By the lame Author

THE LOGIC OF SCIElfrIilC

(Hutchinson
DISCOVERY
of London)
THE OPEI{ SOCIETY
THE POVERTY OT HISTORICISM
(Routkdge €d Kegan Paut)
AI\D ITS ENEMIES
ooNJECTURES AND RETUTATTONS
(Routlcdgc €l Kegan Paul)
by K. R. POPPER

Volume II
THE HIGH TIDE OF PROPHECY:
HEGEL, MARX,
AND THE AFTERMATH

LONDON
ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL
 ( lttnlrBn THE AUTONOMY OF SOfiOLOGY
A concise formulation of Marx's opposition to psychologism r,
i,e, tr-r the plausible doctrine that all laws of social life must be
ultirnutely reducible to the psychological laws of ' human nature ',
lr lrir famous epigram : ' It is not the consciousness of man that
rlrtr':rmines his existence-rather, it is his social existence that
rlelerrnines his consciousness.' a The function of the present
rlrnlrter as well as of the two following ones is mainly to elucidate
llrlr epigram. And I may state at once that in developing what
I lrelicve to be Marx's anti-psychologism, I am developing a view
tu which I subscribe myself,
As an elementary illustration, and a first step in our examin-
alLrn, we may refer to the problem of the so-called rules of
€xnl{irmy, i.e. the problem of explaining the wide distribution,
Rtn(|ng the most diverse cultures, of marriage laws apparently
rlrnigncd to prevent inbreeding. Mill and his psychologistic
rllrool of sociology (it was joined later by many psychoanalysts)
worrld try to explain these rules by an appeal to' human nature ',
ftrr instance to some sort of instinctive aversion against incest
(rlevcloped perhaps through natural selection, or else through
' rrlrrcssion') ; and something like this would also be the naive
lrr lropular explanation. Adopting the point of view expressed
ir Marx's epigram, however, one could ask whether it is not the
lt lrer way round, that is to say, whether the apparent instinct
lr rrot rather a product of education, the effect ratlter than the
t'errse of the social rules and raditions demanding exogamy and
firrlridding incest 3. It is clear that these two approaches
lorrespond exactly to the very ancient problem whether social
lnws are 'natural' or ' conventional' (dealt with at length in
r,lrupter 5). In a question such as the one chosen here as an
lllrrstration, it would be difficult to determine which of the two
llrcories is the correct one, the explanation of the traditional
ror:itl rules by instinct or the explanation of an apparent instinct
lry traditional social rules. The possibility of deciding such
rlrrcstions by experiment has, however, been shown in a similar
lure, that of the apparently instinctive aversion to snakes. This
nversion has a greater semblance of being instinctive or ' natural '
irr that it is exhibited not only by men but also by all anthropoid
ngrcs and by most monkeys as well. But experiments seem to
8g

J
go MARX'S METHOD
indicate that this fear is conventional. It appears to be a
of education, not only in the human race but also for instarl(
"fri-put
r"o, since '6oth you-ng children-and you.nq :h|rnptf
who have t oi b"", taught to fear snakes do not exhibit the
instinct. This exampli should be taken as a warnihg'
faced here with an aversidn which is apparently universal,
bevond the human race. But although from the fact thi
lutia ir not univirsql we might perhaps argue against its b
based on an instinct\(but even this argument is dangerousr!
there are *.,.id
therc thJ suppression of instirlr
crst6'ms enforcing the
social cus!6ms instiri
*" t"" that the is certiinly not true' The uniy4
occurrence of a "/rrr"rt"
certain behaviour is not a decisive argumorl
favour of its instinctive character, or of its being rooted in '
nature t.t.
