The young victims of martial law

(https://www.philstar.com/campus/2017/09/21/1741305/young-victims-martial-
law#rjOxeqQ6zv6lb4t5.99)

Liliosa Hilao

 -“Lili”, constant honor student at PLM

 EIC of campus publication which openly criticised the Marcos Admin.
 first female to die in detention during ML
 Soldiers from the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit beat up Lili and threw her to Camp
Crame. The Constabulary said the Liliosa committed suicide by drinking muriatic acid,
but her body showed otherwise. There were clear signs of torture: cigarette burns in her
lips, injection marks in her arms, and bruises all over her body.

Archimedes Trajano

 21 year-old student from Mapua

 Asked Imee Marcos in 1977 open forum at PLM on her capability to head the youth as
Chair of KB
 Trajano told Imee that she wouldn’t have been the head of KB hadn’t she been the
president’s daughter. He also questioned her father’s role in many human rights
violations.
 On Sept. 2, 1977, his body, covered in blood, was found on the streets of Manila.
Trajano’s parents were told their son got involved in a dorm brawl.
 Witnesses, however, said Trajano was last seen forcibly removed from the university
forum by Imee’s security detail.
 He was believed to have suffered from torture methods for 12 to 36 hours.

Ishmael “Jun” Quimpo Jr.

 College dropout who dedicated his life to the poor and downtrodden
 Involved in community organizing; member of Alyansa ng Maralita sa Tatalon, an
org in a huge slum in QC
 Resorts to singing and songwriting to express dismay on the regime
 In 1976, he quitted school and joined an anti-martial law org
 December 1981, was killed by a member of his unit who secretly joined the military

Ferdie Arceo
 1972, when he was about to take his last semester on a humanities degree, he was warned
to stop activism to be able to enroll; he dropped out and joined the NPA in Panay island
 eight moinths after he left home for the Madya-as mountains, he and a companion were
shot by policemen along a beach in San Joaquin, Iloilo
 Incident was part of operation by state security forces against “subversives” in Panay
Marcos years marked 'golden age' of PH economy? Look at the data

(https://www.rappler.com/views/imho/124682-marcos-economy-golden-age-philippines

Thirty years after the first EDSA Revolution, many myths about the Marcos era are being
deliberately floated around especially among today’s youth.
Particularly alarming is the mistaken notion that the Marcos era ushered in the “golden age” for
Philippine society, including the economy.
We thought we might contribute to the ongoing discussion by looking at the data and allowing
them to speak for themselves.
Indeed, for the newer generations with virtually no means of recalling the brutal martial law era
and the economic hardships that it brought, perhaps one of the best ways of reliving the Marcos
economy is by revisiting the data and opening yourselves to the story these data show.
To do so, we picked the top 5 graphs which, to our mind, best illustrate the ill outcomes of the
Marcos era on the economy.

1) We lost two decades of development

Original graphic by Punongbayan & Mandrilla (2016); basic data from PSA

What the graph shows: A continuous increase in GDP per capita (or income per person) is
usually understood as an overall improvement in economic welfare. Figure 1 shows that
Philippine GDP per capita declined after 1982 and did not reach the same level until 2003, or 21
years later.
What it means: This severe retrogression of Filipinos’ income per person – called “lost decades
of development” – testifies to a truly dark era in our economic history. It took the country an
entire generation to recover from the bad outcomes of the Marcos regime’s economic policies
and management. Even with this data alone, it is difficult to understand why many people cling
to the idea that the Marcos regime, taken as a whole, brought about the Philippine economy’s
“golden age”.

2) We became the “sick man” of Asia

Original graphic by Punongbayan & Mandrilla (2016); basic data from WDI

What the graph shows: The decline of income per person after 1982 was not seen in our
neighboring countries; in fact their incomes went on to soar since then. By the time we recovered
our 1982 income levels, their incomes had already grown between two to 4 times.
What it means: The economic setback due to the Marcos regime cemented our title as the “sick
man of Asia” for the good part of the past 3 decades, and prevented us from partaking of the so-
called “East Asian miracle”. Although we have enjoyed high annual growth rates of 5-7% in
recent years, Figure 2 shows that we lost so much ground compared to our neighbors and
catching up remains a huge challenge.
3) The regime borrowed too much too quickly
The country’s stock of debts grew exponentially in the late 1970s, and this imprudent debt
management burst into a full-blown crisis by 1983.

