"Before there were intelligent beings, they were possible; they had therefore possible relations,

and consequently possible laws. Before laws were made, there were relations of possible justice.
To say that there is nothing just or unjust, but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws, is
the same as saying that, before the describing of a circle, all the radii were not equal."
-Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, in "The Spirit of the Laws"

Latin Religio meaning:

"reverence for God or the gods, careful pondering of divine things, piety"

Latin Opinari meaning:

"to have an opinion or "to think."

Election Latin Root

late 13c., from Anglo-French eleccioun, Old French elecion "choice, election, selection" (12c.),
from Latin electionem (nominative electio), noun of action from past participle stem of eligere

Select Latin Root

Latin sēlēctus (past participle of sēligere to gather apart), equivalent to sē- se- + leg(ere)
to gather, choose + -tus past participle suffix
Pro se legal representation (/ˌproʊ ˈsiː/ or /ˌproʊ ˈseɪ/) comes from Latin, literally meaning "on behalf
of themselves", which basically means advocating on one's own behalf before a court, rather
than being represented by a lawyer.

The Latin “prosequi” meant “to follow after, accompany, chase, pursue, attack, assail, or abuse.”
It is composed of the prefix “pro” meaning “forward” and “sequi,” meaning “follow,” in the same
sense as “sequel.” In its most literal sense, prosequi means, “follow forward.” In Latin, prosequi
was usually used in two ways: literally to mean “follow a path” or figuratively to mean “follow a
course of action.” The past participle of prosequi is “prosecutus.” Prosequi became a Latin agent
noun “prosecutor” in medieval times. Prosecutus became “prosecute” in the early 15th century,
usually meaning “to go into detail.” The first recorded use of the word to mean “bring to a court of
law” is in the 1570s. At this time, the person who brought a case in a court of law was a
“promoter.” Prosecutor, in turn, acquired its modern meaning in the 1620s.

"Forced worship stinks in God's nostrils"

-Roger Williams, President of the Colony of Rhode Island

The Federalist Papers, No. 10 & 51:

http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa10.htm
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa51.htm

To Alexander Hamilton from William C. Bentley, 4 October

1799 From William C. Bentley
"Richmond [Virginia] October 4, 1799. “A few days before my arival at this place, some of the Troops of
the Regimt. of Artillerists & Engineers, of Capt. Eddins’s1 Company, stationed at this place, were guilty of
a most violent and flagrant breach of Civil Authority; the Circumstances were these; One of their new
recruits was discovered to be a fugitive from justice, he had been committed to a County Court jail for
Horse-stealing, which he broke and fled from. The Shff of that County discouvering him among the
Soldiers in Town, had him apprehended under a Warrant from a Magistrate of this City, and which in
possession of the Sheriff, he was rescued by Six or Seven of Eddins’s Soldiers, and Suffered to make his
escape.2 This has afforded another opportunity for the Jacobines Printers to sport with the Standing
Army, as they call it; The paper of this place, called the Examiner3 of which, that Scotch Fugitive
Callender,4 has the direction, has detailed the circumstances to the public, rather highly coloured, and
has called on all his Yoke Mates, (using his own Words) to notice it in their papers.…” "

The Volstead Act (1920)

Officially titled the National Prohibition Act
"Nothing in this title shall be held to apply to the manufacture, sale, transportation, importation,
possession, or distribution of wine for sacramental purposes, or like religious rites"

ULTRA VIRES;
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); United States
v. Alfonso D. Lopez, Jr., 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. _ (2012)

COLORADO BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 3. Inalienable rights. All persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among
which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; of acquiring,
possessing and protecting property; and of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.

Section 4. Religious freedom. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination, shall forever hereafter be guaranteed; and no person shall be denied
any civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on account of his opinions concerning religion;
but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense with oaths or
affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the good
order, peace or safety of the state. No person shall be required to attend or support any
ministry or place of worship, religious sect or denomination against his consent. Nor shall any
preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of worship.

Section 6. Equality of justice. Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy
remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character; and right and justice
should be administered without sale, denial or delay.

Section 13. Right to bear arms. The right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of
his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned,
shall be called in question; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to justify the
practice of carrying concealed weapons.

Section 17. Imprisonment of witnesses depositions form. No person shall be imprisoned for the
purpose of securing his testimony in any case longer than may be necessary in order to take his
deposition. If he can give security he shall be discharged; if he cannot give security his deposition
shall be taken by some judge of the supreme, district or county court, at the earliest time he can
attend, at some convenient place by him appointed for that purpose, of which time and place the
accused and the attorney prosecuting for the people shall have reasonable notice. The accused shall
have the right to appear in person and by counsel. If he has no counsel, the judge shall assign him
one in his behalf only. On the completion of such examination the witness shall be discharged on his
own recognizance, entered into before said judge, but such deposition shall not be used if in the
opinion of the court the personal attendance of the witness might be procured by the prosecution, or
is procured by the accused. No exception shall be taken to such deposition as to matters of form.

Section 21. Suspension of habeas corpus. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never
be suspended, unless when in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.

Section 24. Right to assemble and petition. The people have the right peaceably to assemble
for the common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government for
redress of grievances, by petition or remonstrance.
re·mon·strance
1. a forcefully reproachful protest.

force·ful·ly
1. in a strong and assertive manner; vigorously.

re·proach·ful
1. expressing disapproval or disappointment.

Section 28. Rights reserved not disparaged. The enumeration in this constitution of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny, impair or disparage others retained by the people.

