NOTES ON THE MISSTION “GEM INTERVENTION”

The demo mission "Gem intervention" contains the options boards built by planning
staff at HQ AFNORTH early in 2003 during the Mission Analysis phase of NATO
exercise Allied Action 03.

Staff built these options boards in a two-day planning and analysis session headed by
a flag officer standing in for the Operational Commander. The analysis was not part of
the Operational Planning Process, though conducted by officers involved in the OPP.
Instead, it was an experimental trial of Confrontation and Collaboration Analysis
(CCA) carried out in parallel to the OPP, just prior to presentation of the Mission
Brief.

The purpose of the experiment was to judge the utility of CCA techniques in planning
a typical post-conflict operation – the kind of operation where “victory” is achieved
through a sequence of confrontations with non-compliant (or actively hostile) parties.

The staff involved were not well-trained in Confrontation Analysis. As a result, once
they had built the options boards they were unsure what to conclude from them. At
this point the experimental trial was compromised by the intervention of certain
observers pointing out what to do next. This intervention not only compromised the
trial; it further confused the staff.

The difficulty that the staff found in drawing conclusions shows the need for a
program like Confrontation Manager, which can draw conclusions from assumptions
made by analysts not exceptionally well-trained in CCA. This is demonstrated by the
"Gem intervention" demo, which reproduces the exact assumptions made by
AFNORTH staff. It shows exactly what their input would have generated, had the
program been available to them.

It may be less immediately clear how the conclusions generated would have helped
staff to build a confrontational plan. Briefly, the answer is as follows:

 The conclusions show what kind of messages party A must send to each party
B in order to resolve the dilemmas A faces with respect to B.
 The “offensive” plan of the Operational Commander would have consisted of
sending messages to resolve the dilemmas faced by the party GFOR (Gem
Force) and its allies that shared its objectives. These messages would have
been sent in various ways – eg, through actions that “send a message”, through
meetings with non-compliant parties, through PI, through CIMIC and so on.
 The commander’s “defensive” plan would have consisted of countering
messages sent by OPFOR parties to resolve their dilemmas.

The “Gem intervention” interactions

1. “Pre-intervention interaction”

This options board models the interaction between the GFOR commander, the troop-
contributing countries Westernland, Midlands and Britland, and the host nations,
Coral and Opal, over the aims and conduct of the NATO/UN intervention. The
purpose of the analysis was to look at the conflicting political agendas that had
generated the intervention so as to enable the GFOR commander to design his mission
in accordance with the wishes (conflicting and unclear though they were) of his
political masters.

Accordingly, the options given to GFOR represent various ways of conducting the
mission.

The other options are not particularly important. An experienced analys would have
known already that parties would sign up to options like “contribute troops” and agree
not to “give national direction” (which means dictating the policies of their forces
directly, rather than through the NATO command structure – something they are likely
to do, but in secret). Signing up to “provide HNS (Host Nation Support)” and
“comply with GFAP” (GFAP being the General Framework Agreement for Peace that
parties had already signed) are also obvious choices. Parties may not mean these
policies; but they are more or less guaranteed to proclaim them. Similarly, it’s obvious
that the Civil Actors (ie, NGOs) will “continue humanitarian assistance” and
“cooperate with GFOR” – while refusing to obey the wish of other parties that they
should not try to “influence politics”. The only analytic contribution at this point is to
make clear how little use it is for others to demand or require commitments which, if
made, could not be relied upon. This becomes clear from the conclusions
(cooperation and trust dilemmas) generated by the question marks on the board.

Whether Coral will agree to “press CUF (the Coralese Unification Force) to stop
violence” is less clear – and much more important. The war that has just concluded
was over whether the Coralese in Southern Opal should break away and unite with
Coral. Coral actually invaded Opal to force this unification. It has now agreed to
withdraw – but its relations with the CUF and its intentions for this terrorist/guerilla
force are crucial to the re-establishment of peace and security. However, at this stage
Coral will do no more than sound ambivalent over this option.

It is over the question “How to deal with Coral and the CUF” that the troop-
contributing nations differ – and are trying to give conflicting mandates to the GFOR
commander. Westernland regards the CUF as terrorists supported by a tyrannical
regime (Coral) that has invaded a democracy (Opal). GFOR therefore should not
“negotiate with the CUF”. It should “fight to eliminate the CUF”. Midland and
Britland, on the other hand, are more inclined to see the Coralese in Southern Opal as
a minority oppressed by a rightwing regime (Opal). Hence GFOR should “negotiate
with the CUF” (who represent the genuine grievances of the Coralese), and not “fight
to eliminate the CUF”.

