G.R. No.

L-65935
FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
September 30, 1988

Facts:
Nestor B. Sunga Jr., businessman and owner of the NBS Machineries Marketing and
the NAP-NAP Transit alleged that he purchased a passenger minibus Mazda from
the Motor center, Inc. at Calasiao, Pangasinan on March 21, 1978. A chattel
mortgage was executed in favour of the Motor center, Inc. In addition, the
mortgage was assigned to the Filinvest Credit Corporation with the conformity of
the plaintiff. On October 21, 1978, the minibus was seized by two (2) employees of
Filinvest Credit Corporation upon orders of the branch manager Mr. Gaspar de los
Santos, on account of a balance which was already past its due. Sunga’s accounts
were verified and it was found out that said accounts are all in order. The motor
vehicle was returned to the plaintiff upon proper receipt. The Intermediate
Appellate Court (now RTC) then awarded Sunga a moral damage amounting to
P30,000.00. Dissatisfied with the decision, Filinvest Credit Corporation interposed a
timely appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s
decision, however, it increased the moral damages to be awarded to P50,000.00.
Thus, Filinvest Credit Corporation filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, stating that the respondent court committed a “grave abuse of
discretion in increasing extravagantly the award damages.”

Issue:
Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court committed a “grave abuse of discretion
in increasing extravagantly the award damages”?

Held:
Yes. According to the court, "Well settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that
whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case an appellee who has not himself
appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than
the ones granted in the decision of the court below." The Intermediate Appellate
Court disregarded such settled rule when it increased the award for moral damages
from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, an act indicative of grave abuse of discretion in
increasing extravagantly the award moral damages, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The court granted the petition and modified the questioned decision
of the Intermediate Appellate Court. The award of moral damages is reduced to
P10,000.00 and the grant of litigation expenses is eliminated.

GR No. 110120
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS
March 16, 1994

Facts:
The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government
of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at
the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certifi
cate (ECC) from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, as required under Presidential Decree N o. 1586, and clearance
from LLDA as required under Republic Act N o. 4850 and issued a CEASE and
DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City Government of Caloocan to stop the use of the
dumpsite.

Issues:
1. Does the
LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the
complaint against the dumping of
garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City
Government of Caloocan?
2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist"
order?

Applicable Laws:
• Executive Order N o. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus: Sec. 4. Additional
Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and
functions: (d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such
discontinuance must be accomplished

• As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to

the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases w
here the special law provides for another forum

Held:
1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this regard that the
LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory law s to carry out and make
effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surroun
ding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay,
Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for
environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power
and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the
responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating fro
m the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.
2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental rule that
an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by
law , it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such
powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its ex press powers.
In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a
regulatory and quasi-
judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the
authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce,
implied.

G.R. Nos. 66870-72

MAGBANUA vs. INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT
June 29, 1985

Facts:
The plaintiffs filed a petition against the respondents all surenamed Perez alleging
that they are shared tenants of the defendants, and that the latter divert the flow
of water from their farm lots which caused the drying up of their landholdings and
asked to vacate their areas for they could not plant palay due to lack of water.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor to the plaintiffs and ordered the
defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs. The defendants
appealed to the IAC which the latter affirmed the appeal by deleting the award of
moral and exemplary damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs. Upon the
reinstatement of the IAC, the trial court did not agree to the appellate court in its
decision because the former believe that as shared tenants, they are entitled to
be maintained as agricultural lessees in peaceful cultivation in their respective
landholdings.

Issue:
Whether or not the tenants of defendants were entitled to moral and exemplary
damages.

Held:
The petition is granted and the decision under review is modified and each of the
plaintiffs is entitled to receive award of moral and exemplary damages by the
defendants. Under the law, the landowners have an obligation to keep the tenant
in the peaceful and continuous cultivation of his landholding. In this case, it shows
that the petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots in order to
make them vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated the plaintiff’s
rights and caused prejudiced to the latter by the diversion of water. Under Article
2219 (10), the Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for acts mentioned
in Article 21 of the same Code which provides, Any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The defendants acted in
an oppressive manner which is contrary to the morals of the petitioners and
therefore, they are liable for the compensation to the latter.
GR No. 101083
OPOSA vs. FACTORAN
July 30 1993

Facts:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by
their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or
appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant
in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds
in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.

Issue:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent
the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

Held:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony
of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.

G.R. No. 74816

ERNEST RODRIGUEZ vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
March 17, 1987

Facts:
Ernesto Rodriguez and other residents of South Zuzuarregui Avenue, Quezon City
filed on December 16, 1980, an action for abatement of a public nuisance with
damages against Daytona Construction and Development Corporation. Daytona
has a cement batching plant for the manufacture of road and building concrete
materials such as concrete aggregates. The residents state that effluence and
sediment of the plant has run over to the adjacent lots. Cement dust has also
caused pollution to the area. The pollution has killed many of the resident’s
plants. Also, their health has been affected, many being affected with respiratory
diseases.

Issue:
Whether the construction company is liable.

Held:
Yes. Despite all the procedural ploys used by Daytona to invalidate the decision of
the Trial Court, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Trial Court: “From
the uncontroverted evidence presented by the plaintiffs, there is hardly any
question that the cement dust coming from the batching plant of the defendant
corporation is injurious to the health of the plaintiffs and other residents in the
area. The noise, the vibration, the smoke and the odor generated by the day and
night operation of the plant must indeed be causing them serious discomfort and
untold miseries. Its operation therefore violates certain rights of the plaintiffs and
causes them damage. It is thus a nuisance and its abatement justified.”

G.R. No. 94759

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC v. CA
Jan. 21, 1991

Facts:
Technology Developers, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of
charcoal briquette, received a letter from acting mayor Pablo Cruz: 1) ordering
the full cessation of its plant in Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan until further order,
and 2) requesting its Plant Manager to bring before the office of the mayor its
building permit, mayor's permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environment and
Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.