Original graphic by Punongbayan & Mandrilla (2016); basic data from WDI

What the graph shows: Figure 3 shows the unsustainability of debt during the Marcos regime.
From 1977 to 1982 (or in just 5 years) the country’s total external debt grew from $8.2 billion in
1977 to $24.4 billion. As a result, interest payments as a share of national income (in gray)
increased eightfold in the same period, a trend closely mirrored by the debt-exports ratio (in
orange).
What it means: For the country as a whole, borrowing per se is not a problem; it fact it can even
spur growth. Borrowing is problematic only when it becomes unsustainable, or when the debtor
fails to meet its obligations.
This is exactly what happened during the Marcos regime, whose many “successes” were built on
“debt-driven growth”. While it is true that the regime embarked on an infrastructure spending
spree, this was pursued largely to justify its existence and at the exorbitant cost of the ballooning
of the country’s external debt. The situation was exacerbated by a confluence of external factors,
including the Latin American debt crisis.
The 1983 debt crisis is a painful reminder of the long-run importance of sound and prudent
macroeconomic management. Contrary to the Marcosian economic view, borrowing alone
cannot induce growth. Instead, it requires deep, structural reforms that transform the economy
fundamentally and promote growth through innovation and enterprise.
4) Manufacturing was neglected
The crony capitalism espoused by the Marcos regime disincentivized enterprise and growth in
favor of cronies’ interests, leading to the inimical stagnation of the manufacturing sector.

Original graphic by Punongbayan & Mandrilla (2016); basic data from WDI. Note: data spans
from 1965 to 2004.

What the graph shows: The graph plots income per person (horizontal) versus the share of
manufacturing to total output (vertical). The two variables usually go together, as experienced by
our regional neighbors (notably South Korea); that is, income growth is usually accompanied by
manufacturing growth. This would become the typical pattern of East Asian success that the
Philippines, unfortunately, failed to replicate.
What it means: Although the Marcos era is remembered by many as an age of industrialization, it
was characterized by “crony capitalism” where Marcos’ closest allies were awarded industries
(e.g., TV and car manufacturing) and ambitious industrial projects (e.g., the Bataan Nuclear
Power Plant), many of which ended up being inefficient or bankrupt. Such an economic
environment led to the neglect and stagnation of the vital manufacturing sector, which, in turn,
slackened the pace of the country’s structural transformation.
5) Work conditions deteriorated rapidly
Finally, the martial law regime resulted in poor work conditions as testified by the sharp rise in
underemployment, which at one point afflicted a third of the employed.

Original graphic by Punongbayan & Mandrilla (2016); basic data from PSA. Note:
underemployment rate refers to percent employed

What the graph shows: Martial law coincided with a gradual rise in unemployment and more
importantly, a precipitous rise in underemployment (from around 10% to 33% of the employed).
Some scholars (including Prof Noel de Dios of UP) argue that for a developing country like the
Philippines it may be underemployment (or the inadequacy of one’s work) that matters more
than unemployment. After all, unemployment tends to be a middle-class phenomenon: most of
the poor are employed, and most of the unemployed (e.g., college graduates) are nonpoor.
What it means: Since underemployment contributes to poverty, the severe underemployment
brought by the martial law era gives a glimpse of the deterioration of welfare for Filipino
households during that time. This dissatisfaction in the labor force (especially among skilled
workers) would later give rise to the widespread growth of the OFW phenomenon after 1986.
Conclusion
The notion of a “golden age” of the Philippine economy under the Marcos regime, especially
during its latter years, is a big, fat lie especially when pitted against the data during that time. It’s
quite amazing (and disturbing) that a single man with absolute power could bring down an entire
economy to a lower growth trajectory and set back the march of the country’s economic
development by decades.
National Scientist Raul V. Fabella once said, “The annals of underdevelopment are filled with
chapters on failures due to wasted opportunities”.
As we go to the polling booths on May 9, let us all heed the lessons of history and data, and
choose leaders who will lead us to rapid, inclusive, and sustainable development by not repeating
the mistakes of the Marcos regime (or even daring to kindle among the people its false, illusory
glory). – Rappler.com
Martial Law and its Aftermath, (1972-86)
(http://countrystudies.us/philippines/57.htm)

