Digest-Final Soft

SJS v. Dangerous Drug Board (G.R. No.
157870 November 3, 2008)

Facts:
The constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees
of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 36 of R.A. 9165 is constitutional considering that according to
Senator Pimentel, it imposes a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution, according to SJS, they can be used to harass a student or
an employee according to Laserna, infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being
contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees, and, on the contrary, according to
the Dangerouse Drug Board, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public
will know the quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those who
can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected, the
mandatory but random drug test prescribed for officers and employees of public and private
offices, and students is justifiable on account of the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of
the employees and students.
Held:
Section 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 referring to the mandatory drug testing of the students
and employees is CONSTITUTIONAL, but Sections 36(f) and (g) referring to the mandatory drug
testing of the accused and public office candidates is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Police power is the inherent power of a government to exercise reasonable control over
persons and property within its jurisdiction in the interest of the general security, health, safety,
morals, and welfare except where legally prohibited.
In this case, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy
when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the
parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from
the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement. In the case of the person running for
a public office, the unconstitutionality is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision
defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
Taxicab Operators of Metro Mla. vs. Board of Trans., 119 SCRA 597
Facts:
The petitioner filed a petition which seeks the nullity of the Memorandum Circular No. 77-
42, an administrative regulation which requires the Phasing out and Replacement of Old and
Dilapidated Taxis more than six years old.
Issue:
Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 is constitutional considering that
according to the petitioners, it violates their constitutional right of equal protection of the law
because it is only enforced in Manila and directed solely towards the taxi industry and on the
contrary, the BOT contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and
comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.
Held:
Yes, it is constitutional.
The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of of a lawful subject
and a lawful method. A lawful subject means that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and a lawful
method entails the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In the present case, the Board of Transportations reason for enforcing the Circular initially
in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to
heavier traffic pressure and more constant use and considering that traffic conditions are not the
same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection
clause can har dly be successfully claimed.
DECS vs. San Diego 180 SCRA 533
Facts:
Roberto Rey San Diego took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) three times
and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) rejected his application on the basis of MECS Order No. 12, Series
of 1972, which states that a student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT
After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth
time.”
Issue:
Whether or not MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 is constitutional considering that,
according to San Diego, it violates his rights to academic freedom and quality education, and, on
the contrary, according to DECS, it is a legitimate exercise of police power.
Held:
In this case, the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means of achieving its stated objective of upgrading the selection of applicants into our medical
schools and of improving the quality of medical education in the country. That end is the protection
of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who
would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
Ynot vs. IAC 148 SCRA 659
Facts:
Ynot had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were
confiscated for violation of the Executive Order No. 626-A which prohibited the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and carabeef and further provided that the caraboas and carabeefs which
were the subject of confiscation and forfeiture as a result thereof shall be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions and deserving farmers as the appointed state agencies
may see fit.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional considering that, according to
Ynot, it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court as guaranteed by due process, and on the contrary, according to the government,
there is a need that carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers
who rely on them for energy needs.
Held:
No, it is unconstitutional.
In this case, the reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought
to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise
of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila (40 PHIL 349)
Facts:
The city of Manila presented a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for the
purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not the City of Manila can expropriate private property for public use considering
that, according to the defendants, there is no necessity for the expropriation and according to the
plaintiff, the law has given it authority to expropriate the land.
Held:
No.
The exercise of eminent domain may be restricted to the actual reasonable necessities of
the case and for the purposes designated by the law.
In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in
question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery.
The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge,
which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.
People v. Fajardo 104 PHIL 443
Facts:
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950 prohibits the construction of a building that blocks the view of
the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects the grant of permission to the mayor. Fajardo applied for a permit
to build a building beside the gasoline station near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied.
He continued with the construction. He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the
building.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ordinance is constitutional considering that, according to the defendant, it
deprives them permanently to use their private property and on the contrary, according to the plaintiff,
the proposed building destroys the view of the public plaza.
Held:
It was held that an ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it cannot
be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
taking of the property.
In this case, there was a taking of the property as it restricts the defendant’s right to use his
property permanently without just compensation. Thus, the ordinance is unconstitutional.
10. DAR vs. Galle, G.R. No. 171836, October 2, 2017
Facts:
Decision in DARAB Case No. JC-RIX-ZAMB0-0011-CO fixed just compensation on the basis
of outdated 1991 data instead of valuation criteria as of 1993, the time of taking of the subject property.
Issue:
Whether or not there is just compensation considering that, according to the petitioner, the
1991 valuation is accurate since the actual taking of Galle's property for purposes of fixing just
compensation may be said to have occurred at that time when the Notice of Coverage was served
upon Galle, and considering further that, according to the respondents, the time of the taking of the
property is on 1993.
Held:
No.
Just compensation as 'the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator,' and that the gauge for computation is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. In order
to be 'just', the payment must be real, substantial, full, and ample. The concept of just compensation
embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land, but
also the payment of the land within a 'reasonable time' from the taking of the property.
In this case, the DAR literally took respondent's land without her knowledge and participation,
and without paying her just compensation. Worse, from the time of the taking of respondent's land in
1993 to the time this case reached the Supreme Court until it was decided on 11 August 2014, LBP
has not compensated respondent although DAR has already distributed the lands to the farmer
beneficiaries for more than twenty-one (21) years ago. Justice and equity require that the
unreasonable, even oppressive, delay in the payment of just compensation be appropriately remedied
by the award of legal interest in respondent's favor.
11. Evergreen Manufacturing Corp. vs. Republic, G.R. No. 218628, September 6, 2017
Facts:
Evergreen is the owner of the land involved in an expropriation. RTC Pasig appointed
commissioners to determine the just compensation. RTC ruled that just compensation is P
25,000.00 per square meter. On appeal, CA ruled that it should be P 35,000.00 per square meter.
Issue:
Whether or not there is just compensation considering that, according to the petitioner, it is
entitled to the payment of interest for the Subject Premises expropriated by Republic-DPWH and
considering further that, according to the respondent, the just compensation fixed by the court of
appeals has no basis in fact and in law.
Held:
No.
Just compensation in expropriation cases is defined "as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The Court repeatedly stressed that the true measure
is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word 'just' is used to modify the meaning of the word
'compensation' to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be
real, substantial, full and ample.
In this case, there was nothing to show the value of the property in 2004, which was the year
the taking of the Subject Premises took place. While remanding the case to receive evidence in order
to determine the amount of just compensation at the time of taking would enable the court to clearly
determine the amount of just compensation due to Evergreen, it would be prejudicial to both the
government and Evergreen to do so. A finding of just compensation based on available records would
be most beneficial to both parties concerned.
12. National Transmission Corporation vs. Oroville Dev’t. Corp, G.R. No. 223366, August 1,
2017
Facts:
Oroville requested to reroute the Abaga-Kirahon 230 kV transmission line because the
Tagoloan-Pulangi 138 kV transmission line is already traversing its properties. Oroville has not
been paid just compensation for the construction of the Tagoloan-Pulangi 138 kV transmission
line in its property.
Issue:
Whether or not there is just compensation considering that, according to the petitioner, just
compensation for expropriated property shall be determined based on its fair market value at the time
of its taking and considering further that, according to the respondent, the basis of the payment for just
compensation is not enough to reimburse Oroville for the realty taxes it paid from the year 1983.
