the
 diesel
 fuel,
 fearing
 that
 they
 might
 be
 stolen
 property,
 yet
 he
 did
  The
 CA
 decision
 is
 AFFIRMED.
 
not
  verify
  with
  CBCI
  the
  authority
  of
 Bacsa
 to
  sell
  the
  diesel
  fuel.
  Third,
 
 
Francisco
 relied
 on
 the
 receipts
 issued
 by
 Bacsa,
 which
 were
 typewritten
 on
 
 
a
 half
 sheet
 of
 plain
 bond
 paper.
 If
 Francisco
 exercised
 reasonable
 diligence,
 
he
  should
  have
  asked
  for
  an
  official
  receipt
  issued
  by
  CBCI.
  Fourth,
  the
 

 
 
delivery
  to
  Francisco,
  as
  indicated
  in
  Petrons
  invoice,
  does
  not
  show
  that
 
CBCI
 authorized
 Bacsa
 to
 sell
 the
 diesel
 fuel
 to
 Francisco.
 Clearly,
 Francisco
 
 Pacis
 v.
 Morales
 (2010)
  11. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision and absolved
respondent from all liability.

  12. The CA based their decision on the finding that no employer-
Petitioner:
 Alfredo
 P.
 Pacis
 and
 Cleopatra
 D.
 Pacis
  employee relationship exists because of the lack of control. Thus
Respondent:
 Jerome
 Jovanne
 Morales
  article 2180 does not apply. Even of such relationship existed,
Ponencia:
 Carpio,
 J.
  the mere act of locking the gun away is a sufficient act of

  diligence.
DOCTRINE:
 The
 liability
 of
 an
 employer
 under
 Article
 2176
 is
 primary
 
 
and
  direct,
  based
  on
  a
  person’s
  own
  negligence.
  A
  business
  dealing
  ISSUES:
 
with
  dangerous
  weapons
  requires
  the
  exercise
  of
  a
  higher
  degree
  of
  1.
  WON
  the
  respondent
  was
  liable
  for
  damages
  on
  the
  ground
  of
 
care
 as
 compared
 to
 that
 of
 a
 good
 father
 of
 a
 family.
  negligence
 under
 Article
 2176
 and
 2180
 of
 the
 Civil
 Code
 
 

 
 
FACTS:
  RULING
 +
 RATIO:
 
1. Alfred Pacis was a 17-year-old college student. He visited the
 
gun store of Jerome Morales, herein respondent. The store was 1. Yes.
called Top Gun. A
 higher
 degree
 of
 care
 is
 required
 of
 someone
 who
 posses
 
2. At the time of the incident the owner of the store was in Manila or
  controls
  an
  instrumentality
  of
  extremely
  dangerous
 
and the usual caretaker, Jarnague was also not around. character.
  Such
  person
  must
  then
  have
  a
  duty
  to
  take
 
3. Before Morales left the store for Manila, he left a loaded gun, exceptional
  precautions
  to
  prevent
  any
  injury
  from
  said
 
which was sent to him for repairs in a locked drawer. instrumentality.
 
4. Jarnague left the keys with Matibag and Herbolario who were
 
attending to the store. As
  a
  gun-­‐store
  owner,
  the
  respondent
  is
  presumed
  to
 
5. It was shown that Matibag and Herbolario brought the gun out know
 about
 firearm
 safety
 and
 should
 have
 known
 not
 to
 
and placed it on top of the table where Alfred began inspecting it. keep
  a
  loaded
  gun
  in
  his
  store.
  In
  fact,
  the
  gun
  should
 
6. Alfred was requested to return the gun but while he was handing clearly
  be
  unloaded
  because
  it
  was
  being
  sent
  in
  for
 
it to Matibag, the gun went off and a bullet struck Alfred in the repairs.
 
 
 
head, killing him.
 
7. A criminal complaint for homicide was filed against Matibag but The
  act
  then
  of
  the
  respondent
  in
  accepting
  the
  gun
  for
 
he was acquitted on the ground of the exempting circumstance repair
 without
 first
 unloading
 it
 is
 an
 act
 of
 negligence.
 The
 
of accident. respondent
 should
 have
 first
 unloaded
 the
 gun
 and
 kept
 it
 
8. The petitioners, parents of the deceased, then filed a complaint in
  a
  vault.
  Respondent
  himself
  was
  negligent
  for
  not
 
for damages against Morales. exercising
 the
 degree
 of
 care
 and
 negligence
 required
 of
 a
 
9. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and awarded them good
  father
  of
  a
  family,
  and
  especially
  the
  degree
  of
 
P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Alfred Pacis, someone
 required
 in
 dealing
 with
 dangerous
 weapons.
 
P29,437.65 as actual damages for the hospitalization and burial
 
expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, P100,000.00 as There
  was
  also
  a
  failure
  to
  show
  whether
  or
  not
  the
 
compensatory damages P100,000.00 as moral damages, respondent
 had
 a
 license
 to
 repair
 firearms.
 
P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.
 
10. The Trial court’s ruling was based on the finding that Matibag Disposition:
  Decision
  of
  the
  CA
  is
  reversed.
  Ruling
  of
 
and Herbolario were the employees of Pacis and thus the
 RTC
 is
 reinstated.
 
 
respondent is liable for the damages caused by his employees
 
on the occasion of their duties unless respondent prove that he
 
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage. Respondent failed to do so when he left the key to the
 
drawer with a loaded gun without leaving instructions.
 
 
 MAKATI
 SHANGRI-­‐LA
 v
 HARPER
 (2012)
  11. RTC rules in favor of respondents finding hotel liable for the
death of Harper.
Petitioner:
 Makati
 Shangri-­‐La
 Hotel
 and
 Resort,
 Inc.
 
