113. BUMAGAT VS ARRIBAY GR.

194818 JUNE 9, 2014

FACTS: Bumagat and others are the registered owners of about eight
hectares of agricultural land. They filed a complaint for forcible entry
against Arribay before the MCTC alleging that with the aid of armed
goons and though the use of intimidation and threats of physical harm,
the latter entered the former’s parcels of land and ousted them from
their lawful possession. Arribay sought for the dismissal of the
complaint, claiming that the subject properties are agricultural lands-
which renders the dispute an agrarian matter and subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB. The MARO denied the motion for
failure to show the existed of a tenancy or agrarian relationship between
the parties. The MCTC found that no tenancy or other agrarian
relationship existed between the parties. The RTC affirmed. The CA
reversed the RTC and agreed that the dispute fell under the jurisdiction
of the DARAB.

ISSUE: Is the dispute within the jurisdiction of DARAB?

RULING: No. The CA failed to realize the fact that as between the
parties, there is no tenurial arrangement, not even an implied one. For
the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a
tenancy relation between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement
to take hold over a dispute, it is essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, to wit: 1.) that the parties are the landowner
and the tenant of agricultural lessee; 2.) that the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the
parties to the relaionship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to
bring abpout agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation
on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest
is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
In the present case, it is no tenant, as both parties claim ownership over
the property.
114. REPUBLIC VS DACLAN GR 197115 MARCH 23, 2015

FACTS: The Agoo Breeding station was establish by the Department

of Agricultural, through the Bureau of Animal Industry, Region 1 for
purpose of breeding cattle that would be distributed to the intended
beneficiaries pursuant to the livelihood program of the nation
government. In support of the said project plaintiff executed 4
documents denominated as deed of donation in favor of defendant
donating to the latter 4 parcels of land. The donation was subject to the
conditions that these parcels of land 1. Shall be used solely for the
establishment of breeding station, and 2. Shall not be used for any other
purpose, except with the previous consent of the donors or their heirs.
All in all, the petitioners and several others donated around 13 hectares
of land to the republic. The uniform deed of donation covering these
parcels of land contained the same conditions, including the above
stipulations relative toe exclusive purpose/use and automatic reversion.
Sometime after the donations were made LUMC was constructed on a
1.5 hectare portion of the 13 hectare donated property. The secretary
of the Department of Agriculture, the Daclans and other donors
demanded the return of their donated lands on the ground that the
breeding station has ceased operations and that the land has been
abandoned.

ISSUE: WON Honorable CA erred in directing the petitioner to return

portions of the parcels of land donated by respondents and their
forbears based on an unestablished inference.

HELD: The CA cannot validly order the return to the Daclans of the
donated 1.5-hectare portion where the LUMC is situated, because such
portion was not donated by them. They admitted that the 1.5-hectare
portion where the LUMC is constructed does not form part of the lands
they donated to the government, but belonged to other
donors who are not parties to the instant case. As far as the
Daclans are concerned, whatever they donated remains part of the
breeding station and so long as it remains so, no right of reversion
accrues to them. Only the original owner-donor of the 1.5-hectare
portion where the LUMC is constructed is entitled to its return.

115. Esperanza C. Carinan vs Spouses Gavino Cueto and

Carmelita Cueto G.R. No. 198636 October 8 2014

Facts: The respondent spouses alleged that in May 1986 that the
petitioner and her husband acquired the rights to a parcel of land in
Laguna under the name of the GSIS and were to assume payment of
the monthly amortizations. The petitioner and her husband did not pay
several amortizations, thus the GSIS planned to cancel the conditional
sale in 2005. Petitioner, who was widowed by then, went to Gavino, her
brother, for financial help and the respondents paid the total obligation
to GSIS along with the payment for transfer and renovation of the
residential house. The petitioner and Jazer, the petitioner's son,
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with the condition to buy the land
back within three years. The petitioner surrendered the TCT to the
respondents. The respondents demanded from the petitioner to fulfill
the transfer of the property through the deed of sale by the petitioner
and her son did not comply. The respondents filed with the RTC seeking
refund of the total expenses paid plus damages and attorney's fees.
Petitioner countered saying that it was donation and the payment was
made out of generosity and pity towards the petitioner and there was
no written or oral agreement for transfer or repayment. The RTC ruled
in favor of the respondents reasoning that such a large amount paid by
the respondent was a loan, not a donation, and if the intention was
donation, the petitioner should have kept possession of the title. The
RTC cannot compel the petitioner to transfer the property since it was
unenforceable as it was not in writing. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC.