Held:
No.
Just compensation is defined "as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. The Court repeatedly stressed that the true measure is not the taker's gain
but the owner's loss. The word 'just' is used to modify the meaning of the word 'compensation' to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial,
full and ample.
In this case, Oroville was deprived of beneficial ownership over their property without the
benefit of a timely expropriation proceeding, and to serve as a deterrent to the State from failing to
institute such proceedings, a grant of exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 is fair and
reasonable. Moreover, an award for attorney's fees in the amount of P200,000.00 in favor of Oroville
is in order.
Lladoc v CIR
Facts:
In 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc. in Bacolod City donated P 10,000 in case to Rev. Fr. Crispin
Ruiz, the then parishpriest of Victorias, Negros Occidental and the predecessor of Rev. Fr. Casimiro
Lladoc, for the construction of a newCatholic Church. The total amount was actually spent for the
purpose intended. On April 1960, the CIR issued an assessment for donee’s gift tax in the amount of
P 1,370.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the donee’s gift tax should be paid considering that, according to the petitioner, it is
against the constitution, and considering further that, according to the respondent, the donation is
taxable.
Held:
Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries,
churches and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of
taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra distinguished from excise
taxes.
In the present case, what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on
the properties themselves. It did not rest upon general ownership; it was an excise upon the use made
of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. Manifestly, gift tax is
not within the exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift tax is not a property tax, but
an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on
property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
Guzman v. NU
Facts:
Petitioners, students of respondent National University, has come to court to seek relief from
what they describe as their school’s continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol.
Issue:
Whether or not the refusal for enrollment is proper considering that, according to the
petitioners, it violates their right and considering further that, according to the respondents, their failure
to enroll is due to their own fault.
Held:
No.
There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of
the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer
the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed
of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
In this case, the school did not meet the requirements for a procedural due process.
Their refusal for enrollment is a violation of the constitutional right of the students. Thus, it is
improper and unconstitutional.
Arroyo v DOJ
Facts:
COMELEC and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint Committee and
Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases.
Issue:
Whether or not the the Joint Order is constitutional considering that, according to the petitioner,
it was created with the sole purpose of investigating and prosecuting certain persons and incidents
only, and considering further that, according to the respondents, not all individuals investigated were
linked to GMA.
Held:
Equal protection requires that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be
treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
In this case, while the Joint Committee was created for the purpose of conducting preliminary
investigation of election offenses during the 2004 and 2007 elections, it was not purposefully created
to investigate only the involved parties specifically as there were public officers who were investigated
upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties and private individuals were
also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee. Thus, there is no violation of the equal
protection clause.
19. BSP vs. COA, G.R. No. 213581, September 19, 2017
Facts:
Decision dated April 12, 2013 and Resolution dated May 6, 2014 of the Commission on
Audit find Evelyn T. Yap (Yap) and Perry B. Dequita (Dequita) and other officers of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, Cotabato Branch jointly and solidarity liable for cash shortage in the amount
of P32,701,600.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the mentioned Decision and Resolution are constitutional considering that
according to the petitioner, it infringes due process and considering further that according to the
respondent, it followed the requirements of due process because it studied the records and
evidence submitted during the audit proceedings and in the proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Held:
Due process in administrative proceedings does not require the submission of pleadings
or a trial-type of hearing. However, due process requires that a party is duly notified of the
allegations against him or her and is given a chance to present his or her defense.
In this case, it was an error amounting to grave abuse of discretion to hold Yap liable, and
Dequita and the other bank officers of the Cotabato Branch jointly and solidarity liable with Yap
for the cash shortage without an actual complaint being filed and without giving them the chance
to defend themselves. Thus, the assailed Decision violated the basic tenets of due process.
20. Lai v. People
Facts:
Lai was accused of killing Villanueva. Judge Elumba, who was also the prosecutor in the case
before he was appointed to the bench, rendered the decision
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Elumba should be disqualified to make the decision considering that
according to the petitioner, it violates his right to due process, and, on the contrary, according to the
prosecution, Lai should have sought disqualification prior to the rendition of judgment.
Held:
Yes.
The Constitution has expressly ordained that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. An essential part of the right is to be afforded a just and fair trial
before his conviction for any crime.
In this case, the mere appearance of Judge Elumba’s name as the public prosecutor in that
specific case sufficed to disqualify Judge Elumba from sitting and deciding the case. Having
represented the State in the prosecution of the petitioner, he could not sincerely claim neutrality or
impartiality as the trial judge who would continue to hear the case.
21. Villavicencio vs. Lukban
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at
the night of October 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to
Davao City where they were signed as laborers.
Issue:
Whether or not
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council,
G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9372 is void considering that, according to the petitioners, its terms are vague, and
considering further that according to the respondents, he doctrines of void-for-vagueness apply only to free
speech cases.
Held:
No.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle
In this case, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.
OR
petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372.
Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of “terrorism” is thus legally impermissible. The
Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statute’s future
effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative
lobbying in Congress.
24. PADPAO vs. COMELEC
Facts:
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 10015 which provided for the rules and regulations on the ban
on bearing, carrying or transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons and the employment, availment or
engagement of the services of security personnel or bodyguards during the election period, more commonly referred
to as the "Gun Ban." Petitioner assails the validity of Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 insofar
as its application to Private Security Agency (PSA) is concerned.
Issue:
Whether or not of Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 is constitutional considering
that according to the petitioner, violates the constitutional tenets of equal protection of laws and non-
impairment of obligations of contracts as it impairs the contracts of its member PSAs with their
respective clients and considering further that, according to the respondents, PSAs are not singled out
in the imposition of the requirement.
Held:
The equal protection clause means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of
the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and
in like circumstances.
In this case, Resolution No. 10015 applies to any and all persons, whether private individuals
or public officers. Rule III thereof contains a comprehensive list of persons required to obtain written
authority from the COMELEC to bear, carry, and transport firearms outside his place or residence or
business.
25. Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 PHIL 103
Facts:
Ordinance No. 532 of the City of Manila requires receipts in duplicate in English and Spanish
duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 352 is constitutional considering that, according to the plaintiff,
it violates their right to equal protection of the law, and, on the contrary, according to the defendants,
all public laundries without distinction must comply with the regulation.
Held:
The equal protection clause means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of
the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and
in like circumstances.
In this case, the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege.
There is no privilege, no discrimination, no distinction. Equally and uniformly the ordinance applies to
all engaged in the laundry business, and, as nearly as may be, the same burdens are cast upon them.
26. Ichong v. Hernandez
Facts: Lao H. Inchong is an alien retailer which is one of those adversely affected by R.A. No. 1180, an act
which nationalizes the retail trade business by prohibiting against persons not citizens of the Philippines,
as well as associations, partnerships or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens
of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade with the exception of U.S. citizens
and juridical entities.
ISSUE: WON R.A. No. 1180 is constitutional considering that according to the petitioner, it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and considering further that according to the State, citizenship
is a legal and valid ground for classification.
HELD: Yes, it is constitutional.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. A classification to be valid must be reasonable which means
that it must be based upon substantial distinctions; it must be germane to the purposes of law; it must
not be limited to existing conditions only; it must apply equally to all members of the class.
This case shows the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien
and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure. The
aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers, nor the
patriotic desire to help bolster the nation’s economy, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national
owes to the land. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over
the alien in the retail trade. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction in the exercise of the occupation regulated.
48. Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699
Facts:
Cecilia Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband and forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence
in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not the documents are admissible in evidence considering that, according to
the petitioner, a previous ruling of the same document were admissible in evidence, and
considering further that, according to the respondent, it was taken in violation of his right to privacy
of communication and correspondence.
Held:
No.
The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence
is inviolable.
In this case, it is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order from court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding
`73. Austria v NLRC
Facts:
Austria received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds, willful
breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an
offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative, as grounds for the
termination of his services.
Issue:
Whether or not this case can be heard in a civil court considering that, according to the
petitioner, the grounds for dismissal are covered by the Labor Code and, on the contrary, according
to the private respondent, it is an ecclesiastical matter.
Held:
Yes.
The State is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs. An ecclesiastical affair
involves the relationship between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious
doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation.
In this case, what is involved is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister
as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship
or doctrines of the church. In this case, petitioner was not excommunicated or expelled from the
membership of the SDA but was terminated from employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an
employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a
member from the religious congregation.
74. Long vs. Basa
Facts:
The Board of Directors observed that certain members of the CHURCH, including Alfredo Long
et al exhibited "conduct which was dishonorable, improper and injurious to the character and interest
of the CHURCH. Long et al. ignored these repeated admonitions. Alarmed that Long, et al.'s conduct
will continue to undermine the integrity of the Principles of Faith of the CHURCH, the Board of
Directors, removed them from the membership list.
Issue:
Whether or not this case can be heard in civil courts considering that, according to the
petitioner it was rendered without prior notice to them or, in a constitutional context, without due
process, and, on the contrary, according to the respondents, the expulsion is in accordance with the
By-laws of the CHURCH.
Held:
Yes.
The State is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs. An ecclesiastical affair
involves the relationship between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious
doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation.
In this case, the issue is whether or not the expulsion of some of the members of the religious
community called "The Church in Quezon City" (CQC), contravene the laws of the land or are violative
of the civil rights of the members thereof. Further, the loss of the opportunity to worship in familiar
surroundings is a valuable right, which deserves the protection of the law where no constitutional
barrier exists.
75. Marcos vs. Manglapus
Facts:
In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court prohibit the return of the Marcos family to the
Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the bar from returning to the Philippines was constitutional considering that,
according to the petitioners, it is a violation of their right to return to their country of birth and considering
further that, according to the respondents, it would pose a threat to national interest and welfare.
Held:
The right to liberty of abode and travel can be limited upon lawful order of the court or by the
requirements of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law.
In this case, the death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has
not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the
government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have
not been shown to have ceased.
76. Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners Association
Facts:
Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City.
Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about
to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the writ of amparo can be used as a remedy considering that according to the
petitoners, they were deprived of their rights, and considering further that, according to the respondent,
petitioners hold fraudulent and spurios titles.
Held:
No.
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
In this case, the threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court
is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the
remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear
allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
77. Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017
Facts:
Several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew
ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan
Rody."
Issue:
Whether or not the curfew ordinances are constitutional considering that, according to the
petitioners, it deprives minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due
process and considering further that, according to the respondents, there is a compelling state
interests that the minors should be kept safe.
Held:
No, they are unconstitutional except for the Quezon City Ordinance which provides for
adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the
prescribed curfew hours.
Under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
In this case, the curfew ordinances of Manila and Navotas are not narrowly drawn in that
their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors'
fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful
employment, and to travel at night from school or work.
78. KMU vs. Director-General, NEDA, 489 SCRA 160
Facts:
Executive Order No. 420 requires all government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations to streamline and harmonize their identification (id) systems.
Issue:
Whether or not EO No. 420 is constitutional considering that, according to the petitioner,
it violates their right to privacy, and considering further that, according to the respondent, it is to
enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued IDs.
Held:
In U.S. Justice Department, the State can collect and store in a central database
information on citizens gathered from public records across the country.
In this case, EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the
data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative
safeguards. The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to
reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO
420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed. The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government
entities.
79. Hilado vs. Reyes, 496 SCRA 282
Facts:
Petitioners had, during the lifetime of Roberto, filed two complaints for damages or
collections of sums of money against Roberto Benedicto. Atty. Grace Carmel Paredes, an
associate of petitioners' counsel, was denied access to the last folder-record of the Julita’s petition
for issuance of letters of administration.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of petitioners’ right to information considering that,
according to the petitioner, they were denied of access to public records, and considering further
that, according to the respondents, they are not party to the case.
Held:
Yes.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
In this case, petitioners has a legitimate reason to have a copy of court records. The main
purpose for accessing the records — to monitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the
preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal
of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting49 — appears
legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto et
al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate.
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
Facts:
Neri, appeared in one hearing which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe
him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege”. Hee refused to answer the questions on: (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the right to information considering that, according to
the petitioner, the information were protected by executive privilege and considering further that,
according to the respondents, there is adequate showing of a compelling need to justify the
disclosure of the information sought.
Held:
No.
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to
be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with another sovereign
nation.
It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the President’s
communication with her advisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to the
agreement. It was actually a product of the meeting of minds between officials of the Philippines
and China. Whatever the President says about the agreement - particularly while official
negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China will surely view with particular interest. There
is danger in such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the People’s Republic of China.
Garcillano vs. The House of Representatives
Facts:
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President
of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy
that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-
collapse of the Arroyo government.
Issue:
Whether or not the tape should be played considering that, according to the petitioner, it
was illegally obtained and considering further that, according to the respondents, they have the
right to access public information.
Held:
No.
The right to access of information is subject to limitations as may be provided by law. The
law says that any evidence obtained in violation of the right to privacy of a person is inadmissible.
In this case, the tape was obtained illegally through wire-tapping. Thus, it is inadmissible
as evidence and should not be played.
82. Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN & PDS or CV, A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012
Facts:
Rowena C. Paraan sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth
(SALN) of the Justices of the Supreme Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of
the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the Justices of this Court for the
purpose of updating their database of information on government officials.
Issue:
Whether or not Paraan should be given access considering that, according to Paraan, she
has the right to information, and considering further that, according to the Justices, the Judiciary
is independent.
Held:
Yes.
Under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, access to official records, and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
In this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to deny the public access to the SALN, PDS
and CV of the Justices of the Court and other magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course, to
the limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713. Public officers and employees must, at
all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
83. People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382
Facts:
R.A. 1700, an act to outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and similar
associations, penalizing membership therein was enacted.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 1700 is constitutional considering that, according to the petitioners, the
Government has a right to protect itself against subversion and considering further that, according
to the respondents, it is a violation of their right to association.
Held:
According to Section 8, Article III of the Constitution, the right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
In this case, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force,
violence or other illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of
association is infringed by the prohibition against knowing membership in the Communist Party
of the Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be clearly and heavily outweighed by
the overriding considerations of national security and the preservation of democratic institutions
in his country.
84. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard vs. BLR, G.R. No. 211145, October 14, 2015.
Facts:
Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. Philippines filed a petition for the
cancellation of the registration of Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard' s
association.
Issue:
Whether or not Samahan’s registration should be cancelled considering that, according to
the petitioners, they have the right to association and, on the contrary, according to the
respondents, Samahan committed misrepresentation in its application for registration as it made
an express representation that all of its members were its employees.
