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Studies in Humanism and Atheism

Series editors
Anthony B. Pinn
Rice University
Houston, TX, USA

Jürgen Manemann
Forschungsinstitut für Philosophie
Hannover
Germany
Although numerous scholars and activists have written academic and pop-
ular texts meant to unpack and advocate for humanism and atheism as life
orientations, what is needed at this point is clear and consistent attention
to the various dimensions of humanist and atheist thought and practice.
This is the type of focused agenda that this book series makes possible.
Committed to discussions that include but extend well beyond the United
States, books in the series—meant for specialists and a general r­ eadership—
offer new approaches to and innovative discussions of humanism and
­atheism that take into consideration the sociocultural, political, economic,
and religious dynamics informing life in the twenty-first century.

More information about this series at

http://www.springer.com/series/15125
 Monica R. Miller
Editor

Humanism
in a Non-Humanist
World
Editor
Monica R. Miller
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, PA, USA

Studies in Humanism and Atheism

ISBN 978-3-319-57909-2 ISBN 978-3-319-57910-8  (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57910-8

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017943657

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and
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Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied,
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To Dr. Warren Wolf
In Memoria
 Acknowledgements

Specific thanks are owed to the Institute for Humanist Studies (IHS) in
Washington, D.C., and to its Director of Research, Anthony B. Pinn
for enabling such unique, robust, and formidable spaces for unfolding
dialogue, and extended engagement on Humanism. Over the years,
the research spaces afforded by the IHS have brought together unlikely
thinkers across field, occupation, and life philosophies from all over the
globe. These rare opportunities are ostensibly marked by the highest
commitment to thinking, debating, wrestling, and reasoning together.
I am thoroughly grateful for having had the wonderful opportunity to
have participated in several of these symposia—which have always left
me feeling affirmatively challenged towards something new, and some-
thing different. A special word of thanks is owed to series co-editor
Jürgen Manemann who co-edits this series on Studies in Humanism and
Atheism along with Pinn. In addition, my thanks to Palgrave Macmillan,
especially Philip Getz for his hard work with this series, as well as kind
patience and guidance as I worked through this volume. This book
sprang from the occasion of the 2013 IHS meeting in Houston, Texas
at Rice University which asked participants to consider the question,
“How should humanism relate to a Non-Humanist World?” This volume
draws from this meeting in 2013, and would not exist without Pinn’s
guidance and support at various levels. It was in and through his for-
midable work, unmatched mentorship, and constant challenge to remain
reflexive and ask the ‘hard’ questions of life that I first came into my
own voice in, and stance on, humanism. To him, and for his continued

vii
viii  Acknowledgements

bearing witness to such necessary and difficult work, I am ever grateful.

Additional acknowledgements are due to the board, colleagues and fel-
lows of the IHS, some of whom contributed to this volume, others who
have shown valuable support to me along the way, and in other ‘human-
ist’ endeavors. Of course, I wish to thank each of the contributors for
their generosity and patience with my editorial task, and more basi-
cally, for giving us rich food for thought in the form of this collection of
essays. Further thanks to Jürgen Manemann, Anna Maria Hauk and col-
leagues at the Forshungsinstitut Fur Philosophie, Hannover, Germany.
Prior Fellows and staff of the Institute have provided essays in this vol-
ume, where the completion of this volume was also undertaken while in
residence as a Fellow, away from my home institution, Lehigh University
on sabbatical. A special word of thanks to Christopher Driscoll, for his
enduring encouragement and support of this work, especially for his
ever-gracious feedback, suggestions, and editorial wisdom throughout
the many stages of this volume from the early stages of development
to submission of this manuscript. Lastly, to my mother Charlotte Ann
Pace Spano, my grandmother Addie Pace, and my sister Nicole Lynette
Tricoche, who all, in their own unique ways, taught me how to be skepti-
cal, think logically but never be over-certain, encouraged me to always
think (and do!) for myself, and ‘mothered’ me in all of the complex ways
in which one ought be critically generous, yet generously critical when
developing, and utilizing a hermeneutic of suspicion. Most importantly,
­respectively—my grandmothers love for, service in, yet critique of the
Baptist Church, my mother’s penchant for eclecticism of life philoso-
phies from her start in the church to her arrival in Buddhism, and my big
sister’s mandate that without knowledge (of self, and others), without
a politic of equality, without a stance on life that is radically inclusive of
others, we have not yet begun living, nor come into our own.
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Monica R. Miller

Part I  Humanism in a Non-Humanist World

2 World-Views as Options—Humanistic and

­Non-humanistic 35
Matthias Jung

3 Us vs. Them: But Who Is Us and Who Is Them? 57

Herb Silverman

4 Secular Voices of Color—Digital Storytelling 75

Elonda Clay and Christopher M. Driscoll

5 Where Humanism Is, and Where It Is Headed in This

Non-Humanist World 99
Norm R. Allen

ix
x  Contents

Part II  Humanism in a Non-Humanist World

6 How Could Humanists Become Solidary with the Non-

Humanist World? Towards an Anamnestic Humanism 117
Jürgen Manemann

7 The Absence of Presence: Relating to Black (Non)

Humanisms in Popular Culture 133
Monica R. Miller

8 Rudy’s Paradox: The ALIENation of Race and Its

­Non-Humans 151
Christopher M. Driscoll

9 Figuring in Scripture 171

Allen Dwight Callahan

Part III  Humanism in a Non-Humanist World

10 A Case for Community: Within and Beyond the Four

Walls 193
Mike Aus

11 Uncanny Nihilism and Cornel West’s Tragic Humanism 209

Eike Brock

12 Relating to a “Non-Humanist” World: Participating in

Democracy, on Why the Humanist Viewpoint Matters 237
Toni Van Pelt

13 Postscript 261
Monica R. Miller

Index 
265
 Editor and Contributors

About the Editor

Monica R. Miller is Associate Professor of Religion and Africana

Studies and Director of Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Lehigh
University and Senior Research Fellow for at the Institute for Humanist
Studies (Washington, D.C.). Miller holds research interests in changing
dimensions of religion in the US, youth cultures and subcultures, popu-
lar culture, identity and difference, and new black religious movements.
She is the author/editor of numerous books including Claiming Identity
in the Study of Religion: Social and Rhetorical Techniques Examined
(Equinox, 2015), The Hip Hop and Religion Reader (Routledge, 2014),
Religion and Hip Hop (Routledge, 2012) among others, and contributor
to a host of print and online media outlets.

Contributors

Norm R. Allen, Jr. is Founder and Executive Director of African-

Americans for Humanism and author. Author of the ground-breaking
African-American Humanism: An Anthology (Prometheus Books, 1991)
and others, Allen’s work is wide-ranging and gives attention to the mani-
fold impact of African-American experience on humanism. Allen lives in
Buffalo, New York.

xi
xii  Editor and Contributors

Mike Aus is Executive Director of Houston Oasis, a community of

Freethinkers who meet each week for fellowship and learning, grounded
in the celebration of people ahead of beliefs. Aus is a well-known public
voice of atheism, giving particular attention to those who have formerly
participated in traditional forms of religion.
Dr. Eike Brock  holds a Master’s degree in Philosophy, German Studies,
and Theology from the University of Bonn and a Doctor of Philosophy
degree from the University of Würzburg. His interests include existen-
tialism, cultural philosophy and criticism. His first book Nietzsche und
der Nihilismus (Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung,
Band 68) (De Gruyter, 2015) is regarded by many as an invaluable
­contribution to Nietzsche studies.
Rev. Dr. Allen Dwight Callahan author of The Talking Book: African
Americans and the Bible (Yale UP, 2006), is an independent scholar who
received a BA degree in Religion from Princeton University and MA and
Ph.D. from Harvard University with focus on New Testament Studies
and Early Christian History.
Elonda Clay is a scholar of religion and Ph.D. candidate at VU
University Amsterdam, the Netherlands, in Theology and Religious
Studies. Her dissertation, “Reel DNA Ancestry: How the Mediation of
Genomics Represents the Myth of Biological Race as Real” researches
the ways that direct-to-consumer genetic ancestry testing, genealogy,
and popular racialized notions of biology are mediated and remediated
through documentary films, television, and the Internet.
Dr. Christopher M. Driscoll  is Visiting Assistant Professor of Religion
Studies and Africana Studies at Lehigh University. His first monograph,
White Lies: Race and Uncertainty in the Twilight of American Religion
(Routledge, 2015) explores the philosophical and social parameters of a
“white religion” operative in the USA whose adherents include believer
and atheist, alike.
Prof. Dr. Matthias Jung  is Professor of Philosophical Ethics and Legal
Philosophy at the Institute of Cultural Studies, Universität Koblenz-
Landau, Germany. His doctorate focused on the work of Martin
Heidegger, followed by a habilitation studying the concept of reli-
gious experience. Jung has published numerous books exploring the
­philosophy of experience and belief.
 Editor and Contributors   xiii

Prof. Dr. Jürgen Manemann is a German Catholic political theolo-

gian and Director of the Forschungsinstituts für Philosophie, Hannover,
Germany. A student of Johann Baptist Metz, Manemann’s early work
explores the thought of Carl Schmitt, while recent books like Kritik des
Anthropozäns: Plädoyer für eine neue Humanökologie (Transcript, 2014)
and Der Dschihad und der Nihilismus des Westens (Transcript Verlag,
2015) offer guidance for contemporary discussions seeking to address
new possibilities for human ecology and growing currents of nihilism in
Europe.
Toni Van Pelt  is Co-Founder, President, and Public Policy Director at
the Institute for Science and Human Values (ISHV). A widely-sought
speaker on humanism and public policy, her work gives attention to
humanist and feminist issues including legislation and regulations,
human rights, participation in government and lobbying on behalf of
humanist individuals and organizations.
Dr. Herb Silverman is Founder and President Emeritus of the
Secular Coalition for America, as well as the Secular Humanists of
the Lowcountry in Charleston, South Carolina, and board mem-
ber of the  American Humanist Association. Silverman is a well-known
­humanist/atheist author and activist, and his books include Candidate
without a Prayer (Pitchstone, 2012) and An Atheist Stranger in a
Strange Religious Land (Pitchstone, 2017).
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Monica R. Miller

In August of 2015, Fox News Corp. and Facebook teamed up to host

the first Republican Presidential Candidate Debate for the 2016 election.
With unfiltered, offensive (then) candidate Donald Trump participat-
ing with nine other men, the event was more like a special episode of
Trump’s show, The Apprentice, than a debate befitting the importance
of the U.S. presidency. Bracketing the political consequences of much
of the discussion, the conversation was downright comical at times. And
like (good) bad TV goes, they saved the best (and worst) debate ques-
tion for last:

I want to know if any of [the candidates] have received a word from god
on what they should do and take care of first [upon winning the election].1

Senator Ted Cruz said he was “blessed to receive a word from god
everyday” through the scriptures. He went on to politically nuance
his position by telling the crowd that god speaks through the Bible,
before he shifted gears to remind everyone that he was a “consistent
conservative.” Next up was Ohio Governor John Kasich, who led with
“I do believe in miracles.” He then offered a few mixed platitudes about

M.R. Miller (*) 
Lehigh University, Bethlehem, USA

© The Author(s) 2017 1

M.R. Miller (ed.), Humanism in a Non-Humanist World, Studies
in Humanism and Atheism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57910-8_1
2  M.R. Miller

[god] wanting America to be a strong leader. Wisconsin Governor Scott

Walker was next, saying something about having been redeemed by the
blood of Jesus Christ, appealing to the evangelical crowd, before speci-
fying that “god doesn’t call [him] to do a specific thing…but to follow
his will.” Senator Marco Rubio followed next with a homily on all the
ways god has blessed the United States. Last up was Dr. Ben Carson,
who was thrown a question about race on top of the god question. His
response:

Our strength as a nation comes in our unity. We are the United States of
America, not the divided states. And those who want to divide us are try-
ing to divide us, and we shouldn’t let them.

Few would argue with the physician’s suggestion. A united nation is

most assuredly a strong(er) nation, as true for the U.S. as it is for any
other country. Yet, the politicians did not pick up on the irony of using
the idea of god for an appeal to unity. The humanist Jean-Paul Sartre
might refer to such a scenario as one marked by bad faith, and self-
deception.
Some might wonder how a life philosophy like humanism can thrive
in a world where those contending for the highest seat in the office, the
crème de la crème of those assumed to operate from sound mind and
action, could somehow be guided by such a skewed rationality. What
is the ‘humanist’ citizen to do about such continued rhetorical appeals
to, and presumable weight of god, or traditional religions, prevalent in
America, and many places across the globe for whom we must develop
relations and reason with? One easy response is to turn things like the
GOP debate into comedy spectacle. After all, many humanists will find
it hard not to laugh at ending any political debate with the god ques-
tion. Lurking behind the humor, however, is what many consider a tragic
dimension to contemporary U.S. (and global) social life, especially in a
“post-factual” and “alternative fact” political climate and reality: That it
often seems most of the world would rather believe mythological conjec-
ture than face the concrete issues dividing people across the globe today.
Especially when a good bit, if not most, of such post-factish mythologies
foster such divisiveness and perpetuate social inequalities across human
differences.
Humanism in a Non-Humanist World asks how humanism might
relate to a world filled with myth, halve-truths, and countless social
 1 INTRODUCTION  3

problems and injustices that arise from, and whose solutions are often
complicated by, bad faith of many kinds. For many, the humanist task
of relating to a “non-humanist” world is akin to trying to relate to a for-
eign culture without knowing its language or customs. Doing so pro-
duces frustration, resentment, heartache, and at worst, apathy. Further,
the culture deemed non-humanist is often thought to be “guilty” of
indifference towards humanist and atheist voices (though these are not,
as many humanists know well, precisely the same categories of identifica-
tion). Nevertheless, the seeming durability of religious dogma (and their
attendant methods and myths of legitimation) and stagnant beliefs in the
irreducibility and immutable nature of difference across social categories
in the U.S. and across the globe, is such that humanists face a wide vari-
ety of challenges on social, legislative, and personal levels in the twenty-
first century.
Yet, the need for a forceful consideration of humanisms’ relationality
to a non-humanist world is likely as great as it has ever been. Though it
comes in many varieties, humanism(s) promote the value of human life,
the possibility for its flourishing, and believes it not robbery that humans
might see the world as it is—beyond fabrications—so that we might all
work to make it what it could be. One of these humanistic ‘truths’ long
relied on is that much of the world is simply non-humanist. Throughout
the pages that follow, this non-humanist world is respectively animated
and depicted in wide-ranging ways with each of the volume’s contrib-
utors focusing on different dimensions of the world as it presents itself
through the lens of humanism. But to begin, by the “non-humanist
world” we mean a couple different things: First, it is quantitatively non-
humanist, in that roughly more than 70% of the world holds some ver-
sion of a higher power in higher regard than humans. Therefore, to exist
as a humanist today is to find oneself a minority. Second, when consider-
ing global crises of starvation, water and food shortages, environmental
crises, the proliferation of identity-based wars, racism, patriarchy, homo-
phobia, and rampant greed, the world is also non-humanist to the extent
that it is largely anti-human: It doesn’t seem to have the best interest
of humanity in mind. While these characterizations can be viewed as
perhaps more traditional understandings of non-humanism (reliance on
traditional religious logics and reasoning, and lack of human rights and
social equitability), readers will also encounter unexpected, and uncanny
depictions of a non-humanist world that track in a different direc-
tion towards the limits and possibilities of expanding and complicating
4  M.R. Miller

assumptions pertaining to the humanism/non-humanist divide. From

critical examinations pertaining to the inefficacy of rhetorical binaries to
the call for new voices in and sources of humanist reflection, the chal-
lenges posed in the pages that follow range in scope, content and form.
These varied understandings of the humanist/non-humanist world situ-
ate the impulse behind this present volume. From academia to govern-
ment, today, the world is in desperate need of involvement with and
leadership from humanism and humanists like never before. And yet,
because of either the marginal status and lack of clarity of humanism and
its worldview, this involvement remains incredibly difficult to accomplish,
facilitate, or sustain. Working to respond to this seeming paradox, The
Institute for Humanist Studies (IHS) held a conference in the Fall of
2013 geared toward asking the question: How should humanism relate
to a world where not only are humanists few in number and margin-
alized for their non-theistic worldviews, but also, find themselves in a
world that increasingly seems less and less interested in the social well-
being of those for whom we share a planet with? The proceedings of that
conference, along with contributions from a number of thinkers outside
of the conference, are published here as Humanism in a Non-Humanist
World.

Humanist Heritage—Beginnings
Despite strand of humanism today, most accounts begin, if not explic-
itly, at least conceptually and ideologically, with Enlightenment con-
ceptions of the world, the human, and ethical ideals such as equality,
freedom, and justice. What’s more, across the vast subjects, approaches
to, and practices of humanism, a consistent feature has been a devel-
oped embrace of science (or, the scientific method) over religion, evi-
dence over faith, skepticism over unfounded certainty, undergirded
by a somewhat collective suspicion of the supernatural and theism.
With (now) wide-ranging definitional variability, it seems that one
of the few, if not the only, unchanging principles of the subject(s)
of Humanism is the centrality, individuality, and attitude of thought
which centers the uniqueness of the human, the significance of being a
human.
Beginning with the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries which launched a forceful confrontation with theologi-
cal dogmatism and the rigid religious authority of its time, the ‘Age of
 1 INTRODUCTION  5

Enlightenment’ sought to sweep away the medieval remnants of old,

and break new ground in the making of a new Modern Western world.
Intellectual revolutions in areas of the sciences, politics, and philosophy,
facilitated and ushered in a new age of human reason. Such a narrative,
as representative as it is brief, serves as the more conventional and popu-
lar point of departure for the historical emergence of humanism today.
While such a sketch, no doubt, provides a historical basis from which to
locate the emergence of humanist thought, what else, beyond a starting
point, do we traffic into our contemporary debates and dialogues con-
cerning what humanism is and where it is heading given this archeologi-
cal heritage? No doubt, situating humanism in this way, across its vast
philosophical strands, from Atheism to Existentialism to Marxist inter-
pretive postures, assists in maintaining its inseparability from the author-
ity of reason and the secular age. In this way, the historical antecedents
from which humanism emerges, are often homogenized and glossed over
for the larger sake of a more descriptively universal, perhaps more man-
ageable, historisization. Given this history, what does humanism inherit
about humanism and a non-humanist world? If we consider the early days
of Renaissance humanism, we might find that any talk of a non-humanist
world was one marked by its lack of letters in the humanities (i.e., lack of
formal education). If we look to mainstream Enlightenment narratives
we might assume a break with religion (reason vs. faith), further compli-
cated by the less considered divergences within Enlightenment thought
that gave way to mainstream (reason limited by faith) and radical per-
spectives (reason alone). In each of these, the work of the humanist is
defined, the world of the non-humanist assumed.
Seldom remembered in the historical beginnings of humanism,
however, are the fourteenth to sixteenth century Renaissance founda-
tions wherein a rediscovery of Ancient Greek and Latin texts among
European scholars, with their emphases on aesthetics, capacity, and
human dignity, aided epistemological transformations in and around
areas such as the arts, music, and philosophy. These growing emphases
helped usher in wide scale social and political change in Europe. Sharing
in emphases on human dignity as concurrent across many conceptions
of humanism today, Renaissance humanism emphasized a consideration
of humankinds’ place in nature, the unique human capacity to reason,
with our attendant ability to utilize the senses in discerning and under-
standing ideals such as ‘Truth.’ While humanisms today tend to elevate,
look to, and celebrate science as the trusted space of reason, reliability
6  M.R. Miller

on rationality, and empirical truth, the humanities which offered much

by way of a sort of intellectual humanizing of humanism with its strong
penchant for philosophy, ethics, among other areas, occupy a tenuous
seat at the table of secularized humanist discourses and programs today.
As a collective reaction and response to the domination of Catholic
scholasticism throughout universities in places such as France, Italy, and
Britain, Renaissance humanists (teachers and government bureaucrats
alike) advocated for a study of humanity, the studia humanitatis from
areas such as literature, grammar, history, rhetoric, and poetry, among
others. From the arts to music and its attendant cultural formations
and sensibilities, humanist influence could be seen throughout Europe,
wherein classical Greek and Latin texts still important to Philosophy
today, were unearthed and revived. In fact, the term “humanism”
emerges among the push to distinguish such a program of study from
engineering and science in 1808 by German educator and theologian,
F.J. Niethammer. What’s more, the term humanism derives from the fif-
teenth century term umanista which within the classical curriculums of
secondary education of the day, denoted the study of human affairs, the
realm of human nature. By 1836, thanks to the heavy-lifting of Latin and
Ancient Greek texts, the terminological idea of humanismus would even-
tually make its way into the English language.
Across much of this period, a certain kind of humanist complexity,
rather than dogmaticism, was seemingly emphasized and maintained:
surely, the human, the individuality of being human was celebrated,
underscored, and valued but not at the total expense of, or in com-
plete contradistinction to, a totalizing rejection of religion. In other
words, the act of valuing the importance of individuality (as emphasized
in both the Protestant Reformation and later, Western conceptions of
Democracy) did not come at the expense of individual rights to reason
about religion (e.g., each person has a right to access religion and reli-
gious knowledge for themselves, in lieu of a mediating Roman Catholic
Church hierarchy of religious privilege). Even more, such ideations like-
wise influenced equitable social and political transformations regarding
human worth and dignity despite ones’ social and economic status.
With emphasis on the cultivation and use of human intellect, inge-
nuity and the capacity to reason, humanist orientations and life stances
today emphasize both pragmatic, ethical and philosophical standpoints.
These standpoints emphasize the improvement and flourishing of human
life through a kind of human value and agency that is often restricted and
 1 INTRODUCTION  7

reduced by mediating forces of authority and tradition. Inherent in such

‘violent’ tendencies of blind faith and authoritarian religious authority,
early articulators of humanism (from various strands) saw an even greater
threat and human tendency: the propensity towards a brutish, uncivi-
lized, and savage-like human propensity for cruelty, violence, and the cel-
ebration of ignorance.
This history of humanism and its “non-humanist” antecedent force
questions of humanism today; what it is, its proper place in the world,
and responsibility to it, concerning its relationship to human distinction:
what kind of mind and what kind of training of the mind best equips
humans to manage, confront, analyze, and deal with the persisting trou-
bles of society? Put differently, such distinctions between humanism vs.
non-humanism not only mark differences of degree and kind, but also—
linguistic and hence, etymologically situated historical variations with
divergent historical (classical) antecedents. For example, if one follows a
more popularized version of the Latin, then humanitas connotes a phil-
anthropic stance of goodwill towards others. If, on the other hand, one
is more inclined towards the Greek usage then one will find themselves
advocating for a closer association of the term with the notion of paid-
eia which notes the significance of erudition, a special kind of knowl-
edge only possible for those educated and trained in the liberal arts. Such
knowledge, thought classical thinkers such as the formidable Marcus
Tullius Cicero, was a unique kind of humanitas only afforded to, and
accessible by, humans themselves. Where an intellectual privileging and
privatization of the term is here stored in the “ivory tower” of the life
of the mind, political engagement in human affairs was likewise advo-
cated among figures such as grammarian and judge Aulus Gellius. We
can imagine then, how the resurrected classical world during the Italian
Renaissance by scholars working in and around (Greek and Latin) gram-
mar, poetry, philosophy, among others, considered themselves humanists
insofar as they might have considered their scholastic and erudite work as
humanizing the world around them.
Similar then to today, we might point to illiteracy, under-education,
or educational access and equity as indicative of, and responsible for, per-
sistent social ills. And yet, for all of education’s enlightened potential, its
transformative ability to cultivate a more rational view of (and practice
in) the world durable enough to prevent, if not ameliorate, persisting
social inequalities, human rights abuses, and lead the struggle for human
equality, has yet to be fully realized. While what comes to be known as
8  M.R. Miller

humanism in the Enlightenment age as it concerns its anti-theistic and

anti-supernatural stances might shift or approximate in degree rather
than kind, the early days of humanism before the Enlightenment seemed
to maintain focus on access to the intellectual cultivation of the mind
(for capacity to reason), educational equity for all, and a more general
philanthropic benevolence and ethic of goodwill towards humanity. Such
a stated antithesis to religious ideas and theistic conceptions, while some-
times present, were not as much part and parcel to the definitional qual-
ity and characterization of early Humanism. What’s more, conceptions
of humanitas, a term largely credited with defining and popularizing the
idea of humanism, placed robust valuation on a palpable, and still ever-
present distinction that marked the difference between “us” (humans)
and “them” (brutes): the capacity for speech, the demonstrable mode
marked by the ability to reason, and hence, ultimately live in commu-
nity with one another under the socially accepted collective rule of a law.
In this way, the capacity to reason is evinced by, and inextricable to, the
ability to speak, one is not possible without the other. That is, human-
ity’s capacity for speech is an ability that is thought to uniquely bind
human speciation from other kinds of animals. Although humanism, in
contemporary context, is often narrowly seen and depicted as a “world-
view” that takes an intentional stance of opposition towards logics of
traditional religious reasoning, earlier conceptions credited with giving
the term ‘humanism’ historical content, and conceptual texture, focused
early efforts of distinction on humanisms’ home in the enterprise of edu-
cation. Thus, from the outset, humanitas and hence humanism, signified
on human agency and the benevolent goodwill towards other humans,
culminating in a worldview animated by a way of studying among, think-
ing/debating with, and learning from a group of likeminded humans
committed to the use of language in precise and thoroughgoing ways.
The advent of a religiously oriented humanism in the late ninteenth
and early twentieth centuries, ‘Religious Humanism’ would, over time,
become untethered from its historic connection with the liberal arts, eru-
dition, and that of classical learning—namely, the “thinking mind,” as
briefly discussed above. Although the humanism to flourish in Europe
(Post-French Revolution) would emphasize an ethically focused phi-
losophy with humankind at the center, rather than the supernatural, the
religious inflection on humanism as developed in the U.S. would receive
articulation through an ethical focus on human needs and interests,
rather than belief. In fact, such impact can be seen and felt throughout
 1 INTRODUCTION  9

the first Humanist Manifesto, issued in 1933 as an outgrowth of a con-

ference held at the University of Chicago, where participants and cosign-
ers included the philosophically formidable thinker John Dewey, but
also, many Unitarian ministers and theologians who understood human-
ism to be a particular kind of ideology that espouses and encourages
socio-economic justice, ethics, and human reason.
Rather than a strong stance of religious and theistic antithesis, the
1933 conference and subsequent manifesto (penned in the same year
Adolf Hitler rose to power in Germany as fascism gripped much of
Europe), advocated that science replace the supernatural and dogmatic
for matters pertaining to morality and decision-making. At the outset,
Raymond Bragg offers a preface to the Manifesto:

The Manifesto is a product of many minds. It was designed to represent

a developing point of view, not a new creed. The individuals whose sig-
natures appear would, had they been writing individual statements, have
stated the propositions in differing terms. The importance of the docu-
ment is that more than thirty men have come to general agreement on
matters of final concern and that these men are undoubtedly representative
of a large number who are forging a new philosophy out of the materials of
the modern world.2

The Manifesto then begins by noting that “the time has come for wide-
spread recognition of the radical changes in religious belief throughout
the modern world,”3 not as much an eschewing of ideas about religion,
or conceptions of the religious, but rather, with the intention to revise
and update traditional attitudes within religion according to scientific,
economic and cultural change. Of particular interest is the seventh point
developed in Manifesto I, which states:

Religion consists of those actions, purposes, and experiences which are

humanly significant. Nothing human is alien to the religious. It includes
labor, art, science, philosophy, love friendship, recreation–all that is in its
degree expressive of intelligently satisfying human living. The distinction
between the sacred and the secular can no longer be maintained.4

And to this, the manifesto culminates with a larger word on the nature
and meaning of the theses on religious humanism, wherein “the quest
for the good life” remains what they refer to as the “central task” for
humanity, who is, as depicted here, “alone responsible for the realization
10  M.R. Miller

of the world of his dreams” possible through “intelligence” and the

“will.”5 Written 40 years later, the critically oriented retrospection of
Manifesto II attempts to temper the optimism exuding in the preceding
1933 statement.

Nazism has shown the depths of brutality of which humanity is capable…

totalitarian regimes have suppressed human rights without ending pov-
erty…the beginnings of police states, even in democratic societies, wide-
spread government espionage, and other abuses of power by military,
political and industrial elites, and the continuance of unyielding racism…6

With shared mind to respond to the unfathomable brutality of the hor-

rors of the Holocaust, among other preceding and continued human
atrocities that have given rise to grave totalitarian injustices of many
kinds, here they poignantly note that, “Science has sometimes brought
evil as well as good.”7 The Preface of Manifesto II marks a radical
departure in the tone of idealistic optimism that can be felt in the first
statement drafted in 1933, wherein the advent of progress, scientific
revolution, and even Democracy, have all fallen short of preventing the
social injustices and inhumaneness seen in the realities of governmental
abuses of power, draconian wars in the name of peace, unbridled and
unyielding racism, gender inequalities in society and workforce, all of this
ushering in the twenty-first century, a historical moment they character-
ize as “times of uncertainty.”8 Noting their hope that humanism can still
provide affirmative direction and alternative for the future as it concerns
human needs and guidance, they boldly declare that, “The next century
can be and should be the humanistic century.”9 With so many injustices,
human atrocities, and growing social ills and inequalities, this 1973 docu-
ment finds respite and hope in the “dramatic scientific, technological, and
ever accelerating social and political changes”10 of that time, relying on a
litany of evidence rooted in notions of human progress and development:

We have virtually conquered the planet, explored the moon, overcome the
natural limits of travel and communication; we stand at the dawn of a new
age, ready to move farther into space and perhaps inhabit other planets.
Using technology wisely, we can control our environment, conquer pov-
erty, markedly reduce disease, extend our life-span, significantly modify our
behavior, alter the course of human evolution and cultural development,
unlock vast new powers, and provide humankind with unparalleled oppor-
tunity for achieving an abundant and meaningful life.11
 1 INTRODUCTION  11

Given the continued proliferation of many such social ills, humanist cir-
cles might find it difficult to declare this age as indeed having ushered in
the humanistic one as hoped for by signatories of these documents. We
hope in earnest that this volume, Humanism in a Non-Humanist world
serves as but a small contribution by way of this important consideration
raised in the last century.

