STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 5 : ASSOCIATED WORDS & PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES
LICOMCEN INCORPORATED v. FOUNDATION SPECIALISTS, INC. termination of contract, as clearly inferred from the phrase "discontinue the
GR no 169678
Facts:
This is a petition for review of contracts signed between the two parties. Liberty
Commercial Center, Inc. (LICOMCEN), respondent, is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating shopping mall and Foundation Specialist, Inc. (FSI),
respondent, is the company in constructing the bored pile foundation of the mall
construction. Both signed the contract and commenced work on the site.
In the course of construction, LICOMCEN ordered to indefinitely suspend the
construction due to criminal complaints against the company. But notwithstanding
the order, the materials for construction has already arrived on site and some
partial work have already been done. FSI now demanded payment for its work and
materials but LICOMCEN took no heed.
After due proceedings the CA decided in favor of respondent and ordered to pay
the demands after terminating the contract. LICOMCEN now elevated the case to
the Supreme Court to reconsider the CA’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the contract was merely suspended or terminated.
HELD:
Yes, the contract was terminated and the terms are stipulated in the contract.
GC-41 LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED’S RIGHT TO SUSPEND WORK OR TERMINATE THE
CONTRACT
xxxx
2. For Convenience of LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED
If any time before completion of work under the Contract it shall be found by the
LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED that reasons beyond the control of the parties render it
impossible or against the interest of LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED to complete the
work, the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED at any time, by written notice to the
Contractor, may discontinue the work and terminate the Contract in whole or in
part. Upon issuance of such notice of termination, the Contractor shall discontinue
the work in such manner, sequence and at such time as the LICOMCEN,
INCORPORATED/Engineer may direct, continuing and doing after said notice only
such work and only until such time or times as the LICOMCEN,
INCORPORATED/Engineer may direct.
Unfortunately for LICOMCEN, this provision does not support but enervates its
theory of indefinite suspension. The cited provision may be invoked only in cases of
1
work and terminate the contract." And in statutory construction implies
conjunction, joinder or union.42 Thus, by invoking GC-41, LICOMCEN, in effect,
admitted that the contract had already been terminated.
G.R. No. L-8238 May 25, 1955
CESAR M. CARANDANG vs. VICENTE SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila
Facts:
The petitioner seeks the help of the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to annul
the order of Judge Vicente Santiago suspending the civil case filed by the petitioner
against Tomas Valenton, Sr. and Tomas Valenton, Jr. to await the result of a criminal
case filed by said petitioner against the defendants.
In his contention, Judge Santiago stated that trial of the civil action must await the
result of the criminal case on appeal. The court anchored its decision on the
contention of the defendants that the plaintiff cannot invoke article 33 since the
defendants were charged with frustrated homicide and not for physical injuries.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the court of first instance is correct.
Ruling:
No. The order of the Court of first instance is incorrect.
The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries."
Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses
defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been
used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but
in their generic sense. In other words, the term "physical injuries" should be
understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the
terms used with the latter are general terms.
Thus, in deciding the true meaning of the terms “physical injuries”, construction
may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is
found or associated with. So defamation and fraud are used in generic sense,
physical injuries should also be used in generic sense.
In the case at bar, the judge committed an error in suspending the civil case.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 5 : ASSOCIATED WORDS & PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES
PEOPLE V. SANTIAGO
GR No. L-17584 March 8, 1922
RE: Association of Words
Facts:
Defendant was driving his car when he ran over Porfiro Parondo, a 7-year-old boy,
which instantly caused the latter’s death. He was then found guilty of homicide with
reckless imprudence, was sentenced to suffer one year and one day or prision
correccional, as well as to pay the costs of the trial. However, defendant contended
that Act No. 2886 is unconstitutional, and therefore, the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over his person and the complaint itself.
Issue:
W/N the assailed legislative act is Unconstitutional?
HELD:
No, said law prevails.
The Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it introduces in General
Orders No. 58, the defense arguing that the Philippine Legislature was, and is, not
authorized to amend General Orders No. 58, as it did by amending section 2 thereof
because its provisions have the character of constitutional law.