12. The CA affirmed.
Respondent:
 Ellen
 Johanne
 Harper,
 Jonathan
 Christopher
 Harper,
 
Rigoberto
 Gillera
 
ISSUES:
 W/n
 there
 was
 negligence
 on
 the
 part
 of
 Shangri-­‐La
 and
 its
 
Ponencia:
 Bersamin,
 J.
 
negligence
 was
 the
 proximate
 cause
 of
 the
 death
 of
 Harper
 

 

 
 
DOCTRINE:
 The
 Hotel
 Business
 is
 imbued
 with
 public
 interest.
 Catering
 to
 
RULING
 +
 RATIO:
 
the
 public,
 hotelkeepers
 are
 bound
 to
 provide
 not
 only
 lodging
 for
 their
 

 YES.
 Shangri-­‐La
 was
 liable
 due
 to
 its
 own
 negligence
 
guests
 but
 also
 security
 to
 the
 persons
 and
 belongings
 of
 their
 guests.
 The
 
• Negligence is defined as the omission to do something which a
twin
 duty
 constitutes
 the
 essence
 of
 the
 business.
 
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily

 
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing of
FACTS:
 
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
1. Christian Harper (Harper), a business development manager for
• In determining whether or not there is negligence on the part of
Asia of ALSTOM Power Norway, checked in at the Shangri-La
the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence has laid down the
Hotel Room 1428.
2. He was murdered inside his hotel room by still unidentified following test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act,
malefactors use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
3. A routine verification call from American Express Card to person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person
Harper’s residence in Norway led to the discovery of the death. is guilty of negligence.
4. It appears that a Caucasian male about 30-32 years old, 5’4’’ in • In this case, there is no dispute that even prior to the untimely
height, entered Alexis Jewelry Store in Glorietta and expressed death of Mr. Harper, Shangri-La was duly forewarned of the
interest in purchasing a Cartier lady’s watch valued at P320,000 security lapses in the hotel. Col. De Guzman was particularly
with the use of 2 Mastercard credit cards and an American concerned with the security of the private areas where the guest
Express credit card issued in the name of Harper. rooms are. He wanted not just one roving gourds in every three
5. The customer’s difficulty in answering the queries phoned in by a or four floors. He insisted there must be at least one guard in
credit card representative aroused suspicion of the saleslady every floor considering the length and the shape of the corridors.
who asked for the customer’s passport. • The testimony of Col. De Guzman revealed that the
6. Sensing trouble, the customer hurriedly left the store, and left the management practice prior to the murder of Harper had been to
three credit cards and passport behind deploy only one security or roving guard for every three or four
7. Harper’s family in Norway must have called at his hotel room to floors of the building. Such ratio had not been enough
inform him about the attempt to use his card. considering the L-shape configuration of the hotel.
8. Not getting any response from the room, his family requested • Moreover, in applying the premises liability rule, it is enough that
Raymond Alarcon, the Duty Manager of Shangri-La, to check on guests are injured while inside the hotel premises to make the
Harper’s room hotelkeeper liable. With great caution should the liability of the
9. Alarcon and a security personnel went to Room 1428 and were hotelkeeper be enforced when a guest died inside the hotel
shocked to discover Harper’s lifeless body on the bed. premises
10. Respondents commenced a suit in the RTC to recover various • The Hotel Business is imbued with public interest. Catering to
damages from Shangri-La Hotel alleging that the murdered the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for
succeeded to trespass into the area of hotel’s private rooms and their guests but also security to the persons and belongings of
into the room of the deceased on account of the hotel’s gross their guests. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the
negligence in providing the most basic security system of its business
guests, the lack of which owing to the acts or omission of its DISPOSITION:
 Judgment
 AFFIRMED
 
employees was the immediate cause of the tragic death of
 
Harper.
Consolidated Bank vs. CA (2003)
Petition: 45 certiorari
Petitioner: Consolidated Bank
Respondent: CA
Ponente: Carpio
DOCTRINES:
• There is a difference between negligence which results in
a cause of action under quasi-delict, and negligence which
results in a breach of contract. It is a breach of contract thr
ough negligence if a cause of action could not have arisen
had the contract not existed.
• The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply in breach
of contracts.
• The employer is liable for the acts of its employees for brea
ch of contract under the principle of respondeat superior in
contrast to a quasi-delict liability under 2180 where neglige
nce of the employer is direct, it consisting of negligence in
hiring and supervising the employee.
FACTS:
1. L.C. Diaz is a CPA GPP, and was a client of Consolidated (no
w Solidbank). Calapre was a messenger instructed by L.C. Dia
z to deposit amounts of 990php and 50php. Calapre was also
given the passbook.
2. Calapre gave the deposit money and the passbook to Teller n
o. 6. Such teller gave the duplicate copies of the deposit slips t
o Calapre. Since processing took a while, Calapre went first to
Allied Bank. But upon return the passbook has been given by t
he teller to someone else.
3. Another deposit of 200,000 was made by L.C. Diaz to Solidba
nk. Macaraya the cashier of L.C. Diaz was then with Calapre,
and asked for the passbook. The teller said that he gave it to s
omeone shorter than Calapre.
4. Teller gave a check for 90,000 which was sought to be deposit
ed that day, but such check account in Philippine Banking Cor
p has already been closed so the check bounced.
5. The next day the CEO of L.C. Diaz called Solidbank to inform i
t that pending resolution on who got the passbook, withdrawal
s should be disallowed. This was followed by a letter to the sa
me effect from L.C. Diaz. But Solidbank said that there was alr
eady a withdrawal of 300k on the same day that the check for
90k was sought to be deposited. The check for 300k bore the
signatures of authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, Diaz and Mu
rillo, but they denied that they signed a check. The 300k was r
eceived by a Noel Tamayo.
6. A case for estafa was filed against Ilagan, a messenger, and a
certain Verdezola in RTC Manila, but was dismissed upon mo
tion of the prosecutor.
7. Demand was made to Solidbank to return the money, but they
did not. So L.C. Diaz filed a collection case. RTC Manila ruled
that since the passbook rules state that the holder of the pass
book ìs deemed to be the owner thereof, L.C. Diaz carelessne
ss in keeping the passbook under lock and key was the proxi
mate cause of their loss.
8. On appeal to the CA, the CA ruled that it was Solidbank's act
of giving the passbook to someone other than Calapre that wa
s the proximate cause of the damage. And that since the three
requisites of quasi-delict exists, Solidbank should be held liabl
e. Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
1. WoN, Solidbank is liable, and for what is it liable?
RULING + RATIO:
1. Yes, Solidbank is liable. For negligence resulting in breach
of contract.
The Court ruled that both ratiocinations of the lower courts are wrong
. It said that although L.C. Diaz did not keep the passbook under lock
and key, it was negligent of the bank to give the passbook to some p
erson other than the person who presented it. However, it said that s
 uch act would not be negligence had there been no existing contract
of simple loan between the parties.