Non-Humanist—Identifications
Seen together, Humanist Manifesto I and II drafted in 1933 and 1973
balance the promise and dangers of both irrational religious dogma and
authority, as well as, the progress of science divorced from an ethical
consideration. Building on shared concerns from the original, Manifesto
II argues that the survival of humanity, however, rests in “the extended
uses of scientific method” and the fusing of “reason with compassion”
which they refer to as measures that are as bold, as they are daring. Here,
the hazards and risks of “traditional moral codes and newer irrational
cults” as well as the noted “theism” and appeals to a “prayer-hearing
God” amount to a dangerous, harmful and affirmation-based salvation-
ism that has propensity to divert with distractions of “false hopes of
heaven hereafter.”12 Firm resolve, they assert, is to be found in “reason-
able minds” in search of other means for survival. Although cautions of
the “dangers” of unjust applications of the scientific method are noted,
it remains secondary to the identification of belief in traditional theism,
a “prayer-hearing God,” and an immature salvation premised on what
these authors describe as outmoded and unproved faith producing the
primary ‘non-humanist’ antagonism.
I want to suggest there is a more palpable non-humanist admonition
demonstrated in both Manifestos that exceed beyond the specter-like-dan-
gers of “traditional moral codes and newer irrational cults” which “…fail
to meet the pressing needs of today and tomorrow. Something more than
false ‘theologies of hope’ and messianic ideologies, substituting new dog-
mas for old” which together, “…cannot cope with existing world realities”
because they “…separate rather than unite peoples.”13 Such an established
stance against traditional religious faith and theisms, as it were, have long
offered historic and contemporary depictions, definitions, and character-
izations of Humanism(s) most prized, and as I will gesture below, dan-
gerous non-humanist identity that is seldom confronted in tackling the
fissures among the humanist/non-humanist binary: humanity itself.
12  M.R. Miller

What if the obstacle standing in the way of the “next” humanistic

century are humans themselves? Seldom confronted among discourses
on humanism and atheism is a critical consideration of the primary
assumption undergirding such a life philosophy: that humans, guided
by (scientific) reason, ought to be guided by a maturity of intellect that
will usher in human dignity, equality, justice and life flourishing. Much
of the attendant non-humanisms for which Humanism defines itself over-
and-against, and seeks to challenge through the promise and principle
of human reason, are not mutually exclusive makings of different kinds,
sorts, and orders. From its inception to its contemporary articulations,
has not Humanism (among others such as Atheism) been plagued by a
much larger elephant in the room impeding the improvement and flour-
ishing of human life and life options? A look back, as we move towards
the dawn of perhaps a new age of Humanism nearly 50 years since
the drafting and publication of the second Humanist Manifesto might
offer the kind of, “…bold and daring measures” needed in order for, as
Manifesto II declares, “Humanity, to survive…”.14
Taking a more complicated approach to the long-held antago-
nism that has so shaped and marked visions and adaptable iterations
of Humanism, the authors of Manifesto II not only acknowledge the
“Many kinds of humanism” that “exist in the contemporary world”
but also call for something more  structurally capacious of Humanism:
“views that merely reject theism are not equivalent to humanism. They
lack commitment to the positive belief in the possibilities of human pro-
gress and to the values central to it.”15 On the contrary, they remind
that “Humanism is an ethical process through which we can all move,
above and beyond the divisive particulars, heroic personalities, dogmatic
creeds, and ritual customs of past religions or their mere negation.”16
In a bold declaration they go on to carve a more affirmative stance that
belies simple rhetorical negation of the easy-target of theism and belief
in the supernatural, “As non-theists, we begin with humans not God,
nature not deity” and for those humanists eager to reinterpret traditional
religions as to “reinvest them with meanings appropriate to the current
situation” they caution, “Such redefinitions, however, often perpetuate
old dependencies and escapisms; they easily become obscurantist, imped-
ing the free use of the intellect. We need, instead, radically new human
purposes and goals.”17 And, it is here that emerges one of the greatest
obstacles to the flourishing of humanism, and the dangers of an increas-
ingly non-humanist world, one for which no escape is possible: the
 1 INTRODUCTION  13

problem of the human condition, and the asymmetrical non-humanist

depictions of the human that, at its inception, have long been trafficked
into such discourse.
Just as there is no escape from the project of reinvestment through
reinterpretation as it concerns traditional religions, our flight away from
contemporary projects of reinterpretation are too accompanied with an
inescapable reinvestment that concerns something much more grave
than traditional religious belief, as chiefly implicated in, and contribut-
ing to, what we might refer to as a world of non-humanism. Whether
our humanist and atheistic penchants for scientific modes of discovery,
principles of human reason and the cultivation of the intellect, belief in
human progress as indicative of the former, and the improvement of life
ensuing from ability and capacity for humans to think for themselves,
and rely on their intellectual capacity to do so in determining what to
believe and how to act—we must consider, seriously, the non-humanist
on the underside of such assumptions and ideations. How ought we
conceive of non-humanists, living in a non-humanist world not fully of
their own making, but rather, in part made for them by those considered
among the most rational, reasonable, and ethical of humanist character
and kind? We might begin such a task by considering the contradictory
classificatory foundations of our most prized Enlightenment thinkers
who while concurrently advancing and pointing to human revolutions in
the realms of science, politics, economics, philosophy, math, and beyond
often did so at the expense of those seldom considered human-enough to
make inestimable contributions of similar weight to knowledge, human
affairs, and society as our great humanist thinkers so greatly saw them-
selves as exacting.
We are reminded that Enlightenment philosophies that so enabled
and gave shape to our conceptions of humanism and atheism today,
were not as much theories or doctrines as much as they were char-
acterized by, and reflective of, general tendencies of guiding norma-
tive thought. In 1784, 165 years after the first slave arrived to the
New World of the Americas, Immanuel Kant in raising the question,
“What is Enlightenment?” suggests that it is a self-incurred release from
the immaturity so plaguing humanity, one that is indicative of, ‘“…
the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of
another.’”18 Such troubling perspectives and strong beliefs in humanity’s
intellectual power for ascertaining the kind of systemic knowledge (of
self and world) durable and authoritative enough to guide human affairs
14  M.R. Miller

in the practicalities of life, were held across the vast geographical and his-
torical spectrum of Enlightenment philosophies. Hence, other systems of
authority (e.g., tradition, miracles, superstition, etc.) were subsequently
held in likely suspicion and hostility.
In a pointed, acerbic, and well-articulated piece for the New York
Times in 2013, philosopher Justin E.H. Smith discusses the tragic rea-
son why the genius, West African philosopher Anton Wilhelm Amo,
who successfully wrote and defended a philosophy dissertation at the
University of Halle in Saxony in 1734 would not, “…spend his final
years as successor to Augustine and Terence, but rather in the degraded
position where someone like Kant supposed he belonged: outside of his-
tory, philosophically disenfranchised and entirely defined by something
as trivial as skin color.”19 Despite that it would, as Smith points out,
take until eighteenth century Counter-Enlightenment thinkers (such
as Johann Gottfried Herder) to “formulate anti-racist views of human
diversity,” Smith goes on to rightly note that American culture would
continue to perpetuate such inerrant concepts and views of race well
after, “its loss of scientific respectability by the mid-twentieth century.”20
Worth quoting at length, Smith not only sharply reminds the philosophi-
cal enterprise of the Enlightenment of its ‘Race’ problem, and hence
‘Ours’ as noted in the title of his editorial, but also asks something more
pressing of his readers worthy of consideration in light of the topic of
this volume:

Scholars have been aware for a long time of the curious paradox of
Enlightenment thought, that the supposedly universal aspiration to liberty,
equality and fraternity in fact only operated within a very circumscribed
universe. Equality was only ever conceived as equality among people pre-
sumed in advance to be equal, and if some person or group fell by defini-
tion outside of the circle of equality, then it was no failure to live up to this
political ideal to treat them as unequal.

The question for us today is why have we chosen to stick with catego-
ries inherited from the eighteenth century, the century of the so-called
Enlightenment, which witnessed the development of the slave trade into
the very foundation of the global economy, and at the same time saw racial
classifications congeal into pseudo-biological kinds, piggy-backing on the
divisions folk science had always made across the natural world of plants
and animals.21
 1 INTRODUCTION  15

In his text Racist Culture, David Theo Goldberg argues that method,
empiricism to be precise, and the obsessive import on rationality, con-
tributed much to the kinds of scientific classifications that would even-
tually culminate in what we still approach today, in varying ways, as
racialized categories. Here, Goldberg argues that:

Empiricism encouraged the tabulation of perceivable differences between

peoples and from this it dedicated their natural differences. Rationalism
proposed initial innate distinctions (especially mental ones) to explain the
perceived behavioral disparities.22

And while, as writer Kenan Malik rightfully attempts to complicate

Smith’s and other views regarding the complex relationship between the
Enlightenment and race, he goes on to place such repugnant racial views
of the world, still ever-present today, in the more recent time of the
nineteeth century, noting that, “Enlightenment thinkers certainly often
held deeply prejudiced views of non-Europeans, …but they were largely
hostile to the idea of racial categorisation.”23 Hence, Malik writes, “It
was in the nineteenth, not eighteenth, century that a racial view of the
world took hold in Europe, and it did so largely because of the ‘coun-
ter-Enlightenment’ views that Smith lauds.”24 Scholars such as historian
Jonathan Israel suggest that it was the second less-considered and oft-
remembered Enlightenment, the Radical Enlightenment, which:

…severed the roots of traditional European culture in the sacred, magic,

kingship, and hierarchy, secularising all institutions and ideas, but (intel-
lectually and to a degree in practice) effectively demolished all legitima-
tion of monarchy, aristocracy, woman’s subordination to man, ecclesiastical
authority, and slavery, replacing these with the principles of universality,
equality and democracy.25

The public face of the Enlightenment (e.g., Locke, Kant, Hume,

Voltaire, etc.), Malik argues, is what we often remember and con-
tinue to trope today, yet building from Israel’s “contested” view of the
Enlightenment as put forward in his texts Radical Enlightenment and
Enlightenment Contested that “it was in the Radical Enlightenment”
Malik writes, “shaped by lesser-known figures such as d’Holbach,
Diderot, Condorcet, and Spinoza that provided the Enlightenment’s
heart and soul.”26 What’s more, the two camps, as he goes on to
16  M.R. Miller

demonstrate, were divided among none other than the ruling of reason
as the highest absolute in guiding and administering human affairs. And,
it is here where the most uncanny and curious of shifts lie: contrary to
what is often attributive of reason to the more mainstream face of the
Enlightenment (thinkers) that assume a hard break between reason and
religion, it was Radical Enlightenment thinkers who insisted on reason
reigning supreme, whereas the mainstream view tended to advocate for
the limits of reason by tradition and faith. While certainly such a bifurca-
tion of Enlightenment thought was much more complex, exhaustively,
on this representative point, Malik writes:

The distinction was to shape the attitudes of the two sides to a whole host
of social and political issues such as equality, democracy and colonialism.
The attempt of the mainstream to marry traditional theology to the new
philosophy, Isreal suggests, constrained its critique of old social forms and
beliefs. The Radicals, on the other hand, were driven to pursue their ideas
of equality and democracy to their logical conclusions because, having bro-
ken with traditional concepts of God-ordained order, there was no ‘mean-
ingful alternative to grounding morality, politics and social theory on a
systematic, generalised radical egalitarianism extending across all frontiers,
class barriers and horizons.’27

Malik’s suggestions, building on Israel’s claims, reverberate with simi-

lar caution expressed in Manifesto II wherein the authors warn against
a popular belief maintained among some humanists who advocate for a
reinterpretation of traditional religions, thus reinscribing and perpetu-
ating its more harmful dimensions to enlarging and advancing human
knowledge. As noted above, such a project thus risks advancing the
worst of “old dependencies and escapisms.”28
With such a representative yet demonstrative sketch in mind, as a
thought-experiment of sorts, a consideration of the world, thought,
actions, and context of a non-humanist domain, and society, begs greater
clarification of the long-standing heuristically oriented antagonisms that
humanism has long relied on in its identification of the kinds of prolif-
erating non-humanisms that pose great threat to human progress and
flourishing. The mainstream view, much like the articulations of human-
ism as endemic in the Manifesto I and II, in all of their “…varieties and
emphases of naturalistic humanism” which they include as “scientific,”
 1 INTRODUCTION  17

“ethical,” “democratic,” “religious,” and “Marxist” in nature, the nodes

of “Free thought, atheism, agnosticism, skepticism, deism, rationalism,
ethical culture, and liberal religion all claim to be heir to the human-
ist tradition”29 on one hand, affirmatively blur distinctions between the
dueling “Mainstream” and “Radical” Enlightenment camps discussed
above. Yet, on the other hand, they stop short of a reflexive and criti-
cal assessment of the one default principle they all so heavily rely upon,
the site wherein non-humanist humanisms historically, and currently con-
tinue to thrive today: “…commitment to the positive belief in the pos-
sibilities of human progress and to the values central to it” so endemic
to the “…design for a secular society on a planetary scale.” If, as sharply
intimated in the 1973 Manifesto II, humanism requires much more
than a negation of theism, and if as suggested, a re-inscription of tra-
ditional religious beliefs through reinterpretation is not enough, then
what, written after some of the world’s greatest crimes against human-
ity as witnessed in the Holocaust decades before it, and nearly 355 years
post-Chattel Slavery, of the still-firm belief in the “…obstacles to human
progress?”30 Although the writers of the second Manifesto note well
that orthodox and authoritarian political and economic ideologies and
dogmas have come to function religiously, they have likewise, along with
traditional religions, impeded such advancements in human thought and
action. Troubling yet, is the unwitnessed hope still placed in their Fourth
articulated principle that:

Reason and intelligence are the most effective instruments that humankind
possess. There is no substitute: neither faith not passion suffices in itself.
The controlled use of scientific methods, which have transformed the natu-
ral and social sciences since the Renaissance, must be extended further in
the solution of human problems. But reason must be tempered by humil-
ity, since no group has a monopoly of wisdom or virtue. Nor is there any
guarantee that all problems can be solved or all questions answered. Yet
critical intelligence, infused by a sense of human caring, is the best method
that humanity has for resolving problems. Reason should be balanced with
compassion and empathy and the whole person fulfilled. Thus, we are not
advocating the use of scientific intelligence independent of or in opposition
to emotion, for we believe in the cultivation of feeling and love. As science
pushes back the boundary of the known, humankind’s sense of wonder is
continually renewed, and art, poetry, and music find their places, along
with religion and ethics.31
18  M.R. Miller

Perhaps the time has come for a deep, uncomfortable, yet necessary
look at one of humanisms longest, most durable, and unchanging beliefs:
human capacity to advance, rely upon and utilize science and therefore
human progress to mitigate the dangers of human incapacity and ethical
unaccountability. In so doing, we must consider that which has remained
the point of recursive orientation for such life philosophies so imbued
with the hope of producing and ushering in a more capable, competent,
and equitable version of the world: humans themselves.
In light of the inherited propensity towards reproducing the negated
(e.g., non-humanist) through negation (e.g., incapacity), what then of
the meaning of the topic Humanism in a Non-Humanist World con-
sidering the long-standing non-humanist dimensions so entrenched
among the humans that humanism so puts faith and hope in today?
Could it be that the god-like recursivity of the centrality and uniqueness
of the (rational) human (and our unwitnessed confidence in its capac-
ity toward good, benevolence, progress, and right and proper thinking)
stands as one of the greatest non-humanist impediments to humanism
today? Humanisms’ continued Post-Enlightenment over-reliance on
the mind, demonstrable through its longstanding emphases on (human
capacity for) reason and rationality towards humanisms’ open task of his-
tory’s’ fulfillment, continues to mark out the significant exceptionalism
for appropriate and rightful development of distinct intellectual facul-
ties: namely, the thinking and speaking subject of history. Hence, his-
toric and contemporary clarion calls rooted in education, and access to
it, as the “Great Equalizer” towards such a humanist fulfillment of his-
tory can be dated back to (and, even before) the work of humanist U.S.
Commissioner for Education and founder of the Journal of Speculative
Philosophy, William T. Harris, who advocated that the “Five Windows
of the Soul” (mathematics, geography, history, grammar, and art/litera-
ture) be made available for all children across social divides. Thus, he
located something of value within the five “subjects” of the “soul” in
their great potential towards projects of humanist-like-civilizing as neces-
sary for, and endemic to, the flourishing of Democracy.
In a January 9, 2017 interview in the New York Times Natasha
Lennard discusses the question “Is Humanism Really Humane?” with
scholar Cary Wolfe, wherein they riff on a wide variety of topics related
to violence and posthumanism, liberal humanism, social difference,
among other topics. Striking here, is the manner in which something
like posthumanism does not serve to connote an antithesis of humanism,
 1 INTRODUCTION  19

or that which comes after the human, but rather is meant to denote an
intentional effort:

…that fundamentally decenters the human in relation to the world in

which we find ourselves, whether we’re talking about other forms of life,
the environment, technology or something else. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, you find it in the realization that when you don’t allow the concept
of the “human” to do your heavy philosophical lifting, you are forced to
come up with much more robust and complex accounts of whatever it is
you’re talking about. And that includes, first and foremost, a more consid-
ered concept of the “human” itself.32

Here, the humanist tradition is not rejected nor discounted, but rather,
the fundamental axis mundi that holds humanist philosophies together—
the human itself—is affirmatively troubled for the inherent violence of
such hierarchical thought structures and ontological positioning that
enables its cohesion. Wolfe goes on to note the rich and significant cul-
tural legacy afforded us by the humanist philosophical tradition, but also,
remains hesitant as it concerns the manner in which it both manufactures
and relies on ontological distinctions among domains such as animal vs.
human, and mechanical vs. biological. Humanist taxonomies of old dis-
allow the kind of interdisciplinary thinking and language that enable us
to, “describe much more intricately and robustly how human beings—
not just their minds but their bodies, their microbiomes, their modes of
communication and so on—are enmeshed in and interact with the non-
human world.”33
We’d do well to recall what the Enlightenment thinkers of old were
so wont to remind, that humanism is as much a structure of thought
that enables and guides human practice in, and ethical reflection of, the
world in which we live, as much as it is an ethic, a way of being, a code
which regulates right and proper conduct. Here, Lennard raises a vital
point that humanism has been not so inclined to discuss: the seemingly
unchanging, “…hierarchical distinguishing between human and nonhu-
man animals based on a certain notion of ‘knowledge’ or ‘intelligence’—
is inherently violent and oppressive.”34 Appeals to humanity no doubt
have provided a strong, if not the strongest, platform for discussing and
addressing liberty and equality, universal human rights, environmental
destruction of the planet, and inequities among categories of social dif-
ference, yet do so by relying on appeals to the category “human.” Yet,
20  M.R. Miller

such remains a thought structure whereby the distinction-making desig-

nation of human/non-human have yet to be excised from its logic, argu-
ments, and philosophical construction. On this point, Wolfe writes:

On the one hand, rights discourse is Exhibit A for the problems with phil-
osophical humanism. Many of us, including myself, would agree that many
of the ethical aspirations of humanism are quite admirable and we should
continue to pursue them. For example, most of us would probably agree
that treating animals cruelly, and justifying that treatment on the basis of
their designation as “animal” rather than human, is a bad thing to do. But
the problem with how rights discourse addresses this problem—in animal
rights philosophy, for example—is that animals end up having some kind of
moral standing insofar as they are diminished versions of us: that is to say,
insofar as they are possessed of various characteristics such as the capac-
ity to experience suffering—and not just brute physical suffering but emo-
tional duress as well—that we human beings possess more fully. And so we
end up reinstating a normative form of the moral-subject-as-human that
we wanted to move beyond in the first place.35

There must be, Wolfe asserts, a different kind of way to relate to, or
value, nonhuman life without relegating such species to a second-class
arrangement based on human primacy and development, not only
because such thinking maintains antagonistic hierarchical nodes of
knowledge and structures of thought, but also, because it consigns ethi-
cal considerations, action and reflection to biological designations of
“human” or “animal.” And yet, given the divestment of humanist con-
ceptions and individuated distinction of the human today, it is an impos-
sible task to separate hierarchical appeals to the human, or the self,
within legal and political institutions today. Such enduring import, capi-
tal and weight invested into notions of the self, and its unique distinc-
tions and appeals, as much part and parcel to the “Enlightenment idea
of the self,” and its attendant baggage of investment and belief, makes
it, as Wolfe argues, impossible to untether such an economy from the
advanced neoliberal enterprise. When asked if posthumanism has a role
in the great epistemological task of “undoing interspecies hierarchies
with structures of violence among humans themselves,”36 which ought
be a perennial task for humans today, in light of political fracture, endur-
ing racism, sexism, classism, among other grave social realities, Wolfe
advocates for “a posthumanist ethical pluralism” poignantly stating:
 1 INTRODUCTION  21

…My position has always been that all of these racist and sexist hierarchies
have always been tacitly grounded in the deepest—and often most invisi-
ble—hierarchy of all: the ontological divide between human and animal life,
which in turn grounds a pernicious ethical hierarchy. As long as you take it
for granted that it’s O.K. to commit violence against animals simply because
of their biological designation, then that same logic will be available to you
to commit violence against any other being, of whatever species, human or
not, that you can characterize as a “lower” or more “primitive” form of life.
This is obvious in the history of slavery, imperialism and violence against
indigenous peoples. And that’s exactly what racism and misogyny do: use a
racial or sexual taxonomy to countenance a violence that doesn’t count as
violence because it’s practiced on people who are assumed to be lower or
lesser, and who in that sense somehow “deserve it.”37

While many humanists are certainly committed to the ethical treatment

of humans and non-humans alike(across variety of persuasion) who
would also defend the equitable treatment of animals, Wolfe’s comments
above point to the oft-unconscious structure of thought we risk fall-
ing into, when the ‘human’ is rhetorically and ontologically privileged,
or when sharp humanocentric antagonisms, are posed, relied upon, and
perpetuated. We might consider more forcefully therefore, what type of
work, heavy-lifting, we see such rhetorical oppositions such as the one
framing this volume, and the conceptual ones we tend to more generally
over-rely on to animate, define, and articulate the meaning and signifi-
cance of humanism vs. non-humanism, theism vs. atheism, humanist vs.
non-humanist world as accomplishing.
In humanisms’ desire to mark its ‘rational’ break from the immature
reason of traditional religion, superstition and myth, and understanding
well that simple negation is not enough to define and mark out human-
ism, an overreliance on the autonomy of reason, how ought we wrestle
with the history and reality of humanisms’ non-humanisms? Put other-
wise, from the Enlightenment to our current neoliberal moment, the
capacity to reason, from its inception, has never been a foolproof safe-
guard against the flourishing of non-humanisms, among those already
about the business of the project of humanism. Hence, what happens
when the autonomy of the self and human rationality guided by science,
are insufficient in mitigating the violence of a non-humanist world? How
ought the scientific method guide our assumptions about rationality and
reason in an age where lofty scientific projects espouse an agenda just as
22  M.R. Miller

shrouded in mystery, uncertainty, and dare we say, myth, as traditional

religious thought? What role does religion or spirituality play in the man-
ner in which humanist projects figure religion and myth when consid-
ered over and against the prominent scientific gold standard ‘religion’
has played, anthropologically, in determining when capacity for abstract
and symbolic thought and ritual are apparent in defining the scale of
advancement of contemporary or Ancient civilizations, groups and peo-
ple? What serves (or, has served) as the defining primary archeological
marker for developmentally marking the difference between the capac-
ity to be human as distinct from the incapacity of our Ancient (not-yet-
human) ancestors? On one hand, if by riffing on a non-humanist world
that stands in great need of articulated humanist philosophies, participa-
tion, voices and arguments, then we simply mean to connote a strate-
gic location wherein the ardent struggle for human rights continues on
social, political, economic, judicial and legislative levels. All of which
stand in great need of articulated humanist philosophies, participation,
voices and arguments. If, on the other hand, we intend to describe a
world where many humans continue to live under mythological and
superstitious ideologies unguided by rationality and reason, then perhaps
we intend to signify on a world that is yet fully-Enlightened. Or, finally,
if we have in mind to stretch humanism in all of its known and unknown
capaciousness and robustness, then perhaps we begin by beginning again
by reflexively continuing the work of conceptual recalibration of struc-
ture of thought, doing the work of humanism by staying attuned to the
non-humanisms within and among it.

World—Locating and Relating to (the) Non-Humanist

Humanism in a Non-Humanist World is a variable compilation of the
sensibilities above, whereby readers will be pressed and encouraged
to think in a counterintuitive manner as it concerns the topic at hand.
There is here no final resolution of humanist definition, no concluding
word on the non-humanist world, and no one brand or approach to the
subject espoused that offers easy thinking, and understanding. In more
general terms, the complexity offered in the following essays does not
connote or suggest the impossibility of humanism in a world that by
many accounts might still be constituted as non-humanist. On the con-
trary, the capaciousness of the essays in this volume speak to the promise
of humanism in a multifaceted and manifold world of worldviews, life
 1 INTRODUCTION  23

options, motivations, and projects that challenge as much as resolve,

embrace as much as they do critique, determine as much as they ques-
tion, and add where others may subtract. In fact, such a variable and
adaptable approach to the matter of “humanism in a non-humanist
world” could not emerge and arrive on the scene at a better time as now.
“We reach for new heights and reveal the unknown for the benefit of
human kind.”38 At first glance, an atheist, a humanist, a freethinker, a
skeptic might read the words above with suspicion and mistrust. After
all, talk of revelation and the unknown are not necessarily guiding prin-
ciples espoused among humanist groups today. But, what happens
when such a vision as encapsulated in the words above come not from
a website of a church, mosque, mystic organization, or synagogue, but
rather from the website of the renowned and highly regarded National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)?
Or, what happens to the neat humanism/nonhumanism and
nonhumanist/humanist divides when we stumble across a prominent
and well-received January 2017 New York Times Article with the head-
turning headline, “Neanderthals Were People, Too”? The humaniz-
ing of the nonhuman species of Neanderthal, or shall we say the flurry
of experimentation and discovery to offer a more human face to a spe-
cies long caricatured as a wild caveman, unable to speak, living a sav-
age unreflective life has now taken a quick and dramatic turn in light of
the discovery that there was in fact interbreeding among humans and
our archaic hominoid ancestors. In short, Neanderthal DNA, research-
ers have discovered, is still evident in many humans today.39 Here,
once unimagined human innovation in the sciences made possible the
Neanderthal Genome Project, coordinated by the Max Planck Institute
for Evolutionary Anthropology, was realized in the full sequencing of
the Neanderthal genome in 2010, as seen in the groundbreaking results
published in the May 2010 issue of the journal Science which analyzed
four billion base pairs of Neanderthal DNA.40 Much to their surprise,
comparative analyses between the genome extracted from the bone frag-
ment of a female Neanderthal from 50,000–100,000 years ago discov-
ered in the Altai mountains of Siberia, and humans, revealed a shocking
and unsuspecting discovery: despite prior evolutionary theories that
long suggested humans replaced Neanderthals causing them to die out,
researchers instead found that human evolution was shaped by human
interbreeding with Neanderthals in Eurasia, solidifying a long-suspected
yet controversial hybid-origin theory.
24  M.R. Miller

This fascinating discovery brings into sharp relief, and affirmatively

contests human assumptions about the lines that divide non-human-
ist and humanist worlds as it concerns uncovering new species, plan-
ets, dimensions of space, and so on. The brief example concerning the
Neanderthal/human discovery does little justice to the subject, yet
serves as a fascinating momentary case to consider anew, or differently,
how our concepts and understandings shift and approximate as they con-
front, are confronted by, and have to reckon with the unknown world
of innovation. What’s more, now that the long-standing theory of old
that assumed humans replaced their archaic ancestors, Neanderthals, has
been debunked, many across specialty, interest, and field have jumped
into exploring what it means to be human and what it means for being
human that non-human DNA of a not-yet-human species is still evident
in human DNA today. Among other spaces, such quests are evinced in
the Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History’s “What does it
mean to be human?” online repository dedicated to the exploration of
“The Relationship Between Modern Humans and Neanderthals,” while
documentaries humanizing the Neanderthal have since exploded across
television channels and websites. Most fascinating here is the manner in
which a seeming palpable hierarchy and thought-structure of old, the
human/non-human divide, is durably vested in, and apparent among,
these divergent attempts to understand the Neanderthal species now
that they have been found in humans, in us—not only for the sake of
not rocking the boat of what it means to be human—but more signifi-
cantly—to quickly humanize that which for centuries had been classified
as non-human in a non-humanist world. Such efforts are not under-
taken as much for the sake of understanding better the non-human,
but rather, to ostensibly ameliorate the discomfort of having to now
reckon with the scientific uncovering of the non-human in humanity.
Since this great discovery in 2010, the aesthetic images of Neanderthals
have dramatically and decidedly taken a much softer, more handsome,
more human shape, look, and tone. It is even now suggested that they
possessed the widely-prized humanistic gene for language, buried their
dead, practiced religion, art, and retained the capacity for abstract and
symbolic thought. Such categories, ones that have long afforded humans
the category human, are now seemingly applied to the nonhuman world.
Recent discoveries that shed groundbreaking light on their human-like
capacity have produced new classificatory challenges towards the con-
tinued preservation of human uniqueness, the ‘what’ distinguishes
 1 INTRODUCTION  25

humans from their non-human counterparts. For some, recent discover-

ies such as this force a more complicated, and hence capacious under-
standing of who is considered human, and what makes humans human,
after all. Others, seeing something much more familiar in humans’
ancient Neanderthal ancestors than previously assumed through brutish
like depictions of animal-like savages lacking in the right kind of abili-
ties thought to mark human capacity (e.g.,abstraction of thought), see
a need to reclassify their speciation as human, or at least much closer
(to humans) than previously assumed. Such an approach however, still
unduly attempts to maintain the privilege of human uniqueness, by using
the assumed markers of (human) ability and capacity to check boxes of
the presumably non-human world. Either way, whether considered in a
philosophical or biological sense, what it means to be human seems to
be a considerable question at hand today. Perhaps, the first step towards
seeking such an answer or resolution rests in the task of reflexively exam-
ining humanisms’ non-humanisms within itself. Stated otherwise, one
could ask, what does it mean to be human when being human, for many,
was scientifically made possible through relating and thus crossing-over
into the non-humanist world where origin, ability, and capacity differed?
The time is upon us to leave behind humanisms’ Enlightenment and
Post-Enlightenment Cartesian frame of capacity (of mind), ability (to
act on reasoning), and speech (to access sciences and education of the
mind) which reinforce an ableist-centric historical thinking, and eschews
incapacity and inability based on the narrowest of illusory terms. Most
gravely, reproduction of the non-humanisms that humanism so inherits,
falsely assumes that cognitive capacity and reflection precedes the one
thing all humans, beyond normative assumed abilities (e.g., thinking,
speaking, reasoning), illusory marked limitations (e.g., inability to speak,
and thus think), and their inherent distinctions (able bodied vs. differ-
ently abled) share: the embodied reality of (shared) experience in time,
space, and place.

On Relating—New Beginnings
How might we begin to calibrate and recalibrate the ways in which
we relate to each other and ourselves in a world dominated by classi-
fying, marking, and hierarchizing human social difference? We stand
in grave need of new frames for historical thinking that exceed beyond
divisive assumptions of capacity (to reason, thus to think, hence to be
26  M.R. Miller

an ethical subject in the world guided by reason). How can we formu-

late new and different definitions, stances, and postures of humanism in
ways that are not premised on a seeming paradox of exclusion, which
not only exclude in and of themselves, but also, teach the world how to
exclude? What do we do with the tragic reality that humanitas—educa-
tion—like religion, widens possibilities for human flourishing and inge-
nuity as much as it excludes and results in outcomes that perpetuate
“isms” such as ableism, sexism, homophobia and racism? While many
humanists would, no doubt, make the case that humanisms, and its ethi-
cal dimensions stands in opposition against such social ills, we must wres-
tle with the definitions and assumptions of humanism—how it is marked,
and what is privileged in so doing (e.g., science, rationality, capacity of
thought)—as to recognize that as a term, with a history and heritage,
we continue to inherit exclusionary ideologies that so undergird their
(assumed) significance.
We can begin by examining the idea of “relating,” a notion hold-
ing together “humanism” and the “non-humanist world.” Emphasis
on relating undergirds the impulse of this book, to relate to something
thought to be unlike itself. In the English language, the term Relate has
four different definitions.41 They include:

• To give an account of something.

• To show or establish a logical or causal connection between things.
• To respond favorably or sympathetically to something.
• To demonstrate a point of origin for something. i.e. to relate back
to….