Such considerations may show how naive it is to assume
all social laws must be derivable, in principle, from the psychol
of o human nature'. But this analysis is still rather crude'
order to proceed one step further, we Tay ]ty t-o analyse
directly tfre main thesis ofpsychologism, the doctrine that,.s
being ihe product of intericting minds, social laws must ultimt
f" ,Ja,r"iUte to psychological laws, since the events of social:
including its cinventions, must be -the outcome of mot
springin[ from the minds of individuul.*t':,
' eluiist this doctrine of psycholgSilm, the defenders of)
6.
aotorr"o*oos sociology can advance inltitutionali.rf views
oHAPTER r4: TrrE AUTONOMY OFSOCTOLOGY 9r
lFucture (they may prefer the fashionable word 'pattern') of
6a rocial environment, as opPosed to the natural environment,
L man-made ; and therefore it must be explicable in terms of
lUmon nature, in accordance with the doctrine of psychologism.
lOr instance, the characteristic institution which economists call
t the market ', and whose functioning is the main object of their
ltuclics, can be derived in the last analysis from the psychology
Of economic man', or, to use 'I\{ill's phraseology, from the
t
Erychological 'phenomena . . of the pursuit of wealth'
0'
lilorcou"i, the followers of psychologism insist that it is because
cf the peculiar psychological structure of human nature that
lnttitutions play Juch an important r6le in our society, and that,
gncc established, they show a tendency to become a traditional
'i fficl a comparatively fixed part of our environment. Finally-
t lnd this is iheir decisive point-the origin as well as the deuelopment
gf fiaditions must be explicable in terms of human nature.
;
W[en tracing back traditions and institutions to their origin,
Wc must find that their introduction is explicable in psychological
terms, since they have been introduced by man for some purpose
gr other, and under the influence of certain motives. And even
lf these motives have been forgotten in the course of time, then
that forgetfulness, as well as our readiness to Pu! uP with
lnttitutions whose purpose is obscure, is in its turn based on human
n&ture. Thus 'all phenomena of society are phenomena of
-X Ituman nature' as Mill said ; and' the Laws of the phenomena
?,

can point out, firstif all, that no action can ever be expla
Uy ,iroti"" alone ; if motives- (or any. other psychologicz
behaviourist concepts) are to be used in the explanation, d
they must be supplemented-by a.reference to tle gertt
situation, and espeiially to the environment' In the case
human actions, ihis environment is very largely of a^ so(
nature ; thus our actions cannot be explained without referq
;; ;;, social environment, to social institutions and to tt
manner of functioning. It is therefore impossible, -th-e in$f
tionalist may contendito reduce sociology to a psychologrclli
U"fru"io"titiic a"atysis of our actions ; rather, every such uo'ly!
pr"t"ppot"t sociology, *E"! therefore caTno! wholly {"p"19-!
iry"f,i"Lsi"al analylis. Sociology, or at least a very
importgr
part of it, must be autonornous.
' Against this view, the followers of psychologism r . may -^;r
reto
that ihey are quite ready to admit th.e great
iTPotP":".i
en ironmental iactors, whether natural or social ; but
of society are, and can be, nothing but the laws of the actions
and pasiions of human beings', that is to say, 'the laws of'
lndividual human nature. Men are not, when brought together,
converted into another kind of substance . .'8
This last remark of Mill's exhibits one of the most praiseworthy
Arpccts of psychologism, namely, its saneopposition to- collectivism
e,i.l holir-,-iis refusal to be impressed by Rousseau's or Hegel's
romanticism--by a general will or a national spirit, or perhaps, by
a group mind. Psychologism is, I believe, correct only in so far as
It insisis upon what may be called ' methodological individualism '
ar oppos.d to ' methodological collectivism' ; it rightly insists
that-the 'behaviour' and the ' actions' of collectives, such as'
Itates or social groups, must be reduced to the behaviour. and to,
the actions of human individuals. But the belief that the choice
of such an individualistic method implies the choice of a psycho-
logical method is mistaken (as will be shown belowin thischapter),
evin though it may aPPear very convincing at first sight. And
o.s.r.n.-vol. rr D
92 MARX,S MET}IoD
that psychologism as such moves on rather dangerous
apart from its commendable individualistic method, can be
from some further passages of Mill's argument. For they
that psltchologi.sm isforced to adopt historici,st methods, The
reduce the facts of our social environment to psychological
forces us into speculations about origins and de
When analysing Plato's sociology, we had 4n
gauging the dubious merits of such an approachlto-social sci
(compare chapter 5). In criticizing Mill, we sfrafl now tr
deal it a decisive blow. / yGrsion of the 'iocial contract'*is not only an historical myth,
It is undoubtedly Mill's psychologism *}/"h forces him
adopt a historicist method ; and he is even vaguely aware of
barrenness or poverty of historicism, since he tries to account
this barrenness by pointing out the difficulties arising from
tremendous complexity of the interaction of so many
minds. 'While it is . . imperative', he says, '. . never
inftoduce any generalization . . into the social sciences
sufficient grounds can be pointed out in human nature, I do
think any one will contend that it would have been
setting out from the principle of human nature and frorn
general circumstances of the position of our species, to
a priori the order in which human development must take pla
and to predict, consequently, the general facts of history up
the present time.' 0 The reason he gives is that ' after the first
terms of the series, the influence exercised over each genera
by the generations which preceded it becomes . . more
more preponderant over all other influences'. (In other
the social environment becomes a dominant influence.) t
long a series of actions and reactions . . could not possibly
computed by human faculties .'