The Court further ruled that since under the General Banking Act of 2
000 says that the Banking business is an industry imbued with public
interest, banks are charged with maintaining extraordinary diligence
in their transactions. Failure to observe such diligence constitutes ne
gligence which breaches the contract established between the partie
s.

However the Court reduced the actual damages awarded by the CA

since under 1172 of the civil code, the court may reduce damages a
warded due to contributory negligence.

DISPOSITION: Petition partly granted. CA decision modified to 60-40 be

aring of the actual damages. 60% for Solidbank. Costs proportionate.
 
Digest  Author:  Kapunan  
 
   
 DELA  TORRE  VS.  IMBUIDO   6. The RTC ruled in favor of Pedrito. This was reversed by the CA as it
was not established that the respondents failed to exercise the
 
degree of diligence required of them by their profession as doctors.
Petitioner:  Pedrito  Dela  Torre  
ISSUE:  WON  respondents  should  be  held  liable  for  the  death  of  Carmen?  
Respondent:   Dr.   Arturo   Imbuido,   Dra.   Norma   Imbuido   as   owners   &  
 
operators  of  Divine  Spirit  General  Hospital,    Dr.  Nestor  Pasamba  
HELD:  NO  
Ponente:  Reyes,  J.  
1. Medical malpractice/medical negligence, is that type of claim which a
 
victim has available to him to redress a wrong committed by a
DOCTRINE:   Medical  malpractice/  negligence,  is  that  type  of  claim  which  a  
medical professional which has caused bodily harm. But the patient,
victim   has   available   to   him   to   redress   a   wrong   committed   by   a   medical  
or his family must prove that a health care provider/physician, either
professional   which   has   caused   bodily   harm.   It   must   be   proved   that   such  
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care
physician,   failed   to   do   something   which   a   reasonably   prudent   health   care  
provider would have done, or that he did something that a
provider   would   have   done,   or   that   he   did   something   that   a   reasonably   reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or
prudent  provider  would  not  have  done.     action caused injury to the patient.
  2. In medical negligence cases, there is a physician-patient relationship
FACTS:   between the doctor and the victim. 4 essential elements must be
1. Pedrito filed a complaint for damages alleging that her wife Carmen established by the plaintiff to find physician negligent, thus liable for
died while admitted at the Divine Spirit General Hospital after giving damages: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate
birth to a baby boy on February 3, 1992 via caesarean section causation.
operation. 3. There is breach of duty when the patient is injured in body or in
2. After giving birth, Carmen experienced abdominal pain and difficulty health. Proof of this breach rests upon the testimony of an expert
in urinating. She was diagnosed to be suffering from UTI. However, witness that the treatment accorded to the patient failed to meet the
Carmen’s stomach was getting bigger, but Dr. Norma dismissed it as standard level of care, skill and diligence. To justify an award of
mere flatulence (kabag). When Carmen’s stomach still grew bigger, damages, the negligence of the doctor must be established to be the
Carmen was again operated. proximate cause of the injury.
3. The condition of Carmen worsened that on February 13, 1992, she 4. For the trial court to give weight to Dr. Patilano’s report, it was
vomited dark red blood and died. Per her certificate of death, the necessary to show his specialization and competence to testify on
immediate cause of Carmen’s death was "cardio-respiratory arrest the degree of care, skill and diligence needed for the treatment of
secondary to cerebro vascular accident, hypertension and chronic Carmen’s case. These were not duly established. Similarly, such
nephritis induced by pregnancy." An autopsy Report by Dr. Richard duty, degree of care, and diligence were not sufficiently established
Patilano, Medico-Legal Officer provided that the cause of her death because the testimony of Dr. Patilano was based solely on the
was "shock due to peritonitis, severe, with multiple intestinal results of his autopsy on the cadaver of Carmen. He did not even
adhesions. take full consideration of her medical history, her actual health
4. Pedrito claimed that the respondents failed to exercise the degree of condition at the time of hospital admission, and her condition as it
diligence required of them as members of the medical profession, progressed while she was being treated.
and were negligent for practicing surgery in the most unskilled, 5. On the other hand, Dr. Nestor, a surgeon, possessed the reasonable
ignorant and cruel manner. Dr. Patilano mentioned that the cause of degree of learning, skill and experience required by his profession for
death was peritonitis, an inflammation of the abdomen which may be the treatment of Carmen. Without sufficient proof on a different
caused by infections, entrance of foreign bodies in the intestines in degree of care, skill and diligence that should be expected from the
connection with ruptured peptic ulcer or [may be] somewhere in the respondents, it could not be said with certainty that a breach was
spleen. actually committed.
5. In their answer, it was argued that a caesarian section operation was 6. Laslty, the allegation that Carmen died due to the poor state of the
necessary for the spontaneous delivery of her baby. The second hospital equipment and medical supplies, there was no sufficient
surgery, became necessary due to suspected intestinal obstruction. proof that any such fault actually attended the surgery of Carmen,
Despite the observance of due care by the doctors, however, caused her illness and resulted in her death.
Carmen.
7. The critical factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal
connection between the negligence and the injuries. The claimant
must prove not only the injury but also the defendant's fault, and that
such fault caused the injury. A verdict in a malpractice action cannot
be based on speculation or conjecture. Causation must be proven
within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent
expert testimony, which the Court finds absent in the case at bar.
DISPOSITION:  WHEREFORE,  the  petition  is  DENIED.  
 
