Case 2:17-cv-01519-JCM-NJK Document 41 Filed 09/06/18 Page 1 of 8

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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7 JOHN HUNT, Case No. 2:17-CV-1519 JCM (NJK)
8 Plaintiff(s), ORDER
9 v.
10 THE CITY OF BOULDER CITY, et al.,
11 Defendant(s).
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13 Presently before the court is defendants the City of Boulder (“Boulder City”) and John
14 Glenn’s (collectively “defendants”) motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 29). Plaintiff John
15 Hunt filed a response (ECF No. 36), to which defendants replied (ECF No. 39).
16 I. Facts
17 This is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from an arrest that occurred in
18 Boulder City on June 8, 2016. (ECF No. 19). Plaintiff alleges that defendants Boulder City and
19 sergeant John Glenn, a Boulder City Policy Department (“BCPD”) officer, violated his First,
20 Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights by wrongfully arresting and charging plaintiff with
21 violations of (1) impending ability of driver to yield pursuant to NRS § 484B.283 and (2) resisting
22 a public officer pursuant to NRS § 199.280.3. (ECF No. 19).
23 Defendants have provided clear video evidence that informs the court about plaintiff’s
24 arrest. The following facts are largely based on those videos.
25 On June 8, 2016, BCPD was carrying out crosswalk enforcement activity. (ECF Nos. 19,
26 29). A police officer disguised as a pedestrian would cross Nevada Highway 93 at a crosswalk
27 located approximately at 1208 Nevada Highway 93. (Id.). When a driver would fail to properly
28 yield, the disguised officer would signal to another officer in uniform to approach the scene and

James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge
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1 issue a citation. (Id.). At approximately 7:00 a.m., plaintiff received a citation at the crosswalk
2 when he failed to yield. (ECF No. 29). About 40 minutes later, plaintiff returned to the crosswalk
3 to protest the purported unfairness of the enforcement activity. (ECF No. 19). Plaintiff’s protest
4 entirely consisted of going back and forth over the crosswalk. (ECF No. 19, 29). Generally,
5 vehicles were able to yield. (ECF No. 29). However, on plaintiff’s first attempt to cross the
6 highway, he abruptly stepped onto the road, causing a driver of a gray Camaro to aggressively
7 press his brakes—though at no point did the car’s tires skid or screech. (ECF Nos. 29, 36).
8 Officer Glenn apprehended plaintiff after he crossed the highway for the third time. (ECF
9 No. 29). Initially, officer Glenn grabbed plaintiff by the forearm and plaintiff attempted to pull
10 his arm away. (Id.). A second officer approached and grabbed plaintiff in an effort to detain him.
11 (Id.). Plaintiff moderately resisted the officers, while a third officer stood nearby and observed the
12 events unfold. (Id.). A fourth officer rushed to the scene and placed plaintiff in a headlock for
13 twelve (12) seconds. (Id.). The officers brought plaintiff to the ground, while two more officers
14 approached the scene. (Id.). Officer Glenn sat on plaintiff’s back and, with the assistance of other
15 officers, placed plaintiff in handcuffs. (Id.). At this point all of the officers released themselves
16 from plaintiff, except for officer Glenn, who remained on plaintiff’s back and yelled, “What is
17 your major malfunction?!”—a reference to the 1987 film Full Metal Jacket, where a forceful
18 Marine Corps drill sergeant screams this phrase at his recruits. (Id.).
19 Shortly thereafter, officer Glenn attempted to ascertain why plaintiff was crossing the
20 highway. (Id.). Officer Glenn asked plaintiff if he had been drinking alcohol or taken any drugs.
21 (Id.). Plaintiff informed officer Glenn that he was not intoxicated and said that he was “going for
22 a walk.” (Id.). After two-and-a-half minutes, officer Glenn learned about plaintiff’s traffic citation
23 from earlier that morning and realized that plaintiff was trying to make a political statement. (Id.).
24 On May 30, 2017, plaintiff initiated this lawsuit. (ECF No. 1). On September 11, 2017,
25 plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which raises seventeen causes of action: (1) violation of free
26 speech and due process against officer Glenn; (2) improper search and seizure against officer
27 Glenn; (3) excessive force against officer Glenn; (4) malicious prosecution against officer Glenn;
28 (5) violation of due process against officer Glenn; (6) First Amendment retaliation against Boulder