The Philippines found itself in an economic crisis in early 1970, in large part the consequence of
the profligate spending of government funds by President Marcos in his reelection bid. The
government, unable to meet payments on its US$2.3 billion international debt, worked out
a US$27.5 million standby credit arrangement with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) that involved renegotiating the country's external debt and devaluing the Philippine
currency to P6.40 to the United States dollar. The government, unwilling and unable to take
the necessary steps to deal with economic difficulties on its own, submitted to the external
dictates of the IMF. It was a pattern that would be repeated with increasing frequency in the next
twenty years.

In September 1972, Marcos declared martial law, claiming that the country was faced with
revolutions from both the left and the right. He gathered around him a group of businessmen,
used presidential decrees and letters of instruction to provide them with monopoly positions
within the economy, and began channeling resources to himself and his associates,
instituting what came to be called "crony capitalism." By the time Marcos fled the
Philippines in February 1986, monopolization and corruption had severely crippled the
economy.

In the beginning, this tendency was not so obvious. Marcos's efforts to create a "New Society"
were supported widely by the business community, both Filipino and foreign, by
Washington, and, de facto, by the multilateral institutions. Foreign investment was
encouraged: an export-processing zone was opened; a range of additional investment
incentives was created, and the Philippines projected itself onto the world economy as a
country of low wages and industrial peace. The inflow of international capital increased
dramatically.

A general rise in world raw material prices in the early 1970s helped boost the performance of
the economy; real GNP grew at an average of almost 7 percent per year in the five years after
the declaration of martial law, as compared with approximately 5 percent annually in the five
preceding years. Agriculture performed better that it did in the 1960s. New rice technologies
introduced in the late 1960s were widely adopted. Manufacturing was able to maintain the
6 percent growth rate it achieved in the late 1960s, a rate, however, that was below that of the
economy as a whole. Manufactured exports, on the other hand, did quite well, growing at a rate
twice that of the country's traditional agricultural exports. The public sector played a much larger
role in the 1970s, with the extent of government expenditures in GNP rising by 40 percent in
the decade after 1972. To finance the boom, the government extensively resorted to
international debt, hence the characterization of the economy of the Marcos era as "debt
driven."

In the latter half of the 1970s, heavy borrowing from transnational commercial banks,
multilateral organizations, and the United States and other countries masked problems that had
begun to appear on the economic horizon with the slowdown of the world economy. By 1976 the
Philippines was among the top 100 recipients of loans from the World Bank and was considered
a "country of concentration." Its balance of payments problem was solved and growth
facilitated, at least temporarily, but at the cost of having to service an external debt that
rose from US$2.3 billion in 1970 to more than US$17.2 billion in 1980.

There were internal problems as well, particularly in respect of the increasingly visible
mismanagement of crony enterprises. A financial scandal in January 1981 in which a
businessman fled the country with debts of an estimated P700 million required massive amounts
of emergency loans from the Central Bank of the Philippines and other government-owned
financial institutions to some eighty firms. The growth rate of GNP fell dramatically, and
from then the economic ills of the Philippines proliferated. In 1980 there was an abrupt
change in economic policy, related to the changing world economy and deteriorating internal
conditions, with the Philippine government agreeing to reduce the average level and
dispersion of tariff rates and to eliminate most quantitative restrictions on trade, in
exchange for a US$200 million structural adjustment loan from the World Bank. Whatever
the merits of the policy shift, the timing was miserable. Exports did not increase substantially,
while imports increased dramatically. The result was growing debt-service payments;
emergency loans were forthcoming, but the hemorrhaging did not cease.