This argument, and especially Mill's remark on 'the first
terms of the series ', ate a striking revelation of the weakness
the psychologistic version of historicism. If all regularities
social life, the laws of our social environment, of all instituti
etc., are ultimately to be explained by, and reduced to,
' actions and passions of human beings ', then such an
forces upon us not only the idea of historico-causal
but also the idea of the first steps of such a development.
the stress on the psychological origin ofsocial rules or institu
can only mean that they can be traced back to a state when
introduction was dependent solely upon psychological fact
or more precisely, when it was independent of any establis
crrAP'rER 14 : THE AUTONOIIIY OF SOCIOLOGY 93
Fcial institutions. Psychologism is thus forced, whether it likes it
Er not, to operate with the idea of a beginning of society, and with the
Hea of a hlman nature and a human psychology as they existed
Dtlor to society. In other words, Mill's remark concerning the
| f,rut fe* terms of the series' of social development is not an
lccidental slip, as one might perhaps believe, but the appropriate
ixpression of the desperite position forced upon him.- It is a
deiperate position because this theory of- a pre-social human
nAture whiih explains the foundation of society-a psychologistic
but also, as it were, a methodological myth. It can hardly be
lOriously discussed, for we have every reason to believe that man
0r rathir his ancestor was social prior to being human (consider-
[ng, fcrr example, that language PresuPposes society)' But this
lniiiti.s that social institutlons, and with them, typical social
togularities or sociological laws
10, must have existed prior to what
rome people are pleased to call 'human nature', and to human
orvcholoei. If a reduction is to be attempted at all, it would
llrerefor."t" more hopeful to attempt a reduction or interpreta-
tlon of psychology in terms of sociology than the other.way round.
Thi trings Iis back to Marx's epigram at the tieginning of
thh chapter. Men-i.e. human minds, the needs, the -hopes,
lbnra, and expectations, the motives and aspirations -of human
lndividuals-are, if anything, the product of life in society rather
than its creators. It must be admitted that the structure of our
EClal environment is man-made in a certain sense I that its
lnttitutions and traditions are neither the work of God nor of
hgture, but the results of human actions and decisions, and alter-
rblc by human actions and decisions. But this does not mean
thet they are all consciously designed, and explicable-in terms of
Iceds, hopes, or motives. On the contrary, even those which
lrlre as tle-result of conscious and intentional human actions
lfc, as a rule, the indirect, the unintended and dten the_unwanled.blt-
broducts of sucit. actions, ' Only a minority of social institutions
ire .onr.iously designed, while the vast majority have,just
il grown ", as ihe undesigned results of human actions', as I have
mih befori rr ; and we cit add that even most of the few institu-
tlons which were consciously and successfully designed (say, a
licwly founded University, or a Trade Union) do not turn out
to plan-again because of the uRintended social reper-
rccoidirg-resuiting
GU[ions from their intentional creation. For their
cretrtion affects not only many other social institutions but also
I
94 MARx's r\(ETHoD
n
human nature'-h6ps5, fears, and ambitions, first of those
immediately involved, and later often of all members of
society. One of the consequences of this is that the moral
-of a society-the demands and proposals recognizedby all,
or
very nearly all, of its members-are closely bound'up with
institutions and traditions, and that they cannot survive
.destruction of the institutions and traditions of a society (a,l
indicated in chapter 9 when we discussed the , canvas-clea"tpL 1
of the radical revolutionary).