   
 Li  V.  Spouses  Reynaldo  and  Lina  Soliman  (2011)   administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their failure to
observe the essential precautions in detecting early the
Petitioner:  DR.  RUBI  LI  
symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping early on
Respondent:  SPOUSES  REYNALDO  and  
the chemotherapy, which bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that
LINA  SOLIMAN,  as  parents/heirs  of  deceased  Angelica  Soliman  
caused Angelica’s untimely demise.
Ponencia:  VILLARAMA,  JR.,J.  
21. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that petitioner
 
was not liable for damages as she observed the best known
DOCTRINE:  The  type  of  lawsuit  which  has  been  called  medical  
procedures and employed her highest skill and knowledge in the
malpractice  or,  more  appropriately,  medical  negligence,  is  that  type  of  
administration of chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all
claim  which  a  victim  has  available  to  him  or  her  to  redress  a  wrong   efforts said patient died. It cited the testimony of Dr. Tamayo who
committed  by  a  medical  professional  which  has  caused  bodily  harm.  In   testified that he considered petitioner one of the most proficient
order  to  successfully  pursue  such  a  claim,  a  patient  must  prove  that  a   in the treatment of cancer and that the patient in this case was
health  care  provider,  in  most  cases  a  physician,  either  failed  to  do   afflicted with a very aggressive type of cancer necessitating
something  which  a  reasonably  prudent  health  care  provider  would   chemotherapy as adjuvant treatment. Using the standard of
have  done,  or  that  he  or  she  did  something  that  a  reasonably  prudent   negligence laid down in Picart v. Smith, the trial court declared
provider  would  not  have  done;  and  that  that  failure  or  action  caused   that petitioner has taken the necessary precaution against the
injury  to  the  patient.   adverse effect of chemotherapy on the patient, adding that a
wrong decision is not by itself negligence.
FACTS:   22. The appellate court stressed that since the respondents have
13. Respondents’ 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, been told of only three side effects of chemotherapy, they readily
underwent a biopsy of the mass located in her lower extremity at consented thereto. Had petitioner made known to respondents
the St. Luke’s Medical Center (SLMC). Results showed that those other side effects which gravely affected their child—such
Angelica was suffering from osteosarcoma, osteoblastic type, a as carpo- pedal spasm, sepsis, decrease in the blood platelet
high-grade (highly malignant) cancer of the bone which usually count, bleeding, infections and eventual death—respondents
afflicts teenage children. could have decided differently or adopted a different course of
14. Following this diagnosis and as primary intervention, Angelica’s action which could have delayed or prevented the early death of
right leg was amputated by Dr. Jaime Tamayo in order to remove their child.
the tumor. 23. Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration which the
15. As adjuvant treatment to eliminate any remaining cancer cells, appellate court denied.
and hence minimize the chances of recurrence and prevent the 24. Hence, this petition.
disease from spreading to other parts of the patient’s body
(metastasis), chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo. ISSUE:  Whether  the  petitioner  can  be  held  liable  for  failure  to  fully  disclose  
16. Dr. Tamayo referred Angelica to another doctor at SLMC, herein serious  side  effects  to  the  parents  of  the  child  patient  who  died  while  
petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist. undergoing  chemotherapy,  despite  the  absence  of  finding  that  petitioner  
17. Angelica was admitted to SLMC. However, she died just 11 days was  negligent  in  administering  the  said  treatment.  
after the (intravenous) administration of the first cycle of the
chemotherapy regimen. RULING  +  RATIO:    No.  
18. The Medico- Legal Report issued by said institution indicated the
The  type  of  lawsuit  which  has  been  called  medical  malpractice  or,  more  
cause of death as “Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple
appropriately,  medical  negligence,  is  that  type  of  claim  which  a  victim  has  
organ hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular
available  to  him  or  her  to  redress  a  wrong  committed  by  a  medical  
Coagulation.”
professional  which  has  caused  bodily  harm.  In  order  to  successfully  pursue  
19. Respondents filed a damage suit against petitioner, Dr. Leo
such  a  claim,  a  patient  must  prove  that  a  health  care  provider,  in  most  cases  
Marbella, Mr. Jose Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC.
a  physician,  either  failed  to  do  something  which  a  reasonably  prudent  
20. Respondents charged them with negligence and disregard of
health  care  provider  would  have  done,  or  that  he  or  she  did  something  that  
Angelica’s safety, health and welfare by their careless
a  reasonably  prudent  provider  would  not  have  done;  and  that  that  failure  or  
action  caused  injury  to  the  patient.   divulged  is  its  materiality  to  the  patient’s  decision.  