Issue: WON the agreement was a contract of loan or donation

Held: The SC affirmed the decision of the RTC and CA The SC ruled
that the purely gratuitous act was not supported by records citing the
Civil Code that any donation over Php5000 shall be in writing otherwise
it is void. The formal requirements are mandatory according to Article
748 and non compliance results in a void donation. Although giving help
to someone in need, it does not mean such help equates to a donation
and would not contradict a claim for the return of the aid given. The
petitioner imputed deceit on the part of the respondent, a serious
charge that cannot be proven by mere allegation. The factual findings
of the trial court and affirmed by the CA will not be disturbed. Such
findings are conclusive upon the SC when supported by evidence on
record. The petitioner also introduced the issues of co-ownership and
builders in bad faith. Such factual issues cannot be raised on a petition
for reviews on certiorari and such defenses cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.
116. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DAVID REY GUZMAN

FACTS: David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son

of the spouses Simeon Guzman (naturalized American) and Helen
Meyers Guzman (American citizen). In 1968, Simeon died leaving to his
heirs, Helen and David, an estate consisting of several parcels of land
in Bulacan.
In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
of the Estate, dividing and adjudicating to themselves all of the property,
and registered it to the RD a year after.In 1981, Helen executed a Deed
of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and conveying her ½ share of the
properties to David. But since it was not registered, she executed
another Deed of Quitclaim to confirm the first.

In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG andfurnished it with

documents showing that David’s ownership of ½ of the estate was
defective. He argued that Art. XII of the Constitution only allows Filipinos
to acquire private lands in the country. The only instances when a
foreigner may acquire private property are by hereditary succession
and if he was formerly a natural-born citizen who lost his Filipino
citizenship. Moreover, it contends that the Deeds of Quitclaim executed
by Helen were really donations inter vivos.Republic filed with RTC a
Petition for Escheat praying that ½ of David’s interest be forfeited in its
favor. RTC dismissed. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos
HELD: NO. Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer
of the properties by virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim resulted in the (1)
reduction of her patrimony as donor and the (2) consequent increase in
the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen’s (3) intention to
perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently
established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended to convey to
her son certain parcels of land and to re-affirm it, she executed a waiver
and renunciation of her rights over these properties. It is clear that Helen
merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, interest over the lands
in favor of David, not a donation. She was also aware that donation was
not possible.
Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form and
registration to make the donation valid is lacking. The SPA executed by
David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his acceptance, but an
acknowledgment that David owns the property referred to and that he
authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name. Further, there was
nothing in the SPA to show that he indeed accept the donation.

However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the repudiation

of Helen in favor David valid. There is NO valid repudiation of
inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of the inheritance
when she, together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate, dividing and adjudicating between them all the
properties. By virtue of that settlement, the properties were registered
in their names and for 11 years, they possessed the land in the concept
of owner. Thus, the 2 Quitclaims have no legal force and effect. Helen
still owns ½ of the property.
117. GONZALO VILLANUEVA VS SPS. FROILAND AND LEONILA
BRANCOCO GR 172804 JANUARY 24, 2011
FACTS: Gonzalo Villanueva, represented by his heirs, sued Spouses
Branoco to recover a parcel of land. The former claimed ownership over
the property thru purchase from Vere, who in turn, bought the property
from Rodrigo. Gonzalo declared the property in his name for tax
purposes soon after acquiring it. In their answer, the Spouses Baranoco
similarly claimed ownership over the property thru purchase from
Rodriguez, who in turn, acquired the property from Rodrigo by way of
donation. The Spouses entered the property and paid taxes afterwards.
The trial court ruled in favor of Gonzalo and declared him owner of the
property, and ordered the Spouses Branoco to surrender possession to
Gonzalo. The trial court rejected Spouses Branoco’s claim of ownership
after treating the Deed as a donation mortis causa which Rodrigo
effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere. Thus, by the time
Rodriguez sold the property to the Spouses, she had no title to transfer.
On appeal, the CA granted the Spouses’ appeal and set aside the trial
court's ruling. it held that the deed of donation is one of inter vivos. In
his petition, Gonzalo seeks the reinstatement of the trial court's ruling.
Alternatively, petitioner claims ownership over the Property through
acquisitive prescription, having allegedly occupied it for more than 10
years.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract between Rodrigo and Rodriguez is