James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge -2-
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1 City and officer Glenn; (7) violation of Article I, Sections 1 and 9 of the Nevada Constitution
2 against Boulder City and officer Glenn; (8) malicious prosecution against all defendants; (9) abuse
3 of process against all defendants; (10) false arrest and imprisonment against all defendants; (11)
4 excessive force against all defendants; (12) assault and battery against all defendants; (13)
5 intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants; (14) negligent infliction of
6 emotional distress against all defendants; (15) negligence against all defendants; (16) respondeat
7 superior liability of Boulder City for state law violations; and (17) negligent hiring and supervision
8 against Boulder City. (ECF No. 19).
9 Now defendants move for summary judgment on all seventeen causes of action. (ECF No.
10 29).
11 II. Legal Standard
12 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow summary judgment when the pleadings,
13 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
14 show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a
15 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A principal purpose of summary judgment is
16 “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
17 323–24 (1986).
18 For purposes of summary judgment, disputed factual issues should be construed in favor
19 of the non-moving party. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). However, to be
20 entitled to a denial of summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts
21 showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
22 In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. The moving
23 party must first satisfy its initial burden. “When the party moving for summary judgment would
24 bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a
25 directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has
26 the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to
27 its case.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000)
28 (citations omitted).

James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge -3-
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1 By contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense,
2 the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential
3 element of the non-moving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed
4 to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s case on which that
5 party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323–24. If the moving
6 party fails to meet its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not
7 consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159–
8 60 (1970).
9 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party
10 to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
11 Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, the
12 opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient
13 that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing
14 versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626,
15 631 (9th Cir. 1987).
16 In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on
17 conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,
18 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the
19 pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine issue
20 for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
21 At summary judgment, a court’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the
22 truth, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
23 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and all
24 justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the
25 nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be
26 granted. See id. at 249–50.
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James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge -4-
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1 III. Discussion
2 As a preliminary matter, plaintiff concedes that his claims against Boulder City should be
3 dismissed because discovery did not produce sufficient evidence for plaintiff to prevail. (ECF No.
4 36). Accordingly, the court will dismiss the all of the claims pertaining to Boulder City with
5 prejudice.
6 The remaining claims consist of federal and state causes of action against officer Glenn.
7 First, the court considers whether qualified immunity shields officer Glenn from the federal claims.
8 Second, the court considers the state claims.
9 a. Qualified Immunity
10 Qualified immunity insulates public officials “‘from liability for civil damages insofar as
11 their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
12 would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.
13 Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity is broad, protecting “‘all but the plainly
14 incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 934 (9th
15 Cir. 2004) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
16 Determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 action entails
17 a two-part, conjunctive analysis exercised in the order the court deems appropriate. First, a court
18 should consider whether the defendant's actions violated a constitutional right. Conn v. City of
19 Reno, 572 F.3d 1047, 1062 (9th Cir. 2009). In making this inquiry, the court views the facts in the
20 light most favorable to the party asserting the injury. Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 969 (9th
21 Cir. 2002).
22 Second, the court should determine whether the constitutional right was clearly established.
23 Conn, 572 F.3d at 1062. A right is clearly established if “‘it would be clear to a reasonable officer
24 that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Id. at 1062 (quoting Saucier v.
25 Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). In making this inquiry, the court should consider “the specific
26 context of the case” and not “broad general proposition[s].” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. It is the
27 plaintiff's burden to show the constitutional right was clearly established. Sorrels v. McKee, 290
28 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2002).