CASE LAW
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,508 U.S. 520 (1993)-States and Cities
can't ban Religions they don't like
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. ___
(2018)- State discrimination of Religion
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. ___ (2014)- Religious Freedom
Restoration Act
National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920)
Mellouli v. Lynch 575 U.S. _ (2015)- Harrison Act
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)- Rights of Churches to create Schools
separate from State schools, “The suits were not premature. The injury to appellees
was present and very real, not a mere possibility in the remote future.”
Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church, 210 U.S. 296 (1908)- Treaty of Paris
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)- Heat Sensor (FLIR) is a Search, needs
Warrant
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___ (2013)- Dogs are a Search and need a
Warrant
Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U. S. 696 (1976)- Church Rules
must be acknowledged in Civil Court
Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969)- New Branches are still Religions
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)- No need for Government to be Hostile towards religion
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972)- Pro Se, Ancient Religion denied in
Jail
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)- 2nd Amendment
People v. Newton (1970)- Black Panther Police Murder, overturned because it was involuntary
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)- Men may believe what they can not prove
New Hampshire v. Maine,532 U.S. 742 (2001)- Res Judicata and Judicial
Estoppel MAYFIELD v. TDCJ No. 06-50490 (2008)- Religion in Jail
NATIONAL MOBILIZATION COM. TO END WAR IN VIET NAM v. Foran, 297 F. Supp. 1
(N.D. Ill. 1968)- 3 Judge Review Panel
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)- Non-Mainstream Religion
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)- Right to publish even lies about Public
officials
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)- Slander and libel
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co.,118 U.S. 394 (1886)- Corporations
are people
Ketchum v. Cruz, 775 F. Supp. 1399 (D. Colo. 1991)- Martinez Report
Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3 (1883)
Muskrat v. US, 219 US 346 (1911)- Jury Nullification Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)- Lemon Test
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970)- Can't Tax
Religion out of Existence
Church of the Holy Light of the Queen V Mukasey 615 F.Supp.2d 1210 (2009)- O
Centro case continued
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents 403 U.S. 388 (1971)- Suing
Federal Agents Ex Parte Young 209 U.S. 123 (1908)- Suing State Agents in
Federal Court Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966)- Miranda Rights
Coffin V United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895)- Innocent until proven Guilty
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015)- Right to decide who you are North
Carolina v. Pearce 395 U.S. 711 (1969)- Time Served, Double Jeopardy
United States of America, Appellee, v. Mario Biaggi, Stanley Simon, Richard Biaggi,
Peter Neglia,john Mariotta, and Bernard Ehrlich, Defendants-appellants, 909 F.2d 662
(2d Cir. 1990)-Public Corruption
Wahad v. FBI, 813 F. Supp. 224 (SDNY 1993)- Reading Mail and Listening to Phone
Calls
Struth v. FBI, 673 F. Supp. 949 (ED Wis. 1987)- FBI FOIA
Review; Hobson v. Wilson, 556 F. Supp. 1157 (D.D.C. 1982)-Civil Conspiracy
Quo Warranto in Colorado Supreme Court
Burns v. District Court of Eighteenth Judicial Dist., 356 P.2d 245 (1960)
In Re: the People of the State of Colorado, 00SA127 (Co Sup Crt 1999)

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Cuyler v. Sullivan 446 U.S. 335 (1980)
Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

4th Amendment Property Rights at Home “Right to retreat into home”, Curtilage,
Fenced area, etc. no momre Right than a Trick or Treater, must not avert gaze, but
can not go looking in Gardens and windows
Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
Weeks v. United States 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
Soldal V Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992)
Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States 251 U.S. 385 (1920)

Africa v. Commonwealth, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981) -Vegetarians & Religion in
Jail IN RE: CITY OF PHILADELPHIA LITIGATION (3rd Cir 1998) – Bombing
In Re City of Philadelphia Litigation, 938 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
Abdullah Mustafaa v. Dutton, 958 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1992)-Flesh/Blood of God
Sacramental or ceremonial material shall be provided by the chaplain or volunteer worship leader and
shall be used only in the area designated by the warden for the worship leader and shall not be in the
possession of inmates at any time. These materials include:
a. Wine or grape juice, bread or communion wafers for Christian

communion/mass; b. Wine or grape juice, matsoh, raisins, nuts, and spices for

Jewish ceremonial meals; c. Tobacco, herbs, and pipes for Native American

ceremonies; d. Incense, candles and anointing oils for all faith groups.

The Antelope, 24 U.S. 413 (1826)

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)
“It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute because
not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers. This has been often asserted, and the reports are
full of cases illustrating its application. This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the
legislator, for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an
act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it
unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act.”

Hemp Industries Association v. DEA, Nos. 03-71366, 03-71693 (2004)

"We have previously held that the definition of “THC” in Schedule I refers only to synthetic THC, and that
any THC occurring naturally within Cannabis is banned only if it falls within the Schedule I definition of
“marijuana.”...We reiterate that ruling here: in accordance with Schedule I, the DEA's relevant rules and
regulations may be enforced only insofar as they ban the presence of marijuana or synthetic THC."

United States v. ARTICLE OR DEVICE, ETC., 333 F. Supp. 357 (D.D.C. 1971)
An initial issue presented is whether the normal Food and Drug remedies, 21 U.S.C. § 334, may under any
circumstances be applied to the device when used by some as an "artifact" of a church. A law designed to afford
protection to the public against genuine evils may be used to regulate the activities of religion only if the regulation
involved is the narrowest possible remedy to achieve the legitimate non-religious end, which in this case is only to protect
the public against misrepresentation since the E-meter is harmless in itself. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.
Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963); Barnett v. Rodgers, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 296, 410 F.2d 995 (1969).
The Government argues that once a violation of the Act is established, the devices seized may be treated the
same as any other misbranded device. Since the bona fides of the religion remains unquestioned on this
record, the Government's position is an oversimplification. Here is a pseudo-science that has been adopted
and adapted for religious purposes. The literature held to make false representations, while in itself non-
religious, nevertheless comprises for some, part of the writings, teachings, and history of a religion. Those
who belong to the Church and accept its beliefs assert that many illnesses may be alleviated by religious
counseling designed to free the spirit of encumbrances. They find in the rationale and procedures of
Scientology satisfactory early explanations and techniques to implement what is essentially faith healing by
use of the E-meter. Thus they purport to read the purely secular writings of Scientology with semantic
interpretations fostered by their evolving religious doctrine. Purely scientific statements are given a
theological slant by the initiated and the occasional theological indications in the writings are given
enthusiastic exaggeration. What the layman reads as straight science fiction becomes to the believer a bit of
early imperfect scripture. The result of all this is that what may appear to the layman as a factual scientific
representation (clearly false) is not necessarily this at all when read by one who has embraced the doctrine of
the Church.