All this holds most emphatically for the more ancient periodr
.of social development, i.e. for the closed society, in which thC
conscious design of institutions is a most exceptional event, if it
happens at all. To-day, things
lnay begin to 6e different, owing
to our {owly increasing knowledge of society, i.e. owing to th;
"study of the unintended repercussions of our plans and ictions
I
.and one day, mer:. may even become the consiious creators of an
open society, and thereby of a greater part of their own fate;
(Marx entertained this hope, as will be shown in the next chapi-
ter.) But all this is partly a matter of degree, and although we
may learn to foresee many of the unintended consequenc., of orr
.actions (the main aim of all social technology), theie will always
be many which we did not foresee.
_ The fact that psychologism is forced to operate with the idea
of a psychological origin of society constitu[es in my opinion e
decisiv-e argument against it. But it is not the only one. per.
haps the most important criticism of psychologism is that it failc
'to understand the main task of the explanatory social sciences.
- Thiscourse
'future
task is not, as the historicist bclieves, the prophecy of the
of history. ft is, rather, the discovery a"d explana.
tion of the less obvious dependences within the social sphere. It
{s the discovery of the difficulties which stand in the way of social
action-the study as it were, of the unwieldiness, the resilience
or the brittleness of the social stufl of its resistance to our attemptg
to mould it and to work with it.
In order to make my point clear, I shall briefly describe a
theory which is widely held but which assumes what I consider
the very opposite of the true aim of the social sciences ; I call it
the' conspirac.y theor2 of societ2'. It is the view that an explanation
of a social phenomenon consists in the discovery of thi men or
groups who are interested in the occurrence of this phenomenon
(sometimes it is a hidden interesr which has first to Le revealed),
and who have planned and conspired to bring it about.
oTIAPTER 14: THE AUTONOMY OF SOCIOLOGY 95
This view of the aims of the social sciences arises, of course,
l'rom the mistaken theory that, whatever happens in society-
cspecially happenings such as war, unemployment, poverty,
rlrortages, which people as a rule dislike-is the result of direct
rlesign by some powerful individuals and groups. This theory is
widely held ; it is older even than historicism (which, as shown
by its primitive theistic form, is a derivative of the conspiracy
theory). In its modern forms it is, like modern historicism, and
a certain modern attitude towards ' natural laws ', a typical result
of the secularization of a religious superstition. The belief in the
Ilomeric gods whose conspiracies explain the history of the Trojan
War is gone. The gods are abandoned. But their place is filled
by powerful men or groups-sinister pressure groups whose
wickedness is responsible for all the evils we suffer from-such as
the Learned Elders of Zion, or the monopolists, or the capitalists,
or the imperialists.
I do not wish to imply that conspiracies never happen. On
the contrary, they are typical social phenomena. They become
important, for example, whenever people who believe in the
tronspiracy theory get into power. And people who sincerely
believe that they know how to make heaven on earth are most
likely to adopt the conspiracy theory, and to get involved in a
counter-conspiracy against non-existing conspirators. For the
only explanation of their failure to produce their heaven is the
nvil intention of the Devil, who has a vested interest in hell.
Conspiracies occur, it must be admitted. But the striking
f,rct which, in spite of their occurrence, disproves the conspiracy
theory is that few of these conspiracies are ultimately successful.
(ionspirators rarellt consumnate their conspirac2.