Logically and rhetorically, asking “how should humanism relate to a

non-humanist world?” is an example of begging the question. That is,
the question takes for granted that the world is, in fact, non-humanist,
which further depends on which markers of distinction one (uncon-
sciously) inherits in their conception of humanism (and its heritage).
Thus, non-humanist here can animate anything from animal, theistic,
non-educated, or differently abled. Such a distinction posed between
humanism and non-humanist world has the effect of reinforcing a dan-
gerous binary between humanism and a world that is more complicated
than any one question (or essay) could suggest or resolve. Nevertheless,
humanism and the many humanists that embody humanism are most
assuredly in a world, this world, a planet in which it shares with many
 1 INTRODUCTION  27

others. Being in the world, ethical, humane, and political sensibilities

force a confrontation with how we might relate to that world which
encompasses wide-ranging diversity and difference in species, thought,
action, perspective/world-view, and capacities, meaning that begging the
question, after all, deconstructs itself insofar as we intend to focus on the
relation, or the act of relating.
Humanism in a Non-Humanist World gives an account of human-
ism in the world that still treats its unfamiliar parts as foreign, alien,
strange—non-humanist. Here, as it concerns worldview, humanist and
non-humanist voices give account of that which is shared among the dis-
tinction posed: the category human. It also relates to, and highlights, a
wide-variety of connections between humanism and the world, forging
common ground between seemingly distinct things, such as humans and
aliens, or secular reasoning and use of biblical sources. Next it works to
rehabilitate the image and importance of such a non-humanist world
(for the humanists, the humans in it). Humanism in a Non-Humanist
World is divided into three parts giving emphases to various relational
postures, and postures of relationality that highlight humanisms’ diver-
sity of thought, action and approach, as much as it challenges rhetorical
and ideological divides, opening new space to conceive of humanism in
new, relevant, and exciting ways.
Part one, “Humanism in a non-humanist world,” gives shape and
color to the variable and complicated face/faces of humanism today.
German Philosopher Matthias Jung’s “World-Views as Options—
Humanistic and Non-humanistic” turns to pragmatic philosophers like
William James and John Dewey to argue that humanism is a world-
view similar in many respects to other world-views such as theism. His
point is not to flatten the differences between these “world-views,” but
emphasize that they are commonly connected because they all rely on
the option to choose or adopt them. Jung concludes with some sug-
gestions about how various world-views might build relationships from
this understanding of them as options. Chapter 3 is written by former
Professor of Mathematics and Founder and President Emeritus of the
Secular Coalition for America Herb Silverman and titled, “Us vs. Them:
But Who is Us and Who is Them?” Silverman’s essay argues that effec-
tively relating to the non-humanist world first requires humanists to
better relate to one another. Humanists should focus on their own com-
monalities in order to gain more social and political influence. He con-
cludes with a practical and memorable list of do’s and don’ts.
28  M.R. Miller

Chapter 4, “Secular Voices of Color—Digital Storytelling,” turns

to the online archiving work of black humanist Sincere Kirabo, whose
project “Secular Voices of Color” tells many stories of humanists of
color, including the (often unlikely) journeys they take towards human-
ist postures. Scholars of religion Elonda Clay and Christopher Driscoll
turn to sociological methods in order to mine this rich archive for the
acute nuances it presents about black and humanist life. The chapter also
gives much needed “color” to the multiplicative face of humanism and
humanisms, today. Chapter 5 is an essay from Founder and Executive
Director of African Americans for Humanism, Norm R. Allen, Jr. titled
“Where Humanism is and Where it is Headed in this Non-Humanist
World.” Here, Allen offers a jaunt through different topics historically
and currently of interest to humanism including politics, race, gender,
sexuality, and other social issues. Concluding Part one, Allen’s essay pro-
vides an instructive overview of humanism today.
Part two, “humanism in a Non-Humanist world,” sets out to show
various commonalities and means of forging connections between
humanists, humanism, and the world. Specifically, these essays articu-
late a series of visions of the non-humanist world that humanism may
find of (perhaps, unlikely) value. Chapter 6, written by German political
theologian Jürgen Manemann, is titled “Solidarity between Humanists
and Non-Humanists: Towards an Anamnestic Humanism.” Manemann
is interested in what makes humanism humanism in the deepest sense,
turning to Jean-Paul Sartre to offer the idea of an “anamnestic human-
ism,” as in amnesia. That is, humanism might just involve the remem-
bering of things forgotten, the stories that bind us to the past. These
stories, as Manemann effectively demonstrates, are always rooted in
death and remembering that what connects humanism to humans across
all of time is our shared mortality. Chapter 7 is written by scholar of
African American religion and culture Monica R. Miller, and titled “The
Absence of Presence: Relating to ‘Black’ (Non)Humanisms in Popular
Culture. This essay turns to hip hop culture, the history of African
American (humanist) religious expression, and the high culture of vis-
ual art galleries, to offer an allegory about why race, and other forms of
social difference, are so difficult to see in spaces of humanism. And yet,
the ability to see such differences (and difficulties) are vital to updating
humanism to more equitably engage the world.
Chapter 8 seeks to extend the conversation beyond the gravitational
forces of typical humanist discourses. Christopher Driscoll’s “Rudy’s
 1 INTRODUCTION  29

Paradox: The ALIENation of Race and its Non-Humans” gives an

account of the alien presence already at work in the non-humanist world.
Would a threat from alien forces give us pause to rethink the binary of
“humanism” and “non-humanist?” This and other existential questions
are posed with help from a very unlikely source, Rudy of Germany, the
tall white alien race traitor. Chapter 9, “Figuring in Scripture,” finds
biblical scholar and ordained minister Allen Dwight Callahan exploring
the decidedly “humanistic” sensibilities of an unlikely humanist text, the
Bible. Arguing that “we need not be judged by the Bible. It is we who
judge,” Callahan’s essay is a provocative rehabilitation of the Bible mak-
ing it possible for humanism to treat it as a cultural resource, an artifact
as opposed to an authority.
Part Three, “humanism in a non-humanist World,” gives sus-
tained attention to the worldly issues and forces shaping humanism’s
vision of that world, and the humanist’s varied tasks in responding and
relating to that world. Part Three begins with Chap. 10, “The Case
for Community: Within and Beyond the Four Walls” where former
Christian minister Mike Aus tells a personal and practical story about his
(and our continued need for) work with real people, some believers/
some not, in real places, who find themselves asking questions with dif-
ficult answers or no answers at all. Specifically, he discusses his work with
Houston Oasis (“a completely secular alternative to church”), in order to
provide suggestions for building community among humanists and those
who might find themselves alienated from their former churches and
religious organizations. In Chap. 11, German philosopher Eike Brock’s
“Uncanny Nihilism and Cornel West’s Tragic Humanism,” argues that
sometimes, believers (like West) have much to offer non-believers, as
well. Underscoring that nihilism, the loss of meaning, is a feature of
human life that cuts across believers and non-believers, alike. Giving
attention to the dangers of it, Brock argues that ironically, increased
attention to the tragic dimensions of life, offers a way to understand and
respond to philosophical and social expressions of nihilism. Results of
such increased attention would prove useful for increasing humanism’s
footprint in the non-humanist world. Chapter 12 is written by President
and Public Policy Director at the Institute for Science and Human
Values, Toni Van Pelt, and is titled “Relating to a ‘Non-Humanist’
World: Participating in Democracy, On Why the Humanist Viewpoint
Matters.” After having pushed, probed and reflexively wrestled with
a variety of ways that humanism might better understand itself and its
30  M.R. Miller

roles in the non-humanist world, this final chapter situates humanism as

an incredibly important mechanism for defending and realizing participa-
tory democracy. Actively, and unapologetically, Van Pelt takes American
“theocrats” to task. She outlines concrete examples of the theocratic per-
versions of American democracy before concluding with a didactic pro-
gram for increasing the impact of humanist involvement in the political
sphere.
Humanism in a Non-humanist World then culminates in a brief con-
cluding reflection by Monica R. Miller on the task of this book, and
how it might direct humanist perspectives on the world, and the world’s
perspectives on humanism. And, one final word of relating to tasks also
helps me draw this Introduction to a close.

Our Task
One helpful way of understanding the efforts of this book is by think-
ing of the theme that brought this volume together in the form of an
extended question: How should humanism relate to a non-humanist
world? Humanism in a Non-Humanist World does not settle any score
or come to any conclusions about what “should” should involve. For its
part, “should” connotes obligation, duty, or correctness; and, it often
carries a connotation that whatever should happen will likely happen.
This book consists of a number of humanist and non-humanist authors
who offer suggestions and ideas about how humanism should engage the
world, be engaged by the world, and think about itself. Not all of the
author’s claims or positions agree, neither should they.
Humanism is not immune to self-righteousness, assumptions about
duty, and ideas about who is right or wrong. Where normative claims are
concerned, the moral scale of injustice may balance (as this book does)
between humanism and a largely theistic, non-humanist world. But,
humanism is itself reliant on normative appeals. Consequentially, though
humanism’s guilt may be outweighed by the overwhelming weight of
a god idea that has seen so many killed throughout the centuries, the
hands of humanism, and its human subjects of capacity and great reason,
are nearly as bloody.
Perhaps, normativity—not god, not humanism, but should—is the
deadliest feature of human history. Readers might remember that this
collection of essays is the beginning of a discussion, not an end to one.
The question posed in our conference theme, and the distinction alive
 1 INTRODUCTION  31

in our title remains unanswered, and in many ways, unanswerable. Keep

this question open, active, and uncertain, as you read, and it should prove
worth your time.

Notes
1. http://time.com/3988276/republican-debate-primetime-transcript-full-
text/. Accessed August 9, 2015.
2.  Humanist Manifesto, 1933. https://zelalemkibret.files.wordpress.
com/2012/01/humanist-manifestos.pdf. Accessed March 2, 2017.
3. Humanist Manifesto, 1933.
4. Humanist Manifesto, 1933.
5. Humanist Manifesto, 1933.
6.  Humanist Manifesto II, 1973. https://zelalemkibret.files.wordpress.
com/2012/01/humanist-manifestos.pdf. Accessed March 3, 2017.
7. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973.
8. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973.
9. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973.
10. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973.
11. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973.
12. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973.
13. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973.
14. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973.
15. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973.
16. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973.
17. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973.
18. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Enlightenment,” 2010. https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/. Accessed March 2, 2017.
19. Justin E.H. Smith, “The Enlightenment’s ‘Race’ Problem, and Ours,”
The New York Times Opinionator, February 10, 2013. https://opiniona-
tor.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/why-has-race-survived/. Accessed
March 6, 2017.
20. Smith, 2013.
21. Smith, 2013.
22. David Theo Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of
Meaning (Wiley Blackwell, 1993), 28–29. Cited in Kenan Malik, “On
the Enlightenment’s ‘Race Problem’.” Pandaemonium. 2013. https://
kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2013/02/13/on-the-enlightenments-race-
problem/. Accessed March 6, 2017.
23. Kenan Malik, “On the Enlightenment’s ‘Race Problem’.” Pandaemonium.
2013. https://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2013/02/13/on-the-enlight-
enments-race-problem/. Accessed March 6, 2017.
32  M.R. Miller

24. Malik, 2013.
25. Jonathan Israel, cited in Malik, 2013.
26. Malik, 2013.
27. Malik, 2013.
28. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973.
29. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973.
30. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973.
31. Humanist Manifesto II, 1973.
32. Natasha Lennard and Cary Wolfe, “Is Humanism Really Humane?” The
New York Times Opinion Page, January 9, 2017. https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/01/09/opinion/is-humanism-really-humane.html. Accessed
March 5, 2017.
33. Lennard and Wolfe, 2017.
34. Lennard and Wolfe, 2017.
35. Lennard and Wolfe, 2017.
36. Lennard and Wolfe, 2017.
37. Lennard and Wolfe, 2017.
38. NASA website. https://www.nasa.gov/about/highlights/what_does_
nasa_do.html. Accessed March 5, 2017.
39.  Jon Mooallem, “Neanderthals Were People, Too,” New York Times
Magazine, January 11, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/
magazine/neanderthals-were-people-too.html?_r=0. Accessed March 2,
2017.
40. Mooallem 2017.
41. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/relate. Accessed August 9,
2015.
 PART I

Humanism in a Non-Humanist World

 CHAPTER 2

World-Views as Options—Humanistic
and Non-humanistic

Matthias Jung

Using the concept of “world-view” as a lens, this chapter examines the

varying ways in which the distinction between humanistic and non-
humanistic stances and attitudes are conceptualized with particular focus
upon not only such conceptualizations, but also, their contextualization.
Unfortunately, the broad term humanism is excessively vague and
its meanings are manifold and often inconsistent. We can put aside
highly idiosyncratic uses like the one in Martin Heidegger’s “Letter on
Humanism”, where the term signifies a specific metaphysical attitude
in  which the meaning of ‘Being’ is left unconsidered.1 More recently,
computer scientist David Gelernter used the term (humanism) to
distance himself from reductive functionalism, that is the scientific
attitude of treating mind and self as mere algorithmic patterns,
transforming sensual input into motor output and void of all deeper
meaning. Contrary to this attitude, he declared that we need a new
subjective humanism which does justice to the human desire for a
meaningful world which includes beauty and morality.2 For Gelernter,
human beings thrive only in a meaningful universe and would wither

M. Jung (*) 
Universität Koblenz-Landau, Campus Koblenz, Koblenz, Germany

© The Author(s) 2017 35

M.R. Miller (ed.), Humanism in a Non-Humanist World, Studies
in Humanism and Atheism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57910-8_2
36  M. Jung

away in a world of meaningless causal processes. Here, the term human-

ism denotes opposition to computer-models of the mind and to all
attempts of replacing a strong notion of the human self with the sub-
personal mechanisms of neural networks in the brain. In other contexts,
however, taking a humanistic stance mainly implies opposition to super-
natural worldviews. Thus, Gelernter’s use of the term would easily allow
for subsuming non-religious and religious attitudes alike under the com-
mon species of “humanism,” insofar as both are opposed to scientistic,
reductionist world-views, in which the validity of our personal experi-
ences is denied and substituted by scientific knowledge. On the other
hand, when the distinction between humanistic and non-humanistic is
paralleled with the one between religious and secular, Gelernter’s par-
lance is excluded.
This situation leaves us with uncomfortable options. How we frame
our questions, which contrastive pairs we choose to shape the meaning
of humanism, seems to depend basically on prior conceptual stipulations.
This is hardly satisfying because it leaves the reasons for the diversity of
uses unexplained. Thus I suggest a different, integrative way of treating
the problem. Instead of defining humanisms in, more or less, arbitrary
ways, we ought to focus our attention towards their common status as
world-views. In this manner, attention is diverted from the differences
and directed towards the overall features of world-views, which
distinguish them from more specialized forms of relating to the world
as is the case in science or art. If we draw our attention to these features,
with respect to the difference between science and comprehensive expe-
rience, we can better realize that both the secular and Gelernter’s use
of the term humanism can be understood as expressions of world-views.
As such, they have something in common which becomes invisible if we
focus on their mutually exclusive use of humanism.
The structure I have in mind can be elucidated with the help of a
simple piece of elementary logic, namely the Aristotelian distinction
between genus and species where the importance lies in distinguishing
between, and among, two kinds of differences: genus/species on the
one hand (e.g., tree-oak), species/con-species (e.g., oak-spruce) on the
other. The latter, so to speak animates a “horizontal” difference which
has an exclusive character (an oak is not a spruce), whereas the former
highlights a “vertical” one, by pointing to the common genus shared by
more than one species, and may connect what from a horizontal perspec-
tive looks so different (oaks and spruces are both trees). Excluding  the
 2  WORLD-VIEWS AS OPTIONS—HUMANISTIC AND NON-HUMANISTIC  37

other, species are distinguished from other species by specific differences

to the genus. Therefore, on the level of species, humanism à la Gelernter
and secular humanism are like oaks and spruces: mutually exclusive.
Nevertheless, on the level of the common kind (genus proximum)
“world-view” they share important features and can be regarded as dif-
ferent answers to the same problem of integrating the diverse forms of
human experience into a holistic picture.
Introducing the conceptual level of world-views will prove indispensible
to tackle the problem of humanism (now taken as a secular world-view by
many accounts) vs. non-humanism. In what follows, I argue that in plural-
istic societies, all comprehensive doctrines and world-views, religious and
secular alike, should be viewed as options, framed by other options. Their
strained or even antagonistic relation on the level of the species-species-
distinction is mollified once we recognize their common ancestry in their
common kind, namely the human demand for integrating the cogni-
tive, emotional and volitional facets of being-in-the-world. Admittedly,
this proposal places heavy demands on world-views insomuch as they are
requested to develop a reflexive stance towards the contingencies of their
own development, and to further realize the precarious and fallible sta-
tus of world-view-like generalizations. Consider the self-identification of
“Christian” as an example. Whereas in the Middle Ages being a Christian
might have meant being part of an unquestionable, closed universe of
religious meanings, whereas nowadays it might mean living in a world of
countless other options which too, have to be considered and taken seri-
ously. Such a task is not to be confused with getting rid of religious claims
to truth or validity, since taking the reflexive stance may alter the manner
of believing but not necessarily the beliefs themselves. Nevertheless, one
might imagine that fundamentalist religiosity of any sort will have a hard
time satisfying such demands, in a world where, for example, believing in
the Bible as infallible and inerrant stands to face much scrutiny as legiti-
mate option on the grounds of easy refutation vis-à-vis rational evidence.
But scientism—the belief that science reveals all there is—can be as rigidly
stubborn too, whereas the distinction between scientific knowledge and its
enlargement to a world-view may be hard to swallow for those unwilling
to accept that the act of totalizing always transcends experience.
In what follows, this basic insight will be elaborated by draw-
ing on the resources of classic pragmatism, especially William James’s
and John Dewey’s, two of its most prominent representatives. I make
use of Dewey’s non-reductive naturalism as a starting point in order
38  M. Jung

to show that meaning, in a sense often rejected by scientistic posi-

tions, is a perfectly normal and irreducible feature of human experience,
which comprises volitional and affective as well as cognitive dimensions.
Dewey’s important achievement lies in reconciling scientific knowl-
edge with humane values in a naturalistic framework. He is, however,
quite insensitive to the optional character of this naturalism if taken as
a comprehensive world-view. Drawing on insights by William James,
among others, I then turn to focus both on the inevitability and frag-
ile structure of world-views, and finally, conclude with a discussion of the
humanistic/non-humanistic-distinction in the light of the previous line
of argumentation.

Dewey’s Humanism as a Non-reductive Naturalism

In order to tackle the question how humanists should relate to the non-
humanist world, it is essential to pose the juxtaposition in the right
manner. Many religious humanists—in the more comprehensive sense
of the term Gelernter suggests—feel hostile to naturalist humanism
because they see it as inseparably intertwined with a reductionist view of
human nature and of values in general.3 On the other hand, many secu-
lar humanists feel uncomfortable with religious positions because they
regard them as inevitably connected with claims untenable in the light
of what science tells us about the world. It is here where John Dewey
enters the picture. Dewey developed a non-reductive naturalism which
can serve as a common ground for both brands of humanists on which
they may stage their disputes without overlooking what they actually
share with each other.
Thus, it is essential for my argument here to distinguish between two
kinds of naturalism and to relate both to the larger question of human-
ism. Both terms are synonymously complimentary as they are diver-
gent and complex, and existing confusions therefore stem from lacking
clarity in this regard. Beginning with naturalism, two distinctions are
essential for empirical research and philosophical argumentation: one
between its reductive and non-reductive variants, and the other which
views naturalism on the level of world-views as well as the more lim-
ited form of a naturalistic methodology. More often than not, the lat-
ter distinction is blurred. To offer just one example among others: in
Chap. 3 of his otherwise interesting and important book Science in a
Democratic Society, Philip Kitcher develops “Ethics as a human project”
 2  WORLD-VIEWS AS OPTIONS—HUMANISTIC AND NON-HUMANISTIC  39

and declares his methodological commitment to avoid the invocation

of “spooks”,4 by which he means all sorts of deities, nebulous enti-
ties, but also Kant’s faculty of practical reason. Even if we leave aside
the sloppy categorization of practical reason, this statement remains
ambiguous. If taken in a strictly methodological sense, it only com-
mits to an “innerworldly” explanation of moral resources and rejects
invoking transcendent entities for filling explanational gaps. Thus, it
leaves open the question whether the natural resources of morality, on
the level of a generalized world-view, might or might not be seen as
related to religious convictions about the ultimate source of these natu-
ral processes. Talking about spooks, on the other hand, seems to imply
more than that, namely a negative ontological commitment pertain-
ing to the ‘objects’ of religious convictions. By definition, spooks are
ridiculous entities from the standpoint of reason and rationality. Now,
many people feel so inclined to take the step from methodological natu-
ralism to world-view naturalism which is certainly a legitimate option.
But it should not, however, keep one from scrutinizing whether such
a decisive step is really a plausible one within science or philosophy.
Generalizing experience to ultimate convictions about the universe and
our place in it seems to overstep the boundaries of both. Yet, as Kant
has clearly demonstrated and outlined in his work, we cannot seemingly,
however, fully prevent doing so as such seems justified and an unavoid-
able part of humans trying their hand in developing comprehensive
world-views, as such. But is it not, we might ask, different in kind from
methodological naturalism and realizing the significance for under-
standing the humanistic stance?
Kept clearly distinct (albeit not separated) from a generalized world-
view, methodological naturalism is something all world-views and reli-
gions have to learn to accept and come to terms with. Put otherwise,
it is more or less synonymous with the commitment to letting science
take its course without invoking supernatural explanations for natural
events. Religious convictions failing to satisfy this condition, like funda-
mentalist deniers of evolution, are so hard to deal with precisely because
they deny this common ground of shared experience and reason. But
accepting the demand of methodological naturalism would be easier
for religions and world-views alike if its demands would clearly distin-
guish from scientistic attempts to reduce natural meanings to the realm
of scientific explanations. It is here where Dewey’s efforts at naturalism
come into play.
40  M. Jung

Before that however, it is important to draw attention to the more gen-

eral relations between naturalism and humanism. To begin, methodologi-
cal naturalism poses little to no threat to humanism but rather constitutes
part of its very idea. As Dewey habitually pointed out again and again,
the task humanism calls us to is to secure human, universalistic values in
a contingent frame of nature. To make such possible, we need the kind
of knowledge only the methodological stance that naturalism enables:
knowledge about causal relations between events in the world that further
enable us to influence the course of nature according to human needs.
Reductionist naturalism or scientism, on the other hand, indeed poses a
threat to humanism. But why, we might ask, is it so dangerous? Perhaps,
because it undermines our moral and aesthetic capacity by depicting them
as a merely epiphenomenal: in following scientism, we may, for example,
feel free and strive hard to make the morally right decision, when it is in
fact the neural clockwork in our brain, rather than our own responsibility,
that determines what we will do. And though it is true that science and
humaneness, in the ‘Age of Enlightenment’ were often (not always!) seen
as inseparable, there is no logical bond nor any unalterable historical con-
nection between the further development of science and the progress of
the humanistic agenda.
Given my use of the term “scientism” in a critical manner, a clarifica-
tion might be appropriate. Steven Pinker has recently pointed out5 that
the term is often used as a kind of boo-word, a way to block scientific
research into topics traditionally treated by the humanities. That is true
and regrettable enough, but it should not keep us from using it in a better
way, namely to criticize the reductionist attitude of identifying the cogni-
tive meaning of human experience with that of scientific knowledge. For
Dewey, this fallacy goes under the heading of “intellectualism,” but we can
easily identify it as the core of scientism too: “The isolation of traits char-
acteristic for objects known, and then defined as the sole ultimate realities,
accounts for the denial to nature of the characters which make things love-
able and contemptible, beautiful and ugly, adorable and awful.”6 And if,
as scientism implies, the values which guide us in ordinary experience are
indeed nothing but “projections onto a morally barren world”7 (accord-
ing to Ronald Dworkin), then science, it seems, would cease to be an ally
for moral aspirations. Assigning a merely epiphenomenal status to human
values is hardly compatible with a humanistic attitude. In an age of count-
less attempts to “scientifically” debunk the vocabulary of our understand-
ing of, and reliance on, “folk-psychology” and its attendant emphases on
 2  WORLD-VIEWS AS OPTIONS—HUMANISTIC AND NON-HUMANISTIC  41

self-understanding and freedom and responsibility,8 it would be exceed-

ingly naïve to see science and humanism as natural partners.
Thus, we must distinguish several sorts of relationships between nat-
uralism and humanism. Methodological naturalism, if combined with
a universalistic value-orientation, is conducive to humanism insofar
as it enables us, via causal knowledge and technological skills, to effec-
tively pursue our aims. In stripping the objects of knowledge from their
embeddedness in the organism’s interaction with its environment, and
focusing on causal relations, it will necessarily be reductionist, albeit in a
limited and harmless form. Reductionism as a danger to humanistic val-
ues enters the picture only at the very moment the scientific approach to
nature is taken as comprehensive.
Against the backdrop of this reflection it is now possible to assess
the impact of Dewey’s non-reductive naturalism more precisely, which
I approach as a philosophical attempt to develop a comprehensive met-
aphysics of experience within nature with the double aim of emphasiz-
ing the role both of science and of non-scientific, value-laden ordinary
experience. This metaphysics aims at making the world of science safe
for humanistic values, be they tied to a decidedly non-theistic or reli-
gious form of humanism. As such, it should be placed on an interme-
diary level of reflection and generalization, above concrete scientific and
this-worldly experiences, but below the unifying attempts of world-views
and religions. Dewey himself would probably not find such a sketch and
description agreeable, a point to which I will later return. But first, let us
consider a brief outline of the general form of his argument.
A helpful way of understanding Dewey’s naturalistic metaphys-
ics, exhibited most clearly in works like Experience and Nature or The
Quest for Certainty, is indeed to see it as a way to conceive of the uni-
verse in ways that make it safe for human values. In like manner, Robert
Westbrook reads the naturalistic reflections of these great books as
efforts “to provide a philosophical anthropology for democracy.”9 I find
such efforts so put rather far-fetched, given that one of Dewey’s major
aims was to avoid anthropocentric positions by placing human life in
the entirety of life on the planet, and to further place life in the con-
text of the cosmic order. But Westbrook is correct in that Dewey asks
a vital question which is often overlooked by scientistic naturalists and
religious fundamentalists alike: how are we to conceive of nature as to
do better justice both to the qualitative (i.e., emotional experience
of being human) as well as its scientifically explorable features? Without
42  M. Jung

a satisfying answer to such a question, methodological naturalism alone

easily inclines towards a condescending and unappreciative attitude per-
taining to the values which are important to our lives. On the other
hand, without accepting the middle ground of a naturalistic metaphysics
that includes human values, religious world-views are inclined to deny
the autonomy of both science and morality and invoke divine commands
and acts prematurely. It is easy to see that both attitudes pose challeng-
ing obstacles to the work of promoting of human values.
Dewey’s metaphysics of unreduced, comprehensive human experi-
ence in nature helps us to avoid going astray here insomuch as it builds
upon his distinction (not separation) of knowledge and experience. As
all other organisms, human beings are essentially part of an environ-
ment in which they stand in, and find themselves among, constant
relations of exchange. These repeated interactional feedback loops are
the basis for both our sophisticated practices of scientific inquiry and
for the process of valuation. Ordinary experience takes place within
the action and comprises emotional, volitional and cognitive dimen-
sions, usually without seperation. For example, when we see the sun
rise in the morning, when we are immersed in our work or when we
encounter another human being, we will be filled with a certain “uni-
fied comprehensive quality” (to borrow from Dewey) in which facts
and values are, as Hilary Putnam says, entangled.10 It is only when a
‘hitch’ occurs, when—to give two examples—the ground yields instead
of supporting our steps or when others react in ways unanticipated by
us that the necessity for articulating what we took for granted arises.
The interactional feedback loop is then somehow obstructed. Hitches
like these, though, will occur regularly, since we live in an environ-
ment with other actors and with physical features offering resistance.
It is important to see that the articulations triggered by the encoun-
ter of resistances may develop in two opposite, but related directions:
one cognitive and the other evaluative. Cognitive clarifications separate
what is experienced from its embeddedness into interactions. They can
be seen as the starting point for the human science-project. Evaluative
clarifications appear when the reaction of others urge us to distin-
guish between our spontaneous impulses for action and that which
would be good to do. Thus, they introduce the important distinction
between the (factually) desired and the (normatively) desirable (to
invoke Dewey’s parlance). In this way, they trigger the ethical projects
of humankind. Obviously, this picture is painted in very broad strokes,
 2  WORLD-VIEWS AS OPTIONS—HUMANISTIC AND NON-HUMANISTIC  43

but it should suffice to offer a general idea of what Dewey has in mind:
it is the des-integration of the dynamic unity between organism and
environment from which both the desire for causal knowledge and for
shared human values spring.
By starting with ordinary experience as a holistic way of interactive
relatedness, and by seeing science as an incomplete, albeit extremely
important part of the whole specializing in epistemic knowledge, Dewey
accomplishes a naturalistic re-integration of facts and values. The sub-
ject-matter of science is incomplete, but likewise is the subject-matter of
ordinary experience, so long as it fails to integrate scientific knowledge.
Such a task, however, is not as much a scientific one as it is humanis-
tic. That is, it needs to be performed by the subjects of ordinary experi-
ence, led in this task by the articulation of values inaccessible to science,
but elaborated and reflected upon in natural experiences. Dewey’s non-
reductive, naturalistic humanism encourages the subjects of these experi-
ences (e.g., all of us) to realize that science has no prerogative for the
disclosure of reality. On the contrary, science might be able to tell us
that the sun does not revolve around the earth and yet it cannot tell us
that a beautiful sunset is actually nothing more than atmospheric parti-
cles filtering out the red components of the light, or that human rights
are nothing more than clever instruments of maximizing the survival of
the species.
“If experience actually presents esthetic and moral traits,” Dewey
writes in Experience and Nature, “then these traits may also be supposed
to reach down into nature, and to testify to something that belongs to
nature as truly as does the mechanical structure attributed to it in physi-
cal science.”11 Since we are natural beings, and our interactions with our
environment happen within nature, the experiential and evaluative fea-
tures discovered in this process are as real as the laws of gravity or the
genetic code. Taking the stance of classical, Deweyan pragmatism thus
paves the ground for a naturalistic humanism. It allows us to cherish sci-
ence and humanistic values, since both are grown on the same natural
ground of our embeddedness in nature as interacting and articulating
organisms. If we dispense with the ironic and somewhat condescending
overtones of Kitcher’s phrase, we can confidently say: no spooks so far.
This is an important result since it demonstrates the manner in which
humanism, in the basic sense of a natural evaluative attitude towards
the achievement of universalistic values, is anthropologically situated,
so to speak, in the middle region of our life: above the level of scientific
44  M. Jung

knowledge, since it relies on the comprehensive subject-matter of experi-

ence, not on the incomplete subject-matter of science alone, but below
the level of comprehensive world-views which imply more than that basic
sense of humanism, namely generalizations pertaining to the overall
meaning and structure of existence, be they theistic, agnostic or atheistic
in kind.
To sum up the first part, I’d like to highlight that Dewey’s non-reduc-
tive naturalism incorporates methodological naturalism and thus, gives it
the humanistic twist it often lacks when taken in isolation. By regarding
our natural attitudes towards the social and physical world surrounding
us as nature’s self-revelation in the realm of values and by seeing them
as capable of reflective refinement, Dewey breaks the spell of the barren-
universe-attitude of scientism. For him, values are neither invented, as
John Mackie would have it,12 nor do they come down on us ready-made
from some moral Mount Sinai, as the divine-command-theory claims.
Rather, values are real features of the human world, which is a world of
potentially reflective interaction between the organism and its environ-
ment. This ‘common’ or ‘middle’-ground humanism is so important due
to its world-view independence. Having escaped from the clutches of both
scientism and fundamentalism, world-views and religions of all kinds
should be able to subscribe to the promotion of human values in the
basic sense of conditions for human flourishing. The astonishing rise of
the talk of human rights, and human-dignity, in the last decades testifies
to the possibility of such commonalities below the level of world-views.
No supernatural strings must be pulled in order to establish human
rights. To be sure, for religious believers these common human values
will not be enough. As Charles Taylor has repeated again and again, sec-
ular humanism is hardly satisfying for people aspiring to a more trans-
cendent vision of the ultimate reality.13 But these values nevertheless
indicate the common ground achievable for believers and non-believers
on the basis of non-reductive naturalism.
The obvious objection to this is that naturalism is a no-go for reli-
gious believers. But if you think about it, this is true, strictly spoken,
only of world-view naturalism. Dewey allows one to see that methodo-
logical naturalism, if combined with the broader naturalism of ordinary
experience, constitutes no threat for comprehensive world-views. And,
that the cultural life form of human beings has evolved naturally is a hard
fact to deny. The threat for believers may well reoccur on the level of
world-views, but believers and non-believers alike should in principle
 2  WORLD-VIEWS AS OPTIONS—HUMANISTIC AND NON-HUMANISTIC  45

be able to see universal human values as shared necessary conditions of

human flourishing, despite the fact that believers will not regard these
conditions as sufficient.14
Unfortunately, Dewey himself does not distinguish clearly between
middle-ground naturalistic humanism and humanistic world-views. In his
small book A Common Faith,15 he develops the outline of an all-encom-
passing humanistic faith intended to replace all positive religions. And he
depicts this faith as the natural and only possible outcome of his natu-
ralistic concept of experience. This attempt, as respectable as it is, is yet
flawed in several ways and inappropriate, I argue, for modeling the rela-
tion between the humanistic and the non-humanistic world. In order to
demonstrate this, I will first elaborate the concept of world-views a bit
more.