a donation or a devise?

RULING: It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to

Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos.

First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases

me, the Property will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be
inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling the
irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez's estate,
waiving Rodrigo's right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was
perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez's
acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected in the Deed,
took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo's
acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in
presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivosneed
acceptance by the recipient. Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to
retain full title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated,
as the testator did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer,
sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here
donated x x x" or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo
expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez
predeceases her.

Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the

beneficial title to the Property, evident from Rodriguez's
undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land to
Apoy Alve during her lifetime." Thus, the Deed's stipulation that
"the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise,"
taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to
Rodrigo's beneficial title. Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full
ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary for her to
reserve partial usufructuary right over it.

Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor's

death, such as the donor's love and affection to the donee and
the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises,
nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x
[inter vivos] transfers." Thus, the CA committed no error in giving
weight to Rodrigo's statement of "love and affection" for
Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the gift, to underscore
its finding. Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo's post-
donation transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her retention
of ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds
of donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on
gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property
 owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while
founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing ownership. The
interest of settled property dispositions counsels against
licensing such practice. Accordingly, having irrevocably
transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in 1965,
Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of
the said property in favor of another." Thus, Rodrigo's post-
donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Vere's
successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than
him. On the other hand, respondents bought the Property from
Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter's title which they may invoke
against all adverse claimants, including petitioner.

118. CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY VS CA GR 112127 JULY

17, 1995

FACTS: In 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez was a member of the board
of trustees of Central Philippine University when he executed a
donation to the school, stating that the land must be for exclusive use
of a medical college. 50 years later, The heirs of Ramon Lopez filed an
action to annul the donation, stating the failure of the school to construct
the medical college over the land. RTC ruled in favor of respondents,
which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether there is a resolutory condition

RULING: The donation was an onerous one, where failure of the school
to construct a medical college would give the heirs the power to revoke
the donation, reverting the property back to the heirs of the donor. It is
therefore a resolutory condition. Although, the period was not stated,
and the courts should have fixed a period, in this case, 50 years has
lapsed since the donation was executed, thus fixing a period would
serve no purpose and the property must already be reverted back.

119. Insular v Ebrado G.R. No. L-44059 October 28, 1977

Facts: J. Martin: Cristor Ebrado was issued by The Life Assurance Co.,
Ltd., a policy for P5,882.00 with a rider for Accidental Death. He
designated Carponia T. Ebrado as the revocable beneficiary in his
policy. He referred to her as his wife.

Cristor was killed when he was hit by a failing branch of a tree. Insular
Life was made liable to pay the coverage in the total amount of
P11,745.73, representing the face value of the policy in the amount of
P5,882.00 plus the additional benefits for accidental death.

Carponia T. Ebrado filed with the insurer a claim for the proceeds as
the designated beneficiary therein, although she admited that she and
the insured were merely living as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage.
Pascuala Vda. de Ebrado also filed her claim as the widow of the
deceased insured. She asserts that she is the one entitled to the
insurance proceeds.
Insular commenced an action for Interpleader before the trial court as
to who should be given the proceeds. The court declared Carponia as
disqualified.

Issue: WON a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life

insurance policy of a legally married man can claim the proceeds in
case of death of the latter?