It was in this environment in August 1983 that President Marcos's foremost critic, former
Senator Benigno Aquino, returned from exile and was assassinated. The country was thrown into
an economic and political crisis that resulted eventually, in February 1986, in the ending of
Marcos's twenty-one-year rule and his flight from the Philippines. In the meantime, debt
repayment had ceased. Real GNP fell more than 11 percent before turning back up in 1986, and
real GNP per capita fell 17 percent from its high point in 1981. In 1990 per capita real GNP was
still 7 percent below the 1981 level.
Look Back: The Philippine Constabulary under Marcos

(https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/146867-look-back-philippine-constabulary-marcos)

President Duterte says he wants to revive the Philippine Constabulary – the law
enforcement force that became notorious for human rights abuses during the Martial Law
years
MANILA, Philippines – Days before the Philippines is set to mark the 44th anniversary of the
declaration of Martial Law, President Rodrigo Duterte made another callback to history:
announcing his plan to revive the Philippine Constabulary (PC).

He needed to do so, he said, to fight urban terrorism.

"I will return the Philippine Constabulary under the 4 commands – army and the Philippine
Constabulary because I need people in urban terrorism like the [Special Action Forces]," Duterte
said in a speech before a military camp on Tuesday, September 20, 2016.

The PC was the national police force that began under the American regime in 1901. It
eventually became part of the military and was in charge of maintaining peace and order.

But it became infamous during the martial law years of the late president Ferdinand
Marcos, who used the PC to implement his strongman rule and arrest those deemed critical
of the dictatorship.

...
Following the declaration of Martial Law, the PC took the lead in its implementation. Marcos
had ordered the takeover of private establishments and the arrest of activists – orders followed
through by the PC.

Under Presidential Decree 170, signed in April 1973, the defense secretary was given the power
to place any city or municipal police force under the control of the PC.

...
Promises of New Society

(https://martiallawmuseum.ph/magaral/promises-of-the-new-society/)

In any of President Ferdinand Marcos’s key speeches, he was most inspiring when he would talk
about his vision of the New Society, or Bagong Lipunan, in which every individual Filipino
could be free to fulfill their potential as human beings.

In such a society, no longer would Filipinos live in poverty, hunger, corruption, mass deception,
and violence. After centuries of colonial oppression, Marcos would declare in his speeches, it
was time for Filipinos to finally live in a way that was worthy of their dignity.

In his declaration of Martial Law, Marcos made many specific promises in order to achieve his
dream of the New Society. A brilliant statesman and orator by many accounts, his vision
represented a great aspiration for the Filipino people to enjoy happy and fulfilling lives.

Promise # 1: End Poverty and Create Equality

In many of Marcos’s speeches as President, he declared that central to his mission for the New
Society was to make it a revolution of the poor, aimed at protecting the helpless of
Philippine society and ending the inequality that had kept the nation from truly pursuing
inclusive growth.

Marcos condemned a society based on privilege. He condemned the suffering that privilege
and inequality caused the Filipino people, the unjust anguish of millions at the expense of the
few. In an essay called “The Radicalization of Society”, Marcos declared that:

“We envision, therefore, a new society in which equality of opportunity is not a fraud but a
fact . . . This simply means that a few should not be born “with everything” while the many
have nothing.”

Thus, Marcos promised a Philippines in which true equality of opportunity could be attained. By
striking at the roots of the Philippine social, political, and economic order, Marcos dreamed of a
New Society in which every Filipino, whom he asserted to be equal in rights and in dignity, was
born into a world which allowed him to live out this profound truth.
Promise # 2: End Hunger and Drive Development

In a speech delivered with the World Health Organization in 1968, Marcos emphasized the
importance of increasing food production in the country, in order to sustain the Filipino people’s
basic need for nutrition. He was aware of the troubling fact that despite the huge potential of
Philippine land to produce agricultural resources, millions remained hungry and
malnourished.

