REPUBLIC V. SERENO (G.R. No.

237428, May 11, 2018)

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA

LOURDES P.A. SERENO,

G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam, En Banc]

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act or
omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications
to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the
qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a
validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

FACTS:

From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of
Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed
as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy
Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on Sereno’s
file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment,
only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a
manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or
“drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified
to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.

On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was
declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all previous
SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those
from the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date
documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter
to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated as
coming from the private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an
Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that “considering that most of her government records in the
academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and
that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the
letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete
requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that
Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to hear the
case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then,
was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry
amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and
subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of the
Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original
jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule
66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to
declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom.
[yourlawyersays]

Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition against
AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having testified
against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.

Contentions:

Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):

OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to question the
validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of
the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto
and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2,
Article XI of the Constitution means that Members of the SC may be removed through modes other than
impeachment.

OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66
since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims
that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi
(“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the government. The State has a
continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming
that the one-year period is applicable to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG will
have no other means by which to know the disqualification.

Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a permanent
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving graft and corruption and
ethical violations against members of the SC and contending that this is not a political question because such
issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and
Canons of Judicial Ethics.

OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a
person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section
7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of
filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal
obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the
office. Good faith cannot be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No.
3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA No. 6713) are
special laws and are thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is
completely immaterial.

Sereno (respondent):

Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2 of
Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First
lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio.
Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive category
of public officers who can be removed only by impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as
the method of removing certain high-ranking government officers to shield them from harassment suits that will
prevent them from performing their functions which are vital to the continued operations of government. Sereno
further argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the
impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the SC has no
jurisdiction.
Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case because the
President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on the basis of
Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the “sole judge” of all
contests relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President. There is no such provision for
other impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo
warranto may be allowed.

Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would result to a
conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and
administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to Sections 6
and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative power over all
courts and the personnel thereof.

Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the OSG,
the Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile.

Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for quo
warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the
disqualification.

Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs because as a
public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to overcome
the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all administrative
responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question which can only be decided by the JBC and the
President.

Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to the
inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an inference to a pattern of
filing, not of non-filing.

Intervenors’ arguments:

The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed the
integrity required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or not she qualified for the post
fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what is only required is
the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age, and
experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such as competence, integrity, probity, and independence
are mere subjective considerations.

ISSUES:

Preliminary issues:

Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention

Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five Justices
Main Issues:

Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto.
Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.
Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding, i.e.,
whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is impeachment.
Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of separation of powers
Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive function of the
JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a political question outside the Court’s
supervisory and review powers;
Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of Chief Justice.
If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the
Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations
If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed properly and promptly.
Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC
If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the
nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;
In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent
nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.
Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.
[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

HELD:

Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant
therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be
affected by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of right but rests on the sound
discretion of the court upon compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and the second requirement
that no delay and prejudice should result. The justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their common
desire to protect and uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’
intervention that their would-be participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the articles of
impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the impeachment court will be taken away is not sufficient. The
interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply
contingent or expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo warranto is brought in the name of the Republic. It is
vested in the people, and not in any private individual or group, because disputes over title to public office are
viewed as a public question of governmental legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel among rival claimants.

Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in the
case.

It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the right of a party to seek the
inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of
repression. Bias must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Those justices who were present at the
impeachment proceedings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the
Members are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge. The mere imputation of bias or
partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. There must be acts or
conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or
partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on speculations, or on distortions of the language, context
and meaning of the answers the Justices may have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings before the
House.

Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in entertaining the
quo warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and discordance
between the Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden to no one, except to the sovereign
Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to misrepresent that the
SolGen who has supposedly met consistent litigation success before the SG shall likewise automatically and
positively be received in the present quo warranto action. As a collegial body, the Supreme Court adjudicates
without fear or favor. The best person to determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the magistrate
sought to be disqualified. [yourlawyersays]
Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has jurisdiction.

The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo
warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are
special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the
action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental importance
and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise
restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright
dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear
abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto
proceedings are essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional
duty and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or
transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government including the Congress, even as
it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of
the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules while impeachment is a political
process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by
appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a public office may not be
contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as
a public wrong and carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The
SolGen is given permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by
the national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.

Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not forum
shopping and is allowed.

Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to
(1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved
adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court,
then in another. The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there
is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo
warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to
be considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s
prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue
in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public office
and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses
to warrant her removal from office.

Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease
from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a conviction for the
charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office that
he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in
the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.

Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House is not the
impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The impeachment case is yet to
be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no
pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the House is merely inquisitorial and is merely
a means of discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a crime.
Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly
elected impeachable official may be removed from office.

The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against
impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote
discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an
opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express provision for removal
by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other
adequate reasons to account for this express provision.”

The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted
for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the
Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not
extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the PET Rules
expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the
eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.

Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those enumerated
offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise
purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. If other causes of removal are
available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the view that appointments or
election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any
possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in
an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an
impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of
foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently
represented to be a member of the Bar.

Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not
violative of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who would otherwise
be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional
provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. Again, the difference
between quo warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo warranto does not try a
person’s culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce
such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude
Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and
transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed
power of impeachment.

However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the
conclusion that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if indeed
Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal
controversy simply because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to
sanction the initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire
membership of the Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment
proceedings for the possible removal of a public official, who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under
existing laws and case law.

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or
election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is
properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are
present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected
official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.

The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an
action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within
one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose”.
Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where private individuals asserting their
right of office, unlike the instant case where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice.
Instead, it is the government itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue
the qualification of the person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.

Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President
of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified
in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action.” It may be stated that
ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce
a public right. There is no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there
be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to
an action by the Government.

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo
warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the
action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold public office, much
more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s
qualification· for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has
not been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was
therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.

Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC
complies with its own rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under
the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an
officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy from the Court
as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the Constitution
contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of
discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy
decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective
powers. While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not
give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC
is not accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political
questions that the Court is barred from resolving. [yourlawyersays]

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained by
the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an
applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and
ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of
the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme
Court must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of
office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to comply” with
the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal
from service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and
employees. The filing of the SALN is so important for purposes of transparency and accountability that failure
to comply with such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the public service but also in criminal
liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-compliance with this requirement is not only
punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in disqualification to hold public office.

Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a
positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion in
one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and are considered as
accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby subject themselves to all
constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all the duties of their office.
The public has the right to demand the performance of those duties. More importantly, while every office in the
government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.

Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a trivial
or a formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity does not
persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the
omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law,
and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have
easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the
Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The
Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a letter of the
head of the personnel of the branch of the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and
received by the OCA as the repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be
in the records of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the repository
agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof
constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is
categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009
except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her
SALN.

For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from UP HRDO
and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence. Further,
the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by the State in that the burden
rests upon the respondent.

In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing her SALN
because it is not tantamount to separation from government service. The fact that Sereno did not receive any
pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a government worker “serving in an honorary
capacity” to be exempted from the SALN laws on RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]
Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the period when
Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the
Ombudsman had not yet established compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials and
employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue
compliance order came about only on 2006 from the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been
expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet in
existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said clearance is
limited only to clearing Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities, money and property
accountabilities and from administrative charges as of the date of her resignation.

Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the shortlist
nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her inclusion in the shortlist
of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply her with the requisite proof of
integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to
have considered Sereno eligible because it does not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was
squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment to the
position do not estop the Republic or this Court from looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises
where the representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an
innocent mistake

Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the
Constitutional and statutory requirements .

Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is
attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious circumstances
include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only
notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she received the bulk of her
fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases
were not reflected, suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her first five months
as Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in complying with the physical act
of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The Court does not
hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials whose SALNs were found to have
contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.

Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant to the
JBC rules.

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent Associate
Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been considered for
nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was singled out from the rest
of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in UP Law. It is
clear that JBC did not do away with the SALN requirement, but still required substantial compliance.
Subsequently, it appeared that it was only Sereno who was not able to substantially comply with the SALN
requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing justifications why she should no longer
be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only
in 2009, thus her government service is not continuous; that her government records are more than 15 years
old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative responsibilities
and charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to the JBC
in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply. Moreover,
Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs during the course of her employment in
U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of
integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme Court. [yourlawyersays]
Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs but there was no
compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the service
at the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance
with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability
to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. For these
reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered Sereno for interview.

Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her false
representations that she was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for the
government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with SALNs
requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for the years
2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms.
Macasaet without requisite public bidding, misused P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel accommodation
at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court’s internal rules,
manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao,
ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of survivorship benefits which caused undue
delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the
processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential
document involving national security against the latter among others, all belie the fact that Sereno has integrity.

Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her
integrity was not established at the time of her application

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position of Chief
Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the
requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone through. Further,
the failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the opportunity to
consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for
example, the waiver of the confidentiality of bank deposits would be practically useless for the years that she
failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same matches the entries indicated in the
SALN.

Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination
and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of appointment and
assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The voidance of
the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is ineligible, in the first
place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said position follows as a
matter of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the
Court can take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo
warranto proceeding, maintains the power to issue such further judgment determining the respective rights in
and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office
constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and nomination process is evident
from the composition of the JBC itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While the Court surrenders
discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-negotiable
requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of
which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto
The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid
appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a
Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a
colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her
removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at
the instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno from the appointive position of Chief Justice.
[yourlawyersays]

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and
EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED
therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is
directed to commence the application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.

Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be
sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for
transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme
Court.
Marcos burial case: Ocampo vs. Enriquez case digest
October 9, 2017

Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. vs. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al., G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097,
226116, 226120 & 226294, November 8, 2016

Facts:

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly
announced that he would allow the burial former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga
Bayani ("LNMB"). Duterte won the May 9, 2016 elections.

On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to AFP Chief of Staff
General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng
Mga Bayani.

On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine Army on the
Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and
Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court.

ISSUES

1) Whether respondents Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave abuse of discretion when
they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to
implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB?

2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violated the
Constitution, and domestic and international laws?

3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their cronies, and
the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former
President to interment at the LNMB?

4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of former President Marcos
at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as to
the conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be brought back to and interred in the Philippines?

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petitions.

Procedural issues

Political question

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at
the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the excercise of his powers under
the Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a
land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President
Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and
forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as discussed below,
President Duterte's decision on that political question is outside the ambit of judicial review.

Locus standi

Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus because they
failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of
Marcos at the LNMB.

Petitioners cannot also file as taxpayers. They merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds, without
showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express or implied provision of the
Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.

Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, failed to disclose the direct or potential injury which they
may suffer as a result of the act complained of. Their interest in this case is too general and shared by other
groups, such that their duty to uphold the rule of law, without more, is inadequate to clothe them with requisite
legal standing.

Petitioners also failed to prove that the case is of transcendental importance. At this point in time, the interment
of Marcos at a cemetery originally established as a national military cemetery and declared a national shrine
would have no profound effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of our national life considering that
more than twenty-seven (27) years since his death and thirty (30) years after his ouster have already passed.
Significantly, petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional
rights.

As to petitioners Senator De Lima and Congressman Lagman, they failed to show that the burial of Marcos
encroaches on their prerogatives as legislators.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Petitioners violated the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy,
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration
of the assailed memorandum and directive before the Secretary ofNational Defense. The Secretary of National
Defense should be given opportunity to correct himself, if warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G 161-
375 was issued upon his order. Questions on the implementation and interpretation thereof demand the
exercise of sound administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of his
office to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the
decision of the Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the Office of the President which has control
and supervision over the Department of National Defense (DND).

Hierarchy of Courts

While direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this case, petitioners cannot simply
brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the
exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and
has the power to issue restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.

Substantive issues

I. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law and
jurisprudence.
While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as
providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the
proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.

Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision considering that a law should be
passed by the Congress to clearly define and effectuate the principle embodied therein. Pursuant thereto,
Congress enacted the Code of Conduct on Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, Plunder Act, and Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007. To complement these statutes, the
Executive Branch has issued various orders, memoranda, and instructions relative to the norms of
behavior/code of conduct/ethical standards of officials and employees; workflow charts/public transactions;
rules and policies on gifts and benefits; whistle blowing and reporting; and client feedback program

Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution is also misplaced. Sec.
3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty of educational institutions in teaching the values of patriotism
and nationalism and respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on
sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. Clearly, with respect to
these provisions, there is no direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB.

The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII is likewise not violated by public respondents. Being the Chief
Executive, the President represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his or her department. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the
power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the law. The mandate is self-executory by
virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the other executive functions. It is
best construed as an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power. The provision simply underscores the
rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey
and execute them.

There is no violation of RA 289.

Petitioners miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition that the LNMB and the
National Pantheon are one and the same. This is not at all unexpected because the LNMB is distinct and
separate from the burial place envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of President
Quirino's Proclamation No. 431, which was later on revoked by President Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is
different from that covered by Marcos' Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does not exist at present.
To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its construction or the creation of
the Board on National Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the
establishment of a singular interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the Philippines, national
heroes, and patriots.