Why is this so ? Why do achievements differ so widely from
nspirations ? Because this is usually the case in social life, con-
rpiracy or no conspiracy. Social life is not only a trial of strength
between opposing groups: it is action within a more or less
resilient or brittle framework of institutions and traditions, and it
creates-apart from any conscious counter-action-many unfore-
reen reactions in this framework, some of them perhaps even
rtnforeseeable.
To try to analyse these reactions and to foresee them as far
I believe, the main task of the social sciences. It
ns possible is,
ir the task of analysing the unintended social repercussions of
i ntcntional human actions-those repercussions whose signifi cance
ir neglected both by the conspiracy theory and by psychologism,
I
96 MARX,S METI{OD
asalready indicated. An action which proceeds precisely accord.,
ing to intention does not create a problem for social science,
(except that there may be a need to explain why in this partil
cular case no unintended repercussions occurred). One of thg
most primitive economic actions may serve as an'example ir1
order to make the idea of unintended consequences of our actions
quite clear. If a man wishes urgently to buy a house, we can
safely assume that he does not wish to raise the market price of
houses. But the very fact that he appears on the market as a
buyer will tend to raise market prices.' And analogous remaTtrrs
hold for the seller. Or to take an example from a very-different
field, if a man decides to insure his life, he is unlikely to have the
intention of encouraging some people to invest their money in
insurance shares. But he will do so nevertheless. We see here
clearly that not all consequences of our actions are intended
consequences; and accordingly, that the conspiracy theory of
society cannot be true because it amounts to the assertion that'all
results, even those which at first sight do not seem to be intended
by anybody, are the intended results of the actions of people who
are interested in these results.
The examples given do not refute psychologism as easily as
they refute the conspiracy theory, for one can argue that it is the
sellers' knoubdge of a buyer's presence in the market, and their
hope of getting a higher price-in other words, psychological
factors-which explain the repercussions described. This, of
course, is quite true ; but we must not forget that this knowledge
and this hope are not ultimate data of human nature, and that
they are, in their turn, explicable in terms of the social situation-
the market situation.
This social situation is hardly reducible to motives and to the
general laws of 'human nature'. Indeed, the interference of
certain 'traits of human nature', such as our susceptibility to
propaganda, may sometimes lead to deviations from the economic
behaviour just mentioned. Furthermore, if the social situation
is different from the one envisaged, then it is possible that the
consumer, by the action of buying, may indirectly contribute to
a cheapening of the article ; for instance, by making its mass-
production more profitable. And although this effect happens to
lurther his interest as a consumer, it may have been caused just
as involuntarily as the opposite effect, and altogether under pre-
cisely similar psychological conditions. It seems clear that the
social situations which may lead to such widely different unwanted
oHAPTER 14 : 'rHE AUTONOMY OF SOCIOLOGY 97
or unintended repercussions must be studied by a social science
which is not bound to the prejudice that 'it is imperative never
to introduce any generalization into the social sciences until
nrllicient grounds can be pointed out in human nature', as Mill
rnid 12. They must be studied by an autonomoLrs social science.
Continuing this argument against psychologism we may say
that our actions are to a very large extent explicable in terms of
the situation in r,r,hich they occur. Of course, they are never
firlly explicable in terms of the situation alone I an explanation
of the way in which a man, when crossing a street, dodges the
cnrs which move on it may go beyond the situation, and may
refcr his motives, to an 'instinct' of self-preservation, or to his
wish to avoid pain, etc. But this ' psychological' part of the
explanation is very often trivial, as compared with the detailed
eleiermination of his action by what we may call the logic of the
situation; and besides, it is impossible to include all psychological
lirctors in the description of the situation. The analysis of situa-
tions, the situational logic, plays a very important part in social
lil'c as well as in the social sciences. It is, in fact, the method of
economic analysis. As to an example outside economics, I refer
to the'logic of powerr rs, which we may use in order to explain
the moves of power politics as well as the working of certain
;rolitical institutions. The method of applying a situational logic
io the social sciences is not based on any psychological assumption
t'oncerning the rationality (or otherlvise) of 'human nature'.