More than satisfying the local need, however, Marcos set forth an even more ambitious goal: not
only would the country be producing enough crops to feed the people, the Philippines
would even become an exporter to other nations.

Beyond this, Marcos dreamed of a Philippines in which farmers—directly responsible for

producing majority of local food resources—would be in direct control of their means of
production. This entailed opening up vast opportunities for education and redistributing the land
so they stood to benefit most from their own hard work. Said Marcos, in a speech to the World
Health Organization in 1968:

“I envisage that in the not too distant future our workers in the field of nutrition will be
confronted with the problem of how to utilize scientifically and effectively the foodstuff already
available rather than in worrying as to when and where the essential food elements will be
secured. “

Promise # 3: End Corruption and Enact Justice

Even in his very first State of the Nation Address in 1966, Marcos was direct about his promise
to reform government in order to eliminate corruption, which he viewed as one of the worst
impediments to national growth. He said:

“Our administrative machinery must be regenerated to gear it to the requirements of

national growth. Graft and corruption in our government must be exposed and
eliminated.”

To this end, Marcos recognized that the political climate in the country had to be struck at the
roots. No longer should the same elite families be awarded power by virtue of their blood or
their connections. Moreover, he envisioned swift recompense for those in power who only
aimed to abuse it. The Filipino people would have justice, no matter what one’s name was, or
whose family one belonged to.
In Marcos’s envisioned model of radical political change, the Philippines would only have as
its leaders the best and the brightest. Power could only be conferred upon those who
genuinely desired a life of service, and had the skilful capacity to realize this desire.

Promise # 4: End Deception and Promote Truth

Marcos also recognized mass deception and misinformation as a grave ill that had befallen
Philippine society. He claimed that the notion of freedom of speech had been abused by the
richest of the rich, such that:

“The media have become the weapon of a special class rather than serve as a public forum.
. . . The control of media has perpetuated the simplistic politics that have been obstructive
of meaningful change.”

Because the media institutions were owned by the wealthy and powerful, Marcos accused the
news of being permeated by their personal agendas. Thus, public perceptions of events were
regularly manipulated to favor these special interests.

Marcos thus promised to end this “selective journalism”. In its place, aligned with his vision
of a truly democratic Philippines, he endorsed an ideal of media practice that fulfilled its genuine
goal of furnishing the Filipino people with the truth. Equipped with the truth, every Filipino
citizen would be empowered to effectively participate in the affairs of the nation.

Promise # 5: End Violence and Usher in Peace

Finally, Marcos recognized that alongside these structural ills which afflicted the nation,
everyday criminality was likewise rampant in society. Rates of murder, rape, and theft were
unacceptably high, violating the basic expectation of Filipino citizens to live a life of safety
and security. On the borders of Philippine territory, sovereignty over Sabah was being
challenged by Malaysia, hinting at the tense possibility of war.

To address this, Marcos swore to relentlessly pursue measures to alleviate this daily
violence and usher in an era of peace. To quell the international threat, Marcos promised to
institute advancements for the Philippine military while negotiating a critical juncture for peace.
To combat local threats, Marcos set forth plans for an exceptionally disciplined police force,
capable of not just stopping crime, but preventing it by its sheer effectiveness.
Most important to Marcos, however, in his vision of a peaceful Philippines, was the individual
contribution of every Filipino. This entailed the personal dedication and alignment of all to the
Marcos vision of the New Society, encapsulated by the mantra “Sa ikauunlad ng bayan, disiplina
ang kailangan.” In his media appearance formally announcing the declaration of Martial Law in
September 23, 1972, Marcos vowed:

If you offend the New Society, you shall be punished like the rest of the offenders. People
who have nothing whatsoever to do with such conspiracy and operations to overthrow the
Republic of the Philippines by violence or subversion have nothing to fear.