Furthermore, to apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero"
would be violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal
remains resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots at
the LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the President under existing laws and regulations. Also, the
Court shares the view of the OSG that the proposed interment is not equivalent to the consecration of Marcos'
mortal remains. The act in itself does not confer upon him the status of a "hero." Despite its name, which is
actually a misnomer, the purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to
confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be
treated as a "hero." Lastly, petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and "state honors," without
showing proof as to what kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to the remains of Marcos, is speculative
until the specifics of the interment have been finalized by public respondents.

No violation of RA 10639 .

The Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are not
exclusive as it includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It would be undue to extend the law
beyond what it actually contemplates. With its victim-oriented perspective, our legislators could have easily
inserted a provision specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a "reparation" for the Human
Rights Violations Victims (HRVVs). The law is silent and should remain to be so. This Court cannot read into
the law what is simply not there. It is irregular, if not unconstitutional, for Us to presume the legislative will by
supplying material details into the law. That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.

The enforcement of the HRVV s' rights under R.A. No 10368 will surely not be impaired by the interment of
Marcos at the LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the assailed act has no causal connection and legal relation to
the law. The subject memorandum and directive of public respondents do not and cannot interfere with the
statutory powers and functions of the Board and the Commission. More importantly, the HRVVs' entitlements
to the benefits provided for by R.A. No 10368 and other domestic laws are not curtailed. R.A. No. 10368 does
not amend or repeal, whether express or implied, the provisions of the Administrative Code or AFP
Regulations G 161-375.

There is no violation of International Human Rights Laws.

The nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting through the
public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law
are already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present generation of Filipinos.
As to the unborn, it must be said that the preservation and popularization of our history is not the sole
responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this
country.

Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of the Human Rights Victims' Claims Board and
the HRVV Memorial Commission in the memorialization of HRVV s, the National Historical Commission of the
Philippines (NHCP), formerly known as the National Historical Institute (NHJ), is mandated to act as the
primary government agency responsible for history and is authorized to determine all factual matters relating to
official Philippine history.

II. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out
of malice, ill will or personal bias.

The LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in PD 105

P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D. No. 105, the LNMB
was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in the latter. The proposition that the LNMB is
implicitly covered in the catchall phrase "and others which may be proclaimed in the future as National
Shrines" is erroneous because: (1) As stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105; (2) Following
the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, 138 the LNMB is not a site "of the birth, exile,
imprisonment, detention or death of great and eminent leaders of the nation,"; and (3) Since its establishment,
the LNMB has been a military shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO.

Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and hallowed" refer to the LNMB as a
place and not to each and every mortal remains interred therein. Hence, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB
does not diminish said cemetery as a revered and respected ground. Neither does it negate the presumed
individual or collective "heroism" of the men and women buried or will be buried therein. The "nation's esteem
and reverence for her war dead, " as originally contemplated by President Magsaysay in issuing Proclamation
No. 86, still stands unaffected. That being said, the interment of Marcos, therefore, does not constitute a
violation of the physical, historical, and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national military shrine.

The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO, which is empowered to
administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is under the supervision and control of the DND. The DND,
in tum, is under the Office of the President.
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing provision of the
Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less
withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement
between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac,
Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered
into by his predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and
presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.

Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use and for
specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the reserved land shall remain subject
to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. At present, there is no
law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is located from the use it was
originally intended by the past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a
former President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel,
a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such,
satisfies the public use requirement. The disbursement of public funds to cover the expenses incidental to the
burial is granted to compensate him for valuable public services rendered.

Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos' remains interred at the LNMB was inspired by his
desire for national healing and reconciliation. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
prevails over petitioners' highly disputed factual allegation that, in the guise of exercising a presidential
prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang
(payback) to the Marcoses. As the purpose is not self-evident, petitioners have the burden of proof to establish
the factual basis of their claim. They failed. Even so, this Court cannot take cognizance of factual issues since
We are not a trier of facts.

AFP Regulations G 161-375 must be sustained.

Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor
Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; ( c) Secretaries of National Defense; ( d) Chiefs of
Staff, AFP; ( e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include
active draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) who
died in combat operations or combat related activities; (g) Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or
joined the PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized
guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose
interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of
National Defense; and G) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists,
widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff.

Similar to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel
who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b) Authorized personnel who
were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.

