Ledesma v.

CA
G.R. NO. 113216 September 5, 1997

Facts: A complaint for libel was filed by Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr. against Dr. Rhodora M.
Ledesma, petitioner herein, before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office. Finding sufficient legal
and factual basis, the Quezon City Prosecutors Office filed on July 6, 1992 an Information for
libel against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The Information was filed by
Assistant City Prosecutor Augustine A. Vestil.
A petition for review of the resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Vestil was filed by petitioner
before the Department of Justice.
The Department of Justice gave due course to the petition and directed the Quezon City
prosecutor to move for deferment of further proceedings and to elevate the entire records of the
case.
In a resolution dated January 27, 1993, then Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon reversed the
Quezon City investigating prosecutor.
In obedience to the above directive, Quezon City Trial Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero filed a
Motion to Withdraw Information. The trial judge denied this motion in his Order dated February
22, 1993.

Issue: WON the trial judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
withdraw the information?

Held: Yes, the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to
withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial
courts order is inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an independent and competent
assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion to dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to
evaluate the secretarys recommendation finding the absence of probable cause to hold
petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to proceed with the trial
without stating his reasons for disregarding the secretarys recommendation.
Guy vs. Asia United Bank
G.R. NO. 174874 October 4, 2007

Facts: In 1993, herein respondent Asia United Bank (AUB) granted 3D Industries, Inc. (3D,
hereafter) a loan in the form of stand-by letter of credit (L/C) in the amount of P30 million. To
guarantee the loan accommodation, Guy, as then Vice President for Operations of 3D and a
member of its Board of Directors, and then 3D President Paulino Delfin Pe (Pe) executed
on March 23, 1999 a Continuing Guaranty in AUBs favor. As specifically provided in the trust
receipts thus signed, 3D shall sell the goods for the account of, and, thereafter, remit the
proceeds of the sale to, AUB not later than the fixed periods therein stated, or to account for the
same, if unsold.
However, 3D failed to comply with its obligation as expressly specified in the trust
receipts. Consequently, [respondent] AUB sent [two] demand letters to 3D [and], to [petitioner]
GUY, for the latter to remit the proceeds of the goods in the total amount of P12, 148,816.90
covered by the subject trust receipts. When said demands went unheeded, AUB filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City two (2) complaints against GUY, as majority and
controlling stockholder [of 3D] and by virtue of his continuing guaranty, for estafa.
On October 13, 2005, the Investigating Prosecutor, Emmanuel L. Obungen, came out with the
Joint Resolution, in I.S. No. 05-01-00365 and I.S. No. 05-03-02371, finding probable cause for
the offenses charged. Accordingly, he filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 67,
Pasig City two (2) Informations for estafa.
Aggrieved, [Guy] filed with the DOJ [Department of Justice] a Petition for Review.
On December 22, 2005, [DOJ Secretary Raul] GONZALES issued a Resolution, denying the
petition for review.
[Petitioner] GUY admittedly received a copy of the December 22, 2005 Resolution on December
28, 2005. On January 11, 2006, [he] filed a motion for reconsidered thereto.
On April 20, 2006, [DOJ Secretary] GONZALEZ, issued the assailed Resolution, in I.S. No. 05-
01-00365 and I.S. No. 05-03-02371, this time, granting the petition for review and reversing his
December 22, 2005 Resolution. The City Prosecutor of Pasig is hereby ordered to file the
corresponding motion to withdraw the Informations in the instant cases for the crime of Estafa.
Petitioner admits to the belated filing, due to an inadvertent miscalculation of and
misapprehension on the period of filing, of his motion for reconsideration.

Issue: WON the DOJ can still rule on the motion for reconsideration despite the expiration of
the period to file it?

Held: Yes. In this regard, the authority of the Secretary of Justice to review and order the
withdrawal of an information in instances where he finds the absence of a prima facie case is
not time-barred, albeit subject to the approval of the court if its jurisdiction over the accused has
meanwhile attached. And it is not prudent or even permissible for a court to compel the
Secretary of Justice or the fiscal, as the case may be, to prosecute a proceeding originally
initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient
for conviction. Now, then, if the Secretary of Justice possesses sufficient latitude of discretion in
his determination of what constitutes probable cause and can legally order a reinvestigation
even in those extreme instances where an information has already been filed in court, is it not
just logical and valid to assume that he can take cognizance of and competently act on a motion
for reconsideration, belatedly filed it might have been, dealing with probable cause? And is it not
a grievous error on the part of the CA if it virtually orders the filing of an information, as here,
despite a categorical statement from the Secretary of Justice about the lack of evidence to
proceed with the prosecution of the petitioner? The answer to both posers should be in the
affirmative.
There can be no quibbling that the motion interposed by the petitioner for reconsideration of the
December 22, 2005 DOJ Resolution was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period, or four
days late to be precise, prescribed by the NPS Rule on Appeal.
The Court cannot accord cogency to the posture assumed by the CA under the premises which,
needless to stress, would deny the DOJ the authority to motu proprio undertake a review of his
own decision with the end in view of protecting, in line with his oath of office, innocent persons
from groundless, false or malicious prosecution.
And lest it be overlooked, the DOJ Secretary, when he took cognizance of the petitioners motion
for reconsideration, effectively excepted such motion from the operation of the aforequoted
Section 13, supra, of DOJ Circular No. 70, s. 2000. This show of liberality is, to us, within the
competence of the DOJ Secretary to make, and the Court loathes to disturb the same absent
compelling proof, as here, that he acted out of whim and that the petitioner was out to delay the
proceedings to the prejudice of AUB, as private complainant in I.S. Nos. 05-01-00365 and 05-
03-02371, when he (petitioner) interposed his motion for reconsideration.
The peculiarities of this case impel us to sustain the validity the DOJ Secretarys taking
cognizance of Guys motion for reconsideration in question and eventually resolving the same on
the merits.
The Secretary of Justice had full power and authority to issue his subsequent resolution
dated April 20, 2006 granting petitioners motion for reconsideration and reversing his earlier
resolution of December 22, 2005. The said April 20, 2006 Resolution should, therefore, be
considered valid and fully enforceable.
Si vs. Calis
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1483