Held:
No.
Section 8, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that the right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
In this case, the law clearly afforded the right to self-organization to all workers including
those without definite employers. The existence of employer-employee relationship is not
mandatory in the formation of workers' association. What the law simply requires is that the
members of the workers' association, at the very least, share the same interest. The very definition
of a workers' association speaks of "mutual aid and protection.
85. PADPAO vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 223505, October 3, 2017.
Facts:
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 10015 which provided for the rules and
regulations on the ban on bearing, carrying or transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons
and the employment, availment or engagement of the services of security personnel or
bodyguards during the election period, more commonly referred to as the "Gun Ban." Petitioner
assails the validity of Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 insofar as its application to
Private Security Agency (PSA) is concerned.
Issue:
Whether or not of Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 is constitutional
considering that according to the petitioner, it impairs the contracts of its member PSAs with their
respective clients and considering further that, according to the respondents, does not prevent
PSAs from performing their contractual obligations.
Held:
There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the
parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for
the enforcement of the rights of the parties.
In this case, PSAs' contracts with their clients are not affected in any manner. The
Resolution merely requires written authority to bear, carry, and transport firearms during the
election period.
86. Martinez vs. People, G.R. No. 132852, May 31, 2000.`
Facts:
Petitioner’s motion to litigate as a pauper was denied by RTC of Butuan City and the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the petition is proper considering that, according to the
petitioner, he has paid the docket fees evidenced by two postal money orders and considering
further that, according to the respondents, the amount remitted by petitioner as docket fee was
short of 150.00.
Held:
No.
Our Bill of Rights, which decrees that, (f)ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies
and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
In this case, petitioner has complied with all the evidentiary requirements for prosecuting
a motion to appear in court as a pauper. Thus, the petition should not be dismissed.
87. People vs. Baloloy, G.R. No. 140740, April 12, 2002.
Facts:
Juanito Baloloy claimed that he had caught sight of the dead body of Genelyn Camacho
while he was catching frogs in a nearby creek. However, based on his alleged extrajudicial
confession, coupled with circumstantial evidence, the girl’s unfortunate fate was pinned on him.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged confession should be admitted in evidence considering that,
according to the appellee, the appellant voluntarily confessed and considering further that,
according to the appellant, it violates his constitutional rights.
Held:
Yes.
It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply
to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime.
In this case, after he admitted ownership of the black rope and was asked by Ceniza to
tell her everything, JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN and
thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and
voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under
custody for investigation in connection with the commission of the offense.
88. People vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81
Facts:
SPO1 Fernandez prepared a two-page Inventory Receipt and Affidavit of Orderly Search,
he asked Jack Go to sign the receipt. While Jack Go initially refused, he eventually did sign both
documents without having read them completely after he was hit by the policemen. The two
barangay kagawads also signed both pages of the Inventory Receipt as witnesses.
Issue:
Whether or not the inventory receipt should be admitted in evidence considering that,
according to the appellant, he was not informed of his rights, and considering further that,
according to the appellee, there is a presumption that the police officers regularly performed their
official duty
Held:
No.
Under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
In this case, PO2 Abulencia presented the inventory to appellant for his
signature[85] without any showing that appellant was informed of his right not to sign such receipt
and to the assistance of counsel. Neither was he warned that the same could be used as evidence
against him. The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being
violative of appellants custodial right to remain silent; it is also an indicium of the irregularity in the
manner by which the raiding team conducted the search of appellants residence.
89. People vs. Tomaquin, 435 SCRA 23
Facts:
When appellant intimated that he was willing to confess and requested the presence of
Atty. Parawan, SPO2 Monilar called up Atty. Parawan and informed him of appellant’s decision.
Atty. Parawan was also the barangay captain at the place where the crime was committed.
Issue:
Whether or not confession should be admitted in evidence considering that, according to
the appellee, it was done in the presence of Atty. Parawan, and considering further that, according
to the appellant, Atty. Parawan could not be considered as an independent counsel.
Held:
No.
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
In this case, Atty. Parawan merely "observed" during the entire investigation and failed to
advise or explain to appellant the questions being propounded by SPO2 Monilar. Atty. Parawan
failed to meet the exacting standards of an independent and competent counsel as required by
the Constitution. Thus, the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is deemed an
uncounselled confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
90. People vs. Malngan, 503 SCRA 294
Facts:
EDNA confessed to Brgy. Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry
residents outside theBarangay Hall that she set her employer’s house on fire because she had
not been paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home to her province but her
employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home.
Issue:
Whether or not the confession should be admitted in evidence considering that, according
to the appellee, the appellant admits committing the crime and considering further that, according
to the appellant, the admission was uncounseled.
Held:
Yes.
The constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not
elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby
the accused verbally admits to having committed the offense.
In this case, accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of

Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas house. The testimony of Mercedita
Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in
evidence against her and is not covered by the constitutional guarantee.
91. People vs. Reyes, 581 SCRA 691
Facts:
Appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF) at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Thereupon, appellant Arnaldo, with the assistance of
Atty. Uminga, executed a written extra-judicial confession narrating his participation in the
incident.
Issue:
Whether or not the extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence considering that,
according to the appellants, it was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to have an
independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation and considering further that,
according to the appellee, Atty. Uminga assisted them.
Held:
Yes.
the commission of an offense shall be informed of his right to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one.
In this case, it was the PAOCTF which contacted and suggested the availability of Atty.
Uminga and Atty. Rous to appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Nonetheless, this does
not automatically imply that their right to counsel was violated. What the Constitution requires is
the presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his
client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.
92. Lumanog vs. People, G.R. No. 182555, September 7, 2010
Facts:
Joel de Jesus, alias Tabong, was apprehended on June 19, 1996 at his house at Dahlia
St., Fairview, Quezon City. He executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 20, 1996 and
Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 21, 1996.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extra-judicial confession of the accused Joel de Jesus is valid
considering that, according to the appellee, they have informed him of his rights and considering
further that, according to the appellant, he did not waive his right.
Held:
No.
the commission of an offense shall be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
In this case, there could not have been such a valid waiver by Joel, who was presented
to Atty. Sansano at the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall only the following day and stayed overnight
at the police station before he was brought to said counsel.
93. Pang vs. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011
Facts:
Cinco noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of the same size as those in the first
bag she inspected. Becoming suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate boxes and opened
one of them. She saw white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco
thus immediately called the attention of her immediate who advised her to call the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the Intensive
Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the four chocolate boxes earlier discovered.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence is admissible considering that, according to the petitioner, he
was not informed of his custodial rights and considering further that, according to the respondent,
he was caught in flagrante delicto.
Held:
Yes.
The Constitution provides custodial rights for extra-judicial confession or admission.
In this case, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial
investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from him as
evidence of his guilt. The trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated shabu in determining the guilt of the petitioner
and his co-accused.
94. People vs. Lara, G.R. No. 199877, August 13, 2012
Facts:
Lara was identified by the three witnesses as the one who robbed them and shot Bautista.
Issue:
Whether or not the identification of Lara during a police line-up is admissible considering
that, according to the appellant, he was identified without the assistance of counsel and
considering further that, according to the appellee, there was no legal compulsion to afford him a
counsel during a police line-up.
Held:
Yes.
The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial
investigation begins.