Accordingly, the Government's protestations that it is not interfering with religious practice when it seeks to condemn
the E-meter and related literature must be qualified. The Church is a religious institution protected by the First
Amendment. The E-meter is used by its ministers as part of the ritual and practice of the Church. Serious interference
indeed results if the Church is entirely prohibited from using the E-meter by condemnation or if the Court orders the
Food and Drug Administration to oversee a general rewriting of all the writings the Church purveys. Where there is a
belief in a scientific fraud there is nonetheless an interference with the religion that entertains that belief if its writings
are censored or suppressed. Similarly, if a church uses a machine harmless in itself to aid its ministers in
communicating with adherents, the destruction of that machine intrudes on religion. The dilemma cannot be resolved
by attempting to isolate purely false scientific claims from claims that have sufficient religious content to be outside
the Food and Drug laws. There is a religious substance to everything when seen with the eyes of the believer.

Each user, purchaser, and distributee of the E-meter shall sign a written statement that he has read such
warning and understands its contents and such statements shall be preserved.
Any and all literature which refers to the E-meter or to auditing, including advertisements, distributed directly or
indirectly by the seller or distributor of the E-meter or by anyone utilizing or promoting the use of the E-meter,
should bear a prominent notice printed in or permanently affixed to each item or such literature, stating that the
device known as a Hubbard Electrometer, or E-meter, used in auditing, has been condemned by *365 a United
States District Court on the grounds that the literature of Dianetics and Scientology contains false and
misleading claims of a medical or scientific nature and that the E-meter has no proven usefulness in the
diagnosis, treatment or prevention of any disease, nor is it medically or scientifically capable of improving any
bodily function. Where the notice is printed in or affixed to literature, it should appear either on the outside front
cover or on the title page in letters no smaller than 11-point type.
The E-meter should not be sold to any person or used in any counseling of any person except pursuant
to a written contract, signed by the purchaser or counselee, which includes, among other things, a
prominent notification as specified immediately above.
The effect of this judgment will be to eliminate the E-meter as far as further secular use by Scientologists
or others is concerned. E-meter auditing will be permitted only in a religious setting subject to placing
explicit warning disclaimers on the meter itself and on all labeling. The Government has requested an
opportunity to show that complete forfeiture and destruction of the E-meter is required, but the Court has
concluded that however desirable this may be in the public interest, the Court is without power to so order
in view of the protections afforded claimant and others similarly situated under the First Amendment
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)
Even the most dedicated trial judges are bound to overlook meritorious cases without the benefit of an
adversary presentation. Cf. Gardner v. California, 393 U. S. 367, 393 U. S. 369-370 (1969). In fact, one of
the consolidated cases here was initially dismissed by the same judge who later ruled for respondents,
possibly because Younger v. Gilmore was not cited.
“In order to prevent "effectively foreclosed access," indigent prisoners must be allowed to file appeals and
habeas corpus petitions without payment of docket fees. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 252, 360 U. S. 257
(1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U. S. 708 (1961). Because we recognized that "adequate and effective
appellate review" is impossible without a trial transcript or adequate substitute, we held that States must
provide trial records to inmates unable to buy them. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 351 U. S. 20 (1956).
[Footnote 8] Similarly, counsel must be appointed to give indigent inmates "a meaningful appeal" from their
convictions. Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 372 U. S. 358 (1963).
Essentially the same standards of access were applied in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483 (1969), which struck
down a regulation prohibiting prisoners from assisting each other with habeas corpus applications and other
legal matters. Since inmates had no alternative form of legal assistance available to them, we reasoned that this
ban on jailhouse lawyers effectively prevented prisoners who were "unable themselves, with reasonable
adequacy, to prepare their petitions," from challenging the legality of their confinements. Id. at 393 U. S. 489.
Johnson was unanimously extended to cover assistance in civil rights actions in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S.
539, 418 U. S. 577-580 (1974). And even as it rejected a claim that indigent defendants have a constitutional
right to appointed counsel for discretionary appeals, the Court reaffirmed that States must "assure the indigent
defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 616.
"[M]eaningful access" to the courts is the touchstone. See id. at 417 U. S. 611, 417 U. S. 612, 417 U. S. 615.”
It is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal
documents, with notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them. States must forgo
collection of docket fees otherwise payable to the treasury and expend funds for transcripts. State expenditures
are necessary to pay lawyers for indigent defendants at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963);
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972), and in appeals as of right, Douglas v. California, supra.
This would be understandable if the federal right in question were constitutional in nature. For example, the
State may be required by the Eighth Amendment to provide its inmates with food, shelter, and medical care, see
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 429 U. S. 103-104 (1976); similarly, an indigent defendant's right under the
Sixth Amendment places upon the State the affirmative duty to provide him with counsel for trials which may
result in deprivation of his liberty, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972); finally, constitutional principles of
due process and equal protection form the basis for the requirement that States expend resources in support of
a convicted defendant's right to appeal. See Douglas v. California, supra; Griffin v. Illinois, supra.
(provision of trial transcript may not be conditioned on approval of judge); Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487 (1963)
(same); Lane v. Brown, 372 U. S. 477 (1963) (public defender's approval may not be required to obtain coram nobis
transcript); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305 (1966) (unconstitutional to require reimbursement for cost of trial
transcript only from unsuccessful imprisoned defendants); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U. S. 192 (1966) (State
must provide transcript of post-conviction proceeding); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967) (State must provide
preliminary hearing transcript); Gardner v. California, 393 U. S. 367 (1969) (State must provide habeas corpus
transcript); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 458 (1969) (State must provide transcript of petty offense trial);
Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971) (State must provide transcript of nonfelony trial).