In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G 161-375 remains to be
the sole authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly,
even if they were empowered to do so, former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino
III, who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the rules by expressly prohibiting the
burial of Marcos at the LNMB. The validity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 must, therefor, be sustained for
having been issued by the AFP Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense,
who is the alter ego of the President.

AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of clear and unmistakable showing
that it has been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Neither could
it be considered ultra vires for purportedly providing incomplete, whimsical, and capricious standards for
qualification for burial at the LNMB.
It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to argue that the word "bayani" in
the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a symbolism of heroism may attach to the LNMB as a national
shrine for military memorial, the same does not automatically attach to its feature as a military cemetery and to
those who were already laid or will be laid therein. As stated, the purpose of the LNMB, both from the legal and
historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require
that only those interred therein should be treated as a "hero."

In fact, the privilege of internment at the LNMB has been loosen up through the years. Since 1986, the list of
eligible includes not only those who rendered active military service or military-related activities but also non-
military personnel who were recognized for their significant contributions to the Philippine society (such as
government dignitaries, statesmen, national artists, and other deceased persons whose interment or
reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of National Defense). In
1998, the widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff were added to the
list. Whether or not the extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted in order
to be consistent with the original purpose of the LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar since it is
indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant active military service and military-related activities.

Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a
Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee. For his alleged
human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may disregard Marcos as a President and Commander-in-
Chief, but we cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the
awards he received. In this sense, We agree with the proposition that Marcos should be viewed and judged in
his totality as a person. While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who
erred like us.

Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the disqualifications stated in AFP
Regulations G 161-3 7 5. He was neither convicted by final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude
nor dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.

The fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude. No
less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person shall not be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.

Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no property right to safeguard because
even if one is eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact would only give him or her the privilege to be interred
therein. Unless there is a favorable recommendation from the Commander- in-Chief, the Congress or the
Secretary of National Defense, no right can be said to have ripen. Until then, such inchoate right is not legally
demandable and enforceable.

Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of equal protection clause are not met. 181 In
this case, there is a real and substantial distinction between a military personnel and a former President. The
conditions of dishonorable discharge under the Articles of War attach only to the members of the military.
There is also no substantial distinction between Marcos and the three Philippine Presidents buried at the
LNMB (Presidents Quirino, Garcia, and Macapagal). All of them were not convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. In addition, the classification between a military personnel and a former President is germane to the
purposes of Proclamation No. 208 and P.D. No. 1076. While the LNMB is a national shrine for military
memorials, it is also an active military cemetery that recognizes the status or position held by the persons
interred therein.

Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO expressly recognized him as a retired
veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended. Petitioners have not shown that he was dishonorably
discharged from military service under APP Circular 17, Series of 1987 (Administrative Discharge Prior to
Expiration of Term of Enlistment) for violating Articles 94, 95 and 97 of the Articles of War. The NHCP study is
incomplete with respect to his entire military career as it failed to cite and include the official records of the
AFP.
The word "service" in AFP Regulations G 161-375 should be construed as that rendered by a military person in
the AFP, including civil service, from the time of his/her commission, enlistment, probation, training or drafting,
up to the date of his/her separation or retirement from the AFP. Civil service after honorable separation and
retirement from the AFP is outside the context of "service" under AFP Regulations G 161-375.

Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during the EDSA Revolution
is tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from the military service. The fact that the
President is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the 1987 Constitution only enshrines the principle of
supremacy of civilian authority over the military. Not being a military person who may be prosecuted before the
court martial, the President can hardly be deemed "dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the
service" as contemplated by AFP Regulations G 161-375. Dishonorable discharge through a successful
revolution is an extra-constitutional and direct sovereign act of the people which is beyond the ambit of judicial
review, let alone a mere administrative regulation.

It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the people through the so-called
EDSA Revolution. Said political act of the people should not be automatically given a particular legal meaning
other than its obvious consequence - that of ousting him as president. To do otherwise would lead the Court to
the treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices from multifarious inferences or theories arising
from the various acts of the people. It is not the function of the Court, for instance, to divine the exact
implications or significance of the number of votes obtained in elections, or the message from the number of
participants in public assemblies. If the Court is not to fall into the pitfalls of getting embroiled in political and
oftentimes emotional, if not acrimonious, debates, it must remain steadfast in abiding by its recognized guiding
stars - clear constitutional and legal rules - not by the uncertain, ambiguous and confusing messages from the
actions of the people.