Religions and Other World-Views

Human beings are indeed part of the natural world and their mind is
firmly embedded and embodied into its physical and social structures.
But embodiment should not be confused with identity. Complementary
to embodiment is our ability to transcend local environments and to
relate ourselves to ultimate reality—whatever that is taken to mean
among the great diversity of religions and world-views. This ability
is brought about by our use of symbolic language, which enables us
to think and talk about everything, independent from direct interac-
tion with it, but likewise permeates our whole being in its emotional,
volitional and cognitive dimensions. Existential feelings, as Matthew
Ratcliffe16 has shown, relate us to our way of being-in-the-world in
more general terms. Thus, moral principles transcend the here and
now of every given situation and cognitive convictions about the ulti-
mate reality overstep the boundaries of what we can know in any sci-
entific and even in any empirical sense at all. It is an inevitable part of
our human condition that we lead our lives in the light of generalized
emotional, volitional and cognitive attitudes which transcend the given
or the empirically verifiable in principle. Obviously, huge differences
occur in this regard. Some people seem to get along without recourse
to any even remotely articulated coherent world-view, others stick to
a verbal reading of some holy text as the guideline of their lives. But,
these differences not withstanding, general attitudes with cognitive
implications are anthropologic universals. And these attitudes, though
46  M. Jung

of course connected with experience, necessarily transcend and extrapo-

late each possible experience.
In this respect, William James had a clearer vision than Dewey.
He opened his lectures on Pragmatism by pointing out that the most
important thing to know about a person is her “philosophy,” her over-
all world-view in a non-technical sense. By that he means “our indi-
vidual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of
the cosmos.”17 And despite the fact that James somewhat neglects
the sociological and psychological truism that this “individual way” is
always already shaped by the surrounding culture, he is perfectly right
in underlining that such a general attitude is as inevitable as important
und may exist independently from any further articulation. Another
important insight of James consists in the paramount importance of
emotional attitudes, which he brings under the heading of tender vs.
tough-minded minds. The contemporary discussions about existential
feelings confirm this point.18 And already at the turn of the twentieth
century, the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey attempted to recon-
struct ideal types of world-views depending on generalized emotional
attitudes.19 But world-views develop from the articulation of holistic,
non-methodological experience which they relate to the ultimate reality.
Emotional attitudes will accordingly often be starting points, but during
the process of articulation they will continuously be fused with general
orientations of the will (values and norms) and with cognitive world-
pictures.
I do not follow James in his claim that cognitive world-pictures are
only functions of emotional attitudes. They exhibit a, so to speak, rela-
tive autonomy and cannot be reduced to subjective expressions. But
the important point is, that in all three aspects, human experience is as
well relied on and transcended—emotionally, practically and cognitively.
An isolated cognitive picture of the world will therefore not suffice as a
comprehensive world-view: generalizing our experiential relation to the
world necessarily oversteps the boundaries of scientific, methodological
knowledge. In performing this transcending movement, the generaliza-
tion will necessarily be guided by emotional and volitional desires and
attitudes and consequently loose the epistemic prestige of science. There
is no such thing as a scientific world-view in the all-encompassing sense,
only the—perfectly legitimate—non-scientific extrapolation of science to
a world-view called scientism.
 2  WORLD-VIEWS AS OPTIONS—HUMANISTIC AND NON-HUMANISTIC  47

Accordingly, we find ourselves with a multitude of world-views and

religions. Some are easily compatible with the cognitive claims of science,
like scientism, some not at all, like Christian, Islamic or Jewish funda-
mentalism, and others may find themselves trying to reconcile a scientific
world-picture with religious validity claims, like most liberal forms of the
world-religions. Correspondingly, some existing world-views are com-
patible with what I have called middle-range humanism, like the more
tolerant varieties of the world religions and non-reductive naturalisms,
some are not, like scientism. As one can easily see, the borders between
humanistic and non-humanistic world-views (in the middle-range sense)
are different from those between humanism and religion.
To sum up once again: comprehensive world-views or religions are
part and parcel of the human condition. Their human abode (to para-
phrase Dewey who talks about the “human abode of the religious func-
tion” 20) is the desire for integrating emotional, volitional and cognitive
attitudes towards being-in-the-world as such. Every world-view or reli-
gion transcends the realm of knowledge. Admittedly, this transcending
movement may or may not be compatible with what we know about
the world, which creates a gradient of rationality between several world-
views. But even the most rational world-views transcend knowledge and
interpret reality in the light of more than principles of rationality. Next,
we will consider Dewey’s A Common Faith in the light of these general
observations about the nature of world-views above.
In a way, Dewey’s task in this little book is the same as that of the
volume to which this chapter contributes: How should humanism relate
to the non-humanist world? In a very condensed form, Dewey’s answer
would be: by getting rid of religion and saving the religious. Dewey’s
hope was that it might be possible to redirect the religious attitude onto
its alleged real object, namely humanity. In sharp contrast to the new
atheists of today, he realized clearly that human experience includes an
irreducible religious dimension, a demand, as he called it, for “a thor-
oughgoing and deepseated harmonizing of the self with the Universe (as
a name for the totality of conditions with which the self is connected).”21
Quite recently, Thomas Nagel has made much the same point, albeit in
a more soberly manner.22 Dewey’s attempt of severing the religious in
the adverbial sense from the supernatural believes of the positive reli-
gions rejects both “aggressive atheism” and “traditional supernatural-
ism” and even goes so far as to contemplate, despite his clear negation
48  M. Jung

of any religious believe in the traditional sense, saving the God-talk for
his secular humanism. “Use of the words ‘God’ or ‘divine,’” he writes,
“to convey … the union of actual with ideal may protect man from a
sense of isolation and from consequent despair or defiance.”23 But,
understandably, this attempt satisfied neither the more openly atheistic
of his followers nor the religious believers. Dewey seems to be insensi-
tive to the fact that the functional advantages of God-talk are dependent
upon the belief that there actually is a God. Furthermore, as I see it, he is
mistaken in another important regard in that he overlooks the difference
between his own quasi-religious world-view of naturalism-cum-human-
ism offered in A Common Faith and his non-reductive account of human
experience in nature.
Precision, I suggest, is necessary here: obviously, both aspects of
Dewey’s thought are closely connected, and for Dewey himself his the-
ory of action and experience expanded to a world-view quite naturally.
Nevertheless, the move from an account of experience which shows us
that values are no lesser part of nature than atoms and their interactions
to a comprehensive world-view involves the transcending of all experi-
ence towards a vision of the ultimate reality. Such move is entirely, no
doubt, legitimate but not, however, an unavoidable consequence of the
non-reductive theory of experience. As I have already attempted to dem-
onstrate, it is indeed possible to share the concept without necessarily
sharing the world-view. And this possibility creates common ground for
shared human values and -rights which are independent from religious
or anti-religious convictions. Independent but not wholly unrelated:
quite naturally, religious believers will see human dignity as rooted in
God’s creation. Such surplus does not, I believe, affect the main thrust
of my point here: many different and mutually exclusive world-views
or religions can share the minimal humanism of allegiance to, if I may
use Philippa Foot’s expression, natural goodness.24 In order to reach this
common ground, they have to accept that fertile sources of values and
norms can be found in ordinary human experience, conceived of in a
non-reductive naturalistic, but world-view neutral manner.
This is as far as we get so long as we put aside the human desire
for a unified world-view which integrates and inspires the search for
the securing of human values in a contingent world. Dewey wrote
A Common Faith because he realized the strength and importance of this
desire, but his solution is nonetheless faulted because—to put it quite
bluntly—he tried to have it both ways. As I see it, theistic world-views
 2  WORLD-VIEWS AS OPTIONS—HUMANISTIC AND NON-HUMANISTIC  49

own their inspiring power at least partly to their use of concepts like
saving grace or redemption which can never be reconstructed in natural-
istic terms, since they presuppose some active instance beyond nature.
Dewey succeeded in enlarging naturalism over the limits of methodol-
ogy and thereby paved the ground for middle-range humanism across
the differences between the world-views and religions. But his attempt
to appropriate the powers of God-talk for world-view naturalism
remains a non-starter. If secular humanism needs transcendent consola-
tions, theistic vocabulary and grammar is certainly not where it is to be
found.
Thus far, I have attempted to sketch the possibility and limits of mid-
dle-range humanism through a critical assessment of Dewey’s attempt
to glide smoothly from a naturalistic theory of experience to a secularist
world-view. In what follows, I focus on the status of and mutual relations
among full-fledged world-views.

World-Views as Options

The Inevitability of Generalizations

Above, I suggested that world-views and religions necessarily generalize
and synthesize experience beyond the limits of both methodological and
ordinary naturalism. Methodological naturalism, after all, is what makes
science possible. It is compatible with, but must be distinguished care-
fully from ordinary naturalism, which takes values and meanings as they
come in our natural experiences. Religions and other comprehensive
ways of life do not stop here. The range of world-view independent uni-
versal values lies below their level of generalization, and this is an insight
hard to overestimate, because it provides common ground for several
branches of humanism. Nevertheless, due to our anthropological procliv-
ity for articulating our relation to the ultimate reality, humankind will
probably never be able to stop there and refrain from such totalizations.
In other words, we do not need them to secure the validity of univer-
salistic norms and values and thus of a ‘weak,’ middle-range humanism,
but we likewise cannot seem to do without them in view of our search
for meaning. Meaning, in this sense, comprises emotional, volitional
and cognitive aspects in intricate reciprocal relationships. Accordingly,
isolating the cognitive aspect as exemplified in the example of the
so called proofs for God’s existence, in the end, will have very limited
50  M. Jung

powers of persuasion. It is precisely this entanglement of emotion, will

and cognition that shapes the form of communication about values and
religions and distinguishes it from scientific argumentation, at least in its
idealized form. And it is essential to realize that we cannot import the
standards of science into the realm of world-views, since that would inev-
itably amount to changing the subject. Hence, world-views and religions
deal with the totality of man’s being-in-the-world, not only with the sci-
entifically accessible aspects of it.
These considerations determine my reflections on the relation
between full-fledged secular humanism and other comprehensive world-
views. First, it is important to acknowledge the insecurity and fallibility
of all world-views. As Ronald Dworkin has so convincingly emphasized
in his work, “absolute confidence or clarity is the privilege of fools and
fanatics.”25 Now, what about the difference in rationality? Obviously it
is highly counterintuitive to put fanatical religious or secular supposi-
tions on a par with sophisticated world-views offering subtle conceptions
of the relation between scientific knowledge and this-worldly meaning.
The rationality of a world-view or religion can be measured partly by the
seriousness of their attempts to incorporate scientific knowledge. But, it
would nevertheless be misleading to assign a higher degree of rationality
to scientism, which is by definition, compatible to the findings of science,
than to other world-views and religions. On one hand, scientism falls
short of the practical rationality of our ordinary evaluations and denies
them the cognitive status of revealing properties of nature. Yet, on the
other, it is prone to underestimating the precarious and fallible character
of its own world-views, since it is blind to the non-scientific character
of the relevant generalizations. Religious fundamentalists, on the oppo-
site side of the range, suffer from the complimentary blindness of being
unable to integrate science and to admit the fallible and interpretative
element of all religions and world-views.

The Inevitability of Pluralism

These considerations are enforced by the fact that world-view plural-
ism has arrived at the core of all western, democratic societies—albeit
in astonishingly different degrees. On the factual level, we find a wild
diversity of standpoints concerning conceptions of the ultimate real-
ity, and political philosophies since the time of John Rawls’s Theory of
Justice26 are highly sensitive to this fact. Looking for overlapping con-
sensus among the comprehensive world-views like Rawls or for discursive
 2  WORLD-VIEWS AS OPTIONS—HUMANISTIC AND NON-HUMANISTIC  51

consent like Habermas,27 they try to travel, metaphorically speaking,

with as few luggage as possible. Nevertheless, as sociologist Hans Joas
aptly shows,28 such a pluralistic setting and context ought not prevent
us from looking for the possibilities of value-generalizations. Competing
religions and secular world-views, under the pressure of an honest
encounter with alternative visions, may rearticulate their own values in a
manner that allows for a more comprehensive view and for shared values
across religions. This process, I suggest, is what allows for, and enables
the success of talk of human rights, at all.
The conceptual status of world-views and religions, in the light of
the considerations above, is that of options framed by other options
which provide alternatives. There is, in the end, no such thing as a sin-
gle option. In the meaning William James gave to that term, an option
is anything which, “appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is
proposed”.29 Christianity, in the Middle Ages, was not an option for
most Europeans, because it wasn’t framed by viable alternatives. In any
one region of the world today the local creed might still be obligatorily,
if no other options exist. For such places, clarifying the relation between
the humanist and the non-humanist world essentially boil down to
questions of power and dominance. But, the hallmark of democracies is
the value placed on pluralism, and in this setting, world-views and reli-
gion inevitably encounter each other as living options framed by oth-
ers. This situation becomes even more complicated with the process of
religious individualization in mind insomuch as it unduly dissolves the
traditional unity and closedness of world-views themselves. Individuals
can, for example, easily be inclined to secular humanism, concurrently
attend to Christian religious services, and still feel drawn to shamanic
spirituality and be the biggest fan of the Dalai Lama at the same time.
On the other hand, individualization is limited by the fact that world-
views are more or less always parts of lived communities, draw upon
the resources of the more traditional religions and furthermore, if
rationally articulated, still meet some minimal standards of coherence
and consistency.

The Odds and Limits of Dialogue

Taken together, we can say that—provided the existence of science
and democracy—all world-views and religions bear an optional char-
acter but, unfortunately, only the enlightened ones have integrated
this fact reflectively into their self-interpretation. It follows from my
52  M. Jung

argumentation that scientism is perfectly legitimate if it is seen as the

risky and fallible extrapolation of science from the standpoint of ordi-
nary experience, one that can likewise degenerate into an unenlightened
dogmatic travesty if it fails to do so. Still worse is religious fundamen-
talism with its refusal to acknowledge the autonomy of ‘natural’—in
the elucidated sense—morality (thus making impossible middle-range
humanism) and the truth of science. But in between we find a wide
range of world-views and religions which compete with each other (on
the level of the species-species-distinction), but at the same time, can be
seen as different extrapolations of the same generic humanism of shared
universal values, ranking foremost among them those of human rights
and dignity.
If the encounter takes place in a pluralistic and democratic setting, the
relations of humanism to the non-humanist world are thus, I suggest,
threefold: (1) Against reductionist attitudes like scientism and religious
fundamentalism it emphasizes the importance of ordinary experience
and the universal, world-view independent values of human flourish-
ing. Since human culture develops within nature, this includes the pos-
sibility of extending the realm of protective rights to other animals and
even to inorganic nature. (2) Together with reflective representatives of
non-humanistic world-views, humanists can and should work for what
I have called middle-range, world-view independent humanism. This
work includes the search for value-generalizations, which enlarge the set
of values and convictions shared diagonally across very different world-
views. (3) Finally, on the level of competing full-fledged world-views,
secular humanism should debate together with, for example, theistic reli-
gions and at the same time against their validity claims. Over and against
the other, we ought to remain consciously aware that fallible generaliz-
ing inferences to the best explanations are at stake, not embodiments of
some absolute truth, be it scientific or divinely revealed. Hence, we must
accept that an element of antagonism will constitutively remain. After all,
to be convinced of a certain world-view or religion means to see it as the
best possible general interpretation of experience for everyone, not just
for me and my local tribe. One cannot consistently subscribe to a com-
prehensive vision of ultimate reality and at the same time limit its scope
to oneself only.
The demanding task at hand lies in efforts to combine confidence in the
validity of one’s own world-view with openness and fallibility-consciousness.
 2  WORLD-VIEWS AS OPTIONS—HUMANISTIC AND NON-HUMANISTIC  53

Such a task is at least facilitated by two important insights: (1) World-view

independent middle-range humanism offers common ground for all min-
imally self-reflective world-views, and (2) On the other hand, even those
values which are tied up to full-fledged religions or world-views are in prin-
ciple open to the process of value-generalization. On the level of cognitive
convictions about the character of ultimate reality, differences are cast in
a more exclusive manner and looking for a synthesis of theistic and non-
theistic world-views would prove futile. Still, if humanists and non-human-
ists alike would realize both the inevitable and contingent nature of their
ultimate beliefs, such differences would not vanish but after all loose their
implacable character. Seeing other non-fundamentalist world-views as living
options, not primarily as manifestations of error and obduracy, and grasping
the possibility of middle-range humanism would at least be a huge step in
the right direction.

Notes
1. I refer to Heidegger’s famous “Brief über den Humanismus” (Letter on
Humanism) from 1946/1947.
2. David Gelernter, “The Closing of the Scientific Mind”, Commentary, March
2014, accessed March 31, 2014. http://www.commentarymagazine​
.com/article/the-closing-of-the-scientific-mind/.
3. For a poignant critique of naturalistic reductionism from a non-
theistic standpoint see Raymond Tallis, Aping Mankind. Neuromania,
Darwinitis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity (Durham UK:
Acumen, 2012).
4. Philip Kitcher, Science in a Democratic Society (New York: Prometheus
Books, 2011), 41.
5. Steven Pinker, “Science Is Not Your Enemy. An impassioned plea to
neglected novelists, embattled professors, and tenure-less historians”,
New Republic August 6, 2013, accessed March 31, 2014. http://www.
newrepublic.com/article/114127/science-not-enemy-humanities.
6. John Dewey, Experience and Nature, The Later Works, 1925–1953,
vol. 1, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale IL: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1988), 28.
7. Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge MA/London:
Harvard University Press, 2011), 36.
8. To give just one example from popular neuroscience: David Eagelman,
Incognito. The Secret Lives of the Brain (Edinburgh: Canongate Books,
2011), chap. 6.
54  M. Jung

9. Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca/

London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 320.
10. See Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value-Dichotomy and other
Essays (Cambridge MA/London: Harvard University Press, 2004), 202.
11. Dewey, Experience and Nature, 13.
12. See John Mackie, Ethics. Inventing Wright and Wrong (New York: Viking
Press, 1977).
13. See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge MA/London: Harvard
University Press, 2007).
14. Even from an agnostic or atheistic perspective, human values alone might
no be enough. The desire for somehow relating the contingencies of our
life-stories into a greater picture of the universe is presumably more or
less an anthropologic universal.
15. John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven/London: Yale University
Press, 1934).
16. Matthew Ratcliffe, “The Feeling of Being”, Journal of Consciousness
Studies 12/8–10 (2005): 43–60.
17. William James, Pragmatism, ed. by B. Kuklick (Indianapolis/Cambridge:
Hackett, 1981), 7.
18. See Joerg Fingerhut and Sabine Marienberg, eds., Feelings of Being Alive
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012).
19. See Wilhelm Dilthey, Weltanschauungslehre. Philosophie der Philosophie,
Gesammelte Schriften Bd. VIII (Stuttgart/Göttingen: Teubner/
Vandenhoeck, 1960).
20. Dewey, Common Faith, 59.
21. Ibid., 19.
22. See Thomas Nagel, Mind & Cosmos. Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian
Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012), 20: “The implausibility of the reductive program
that is needed to defend the completeness of this kind of [scientistic,
M.J.] naturalism provides a reason to think of alternatives—alternatives
that make mind, meaning, and value as fundamental as matter and space-
time in an account of what there is.”
23. Dewey, Common Faith, 53.
24. See Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001).
25. Dworkin, Justice, 95.
26. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA/London: Harvard
University Press, 1971); the question of world-view pluralism is especially
tackled in Rawls’s “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical”,
Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 (1985): 223–251.
 2  WORLD-VIEWS AS OPTIONS—HUMANISTIC AND NON-HUMANISTIC  55

27. See Jürgen Habermas, Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory

(Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).
28. See Hans Joas, The Sacredness of the Person. A New Genealogy of Human
Rights (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2013), chap. 6.
29. William James, “The Will to Believe”, in The Will To Believe and other
essays in popular philosophy/Human Immortality (both books bound into
one; New York: Dover, 1956), 2.
 CHAPTER 3

Us vs. Them: But Who Is Us and Who

Is Them?

Herb Silverman

Before examining how “Humanism” relates to the “Non-Humanist”

world, I’d like to discuss how humanists relate to one another and
nontheists who prefer different labels. Here I will use the word
“humanist” or “atheist” in a big-tent sort of way to include agnos-
tics, secular humanists, freethinkers, nontheists, anti-theists, skeptics,
rationalists, naturalists, materialists, ignostics, apatheists, and more. If
you don’t know what each of these words means, don’t worry. Even
those who identify with such labels often disagree on their definitions.
Parsing words might be a characteristic of folks engaged in the secular
movement. My inclusive term “functional atheist” embodies all who live
as if there are no personal, judging gods.
Case in point, here’s an interesting distinction between Christians
and secularists: Christians have the same unifying word, but fight
over theology; secularists have the same unifying theology, but fight
over words. At least, our wars are only rhetorical. In what follows, I
hope to show why we should put aside such “verbal” wars of posi-
tions and instead focus our attention on common and shared interests.

H. Silverman (*) 
Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Mathematics,
College of Charleston, Charleston, SC, USA

© The Author(s) 2017 57

M.R. Miller (ed.), Humanism in a Non-Humanist World, Studies
in Humanism and Atheism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57910-8_3
58  H. Silverman

Fights over terminology were hilariously satirized in the Life of Brian

movie, where people with common interests splintered into Judean
People’s Front, Judean Popular People’s Front, and People’s Front of
Judea—sometimes forgetting the name of their own group.1
I pretty much view “atheist” and “humanist” as two sides of the
same coin. I’m the same person whether I talk about what I don’t
believe as an atheist (I don’t believe in any gods) or what I do believe as
a humanist (I believe we can lead ethical lives that aspire to the greater
good of humanity without supernatural beliefs). Certainly words matter,
but our special designations are sometimes nothing more than a matter
of taste or comfort level. We recognize that “atheist” gets more atten-
tion and “humanist” sounds more respectable to the general public. My
own “conversion” from agnosticism to atheism (before I had even heard
of humanism) was more definitional than theological. After all, we all
disbelieve in the same gods. As a mathematician, I could not logically
prove there was no god, so I took the agnostic position that no proof
exists. Therefore, I was simply without a belief in any gods. But when I
learned that this view was consistent with the classification/category of
atheism, I also became an atheist. So I’m comfortable calling myself an
atheist, agnostic, or humanist. We all strive to be Good Without God.2
Humanists might place more emphasis on being “Good,” and atheists
on being “Without God.” Whatever labels people prefer, we can improve
our culture by cooperating on the 95% we have in common rather than
arguing about the 5% that sets us apart.
I think we generally agree on what we mean by “good,” as with the
principles and values of our local humanist group.3 They include: a
commitment to the application of reason, science and experience to
better understand the universe and to solve human problems; protect-
ing and enhancing the earth, to preserve it for future generations and
to avoid inflicting needless suffering on other living beings; eliminat-
ing discrimination and intolerance based on race, religion, gender,
nationality, class, sexual orientation or ethnicity; the right to sexual
and reproductive freedom commensurate with the acceptance of sexual
and reproductive responsibility; and leading meaningful, ethical, joy-
ful and hope-filled lives while improving the human condition. However,
I use a variety of secular labels, depending on context. I want people
to be comfortable with my label, at least initially. That’s how I decide
whether to lead with atheist, agnostic, humanist, or even secular Jew.
 3  US VS. THEM: BUT WHO IS US AND WHO IS THEM?  59

Why are there so many nontheistic labels? Many people who are not
religious still identify with the religious tradition in which they were
raised. Some may adopt a nontheistic label popular in their community,
some might prefer identifying with a specific label, and others of us
choose the label that best enhances communication or goals when
talking to different kinds of religious people.
I was raised as an Orthodox Jew, later became an apathetic athe-
ist, and then an accidental activist atheist when I moved to the Bible
Belt in South Carolina and discovered overt discrimination against
atheists. There I learned that our state Constitution prohibited atheists
from holding public office. Since the U.S. Constitution prohibits reli-
gious tests for public office, I challenged this provision by running for
governor of South Carolina. An 8-year legal battle as the “candidate with-
out a prayer” ended for me in a unanimous victory in the South Carolina
Supreme Court, nullifying the anti-atheist clause in the South Carolina
Constitution. I described these adventures in my book, Candidate
Without a Prayer: An Autobiography of a Jewish Atheist in the Bible Belt.4
Many of us tend to focus on our uniqueness, or at least on how we
differ from mainstream culture or one another. But however we identify,
as human beings we have more in common than sets us apart. In this
chapter, I will discuss ways for all of us to cooperate and improve the
human condition.

Competition and Cooperation Among Secular Groups

I felt that a prerequisite for cooperation with non-humanist groups
would be cooperation with one another. When I first got involved
with the secular movement, I thought this would be a no-brainer
because I assumed that humanists and atheists are all rational people
who would see the value of cooperating. However, it wasn’t as easy as
I had initially hoped. Apparently, such cooperation had never been tried
before on a national scale. Some were fiercely protective of the label
in their organization, perhaps an illustration of the narcissism of small
differences. For several years, encouragement for such cooperation
became my focus, as I will describe.
During my political campaign, I discovered a number of fine national
organizations promoting secularism, and I supported each one. They
worked to maintain separation of religion and government and to foster
60  H. Silverman

the right to be nonreligious. However, the better I got to know the

organizations, the more I recognized that each was doing its own thing
with little backing for worthwhile efforts of the others. I thought this
was an important shortcoming that needed to be addressed.
One artificial barrier to cooperation has been what I call the “fixed
pie syndrome,” the false notion that the growth of a “rival” organiza-
tion must be at the expense of your own. In game theory, poker is an
example of a zero-sum game: One person’s gain is another person’s loss.
However, collaboration among nontheistic organizations is not a zero-
sum game. For every humanist or atheist in one of our groups, there are
likely a thousand nontheists who have never heard of any such groups.
Our players can cooperate in creating a bigger pie, to the benefit of all.
Like me, people who find out about one organization often wind up
joining others. This mixture of cooperation and competition is known as
co-opetition,5 a term used in economics and mathematical game theory.
In cooperative games, players form coalitions and work together to cre-
ate a bigger pie. Organizations then continue to promote themselves and
compete a bit, with each group getting a bigger slice than before.
Blacks, women, Jews, and gays have successfully asserted their right
to be treated fairly. They worked to end discrimination, demanded
a place at the table of public opinion, formed special interest groups,
and lobbied for political and social change. There continues to be dis-
crimination against these groups, but not without consequences.
Most politicians in America are careful not to denigrate or stereotype
them, knowing that these groups have well-organized advocates and
constituencies.

Enter the Secular Coalition for America

Despite the growing numbers of atheists and humanists, we have not

been nearly as influential politically or respected in our culture as most
other minority groups. That’s in part because we pride ourselves in being
an independent lot and not easy to organize, much like the difficulty in
herding cats. In this section, we will describe a method to gain influence
(by getting a seat at the table of public opinion and by having our non-
theistic viewpoints respected) while respecting the independence of dif-
ferent nontheistic groups.
To gain significant recognition and influence, we have to become
a more cohesive unit with shared values and expectations. For that
to occur, our secular communities need to stop focusing on relatively
 3  US VS. THEM: BUT WHO IS US AND WHO IS THEM?  61

petty disagreements, almost always having to do with semantics or turf

protection of organizations or their leaders, and unite to establish our
legitimacy as a demographic.
With this in mind, in 2002 I helped form the Secular Coalition for
America,6 which now includes eighteen cooperative, national, nontheistic
member organizations. We are motivated by a desire to speak with one
loud and clear voice toward the goal of gaining more political, as well
as cultural, influence. We work to prevent further theocratic threats to
our secular democracy. We want to turn widespread misunderstandings
about nontheists into greater respect and public acceptance. The Secular
Coalition lobbies members of Congress and also urges politicians and
others to come out of their atheist and humanist closets, with some
success so far and more anticipated.
We must build and sustain coalitions among freethinkers, as well as
between freethinkers and liberal religionists. We must show our strength
in numbers and work for opportunities to get a place at media and
political tables. To do this, the Secular Coalition collaborates and lobbies
on issues of common interest with a number of organizations that are
not nontheistic, like the American Civil Liberties Union7 and Americans
United for Separation of Church and State.8 We also cooperate on
selected issues with explicitly theistic organizations, like the Interfaith
Alliance9 and Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty.10 Working
with such diverse groups provides the additional benefit of gaining more
visibility and respect within the larger culture for our unique perspective,
including religious allies, politicians, and the media.

Working in a Non-humanist World

Three-quarters of U.S. adults say they believe in God11 though we share
lots of values with progressive religionists. I hope we will look for ways
to cooperate, not just because we agree on projects but also because
we will be recognized and viewed as allies to many in the religious
community.
Here’s a personal example of working with a different group. I admire
former president Jimmy Carter, so in 1988 I spent a week in Atlanta
working on a Habitat for Humanity12 project along with Carter and
about 100 other participants. I knew Habitat was a Christian organiza-
tion that did good works, and I wanted to engage with such Christians.
But I didn’t realize just how Christian it was. Habitat for Humanity
founder Millard Fuller13 led us in daily prayers to Jesus before breakfast,
62  H. Silverman

lunch, and dinner, along with inspirational sermons at other times. I told
Fuller he could attract more participants if he were inclusive, since we
were all building houses for people. Fuller said, “Not me! I’m building
houses for Jesus, and would stop if I thought that Jesus didn’t care.” I
much preferred Jimmy Carter’s viewpoint.
We would have dinner nightly in Atlanta at different African American
churches. Once I walked in with Carter, and there was a standing
ovation. I then whispered in Jimmy’s ear, “I hope you don’t mind, but
this happens to me wherever I go.” I still think Jimmy Carter is a great
human being, even though he didn’t laugh at my little joke.

Local Activism: To Assert Our Rights and Gain

Religious Allies
Atheists and humanists don’t look for special rights, but we do expect
equal rights. Publicity is generally good for minority groups, but we
need to pick and choose carefully our battles. That’s what I had in mind
in 1994, when I helped form a local group in Charleston, the Secular
Humanists of the Lowcountry14 (SHL), to create a community for athe-
ists and humanists. After our group began receiving publicity for good
works, I got a call from a member of First Baptist Church,15 the oldest
Southern Baptist church in the South. He suggested that some people
from both organizations get together and talk, since we both probably
had unfair stereotypes of each other. I agreed, and we arranged for sev-
eral in each group to meet for brunch at a local deli. One of the first ste-
reotypes we wanted to break was the view of many religious people that
it is uncommon for atheists and humanists to be engaged in good works.
Participant Mitch Carnell, a Sunday school teacher at First Baptist,
wrote an article in our local newspaper about our Sept. 25, 1995 gath-
ering. He said, “We were meeting to discuss religious beliefs or the
lack of them. We knew in advance that we not only disagreed with
each other, but that our views were directly opposite of each other’s.
Yet, by all accounts, the event was a rousing success. People not only
enjoyed it, but also wanted to continue the discussions. Why? There was
mutual respect for the individual.” And that was the key. Both groups
chose representatives who knew how to disagree without being disa-
greeable. While everyone considered it a worthwhile experience, I think
there is generally more of an upside for nontheists than theists at such
gatherings because we know more about them than they know about us.
 3  US VS. THEM: BUT WHO IS US AND WHO IS THEM?  63

We continued to meet periodically, and even gave a name to our group:

BASH. The acronym stood for Baptists And Secular Humanists, not the
tenor of our meetings. Since our SHL group wanted equal rights for
everyone, not special rights for our community, we tried to make small
changes in a culture where we were marginalized or ignored. Here are a
couple examples. The South Carolina legislature sponsored In God We
Trust16 license tags. In response, the SHL applied to sponsor In Reason
We Trust17 tags. The Department of Motor Vehicles gave us a hard time,
but they finally gave in. Had they turned us down, we would have pub-
licized that South Carolina supports God, but not reason. There are
many Christian billboards in South Carolina. So SHL put up a billboard
that said, “Don’t believe in God? You are not alone.” We weren’t trying
to convert people, just tell other atheists and humanists about our wel-
coming community. Since this was the first such billboard in the South,
Laurie Goodstein from the New York Times came down to Charleston
in 2009, interviewed some of us, and wrote about it. Her article, More
Atheists Shout it From the Rooftops,18 was the second most popular
piece in the New York Times that week. The takeaway from the article
was, “If it can happen in South Carolina, it can happen anywhere.”
People choose their activities according to circumstances and per-
sonal comfort levels, but I want to suggest a strategy that has worked
for others and me. Prepare to take advantage of the Law of Unintended
Consequences, where an action results in an outcome other than what
was intended. To plan for the unplanned sounds paradoxical, but adver-
saries may find that their squashing of our Plan A can make a Plan B
more effective than the intended Plan A. There are numerous opportuni-
ties for us to take the “moral” high ground on wedge issues, which can
create a Win-Win situation. For instance, we can ask respectfully for our
rightful place at the table and either get it or get others to share our out-
rage for having been denied.
Here is a classic example. Of the many influential people in the
American civil rights movement of the 1960s, my surprise choice for the
top ten is none other than Birmingham, Alabama police chief “Bull”
Connor.19 His use of fire hoses and police attack dogs against unarmed,
nonviolent protest marchers in 1963 was televised nationally. This incident
shocked and moved the entire nation, and led to the most far-reaching
civil rights legislation in American history, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.20
So Bull Connor’s tactics hastened the very change he had been opposing.
64  H. Silverman

Just as the civil rights movement was successful because of

cooperation among a variety of people with different religious, ethnic,
and cultural backgrounds, so can secularists benefit by working with
religious allies. Movements are most effective when they appeal to folks
outside the group. We should look for serendipitous opportunities to
expose the religious “Bull Connors” of the world. This will compel many
Christians to support the moral position of an atheist over that of some
of their fellow Christians.

Progressive Network
Our local SHL group benefitted in this way after joining the
South Carolina Progressive Network,21 composed of more than
50 organizations across South Carolina. It includes advocacy groups for
the environment, peace, and abolition of capital punishment, along with
rights for workers, women, African Americans, gays, and other social
causes. Most groups in the network either have no theological position
or are religious. What we have in common is that we are all outside
mainstream South Carolina and demonized by the religious right. We
understand that people are more likely to listen to a network of groups
than to one lone group, so we try to support one another’s issues.
Here’s an example of how this cooperative strategy worked in 2003.
The Charleston City Council started its meetings with an invocation,
almost always Christian. Through the Progressive Network, we
persuaded one council member to offer some diversity, and he invited
me to give a secular invocation. But as the mayor introduced me, half
the council members walked out22 because they knew I was an atheist,
and they didn’t return until the Pledge of Allegiance, where they turned
toward me as they said the words “under God.”
After the meeting, a reporter for our local newspaper asked the
council members to comment on the walkout. Those who heard my
invocation, including the mayor, thought it was fine. Here are some of
the reasons councilmen gave for walking out. One quoted Psalm 14:
“The fool says in his heart there is no God. They are corrupt, their deeds
are vile, there is not one who does good.” He then told me it wasn’t
personal. In other words, his religious beliefs compelled him to ignore or
demonize an entire class of people he was elected to represent. Frankly, I
would rather it had been personal.
 3  US VS. THEM: BUT WHO IS US AND WHO IS THEM?  65

Another councilman said, “He can worship a chicken if he wants to,

but I’m not going to be around when he does it.” My response was,
“Perhaps the councilman doesn’t realize that many of us who stand
politely for religious invocations believe that praying to a god makes no
more sense than praying to a chicken. At least you can see a chicken.”
I didn’t expect such open defiance, but it offered a unique opportunity
to take advantage of the “Law of Unintended Consequences.” Several
days later, multiple outraged letters by Christians appeared in the
newspaper. When Christians side with atheists against other Christians, it
likely means we have won by losing. Here’s one of the letters, from the
president of the Charleston branch of the NAACP:

I read with disbelief the actions of our councilmen who walked out of an
official meeting during the invocation by Herb Silverman simply because
of his religious views. It is most difficult for me, a Christian African-
American female, who has probably experienced every kind of prejudice
and intolerance imaginable, to understand an act that was not only
disrespectful, but unquestionably rude by folks elected to represent all of
the citizens, regardless of race, creed, color, religion or sexual orientation.
It is most regrettable that during a time when the fight is so fierce to have
all citizens’ rights protected and respected, some of us would neglect to
do the same for others. When any elected official demonstrates such lack
of tolerance, especially while performing his official duties, those of us of
conscience must speak out and voice our outrage.