Both sides agree, however, that GFOR should “press Coral to stop support of CUF”
and “press Coral to treat the Coralese minority fairly”.

What, in these circumstances, should the GFOR commander take as his mandate? The
analysis found that, by “leaving open” his first two options (“negotiating with the
CUF” and/or “fighting to eliminate the CUF”) the commander would be taking a
position that was compatible with those of all the troop-contributing nations. Thus it
was compatible with those of all his political masters – even though they disagreed
with each other. At the same time, this position would giving him freedom of
manoeuvre in dealing with the confrontations he would face in Gem.

The important part of this analysis, from this viewpoint, is in its conclusions regarding
Compatibility.

2. “Separation of forces”

Mission Analysis had defined two broad objectives for GFOR. One was “Separation
of Forces” by ensuring the withdrawal of Coralese and Opalese from a Zone of
Separation. The other was providing a “Safe and Secure Environment”, something
which largely depended on dealing with the CUF and its supporters in Coral.

The analysis at AFNORTH was, of course, done ahead of time, several months before
forces would actually land in Gem. Looking ahead in this way, it was not possible to
see the detailed problems that Separation of Forces might entail. This options board
sets out what could be foreseen. It is therefore quite symmetrical and general.

GFOR, it was clear, would have to “issue separation instructions” to Opal and Coral
in specific, detailed form. It would then have to “assess separation” and “enforce
separation” as necessary. There was agreement, in principle, by the Opalese and
Coralese governments that their defence ministries would then “direct and control
withdrawal/cantonment of forces”.

This agreement is shown in the options board, together with question marks as to
whether the Opalese and Coralese governments would in fact give such directions to
their forces – or whether each might not give instructions to delay withdrawal,
suspecting the other of doing so.

These suspicions result in the cooperation and trust dilemmas that are the significant
conclusions of this analysis.

3. “Safe and secure environment”

Staff’s assumptions about the issues surrounding the CUF generate, through the
Confrontation Manager program, complex and interesting conclusions.

These, as said, depend on assumptions made months before deployment. But they
show the wisdom of the adage, “It is essential to plan, even though no plan survives
the first engagement”. It was clearly essential to plan on the lines of these
conclusions, even though the assumptions on which they were based were doubtful.

This options board omits some of the parties and options actually assumed at
AFNORTH in order to concentrate on the more important ones. The options board
that follows (“Safe and secure environment (expanded model)” gives the full array of
parties and options.

In order to achieve a “Safe and secure environment”, GFOR (with its allies the UN
High Representative and other members of the International Community) had to bring
Opal, Coral and the CUF into compliance with its position. Opal’s policy (as
projected at AFNORTH) was to go all out to crush the CUF, while violating human
rights (despite their own declared position) and ignoring the wishes of the Coralese
minority. Their position was “fight to eliminate the CUF” and “not share power with
the Coralese minority”. By their actions, they violated human rights. GFOR’s
position, shared by the UN, was to weaken support for CUF terrorism by getting Opal
to “share power with the Coralese minority” and not to “fight to eliminate the CUF”
(“aim to neutralize the CUF” was GFOR’s preferred option).

These were the problems in bringing Opal into line. Coral, on the other hand, was out
of compliance with the position of the International Community in its policy of
supporting the CUF and resisting GFOR’s position of pressing it not to and aiming to
neutralize the CUF. The CUF’s non-compliance went further than this, involving
continued terrorism.

Which should be brought into line first, and how? The conclusions set out what needs
to be done to bring each non-compliant party into line, but do not say which non-
compliant should be tackled first – they merely raise this question.

Further planning would have looked at this by looking at the measures necessary to
bring, say, Opal into agreement with the International Community; then at the
measures necessary to bring Coral into line, assuming Opal is on board; then, finally,
looking at the pressures that the CUF could be subjected to, assuming Coral as well as
Opal is compliant.

4. “Safe and secure environment (expanded model)”

This model adds a few details to the previous one, without affecting the main
conclusions. Civil Actors (NGOs) and UNCIVPOL are assumed to be part of the
International Community coalition. One particular NGO supported the CUF so firmly
that it was definitely not part of this coalition, but rather tended to form a coalition
with the CUF.