In this case, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory. Being
made to stand in a police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
95. People vs. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546
Facts:
Appellant signed a sworn statement as his confession
Issue:
Whether or not the confession is admissible considering that, according to the appellee,
he was informed of his custodial rights and considering further that according to the appellant, it
was defective.
Held:
No.
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
In this case, neither the sworn statement nor the testimony of the investigating officer
showed an affirmative offer to provide appellant with counsel de oficio if he could not retain
counsel of his choice. Consequently, the sworn statement may very well be inadmissible and may
not be utilized against appellant.
96. Aballe vs. People, G.R. No. 64086, March 15, 1990
Facts:
Aballe made an extrajudicial confession admitting his guilt in killing Jennie while under
the influence of liquor and marijuana.
Issue:
Whether or not the confession is admissible considering that, according to the appellant,
it was obtained in violation of his rights and considering further that, according to the appellee,
the appellant orally admitted killing the victim.
Held:
Yes.
Compliance with the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation is not applicable

to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner.
In this case, the accused orally admitted having slain the victim. Thus, the evidence may
be used against him.
97. People vs. Capitle, G.R. No. 175330, January 12, 2010
Facts:
Arturo Nagares executed an extrajudicial confession to the killing of Barangay Chairman
Avelino Pagalunan before Atty. Orlando V. Dizon, Chief, SOG, NBI. Assisting him in the
confession was practicing lawyer, Atty. Esmeralda E. Galang, who was at the NBI following up
the implementation of a warrant of arrest in one of the cases she was handling.
Issue:
Whether or not the the confession is admissible considering that, according to the
appellee, it is presumed to be voluntary and considering further that, according to the appellant,
he was not assisted by an independent counsel.
Held:
Yes.
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
In this case, the records show that Nagares was duly assisted by an effective and
independent counsel during the custodial investigation in the NBI. As found by the Court of
Appeals, after Nagares was informed of his constitutional rights, he was asked by Atty. Esmeralda
E. Galang whether he accepts her as counsel.
98. People vs. Omilig, G.R. No. 206296, August 12, 2015.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Peñaflor’s first extrajudicial confession was taken before Assistant City
Prosecutor Albulario, during which accused-appellant Peñaflor was assisted by Atty. Cristobal.
On the other hand, his second extrajudicial confession was taken before City Prosecutor Lagcao
with Atty. Cavales assisting accused-appellant Peñaflor, and while in the presence of accused-
appellant Peñaflor’s father, mother, and other relatives.
Issue:
Whether or not the confession are admissible as evidence considering that, according to
the appellant, they were not made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel
and considering further that, according to the appellee, the lawyers who assisted him were
competent and properly discharged their duties.
Held:
Yes.
The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial
investigation begins.
In this case, accused-appellant Peñaflor executed his extrajudicial confession not during
custodial investigation, but during the preliminary investigation.
99. People vs. Guting, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015
Facts:
Appellant, with a bladed weapon in his hand, suddenly approached two police officers
standing in front of the Camiling Police Station and told them that he had stabbed his father.
Issue:
Whether or not the confession is admissible considering that, according to the appellant,
it was made without the assistance of counsel and considering further that, according to the
appellee, he voluntarily confessed committing the crime.
Held:
Yes.
The "investigation" in Section I 2, paragraph I, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertains
to "custodial investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into
custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the
police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect' s participation therein and which tend to
elicit an admission.
In this case, accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation when he admitted,
without assistance of counsel, to POI Torre and POI Macusi that he stabbed his father to death.
Accused-appellant's verbal confession was so spontaneously and voluntarily given and was not
elicited through questioning by the police authorities. It may be true that POI Macusi asked
accused-appellant who killed his father, but POI Macusi only did so in response to accused-
appellant's initial declaration that his father was already dead.
100. Gacal vs. Judge Infante, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845, October 5, 2011
Facts:
Judge Jaime I. Infante granted bail to the accused and released him immediately after
allowing bail.
Issue:
Whether or not the grant of bail is proper considering that, according to the complainant,
the Judge violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and considering further that, according
to the respondent, they were not orders granting an application for bail, but were instead his
approval of the bail bond posted.
Held:
No.
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law.
In this case, the accused was charged with a capital offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua. Bail should not be allowed without a hearing upon notice to the Prosecution whether
bail is a matter of right or discretion. Thus, the bail is not valid.
101. Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015.
Facts:
Enrile was charged with plunder, an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua. He then
file a Motion to Fix Bail.
Issue:
Whether or not bail should be granted considering that, according to the petitioner, the
evidence of his guilt was not yet established and considering further that, according to the
respondent, he is charged with a capital offense.
Held:
Yes.
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the trial court.
In this case, the national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail considering that Enrile
will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community and that there exist special, humanitarian
and compelling circumstances which is his old age and health condition.
102. Tejano vs. Marigomen, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492, September 26, 2017.
Facts:
Judge Marigomen granted the bail of Andrino.
Issue:
Whether or not the grant of bail is proper considering that, according to the complainant,
the case was outside his jurisdiction and considering further that, according to the respondent,
the judge in that jurisdiction was absent.
Held:
No.
A judge not assigned to the province, city, or municipality where the case is pending but
approves an application for bail filed by an accused not arrested is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law.
Judge Marigomen was not a judge in the province, city, or municipality where the case
was pending. Neither was Andrino arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where
the case was pending precisely because no warrant of arrest had yet been issued when he posted
bail on May 9, 2013. Moreover, Judge Marigomen did not ascertain the absence or unavailability
of Judge Saniel. Thus, the bail is invalid and Judge Marigomen is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law.
103. Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), G.R. No. 224162, November 7, 2017
Facts:
Napoles was charged with plunder and she applied for bail.
Issue:
Whether or not the bail should be granted considering that, according to the petitioner, the
evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
considering further that, according to the respondent, the evidence of her guilt for the crime of
Plunder is strong.
Held:
No.
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
In this case, the prosecution was able to establish with evident proof that Napoles
participated in the implied conspiracy to misappropriate public funds and acquire ill-gotten wealth.
The testimonies of the whistleblowers, especially since these were corroborated by other
available evidence may be relied upon. Plunder is a capital offense and the evidence is strong
thus, the bail should not be granted.
104. Enrile vs. People, G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015.
Facts:
Enrile was charged with Plunder and filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars.
Issue:
Whether or not the Motion for Bill of Particulars should be granted considering that
according to the petitioner, it is his right as an accused and considering further that, according to
the respondent, the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.
Held:
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In this case, the Information should be definite enough to enable the accused to properly
plead and prepare his defense. Thus the Motion for Bill of Particulars should be granted.
105. People vs. Saragena, G.R. No. 210677, August 23, 2017
Facts:
Despite the lack of contraband found, accused-appellant was sent to the Mabolo Police
Station. He inquired why he was being arrested. The buy-bust team told him that they were able
to buy shabu from him. Denying this accusation, accused-appellant asserted that they planted
the evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt considering that, according
to the appellee, they have seen the sale of the illegal drug and considering further that, according
to the appellant, it is absurd how the witness could have seen the alleged sale based on their
location.
Held:
No.
Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
In this case, the failure to present the poseur-buyer casts doubt on the charge that an
illegal sale of drugs took place. SPOl Paller and SP03 Magdadaro's location, the nightfall, and the
miniscule amount of the alleged illegal drug further call into question prosecution's claim that SPOl
Paller and SP03 Magdadaro witnessed the scene.