Here’s another case where the Progressive Network helped our SHL
group. We asked if they would support a Charleston Day of Reason,
coordinating with other national freethought organizations across the
nation. I expected opposition from some of the religious members
because it was the same day as the National Day of Prayer.23 I told
them that the day was picked because reason is a concept all Americans
can support, and that we wanted to raise public awareness about the
persistent threat to religious liberty posed by government intrusion
into the private sphere of worship. To my pleasant surprise, the vote
of support was unanimous and the Progressive Network convinced
the mayor to issue a proclamation. Members of the Network and
others joined us in a local park for a celebration of reason, tolerance,
democracy, and human rights. The celebration began with a member
of Charleston City Council reading the mayor’s proclamation.
66  H. Silverman

Others, both secular and religious, then contributed freethought

statements or comments in support of reason.
If you would like to form such an advocacy network in your area,
here are some suggestions on how to start one. Get together with
your friends or local freethought group and list the organizations to
which you all belong, secular and otherwise. Chances are they are
mostly the usual (marginalized) suspects, small groups in need of
recognition. Find a representative from each organization willing to
serve on a board for the network. Have the board draw up a mission
statement, simple bylaws, and a dues structure. Organizations in the
network will undoubtedly have members who come up with additional
groups interested in joining. Then you “steal” from one another! The
SHL increased its membership when members of some of the other
organizations in the network heard about our activities and gave us a try.
Several of our members also became active in other organizations. When
we associate faces with organizations, it is much easier for each group to
garner endorsements from other groups. It’s also a great way to make
new friends. And when “us” combine forces and become influential
within our community, then we can more effectively go after “them.”
Just make sure that “them” is not “us.”

Activism and Apathy
Atheists have long been known primarily for criticizing religion and
protesting the intrusion of religion into government. Such actions are
often called for, especially when conservative religionists set a political
agenda that affects those who don’t share their religious beliefs. We must
confront and respond, and let the undecided judge who is more honest,
reasonable, tolerant, and fair.
There are many ways to increase the visibility of and respect for atheist
and humanist viewpoints. Recent books by atheist authors have created
media interest in atheism, if not its full acceptance. Best selling authors
Richard Dawkins (The God Delusion), Daniel Dennett (Breaking the
Spell), Sam Harris (The End of Faith), and Christopher Hitchens (God is
Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything) have given us more visibility
than ever before. We should now make the most of this opportunity.
Other minorities have had significantly more problems than
atheists and humanists. As a class, we are well educated, productive,
and prosperous. However, most atheists are in the closet about their
 3  US VS. THEM: BUT WHO IS US AND WHO IS THEM?  67

religious views, and it’s relatively easy for them to remain there. Blacks
and women can’t be in the closet, and gays can only do so with great
personal sacrifice. Many atheists are afraid to come out of the closet, but
a lot of them are probably just apathetic about religion. They have full
lives, and can’t understand why some of us waste so much time focusing
on nonexistent deities.
I can empathize with such apatheists, since I used to be one,
myself, until open discrimination against atheists became for me a
civil rights issue. I’ve gone from religious believer in my childhood, to
apathetic atheist as a young adult, and finally to activist atheist because
of my concern that a well-organized religious right wants to move our
country closer to theocratic rule. At one time I saw no more need to
promote atheism than to promote a round earth. Though a Flat Earth
Society24 still exists, its supporters don’t have the political clout of a well-
organized religious right.

Religious Allies
We turn off potential allies when we assume all religionists are
fundamentalists, and ask them to justify passages in their holy books
that they find every bit as absurd as we do. Some atheists make the same
mistake as religious conservatives, treating the Bible as either all good or
all bad. While it contains many boring, anachronistic, contradictory, and
repetitive sections, it also has passages with rich and diverse meanings.
The same can be said for Greek mythology—fictional tales that were
once religious texts. For better or worse, the Bible and the many
religions it spawned have deeply influenced our culture and the world.
For that reason alone, the Bible is worth reading. Surveys have shown
that atheists and humanists rank highest in religious knowledge, but we
need to understand and appreciate why so many people love the Bible
even if they haven’t actually read it.
Progressive Christians are as appalled as we are by the merger of
Christianity and government, embarrassed by Christians who use their
religion for political gain, and annoyed that this brand of Christianity
grabs media attention. I think we must look for opportunities to bring
moderate religionists to our side. They are concerned that too many
Christians are neglecting the Christianity promoted by the likes of Martin
Luther King, who worked on behalf of the marginalized—the helpless,
the sick, and the poor. Such Christians are more “us” than “them.”
68  H. Silverman

I was surprised by the discovery that humans and chimpanzees have

about 99% of their genetic structure in common. If a gene for skepticism
is ever discovered, I expect it will show liberal religionists to be more
like us than like their conservative religionist counterparts. I think the
fundamentalists in different religions have more in common with each
other than they do with the liberal wings within their own religions. On
most political issues important to Humanists (church/state separation,
abortion rights, gay rights, etc.), liberal religionists are usually our allies.
People often assume that as an atheist I must be anti-religion. But by
one measure, I might be one of the most religious people in the world.
You see, I have not one, not two, but three religions. First I joined the
Society for Humanistic Judaism,25 consisting of humanist and atheist
Jews; then I joined the American Ethical Union,26 another nontheistic
religion that does good works. Finally, I joined my local Unitarian
Church27 after they invited me to give a sermon on positive atheism, and
most agreed with what I said.
We can learn from how churches have organized, without accepting
their theological beliefs. Nontheistic groups have formed welcoming
communities with activities for individuals and families. Some groups are
primarily interested in lectures and book clubs, some in socializing, some
in good works, some in protesting, some in political action, some in
family activities, and some in all of the above. There are also active virtual
groups that enjoy discussions. I believe in a big tent where people follow
their passion while respecting and supporting those whose emphasis
might be different. More recent, and rather controversial among atheists,
are so-called atheist churches.28 Some who have abandoned the faith
of their youth miss religious ritual and seek to replace it with the awe-
inspiring wonders of science and reality. They find ways to address
spiritual, emotional, intellectual, or community needs without involving
the usual supernatural beliefs. Such weekly “church” or congregational
meetings may not be for me, but I appreciate and welcome these active
fellow travellers.
For many years, I’ve been encouraging atheists and humanists to
organize and cooperate in order to change the culture. However, the
movement has become larger than formal organizations alone, perhaps
because of the increasing number of “nones,”29 those who don’t identify
with any religion. This demographic has risen to 20% among the general
public, and even higher among millenials.
 3  US VS. THEM: BUT WHO IS US AND WHO IS THEM?  69

Most “nones” don’t much care whether people have god beliefs. They
just don’t like to be around those who talk endlessly about religion,
and they resist being governed by other people’s religious beliefs. They
will probably not be joining atheist or humanist organizations in large
numbers, and I’m fine with that.
Unlike the religious right, “nones” are generally accepting of full and
equal rights for atheists, gays, women, and other marginalized groups.
If young people continue to be more interested in how we treat others
and what we do to make the world a better place, rather than equating
morality with religion, then we will finally realize an America that values
freedom of and freedom from religion. I hope we are evolving into
a world where deeds are more important than creeds, in which case
atheists and humanists will one day be part of a respected mainstream
culture, along with progressive religious allies. So “nones” are more “us”
than “them.” And when “us” combine forces and become influential
within our community, we can more effectively go after “them.”
So who is “them?” Is “them” the biblical literalists of the world?
Usually, but not always. We can occasionally find common ground,
even if we reach the same conclusion through different processes. For
example, Richard Land,30 former president of the Southern Baptist
Convention, quoted from Genesis, this chapter, where “man is put
into the Garden to till it and to keep it, with a divinely mandated
responsibility to develop the earth for human betterment and to protect
it and exercise creation care.” Humanists have other reasons to protect
the earth, but we can sometimes cooperate on selected issues even with
such Southern Baptists.
Since I always look for common ground, even among those with whom
I seem to have absolutely nothing in common, I was once asked if I agree
with Jerry Falwell about anything. I thought for a moment and replied,
“Jerry Falwell said that God doesn’t answer the prayers of a Jew.31 I agree
with Jerry Falwell.” Of course we agreed for very different reasons.

Humanist Evangelism
Do humanists have anything in common with evangelists? There are
many examples of ugly evangelism, and we don’t want to be ugly.
We do want to promote our values. Theist or nontheist, we are all
“evangelists” for issues that matter to us. The question isn’t whether we
70  H. Silverman

should proselytize, but how and how often? Were I on the other team
(soul saving), I would be embarrassed by a fellow believer who stood on
a corner shouting epithets at sinning passersby. We shouldn’t be scream-
ing atheists, nor should we go door-to-door spreading the word that
there are no gods. But each of us has to decide our level of evangelism.
Many of us are comfortable writing letters to the editor or to politicians,
participating in discussions or debates, running for political office, or sim-
ply coming out of our atheist and humanist closets at appropriate times.
But in the end, religious or not, silent evangelism might be the most
effective approach. People are likely to respect our worldview more for
what we do, than for what we preach.
I’m more of a counter-evangelist. I don’t usually initiate discussions
with religious people, but I do look forward to such conversations. In a
culture replete with religionists, engaging impassioned participants in a
conversation they never had before is for me the best kind of (counter)
evangelism. I especially enjoy public debates with conservative Christian
ministers, often the first opportunity for Christians in the audience to
hear an atheist point of view from an atheist, rather than from other
Christians.
One such debate topic was “Can we be good without God?”32 There
were over 800 in the audience, mostly from the minister’s megachurch.
During the debate, the minister and I got to question each another.
My favorite question for the minister was, “How would you behave
differently if you stopped believing in God?” The minister thought
for a minute and said, “Sometimes I’m tempted by other women and
might cheat on my wife were it not for my love of Jesus, knowing how
much it would hurt Jesus.” My response was, “Sometimes I’m tempted
by other women and might cheat on my wife were it not for my love
of Sharon, knowing how much it would hurt Sharon.” I looked at the
minister’s wife in the audience, and I think she preferred my answer to
his. Whether to base decisions on the needs of an imaginary god or on
the needs of real human beings is the essential difference in my mind
between conservative religionists and humanists.

Do’s and Don’ts

So how can humanists and atheists turn the country around? Skeptics
that we are, I have no magic bullets. However, I have some suggested
do’s—but first a few don’ts:
 3  US VS. THEM: BUT WHO IS US AND WHO IS THEM?  71

1. Don’t go out of your way to gratuitously bash religion and the

Bible, even though it can be fun. Discussing the misguided
reasoning of theists is a favorite pastime at just about any atheist
gathering, but let’s try mostly to keep it all in the family.
2. Don’t stereotype Christians. They don’t like it any more than
atheists do. We need to acknowledge that most Christians aren’t
like the ones who have their own television shows or believe that
the Bible is inerrant.
3. Don’t fight every battle. We haven’t the good will, the resources,
or the political capital to respond to all possible slights.
4. Don’t be in-your-face atheists. Keep in mind how we view in-your-
face Christians.
5. Don’t whine about past injustices or your unhappy religious
upbringing. We won’t win friends and influence people on the
basis of victimhood.

Now for some do’s.

1. Do emulate gays by encouraging people to come out of their
atheist closets. Gays have become more respected than atheists
not because of their collective good works, but because straight
people learned that some of their friends, co-workers, and even
family members are gay. While just about everyone personally
knows an atheist, many don’t know that they know an atheist.
2. Do come out softly, or at least wait for the right opportunity. It
won’t take long. Perhaps you will be asked which church you
attend or how you will be celebrating a religious holiday. We can
describe and answer questions about our naturalistic worldview
without trying to convince others to adopt it. If they are open to
new ideas, some may convince themselves, as many of us did.
3. Do understand why relatively few atheists come out. It’s not just
fear. For a long time, I was an atheist who was neither in nor out
of the closet. I didn’t look for or avoid opportunities to say I was
an atheist. I was only moved to go public when I learned that
atheists in South Carolina could not hold public office, and I then
became committed to this civil rights issue. Most atheists don’t
place a high priority on coming out, unless they see an important
reason to do so.
4. Do be a humble atheist. What the majority of Americans don’t
like about the Pat Robertsons or Jerry Falwells of the world are
72  H. Silverman

their arrogance and smugness. When atheists and humanists don’t

know something, they say, “I don’t know.”
5. Do acknowledge that religionists’ worldview is more important
to them than ours is to us. For most of us, it’s a philosophical
position or an intellectual exercise. At worst, we fight for our civil
rights and for maintaining a secular government. For some of
them, eternal life is at stake, which is literally more important than
life itself.
6. Do unto others. Remember, they are as puzzled by our worldview
as we are by theirs. We must all learn to respect the right of every
person to believe what makes most sense to him or her. This does
not mean we need to respect the belief itself, or condone harmful
actions based on beliefs.
7. Do recognize why so many who have suffered under religious
discrimination (blacks, women, gays, etc.) continue to embrace
traditional religion, along with the holy books that relegate
them to second-class status. Often it is simply family tradition or
heritage. Some likely have doubts, but also have a strong desire
to fit into mainstream culture. We can provide opportunities for
them to discover a non-threatening community whose worldview
is more similar to theirs than the tradition in which they were
raised.
8. Do seek common ground with religionists. Since there are so
many more of them than there are of us, we should welcome
support from allies. Many religious people can also support most
of our humanist causes, which present excellent opportunities for
networking. For example, my wife and I are both members of
our local NAACP. The meetings begin with a prayer, for which
we stand quietly. Their leadership knows we are atheists, and
that we actively support civil rights for all people. Were they to
be surveyed, their opinion of atheists would likely move to the
favorable category.
9. Do be like the Christian Coalition. (Got your attention, didn’t
I!) Though we disagreed with everything they stood for, they
had a terrific model. They brought people together who had
common interests, locally and nationally, and made the nation
and politicians take notice. And so must we.
10. Do some homework: Choose another idea that works for you,
and let us hear about it.
 3  US VS. THEM: BUT WHO IS US AND WHO IS THEM?  73

Some of you are already doing many of these things. Some of you are
discouraged because we haven’t seen change fast enough. But we are
evolutionists, not creationists. Evolution takes a long time. Whenever
you feel discouraged by slow progress, keep this in mind: If we do
nothing, nothing will change. You don’t have to do it all, but I hope you
will all do something.
So who is Us and who is Them? Ideally, I think we should work for
all of us to become Us. Both theists and nontheists differ. While we
may differ on some issues, we must learn to respect our differences.
Practically, we can work toward becoming a majority. That would not
only include nontheists, but also progressive religionists, “nones,” and
supporters of secular government regardless of personal religious views.
We have countless allies and we need to find more ways to cooperate
with such “Us’s” of the world. And when “Us” combine forces and
become influential within our community, then we can more effectively
go after “Them.” Just make sure that “Them” is not “Us.”

Notes
1. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gb_qHP7VaZE. Accessed August
11, 2015.
2. http://www.amazon.com/Good-Without-God-Billion-Nonreligious/
dp/006167012X. Accessed August 11, 2015.
3. http://lowcountryhumanists.org/default.php?page=Principles. Accessed
August 11, 2015.
4. http://www.herbsilverman.com. Accessed August 11, 2015.
5. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coopetition. Accessed August 11, 2015.
6. http://secular.org. Accessed August 11, 2015.
7. https://www.aclu.org. Accessed August 11, 2015.
8. https://au.org. Accessed August 11, 2015.
9. http://www.interfaithalliance.org. Accessed August 11, 2015.
10. http://bjconline.org. Accessed August 11, 2015.
11. http://www.upi.com/Health_News/2013/12/22/US-belief-in-God-
down-belief-in-theor y-of-evolution-up/UPI-24081387762886/.
Accessed August 11, 2015.
12. http://www.habitat.org. Accessed August 11, 2015.
13. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millard_Fuller. Accessed August 11, 2015.
14. http://lowcountryhumanists.org/. Accessed August 11, 2015.
15. http://www.fbcharleston.org. Accessed August 11, 2015.
16. http://www.wistv.com/Global/story.asp?S=866365. Accessed August
11, 2015.
74  H. Silverman

17. 
http://lowcountryhumanists.org/IRWT.php. Accessed August 11, 2015.
18. 
h ttp://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/us/27atheist.html?_r=4&
Subscription Required; accessed August 11, 2015.
19. 
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/bull_connor.htm. Accessed August
11, 2015.
20. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Rights_Act_of_1964. Accessed
August 11, 2015.
21. 
http://www.scpronet.com. Accessed August 11, 2015.
22. 
h ttp://ffrf.org/legacy/fttoday/2003/may/index.php?ft=silverman.
Accessed August 11, 2015.
23. http://nationaldayofprayer.org. Accessed August 11, 2015.
24. http://theflatearthsociety.org/forum/index.php. Accessed August 11,
2015.
25. http://www.shj.org. Accessed August 11, 2015.
26. http://aeu.org. Accessed August 11, 2015.
27. http://www.charlestonuu.org. Accessed August 11, 2015.
28. h ttp://www.salon.com/2013/12/03/atheist_churches_a_era_of_
secular_community_partner/. Accessed August 11, 2015.
29. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/10/09/nones-
religion-pew-study/1618607/. Accessed August 11, 2015.
30. http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/2006/11/17/november-
17-2006-e-o-wilson/3349/. Accessed August 11, 2015.
31. http://www.religioustolerance.org/falwell.htm. Accessed August 11,
2015.
32. http://lowcountryhumanists.org/default.php?page=videolibrary&vidna
me=gwg. Accessed August 11, 2015.
 CHAPTER 4

Secular Voices of Color—Digital Storytelling

Elonda Clay and Christopher M. Driscoll

Introduction
While secular humanists and atheists of all cultures and racial classifications
are subjected to discrimination based on their nonreligious identifications,
secular humanists and atheists of color are often also subjected to cul-
tural policing and social ostracization by family and friends. What’s more,
they are often routinely intra-racially targeted, harassed, and marginal-
ized due to their rejection of what is perceived to be an integral aspect
of “­authentic” racial/ethnic identity: religious affiliation and traditional
religious belief. The threat of marginalization from family and community
often leads to secularists of color being ‘in the quiet’ about their stories
and their contributions to humanist thought and practice.
Within secular humanism, the voices of humanists and atheists of
color continue to be underrepresented and not as publicly visible as
that of their white male counterparts. Supportive secular institutions
often overlook or exclude humanists of color from participation in

E. Clay (*) 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
C.M. Driscoll 
Lehigh University, Bethlehem, USA

© The Author(s) 2017 75

M.R. Miller (ed.), Humanism in a Non-Humanist World, Studies
in Humanism and Atheism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57910-8_4
76  E. Clay and C.M. Driscoll

organizational leadership roles (as recognized in the lack of diversity

on recently reconfigured Board of Directors after the merger of the
Center for Inquiry and the Richard Dawkins Center for Reason and
Science). Regarding visibility and representation of thought, action
and ­ participation, difference and diversity continue to be a point of
­contention and negotiation between mainstream, mostly white, secular
humanist organizations and the creation of new affiliated yet independ-
ent secular humanist organizations among African Americans and other
racial and ethnic groups. While viewed by some secular humanists and
atheists as being divisive, separatist, and non-inclusive, these independ-
ent organizations argue that not only are they profoundly inclusive, they
also address social needs and concerns that older humanist and atheist
organizations tend to overlook or fail to give sustained consideration.
Such challenges have led several secular humanists of color to use social
media, hashtag activism, and digital storytelling as a means to promote
secular humanism among people of color, engage in public dialogue on
the issues and concerns of humanists of color, launch digital campaigns,
shape self-representations, and coordinate online and offline activities for
both secular humanist organizations and individuals using digital media.
This chapter examines the use of digital storytelling by humanists and
nonbelievers of color on YouTube as contributors to the “Secular Voices
of Color” project and as humanists engaging in civic and intellectual
public forums. The project, founded by Sincere Kirabo, is described as “a
unique opportunity to focus on the stories of nonbelieving minorities.”1
Kirabo is the author of the blog, “Notes from an Apostate,”2 as well
as the creator of his own Youtube channel, which houses the project.
He serves as Social Justice Coordinator with the American Humanist
Association and works with the Freethought Books Project, both
branches of the Center for Inquiry. His efforts, particularly the Secular
Voices of Color project discussed here, offer profound insight into the
peculiar (and particularly overlapping) modes of marginalization and rep-
resentation marking secular humanist persons of color. Here, we turn
our attention towards highlighting some of these voices and their stories.

African American Secular Humanism Online

Scholarship on African American/Black secular humanism is a small yet
growing body of literature which to date have published online arti-
cles on humanism, little to none of which have focused on the online
 4  SECULAR VOICES OF COLOR—DIGITAL STORYTELLING  77

communities or their use of social media among secular humanists

of color. Additionally, there is also a lack of ethnographic (and hence,
demographic) research on secular humanists of color more generally,
therefore researching online content provides a robust window into the
contours, subjectivities and daily lives of humanists of color in ways that
have not previously been documented. In the essay, “Media and the
Nonreligious,” scholar of media and atheism Teemu Tiara asserts:

The internet plays an important role in facilitating more active and visi-
ble identities among atheist and secular groups via online social networks.
It helps people to communicate anonymously if needed and find support
from other atheist… in digital space, people are not simply media users and
consumers but prosumers as they co-create, both producing content and
using it.3

Tiara has further noted that while news media finds it convenient to
run stories on anti-religious atheists, it has found difficulty in covering
non-believers who have no interest in belittling religion.4 Norm Allen,
Jr., founder of African Americans for Humanism and well-known author
and speaker on the topic of humanists of color, reiterates this assessment
when he notes, “reaching out to show that atheists are not bad people…
that type of message is not popular in the media. The media is looking
for controversy. They are looking for that firebrand type of atheists…
that’s why New Atheists have been so big.”5
The online presence of secular humanists of color also includes a
variety of organizational websites and Facebook groups. Websites that
encourage online community among secular humanists of color include
African Americans for Humanism, African Americans for Humanism DC
(AAH DC), Black Nonbelievers, Inc., Black Freethought Discussion
Group, Atheist Nexus, Harlem Community Center for Inquiry, Minority
Atheists of Michigan, Black Nonbelievers of Dallas, Black Nonbelievers
of Houston group, with the Facebook groups Black Atheist Alliance
and Black Atheists of America, among others.6 Yearly events such as
A Day of Solidarity, founded by Donald Wright of Houston, TX and
annual meetings of various humanist and atheist organizations have also
become more visible as a result of their promotion through online social
­networks.
There are several YouTube channels as well as thousands of user-­
generated videos and video playlists devoted to the topic of black
78  E. Clay and C.M. Driscoll

humanism, skepticism, atheism, freethinking, and nonbelievers. Many of

them serve the dual purpose of discussing social and often progressive
political concerns of humanists of color as well as examining the particu-
lar challenges they face such as overlapping stereotypes, marginalization,
isolation and rejection, finding community and support, racism, sexism,
homophobia, and assumed racializations of anti-atheistic stances. These
YouTube channels also serve as educational tools to inform the broader
public about the reality, lives, and varying thought among black human-
ists. Among other affirmative aspects, such work tends to be a viable and
low-cost means to produce positive representations that provide a coun-
ter narrative to negative assumptions and perceptions about race and sec-
ular humanism across other categories of social difference. As Tiara so
rightfully argues, “The Internet does not simply offer more possibilities,
but it also directs the self-representation of non-religious people.”7

Digital Storytelling
Since the 1990’s, digital technologies have been reshaping organizational
and social practices surrounding storytelling, including attention to the
regulative power dynamics of who functions as official spokespersons, what
can be said, and how it should be delivered to the public. A digital story
can be defined as a, “short, first-person video-narrative created by combin-
ing recorded voice, still and moving images, and music or other sounds.”8
According to media scholar Knut Lundby, digital storytelling, “not only
bypasses set forms of authority, but also invites new forms.”9 Lundby fur-
ther argues that, “The participatory potential in self-representational digital
storytelling may challenge established patterns of authority based on vari-
ous forms of institutional legitimacy. The authority of digital storytelling
depends on whether such stories and storytelling become recognized.”10
Hartley and McWilliam define digital storytelling as a media form, a
new media practice, an activist/community movement and a textual sys-
tem.11 Moreover, Hertzberg and Lundby (2009) have suggested that
digital storytelling “bridges the subjective ‘me’ focus of contemporary
culture and diffuse collective strands of society.”12 While some media
scholars have designated digital storytelling as a mediated process,13 oth-
ers have designated digital storytelling as a mediatized process.14 The
scholarly debate on mediation versus mediatization hinges on whether
one is arguing that mobile and information communications media are
agents of a systematic macro-level transformation of cultural or social
 4  SECULAR VOICES OF COLOR—DIGITAL STORYTELLING  79

processes that depend on, “the logic of the media” or, whether one is
arguing that because the access and domestic appropriation of mobile
and information communications media is more heterogeneous than
homogeneous in its transformative effect, it is better to examine the ways
in which mediation transforms the types and forms of engagements par-
ticular groups of viewers, listeners, and users have with new media.
The concepts “digital storytelling” and “mediated stories” could be
used to describe an unlimited amount of content and digital forms on
the Internet. Although virtual ethnography is well beyond the scope of
this chapter, ethnography of digital stories would include vlogs (video
blogs), the blogosphere, virtual worlds, Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, cor-
porate and alternative online news and magazines, and many other pos-
sible online sites for research. The videos featured in this chapter broadly
fit into three categories or genres: collective storytelling online, main-
stream media interviews of black humanists, and user generated content
from individuals.

Digital Storytelling as Everyday Activism

Everyday online activism can take the forms of participatory engagement
such as user comments to news media stories, dialogues on FaceBook,
blogs, vlogs, and Twitter exchanges; any combination of talk and com-
municative actions that, while not coordinated collective action, are,
“inspired by a social movement and consciously intended to change oth-
ers’ ideas or behavior in directions advocated by the movement.”15
By creating spaces for positive self-representation, sharing experiences
with like-minded people, and publishing content and influencing debate
and discourse; digital storytelling functions as a tool of empowerment as
well as a valuable resource for nonbelievers and interested viewers. Davis
and Weinshenker note:

Digital stories can range along a continuum of social involvement, from

the story authored mainly alone as an act of autobiography or self-expres-
sion, to a collective effort to portray community or assert a shared per-
spective…Those emphasizing the collective function understand digital
storytelling as an act of group representation serving a political purpose for
that group in being able to define who they are and to counter stories and
impressions of them created by others, often others with greater power
and resources.16
80  E. Clay and C.M. Driscoll

YouTube prosumers who create digital stories often describe themselves

as ‘ordinary’ people; yet collective projects are representative of people
who Mansbridge and Flaster (2007) describe as ‘everyday activists’; indi-
viduals who “may not interact with the formal world of politics, but they
take actions in their own lives to redress injustices….”17

Methodology
Drawing from data collected and analyzed among digital narratives from
the Secular Voices of Color Project on YouTube, as well as other user-
generated videos among selected humanists of color, we analyze a repre-
sentative sampling of the digital stories of secular humanists of color. In
particular, social media has been simultaneously utilized as a social “third
space” and hence, an alternative mode of political communication. The
YouTube material was thus analyzed using narrative and visual analysis of
select digital stories as a means by which to identify key topics in the vid-
eos and provide a foundation for future research into digital storytelling
productions by secular humanists and atheists of color. The stories tend
to be autobiographical in form, focusing on personal experiences of an
individual or a particular community.18
Our unit of analysis is video posts (images, speech and music/
sounds), including associated online content, such as YouTube ­videos,
hyperlinks and the video’s comment section. In terms of approach,
the videos are treated as texts. No contact with the content creators
for ­ further analysis of videos was made. This decision was made by
­considering the size of the YouTube search results (e.g., 18,900 results
for “black atheist,” 2710 results for “black atheism,” and a combined
total of over 1000 results for the search terms “black nonbeliever,”
“black h­ umanism,” “black freethinkers,” “black skeptics,” “black secu-
larism” and so on), the accessibility of already archived videos, and the
participatory mandate and motto of YouTube as a social networking
platform that invites users to “Broadcast Yourself.” Thus, the unfolding
data below collected from the videos were treated as textual resources
that reside in the public domain, or have been released under Creative
Commons license that permits fair use.
We were interested in the texts themselves, the contexts of the texts,
and the texts as video narratives shared among both supportive and
unsupportive publics. We considered the material conditions of the digi-
tal stories (scenic background, artifacts), texts (speech, video images,
 4  SECULAR VOICES OF COLOR—DIGITAL STORYTELLING  81

hyperlinks) issues (humanism, race, exclusion, and intersectionality),

computer graphics, and the ways in which all these elements are collec-
tively woven together in the unfolding stories and narratives. We closely
considered the editing and performativity, examining how the subjects
position themselves in relation to their expected audience as well as the
dominant discourses of racial/ethnic religious affiliation and racial/eth-
nic or atheist/non-believer stereotypes.
Here, we argue that the videos from The Secular Voices of Color pro-
ject are not just acts of storytelling or social interaction; rather, they are
part of a larger complex of contemporary secular humanism that must be
viewed within expanded conceptualizations of inclusion of marginalized
humanists and atheists and the diversification of secular humanism. We
now turn to brief descriptions of five stories from the Secular Voices of
Color project.

Analysis of Secular Voices of Color Videos—

Representative Stories
Story A—“Secular Voices of Color—Sincere Kirabo”19
Kirabo’s larger goals with The Secular Voices of Color project have been
briefly discussed above. Here, we offer attention to the personal story
shaping Kirabo’s humanist journey, and situate it within the context out
of which the larger project grows. Within a few seconds of the start of
his interview, he wryly describes himself as a “black unicorn,” better
known as a black atheist. Kirabo then goes on to describe his upbring-
ing in an “animated” Pentecostal home, and presents a narrative wherein
the believing sensibilities of his familial inheritance were programmed
before even a developmental capacity to rationalize them (not, simply,
to rationalize them away) at all. He was unable to investigate the beliefs
on his own terms, a process he comes to see and refer to as a mode of
“­indoctrination.”
This indoctrination could not hold up to his curious mind. In his
twenties, even while still a believer, his curiosity led him to examine
church history and presented “discrepancies” to him that contradicted
what he grew up believing. This curious exploration was a “slow pro-
cess,” but over time and with intense study, he came to find his Christian
beliefs as “untenable.” One of the major points galvanizing his turn to
secular humanism was the wholesale lack of evidence in the reality of
82  E. Clay and C.M. Driscoll

god. Inspired by this newfound secular perspective, Kirabo set about to

inspire others who might find themselves in similar places or with parallel
stories. Focusing attention to black atheism, particularly, Kirabo circles
back to the uniqueness of black atheism. He notes that many believ-
ers have never met atheists, and among black folk, fewer still have ever
come across a black atheist. Pushing against these narrow assumptions
and provincial perspectives, Kirabo concludes his video with a somewhat
simple—if still all-too-necessary—admonition: “The truth is, people of
color do do atheism. We, too, can and do enjoy critical thinking.” Thus,
Blackness and atheism are not mutually exclusive, according to Kirabo.
Regardless of guilt felt from friends or family, Kirabo refuses to be
ashamed of who he is and is determined to not succumb to any cultural
demands that seek to limit or compartmentalize who he is, or what he
does (or does not) believe.