Glasser v. United States 315 U.S. 60 (1942)

“Glasser wished the benefit of the undivided assistance of counsel of his own choice. We think that such a desire
on the part of an accused should be respected. Irrespective of any conflict of interest, the additional burden of
representing another party may conceivably impair counsel's effectiveness. To determine the precise degree
of prejudice sustained by Glasser as a result of the court's appointment of Stewart as counsel for Kretske is at
once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to
allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial”

Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942)

“A petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the petitioner is imprisoned upon a conviction obtained through the
use of testimony known by the prosecuting officers to have been perjured, and through the suppression by them of
evidence favorable to him, sufficiently alleges a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and the
denial of the petition without a determination as to the truth of the allegations was error. P. 317 U. S. 216.”

Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-24 (1967)

“He traced it to sources of English common law as old as the Assize of Clarendon in 1166 and the Magna
Carta in 1215. Not only was American common law heir to the English legal tradition, but Warren also
found that many of the founding fathers were schooled in that tradition and had studied English law and
intended its rights to apply to Americans. The right to a speedy trial was guaranteed in the federal
Constitution and in many early state constitutional documents. By 1967, it was guaranteed in some fashion
by each of the 50 states. Warren called it "...one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution." “

Miranda Juarez v. DOJ/DEA, 07-5064 (DC Cir 2008)

Miranda first claims that the district court's entry of summary judgment was improper because DEA failed to
establish that FOIA Exemption 7(A) applied. That exemption protects from mandatory disclosure “records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law
enforcement records or information ․ could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.”
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). This Court has further interpreted § 552(b)(7)(A) to require a law enforcement agency
invoking the exception to show that the material withheld “relates to a concrete prospective law enforcement
proceeding.” Bevis v. Dep't of State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1389 (D.C.Cir.1986) (quoting Carson v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1018 (D.C.Cir.1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
 We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Assassination Archives & Research
Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55, 57 (D.C.Cir.2003).
We review a district court's decision whether to conduct in camera review of FOIA documents for abuse of
discretion, Horowitz v. Peace Corps, 428 F.3d 271, 282 (D.C.Cir.2005), and we have provided guidance on the
exercise of that discretion, see Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287, 1298-99 (D.C.Cir.1980), overruled on other grounds
by Founding Church of Scientology of Washington D.C., Inc. v. Smith, 721 F.2d 828 (D.C.Cir.1983).
 In this case, due to the minimal length of the documents involved, we agree with appellant that the district
court would not have abused its discretion had it chosen to review the documents in camera. See id. at 1299
(observing that an in camera review of a fifteen-page document would have offered the district court an efficient
technique for conducting its de novo review). But that does not in itself compel a conclusion that the district
court's decision not to conduct an in camera review constituted an abuse of its discretion. If a district court
believes that in camera inspection is unnecessary “to make a responsible de novo determination on the claims
of exemption,” Carter v. Dep't of Commerce, 830 F.2d 388, 392 (D.C.Cir.1987) (quoting Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d
1187, 1195 (D.C.Cir.1978)), it acts within its “broad discretion” by declining to conduct such a review, id.
The FOIA requires that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting
such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). This Circuit has long recognized,
however, that documents may be withheld in their entirety when nonexempt portions “are inextricably intertwined with
exempt portions.” Mead Data Central, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260(D.C.Cir.1977). A court may
rely on government affidavits that show with reasonable specificity why documents withheld pursuant to a
valid exemption cannot be further segregated for this reason. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the
President, 97 F.3d 575, 578 (D.C.Cir.1996).
 Here, DEA provided sufficient information in its affidavits to allow a court to affirm withholding of the
documents in toto. DEA stated that it had conducted a page-by-page review of all investigative records
contained in the requested documents, and determined that each document, and each page of each
document, contained information subject to law enforcement withholding exemptions. It justified its inability to
simply redact sensitive portions (i.e., informant names) from these documents by pointing out that the balance
of information remaining in the documents could still reveal the extent of the government's investigation, the
acts on which it is focused, what evidence of wrongdoing it is aware of, the identity of cooperating sources, and
the agency's investigative techniques in this investigation. The affidavits further attested that release of any of
this information could jeopardize the investigation. For these reasons we are satisfied that no portions of the
withheld documents may be segregated and released to appellant.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins 118 U.S. 356 (1886)

The Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Matthews, found that the administration of the statute in question
was discriminatory and that there was therefore no need to even consider whether the ordinance itself was lawful. Even
though the Chinese laundry owners were usually not American citizens , the court ruled they were still entitled to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Matthews also noted that the court had previously ruled that it was
acceptable to hold administrators of the law liable when they abused their authority. He denounced the law as a blatant
attempt to exclude Chinese from the laundry trade in San Francisco, and the court struck down the law, ordering
dismissal of all charges against other laundry owners who had been jailed.

United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987)

a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a serviceman could not file a tort action against
the federal government, even though the government secretly administered doses of LSD to the serviceman as part
of an experimental program, because his injuries were found by the lower court to be service-related.

Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979)

At 4:30 a. m. on December 4, 1969, fourteen Chicago police officers, detailed to the Special Prosecutions Unit of the
Cook County State's Attorney's Office, arrived at an apartment building located on the near west side of Chicago.
They were equipped with a search warrant issued the previous day by a judge of the Cook County Circuit Court
authorizing the search for and seizure of "sawed-off shotguns and other illegal weapons," at the first floor apartment,
2337 West Monroe Street. This apartment was occupied by nine members of the Black Panther Party ("BPP"). Seven
officers took "cover" positions at the front and rear entrances of the apartment; seven entered the apartment.
Immediately upon the police entry there was an enormous burst of gunfire. Two of the occupants, Fred Hampton and
Mark Clark, died as a result of the gunfire and four others, Ronald Satchel, Blair Anderson, Brenda Harris, and Verlina
Brewer, were wounded. Louis Truelock, Deborah Johnson, and Harold Bell escaped without physical injury.
On appeal our task is equally well established. We must consider all the evidence disregarding
conflicting, unfavorable testimony and extract all the reasonable inferences therefrom. Viewing such
evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the question is whether a prima facie
case has been presented against any of the defendants. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324
(7th Cir.), Cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070, 95 S.Ct. 657, 42 L.Ed.2d 666 (1974); Kish v. Norfolk & Western
Ry. Co., 426 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1970); Pinkowski v. Sherman Hotel, 313 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1963).
In addition to their conspiracy allegations, plaintiffs have presented a prima facie case under section 1983
against the nonshooters on the basis of their nonfeasance at the BPP apartment. This court previously
imposed liability in damages for nonfeasance in Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972). The facts in
Byrd are strikingly similar to those alleged in the case at bar. In Byrd Chicago police officers failed to deter
other officers who, in their presence, beat the plaintiff with fists and clubs. Holding that purposeful
nonfeasance of such magnitude could serve as the basis of tort liability under section 1983, we stated that
"one who is given the badge of authority of a police officer may not ignore the duty imposed by his office
and fail to stop other officers who summarily punish a third person in his presence." 466 F.2d at 11.
joint tortfeasor liability arises when persons "who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act,
actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or
ratify and adopt his acts done for their benefit are equally liable with him." Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) p. 292.
The evidence which plaintiffs presented to support their nonconspiracy theory against these defendants is
identical to that which was aimed at establishing their conspiracy claims. Accordingly, although we fail to
see the need to allege this redundant theory of recovery, we hold that plaintiffs have presented sufficient
evidence to support their joint activity claims.

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)

Nevertheless, the principles which control the application of the privilege emerge quite clearly from the available
precedents. The privilege belongs to the Government, and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor
waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be formal claim of privilege, lodged by the
head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer.
The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do
so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. The latter requirement is the
only one which presents real difficulty. As to it, we find it helpful to draw upon judicial experience in dealing with
an analogous privilege, the privilege against self-incrimination. ...here are differences in phraseology, but, in
substance, it is agreed that the court must be satisfied from all the evidence and circumstances, and
"from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or
an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result."

Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 341 U. S. 486-487 (1951). If the court is so satisfied, the
claim of the privilege will be accepted without requiring further disclosure.

Craker v. Drug Enforcement Admin., No. 09-1220 (1st Cir. 2013)

Plaintiff, a professor at the University of Massachusetts, applied to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for
registration to manufacture marijuana for clinical research. An ALJ recommended that the DEA granted Plaintiff's
application. The DEA Deputy Administrator Administrator rejected the ALJ's recommendation and denied Plaintiff's
application. The Administrator then denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. The First Circuit Court of Appeals
denied Plaintiff's petition for review, holding (1) the Court had jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's petition for review;
(2) under Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Administrator's interpretation
of the Controlled Substances Act was permissible; and (3) the Administrator's findings were reasonable
and supported by the evidence.

Linder v. United States 268 U.S. 5 (1925)

"Obviously, direct control of medical practice in the states is beyond the power of the federal government."

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)

Even respondents acknowledge the existence of an illicit market in marijuana; indeed, Raich has personally
participated in that market, and Monson expresses a willingness to do so in the future. More concretely, one concern
prompting inclusion of wheat grown for home consumption in the 1938 Act was that rising market prices could draw
such wheat into the interstate market, resulting in lower market prices. Wickard, 317 U.S., at 128. The parallel
concern making it appropriate to include marijuana grown for home consumption in the CSA is the likelihood that the
high demand in the interstate market will draw such marijuana into that market. While the diversion of homegrown
wheat tended to frustrate the federal interest in stabilizing prices by regulating the volume of commercial transactions
in the interstate market, the diversion of homegrown marijuana tends to frustrate the federal interest in eliminating
commercial transactions in the interstate market in their entirety. In both cases, the regulation is squarely within
Congress' commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or
marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity.
Gonzales v. O Centro, 546 U.S. 418 (2006)
Under RFRA’s more focused inquiry, the Government’s mere invocation of the general characteristics of Schedule I
substances cannot carry the day. Although Schedule I substances such as DMT are exceptionally dangerous, see, e.g.,
Touby v. United States, 500 U. S. 160, 162, there is no indication that Congress, in classifying DMT,
considered the harms posed by the particular use at issue.
despite the fact that everything the Government says about the DMT in hoasca applies in equal measure to the
mescaline in peyote, another Schedule I substance, both the Executive and Congress have decreed an exception
from the Controlled Substances Act for Native American religious use of peyote, see 21 CFR §1307.31; 42 U. S. C.
§1996a(b)(1). If such use is permitted in the face of the general congressional findings for hundreds of thousands of
Native Americans practicing their faith, those same findings alone cannot preclude consideration of a similar exception
for the 130 or so American members of the UDV who want to practice theirs. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 547. The Government’s argument that the existence of a congressional exemption for
peyote does not indicate that the Controlled Substances Act is amenable to judicially crafted exceptions fails because
RFRA plainly contemplates court-recognized exceptions, see §2000bb–1(c). Pp. 11–13.
Here the Government’s uniformity argument rests not so much on the particular statutory program at issue as on
slippery slope concerns that could be invoked in response to any RFRA claim for an exception to a generally
applicable law, i.e. , “if I make an exception for you, I’ll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions.” But
RFRA operates by mandating consideration, under the compelling interest test, of exceptions to “rule[s] of
general applicability.” §2000bb–1(a). Congress’ determination that the legislated test is “workable … for striking
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests,” §200bb(a)(5), finds
support in Sherbert, supra, at 407, and Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. ___, ___. While there may be instances
where a need for uniformity precludes the recognition of exceptions to generally applicable laws under RFRA, it
would be surprising to find that this was such a case, given the longstanding peyote exemption and the fact that
the very reason Congress enacted RFRA was to respond to a decision denying a claimed right to sacramental
use of a controlled substance. The Government has not shown that granting the UDV an exemption would
cause the kind of administrative harm recognized as a compelling interest in, e.g., Lee. It cannot now
compensate for its failure to convince the District Court as to its health or diversion concerns with the bold
argument that there can be no RFRA exceptions at all to the Controlled Substances Act. Pp. 13–16.
The Government argues unpersuasively that it has a compelling interest in complying with the 1971 U. N. Convention.
While this Court does not agree with the District Court that the Convention does not cover hoasca, that does not
automatically mean that the Government has demonstrated a compelling interest in applying the Controlled
Substances Act, which implements the Convention, to the UDV’s sacramental use. At this stage, it suffices that the
Government did not submit any evidence addressing the international consequences of granting the UDV an
exemption, but simply relied on two affidavits by State Department officials attesting to the general (and undoubted)
importance of honoring international obligations and maintaining the United States’ leadership in the international war
on drugs. Under RFRA, invocation of such general interests, standing alone, is not enough. Pp. 16–18.