106. Casona vs. People, G.R. No. 179757, September 13, 2017
Facts:
The petitioner appeals the decision of the Court of Appeals convicting him of a violation of
Section 11, Article II of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt considering that according
to the petitioner, the testimony of PO 1 Madlangbayan was not worthy of belief and considering
further that, according to the respondent, all the elements of the offense are present.
Held:
No.
In this case, the lack of the inventory signed by the petitioner himself or by his
representative as well as by the representative of the media and the DOJ and/or the elected
official as required by law could very well be held to mean that no shabu had been seized from
the petitioner on that occasion. Thus, the accused cannot be proven guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
107. People vs. Nuñez, G.R. No. 209342, October 4, 2017
Facts:
The appellant assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the
RTC-Binangonan, Rizal which found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
robbery with homicide.
Issue:
to the appellant, he is not the Paul Pobre identified in the Information and considering further that,
according to the appellee, he was identified by the two witnesses.
Held:
No.
In this case, there is deficiencies and doubts over Cruz's and Perez's opportunity to peruse
the fourth robber's features and their degree of attentiveness during the crime clearly show that
this case does not manage to satisfy even one (1) of the six (6) factors that impel consideration
under the totality of circumstances test. Thus, the accused-appellant cannot be proven guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and is presumed innocent.
108. Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 206437, November 22, 2017
Facts:
Petitioners were charged with Qualified Theft for the loss of perfumes worth P10 million.
Issue:
to the petitioners, the CA did not explain how the unlawful taking was committed in this case and
considering further that, according to the respondent, the petitioners signed a confession.
Held:
No.
In this case, the confessions were obtained under duress. Without the supposed
confessions, there is no other evidence that would establish that petitioners committed theft
against Prestige Brands. Also, it would be impossible to take all the alleged missing perfumes in
one instance. Thus, the accused cannot be proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt and are
presumed innocent.
109. People vs. Arposeple, G.R. No. 205787, November 22, 2017
Facts:
Arposeple and Sulogaol were both charged with three counts of violation of certain
provisions of R.A. No. 9165.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt considering that
according to the appellant, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt and considering further that,
according to the appellee, the body search yielded the seized items.
Held:
No.
In his case, the items seized were handled in a highly irregular manner. Considering that
the seized items constitute the corpus delicti of the offenses charged, it must be unwaveringly
established that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the
same as that seized from him in the first place. Thus, the accused-appellants cannot be proven
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and are presumed innocent.
110. Camara vs. Pagayatan, 520 SCRA 182
Facts:
Camara was detained for LBPs failure to deposit the preliminary compensation in Civil
Case. Hence, a petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition of writ of habeas corpus should be granted considering that,
according to the petitioner, they have already filed their compliance and considering further that,
according to the respondent, the compliance is insufficient because Lubrica could not withdraw it
immediately.
Held:
Yes.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty.
In this case, Nothing in the 4 March 2005 Order requires that the deposit be placed in the
name of Josefina S. Lubrica as payee, in a form that is readily withdrawable. What respondent
judge ordered LBP to do, which LBP did, was to deposit the preliminary compensation as
determined by the PARAD, in cash and bonds[,] in the total amount of Php 71,634,027.30 with
the Land Bank of the Philippines, Manila. Thus, the detention of Camara is unlawful and the
petition must be granted.
111. Veluz vs. Villanueva, 543 SCRA 63
Facts:
Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R. Pabello took Eufemia from petitioner Veluz’ house.
He made repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but these proved futile. Claiming that
respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition for habeas corpus.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition of writ of habeas corpus should be granted considering that,
according to the petitioner Eufemia is unlawfully being deprived of liberty and considering further
that, according to the respondent, they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia.
Held:
No.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld
from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully
being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person.
In this case, there is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained of her liberty
by respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she was forcibly taken by respondents. On the
contrary, respondents, being Eufemia’s adopted children, are taking care of her.
112. Fletcher vs. The Director of Bureau of Corrections, 593 SCRA 265
Facts:
Martin Gibbs Fletcher seeks his release from prison in this petition for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus. He claims that his prison sentence of 12 to 17 years was commuted by
then President Fidel V. Ramos to nine to 12 years. Since he had already served 14 years, three
months and 12 days, including his good conduct allowance, his continued imprisonment is illegal.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus should be granted considering that,
according to the petitioner, his prison sentence was commuted by President Ramos and
considering further that, according to the respondent, petitioner’s prison sentence was never
commuted by then President Ramos
Held:
No.
The writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned
without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the
person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
In this case, petitioner is again on trial for estafa. The pendency of another criminal case
is a ground for the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole. Having
established that petitioner’s continued imprisonment is by virtue of a valid judgment and court
process, the petition for writ of habeas corpus should be denied.
113. Callo vs. Commissioner Morente, G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017
Facts:
Callo seeks the issuance of the writ of amparo for the immediate release of Parker.
Issue:
Whether or not the writ of amparo should be issued considering that, according to the
petitioner, Parker is a natural-born Filipino citizen and thus should not have been detained and
considering further that, according to the respondents, there is no enforced disappearance.
Held:
No.
The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to

violations of a person's constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to
address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
In this case, Parker has a pending criminal case against her in Davao City, which prevents
the Bureau of Immigration from deporting her from the country. There are no elements of enforced
disappearance and no threat of such enforced disappearance that would warrant the issuance of
the writ of amparo.
114. Lt. Sg. Gadian vs. AFP Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ibrado, G.R. No. 188163, October 3, 2017.
Facts:
The older sister of Lt. SG Gadian filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo in her
behalf, impleading as respondents various officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Issue:
petitioner, there are perceived threats to the life, liberty and security of Lt. SG Gadian and
considering further that, according to the respondent, there is no existing threats against Lt. SG
Gadian’s life.
Held:
No.
A writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy to provide immediate judicial

relief for the protection of a person's constitutional right to life and liberty. However,the source of
this fear must be valid and substantiated by circumstances, and not mere paranoia.
In this case, Lt. SG Gadian's life was in actual danger due to her expose of the Balikatan
Funds anomaly. the AFP already conducted its own investigation of the misuse of the Balikatan
Fund. Despite the grant of the petition for the writ of amparo brought at her instance, Lt. SG
Gadian still opted not to participate in that investigation. Such attitude could only reveal the lack
of sincerity of her resort to the recourse of amparo.
115. Republic vs. Cayanan, G.R. No. 181796, November 7, 2017
Facts:
Regina filed a petition for habeas corpus in the R TC alleging that Pablo, her husband,
was being illegally detained by the Director/Head of the CIDG. She amended her petition to seek
instead the issuance of a writ of amparo.
Issue:
petitioner, there is no evidence to support respondent’s claim and considering further that,
according to the respondent, Pablo had not been found or heard from since his forcible arrest
without warrant.
Held:
Yes.
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
In this case, Regina fully discharged her duty to present substantial evidence in support
of her petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo. Pascua himself expressly admitted the
abduction of Pablo. Thus, the writ of amparo should be issued.