Story B—“Secular Voices of Color—Zakkiyya Chase”20

Chase begins her story emphasizing the long journey it has been to
come out as a “nonbeliever” which begins in a black Baptist church set-
ting and subsequently moves into a nondenominational megachurch
context. Similar to Kirabo’s story above, Chase indicates not a melba-
toast relationship to church, but rather, the significance and influence
of the church and the manner in which it mattered. Thus, she became,
“heavily immersed in it, reading the Bible daily, going to church two or
three times a week,” including fellowships of various sorts, workshops,
and youth group. In what can only be described as good critical aca-
demic fashion, she immediately deconstructs these stated relations as a
result of cultural and social connections ahead of “religious” or connec-
tions related to “belief.”
It would not be until college, and exposure to the field of Religious
Studies where Chase would confront her religious beliefs with skepticism.
With a youthful indignation, Chase assumed she could study religion aca-
demically and put her faith to the test. Soon, she was asking questions
not only about her faith, but in a manner her faith’s focus on blind belief
had not prepared her for at all. In her words, she “was not prepared for
the answer” she’d receive to this newfound critical questioning.
What’s more, Chase makes it very clear that this about face was diffi-
cult. She was not prepared for what her questioning would create in her-
self, nor in the social ruptures and tensions that would come as a result
 4  SECULAR VOICES OF COLOR—DIGITAL STORYTELLING  83

of this deep questioning. Chase even likens the existential duress as “like
a bad break-up.” Thanks to a continued reliance on community in the
form of the Unitarian Universalists, she found her footing in humanism,
and has since “gotten past the point of trying to make other people non-
believers.” Drawing her interview to a close, Chase focuses on diversity
of belief. For Chase, what is of most importance for her is that everyone
has, “mutual respect…People are allowed to call something sacred and
to think that certain things are sacred, as I do in my personal life.” All
that said, Chase still finds a final moment to emphasize just how wonder-
ful it is to meet “all these amazing black non-believers, and it is a force to
be reckoned with.”

Story C—“Secular Voices of Color—Cheryl Abram

(Author of Firing God)”21
Cheryl Abram, author of Firing God (Non-Duality, 2014), a book
revealing her journey towards atheism, begins her interview with a shout
out to other videos in the series. Like them, she tells us, her story starts
in religion. Religion, for her offered a “sense of family” and a sense of
chosen-ness by god. But in the face of an inordinate amount of suffering
as a young girl, she started to ask bigger questions of her religion than it
was ready to provide. In short, Abram wanted, “evidence for the prom-
ises god made in the Bible.” These answers were not arriving, so the
questions grew. These unanswered questions led her to choose atheism.
Abram emphasizes that the term “believer” was more than an action,
or a thought. Rather, it was, in her words, “who she was.” That is, it was
her identity, one she could never have (then) fathomed to do without.
She would have never guessed then that she’d one day call herself a non-
believer. For Abram, belief, or non-belief, was an identity. And, identity
is not easily parted with. In her words, “no longer believing felt like a
death…it literally felt like a death, like I died.”
With somberness, she continues in explaining that indeed, part of her
did die along with her belief. Yet, it was the part of her that had not
really been part of her. At just this moment in the video, the viewer hears
children playing in the background while Abram rolls her eyes and notes,
“my kids.” The timing could not be more perfect, especially as coinci-
dental, in that the video takes on a quality of completion and finality, as if
to remind the audience that with every death of self—maybe death of the
believer in us—comes a newer, fuller self.
84  E. Clay and C.M. Driscoll

“It’s good. It’s good to finally be brave enough to just live instead of
hiding behind belief systems,” Abram tells viewers as the video draws to
a close. Finding non-belief opened her to the possibility of living in the
now, for today, in a way that religion’s ‘believing in tomorrow’ mentality
does not allow.

Story D—“Secular Voices of Color—Danielle Whitelow”22

Whitelow begins her story with a story from work. One day, colleagues
began to talk and one of them came up to ask Whitelow if it was true
that she was an atheist. Answering yes, the colleague asking was also
African American and gave indication that they thought all black folks
were believers. Whitelow juxtaposes this response to the same co-­
worker’s response upon finding out another colleague was atheist. Only,
this atheist was white. There was a discrepancy in responses. It was
“acceptable” for the white person to be an atheist, but it was “shocking”
to the coworker that Whitelow, “as a black woman” would be an atheist.
This initial anecdote and others like it led Whitelow to emphasize the
need for atheists of color to share their stories and experiences. As to
her specific story, hers is much like others in the Voices of Color pro-
ject. She was raised in a Baptist church, baptized at 10 years of age, and
attended choir and other social events in the church. Despite this activity,
Whitelow was always questioning church doctrine. As both a child  and
an adult, she continued to question. Eventually, she left the church
and practiced Sunni Islam. Islam did not stop her questioning, however,
and after some time, she stopped practicing.
Whitelow frames this end of practice, as well as church attendance,
as necessitating a decision. What was she to do now? She had problems
with assumed aspects of faith, particularly the doctrine of Original Sin,
so she wasn’t about to go back to Christian church. The decision she
made, then, was to turn away from religion altogether. This began her
shift towards an atheist posture.
Turning to atheism “wasn’t as bad” for family relations “as it could
have been,” she remarks, before noting that in matters of her atheism,
[she and her family] came to a “truce.” Despite this working respect for
difference, Whitelow emphasizes that there are moments when the dif-
ferences come to a head. She does not pretend to be a “theist” in these
moments, and encourages all atheists and especially atheists of color to
be vocal in their beliefs and more especially in defense of those beliefs,
 4  SECULAR VOICES OF COLOR—DIGITAL STORYTELLING  85

“so that people can understand” the stereotypes about atheists are not
true.
Whitelow emphasizes that in her experiences of speaking up, she has
often found common ground with believers as it relates to shared doubts
and questions. She meets a lot of people who are, “religious in name
only, in terms of how they think and how they really feel about doctrine
and the existence of a deity, they’re very similar to us.” In focusing on
openness towards believers and openness to personal story as atheists,
this common ground can promote acceptance and respect.

Story E—“Secular Voices of Color—Richard Flenory”23

Flenory begins his video noting geography. He lives in North Carolina.
And by way of introduction, he paints a portrait of himself as a Zumba-
loving, Dan Brown and Anne Rice reading, swimmer and practitioner of
yoga. Among this variety of personality traits and hobbies, Flenory notes
that more and more people are learning that he is also an atheist.
He intimates that he has grown more vocal in “coming out about
who he is,” and that in doing so, his family and friends have grown
to respect him even if they do not agree with his perspectives or opin-
ions. The reason for this respect, Flenory emphasizes, involves identity.
Through his openness about who he is, they are able to get a better
­portrait of who he is.
A major feature of this “who” Flenory is, is an atheist. He empha-
sizes the need to claim atheism for oneself and speak openly about it,
because it helps in presenting atheists as productive members of society.
Coming out as an atheist was not always easy for Flenory, because ­others
had the impression that he was “this church boy.” Admitting that he
grew up Pentecostal, he notes that coming out as an atheist left others
confused about who he was. He notes that these situations were initially
“­awkward,” but emphasizes that the rewards far outweigh the initial
awkwardness.
Flenory then gives some advice to other atheists about coming out.
The first time is harder than subsequent times. “It gets easier as you go,”
he says with an air of confident relief. The goal of such a process is not to
make others happy, but to “inform” them about who you are. Coming
out as an atheist has been a wholly positive experience for Flenory.
“Knowledge is power,” Flenory concludes, particularly “the knowledge
of who you are.”
86  E. Clay and C.M. Driscoll

General Findings
In our analysis of the narratives of the humanists and atheists from the
Secular Voices of Color website, several themes emerged. The routes to
secular humanism we observed in our analysis can be coded using six
themes: (a) the ubiquity of Theism and the prevalence of early sociali-
zation into religious identity within non-white cultures, (b) question-
ing theism and the eventual decision to discontinue with theism, (c) the
transition to a new humanist/atheist subjectivity and the search for com-
munity, (d) the decision to either defang or debunk religious belief and
responses to hegemonic Theist culture in everyday social interactions,
(e) the difficulty of “coming out” to family, friends, and co-workers, and
(f) the triple jeopardy of overlapping racial, gender, and atheist stereotypes,
assumed religious affiliation, and hegemonic anti-atheism/humanism.

The Ubiquity of Theism and the Prevalence of Early Socialization

into Theism Within Non-White Cultures
Many of the narrators express that even as young people, the speakers
had questions about religion, science, and the human condition; ques-
tions that were impossible for religious believers to answer, questions
that were labeled inappropriate or sacrilegious, and answers that were
wholly insufficient. Travel, education, inquisitiveness, self-directed study,
noticing inconsistencies in Biblical stories, seeing through religious justi-
fications of inappropriate and violent behaviors, and counter-reading the
Bible as mythology or as literature were actions that provided speakers
with a wider view of religion and culture which informed serious critical
thinking about religious belief and belonging.
Some humanists and atheists of color have another perspective
on early immersion (and coercion) into religious community. Ken
Granderson, who describes himself a black person who was immunized
from religious belief by learning to reason before he learned to believe,
purports, “You don’t choose to be an atheist; you’re born that way. Not
believing in the Judeo-Christian God is no different than not believing in
Thor or Poseidon or Osiris. Someone told me that there’s this god, but
once I learned to question, I understood that the god I was told about—
and the stories about that god—were no different from the mythologies
of any other people who created stories to explain their worlds.”24
 4  SECULAR VOICES OF COLOR—DIGITAL STORYTELLING  87

Granderson’s perspective is analytically helpful in that it aids in not

assuming too much about objects believed in, and works to prevent an
inverse reinforcing in those objects. Ideas are, after all, only ideas, even
if some ideas matter to people much more than other ideas. Here, the
stories presented online give more attention to the dimensions of
power and authority that often overlap with socialization and encul-
turation. In general, non-white cultures are portrayed as overwhelm-
ingly religious, with most black folks having very different experiences
than those noted by Granderson. Such religiosity is difficult to measure,
and although many sociological surveys note the prevalence of theism
among African Americans, these surveys unduly reinforce the notion that
belief—­replacing similar treatment of god by believers—is still a substan-
tial feature of social life. In this way, the Secular Voices of Color project
simultaneously offers a normative depiction of black religiosity while it
also troubles easy assumptions about responses to such socialization.

Questioning Theism and the Eventual Decision to Discontinue

with Theism and/or Religious Affiliation
Most narrators went through a period of study, whether self-study or
post-secondary study of World Religions or Comparative Religious
History. The presentation of new evidence rendered theism and reli-
gion unreasonable, unable to provide answers, and/or irresponsible and
unethical. At this point, investment in religious belief was discontinued
and religious belonging often rejected.
In this framing of belief as a decision, religion is treated as a market-
place. Inside such an economy, it is incumbent upon the seller to offer
a product able to address the concerns of the buyer (or “believer,” as
it were). Questions about the product of religion were not provided.
Intense rational, logical, and textual “tests” were performed by many of
these voices, even from an early age. The portrait presented is one of
a cadre of black freethinkers serving as a quality control group for test-
ing of this product of religion, almost exclusively rendered as Christian
with some exceptions to include certain “spiritual” sensibilities as well as
Islam.
The consequences of such a choice, however, are palpable. Sociologist
of Religion Carl L. Bankston III suggests that, “potential religious
­consumers choose to involve themselves with those who are ­collectively
producing [belief] through interactions of faith.”25 Considerable
88  E. Clay and C.M. Driscoll

consequences await those who would reject such an economy of belief,

forcing tensions within social networks and familial structures of affin-
ity. Such is expressed by many Secular Voices of Color, who note acute,
actual tensions and difficulties/impossibilities of retaining community
with believers. On top of this actual risk, knowledge of this risk creates
a great deal of anxiety for those who make the decision not to believe.
They find out fast that not believing is also a decision about community.
Though not all of the stories involve the same consequences, many black
atheists seem all too aware that the decision of whether to believe or not
is inextricably linked to social relationships.

The Transition to a New Humanist/Atheist Subjectivity

and the Search for Community
Connected as a consequence of the relationship between belief and social
belonging, the decision to give up on belief quickly forces new black
non-believers into a bit of a wilderness experience. Whether deeply active
in past church organizations or newly interested to determine whether
they are the only “black unicorn” in the world, a search for commu-
nity often follows transition towards a new Humanist/Atheist posture
towards the world.
African American non-theist humanist theologian Anthony B. Pinn
gives attention to the topic of community in his book The End of God-
Talk (Oxford, 2012). Here, Pinn rethinks community in less-geographic
ways, turning to the place of coffee shops and philosophical naturalism
to imagine community as predicated on both presence and absence.26
Community, as Pinn sees it, “has something to do with a shared rest-
lessness that encompasses various geographies of embodied life but that
is not defined by the presence of these embodied forms of life.” Such
a perspective helps to demonstrate that a community is necessitated
through the transition into humanism for African Americans. The (seem-
ing) uniqueness of the position elaborates a non-normative version of
community, even if physical presence is not always found and/or takes
more time. What’s more, Pinn helps to unpack the manner in which
the Secular Voices of Color project works to enact or create community.
Importantly, this is not an explicit motivation for Kirabo. His concern is
to tell stories of black atheists and nonbelievers. Nevertheless, the virtual
cataloging of stories offers a representation of the kind of black humanist
community Pinn elaborates. It both is and is not there, as attested in the
 4  SECULAR VOICES OF COLOR—DIGITAL STORYTELLING  89

content of many of the participant’s stories about having difficulty find-

ing other black atheists, but also in the invisibility of the online network
created as a by-product of storytelling.

The Decision to Either De-Fang or Debunk Religious Belief

and Responses to Hegemonic Theist Culture27 in Everyday Social
Interactions
Professor of African American Religion William Hart argues that among
African American secular atheists, humanists, and naturalists, a group
that he calls “the one percent,” there exists two strategies of enacting
their nonbeliever identity; one is to defang religion and the other is to
debunk religion.28 We observed performances of de-fanging/debunk-
ing strategies in the video self-presentations of atheists of color as well
as with the Secular Voices of Color Project’s founder, Sincere Kirabo.
Kirabo exhibits more of a debunking strategy. He wants to inspire oth-
ers, to share the good news of the gospel of secular humanism. Such
continued emphasis, comparative to many Christian traditions of pros-
elytizing, suggests a complicated influence from culture, and an even
more complicated perspective on what culture is and how culture
impacts belief and action regardless of believer or nonbeliever. Is belief
really about god/theism, or is theism akin to something philosopher
Alisdair Macintyre has termed, “belief in belief,” a process more akin to
acting like god than believing or disbelieving in a reality of god.29
Even still, a rather nuanced portrait of compassion, hostility, and indif-
ference mark the stories presented in Secular Voices of Color. In general,
nearly all of them demonstrate something far different than the typical
image of New Atheists looking far more like their fundamentalist straw-
men than ordinary secular humanists or freethinkers. Some stories empha-
size the need to change minds. Other stories circle around the importance
of individual (internal) belief. Additional stories still promote something
similar to interreligious or intercultural dialogue with believers for the
sake of promoting a compassionate image of atheism and for emphasizing
that whether believer or nonbeliever, culture is bigger than religion, and
so there is more room for agreement and similarity than dissimilarity.
Whether exemplifying a concern to de-fang or debunk beliefs held
by others or not, the image of the relationship between black atheists
and black believers is much more robust than typical journalistic render-
ings of the relationship between dominant culture atheist and believer.
90  E. Clay and C.M. Driscoll

The  latter is marked by a more voracious hostility, while the former

demonstrates a kind of cultural discernment that, though it may not be
wholesale lacking in broader Atheist and non-theist circles, could do a
great deal to promote shared concern between and beyond atheist ideo-
logical and organizational parameters.

The Difficulty of “Coming Out” to Family, Friends, and Co-workers

The use of “coming out” language,30 primarily associated with the pub-
lic revealing of non-conforming sexual and gender orientations to family
and friends, indicates that there is significant policing of religious belief
and identification and stigmatization of religious non-belief in non-white
cultures. Atheism and non-belief are generally assumed to be identifica-
tions only associated with White Europeans and Americans, especially
educated white males. Within Africana communities, atheism is associ-
ated with immorality and “godless” people that lack of absolute moral
foundation, leading to distrust and disgust with atheists.31 Alix Jones
of Houston has revealed that the self-disclosure of nonbelief in African
American communities can become a form of ‘social suicide.’32
In many communities of color, to be a nonbeliever signifies men-
tal confusion, a tendency to choose unethical behavior (living without
a moral compass), rejection of traditional values, or alienation from
one’s racial/ethnic roots. As a result, not only are non-believers har-
assed about their lack of belief, they are also sometimes heavily policed
to reclaim their religious beliefs and/or marginalized or disassociated
with or ignored until they “come to their senses” and reclaim their
religious belief and identification. Mandisa Thomas, founder of Black
Nonbelievers, Inc., explains this frequent reaction to blacks who publicly
self-identity as secular humanists in detail:

Black nonbelievers have to deal with backlash. If you disagree with certain
premises you are seen as against the [African American] community. ‘How
dare you be black and not believe in God! Religion is a part of our tradi-
tion…’ You are seen as selling out… looked at as race traitors because you
are exposing the issues in our community. ‘How dare you talk about the
issues of our [African American] community!33

Thomas’ characterization may not be representative of all intra-racial

encounters had by black atheists, but the dye is clearly cast that black
 4  SECULAR VOICES OF COLOR—DIGITAL STORYTELLING  91

communities are often hostile to the idea of a black atheism, even if

able to (at times) show compassion to black atheists. What’s true in the
black community is proved true in generic, white atheist and humanist
cultural contexts as well. Despite an overwhelming need for (and inter-
est in) spaces where the wholeness of black atheist subjectivity might
be expressed, the grass is not greener on the “whiter” side of culture.
If black atheists risk alienation in black spaces on account of belief, such
is as true of moving in and amidst white spaces where belief is rendered
only skin deep. Such a perspective finds black atheists in a complicated,
constantly frustrated position, rendering a sense of community all the
more important for its all-too-often absence in both black and white
spaces.

The Triple Jeopardy of Overlapping Racial, Gender, and Atheist

Stereotypes, Assumed Religious Affiliation, and Hegemonic Anti-
Atheism/Humanism
Several of the storytellers discussed how family, friends, and co-workers
were shocked or in disbelief (and disgust) that a person of color, and
especially a woman of color, would openly claim an atheist, non-believer,
or secular humanist subjectivity. In personal stories such as the ones fea-
tured, humanism and atheism are perceived by religious believers of the
same racial/ethnic background to be evidence of an inauthentic racial/
ethnic self. Such characterizations are troubling for atheists whose sub-
jectivities overlap with multiple codes of identification.
Black female secular humanists experience atheist stereotypes which
are then compounded by gendered and racialized stereotypes or “con-
trolling images” of black woman as bad mothers, hypersexual, or angry
women.34 While the socio-political entanglements of white supremacist
capitalist patriarchy35 with religions, particularly Christianity, have been
well researched in black feminism and critical race theory, these entangle-
ments do not magically go away when black women dis-identify as reli-
gious believers and become secular humanists and nonbelievers.36 And,
within humanist/atheist circles, an air of liberal arrival (beyond being
racist, sexist, homophobic, etc.) ensures that critical assessment of white
supremacy or, “the religion of whiteness” has really only just begun in
atheist and freethought circles. Sikuvu Hutchinson, author of the book
Godless Americana and founder of Black Skeptics Los Angeles, argues
that the complicity of Western atheism and secular humanism with white
92  E. Clay and C.M. Driscoll

supremacist capitalist patriarchy has only recently begun receiving critical

analysis.37 Such a long-awaited, much-needed accounting of the inexora-
ble whiteness and masculinity and heteropatriarchy shaping so much of
atheism is more than a matter of twenty-first century political correctness
or blithe niceties. It will practically matter for the continuance of atheism
in years and decades ahead.
Voices in Kirabo’s project know all of this all too well, and some
make mention of it; others give more critique to the internal racial cul-
ture instead of the “new” culture offered by atheist and freethought and
humanist circles. Such is to be expected, as these new affinities are less
galvanized than those racial affinities that are less in risk of rupture. But
in the telling of these stories there is an invitation to dominant culture
atheists and humanists to see something of themselves in these Secular
Voices of Color. With modes of social and cultural jeopardy in mind,
this invitation is a reminder that for dominant culture folks, atheism and
anti-atheist marginalization is one of the few modes of identification that
necessitate connectedness beyond race.
Importantly, what we are referring to as this invitation is not condi-
tional as Secular Voices of Color demonstrate that by virtue of technol-
ogy, and the storytelling apparatuses offered therein, white rehabilitation
is not a prominent feature of the topics or foci held by black atheists.
Secular Voices of Color addresses overlapping modes of marginalization
by opening new spaces of subjective awareness. As Kirabo notes, such
efforts are often rendered as exclusive or discriminatory by dominant cul-
ture atheists, but this couldn’t be further from the case. And, black athe-
ists have more to offer than serving as the ethical conscience of atheist
organizations still wrestling with who they want to be in the future.

Conclusion
With respect to media and nonbelievers, this chapter has drawn atten-
tion to an important body of data which has received scant notice in the
scholarship and discussions of contemporary Secular Humanism and
Atheism. Digital storytelling, as a low-cost multimodal form that eas-
ily uploads to online spaces, offers big potential for telling the stories of
secular humanists as everyday activists. Secular humanists of color are
employing YouTube as a site for their own mobilization and self-repre-
sentation. The results are both inchoate, yet substantial enough to do
what many dominant culture spaces of atheism and humanism fail to
 4  SECULAR VOICES OF COLOR—DIGITAL STORYTELLING  93

do on a regular basis: give voice to the multiplicative, complicated, and

robust stories of black atheism and atheism in black.
Social media and social networking have become instrumental in facil-
itating the growth of secular humanism and nonbelief. Social psycholo-
gist Jesse Smith is instructive on shifts that are taking place in American
atheist groups:

…only within the last decade have explicitly atheist groups all across the
country proliferated and become conspicuous. These groups have become
increasingly interconnected, and an expanding network—an American atheist
community—is developing a more recognizable place in American culture.
The Internet and new social media have facilitated much of this expansion.
But the new atheist community is not merely an online or virtual one.38

This essay is an unfinished beginning to the digital footprint offered

by black atheism and black atheists. We have barely touched upon the
possibilities for researching online sociability, progressive politics, and
communicative action among secular humanists and atheists of color, so
we encourage further research in this area and beyond it. In the mean-
time, the digital archive is growing exponentially. There has never been a
more pressing need for scholarship on digital black atheism. And thanks
to the online arena and proliferating technological prowess and dexterity,
the stories of black atheism have never rang more loudly than they do
now, leaving atheist organizations and dominant culture individuals with-
out excuse as to whether we hear these stories or not.

Notes
1. “Secular Voices of Color.” http://www.patheos.com/blogs/notes
fromanapostate/secular-voices-of-color/. Accessed February 28, 2017.
2. Ibid.
3. Tiara, Teemu. “Media and the Nonreligious.” In Granholm, Kennet,
Moberg, Marcus, and Sjö, Sofia, Religion, Media, and Social Change
(Vol. 5) (Routledge, 2014).
4. Ibid.
5. Quote from Norm Allen, Jr. 2016. African Americans for Humanism w/
Norm Allen Jr. Mythicist Milwaukee YouTube channel. Published on Oct
14, 2016. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kuy_6x_J-
Ak. Accessed March 10, 2017. See, also, Norm R. Allen, ed., African-
American Humanism: An Anthology (Prometheus Books, 1991).
94  E. Clay and C.M. Driscoll

6. See complete list of websites in the bibliography.

7. Tiara, 2014.
8. Center for Digital Storytelling. Qtd. In lke Zobl, Ricarda Drüeke, eds.,
Feminist Media: Participatory Spaces, Networks and Cultural Citizenship
(Transcript Verlag), 239.
9. Lundby, Knut. Digital Storytelling, Mediatized Stories: Self-Representations
in New Media (Peter Lang: New York, 2008).
10. Lundby, ibid.
11. Hartley, John and McWilliam, Kelly. Story Circle: Digital Storytelling
Around the World (Blackwell Publishing: United Kingdom, 2009).
12. Hertzberg-Kaare, Birgit and Lundby, Knut. “Mediatized Lives:
Autobiography and Assumed Authenticity in Digital Storytelling.” In
Digital Storytelling, Mediatized Stories: Self-Representations in New Media
(Peter Lang, 2008), 105–122.
13. See, for example, Couldry, N. The Place of Media Power (Routledge:
London, 2000); Erstad, O. and J.V. Wertsch. ‘Tales of Mediation:
Narrative and Digital Media as Cultural Tools’, in K. Lundby (ed.) Digital
Storytelling, Mediatized Stories: Self-representations in New Media (Peter
Lang: New York, 2008); Martín Barbero. J. 1993. Communication,
Culture and Hegemony: From the Media to Mediations (SAGE Publications:
London, 1993); Silverstone, R. 2002. ‘Complicity and Collusion in the
Mediation of Everyday Life’, New Literary History, 33: 745–764.
14. See, for example, Hjarvard, S. Changing Media, Changing Language: The
Mediatization of Society and the Spread of English and Medialects. Paper
presented to ICA annual conference, San Francisco, May 23–28, 2007;
Lundby 2008; Mazzoleni, G. and W. Schultz. 1999. ‘“Mediatization”
of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy?’ Political Communication,
16: 247–261.; Schulz, W. 2004. ‘Reconsidering Mediatization as an
Analytical Concept’, European Journal of Communication 19(1): 87–101.
15. Mansbridge, Jane. Everyday Activism. The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of
Social and Political Movements (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).
16. Davis, Alan and Weinshenker, Daniel. 2012. “Digital Storytelling and
Authoring Identity.” Constructing the Self in a Digital World (Cambridge
University Press, 2012), 47.
17. Mansbridge, Jane, & Flaster, K. (2007). The cultural politics of everyday
discourse: The case of “malechauvinist.” Critical Sociology, 33, 627–660.
(p. 630).
18. Lundy 2008.
19. “Secular Voices of Color—Sincere Kirabo.” https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=gL0KjyAbRYA&index=16&list=PL8by77Qrh064__9a93f05he
utNoJC_C9G. Accessed February 28, 2017.
 4  SECULAR VOICES OF COLOR—DIGITAL STORYTELLING  95

20. “Secular Voices of Color—Zakkiyya Chase.” https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=dyurGxdrn-o&list=PL8by77Qrh064__9a93f05heutNoJC_
C9G&index=17. Accessed February 28, 2017.
21. “Secular Voices of Color—Cheryl Abram (author Firing God).” https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=08HlvEYkl3s&list=PL8by77Qrh064__9a9
3f05heutNoJC_C9G&index=25. Accessed February 28, 2017.
22. “Secular Voices of Color—Danielle Whitelow.” https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=cmHRCMStwcQ&index=9&list=PL8by77Qrh064__9a9
3f05heutNoJC_C9G. Accessed February 28, 2017.
23. “Secular Voices of Color—Richard Flenory.” https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=HFXPcW5LHm8&index=6&list=PL8by77Qrh064__9a93f05
heutNoJC_C9G. Accessed February 28, 2017.
24. Bey, Jamila. 2010. “Black Women Who Use the ‘A’ Word.” The Root
website. Available at http://www.theroot.com/black-women-who-use-
the-a-word-1790879567. Accessed March 10, 2017.
25. Carl L. Bankston, “Rationality, Choice and the Religious Economy: The
Problem of Belief,” Review of Religious Research 2002, Volume 43: 4,
311–325.
26. Anthony B. Pinn, The End of God-Talk: An African American Humanist
Theology (Oxford, 2012). See, also, Anthony B. Pinn, By These Hands:
A Documentary History of African American Humanism (NYU Press,
2001).
27. “Hegemonic Theist culture” is a concept that describes a social environ-
ment that is socially embedded in theistic belief and practice, such that
theism becomes a “common sense” assumed aspect of cultural practice;
one that does not take into consideration that individuals may choose to
self-identify as humanists and atheists, skeptics, etc.
28. Hart, William David. 2013. ““One Percenters”: Black Atheists, Secular
Humanists, and Naturalists.” South Atlantic Quarterly 112 (4): 675–696.
29. Christopher M. Driscoll, White Lies: Race and Uncertainty in the Twilight
of American Religion (Routledge, 2016), Chap. 1. See, also, Alisdair
MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur, The Religious Significance of Atheism
(Columbia University Press, 1969).
30. The use of the closet metaphor (linked to LGBTQ practices of public
self-disclosure of sexual orientation) with the self-disclosure of nonbelief
among atheists and humanists has become increasingly common in athe-
ist discourses. Center for Inquiry founder Paul Kurtz made the compari-
son in 2000 and Richard Dawkins in 2006.
31. Gervais, Will M. (2014) Everything Is Permitted? People Intuitively Judge
Immorality as Representative of Atheists. PLoS ONE 9(4): e92302.
96  E. Clay and C.M. Driscoll

32. Jones, Alix. Trailer for the forthcoming movie, Exodus. Available at

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jej6u9QCCOw&t=0s. Accessed
March 13, 2017.
33.  Quote by Mandisa Thomas. From the video, “‘Growing Secularism
in the Black Community’ @ HBN October 2015” Humanists of
Houston YouTube Channel. Available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=2i4G-OH7nho. Accessed March 1, 2017.
34. Collins, Patricia Hill. Black Sexual Politics: African Americans, Gender,
and the New Racism (Routledge, 2005).
35. Hooks, bell. Black Looks: Race and Representation (South End Press,
1992).
36. “Women of Color and Religious Oppression.” 2014. People of Color
Beyond Faith YouTube channel. March 30, 2014. Available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=8s2uZsZOyiI&t=38s. Accessed March 10,
2017.
37. Hutchinson, Sikivu. 2013. Godless Americana: Race and Religious Rebels.
Infidel Books. See, also, Sikivu Hutchinson, “Black Infidels.” In The
Oxford Handbook of Secularism (Oxford University Press, 2016), 450.
38. Smith, Jesse M., 2013. Creating a Godless Community: The Collective
Identity Work Of Contemporary American Atheists. Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion, 52(1), pp. 80–99.

Acknowledgements   The authors would like to express a special thanks to

Ken Granderson of Boston, Massachusetts, whose willingness to share his story
as well as his various engagements with local and national atheists groups and
online communities. His route to atheism was of great help in envisioning
various relationships between atheism and humanism among African Americans,
diversity within secular humanism, and types of secular humanist engagements
with social media over the last decade.

Digital Bibliography

Videos
African Americans for Humanism w/ Norm Allen Jr. Mythicist Milwaukee
YouTube channel. Published on Oct 14, 2016. Available at https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=kuy_6x_J-Ak. Accessed 10 Mar 2017.
Exodus, a forthcoming documentary about African-Americans leaving God and
the church. Trailer Sizzle Reel HD. Blue Checker Productions. Produced,
 4  SECULAR VOICES OF COLOR—DIGITAL STORYTELLING  97

directed, and written by David Person, July 4, 2016. Available at https://

www.youtube.com/watch?v=jej6u9QCCOw&t=0s.
“Growing Secularism in the Black Community” @ HBN October 2015”.
Humanists of Houston YouTube Channel. Available at https://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=2i4G-OH7nho. Accessed 1 Mar 2017.
Quote from Norm Allen, Jr. 2016. “African Americans for Humanism w/ Norm
Allen Jr.” Mythicist Milwaukee YouTube channel. Oct 14, 2016. Available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kuy_6x_J-Ak.
Secular Voices of Color—Sincere Kirabo. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
gL0KjyAbRYA&index=16&list=PL8by77Qrh064__9a93f05heutNoJC_
C9G. Accessed 28 Feb 2017.
Secular Voices of Color—Zakkiyya Chase. https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=dyurGxdrn-o&list=PL8by77Qrh064__9a93f05heutNoJC_
C9G&index=17. Accessed 28 Feb 2017.
Secular Voices of Color—Cheryl Abram (author Firing God). https://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=08HlvEYkl3s&list=PL8by77Qrh064__9a93f05heutN
oJC_C9G&index=25. Accessed 28 Feb 2017.
Secular Voices of Color—Danielle Whitelow. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
cmHRCMStwcQ&index=9&list=PL8by77Qrh064__9a93f05heutNoJC_C9G
Accessed 28 Feb 2017.
Secular Voices of Color—Richard Flenory. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
HFXPcW5LHm8&index=6&list=PL8by77Qrh064__9a93f05heutNoJC_
C9G. Accessed 28 Feb 2017.
Women of Color and Religious Oppression. 2014. People of Color Beyond Faith
YouTube channel. March 30, 2014. Available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=8s2uZsZOyiI&t=38s. Accessed 10 Mar 2017.

Websites
African Americans for Humanism. http://www.aahumanism.net. Accessed
1 Mar 2017.
African Americans for Humanism DC (AAH DC). http://www.meetup.com/
aah-dc. Accessed 1 Mar 2017.
Black Nonbelievers, Inc. https://blacknonbelievers.wordpress.com. Accessed
1 Mar 2017.
Black Freethought Discussion Group, Atheist Nexus. http://atheistnexus.org/
group/blackfreethought. Accessed 1 Mar 2017.
Black Atheist Alliance. http://www.facebook.com/groups/blackatheistalliance.
Accessed 1 Mar 2017.
Black Atheists of America. http://www.facebook.com/BlackAtheistsofAmerica.
Accessed 1 Mar 2017.
98  E. Clay and C.M. Driscoll

Black Nonbelievers of Dallas. https://www.facebook.com/BlackNonbelievers

OfDallas. Accessed 1 Mar 2017.
Black Nonbelievers of Houston. https://www.meetup.com/Houston-Black-
Non-Believers. Accessed 1 Mar 2017.
Center for Inquiry-Austin, Texas. http://www.centerforinquiry.net/austin.
Accessed 1 March 2017. 
Harlem Community Center for Inquiry. http://www.centerforinquiry.net/har-
lem. Accessed 1 Mar 2017.