Facts: Stating that he is the accused in the aforementioned criminal case, complainant alleged
that on March 26, 2002 at around 3:45 p.m., an accident occurred in front of the Landbank of
the Philippines Building in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, when the car he was driving, a Toyota Corolla
Model 1992 with Plate No. TEM-216, bumped the back of a Nissan Sentra car Model 1998 with
Plate No. PRX-231 being rented by the complaining witness Atty. Ceriaco A. Sumaya, a close
friend of respondent Judge. Atty. Sumaya, complainant further alleged, jacked up the minimal
damage to his car by adding a charge for the repair/replacement of the damaged front
windshield.

Notwithstanding the fact that the offense charged carried only the penalty of a fine, respondent
Judge issued a warrant for complainants arrest and fixed the bail for his provisional liberty
at P21,200. Complainant invokes Sec. 6 (c), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which states:

(c) When warrant of arrest not necessary. A warrant of arrest shall not issue
if the accused is already under detention pursuant to a warrant issued by the
Municipal Trial Court in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, or if the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule or is for an
offense penalized by fine only. The court then shall proceed in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction.

Issue: WON the respondent Judge was right in filing the warrant of arrest?

Held: No. The Court agrees with the finding of the Court Administrator. Respondent Judge in
fact admitted in his Comment that he might have overlooked the pertinent rule.
It is the duty of judges to keep themselves abreast of the law and the rules of court and the
latest jurisprudence, for ignorance of the law on their part is the mainspring of
injustice. Respondent Judge failed to fulfill this duty. An oversight of a new provision of the law
or the rules is not a valid excuse from performing this bounden duty.
Sanchez vs. Demetriou
G.R. NO. 111771-77 November 9, 1993

Facts: On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of
appropriate charges against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the
rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner
requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was
served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the said
camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and
SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating him as a principal in
the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest
status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty.
Salvador Panelo as his counsel.
On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo issued a warrant for the arrest of all the
accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.

Issue: WON the invitation was considered as an arrest?

Held: Yes, Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a
formal declaration of arrest is not, required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of
one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary.

The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter-
invitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the said camp for
investigation.

In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the investigation
of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a request, it was
obviously a command or an order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly be expected to defy.
In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went without protest (and in informal clothes and
slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch him.
People vs. Shabaz
424 Mich. 42 (1985)

Facts: On July 22, 1982, at approximately 9:00 P.M., Detroit Police Officers Surma, Scotsky,
and Hayes were on patrol in an unmarked police vehicle in the area of Clairmount and
Woodward Avenues in the City of Detroit. The officers were in plain clothes, and Officer Scotsky
was driving.

The vehicle was proceeding westbound on Clairmount *47 from Woodward when Officer Surma
observed defendant leaving a building.

Surma observed defendant carrying a small brown paper bag, and walking east on Clairmount
toward Woodward Avenue. At the time he observed defendant leaving the building, Surma was
in the police vehicle approximately fifty feet from the defendant, and the police car was moving
toward defendant. Defendant looked in Surma's direction and began "stuffing a paper bag like
under his vest," or "in his pants." The driver, Officer Scotsky, slowed the vehicle, and the
defendant and the scout car passed each other. When the officers' vehicle had nearly come to a
complete stop, defendant "took off running." Surma testified: "We started slowing down to take a
better look at what he was doing. As we were coming to a stop, he immediately started to run."

Surma got out of the car and chased the defendant. By the time Surma reached the doorway
the defendant had entered, defendant was coming out. Surma grabbed defendant and, as the
defendant tried to push away, Surma "tossed him towards Officer Hayes," and Hayes subdued
the defendant. Surma then went into the vestibule of the building and retrieved a closed, brown
paper bag. Surma did not know what was in the bag until after he retrieved it. The bag
contained a "Smith & Wesson, four inch blue steel revolver, .357."

Officer Surma confiscated the weapon, unloaded it, and asked the defendant if he had a permit.
After receiving a negative reply from the defendant, Surma placed defendant under arrest for
unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon.

Issue: WON flight is synonymous to guilt?

Held: No, Defendant's flight at the approach of police did not, by itself, in the circumstances of
this case, support a reasonable suspicion. Although it is uncontroverted that flight may be a
factor to be considered in ascertaining whether there is reasonable suspicion to warrant a Terry
stop, United States v Sharpe, supra; United States v Brignoni-Ponce, supra, flight alone is not a
reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances to make its import less ambiguous.