116. Padillo vs. Apas, 487 SCRA 29
Facts:
Petitioner Nicolas Padillo, Badere Apas and Kasuagi Ladjarani were charged before
Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court at Bongao, Tawi-Tawi (the court) for Estafa in an Information
filed on February 28, 1996. More than four years after the filing of the Information or on March 22,
2000, the accused moved to dismiss the case on the ground of failure of the prosecution to
prosecute the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed considering that, according to the petitioner,
it violates his right to a speedy trial, and considering further that, according to the respondents, it
was due to the motion for postponement of the private prosecutor.
Held:
No.
Section 16 of article III of the Constitution provides that all persons shall have the right to
a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
In this case, the scheduled hearing of this case have been postponed several times – four
times at the instance of the prosecution, four times at the instance of both the prosecution and
the defense who filed either joint or separate motions for postponement, and one time at the
instance of the defense. The proceedings were postponed thrice at the instance of the private
complainant Nicolas Padillo through the private prosecutor. Thus, the case could not be dismissed
due to his postponement.
117. Gaas vs. Mitmug, 553 SCRA 335
Facts:
The complaint for the petitioners was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao
as early as November 18, 1991, the order for them to file their counter-affidavits was made only
on June 16, 1995 or more than three years after and the case was resolved only on October 23,
1997.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial considering that
according to the petitioners, they were only required to submit counter-affidavits after three years
the Information was filed and considering further that, according to the respondents, the delay
was not vexatious, capricious and oppressive
Held:
The right to speedy disposition of cases, like the right to speedy trial, is violated only when
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In the
determination of whether said right has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case.
In this case, it was only when they lost and pursued their appeal that they first raised the
issue. It cannot therefore be said that the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. In effect, they are deemed to have waived their rights when they filed their
counter-affidavits after they received the Order dated June 16, 1995 without immediately
questioning the alleged violations of their rights to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of
the case.
118. Beltran vs. Samson, 53 Phil. 570
Facts:
The respondent judge ordered Beltran to appear before the provincial fiscal to take
dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. This is to compare the petitioner's handwriting and
determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can be compelled to write considering that, according to the
petitioner, it would violate his right against self-incrimination and considering further that,
according to the respondents, it is the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for.
Held:
No.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
In this case, writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. To create
this evidence which may incriminate him. Thus, he cannot be compelled to write.
119. Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 109242, January 26, 1999.
Facts:
A case for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan wherein the accused were
declared guilty for the pilferage of mail matter in the post office. The accused was made to sign
the letters.
Issue:
Whether or not the right of the accused against self-incrimination was violated considering
that, according to the petitioner, their signing required the use of intelligence and not just a mere
mechanical act and considering further that, according to the respondent, the signatures were not
to incriminate them.
Held:
No.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
In this case the purpose for securing the signature of petitioner on the envelopes was
merely to authenticate the envelopes as the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero. Thus, no
right against self-incrimination was violated.
120. Rosete vs. Lim, 490 SCRA 125
Facts:
Orders dated 22 July 1997 and 27 August 1997 allowed and scheduled the taking of the
depositions of Magpalo and Rosete by way of oral examination.
Issue:
Whether or not the said orders are constitutional considering that, according to the
petitioner, it violates their right against self-incrimination and considering further that, according
to the respondents, they are not facing criminal charges in the civil case
Held:
Yes, they are constitutional.
The right against self-incrimination secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the
right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question. However, the right can be claimed
only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness.
In this case, the case is civil it being a suit for Annulment, Specific Performance with
Damages. In order for petitioners to exercise the right to refuse to take the witness stand and to
give their depositions, the case must partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. The fact that
there are two criminal cases pending which are allegedly based on the same set of facts as that
of the civil case will not give them the right to refuse to take the witness stand and to give their
depositions.
121. People vs. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004
Facts:
Appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" was sentenced to Death for the special complex crime
of Rape with Homicide. A DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood
sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the DNA result should be admitted in evidence considering that, according
to the appellant, it violates his right against self-incrimination and considering further that,
according to the appellee, it is part of object evidence.
Held:
Yes.
Under People v. Gallarde, the accused may be compelled to submit to a physical

examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
In this case, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood
sample given by the appellant. The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal
process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply when
the blood sample was taken to determine if the DNA matches with the semen from the vagina of
the victim. Thus, the DNA result may be admitted in evidence.
122. People vs. Linsangan, 62 PHIL 646
Facts:
Ambrosio Linsangan was prosecuted for nonpayment of the cedula or poll tax.
Issue:
Whether or not Linsangan should be convicted considering that, according to the
appellant, he should not be imprisoned for nonpayment of poll tax and considering further that,
according to the appellee, nonpayment violates 2718, of the Revised Administrative Code
Held:
No.
Section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the 1935 Constitution provides that "no person shall
be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax.
In this case, it was tried and decided in the court below before the Constitution of the
Philippines took effect. But while this appeal was pending, the said Constitution became effective.
Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes imprisonment for nonpayment of the
poll or cedula tax while the Constitution forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration of the
Government of the Commonwealth, said section became inoperative, and no judgment of
conviction can be based thereon.
123. Arceta vs. Judge Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895, June 15, 2004
Facts:
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, an act penalizing the making or drawing and issuance of a
check without sufficient funds or credit was enacted.
Issue:
Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional considering that, according to the petitioner, it
violates the right against non-imprisonment for nonpayment of debt and considering further that,
according to the respondent, the contention of the petitioner is speculative.
Held:
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful,
speculative or argumentative.
In this case, the thesis of petitioner Dy that the present economic and financial crisis
should be a basis to declare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant
consideration. It is precisely during trying times that there exists a most compelling reason to
strengthen faith and confidence in the financial system and any practice tending to destroy
confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading
and financial communities.
124. Chiok vs. People, G.R. No. 179814, December 7, 2015
Facts:
Chiok was charged with estafa. The CA rendered a Decision acquitting Chiok for failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Chua filed a motion for
reconsideration
Issue:
Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration should be granted considering that,
according to the petitioner, it would violate the guarantee against double jeopardy and considering
further that, the case is an exception to the rule on double jeopardy.
Held:
No
In People v. Uy, it was held that by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal
case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower
court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus
rendering the assailed judgment void.
In this case, the main basis of the acquittal is not on the credibility of the physical evidence
but of the testimony of Chua herself. These are purported errors of judgment or those involving
misappreciation of evidence which cannot be raised and be reviewed in a petition for certiorari.
125. Navaja vs. Hon. De Castro, G.R. No. 180969, September 11, 2017
Facts:
Atty. Borje filed the following criminal: the first one, charging petitioner of Obstruction of
Justice for violation of Section 1 (a) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 182912 in connection with
the March 9, 2004 incident; and the second one, charging petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy of
Obstruction of Justice as well for violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law in connection with the
March 15, 2004 incident.
Issue:
Whether or not the said cases is valid considering that, according to the petitioner, it would
be tantamount to double jeopardy and considering further that, according to the respondent, the
acts of the petitioner are deemed separate crimes.
Held:
No.
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
In this case, petitioner's acts of allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and
testifying in a preliminary investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false affidavit were
clearly motivated by a single criminal impulse in order to realize only one criminal objective. Thus,
petitioner should only be charged with one (1) count of violation of PD 1829.
126. Nasi-Villar vs. People, 571 SCRA 202
Facts:
The criminal acts alleged to have been committed happened sometime in 1993. However,
R.A. No. 8042, under which petitioner was charged, was approved only on 7 June 1995 and took
effect on 15 July 1995.