Washington v. Sessions, et al 1:17-cv-05625

Argument against Marijuana Prohibition denied because Plaintiffs failed to go through the DEA
Administrative Process

Olsen V DEA 878 F.2d 1458, 279 D.C. 1, 58 USLW 2023

"In an effort to prompt a response from the DEA, Olsen unsuccessfully sued in the Eleventh Circuit to
compel agency action. Olsen v. DEA, 776 F.2d 267 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming district court's dismissal of
Olsen's complaint), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1030, 106 S.Ct. 1236, 89 L.Ed.2d 344 (1986). Thereafter, in
January 1986, Olsen petitioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for a writ of mandamus,
and that court, in March 1986, directed the DEA to show cause why the writ should not issue."

United States v. Forbes, 806 F. Supp. 232 (D. Colo. 1992)

Finally, courts must construe criminal statutes narrowly in favor of lenity to the accused. United States v. Enmons, 410
U.S. 396, 411, 93 S. Ct. 1007, 1015, 35 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1973); Mahn v. Gunter, 978 F.2d 599 (10th Cir.1992), (Rule of
lenity is a doctrine of last resort in statutory construction). Although it is not necessary to apply this rule as a last
resort, its application yields a result entirely consistent with defendants' construction. The two-pronged definition not
only promotes lenity in this prosecution, but narrows future analogue prosecutions to only those cases where the
substance has a chemical structure substantially similar to a schedule I or II controlled substance.
Therefore, I hold that a substance may be a controlled substance analogue only if it satisfies clause (i) and clauses (ii)
or (iii).

The void for vagueness doctrine stems from the Fifth Amendment's constitutional guarantee of due
process. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 127, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926).
"[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first
essential of due process of law." Id. See also, Hejira Corp. v. MacFarlane, 660 F.2d 1356, 1365 (10th
Cir.1981), (The words of a penal statute must "be clear and beyond speculation").
It is undisputed that there is no scientific consensus whether AET has a chemical structure that is substantially similar to
DMT or DET. The government's own chemists cannot agree on this point, and the U.S. attorneys' office once before declined
to prosecute defendant Forbes for the very conduct that is charged here. The scientific community cannot even agree on a
methodology to use to determine structural similarity. Thus, unlike the meaning of cocaine base or the boundaries of a
military reservation, a defendant cannot determine in advance of his contemplated conduct whether AET is or is not
substantially similar to a controlled substance. See, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, ___ U.S. ___, ___
_ ___, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2722, 115 L. Ed. 2d 888, 906-907 (1991), ("In the context before us, these
terms have no settled usage or tradition of interpretation in law"). Indeed, based on the prior refusal to
prosecute Forbes, these defendants believed that AET was not a controlled substance analogue. To
this day, AET is freely available for purchase through the U.S. mails, and the government has not
scheduled it as a controlled substance throughout the drug's 30 year existence.
[T]he term "controlled substance analogue" in § 813 is clearly and specifically defined.... It provides
adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited. The statute makes plain that drugs which have been
chemically designed to be similar to controlled substances, but which are not themselves listed on
the controlled substance schedules, will nonetheless be considered as schedule I substances....

Granberry, 916 F.2d at 1010, (emphasis added). Upjohn developed AET in 1960 as a prescription anti-
depressant. Obviously, it was not "chemically designed to be similar to controlled substances."