This  Court  has  recognized  that  medical  negligence  cases  are  best  proved  by   There  are  four  essential  elements  a  plaintiff  must  prove  in  a  malpractice  
opinions  of  expert  witnesses  belonging  in  the  same  general  neighborhood   action  based  upon  the  doctrine  of  informed  consent:  “(1)  the  physician  had  
and  in  the  same  general  line  of  practice  as  defendant  physician  or  surgeon.   a  duty  to  disclose  material  risks;  (2)  he  failed  to  disclose  or  inadequately  
The  deference  of  courts  to  the  expert  opinion  of  qualified  physicians  stems   disclosed  those  risks;  (3)  as  a  direct  and  proximate  result  of  the  failure  to  
from  the  former’s  realization  that  the  latter  possess  unusual  technical  skills   disclose,  the  patient  consented  to  treatment  she  otherwise  would  not  have  
which  laymen  in  most  instances  are  incapable  of  intelligently  evaluating,   consented  to;  and  (4)  plaintiff  was  injured  by  the  proposed  treatment.”  The  
hence  the  indispensability  of  expert  testimonies.   gravamen  in  an  informed  consent  case  requires  the  plaintiff  to  “point  to  
significant  undisclosed  information  relating  to  the  treatment  which  would  
As  early  as  1767,  doctors  were  charged  with  the  tort  of  “battery”  (i.e.,  an   have  altered  her  decision  to  undergo  it.  
unauthorized  physical  contact  with  a  patient)  if  they  had  not  gained  the  
consent  of  their  patients  prior  to  performing  a  surgery  or  procedure.  From   Examining  the  evidence  on  record,  we  hold  that  there  was  adequate  
a  purely  ethical  norm,  informed  consent  evolved  into  a  general  principle  of   disclosure  of  material  risks  inherent  in  the  chemotherapy  procedure  
law  that  a  physician  has  a  duty  to  disclose  what  a  reasonably  prudent   performed  with  the  consent  of  Angelica’s  parents.  Respondents  could  
physician  in  the  medical  community  in  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care   not  have  been  unaware  in  the  course  of  initial  treatment  and  amputation  of  
would  disclose  to  his  patient  as  to  whatever  grave  risks  of  injury  might  be   Angelica’s  lower  extremity,  that  her  immune  system  was  already  weak  on  
incurred  from  a  proposed  course  of  treatment,  so  that  a  patient,  exercising   account  of  the  malignant  tumor  in  her  knee.  When  petitioner  informed  the  
ordinary  care  for  his  own  welfare,  and  faced  with  a  choice  of  undergoing   respondents  beforehand  of  the  side  effects  of  chemotherapy  which  includes  
the  proposed  treatment,  or  alternative  treatment,  or  none  at  all,  may   lowered  counts  of  white  and  red  blood  cells,  decrease  in  blood  platelets,  
intelligently  exercise  his  judgment  by  reasonably  balancing  the  probable   possible  kidney  or  heart  damage  and  skin  darkening,  there  is  reasonable  
risks  against  the  probable  benefits.   expectation  on  the  part  of  the  doctor  that  the  respondents  understood  very  
well  that  the  severity  of  these  side  effects  will  not  be  the  same  for  all  
The  physician  is  not  expected  to  give  the  patient  a  short  medical  education,   patients  undergoing  the  procedure.  In  other  words,  by  the  nature  of  the  
the  disclosure  rule  only  requires  of  him  a  reasonable  explanation,  which   disease  itself,  each  patient’s  reaction  to  the  chemical  agents  even  with  
means  generally  informing  the  patient  in  nontechnical  terms  as  to  what  is  at   pre-­‐treatment  laboratory  tests  cannot  be  precisely  determined  by  the  
stake;  the  therapy  alternatives  open  to  him,  the  goals  expectably  to  be   physician.  That  death  can  possibly  result  from  complications  of  the  
achieved,  and  the  risks  that  may  ensue  from  particular  treatment  or  no   treatment  or  the  underlying  cancer  itself,  immediately  or  sometime  after  
treatment.   the  administration  of  chemotherapy  drugs,  is  a  risk  that  cannot  be  ruled  
out,  as  with  most  other  major  medical  procedures,  but  such  conclusion  can  
And,  as  in  malpractice  actions  generally,  there  must  be  a  causal  relationship   be  reasonably  drawn  from  the  general  side  effects  of  chemotherapy  already  
between  the  physician’s  failure  to  divulge  and  damage  to  the  patient.   disclosed.  

However,  the  physician  is  not  obliged  to  discuss  relatively  minor  risks   The  element  of  ethical  duty  to  disclose  material  risks  in  the  proposed  
inherent  in  common  procedures  when  it  is  common  knowledge  that  such   medical  treatment  cannot  thus  be  reduced  to  one  simplistic  formula  
risks  inherent  in  procedure  of  very  low  incidence.  Cited  as  exceptions  to  the   applicable  in  all  instances.  Further,  in  a  medical  malpractice  action  based  on  
rule  that  the  patient  should  not  be  denied  the  opportunity  to  weigh  the   lack  of  informed  consent,  “the  plaintiff  must  prove  both  the  duty  and  the  
 
risks  of  surgery  or  treatment  are  emergency  cases  where  it  is  evident  he   breach  of  that  duty  through  expert  testimony.  
 
cannot  evaluate  data,  and  where  the  patient  is  a  child  or  incompetent. The  
court  thus  concluded  that  the  patient’s  right  of  self-­‐decision  can  only  be   In  this  case,  the  testimony  of  Dr.  Balmaceda  who  is  not  an  oncologist  but  a  
effectively  exercised  if  the  patient  possesses  adequate  information  to   Medical  Specialist  of  the  DOH’s  Operational  and  Management  Services  
enable  him  in  making  an  intelligent  choice.   charged  with  receiving  complaints  against  hospitals,  does  not  qualify  as  
expert  testimony  to  establish  the  standard  of  care  in  obtaining  consent  for  
The  test  therefore  for  determining  whether  a  potential  peril  must  be   chemotherapy  treatment.    
DISPOSITION:  WHEREFORE,  the  petition  for  review  on  certiorari  is  
GRANTED.  The  Decision  dated  June  15,  2004  and  the  Resolution  dated  
September  1,  2004  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  in  CA-­‐G.R.  CV  No.  58013  are  SET  
ASIDE.  