It amended the proper complainant for Criminal Cases from United States to People
of the Philippines.
For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not incorporated in the
Constitutions of the States, but is left in the hand of the legislatures, so that it falls
within the realm of public statutory law.
As has been said by Chief Justice Marshall:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the
Subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the
means by which they may be carried into execution, would
partake of a prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be
embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be
understood by the public.
Act No. 2996 is not violative of any constitutional provision, nor does it partake of
the same character as that of the provisions of the constitution; thus, the court did
not commit any of the errors assigned. Furthermore, its main purpose is limited to
2
criminal procedure inasmuch as its intention is to give to its provisions the effect of
law in criminal matters.
The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed
Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople
156 SCRA 629
FACTS:
Six cases involving various private schools, their teachers and non-teaching school
personnel, and even parents with children studying in said schools, as well as the
then Minister of Labor and Employment, his Deputy, the National Labor Relations
Commission, and the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, have
been consolidated in this single Decision in order to dispose of uniformly the
common legal issue raised therein, namely, the allocation of the incremental
proceeds of authorized tuition fee increases of private schools provided for in section
3 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 451, and thereafter, under the Education Act of 1982
(Batas PambansaBlg. 232).
Going now to the matter of service incentive leave benefits, petitioner claims that
private respondents are engaged by the school on a contract basis as shown by the
individual teachers’ contract which defines the nature, scope and period of their
employment; hence, they are not entitled to the said benefit according to Rule V of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code to wit:
Sec. 1. Coverage. — This rule [on Service Incentive Leave] shall apply to all
employees, except:
(d) Field personnel and other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the
employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely
commission basis, or those who are paid in a fixed amount for performing work
irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof; (MOLE Rules and
Regulations, Rule V, Book III)
ISSUE:
Whether teachers hired on contract basis are entitled to service incentive leave
benefits as against the claim that they are not so?
HELD:
The phrase "those who are engaged on task or contract basis" should however, be
related with "field personnel " applying the rule on ejusdem generis that general
and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms that they
follow, [Vera v. Cuevas, G.R. No. L-33693, May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 379]. Clearly,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 5 : ASSOCIATED WORDS & PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES
petitioner's teaching personnel cannot be deemed field personnel which refers "to
non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the
principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours
of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. [Par. 3, Article
82, Labor Code of the Philippines]. Petitioner's claim that private respondents are
not entitled to the service incentive leave benefit cannot therefore be sustained.
G.R. No. 148408 July 14, 2006
CONCEPCION PARAYNO, petitioner, vs. JOSE JOVELLANOS and the MUNICIPALITY
OF CALASIAO, PANGASINAN,* respondents.
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court
questioning the resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for issuance of a preliminary
and mandatory injunction, filed by petitioner Concepcion Parayno against
respondents Jose Jovellanos and the Municipality of Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In
1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said
municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The
matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health
Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the
Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location
of petitioner's gasoline station.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the SB resolution but it was denied.
After the hearing on the propriety of issuing a writ of preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction, the trial court ruled:
There is no basis for the court to issue a writ of preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction. Albeit, Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of
respondent municipality does not mention a gasoline filling station, [but]
following the principle of ejusdem generis, a gasoline filling station falls
within the ambit of Section 44.
The gasoline filling station of the petitioner is located under the
establishment belonging to the petitioner and is very near several buildings
occupied by several persons. Justice dictates that the same should not be
allowed to continue operating its business on that particular place.
Further, the gasoline filling station endangers the lives and safety of
3
people because once there is fire, the establishment and houses nearby
will be razed to the ground.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision but it was denied by the trial
court.
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus,5 with a prayer for injunctive relief. She ascribed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of Judge Laron
who dismissed her case.
After the CA dismissed the petition, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
The legal maxim of ejusdem generis did not apply to her case
Ruling:
We find merit in the petition.