Blogs
Kirabo, Sincere. “Secular Voices of Color.” Notes From an Apostate blog.
Available at http://www.patheos.com/blogs/notesfromanapostate/secular-
voices-of-color. Accessed 28 Feb 2017.
 CHAPTER 5

Where Humanism Is, and Where

It Is Headed in This Non-Humanist World

Norm R. Allen

Humanist Approaches
Despite its long history, humanism today faces many challenges at
social acceptability. For one, it must compete with the social capital of
traditional religions that have long been around for millennia. As such,
humanism is confronted with a social world that largely believes that the-
ism, owing largely to its longevity, is pragmatic, successful, attendant to
concrete reality and as such, a logical resolution to the pressing concerns
of life. Complicating matters, the formalized structure of religion binds
people together and, in many cases, is set up to punish and ostracize
those that will not “get with the program.”
This is, however, a major advantage that humanism has over tradi-
tional religions: there are no popes, mullahs, and sacred texts to which
adherents must bow for acceptance and authorization. In most cases,
humanists offer their worldview freely, and no one is compelled to accept
it through tactics of fear and intimidation. Similarly, there is no humanist

N.R. Allen (*) 
Buffalo, NY, USA

© The Author(s) 2017 99

M.R. Miller (ed.), Humanism in a Non-Humanist World, Studies
in Humanism and Atheism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57910-8_5
100  N.R. Allen

equivalent of the theological concept of hell to which non-humanists are

consigned for any reason whatsoever.
Among those trying to promote humanism, the subject of respect for
other religions often arises. Although we (humanists) must respect every-
one’s right to believe as they so desire, the expectation that religion must
be respected is problematic at best. How far exactly must this “respect”
be extended? Are humanists expected to be respectful of biblical passages
that condone slavery, genocide, sexism, anti-Jewish bigotry, and so on?
Pushing this challenge of “respect” further, what does offering deference
to the ideas of creationists and intelligent design theorists by humanists
look like and signify?
We know all too well that ridicule attracts at least as much as it repels.
The great nineteenth Century freethinkers Robert Green Ingersoll and
eighteenth Century freethinkers Voltaire, Thomas Paine and countless
others have persuaded many of their ideas and causes with harsh, biting,
and withering critiques of religion. Indeed, sometimes the best way to
make a point is to do so with biting humor, piercing sarcasm and, dare
I say it, contempt. The so-called New Atheists have come under great
criticism, largely due to their alleged disrespect of religious sensibilities.
However, they have been responsible for large numbers of non-theists
coming out of the closet, proudly making their disbelief known to the
world.
Nowhere is this most apparent than at the Reason Rally which gathers
in Washington, D.C., bringing together the largest group of freethinkers
in the U.S. The Reason Rally has attracted crowds of more than twenty
thousand, according to most accounts. Although awkwardly named,
I had the honor of speaking at the rally’s predecessor, Godless March
on Washington, in 2002, which only attracted roughly three thou-
sand attendees. The success of the Reason Rally shows that a hard-core
approach greatly increases the visibility, and probably the influence, of
organized non-theists.
What’s more, some of the harshest critics of the New Atheism have
been among its largest beneficiaries. For example, when I worked with
the Center for Inquiry (CFI), leading New Atheist Richard Dawkins’
book The God Delusion (2008) was a bestseller and a long-standing
topic among the religious and non-religious alike. Although the topic
of Dawkins’ chart-topper found its way into many conversations among
humanists and other freethinkers, many at the CFI were highly critical
of Dawkins’ manuscript. Interestingly, at the end of The God Delusion
 5  WHERE HUMANISM IS, AND WHERE IT IS HEADED …  101

Dawkins provides a resource list of organizations and included the

organization I founded: African Americans for Humanism (AAH), and
the Council for Secular Humanism, of which AAH is a subdivision. As a
result, interest in both the AAH and the Council grew considerably.
The continued debate over the “proper” approach to present-
ing humanism is not new and remains unresolved. Although blacks are
demographically underrepresented in humanism, examples over the
proper approach and politics of representation can be found among
debates about formative black leaders in the U.S. For example, many
people of color believed Malcolm X, even after his conversion and
departure from the Nation of Islam, was too angry and uncompromis-
ing to “properly” represent the black community. On the other hand,
more militant blacks felt that Martin Luther King Jr. was too politically
cautious and racially accommodating. However, after their deaths, they
both came to be regarded as two necessary icons in the struggle for
black liberation by black people of all religions, racial perspectives and
political persuasions. Effectively, the differences long suggested of them
seemingly merged in the widely-held posthumous claim that there is
no Malcolm without Martin, and no Martin without Malcolm. Just as
there is no one-size-fits-all approach to relating humanism to the non-
humanist world, the differences in form, content and approach need
not be suppressed for the illusion of coherence and homogeneity. Many
find their way to humanism for a wide variety of reasons, and to assume
a proper approach to what is, in essence, a life stance is a highly pre-
sumptuous and entitled position. But perhaps we are getting way ahead
of ourselves. Although many humanists say that trying to define human-
ism is like trying to nail jello to a wall, there has to be some working,
or workable, definition of the term/label “humanism” without which
organizing humanists is impossible.

Humanist/Non-Humanist: Defining Our Terms

of Engagement

Humanism, at least loosely defined, is a human-centered life stance

with secular approaches to living. There is no reliance upon a belief in a
Supreme Being. Despite its conceptual broadness, many humanists con-
tinue to define the term in strict and rigid ways. Barry Seidman, a humanist
from New Jersey, believes that humanism and anarcho-socialism—or social
libertarianism—are virtually one and the same. He and others believe that
102  N.R. Allen

capitalism, as an economic structure, is essentially anti-human, for which

no true humanist could possibly advocate and promote. On the other
hand, a number of African American humanists equate what they take to
be true humanism as well, through a black-centered paradigm. Widely
known black atheist activist and author Sikivu Hutchinson promotes a con-
ception of humanism that primarily focuses on feminism, LGBTQI rights,
anti-black racism, and culturally relevant education and pedagogy, among
other topics. Unlike other humanist and atheist activists, she does not voice
much concern with the issues of church/state separation, defense of evolu-
tion and science.
Humanism, and humanist values and concerns as briefly reflected
in the vignettes above, are advocated for and practiced by a variety of
individuals that might hardly be recognized as humanist by most peo-
ple involved in organized humanism. Although not advanced in this
chapter, the topic of humanist misrecognition is important and deserves
a great deal of attention toward articulating and advancing differences
among conceptions of humanism that adequately describe the groups
they are attempting to name and describe. For example, Seidman could
call any group he might organize, something like the Social Libertarian
Humanists Those focusing primarily on issues of social justice, het-
eronormativity, and opposition to imperialism, could call their group
something like the Radical Humanist Working Group. Varying titles
would allow people the space to get a feel for and some understanding
of the kind of group they are joining and what they represent. If such
were the case, fewer people, I imagine, would be disappointed to find
that their conception of humanism differs from the group they are join-
ing. Additionally, facilitators of those organizations could save themselves
a great deal of time and problems by giving people a solid idea as to what
their organizations are about. Finally, the public use of such varying
titles would highlight humanist differences, rather than championing an
organizational appearance of one truth.

The Work of Relating: Various Models

In order for humanism to be relatable to a non-humanist world, it has to
first be made relevant to the needs of ordinary people, and in some cases,
must be applicable to people’s cultural particularities and experiences if
it is to be what it claims to be, a life philosophy. A good example of this
applicability comes from organized humanists across the continent of
 5  WHERE HUMANISM IS, AND WHERE IT IS HEADED …  103

Africa. Although the persecution of alleged witches was eradicated cen-

turies ago in the West, this is still sadly a problem throughout the world
today, including many parts of Africa. In response to this disturbing phe-
nomenon, organized efforts among African humanists and skeptics have
drawn upon humanist ideals and African culture to promote humanist
worldviews, rationality and compassion for the victims of these continued
witch-hunts.
To relate, these groups use songs, dance, plays and other forms of
traditional African cultures as a mode of presenting humanist thought.
Understanding the particularities of cultural differences is vital for pro-
moting life flourishing and ensuring that individuals and groups of
people see their differences reflected in, celebrated among, and taken
seriously in humanist circles. When superstition, pseudo-science and
culture become intertwined, promoting humanism and skepticism in an
overly-theistic world is not easy. For instance, some Eastern Europeans,
Middle Easterners and Africans insist that opposition to LGBTQI rights
is rooted in highly valued cultural traits. Still, the alternative ought not
be a blind embrace of cultural relativism. After all, there are human
rights that take precedence over any deeply cherished and highly valued
cultural trait. Humanists must never abandon a consistent and principled
defense of human rights in an awkward display of respect for inhumane
cultural practices but yet must be reflexive and careful not to deify their
own cultural locations.
As it concerns the practice of self-critique and attending to social dif-
ference, the New Atheists have provided a model of how not to present
humanism to non-humanists. Sadly, many of them have ignored and/
or downplayed social concerns related to sexism, racism, homophobia,
poverty, economic inequality, preferring to obsessively focus their efforts
on making a soapbox of the shortcomings of the Arab world. In doing
so, they have given short shrift to the impressive history of science, phi-
losophy and other global achievements of the Arab world, while extolling
the glories of Western achievements. Such a shortsighted view is not only
unfair, but more disturbingly, it is xenophobic and alienating at best.
Engaging the non-humanist world, especially globally, requires humil-
ity rather than a hubris-filled assumption that one is bringing with them
something new. For example, many humanists are opponents of the
practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), also known as genital cut-
ting. In the 1990s, many Western humanists were of the opinion that it
was necessary to present Africans with an alternative ignoring the reality
104  N.R. Allen

that those who know best the horrors of FGM are African women them-
selves. As it turned out, African women in twenty-five nations organized
themselves to combat FGM in their respective nations. Such efforts are
likely to be much more successful than even well intentioned efforts by
Western humanists to bring “civilization” to African people and their
presumed non-humanist worldviews. Regardless, secular charities would
do well to keep the needs of both the humanist and non-humanist world
in mind: giving blood, feeding the hungry, doing hospice work, visiting
shut-ins, providing money and materials to victims of natural disasters,
providing medical care to the poor. Relating to the non-humanist world
requires doing the work of humanism itself—it is often the case we want
to do the former without doing the latter.
One of the most impressive organizations in this regard has been
Secular Organizations for Sobriety (SOS), founded by Jim Christopher
in 1985. Christopher was put off by the emphasis upon a “higher
power” in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), and the organization’s 12-step
program. Putting his frustrations to work, he started a secular alternative
to AA which has had incredibly productive results and a wide reach—
including an international platform. The organization is non-religious
and disagrees with the notion that looking to a higher power is the only
way to combat addiction, but SOS is not anti-religious and has religious
and non-religious members alike.
Messaging on Billboards has become a popular way and widely used
method of engagement with the world among humanists and non-the-
ists—which can be productive, depending upon the message. Members
of American Atheists report that their billboard campaign has enabled
engagement with non-humanist communities, resulting in an increase
in membership and participation. However, depending on the mes-
sage that is being promoted, billboard campaigns can negatively impact
the public impression of humanists as seen in the unfolding contro-
versy surrounding a billboard proudly highlighting the biblical injunc-
tion, “slaves obey your masters.” What’s more, American Atheists used
the image of a kneeling slave with his hands clasped in prayer. As one
would expect, atheists and theists of color alike found the image and
the use of the biblical quotation to be abhorrent. This was obviously
a culturally insensitive and in “in-your-face” approach to engaging the
non-humanist world. Conversely, another campaign celebrated highly
revered black historical figures accompanied by simple and straightfor-
ward messages.
 5  WHERE HUMANISM IS, AND WHERE IT IS HEADED …  105

Another impressive billboard campaign was launched by the Military

Religious Freedom Foundation (MRFF) which started a billboard cam-
paign in Colorado Springs, home of the excessively religious Air Force
Academy where some influential members claim that George Washington
used the words “so help me God” (a phrase it has used since 1984) as
part of his military oath. The MRFF however wants the academy to do
away with the phrase for good. Complicating matters, staff director of
the MRFF, Chris Rodda, has complained that cadets have received emails
claiming that their commissioning oath would be illegal if they refused to
say “so help me God.” The MRFF billboard campaign was organized in
direct challenge to the Academy’s stance.

Humanists, Science, and Difference

Many organized humanists tend to embrace a blind belief in science and the
findings of the scientific establishment more generally by downplaying and
often blatantly ignoring the damage that has been done to many in the name
of science (i.e., eugenics, biologically determined conspiracy theories about
racial differences, and experimentation on animals). In Godless Americana:
Race and Religious Rebels (2013), Sikivu Hutchinson discusses the histori-
cal use and history of medical experiments on black bodies, a tragic reality
also brought into sharp relief in texts such as Medical Apartheid (2008) by
Harriet A. Washington who delves into the dark history of the impact of
enduring experimentation on black female slave bodies’ on the rise of gyne-
cology, many of which often left the women with severe bodily damage.
The most infamous example of experimentation on black bodies in
the U.S. was the Tuskegee Study where hundreds of black men were
intentionally left untreated for syphilis for forty years. Former President
Clinton issued an apology to the victims’ survivors, as well as the thou-
sands impacted by the use of radioactive experiments conducted by
the U.S. government starting in the 1940s. Sadly, the Tuskegee Study
in the U.S. was not the only experiment which intentionally saw peo-
ple untreated for syphilis. In 2010, the U.S. government issued an apol-
ogy to the people of Guatemala for syphilis experiments in which 1308
men and women were infected with the disease without their permission
between the years of 1946 and 1948.
Women in particular have been disproportionately impacted by such
scientific dehumanization as seen with many cases of forced steriliza-
tion. Christina Cordero, a California resident who was imprisoned for car
106  N.R. Allen

theft, was one such victim. After finding out that she had five children,
Dr. James Heinrich urged her to consider sterilization, to which she even-
tually agreed. However, she later said, “I wish that I would have never
had it done.” The Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR) issued a
report on the issue of sterilization in prisons in California, and according
to syndicated columnist Leonard Pitts of the Miami Herald, the report
documented that: the California prison system in violation of state rules
sterilized as many as 250 women many whom were pressured to do so.
Reportedly, the state spent $147,000 on these cases of mass-sterilization.
According to Dr. Heinrich, this is a bargain. “Over a 10-year period,” he
told CIR, “that isn’t a huge amount of money compared to what you save
in welfare paying for these unwanted children—as they procreated more.”1
Thirty-two states have had laws on the books condoning the sterilization
of people deemed inferior, and such eugenics programs continued on more
than 60,000 U.S. citizens considered to be feeble-minded. According to a
story on BBC regarding a 1972 Supreme Court Decision that upheld the
laws, storied jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, “It is better for all the
world if, instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime or to
let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are mani-
festly unfit from continuing their kind.”2 The story estimated that roughly
2900 of the men and women sterilized in North Carolina between 1929
and 1974 could still be alive today. A plan to pay each surviving victim
$50,000 was rejected by the state in June of 2012.
In February of 2013, it was reported that Israel intentionally tried to
decrease birthrates among Ethiopian immigrants by giving Ethiopian
women Depo-Provera, a birth control method that is rarely administered to
other Israelis. As a result, the birthrate among Ethiopian Israelis has fallen
by over 50% in the past 10 years, causing some to label it as black genocide.
These are just a few examples of well-documented narratives that
many skeptics and humanists insist did not and could never exist in
ostensibly democratic societies.

Know Before You Go: Relating Is a Two-Way Street

With this in mind, one way for humanists to engage a non-humanist is
to put people’s wellbeing and issues of equity first by shifting its epis-
temological reliance on and overwhelming support of science as undis-
puted truth. A blind defense of science will only perpetuate a distrust of
humanism among historically oppressed groups.
 5  WHERE HUMANISM IS, AND WHERE IT IS HEADED …  107

When bringing humanism to non-humanists, it is important to be intel-

lectually honest about the complicated relationship humanism, freethought
and atheism have had with marginalized groups. No matter how much
humanist groups and organizations profess “reason,” it is a farce to believe
that non-dominant group members will be attracted to organizations or
movements led and dominated by one representative group (across gender,
race, class, sexuality, and so on). As we know, some of the most influential
mid-twentieth century freethinkers wrote and spoke harshly against certain
groups such as African Americans. For example, James Hervey Johnson,
who edited the Truth Seeker, advocated for eugenic programs and tactics.
Today, his legacy is still alive and well through the James Hervey Johnson
foundation, which provides huge sums of money to various freethought
organizations. Woolsey Teller was another leading freethought bigot. In
1945, the Truth Seeker Company published his book Essays of an Atheist
where he included five incredibly racist essays in his book under the titles
“Grading the Races,” Brains and Civilization,” “There Are Superior
Races,” “Shall We Breed Rationally?” and “Natural Selection and War.”
Teller’s conception of freethought was inextricably linked to the notion
of black genetic inferiority and proclaimed that there are only three races:
the “White Race,” the “Yellow-Brown Race,” and the “Black Race.”
Unsurprisingly, he argued that the white race is intellectually superior
based on his contention that whites have bigger brains with more convo-
lutions than the other two races. Teller maintained that there is an “aris-
tocracy of brains” with whites, naturally, at the top. He fiercely opposed
“miscegenation” which he feared would culminate in destroying the white
race. Perhaps worst of all, Teller identified himself as a “Darwinian” and
implied that natural selection leads to inferior and superior races.
It should go without saying that such ideas will not go over well with
non-white people. Even the Skeptic magazine has run articles about sup-
posed racial differences in IQ and sports as seen in Vol. 3 No. 3, 1995
and Vol. 8 No. 1, 2000 of their issues. Moreover, two skeptics from the
journal, Vincent Sarich and Frank Miele, who co-wrote Race: The Reality
of Human Differences (2004) concluded that the black race is among the
least intelligent. (I have personally responded to these claims in an eleven
part article titled “Dissin’ Blacks in the Name of Science,” under my col-
umn “Reasonings” with The Institute for Science and Human Values.)
Another way for humanists to relate to a non-humanist world is to
strengthen focus on wide scale social issues affecting many non-humanists
today, such as wealth inequality and growing rates of poverty. As quietly
108  N.R. Allen

as it is kept, in this area, no leader of organized humanism had more to

say than the late Paul Kurtz who called for the worldwide eradication of
poverty as seen in his work, Humanist Manifesto 2000 and Humanist
Manifesto II.3 Unlike many who often associate poverty with behavio-
ral deficiencies of the poor, Kurtz fostered a progressive view and unlike
his late colleague, Antony Flew, Kurtz did not embrace a mythic view
of social justice. On the contrary, he saw it as essential to humanist eth-
ics. The sub-title of his Neo-Humanist Statement of Secular Principles
and Values, says it all, which emphasizes the “Personal, Progressive, and
Planetary” and recognizes the need for new transnational institutions
to, in part, “…encourage world commerce and trade…and…work with
the governments of the world to maximize employment, education, and
health care for the populations of the world.”4
Not only did Kurtz believe that wealthy countries ought to increase
their financial aid to poor nations, but he also advocated that such
nations pay an international tax to help end poverty in poorer countries.
In his magazine editorials and in other publications, Kurtz was routinely
critical of abusive corporate power and especially regretted the fact that
conglomerates were taking over the publishing industry, and that many
citizens wanted corporations to be recognized as persons. Such views
motivated Kurtz to help many people throughout the world especially
around the worldwide eradication of poverty—an issue to which all
humanists ought to give attention.

Doing the Work: Two Examples in Africa

As briefly discussed in the first part of this paper, African humanists have
been especially imaginative in coming up with ways to present human-
ism to non-humanist Africans. One group of African humanists has been
especially creative and stands out among others: Annette Nalunga is the
leader of the Woman of the Free World Organization (WOFEWO) in
Uganda, an organization which uses humanist principles to fight cultural
prejudice against girls and women by focusing upon the development of
critical thinking skills; stressing the importance of reproductive health;
and steady attention to HIV/AIDS prevention.
To this end, Nalunga founded the Emitos (“young girls”) Humanist
Football Club-Uganda, perhaps the sole humanist soccer team in the
world, of which I had the great pleasure of helping to inaugurate during
one of my last trips to Africa. The establishment of this club and team
 5  WHERE HUMANISM IS, AND WHERE IT IS HEADED …  109

was important because, in Uganda, girls are especially discouraged from

participating in sports. The team founded by Nalunga consists of girls
between the ages of 12 and 20 and gives athletes a sense of pride and
confidence.
Another important initiative among Ugandan humanists can be
seen in the work of the Ugandan Humanist Effort to Save Women
(UHESWO), founded by Betty Nassaka. UHESWO has been dedicated
to assisting prostitutes with other means of work, making available to
them job training, computer classes, food, lodging and providing other
benefits such as condoms for protection against HIV/AIDS.

Reconsidering Humanist Ethics: A Way Forward

For way too long, religions have continuously hijacked the discourse
of morality. Here, also, humanists can engage a non-humanist world:
by stressing the importance of an ethics rooted in a concern for the
consequences of ideas and actions, rather than a continued appeal to
belief/disbelief. In 2011, I wrote an article on the need for moral educa-
tion for children in the Human Prospect, published by the Institute for
Science and Human Values, where I discussed why an intentional ethical
system concerned with avoiding harmful consequences and striving for
beneficial outcomes is better than a blind devotion to a theism that risks
resulting in inaction.5 I built on ideas advanced by professor of philoso-
phy and legal studies, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong who writes:

In my view, what makes it morally wrong to murder, rape, steal, lie, or

break promises, for example, is simply that these acts harm other people
without any adequate justification. I can’t help but believe that it would
be morally wrong for someone to cause such unjustified harm to me.
There is no reason why I would have any more rights than any other per-
son. Hence, it must also be morally wrong for me to cause such unjustified
harm to them.6

Here, Sinnott-Armstrong was responding to philosopher William Lane

Craig’s claim that it is impossible to have an objective basis for moral-
ity without God. Of course there are many philosophers who claim
that it is impossible to have an objective foundation for morality with
or without God. However, regardless of whether Sinnott-Armstrong’s
“harm-based” foundation for morality is truly and completely objective,
110  N.R. Allen

it is hard to imagine a better basis for morality. Compare Sinnott-

Armstrong’s proposal with that of the subjective Divine Command
Theory model, which has been overtly used to condone biblically based
genocide (Numbers 31:17–18), sexism (Genesis 3:16), slavery (Luke
12:47–48) and other crimes against humanity. Conversely, an ethical sys-
tem rooted in avoiding harm to others could be used to fight many of
these issues in relationally equitable ways.
Relatedly, a notably contentious area of concern for many humanists
trying to promote humanism to non-humanists concerns the notion of
free will, an idea that many humanists are split on. Although human-
ists are split on whether or not free will exists, we should at least be
able to agree that we are not as free as we imagine ourselves to be. A
point to which I alluded in a previous article, “On Moral Education for
Children” where I ask:

How free are children to be what they yearn to be? They are under the
influence of their genes, environment, parents, family history, culture,
teachers, peers, and social, political and economic systems. Freedom seems
to be a relative concept. Though we are “free” to make many choices,
those choices are circumscribed by many unseen and unrecognized forces.7

By challenging the biblical notion of free will, we place ourselves in a

better position to fight for larger and more pressing issues of social and
economic justice and better able to challenge unfair power arrange-
ments, make demands based on quality of life concerns, and call for
prison reform especially in light of mass-incarceration. Conversely, to
simply assert that everyone goes through life freely making unencum-
bered choices makes it difficult to fight for structural changes needed to
improve the lives of the world’s underprivileged citizens.
Furthermore, ethics must include attention to our racial ethics. Today
there are numerous diverse non-theistic groups such as the Black Atheists
of America, the Black Skeptics of Los Angeles, The Black Non-believers
of Atlanta, among others. With the formation of such groups has come
criticism, a little of which I personally encountered when I founded
African Americans for Humanism in 1989. Seeing such groups as prom-
ulgating segregation and racial division, some white critics believe that
it is actually unethical and racist for blacks to establish such separate
groups. This logic and skewed ethic also presumes that blacks want to
join predominately white humanist groups.
 5  WHERE HUMANISM IS, AND WHERE IT IS HEADED …  111

There is so much wrong with these criticisms that it is difficult to

know where to begin. The most genuine response I have come across
thus far came from a white woman who stated that she does not under-
stand why it is not obvious why such groups are necessary. It is blatantly
obviously that some white humanists see their culture of whiteness as
irreproachable. It is impossible to separate humanism and its fraught
foundations from the history of such divides. In addition to race, the role
of class must not be ignored especially in light of the reality that blacks
suffer the consequences of economic inequality disproportionately. For
example, it is well noted that blacks are more likely than poor whites to
depend upon public transportation. Yet many white humanists in the
U.S. continue to hold their gatherings in areas not accessible by public
transportation. Why, then, would it be surprising that black humanists
might want to organize among common interests, including the estab-
lishment of a location with easy access via bus or subway? Adding to this,
there are also great differences in the social issues that black and white
humanists find ethically important. For example, many black humanists
today are invested in fighting issues of police brutality, racial profiling,
and mass-incarceration. That is, subjects that they find culturally relevant
and essential to their immediate survival and humanity.
What’s more, many blacks do not feel welcome at predominantly
white humanist gatherings. In this respect, humanists could learn a
great deal from their non-humanist (and quite religious) counterparts.
Consider the fact that in many churches there are established groups and
ministries whose primary job is to welcome visitors and help to make
them feel comfortable. Conversely, most organized humanist groups are
not so welcoming in this regard.
Finally, it should be noted that Black humanist groups are always
working closely on events with their white counterparts—a common
occurrence not only in the U.S., but also, in Africa. They have co-spon-
sored conferences, shared meeting places and resources, and so forth.
It is not only race that humanists and organized humanists need an
ethical revision of—sexism is equally rampant. Over the past few years,
this reality has become increasingly obvious.
In the spring of 2013, Ronald Lindsay, CEO of the Center for
Inquiry (CFI), angered many women at the Women in Secularism 2
Conference regarding remarks they considered to be demeaning. After
much pressure from women and CFI board members, Lindsay offered
an apology. Prominent secular anti-feminists, including the YouTube
112  N.R. Allen

video bloggers Phil Mason (aka “Thunderf00t”) and TJ Kincaid (aka

“The Amazing Atheist”), and blogger Justin Vacula, vehemently insist
that feminism has no place in the secular movement. These bloggers
have negligible intellectual credibility in mainstream secularism, but they
have built a significant digital platform and online audience. Mason’s
anti-feminist videos consistently garner hundreds of thousands of views
each. As of this writing Kincaid’s video, “The Failure of Feminism,”
has garnered over half a million views on YouTube since it went live in
late 2011, and his channel has over 128 million views and four hundred
thousand subscribers.8
With cause for concern, humanist feminist Lindsay Beyerstein writes:

As far as strengthening the secular community, the single greatest threat

to community cohesion is an online subculture of virulent misogyny per-
sonified by the views of the Amazing Atheist and his fans. (The Amazing
Atheist is notorious for repeatedly threatening to rape a woman who iden-
tified herself as a rape survivor during an online discussion.) Feminist free-
thought activists, particularly feminist bloggers, are being deluged with
abuse, including rape and death threats from fellow secularists. One promi-
nent secular feminist blogger, Jennifer McCreight, abandoned blogging
[altogether] after a sustained campaign of online harassment.9

As Beyerstein eloquently maintains, humanism needs feminism.

Humanists must do everything in their power to assure that women feel
safe at their meetings. They must have clear and firm policies against
sexual harassment and sexual assault and be willing to listen closely and
respectfully to women’s concerns. Men in humanist spaces must wel-
come the leadership of women and continually stress the importance of
equal opportunity between the sexes.
These are just some of the ways in which we can better relate human-
ism to a non-humanist world: by cleaning up our own spaces first (self-
critique) and developing an action-oriented ethics that responds to
pressing issues among many humanists and non-humanists. We must
be imaginative and respectful of human difference and keep in mind
that there are many different views and conceptions of humanism and
non-humanism. Humanists might do well in our work of relating to a
non-humanist world by being more plural where we are rigidly too sin-
gular—starting with “humanisms” and “non-humanisms” would be a
good start.
 5  WHERE HUMANISM IS, AND WHERE IT IS HEADED …  113

Notes
1. Leonard Pitts, “Still Being Victimized,” Buffalo News, July 23, 2013, A7.
2. Daniel Nasaw, “Sterilisation: North Carolina grapples with legacy,”
accessed June 13, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-
13700490?print=true.
3. David Hoelscher, “Grown Up Idealist: Paul Kurtz on Economic Justice,”
The Human Prospect: A Neohumanist Perspective, 3, no. 2, summer 2013:
36–44.
4. Paul Kurtz, Neo-humanist Statement of Secular Principles and Values,
Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 2011: 41.
5. Norm Allen Jr., “On Moral Education for Children,” The Human Prospect:
A Neohumanist Perspective, 1, no. 3, December 2011/January 2012:
31–34.
6. Walter Sinnott Armstrong, “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide
an Adequate Foundation for Morality,” in Is Goodness without God Good
Enough?: A Debate on Faith, Secularism, and Ethics, Robert K. Garcia and
Nathan L. King, eds., Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009:
101.
7. Norm Allen Jr., “On Moral Education for Children,” The Human Prospect;
A Neohumanist Perspecyive, 1, no. 3, December 2011/January 2012: 31.
8. Lindsay Beyerstein, “Why Secularism Needs Feminism,” The Human
Prospect: A Neohumanist Perspective, 3, no. 2, summer 2013: 30.
9. Ibid., 34.
 PART II

Humanism in a Non-Humanist World

 CHAPTER 6

How Could Humanists Become Solidary

with the Non-Humanist World? Towards
an Anamnestic Humanism

Jürgen Manemann

What Does Humanism Mean?

Raising the question how humanists may relate to a non-humanist world
one is well advised to define first of all the concept of humanism he/she
is speaking about. Generally understood, the word “humanism” denotes
the commitment to make the world a better place; a commitment which
derives from the notion of universal solidarity whereas humanists often
use the word in order to refer to a particular kind of worldview.1
The philosopher and humanist Stephen Law presents a “seven-point
characterization” of humanism in the second meaning.2 According to
Law, humanists, “believe science, and reason more generally, are invalu-
able tools we can and should apply to all areas of life. No beliefs should
be considered off-limits and protected from rational scrutiny.”3 Thus
humanists, if they are atheists make the claim that a god or gods don’t
exist, whereas non-atheist humanists are only very skeptical about such
a claim.4 For humanists it is obvious “that this life is the only life we

J. Manemann (*) 
Forschungsinstitut für Philosophie, Hannover, Germany

© The Author(s) 2017 117

M.R. Miller (ed.), Humanism in a Non-Humanist World, Studies
in Humanism and Atheism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57910-8_6
118  J. Manemann

have.”5 That’s why they resist to think about otherworldliness. They are
afraid that such reflections will force us to escape the problems of our
present life. What counts for them is “[…] what’s before us—the rich
warp and weft of our worldly, human lives—that really matters.”6
This definition of humanism is very common, also in Germany where
the Humanist Association explicitly refers to Law’s characterization.7
But this definition is a form of reductionism which is in danger to cut
through the bonds to the non-humanist world, thus leaving us vulner-
able to the prospect of forgetting what humanity is all about. How so,
and why, we might ask. Take together, the definition of humanism in
its most narrow of conceptions is insufficient to meet human life in its
deep and often tragic sense. To be a human means to wrestle with the
dead, especially with our loved ones, who are dead, and with the vic-
tims throughout human history who will never be able to receive justice.
We humans dwell in stories which connect us to people who live with
us, who lived with us and before us. Therefore, humanism with a sense
for the tragic has to be worked out as humanism grounded in memories
and stories which ultimately bind us to the past. I refer to such human-
ism a memory-based humanism or, an anamnestic humanism. Humanism
without such an anamnestic dimension participates in self-deception by
forgetting the tragic of life and thus is in danger to become, in the end,
just another ideology of pseudo-humanism. Being human means feel-
ing solidary with the past, the present and the future. This anamnestic
dimension is a key-element for binding humanists and non-humanists
together in solidarity.
Being primarily occupied with working out a particular understand-
ing of humanism by pre-dominantly referring to and relying on science,
humanists are in danger to lose sight of the past because science is not
inherently interested in the past. On the contrary, science is a counter-
force to the past because it, at its base, destroys traditions. But, without
traditions humanism risks a ridding of the past, thus becoming a chal-
lenge for universal solidarity as solidarity with the past, the present and
the future. If humanism fails to be grounded in universal solidarity it will
eventually lose its connection to humanitarianism because it will leave
one of the most important aspects of humanity behind. The philosopher
Theodore W. Adorno put it in a nutshell by declaring if all of traditions
“are eradicated, inhumanity will begin its forward March”.8 As such,
we are in desperate need of an anamnestic humanism as a guarantor for
the solidarity with the past and the future because the idea of future is
 6  HOW COULD HUMANISTS BECOME SOLIDARY …  119

already incorporated in the unfulfilled hopes and dreams of the past.