Normaco v. DEA, 375 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

Second, Noramco contends the DEA's interpretation is inconsistent with the CSA's legislative history and with the
testimony before the ALJ by a former DEA administrator. The statements Noramco cites, however, simply reflect a
concern that the marketing of Schedule I and II controlled substances not be so broadened as to enhance the risk of
diversion. See Pet'r Br. (02-1211) at 42 -44 (quoting S.Rep. No. 91-613 at 7 (1969) (explaining that section 823(a)(1)
addresses "concern ... that parts of [the CSA] ... may tend to expand the commerce in controlled dangerous
substances, particularly narcotics, possibly adding to the danger of diversion and leading to unfavorable changes in
the price structures of these substances") (first ellipsis added); CSA, Hearings before the Subcomm. to Investigate
Juvenile Delinquency of Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 261-62 (1969) (Statement of Attorney Gen. Mitchell)
("[T]here is no intention on the part of the Justice Department nor the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs by
this provision to expand beyond necessity ... any manufacturers in this particular area"); id. at 371 (Statement of Dep't
of Justice) ("If evidence indicates that additional licensing will result in more reasonable prices with no significant
diminution in the effectiveness of drug control, the Attorney General should be able to license the additional
manufacturers.")); Pet'r Br. (02-1211) at 40 (quoting testimony of former DEA Administrator Peter Bensinger) ("Given
the intent of the law and regulations to limit the number of registrants, in administering the law one must accept that
not all qualified persons who seek to register are entitled to be registered.... The public interest is served by
limiting the access to NRMS to a much smaller number of companies than would be appropriate in a free market.").
That concern is not in play where, as here, the DEA affirmatively finds that diversion is effectively controlled. Noramco
next contends that the DEA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not requiring that Johnson Matthey submit "concrete"
plans for how it will import and process NRMs (specifically regarding the technology it will use, the amount and
identity of NRMs imported, the kind of plant it will construct, the technical expertise of its employees and its
commitment to spend sufficient funds). Noramco asserts that by failing to do so the DEA held Johnson Matthey to a
"lower standard of proof" than it imposed when it granted the registration application of McNeilab, Inc. in 1981. Pet'r
Br. (02-1211) 57. We see no material difference in the DEA's treatment of the two applicants. McNeilab's
application was approved "contingent upon the successful completion of all necessary and pertinent actions outlined
in the applications, such as the construction of a secure manufacturing facility, and upon the ultimate approval of
those actions by the Drug Enforcement Administration." McNeilab, Inc., 46 Fed.Reg. 22,089 (DEA Apr. 15, 1981)
(grant of registration; adopting findings of fact and conclusions of law from McNeilab, Inc, Docket No. 78-12 (Aug. 20,
1980)). This is substantially what the DEA did in approving Johnson Matthey's application "upon Johnson
Matthey's providing to DEA, prior to the receipt of the first shipment of NRMs, sufficient information concerning
its facilities and procedures contingent upon the successful completion of all necessary and pertinent actions
outlined in the applications, such as the construction of a secure manufacturing facility, and upon the ultimate
approval of those actions by the Drug Enforcement Administration." 67 Fed.Reg. at 39,045. In each case, the
DEA withheld final approval pending the applicant's completion of its facilities and the DEA's ultimate approval
thereof. Noramco complains in particular that the DEA did not require that Johnson Matthey, as McNeilab was
required to do, provide a "concrete business plan calling for the importation of opium and the construction of a
plant capable of converting opium into APIs." Pet'r Br. (02-1211) at 58. Unlike McNeilab, however, Johnson
Matthey was already in the business of importing and manufacturing controlled substances and had facilities in
place for doing so. Given Johnson Matthey's experience and its pre-existing facilities, the DEA reasonably
required less detailed specifications in advance of Jackson Matthey's proposed expansion.

New York v. Phillips (N.Y.Ct.Gen.Sess.1813)

People v. Smith (N.Y. 1817)
New York v. Smith, 2 City Hall Recorder 77 (1817)
In re: Verplank,329 F.Supp 433,435 (C.D.Cal1971)
"(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.

"(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties.
"(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.

"(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." (emphasis in original).

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)

Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized that person. United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975).

Largent v. Texas 318 U.S. 418 (1943)

held that a city ordinance of Paris, Texas requiring permits in order to solicit orders for books is
unconstitutional as applied to the distribution of religious publications.

Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052 (1972)

The petitioner has now sought federal habeas corpus relief, claiming that the sheriff's dual role as key prosecution
witness and jury bailiff and his substantial association with the jurors during the trial infringed the petitioner's right to
due process of law under the doctrine of Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466. In Turner two deputy sheriffs served
identical dual roles as prosecution witnesses and jury custodians, testifying as to the circum- [405 U.S. 1052 , 1054]

Yates v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1074 (2015)

a provision added to the federal criminal code by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to criminalize the destruction
or concealment of "any record, document, or tangible object" to obstruct a federal investigation. By a 5-
to-4 vote, the Court stated that the term "tangible object" as used in this section means an object used
to record or preserve information, and that this did not include fish.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)

Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that, in the administration of the criminal law, the end
justifies the means -- to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal -- would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.

Rule 23. Class Actions

(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class
28 U.S. Code § 2254 - State custody; remedies in Federal courts

USC Title 42 Chapter 21A- Privacy Protection

USC Title 42 Chapter 21B- Religious Freedom Restoration Act
USC Title 42 Chapter 21C- Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act USC Title 42 Chapter 21E- Privacy and Civil Rights Protection & Oversight
Title 42 USC 1996- Protection and Preservation of Traditional Religions of Native
Americans Title 42 USC 1996a- Traditional Indian use of Peyote

Title 28 USC 144- Bias or Prejudice of Judge

Title 28 USC 351- Complaints; Judge Defined
Title 28 USC 455- Disqualification of Justice, Judge or Magistrate
Title 18 USC 242- Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law
Title 18 USC 241- Conspiracy Against Rights
Title 18 USC 245- Federally Protected Activities
Title 18 USC 246- Deprivation of Relief Benefits
Title 42 USC 1985- Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights
Title 18 USC 1964- Civil Remedies
Title 42 USC 1986- Action for Neglecting to Prevent

Title 42 USC 1989- US Magistrates; Appointment of Persons to Execute Warrants

Title 42 USC 1990- Marshal to Obey Precepts; Refusing to receive or Execute
Process Title 42 USC 1991- Fees; Persons appointed to Execute Process

USC Title 18 Chapter 95- Racketeering

USC Title 18 Chapter 96- RICO
USC Title 18 Chapter 101- Records and Reports
USC Title 18 Chapter 109- Searches and Seizures
USC Title 18 Chapter 120- ECPA
USC Title 18 Chapter 121- Stored Wire and Electronic Communications
USC Title 18 Chapter 123- Prohibition on release of certain State Motor Vehicle
Records USC Title 18 Chapter 211- Jurisdiction and Venue
USC Title 21- Food & Drugs

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine

Doctrine of Commanding Precedent
Overbreadth Doctrine
Exhaustion of Remedies Doctrine
Presumption of Innocence
Reasonable Doubt
Standard of Review
Supremacy Clause
Due Process Clause
Assistance of Counsel Clause
Impartial Jury Clause
Compulsory Clause
Compulsory Process Clause
Vesting Clauses
Case or Controversy Clause
Benefit of Assumption
Burden of Proof