On the contrary : when we speak of ' rational behaviour' or of
' irrational behaviour' then we mean behaviour which is, or
which is not, in accordance with the logic of that situation. In
lirct, the psychological analysis of an action in terms of its (rational
or irrational) motives presuPposes-as has been pointed out by
Max Weber lLthat we have previously developed some standard
of what is to be considered as rational in the situation in question.
My arguments against psychologism should not be misunder-
rtood 15. They are not, of course, intended to show that psycho-
logical studies and discoveries are of little importance for the social
rcientist. They mean, rather, that psychology-the psychology of
tlre individual-is one of the social sciences, even though it is not
the basis of all social science. Nobody would deny the import-
nnce for political science ofpsychological facts such as the craving
flor power, and the various neurotic phenomena connected with it.
Bu[' craving for power ' is undoubtedly a social notion as well as
t psychological one : we must not forget that, if we study, for
i
9B MAR.:(?S METIIoD oITAPTER 14: THE AUTONOMY OF SOCTOLOGY 99

example, the first appearance in childhood of this craving, then did he criticize it systernatically; nor was it MilI whom he had
we study it in the setting of a certain social institution, for er<arnple, in mind in the epigram quoted at the beginning of this chapter.
that of our modern family. (The Eskimo family may give rise to The force of this epigram is directed, rather, against ' idealism',
rather different phenornena.) Another psychological fact which in its Hegelian form. Yet so far as the problem of the psycho'
is significant for sociology, and which raises grave political and logical nature of society is concerned, Mill's psychologism can be
institutional problems, is that to live in the haven of a tribe, or said to coincide with the idealist theory combated by Marx 10.
of a ' community' approaching a tribe, is for many Eqn an As it happened, however, it was just the influence of another
emotional necessity (especially for young people who, perhals in element in Hegelianism, namely Hegel's Platonizing collectivism,
accordance with a parallelism between ontogenetic and pfrylo- his theory that the state and the nation is more 'real' than the
genetic development, seem to have to pass through a t$6al or individual who owes everything to them,'that led Marx to the
'American-Indian' stage). That my attack on psychofogism is view expounded in this chapter. (An instance of the fact that
not intended as an attack on all psychological considerations may one can sometimes extract a valuable suggestion even from
be seen from the use I have made (in chapter ro) of such a an absurd philosophical theory.) Thus, historically, Marx
concept as the 'strain of civilization' which is partly the result developed certain of Hegel's views concerning the superiority of
of this unsatisfied emotional need. This concept refers to certain society over the individual, and used them as arguments against
feelings of uneasiness, and is therefore a psychological concept. other views of Hegel. Yet since I consider Mill a worthier
But at the same time, it is a sociological concept also ; for it opponent than Hegel, I have not kept to the history of Marx's
characterizes these feelings not only as unpleasant and unsettling, ideas, but have tried to develop them in the form of an argument
etc., but relates them to a certain social situation, and to the against Mill.
coptrast between an open and a closed society. (Many psycho-
logical concepts such as ambition or love have an analogous
status.) Also, we must not overlook the great merits which
psychologism has acquired by advocating a methodological indivi-
dualism and by opposing a methodological collectivism; for it
lends support to the important doctrine that all social fhenomena,
and especially the functioning of all social institutions, should
always be understood as resulting from the decisions, actions,
attitudes, etc., of human individuals, and that we should never be
satisfied by an explanation in terms of so-called 'collectives t
(states, nations, races, etc.). The mistake of psychologism is its
presumption that this methodological individualism in the fieid of
social science implies the programme of reducing all social
phenomena and all social regularities to psychological phenomena
and psychological laws. The danger of this presumption is its
inclination towards historicism, as we have seen. That it is
unwarranted is shown by the need for a theory of the unintended
social repercussions of our actions, and by the need for what I
have described as the logic of social situations.
In defending and developing Mary's view that the problems
of society are irreducible to those of 'human nature', I have
permitted myself to go beyond the arguments actually pro-
pounded by Mam. Marx did not speak of ' psychologism ', nor