The  Decision  dated  September  5,  1997  of  the  Regional  Trial  Court  of  
Legazpi  City,  Branch  8,  in  Civil  Case  No.  8904  is  REINSTATED  and  UPHELD.  

No  costs.  SO  ORDERED.  

 

 
Digest Author: Coco Navarro
Adarne v. Aldaba
Petitioner: Cesario Adarne
Respondent: Atty. Damian Aldaba
Ponencia: Conception
DOCTRINE: An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary
diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill, having
reference to the character of the business he undertakes. Being prone
to err as other human beings, he is not answerable for every error or
mistake, and will be protected so long as he acts honestly and in good
faith to the best of his skill and knowledge.
Standard of Proof: In disbarment proceedings, the complainant bears
the burden of proof; liability must be established by convincing proof.
FACTS
1. This case is an administrative action for disbarment against Atty.
Aldaba for “gross negligence and misconduct”, failing to give full
devotion to his client’s interest.
2. Adarne was a defendant in a case on forcible entry. In a
hearing, his lawyer failed to appear.
3. Incidentally, Atty. Aldaba was present to attend trial for an
electoral case he was handling. Since they’re third cousins,
Adarne asked Atty. Aldaba to ask for a postponement on his
behalf. Noticing that the other parties were not present, he
moved for a dismissal instead of a postponement.
4. Plaintiffs in the forcible entry case filed for a motion for
reconsideration to which Atty. Aldaba filed an opposition. Motion
by plaintiffs were denied but upon appeal, the CA set aside the
order of dismissal and the case was remanded to the lower
court.
5. In the hearing of the remanded case, Adarne again asked Atty.
Aldaba to appear on his behalf. Atty. Aldaba entered a “special
appearance” and successfully argued to allow a joint action for
quieting of title and the action for forcible entry. Court agreed
and ordered Aldaba to file the action for quieting of title.
6. On the day of the hearing for the joint trial, Adarne was declared
in default for failing to appear and the other parties were allowed
to present evidence for their forcible entry claim. Court rendered
a decision (most likely for the other party) and issued a writ of
execution.
7. As a result of the declaration of default, Adarne filed a case for
disbarment against Atty. Aldaba. Atty. Aldaba avers that he
never agreed to handle his case except for the “special
appearance”in view of the non-availability of Adarne’s lawyer on
two occasions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the respondent attorney should be disbarred (for
purportedly causing the judgment of default against the petitioner/client)
RULING + RATIO:
No. It cannot be attributed to the respondent attorney. Adarne is at fault
for engaging the services of several lawyers without formal withdrawal.
To add to the confusion, Adarne apparently asked for the clerk of court to
directly furnish him with summons and subpoenas, and even filed the
motion himself (hence it appears he was even handling his own case).
Apparently, Adarne had three changes of lawyers in the forcible entry
case but no formalities were observed such that Atty. Aldaba entered a
“special appearance” so he can temporarily act as counsel.
It appears that the respondent attorney honestly believed that he only
appeared for the complainant for a special purpose only and that Adarne
agreed to contact his attorney of record to handle the rest of the case.
There was neither gross negligence nor omission; (reiterating doctrine...)
An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a
reasonable degree of care and skill, having reference to the character of
the business he undertakes. Being prone to err as other human beings,
he is not answerable for every error or mistake, and will be protected so
long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and
knowledge, having reference to the character of business he undertakes
to do.
In disbarment proceedings, the complainant bears the burden of proof;
liability must be established by convincing proof. In the case at bar, there
is no sufficient proof to warrant disbarment of the attorney; neither is
there culpable malpractice to warrant suspension.
OTHERS:
Case also mentioned that substitution of attorneys not allowed unless
there be filed: 1) written application for substitution; 2) written consent of
client; 3) written consent of attorney substituted; 4) in case written
consent cannot be secured, proof of service of notice of motion for
substitution

 
   
 ISAAC  v  A.L.  AMMEN  TRANS.  CO.     1. Whether or not defendant observed extraordinary diligence
or the utmost diligence of every cautious person.
Appellant:  CESAR  L.  ISAAC  
RULING  +  RATIO:    
Appellee:  A.  L.  AMMEN  TRANSPORTATION  CO.,  INC.,    
1. YES. The Bus Driver exercised extra-ordinary diligence which
Ponente:  Bautista  Angelo,  J.      
redounds to the benefit of the Appellee.
 