Technology Developers undertook to comply with the request to produce the

required documents. It sought to secure the Region III-Pollution of Environment
and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit although prior to the operation of
the plant, a Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation was issued to
it. Petitioners also sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure a
mayor’s permit but were not entertained.

Eventually, the acting mayor ordered that the plant premises be padlocked,
effectively causing the stoppage of operation. This was done without previous
and reasonable notice.

Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus with preliminary injunction against the acting mayor with Bulacan
RTC, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.

The RTC found that the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
was proper, ordering the acting mayor to immediately revoke his closure order
andallow Technology Developers to resume its normal business operations until
the case has been adjudicated on the merits.

Upon MR, the Provincial Prosecutor presented evidence as to the allegation that
"Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes
coming from the factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to
the health of the people. As such, the company should cease operating until such
a time that the proper air pollution device is installed and operational."

Reassessing the evidence, the RTC set aside its order granted the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. The CA denied Technology Developer's petition
for certiorari for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether the acting mayor had a legal ground for ordering the stoppage of
Technology Developer

Held:
YES. The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of
preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of
determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control
if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the
Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much
responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police
power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or
otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control
and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the
emissions in the operation of the business.

2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by
the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality
but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was
ordered to stop its operation until further orders.

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the
residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial
Governor through channels.

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation
was made by Marivic Guina who in her report observed that the fumes emitted
by the plant goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air
pollutiondevice has been installed.

5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta.

Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati on
March 6, 1987.

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the

then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit
was good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to
extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the
pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.

Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this
dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the
need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the
equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the
people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.

The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its
action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of its
discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary relief may
recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant.

Petition denied.

G.R. No. 145328

EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ vs. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
March 23, 2006

Facts:

NAPOCOR began the construction of steel poles or towers in connection with its
Power Transmission Project. Petitioners in search of the adverse effects, got hold
of published articles and studies linking the incidence of a fecund of illnesses to
exposure to electromagnetic fields. These illnesses range from cancer to
leukemia. Petitioners aired this growing concern to the NAPOCOR, which
conducted a series of meetings with them. NAPOCOR received flak from
Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, who in his Privilege Speech dated 10
May 1999, denounced the cavalier manner with which Napocor ignored safety
and consultation requirements in the questioned project. Negotiations being
unsuccessful, petitioners filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against NAPOCOR. The lower court then issued an order temporarily restrained
the respondent from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current
through the said project.

NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the above
order by the trial court. Alluding to Presidential Decree No. 1818
(1981), "Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Restraining Orders or Preliminary
Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource Development
Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the Government," particularly Sec. 1,
NAPOCOR stalwartly sought the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack
jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1818 provides:

The trial court, thus, enjoined the NAPOCOR from further preparing and installing
high voltage cables to the steel pylons erected near petitioners’ homes and from
energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current through said cables while
the case is pending final adjudication

The Court of Appeals however reversed the trial court’s order hence, this petition
for review.

Issue:
Whether the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the steel poles or towers by
the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding Presidential Decree No. 1818.

Held:
Yes. Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued prohibiting judges from issuing
restraining orders against government infrastructure projects. In part, the decree
says, "No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary order, preliminary mandatory
injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure project."
Realizing the importance of this decree, this Tribunal had issued different circulars
to implement this particular law.

While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the
implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource
development and public utilities, this rule, however, is not absolute as there are
actually instances when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find application.
In a spate of cases, this Court declared that although Presidential Decree No. 1818
prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure
projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining
orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise
of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and
involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented
from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary injunction on

the ground that the NAPOCOR Project impinged on their right to health as
enshrined in Article II, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.

To boot, petitioners, moreover, harp on respondent’s failure to conduct prior

consultation with them, as the community affected by the project, in stark
violation of Section 27 of the Local Government Code which provides: "no project
or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the
consultations mentioned are complied with, and prior approval of
the Sanggunian concerned is observed."

From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners’ constitutionally

protected right to health and whether respondent NAPOCOR had indeed violated
the Local Government Code provision on prior consultation with the affected
communities are veritable questions of law that invested the trial court with
jurisdiction to issue a TRO and subsequently, a preliminary injunction. As such,
these questions of law divest the case from the protective mantle of Presidential
Decree No. 1818.

The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless restrained, the act
complained of will probably violate his rights and tend to render the judgment
ineffectual.
Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that the
project of NAPOCOR probably imperils the health and safety of the petitioners so
as to justify the issuance by the trial court of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Moreover, the Local Government Code, requires conference with the affected
communities of a government project. NAPOCOR, palpably, made a shortcut to
this requirement.

After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not require
that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the applicant. Indeed,
what the Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in violation of
the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of Court, probability is enough basis
for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy, which is different from injunction
as a main action where one needs to establish absolute certainty as basis for a
final and permanent injunction.

G.R. No. L-72119

VALENTIN L. LEGASPI vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
May 29, 1987

Facts:
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern
is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner
Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had
earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of
certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had
allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligible who passed the civil
service examinations for sanitarians.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the
civil service eligibilities of the Health Department employees

Held:
The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not
absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the
Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as
may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It
follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record
must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of
public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted
by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question
is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public
concern. This question is first addressed to the government agency having
custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not
give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of
denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the
information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that
the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold
otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the
government is in an advantageous position to marshal and interpret arguments
against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the
constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned
is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be
compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the
legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil
service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligible. Public officers are
at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their
respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the
claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil
Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are
not, civil service eligible. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of
those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and
licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence,
there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed.
Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as
in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service
eligible, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed
eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a
sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under
the law upon access to the register of civil service eligible for said position, the
duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility
of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore
lies