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U.S. District Judge -5-
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1 Here, plaintiff argues that qualified immunity does not shield officer Glenn from liability
2 because officer Glenn falsely arrested plaintiff in order to silence his freedom of speech and
3 prepared a false report to justify the arrest. (ECF no. 36). Plaintiff’s argument fails to show that
4 the constitutional rights at issue were clearly established for two reasons. First, plaintiff has not
5 brought forth any legal authority or further arguments to show clearly established rights. Second,
6 even if plaintiff had shown adequate legal authority, his argument would still fail because it is
7 based on false allegations that would fatally undermine a showing of clearly established rights in
8 the “specific context of the case.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Clear video evidence demonstrates
9 that officer Glenn (1) did not arrest plaintiff in an attempt to silence plaintiff’s protest, (2) had
10 probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and (3) did not prepare false reports.
11 i. Officer Glenn did not arrest plaintiff in an attempt to stop him from protesting
12 Here, officer Glenn did not realize that plaintiff was engaging in First Amendment
13 activities until he had already arrested plaintiff. (ECF No. 29). Therefore, Glenn’ actions could
14 not have been motivated by an intent to silence plaintiff.
15 ii. Officer Glenn had probable cause to arrest plaintiff
16 A police officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect without a warrant if the available
17 facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime. United States v. Hartz, 458
18 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2006). The analysis involves both facts and law. Rosenbaum v. Washoe
19 Cty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2011). The facts are those that were known to the arresting
20 officer at the time of the arrest. Id. The law is the criminal statute to which those facts apply. Id.
21 Officer Glenn arrested plaintiff pursuant to NRS § 484B.283(2), which reads:
22 A pedestrian shall not suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or
23 run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for the driver to
yield.
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Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484B.283.
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Here, video footage shows that plaintiff abruptly stepped onto the highway, causing a
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driver to aggressively press the brakes. (ECF No. 29). The video footage also reveals that officer
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Glenn was able to personally observe plaintiff’s actions. (Id.). Further, plaintiff’s own expert
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witness, sergeant Raymond Hubbs, reviewed the video evidence and admitted that he would have

James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge -6-
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1 issued a citation. (ECF No. 36). These facts suggested a fair probability that plaintiff was in
2 violation of NRS. § 484B.283 and, thus, gave officer Glenn probable cause to arrest plaintiff.
3 iii. Officer Glenn did not prepare a false report.
4 Officer Glenn’s arrest report details events that are substantially supported by video
5 evidence. (ECF No. 29). Not only did officer Glenn provide an account of plaintiff’s protest
6 activities, but he also describes the arrest. (Id.). The report does contain some inaccuracies and
7 omission, such as stating that plaintiff’s protested caused a car to “skid to a stop” and failing to
8 report that an officer placed plaintiff into a headlock. (Id.). However, in totality the report appears
9 to be a genuine, though imperfect, account of plaintiff’s arrest.
10 In sum, plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to show established constitutional rights
11 because he has not provided legal authority that establishes clear constitutional rights and has
12 failed provide analysis that applies to the specifics of the case. Accordingly, the court will grant
13 summary judgment on the federal claims.
14 b. State law claims
15 The court has resolved the federal claims and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
16 over plaintiffs' remaining state law claims. See, e.g., Wade v. Reg'l Credit Ass'n, 87 F.3d 1098,
17 1101 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that “where a district court dismisses a federal claim, leaving only
18 state claims for resolution, it should decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them
19 without prejudice”); see also Zelaya v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 628 Fed.Appx. 535, 537 (9th Cir.
20 2016) (instructing that a district court could consider dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)
21 after resolving federal claims through summary judgment).
22 IV. Conclusion
23 Accordingly,
24 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that defendants’ motion for
25 summary judgment (ECF No. 29) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED, consistent with the
26 foregoing.
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James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge -7-
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1 The clerk is instructed to enter judgment accordingly and close the case.
2 DATED September 6, 2018.
3 __________________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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James C. Mahan
U.S. District Judge -8-