a. Based on art. 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the civil code, the
DOCTRINE:    
following principles governing the liability of the common
A  carrier  is  presumed  to  be  at  fault  or  to  have  acted  negligently  in  case  
carrier can be gleaned:
of   death   of,   or   injury   to,   passengers,   it   being   its   duty   to   prove   that   it  
i. The liability of a carrier is contractual and arises
exercised  extraordinary  diligence  
upon breach of its obligation; there is breach if it fails
  to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the
FACTS:   circumstances of each case
  ii. Carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the
1. Appellee was a corporation engaged in transporting passengers. utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having
Appellant boarded a passenger bus of the defendant, paying the due regard for all the circumstances
required fare from Albay bound for Camarines Sur, but before iii. A carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted
reaching the destination, the bus collided with a pick-up type negligently in case of death of, or injury to,
vehicle coming from the opposite direction. passengers, it being its duty to prove that it
2. Appellant’s left arm was severed due to the collision, and he was exercised extraordinary diligence.
rushed to a hospital in Iriga wherein he was given a blood iv. Carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel
transfusion to save his life. He was transferred to two more b. The Bus Driver exercised extraordinary diligence when upon
hospitals where he was operated on and stayed for multiple seeing the Pickup Truck, which was heading towards them
months. The medical fees were shouldered by the Appellee. at full speed, he swerved the bus to the very right of the road
3. Appellant brought this action against the Appellee for damages until its front and rear wheels have gone over the pile of
on the ground that the collision was caused by the incompetence stones or gravel situated on the rampart of the road. Said
and recklessness of the driver of the bus and that Appellee driver could not move the bus farther right and run over a
breached the contract of carriage for failure to transport the greater portion of the pile, the peak of which was about 3
Appellant safely to his destination. Appellant prayed for Moral feet high, without endangering the safety of his passengers.
damages, loss of earnings, attorney’s fees, medical expenses And notwithstanding all these efforts, the rear left side of the
and the cost of the artificial arm. bus was hit by the pick-up car.
4. Defendant on the other hand alleges that the injury suffered was c. Plaintiff contends that the bus driver should have stopped
due entirely to the fault or negligence of the driver of the pick-up and waited for the vehicle from the opposite direction to pass
car and to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff himself. but the held that:
Defendant further claims that the accident which resulted in i. “Where a carrier’s employee is confronted with a
the injury of plaintiff is one which defendant could not sudden emergency, the fact that he is obliged to act
foresee or, though foreseen, was inevitable. quickly and without a chance for deliberation must
5. The Trial Court found that the collision occurred due to the be taken into account, and he is not held to the
negligence of the driver of the pick-up car and not to that of the same degree of care as any ordinary prudent person
driver of the bus it appearing that the latter did everything he would exercise only such care as any ordinary
could to avoid the same but that notwithstanding his efforts, he prudent person would exercise under like
was not able to avoid it. As a consequence, the court dismissed circumstances and conditions, and the failure on his
complaint, with costs against plaintiff. This is an appeal from said part to exercise the best judgment the case renders
decision. possible does not establish lack of care and skill on
his part which renders the company, liable”
ISSUES:    
 
 d. Considering the attendant circumstances, the driver of the
bus has done what a prudent man could have done to avoid
the collision and relieves the defendant from liability
2. There was contributory negligence on the part of the Appellant.
a. Furthermore, plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence,
which further militates against the position taken by him.
b. Upon boarding, he placed himself in such a position as to
expose his arm to injury, which is the position he was in
when the collision happened. He rest his arm on the window
sill but with his left elbow outside the window. Had he not
placed his left arm on the window sill with a portion thereof
protruding outside, perhaps the injury would have been
avoided as is the case with the other passenger. It is to be
noted that appellant was the only victim of the collision.
c. Notably, it is only the plaintiff who was the victim of the
collision
d. It has been held that:
i. “It is negligence per se for a passenger on a railroad
voluntarily or inadvertently to protrude his arm, hand,
elbow, or any other part of his body through the
window of a moving car beyond the outer edge of
the window or outer surface of the car, so as to
come in contact with objects or obstacles near the
track, and that no recovery can be had for an injury
which but for such negligence would not have been
sustained

DISPOSITION  
Wherefore,  the  decision  appealed  from  is  affirmed,  with  cost  against  
appellant.  
 
 
   
 Calvo  v.  UCPB   (2002)   PROVISION:  
Petitioner:  VIRGINES  CALVO  doing  business  under  the  name  and  style  
TRANSORIENT  CONTAINER  TERMINAL  SERVICES,  INC.   Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms
Respondent:  UCPB  GENERAL  INSURANCE  CO.,  INC.  (formerly  Allied   or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
Guarantee  Ins.  Co.,  Inc.)   transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air
Ponencia:  MENDOZA,  J.   for compensation, offering their services to the public.
 
DOCTRINE:  “Common  carriers,  from  the  nature  of  their  business  and   RULING  +  RATIO:  
for  reasons  of  public  policy,  are  bound  to  observe  extraordinary  
diligence  in  the  vigilance  over  the  goods  and  for  the  safety  of  the   • The article makes no distinction between one
passengers  transported  by  them,  according  to  all  the  circumstances  of   whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons
each  case.”   or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as
  an ancillary activity . . . Article 1732 also carefully avoids
  making any distinction between a person or enterprise
FACTS:   offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled
1.  Petitioner  Virgines  Calvo  is  the  owner  of  Transorient  Container   basis and one offering such service on an occasional,
Terminal  Services,  Inc.  (TCTSI),  a  sole  proprietorship  customs  broker.  At   episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732
the  time  material  to  this  case,  petitioner  entered  into  a  contract  with  San   distinguish between a carrier offering its services to
Miguel  Corporation  (SMC)  for  the  transfer  of  114  reels  of  semi-­‐ the general public, i.e., the general community or
chemical  fluting  paper  and  124  reels  of  kraft  liner  board  from  the  Port   population, and one who offers services or solicits business
Area  in  Manila  to  SMCs  warehouse  at  the  Tabacalera  Compound,   only from a narrow segment of the general population.
Romualdez  St.,  Ermita,  Manila.  The  cargo  was  insured  by  respondent  
UCPB  General  Insurance  Co.,  Inc.   • There is greater reason for holding petitioner to be a common
  carrier because the transportation of goods is an integral part
2.  The  goods  were  inspected  by  Marine  Cargo  Surveyors,  who  found  that   of her business. To uphold petitioners contention would be to
15  reels  of  the  semi-­‐chemical  fluting  paper  were  wet/stained/torn   deprive those with whom she contracts the protection which the
and  3  reels  of  kraft  liner  board  were  likewise  torn.   law affords them notwithstanding the fact that the obligation to
  carry goods for her customers, as already noted, is part and
3.  SMC  collected  payment  from  respondent  UCPB  under  its  insurance   parcel of petitioners business.
contract  for  the  aforementioned  amount.  In  turn,  respondent,  as  
subrogee  of  SMC,  brought  suit  against  petitioner  in  the  Regional  Trial   • Now, as to petitioners liability, Art. 1733 of the Civil Code
Court,  Branch  148,  Makati  City,  which,  on  December  20,  1995,  rendered   provides:
judgment  finding  petitioner  liable  to  respondent  for  the  damage  to  the   Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
shipment.   reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
  extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and
4.  Petitioner  contends  that  contrary  to  the  findings  of  the  trial  court  and   for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
the  Court  of  Appeals,  she  is  not  a  common  carrier  but  a  private  carrier   according to all the circumstances of each case. . . .
because,  as  a  customs  broker  and  warehouseman,  she  does  not   The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
indiscriminately  hold  her  services  out  to  the  public  but  only  offers  the  same   tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to know and
to  select  parties  with  whom  she  may  contract  in  the  conduct  of  her   to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or
business.   destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and
  delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with the
ISSUE:  WON  the  petitioner  is  a  common  carrier.   greatest skill and foresight and to use all reasonable means to
  ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for
 shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage,
including such methods as their nature requires.