Issue:
Whether or not the Decision of the CA is valid considering that, according to the petitioner,
R.A. No. 8042 cannot be given retroactive effect and considering further that, according to the
respondent, the designation of the offense in the Information is not determinative of the nature
and character of the crime charged against her but the acts alleged in the Information.
Held:
Yes.
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the real nature of the crime charged is
determined, not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the
law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
In this case, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had
performed the acts constituting the offense punished by Art. 39 of the Labor Code, as alleged in
the body of the Information. The Court of Appeals' conviction of petitioner under the Labor Code
is correct.
127. Bureau of Customs Employees Association vs. Teves, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011
Facts:
RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It
covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional considering that, according to the petitioner,
it is a bill of attainder and considering further that, according to the respondent, R.A. No. 9335
and its IRR merely defined the offense and provided for the penalty that may be imposed.
Held:
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members

of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of
certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise,
and the lack of judicial trial
In this case, R.A. No. 9335 does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. R.A.
No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee
and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the
constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected.
128. Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991
Facts:
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
Issue:
Whether or not HRET is correct considering that, according to the petitioner, respondent's
father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of
citizenship and considering further that, according to the respondent, a certificate of naturalization
was issued to his father.
Held:
Yes.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino
mothers with an alien father were both considered as natural-born citizens.
In this case, there is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina
at the time of her marriage and his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only
nine (9) years old. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when
he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary as he was already a citizen.
129. Tecson vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004.
Facts:
In his certificate of candidacy, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
or FPJ, represented himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born on August
20, 1939
Issue:
Whether or not FPJ is a Filipino Citizen considering that, according to the petitioner, FPJ
is an illegitimate child and should follow the American citizenship of his mother and considering
further that, according to the respondent, the marriage certificate of FPJ’s parents showed that
his father is a Filipino and his birth certificate showed that he is born to a Filipino father.
Held:
Yes.
The 1935 Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are those whose
fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
In this case, FPJ was born when the 1935 Constitution is in effect. He is considered a
Filipino citizen regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate
130. RP vs. Sagun, G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012.
Facts:
Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959. At the age of 33 she executed an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent has effectively elected Filipino citizenship considering that,
according to the petitioner, respondent’s purported election was not made in accordance with the
law and considering further that, according to the respondent, she has effectively elected
Philippine citizenship by virtue of her positive acts.
Held:
No.
The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1,
Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
In this case, the records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal
requirements for a valid election. Respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election
of Philippine citizenship. The execution of respondent’s oath of allegiance was not within a
reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not registered with the
nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625.
131. Tabasa vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125793, August 29, 2006, 500 SCRA 9
Facts:
Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when
petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the
United States. By derivative naturalization, petitioner also acquired American citizenship.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has reacquired Philippine citizenship considering that, according
to the petitioner, he is now a Filipino by repatriation in accordance with RA 8171 and considering
further that, according to the respondent, petitioner does not qualify for repatriation under RA
8171.
Held:
No.
Under RA 8171, natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their
Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity are entitled to repatriation.
In this case, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political
or economic exigencies. Also, petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation".
The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of
the petition for repatriation.
132. De Guzman vs. Commission on Elections, 590 SCRA 149
Facts:
Petitioner was one of the candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. He admitted
that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is qualified to run for vice-mayor considering that, according to
the petitioner, he has reacquired Philippine citizenship and considering further that, according to
the respondent, he is not a Filipino citizen.
Held:
No.
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 requires that those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
In this case, petitioner’s Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did not comply
with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such,
he is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
133. Bengson vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001
Facts:
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. However, Cruz enlisted in the United
States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
Issue:
Whether or not Cruz can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship considering that, according to the petitioner, he lost his Philippine
citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States and considering further that, according
to the respondent, he had reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he was repatriated
since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn
characteristic of being a natural-born citizen
Held:
Yes.
Section 3 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution provides that Philippine citizenship may be
lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
In this case, having complied with the requirements of RA No. 2630, respondent Cruz is
deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired
at birth as the son of a Filipino father. The act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to,
his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
134. Lee vs. Comelec and Frivaldo, G.R. No. 123755, June 28, 1996
Facts:
Frivaldo garnered the highest number of votes in the election for Governor. Lee filed a
petition praying for his proclamation as Governor. Lee was then proclaimed as Governor .Frivaldo
filed a petition for annulment of the proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation.
Issue:
Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation is valid considering that, according to the petitioner,
Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects and considering further that, according to the
respondent, he has reacquired citizenship by repatriation under P.D. No. 725.
Held:
Yes.
In this case, it is unarguable that the legislative intent of P.D. No. 725 was precisely to
give the statute retroactive operation as it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy.
Thus, the repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of his application.
135. Tan vs. Crisologo, G.R. No. 193993, November 8, 2017
Facts:
Tan filed her voter's registration application on 26 October 2009, and that she only took
her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 30 November 2009, or more than a
month after the ERB approved her application.
Issue:
Whether or not can be a voter considering that, according to the petitioner, her
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through R.A. No. 9225 has a retroactive effect and
considering further that, according to the respondent, petitioner was not a Filipino citizen when
she registered as a voter.
Held:
No.
In the present case, during the time Tan lost her Philippine citizenship, R.A. No. 9225 was
not yet enacted and the applicable law was still Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, both
the renunciation of Philippine citizenship and the acquisition of a new citizenship in a foreign
country through naturalization are grounds to lose Philippine citizenship. Thus, Tan was not a
Filipino citizen at the time she registered as a voter.
136. Nicolas-Lewis vs. Comelec, 497 SCRA 649
Facts:
Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and
certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the
United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September
23, 2003 2, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year
residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners can exercise the right of suffrage considering that,
according to the petitioners, they have reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225
and considering further that, according to the respondent, they have not established their
domicile.
Held:
Yes.
Section 5 (1) of R.A. 9189 provides that "duals" can enjoy their right to vote, as an adjunct
to political rights, only if they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V of the Constitution,
R.A. 9189 and other existing laws.
In this case, the next generation of "duals" may avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil
and political rights. There is no reason why the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided
they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189,
be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter.
137. AASJS vs. Datumanong, 523 SCRA 108
Facts:
Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who
Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent was implemented.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9225 is constitutional considering that, according to the petitioner, it
violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution and considering further that, according to
the respondent, it does not allow dual allegiance.
Held:
Pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt
with by law.
In this case, the Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is
enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding
dual allegiance.
138. Jacot vs. Dal, 572 SCRA 295
Facts:
Jacot was disqualified from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin,
on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his United States (US)
citizenship.
Issue:
Whether or not Jacot is qualified to run for office considering that, according to the
petitioner, he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, and
considering further that, according to the respondents, reacquisition of Philippine citizenship does
not automatically bestow upon any person the privilege to run for any elective public office.
Held:
No.
In this case, the oath shows that Jacot swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is
nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Thus, he is considered a dual citizen
and therefore, cannot run for a public office.
139. Agustin vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015
Facts:
The petitioner was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America who seeks the
position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is eligible to run for office considering that, according to the
petitioner, he had renounced his US citizenship and considering further that, according to the
respondents, he is a dual citizen.
Held:
No.
In this case, the petitioner used his US passport after he has already renounced his US
citizenship. This disqualified him from continuing his candidacy.

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SJS v. Dangerous Drug Board (G.R. No.

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