The Principle of Ejusdem Generis
We hold that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear
distinction between "gasoline service station" and "gasoline filling station." The
pertinent provisions read:
Section 21. Filling Station. A retail station servicing automobiles and other
motor vehicles with gasoline and oil only.7
Section 42. Service Station. A building and its premises where gasoline oil,
grease, batteries, tires and car accessories may be supplied and dispensed at
retail and where, in addition, the following services may be rendered and sales
and no other.
a. Sale and servicing of spark plugs, batteries, and distributor parts;
b. Tire servicing and repair, but not recapping or regrooving;
c. Replacement of mufflers and tail pipes, water hose, fan belts, brake fluids,
light bulbs, fuses, floor mats, seat covers, windshield wipers and wiper blades,
grease retainers, wheel, bearing, mirrors and the like;
d. Radiator cleaning and flushing;
e. Washing and polishing, and sale of automobile washing and polishing
materials;
f. Grease and lubricating;
g. Emergency wiring repairs;
h. Minor servicing of carburators;
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 5 : ASSOCIATED WORDS & PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES
i. Adjusting and repairing brakes;
j. Minor motor adjustments not involving removal of the head or crankcase, or
raising the motor.8
xxx xxx xxx
It is evident from the foregoing that the ordinance intended these two terms to be
separate and distinct from each other. Even respondent municipality's counsel
admitted this dissimilarity during the hearing on the application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Counsel in fact
admitted:
1. That there exist[ed] an official zoning code of Calasiao, Pangasinan which
[was] not yet amended;
2. That under Article III of said official zoning code there [were] certain
distinctions made by said municipality about the designation of the gasoline
filling station and that of the gasoline service station as appearing in Article III,
Nos. 21 and 42, [respectively];
3. That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as
defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station
as differently defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning code;
4. That under Section 44 of the official zoning code of Calasiao, the term filling
station as clearly defined under Article III, Section 21, [did] not appear in the
wordings thereof;9(emphasis supplied)
The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality,
the party making them.10 Respondent municipality thus could not find solace in the
legal maxim of ejusdem generis11which means "of the same kind, class or nature."
Under this maxim, where general words follow the enumeration of particular
classes of persons or things, the general words will apply only to persons or things
of the same general nature or class as those enumerated. 12 Instead, what applied in
this case was the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius which means that
the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others. 13 Hence, because
of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning
ordinance, respondents could not insist that "gasoline service station" under
Section 44 necessarily included "gasoline filling station" under Section 21. Indeed,
the activities undertaken in a "gas service station" did not automatically embrace
those in a "gas filling station."
Coconut Oil Refiners vs Torres
GR 132527 29 July 2005
Facts:
4
This is a Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public respondent Ruben Torres in his
capacity as Executive Secretary from allowing other private respondents to continue
with the operation of tax and duty-free shops located at the Subic Special Economic
Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner seeks to
declare Republic Act No. 7227 as unconstitutional on the ground that it allowed
only tax-free (and duty-free) importation of raw materials, capital and equipment. It
reads:
The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate
customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into
and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives
such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment.
However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special
Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to
customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax
laws of thePhilippines [RA 7227, Sec 12 (b)].
Petitioners contend that the wording of Republic Act No. 7227 clearly limits the
grant of tax incentives to the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment
only thereby violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
He also assailed the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A for being violative
of their right to equal protection. They asserted that private respondents operating
inside the SSEZ are not different from the retail establishments located outside.
Issue:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7227 is valid on the ground that it violates the
equal protection clause.
Decision:
The SC ruled in the negative. The phrase ‘tax and duty-free importations of raw
materials, capital and equipment was merely cited as an example of incentives that
may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA
correctly argued that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which
petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not apply
when words are mentioned by way of example.
The petition with respect to declaration of unconstitutionality of Executive Order
No. 97-A cannot be, likewise, sustained. The guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a legislation based which was based on reasonable
classification. A classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2)
be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only,
and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Applying the foregoing test
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 5 : ASSOCIATED WORDS & PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES

to the present case, this Court finds no violation of the right to equal protection of
the laws. There is a substantial distinctions lying between the establishments inside
and outside the zone. There are substantial differences in a sense that, investors
will be lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called ‘secured area
and the present business operators outside the area. There is, then, hardly any
reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in R.A.
7227.