Held: No. Petition

Ratio:Section 50 of the Insurance Act which provides that "the

insurance shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the
person in whose name it is made"The word "interest" highly suggests
that the provision refers only to the "insured" and not to the beneficiary,
since a contractof insurance is personal in character. Otherwise, the
prohibitory laws against illicit relationships especially on property
and descent will be rendered nugatory, as the same could easily be
circumvented by modes of insurance. When not otherwise specifically
provided for by the Insurance Law, the contract of life insurance is
governed by the general rules of the civil law regulating contracts. And
under Article 2012 of the same Code, any person who is forbidden from
receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be
named beneficiary of a fife insurance policy by the person who cannot
make a donation to him. Common-law spouses are barred from
receiving donations from each other.

Article 739 provides that void donations are those made between
persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
donation. There is every reason to hold that the bar
in donations between legitimate spouses and those between
illegitimate ones should be enforced in life insurance policies since the
same are based on similar consideration. So long as marriage remains
the threshold of family laws, reason and morality dictate that the
impediments imposed upon married couple should likewise be imposed
upon extra-marital relationship.

A conviction for adultery or concubinage isn’t required exacted before

the disabilities mentioned in Article 739 may effectuate. The article says
that in the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity
may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilty of
the donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same
action.
The underscored clause neatly conveys that no criminal conviction for
the offense is a condition precedent. The law plainly states that the guilt
of the party may be proved “in the same acting for declaration of nullity
of donation.” And, it would be sufficient if evidence preponderates. The
insured was married to Pascuala Ebrado with whom she has six
legitimate children. He was also living in with his common-law wife with
whom he has two children.

120. ZAMBOANGA V PLAGATA G.R. No. 148433 : September 30,

2008

Facts: On 17 June 1981, ZBTKBI, thru its President, Atty. Hassan G.

Alam, and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Maj. Gen.
Delfin C. Castro entered into a Deed of Donation whereby ZBTKBI
donated to the Republic a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of
Canelar, City of Zamboanga, containing an area of 13,643 square
meters, more or less. The building was completed on 30 March 1983
and was occupied by members of ZBTKBI, as well as by other persons
engaged in barter trade. On 17 June 1988, the Office of the President
issued Memorandum Circular No. 1 which totally phased out the
Zamboanga City barter trade area effective 1 October 1988. Petitioner
argues effective October 1, 1988, the donated property was no longer
owned by the Republic of the Philippines having violated the condition
number 4. Following the condition contained in the Deed of Donation,
the donated land shall revert to the petitioner without further formality
or documentation. It follows that upon the phase-out of barter trade,
petitioner again became the owner of the subject land. As found by the
Court of Appeals, Atty. Hasan G. Alam subscribed to the legal reality
that ZBTKBI was the owner of the subject land when he wrote Lt. Gen.
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. of the Southern Command on 6 February 1996,
requesting the return of the original TCT covering the property. It should
be clear that reversion applied only to the land and not to the building
and improvements made by the Republic on the land worth
P5,000,000.00.

Issue: Whether or not a stipulation of automatic reversion in a deed of

donation valid

Held: The deed of donation contains a stipulation that allows automatic

reversion. Such stipulation, not being contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding on the parties
to the donation. As held in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort
North) Municipality of Dumangas, citing Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila v. Court of Appeals70 When a deed of donation expressly
provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property
donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription
should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306
of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such
stipulations, not contrary to law, public order or public policy, we are of
the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing
for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial
action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the
propriety of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained,
the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation,
but it is not in itself the revocatory act. The automatic reversion of the
subject land to the donor upon phase out of barter trading in
Zamboanga City cannot be doubted. Said automatic reversion cannot
be averted, merely because petitioner-donor has not yet exercised its
option to purchase the buildings and improvements made and
introduced on the land by the Republic; or because the Republic has
not yet sold the same to other interested buyers. Otherwise, there would
be gross violation of the clear import of the conditions set forth in the
deed of donation.