DISPOSITION:
 

  The
 decision
 of
 the
 Court
 of
 Appeals,
 dated
 May
 31,
 2001,
 is
 
AFFIRMED.
 

 
TITLE: Ridjo Tape & Chemical Corp. v. Court of Appeals (1998)
PETITIONERS: Ridjo Tape & Chemical Corp, Ridjo Paper
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, MERALCO
DOCTRINE: Being a public utility vested with public interest, MERALCO
is impressed with certain obligations towards its customer and any
omission on its part to perform such duties would be prejudicial to its
interest.
FACTS:
1. Case involves 2 consolidated civil cases involving a Prayer for
Injunction and/or TRO against Meralco by Ridjo Taper and Ridjo
Paper.
2. Ridjo Tape and Ridjo Paper applied for and were granted electric
service by MERALCO.
3. In separate occasions, MERALCO sent demand letters to Ridjo
Tape and Rido Paper for unpaid bills for unregistered electric
consumption due to defects of the electric meter.
st
a. 1 demand: For period of 3 months, around P415K
nd
b. 2 demand: 9 months, around P89k
4. In both occasions, MERALCO warned them that nonpayment
may yield to disconnection. Hence, they filed the cases to stop
Meralco from doing so and such were granted by the QC RTC.
5. Ridjo Tape and Ridjo Paper sought for the consolidation of 2 civil
cases. Trial Court rendered judgment in their favor:
a. Enjoining MERALCO from committing acts of
dispossession/disruption of electric power
b. Ordering MERALCO to pay the cost of the suit
6. MERALCO appealed to CA. CA reversed asking Ridjo Tape and
Ridjo Paper to pay the differential billings. MR was filed but CA
denied it.
ISSUE: WoN Meralco was negligent in inspecting the meter
HELD: YES
Interpretation of Service Contract (discussed prior to Torts issue so it
was through this how the Court arrived at its decision)
• In determining WoN Petitioners shall be held liable for the unpaid
amounts, the Court looked into the Service Agreement between
the parties. There was a part which stated that: In the event of
the stoppage or the failure by any meter to register the full
amount of energy consumed, the Customer shall be billed for
such period on an estimated consumption based upon his use of
energy in a small period of like use.
o Ridjo’s interpretation of the underline phrase: it only
refers to tampering on the part of the customer and not
to mechanical failure or defects
o MERALCO: having such interpretation will constitute
unjust enrichment on their part
• SC upheld otherwise. It acknowledged the fact that such was a
contract of adhesion prepared solely by MERALCO and just
adhered to by the customers. These contracts, nonetheless, are
just like ordinary contracts because the party adhering to is free
to reject it.
• Being an ordinary contract, the parties are free to make
stipulations (Principle of Autonomy) and such contract serves as
the law between the parties.
• HOWEVER, both parties have different interpretations in this
case. SC stressed that the reason behind and circumstances
surrounding the execution of the contact are of paramount
importance in interpreting the contract.
• SC upheld MERALCO’s interpretation recognizing that the
rationale of the provision was primarily to cover situations similar
to the case and it is the kind of predicament MERALCO seeks to
protect itself to prevent business losses or reverse.
TORTS REAL DEAL: MERALCO WAS NEGLIGENT
• Meralco having the technical knowledge in this situation had the
duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of equipment
to make sure that they don’t malfunction and the DUE
DILIGENCE to cover and repair defects therein. Failure to repair
such constitutes negligence.
• Considering the amount of time MERALCO had been given, it
committed an inexcusable negligence for failure to discover the
defect. It failed to make the necessary repairs and replacement
of the defective meter.
• MERALCO AS A PUBLIC UTILITY is obliged to discharge its
functions w/ utmost care and diligence.
• Proximate cause of the dispute = MERALCO’s failure to make
the necessary repairs and replacement of the defective meter
• Having the technical knowledge and vast experience, MERALCO
could have easily verified if there was an unusual electric
consumption not reflected in the statements OR if they
discovered illegal devices or contraptions installed on the meter,
they should filed a criminal complaint under PD No. 401.
 • Rationale behind the ruling: As a public utility, Meralco by not
putting on serviceable meters runs the risk of forfeiting amounts
from the consuming public
• Hence, the liability of Ridjo Tape and Ridjo Paper was a result of
MERALCO’s negligence. As an equitable solution, they are
asked to pay only the estimated consumption on a 3 month
average before the period in controversy