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71
(1948). Article 18

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar.
23, 1976. Article 18

Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on

Religion or Belief, G.A. res. 36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/684
(1981). Article 1, Article 2, Article 4, Article 6 (definitely pay attention to sections C & H), Article 7

Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief (1986)

Mandate

Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 1993). Compilation
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 35 (1994).
2, 3, 4

Colorado Federal Clerk

901 19th Street
Denver, CO 80294

10th Cir Federal Appellate Clerk

1823 Stout Street
Denver, CO 80257
DC District Court
333 Constitution Avenue N.W.
Washington D.C. 20001

Easter Texas Federal Court

7940 Preston Road Rm 101
Plano, Texas 75024

5th Cir Federal Appellate Clerk

600 S. Maestri Place
New Orleans, LA 70130-3408

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

200 17th St NW,
Washington, DC 20006

FISA Court
145 N St NE Rm #2W115
Washington, DC 20530

Colorado State District Court

1437 Bannock Street
Room 256 (Clerk's Office) Room 431 (Jury)
Denver, CO 80202

Colorado Supreme Court

2 East 14th Avenue.
Denver, CO 80203

DC Federal District Court

333 Constitution Ave NW,
Washington, DC 20001

Judicial Complaint # …..............

Gallagher v. United States, et al …...........
Gallagher v. NSA, 1:2018cv01525
Gallagher v. DEA, 1:2018cv01674
Gallagher v. FDA, …...............
Gallagher v. Paxton, et al 4:2018cv00575
Gallagher v. Austin PD1:2016cv00527
Gallagher v. Austin PD, 5th Cir request for Writ 18-50652
Gallagher v. DEA, et al 5th Cir request for Writ 18-10407
Gallagher v. DEA, et al 3:2017cv00734
Gallagher v. YouTube, et al 1:2018cv01694
Gallagher v. Bitcointalk.org, …......
Request for Writ 1:2018cv02263
Gallagher v. Organization of American States, 1:2018cv02046
Gallagher v. DNC, et al 1:2018cv02029
Gallagher v. FBI, 1:2018cv01697
Gallagher v. CO DoR, et al 1:2018cv01699
Gallagher v. ATF, 1:2018cv01693
Gallagher v. DEA, 1:2016cv01117
Filing Rule 83(a)(2)- Unwillingly not using proper forms

"It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions
to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out,
were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were
consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard
against the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be
guarded against." -James Madison, when Introducing the Bill of Rights

The 9th Amendment

"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."

“Commonwealth is ‘a society of men constituted for preser[ving] their civil <rights> interests.’
interests are ‘life, health, indolency of body, liberty, property.’ the magistrate’s jurisdn. extends
only to civil rights and from these considns.: the magistrate has no power but wt. ye. people
gave hm. the people hv. nt. givn. hm. <powr.> the care of souls bec. y cd. nt., y. cd. nt.
because no man hs. right to abandon ye. care of his salvation to another. no man has power
to let another prescribe his faith. faith is not faith witht. believing. no man can conform his
faith to the dictates of another. the life & essence of religion consists in the internal
persuasion or belief of the mind. external forms [of wor]ship, when against our belief, are
hypocrisy [and im]piety. Rom.14.23. ‘he that doubteth is damned, if he eat, because he
eateth not of faith: for whatsoever is not of faith is sin.’ if it be said the magistrate may make
use of a[rguments] and so draw the heterodox to truth: I [answer] every man has a
commission to admonish, exhort, convince another of error. [a church] is ‘a voluntary society
of men, joining [themselves] together of their own accord, in order to the [publick]
worshipping of god in such a manner as they judge [accept]able to him & effectual to the
salvation of their souls. [it is] voluntary because no man is by nature bound to any church. the
hopes of salvation is the cause of his entering into it. if he find any thing wrong in it, he
[sh]ould be as free to go out as he was to come in.
[w]hat is the power of that church &c.? as it is a society <of voluntary> it must have some
laws for it’s regulation. time & place of meeting, admitting & excluding members &c. must be
regulated. but as it was a spontaneous joining of members, it follows that it’s laws extend to
it’s own members only, not to those of any other voluntary society: for then by the same rule
some other voluntary society might usurp power <of> over them. Christ has said
‘wheresoever 2 or 3 are gatherd. togeth. in his name he will be in the midst of them.’ this is
his definition of a society. he does not make it essential that a bishop or presbyter govern
them. without them it suffices for the salvation of souls. from the dissensions among sects
themselves arises necessarily a right of chusing & necessity of deliberating to which we will
conform. but if we chuse for ourselves, we must allow others to chuse also, & so reciprocally.
this establishes religious liberty.”
-Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, 11 October–9 December 1776

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).
Article 18
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23,
1976.
Article 18

Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on

Religion or Belief, G.A. res. 36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/684
(1981).
Article 1, Article 2, Article 4, Article 6 (definitely pay attention to sections C & H), Article 7

Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief (1986)

Mandate

Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 1993).
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 35 (1994).
2, 3, 4

"Before there were intelligent beings, they were possible; they had therefore possible
relations, and consequently possible laws. Before laws were made, there were relations of
possible justice. To say that there is nothing just or unjust, but what is commanded or
forbidden by positive laws, is the same as saying that, before the describing of a circle, all the
radii were not equal." -Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, in
"The Spirit of the Laws"

“VII. If the Creature is thus limited in his actions, being able to do only such Things as God
would have him to do, and not being able to refuse doing what God would have done; then
he can have no such thing as Liberty, Free-Will, or Power to do or refrain from an Action.
By Liberty is sometimes understood the absence of Opposition; and in this Sense, indeed, all
our Actions may be said to be the Effects of our Liberty: But it is the Liberty of the same
Nature with the Fall of a heavy Body to the Ground; it has Liberty to fall, that is, it meets with
nothing to hinder its Fall, but at the same Time it is necessitated to fall, and has no Power or
Liberty to remain suspended.” -Benjamin Franklin in “A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity,
Section 1 'of Liberty and Necessity', #VII