Those who will lose their memory will also lose their sense for the future.
In the following, I argue that such anamnestic humanism can serve as
a foundation for creating solidarity between humanist and non-human-
ists especially in situations and contexts of terror. Therefore, I begin with
a foray into Jean-Paul Sartre’s Nativity play “Bariona.”

Humanism Between Despair and Hope: Bariona and the

Birth of Christ
It was in the winter 1940, at Christmas Eve, in a prisoner-of-war camp
in Trier, Germany: 2000 Prisoners gathered in a tent, in order to visit a
Nativity play. The play was written and organized by a prisoner, who was
a humanist, it was performed by prisoners, arranged by prisoners and—
most importantly—“it was aimed exclusively at prisoners”9: The author’s
name: Jean-Paul Sartre. The name of the play was “Bariona.”10 Bariona
is a play which oscillates between a politics of despair and a politics of
hope. This play offers much by way of the topic at hand, and could serve
as a palpable example animating how humanists might relate to the non-
humanist world.
Bernard J. Quinn summarizes the complex story as follows11:
The action of the play takes place in Judea during the time of the
Roman occupation. The play begins with the annunciation to the Blessed
Virgin Mary which welcomes the forthcoming birth of Christ as a cele-
bration of the human beings, because due to this birth the human being
will be sanctified. The day before the birth of the Christ a roman census-
taker arrives in a small and impoverished village in order to announce
a drastic tax-increase for the poor villagers. He class for the local chief
Bariona in order to request his cooperation. Should Bariona refuse, the
villagers will lose all of their sheep and be forced to witness the rope of
their women. Bariona’s decision is unequivocal: The oppressed will do
like Cesar forced them to do, but the Romans will have to pay a heavy
price for their cruelty. No more children will be engendered by the peo-
ple. That means for the romans: They will be deprived of laborers for
their factories, military and so on. Bariona makes this announcement
while knowing that his wife Sarah is expecting a child. Sarah protests
against his decision very emotionally.
That very night an angel appears to a group of shepherds on a nearby
mountain. They are told to go down into the village to spread the good
120  J. Manemann

news of the birth of Christ, who is proclaimed as the coming messiah.

The villagers who have been so strongly longing for the messiah are full
of hope. Bariona is going to destroy this hope. Suddenly three wise men,
magicians, appear and tell about other people in other villages who have
already gone to Bethlehem in order to worship the child. Armed with
the naive hope that Christ has come to build a paradise on earth they
start their march to Bethlehem.
The local magician predicts the Messiah’s ultimate demise on the
cross and the non-violent philosophy he and his chosen disciples will
spread throughout the land. Hearing this message Bariona becomes ter-
ribly upset seeing his people succumb to such a religion of resignation.
Thus he sets out to assassinate Christ. Taking a shorter route, he arrives
in Bethlehem before his villagers.
But after having witnessed the look of awe in Joseph’s eyes gazing at
the child, Bariona gives up his idea to murder Christ. Nevertheless look-
ing at the crowd entering the stable, he is bitterly ashamed about such
immaturity. But suddenly Bariona’s despair vanishes. It is Balthazar, who
persuades him to accept Christ. After this conversion—which is not be
interpreted as a conversion to faith—he gathers a group together to fight
against Herold’s soldiers in order to save Christ. The play ends with trium-
phant and hopeful war cries of Bariona’s soldiers departing for the fight.
First of all, Bariona’s fight against the roman oppressors is an expres-
sion of a politics of despair based on what he considers to be a realistic
insight into the nature of human existence. Here he so desires to refrain
from resignation by demanding his comrades to choose hopelessness:
“The dignity of the human being is hopelessness.”12 Thus, Bariona envi-
sions “the beginning of a new religion, a religion of nothingness […].”
In opposition to her husband, Sarah personifies a politics of hope which
is very much in line with Vaclav Havel’s famous definition: “Hope is defi-
nitely not the same thing as optimism. It is not the conviction that some-
thing will turn out well, but the certainty that something makes sense,
regardless of how it turns out.” Sarah cries out: “I beg you, please, let
the child come into the world, please, let chance in the world appear.”
But, Bariona answers: “To engender a child means to welcome the crea-
tion with all of your heart.” And he strongly emphasizes that the dig-
nity of man is grounded in utter despair. It is Balthasar—the figure who
Sartre himself performs in the play—who challenges this position: “Are
you sure that it (the dignity of man, J.M.) does not lie in his hope?” But
 6  HOW COULD HUMANISTS BECOME SOLIDARY …  121

then, after a while of being alone, after having seen the gaze of Josef and
after having again experienced the cowardliness of the people Bariona
watching at the villagers in front of the child declares: “They are happy
because they believe in beginning.” Thereupon Balthasar reacts with the
following statement: “You are much nearer to Christ than all the others
and your ears could be open in order to welcome the good news.” And
he continues: “He (Christ, J.M.) has come, in order to say to you: Let
your child be born; of course, it will suffer. But this does not affect you.
Have no mercy with his suffering you have no right to let this happen:
It alone will have to deal with that, and it will deal with it in that way,
which has its own purpose, because it will be free. You are not allowed to
resign from engender children. Even for the blind, the workless, the war-
prisoners and the challenged people there is joy.”
Finally Bariona decides to save the child by sacrificing his life, a sacri-
fice which is far from an interpretive posture of weary reaction. He justi-
fies it towards Sarah: “I don’t wanna die. I don’t like to die. I like to live
and to have joy in the world, which is revealed to me, and I would like
to help you, to raise our child. But I am going to prevent, that someone
will kill the messiah, and I believe, I have no choice: I will only be able to
protect him, if I devote my life.”
Here, it is important to emphasize that, “one of the most important
facets of Balthazar’s God is that He does not demand resignation: The
suffering of mankind, though universally shared, is not to be justified by
recourse to some preconceived divine order.”13 Balthazar “suggests that
since man is free he should revolt against his condition.”14
Quinn describes Sartre’s intention very well: “Sartre skilfully, yet
unmistakably, makes his hero equal to Christ, if not even more powerful.
Balthazar knows, as does Bariona, that the coming of Christ will not rid
the country of the occupiers, nor will flowers be made to grow on rocky
ground. Mankind must look beyond the pettiness and selfishness of
existence by exercising his freedom through meaningful choice.”15 Sarah
is very much in tune with this perspective when she makes the unequivo-
cal statement about her child: “Maybe he won’t change his life, but I bet
that he will transform it.”
Sartre indicates how humanists facing a situation of danger and threat
could relate to non-humanists in order to create solidarity between
both groups. He is much aware that, “the decision to engage in action
based on solidarity when faced with threats which can be averted only by
122  J. Manemann

collective efforts calls for more than insight into good reason.”16 He did
not offer a secular reading of the Christian nativity myth, but he likewise
certainly did not offer a religious and dogmatic reading of it. Rather,
Sartre holds tightly to a reasonable position comparable with someone
like the famous German philosopher Jürgen Habermas’ plea for keep-
ing distance from religion without at the same time excluding its per-
spective. Such a position, I argue, can be understood as an expression
of self-enlightenment, serving as a most necessary hinge in connecting
humanists and non-humanists, alike.

Anamnestic Humanism: An Awareness of What Is Missing

According to Habermas, who philosophizes always as a methodological
atheist, humanists and non-humanists are connected through “an aware-
ness of what is missing.”17 He goes on to describe what he means by
such awareness in the following episode, worth quoting at length:

On April 9, 1991, a memorial service for Max Frisch was held in St.
Peter´s Church in Zürich. It began with Karin Pilliod, Frisch’s partner,
reading out a brief declaration written by the deceased. It stated, among
other things: » We let our nearest speak, and without an ‘amen.’ I am
grateful to the ministers of St. Peter’s in Zürich […] for their permission
to place the coffin in the church during our memorial service. The ashes
will be strewn somewhere. « Two friends spoke. No priest, no blessing.
The mourners were made up of intellectuals, most of whom had little time
for church and religion. Frisch himself had drawn up the menu for the
meal that followed. At the time the ceremony did not strike me as pecu-
liar. However its form, place, and progression were peculiar. Clearly, Max
Frisch, an agnostic who rejected any profession of faith, had sensed the
awkwardness of non-religious burial practices and, by his choice of place,
publicly declared that the enlightened modern age has failed to find a suit-
able replacement for a religious way of coping with the final rite de passage
which brings life to a close. One can interpret this gesture as an expres-
sion of melancholy over something which has been irretrievably lost. Yet
one can also view the ceremony as a paradoxical event which tells us some-
thing about secular reason, namely that it is unsettled by the opaqueness
of its merely apparently clarified relation to religion. At the same time, the
church, even Zwingli’s reformed church, also had to overcome its inhibi-
tions when it allowed this ceremony, given its secular character ‘without an
‘amen’,’ to take place within its hallowed halls.18
 6  HOW COULD HUMANISTS BECOME SOLIDARY …  123

Humanism, as an expression of an awareness of what is missing has lit-

tle to do with a way of life as a permanent muddling through. Rather,
such humanism perceives human beings as entangled in histories. By liv-
ing in stories and traditions one becomes human. In light of this entan-
gled reality, and reflective of it, Humanism must be worked out as an
anamnestic humanism committed to wrestling with the dialectics of tra-
ditions as Adorno so aptly points out: “Today tradition confronts us with
an irreconcilable contradiction; No (single) tradition is available to be
invoked but if all of them are eradicated, inhumanity will begin its for-
ward March.”19
At its core, an anamnestic humanism is aware that we must assure our-
selves about two points of significance at the same time: “First, if the
new generations did not revolt against traditions we would still live in
caves; if the revolt against the tradition becomes universal, we will live
in caves again.”20 For this reason, an anamnestic humanism needs both:
resistance against traditions as well as a cult of traditions. What would,
after all, our society be without traditions? What would reason be with-
out traditions?
But we need criterions to be able to distinguish between good and
bad traditions. The central criterion is that a good tradition shapes actual
lives and communities, and results in truthful lives open to the for-
eign—strangers and the strangeness of their traditions.21 According to
the theologian Darrell Fasching, we must come to realize that the first
test of each tradition remains its openness to questions and questioning.
On this point, he writes, “The second requirement is that the story must
permit one to follow the questions wherever they lead, even if that takes
one beyond the story one is in; even if it entails the risk of damaging
the faith one seeks to secure.”22 And he continues: “A master story that
does not permit itself to be called into question is ultimately demonic.”23
Anamnestic humanism has liberating potential in its capacity to interrupt
the one-dimensionality of a market-driven society as the German phi-
losopher Herbert Marcuse so well points out: “Remembrance is a mode
of dissociation from given facts, a mode of ‘mediation’, which breaks,
for short moments the omnipresent power of the given facts.”24 Hence,
remembrance is interruption, as such, and thus, memoria could interrupt
our life and help to reveal our idols.
In order to understand and fully conceive the power of stories, an
anamnestic humanism might be well advised to learn from communi-
ties of memories and story-telling. Biblical narratives, especially offer
124  J. Manemann

robust examples for subversive or dangerous memories which function

as a counterpart to a total circularity and a false longing for security or
certainty which both support prevailing power-structures. An anam-
nestic humanism rests on three main-categories: memory, story-telling
and solidarity. Its remembrance is mainly focused on memories of suf-
fering. These memories require humanists to remember stories not only
of suffering received but of suffering inflicted—therefore these memo-
ries become stumbling blocks for humanists forcing them permanently to
alter their humanism. Such humanism is an expression of hope because it
is tied to the past and at the same time tied to future.

Living with the Paradox of Anamnestic Solidarity

As a product of the renaissance, humanism needs an anamnestic revision,
insomuch as it has become amalgamated with various ideologies of pro-
gress which have masked its sensitivity for and towards the anamnestic.
A humanism which begins with science is in danger to effacing and the
erasure of memory. An orthodox-Marxian atheistic humanism is espe-
cially vulnerable to collimating in a theory and practice of emancipation
from remembrance, as it is so entranced by the prospects of the future
that it believes a humanist could accept the sacrificial abandonment of
the self of further generations without sadness.25
An anamnestic humanism raises the question pertaining to which ide-
als motivate us to go further in making the world a better place. There
is the ideal of our grandchildren living in a sustainable environment and
the ideal of justice developed in the images of enslaved, oppressed, suf-
fering ancestors. Facing these ideals one realizes that we need at the same
time solidarity with the future as well the past, but we must not fail to
remember that solidarity with the past is prior because it entails already
solidarity with future. Furthermore, the experience of death is the pre-
condition for developing a historical awareness which distinguishes
between past, present and future.
At its core an anamnestic humanism is, at its core, to borrow from
Christian Lenhardt, grounded in an “anamnestic solidarity.” But, how
does such solidarity relate to a humanism understood as an expression
of universal solidarity? Does the ideal of universal solidarity include past
generations—those to whom we owe the creation of the human possibil-
ities we so enjoy in the present? The neo-Marxist philosopher Lenhardt
asks: “How can we extend solidarity to the past, or even recognize our
 6  HOW COULD HUMANISTS BECOME SOLIDARY …  125

debt to it, if the past is past and the dead are finally and irrevocably
dead?”26 This is the “paradox of anamnestic solidarity,” a phrase coined
by Lenhardt in his generational typology of relations to the past in the
struggle for emancipation. Lenhardt criticizes a materialist notion of
total emancipation which is reduced “to a phenomenology of liberated
man, who is yet to be, but who, once he is, will embody all characteris-
tics of the human species in himself. In reality, mankind is an ensemble
of concrete historical beings, both living and dead, of whom only the
lucky few achieve the status of emancipated samples of a species which
has matured to full growth.”27
To elaborate on this point, Lenhardt introduces a “simple genera-
tional typology where G1 stands for the generation of enslaved predeces-
sors (Vorwelt), G2 for the generation of enslaved contemporaries who,
according to Marx, will emancipate themselves, (Mitwelt), and G3 for
the generation of emancipated successors (Nachwelt). It is quite conceiv-
able, albeit not likely, that Marx saw the solidarity of a liberated mankind
simply in terms of an interpersonal principle of harmony amongst the
members of G3. This would reduce the exploited predecessors (G1) and
those who struggle for the revolutionary cause (G2) to the status of non-
entities or dead wood in the evolution of mankind. And if G2 feels that
it has a debt toward G1 because the ancestors provided, however blindly
and unknowingly, the historical opportunity for a great cataclysmic over-
throw of the aggregate conditions of unfreedom, how much greater
must be the debt owned by G3 to the memory of G1 and G2, and yet G3
cannot pay it off in the same self-sacrificial manner in which G2 pays off
its debt to G1. The members of the humanized socialistic society enjoy
their social praxis, their labor becoming creative, and so on. But how can
this daily routine give rise to the same kind of intergenerational redemp-
tion of debts which G effected by making a revolution of vengence? If a
redemptive attitude is part and parcel of the idea of emancipated man-
kind, is it not rather an unenviable destiny to belong to the successor
generation (G3), for what can it do, practically and existentially, to equal-
ize the burden of injustice borne by its predecessors (G1 and G)? Must it
not passively accept the gifts of the dead, as gods were said to accept the
hecatombs of those who believed in them? If that were the point of the
revolution, its alleged humanization would be tantamount to the deifi-
cation of man: a perversion of the notion of species being. All concep-
tions of a ‘truly humanized’ collectivity, which do no more than project
a systematic synthesis of labor and play, of plenitude and self-restraint, of
126  J. Manemann

desublimation and a new morality, and what not, are plainly a-historical
and, I believe, un-Marxian. They operate with the premise that only vis-
ible suffering creates a barrier to happiness, and once this visible suffer-
ing is gone, a boundlessly affirmative appropriation and understanding of
the world become possible.”28
It is obvious that for Lenhardt, “evils of prehistory may have been
overcome but they will linger on in the collective anamnesis of liberated
mankind. They must so linger, or else the achievement of true solidar-
ity is just another form of one-dimensional experience where enjoyment
of the Thing and the Other is as unreflective as it is under conditions
of late-capitalist affluence. For posterity, gratification is mixed with the
guilt of those who » have made it.”29 In referring to Max Horkheimer,
with clarity Lenhardt points out that, “The suffering of dead generations
will find no recompense.”30 Facing the paradox of anamnestic solidar-
ity, humanists must renounce and untether the idea of perfect justice
accompanying the idea of permanent progress. What’s more, a humanist
has to look behind themselves and what, “he sees are desolate scenes of
human degradation. Unable to administer to his ancestors the traditional
comfort of redemptive certainty (‘you will be saved’), he cannot but
feel utterly helpless and hopeless. Somehow the compass of his acquired
sense of solidarity is too narrow to embrace what has disappeared from
view.”31
One does not have to refer to the category of redemption in order to
stand the paradox of anamnestic solidarity like the German theologian
Helmut Peukert maintains.32 But what could an anamnestic solidarity
mean from a humanist perspective?

For the Sake of the Dead

Habermas indicates the meaning of anamnestic solidarity in Germany
after Auschwitz:

There is the obligation incumbent upon us in Germany – even if no one

else were to feel it any longer – to keep alive, without distortion, and not
only in an intellectual form, the memory of the sufferings of those who
were murdered by German hands. It is especially these dead who have a
claim to the weak anamnestic power of a solidarity that later generations
can continue to practice only in the medium of a remembrance that is
 6  HOW COULD HUMANISTS BECOME SOLIDARY …  127

repeatedly renewed, often desperate, and continually on one’s mind. If

we were to brush aside this Benjaminian legacy, our fellow Jewish citizens
and the sons, daughters and grandchildren of all those who were murdered
would feel themselves unable to breathe in our country.33

But, as the philosopher Max Pensky problematizes, this solidarity entails,

“the obligation to practice solidarity with persons who cannot possibly
be the subjects of an obligation. How can this conclusion make sense?”
One option is, as Pensky does well to work out, the “obligation to prac-
tice solidarity with the dead, but that this obligation is not to the dead
themselves. It is presumably to the living, perhaps their survivors and
descendents, and perhaps to ‘us,’ to ourselves in one and the same ethi-
cal community.”34
Throughout, Pensky shows that speaking of solidarity with the dead
is usually understood in a “real-political reading of solidarity with the
past,” That means talking “about a debt to the past, of claim about a
specific form of backward-looking justice or solidarity, is nothing more
but a rhetorical strengthening of political solidarity for the present.”35
Pensky sharply criticizes that the claim, “we have obligations to the dead,
to keep their memory alive,’ is in the strict sense false.”36 It is what Pablo
de Greiff has called a “prophylactic use of memory.”37 But, Pensky offers
another understanding: the duty to the dead is in fact a “duty to one
another in light of the dead” or how de Greiff formulates it: “[…]we
have an obligation to remember whatever our fellow citizens cannot be
expected to forget.”38
Nevertheless, anamnestic solidarity includes more: It means, “that we
do in fact bear an obligation to the dead, but that it is our own moral
language that is lacking […]”.39 Thus the “term ‘anamnestic solidarity’
already indicates that we exercise solidarity with the dead by remember-
ing them—more, by remembering their suffering.”40 Put more precisely,
to remember the dead means to remember the dead for the sake of the
dead. Therefore, a secular anamnestic humanism has foremost to be
based on such an anamnestic solidarity.

Anamnestic Humanism and the Challenge of Religion

But an anamnestic humanism is also connected to former traditions even
if this connection is grounded in an awareness of what is missing:
128  J. Manemann

Secular languages that simply eliminate what was once there leave behind
only irritation. Something was lost when sin became guilt. The desire for
forgiveness is, after all, still closely connected with the unsentimental wish
to undo other injuries as well. We are rightfully disturbed by the irrevers-
ibility of past suffering, the injustice that has been committed against the
innocently mishandled, debased and murdered, injustices that exceed every
human power of redemption. The lost hope of resurrection has left behind
a palpable emptiness.41

For an anamnestic humanism grounded in an anamnestic solidarity, it is

not sufficient to develop a scientific-based understanding of rationality.
Rather, what we need is an anamnestic reason, a form of thinking that
proceeds in narrative rather than discursive form. Like Johann Baptist
Metz maintains: “For me memories are not just the objects of a test-
ing discourse, but rather the ground of discourse, without which they
would collapse into a vacuum. They can not only launch discourse or
illustrate it, but also interrupt and halt it. I know of really only one abso-
lutely universal category: it is the memoria passionis. And I know of only
one authority which cannot be revoked by any Enlightenment or eman-
cipation: the authority of those who suffer.”42 That means, according to
American philosopher Cornel West, “that the condition of truth is to
allow the suffering to speak. It doesn’t mean that those who suffer have
a monopoly on truth, but it means that the condition of truth to emerge
must be in tune with those who are undergoing social misery—socially
induced forms of suffering.”43 And he continues further: “I never want
to lose insight of that scream and that cry, because I think that really sits
at the centre of any serious philosophy that’s grappling with life.”44
Anamnestic humanism is centred in a weak autonomy because it rec-
ognizes one oft-overlooked and under-recognized authority, the author-
ity of those who suffer. Offering more than a complimentary relationship
between faith and knowledge as so demanded by Habermas, an anam-
nestic humanism is the deep awareness that human beings are entangled
in stories they have not themselves (always) chosen. Such humanism,
therefore, has to be understood as an attempt, “to live alongside the slip-
pery edge of life’s abyss with the support of the dynamic stories, sym-
bols, interpretations and insights bequeathed by communities that came
before”45—as so exemplified by Sartre in his play Bariona. But, of course
this kind of humanism remains a is a great challenge for Marxists as
well as for liberal humanists because an anamnestic humanism includes
 6  HOW COULD HUMANISTS BECOME SOLIDARY …  129

ccommitments which are my own but which are not the result of my
own will. Such humanism is critical to the idea of progress and to a vol-
untaristic understanding of moral action.46 Humanism inspired by these
philosophical perspectives has “sufficient strength to awaken, and to keep
awake, in the minds of secular subjects, an awareness of the violations of
solidarity throughout the world, an awareness of what is missing, of what
cries out to heaven.”47

Notes
1. Stephen Law, Humanism. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University
Press, New York 2011, 1.
2. Stephen Law, Humanism. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University
Press, New York 2011, 1.
3. Stephen Law, Humanism. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University
Press, New York 2011, 1.
4.  See: Stephen Law, Humanism. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford
University Press, New York 2011, 2.
5. Stephen Law, Humanism. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University
Press, New York 2011, 2.
6. Stephen Law, Humanism. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University
Press, New York 2011, 134.
7.  Humanistischer Verband Deutschland/ Bayern, Humanistische
Grundsätze, in: http://www.hvd-bayern.de/dateien/PDF/
Grundsaetze_des_HVD_Bayern.pdf.
8.  Theodor. W, Adorno, Thesen über Tradition, in: Ohne Leitbild,
Suhrkamp-Verlag, Frankfurt a.M. 1967, 29–41, 35.
9. Jean-Paul Sarte, in: Bernard J. Quinn, The Politics of Despair Versus the
Politics of Hope. A Look at Bariona, Sartre’s First “pièce engagée”, in:
The French Review, Vl. XLV, Special Issue, No. 4, Spring, 1972, 95–105,
96.
10. Jean-Paul Sartre, Bariona oder Der Sohn des Donners. Ein
Weihnachtsspiel, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, Reinbek 122013. In the
following I refer mainly to the very good summary by Bernard J. Quinn,
The Politics of Despair Versus the Politics of Hope. A Look at Bariona,
Sartre’s First piece engagee, in: The French Review, Vl. XLV, Special
Issue, No. 4, Spring, 1972, 95–105. See also: John Ireland, Freedom as
Passion: Sartre’s Mystery Plays, in: Theatre Journal, Vol. 50, No. 3, (IL)
Legitimate Theatres (Oct., 1998), 335–348.
11. This summary includes quotations and paraphrases: Bernard J. Quinn,
The Politics of Despair Versus the Politics of Hope. A Look at Bariona,
130  J. Manemann

Sartre’s First “pièce engagée”, in: The French Review, Vl. XLV, Special
Issue, No. 4, Spring, 1972, 95–105, 96–97.
12. For the following quotations see: Jean-Paul Sartre, Bariona oder Der
Sohn des Donners. Ein Weihnachtsspiel, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag,
Reinbek 122013 (Translation J.M.).
13. Bernard J. Quinn, The Politics of Despair Versus the Politics of Hope. A
Look at Bariona, Sartre’s First “pièce engagée”, in: The French Review,
Vl. XLV, Special Issue, No. 4, Spring, 1972, 95–105, 102.
14. Bernard J. Quinn, The Politics of Despair Versus the Politics of Hope. A
Look at Bariona, Sartre’s First “pièce engagée”, in: The French Review,
Vl. XLV, Special Issue, No. 4, Spring, 1972, 95–105, 103.
15. Bernard J. Quinn, The Politics of Despair Versus the Politics of Hope. A
Look at Bariona, Sartre’s First “pièce engagée”, in: The French Review,
Vl. XLV, Special Issue, No. 4, Spring, 1972, 95–105, 103.
16. Jürgen Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, in: J. Habermas
et al. An Awareness of What is Missing, Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular
Age, Polity Press, Malden 2010, 15–23, 18/19.
17. Jürgen Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, in: J. Habermas
et al. An Awareness of What is Missing, Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular
Age, Polity Press, Malden 2010, 15–23
18. Jürgen Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, in: J. Habermas
et al. An Awareness of What is Missing, Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular
Age, Polity Press, Malden 2010, 15–23, 15/16
19. Th. W. Adorno, Über Tradition, in: Th. W. Adorno, Ohne Leitbild. Parva
Aesthetica, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp-Verlag, 1967, 29–41, 35.
20. See: Leszek Kolakowski, Der Anspruch auf die selbstverschuldete
Unmüdigkeit, in: L. Reinisch (Ed.), Vom Sinn der Tradition, München:
C.H. Beck-Verlag, 1970, 1–16, 1.
21. See: Darrell J. Fasching, Narrative Theology after Auschwitz. From
Alientation to Ethics, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992, 96/97.
22. Darrell J. Fasching, op.cit., 118.
23. Darrell J. Fasching, op.cit., 120.
24. Herbert Marcuse, Der eindimensionale Mensch. Studien zur Ideologie der
fortgeschrittenen Gesellschaft, Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 221988, 117.f
25. See: Christian Lenhardt, Anamnestic Solidarity: The Proletariat and its
Manes, in: Telos 25/26, Fall 1975, 133–154.
26. Christian Lenhardt, Anamnestic Solidarity: The Proletariat and its Manes,
in: Telos 25/26, Fall 1975, 133–154.
27. Christian Lenhardt, Anamnestic Solidarity: The Proletariat and its Manes,
in: Telos 25/26, Fall 1975, 133–154.
28. Christian Lenhardt, Anamnestic Solidarity: The Proletariat and its Manes,
in: Telos 25/26, Fall 1975, 133–154, 134/135.
 6  HOW COULD HUMANISTS BECOME SOLIDARY …  131

29. Christian Lenhardt, Anamnestic Solidarity: The Proletariat and its Manes,

in: Telos 25/26, Fall 1975, 133–154, 138.
30. Christian Lenhardt, Anamnestic Solidarity: The Proletariat and its Manes,
in: Telos 25/26, Fall 1975, 133–154, 139.
31. Christian Lenhardt, Anamnestic Solidarity: The Proletariat and its Manes,
in: Telos 25/26, Fall 1975, 133–154, 141.
32. Helmut Peukert, Science, Action, and Fundamental Theology Toward a
Theology of Communicative Action, MIT-Press 1986.
33. Habermas quoted in: Max Pensky, Solidarity with the Past and the Work
of Translation: Reflections on Memory Politics and the Post-Secular, in:
http://www.binghamton.edu/philosophy/people/docs/pensky-solidar-
ity-translation.pdf, 1–42, 15.
34. Max Pensky, Solidarity with the Past and the Work of Translation:
Reflections on Memory Politics and the Post-Secular, in: http://www.
binghamton.edu/philosophy/people/docs/pensky-solidarity-translation.
pdf, 1–42, 17/18.
35. Max Pensky, Solidarity with the Past and the Work of Translation:
Reflections on Memory Politics and the Post-Secular, in: http://www.
binghamton.edu/philosophy/people/docs/pensky-solidarity-translation.
pdf, 1–42, 20.
36. Max Pensky, Solidarity with the Past and the Work of Translation:
Reflections on Memory Politics and the Post-Secular, in: http://www.
binghamton.edu/philosophy/people/docs/pensky-solidarity-translation.
pdf, 1–42, 20.
37. Pablo de Greiff quoted in: Max Pensky, Solidarity with the Past and
the Work of Translation: Reflections on Memory Politics and the Post-
Secular, in: http://www.binghamton.edu/philosophy/people/docs/
pensky-solidarity-translation.pdf, 1–42, 21.
38. Max Pensky, Solidarity with the Past and the Work of Translation:
Reflections on Memory Politics and the Post-Secular, in: http://www.
binghamton.edu/philosophy/people/docs/pensky-solidarity-translation.
pdf, 1–42, 22.
39. Max Pensky, Solidarity with the Past and the Work of Translation:
Reflections on Memory Politics and the Post-Secular, in: http://www.
binghamton.edu/philosophy/people/docs/pensky-solidarity-translation.
pdf, 1–42, 18.
40. Max Pensky, Solidarity with the Past and the Work of Translation:
Reflections on Memory Politics and the Post-Secular, in: http://www.
binghamton.edu/philosophy/people/docs/pensky-solidarity-translation.
pdf, 1–42, 18.
41. Jürgen Habermas, Faith and Knowledge, in: The Frankfurt School on
Religion. Key Writings by the Major Thinkers, ed. By. Eduardo Mendieta,
Routledge, New York/London 2005, 327–337, 333.
132  J. Manemann

42. Metz quoted in: Max Pensky, Solidarity with the Past and the Work of
Translation: Reflections on Memory Politics and the Post-Secular, in:
http://www.binghamton.edu/philosophy/people/docs/pensky-solidar-
ity-translation.pdf, 1–42, 34.
43. Cornel West, Prophetic Thought in Postmodern Times, Monroe 31993,
4.
44. Cornel West, On my Intellectual Vocation, in: Cornel West, The Cornel
West Reader, New York 1999, 19–33, 25.
45. Cornel West, The Making of an American Radical Democrat of African
Descent, in: Cornel West, The Cornel West Reader, New York 1999,
3–18, 14.
46. See: Michael Sandel, Solidarität, in: Transit, 44, 103–117, 113.
47. Jürgen Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, in: J. Habermas
et al. An Awareness of What is Missing, Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular
Age, Polity Press, Malden 2010, 15–23, 19.
 CHAPTER 7

The Absence of Presence: Relating to Black

(Non)Humanisms in Popular Culture

Monica R. Miller

In 1965, the great American novelist, playwright, poet and social critic
James Baldwin in discussing the manner in which, “One can measure
very neatly the white American’s distance from his conscience—from
himself—by observing the distance between White America and Black
America,”1 poignantly asks a question as apt then, as it is today, “One
has only to ask oneself who established this distance, who is this distance
designed to protect, and from what is this distance designed to offer pro-
tection?”2 Here, Baldwin boldly animates the social legacies and contin-
ued motivations of travelers today, in seeking distance from—American
racism. Many black Americans have responded to the cultural and social
distances—noted by Baldwin above—those between black and white
America (economic, civic, and educational disparities, for instance)—by
placing geographic distances between their lives and the U.S. soil. Dating
back to the early nineteenth century, countless African Americans sought
refuge and escape from American racism by fleeing to places like France.
Black artists such as Baldwin, Nina Simone, and Josephine Baker, among
a host of others, imagined France to be a place where they could escape

M.R. Miller (*) 
Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA, USA

© The Author(s) 2017 133

M.R. Miller (ed.), Humanism in a Non-Humanist World, Studies
in Humanism and Atheism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57910-8_7
134  M.R. Miller

the vicious legacy of American racism—a place to call home—where

their artistry and cultural contributions would be appreciated, equally.
Numerous African American GIs in WWII traveled to France, and found
there a similar escape as suggested of artists, and many remained in
France to establish roots.
Such a practice continues among black artists today, such as rappers
Kanye West and Jay-Z—who in 2011 rapped about the allure of French
exile in the lyrical hit “Ni**as in Paris” off Watch the Throne, “You
escape what I’ve escaped…You’d be in Paris getting f***ed up, too.”
In 2013, Jay-Z continued to press easy social impressions of rap music
and hip hop culture through his famed (and widely celebrated) remix-
ing and representation of globally renowned performance artist Marina
Abramović’s 2010 “The Artist is Present” exhibition at the MoMA
into his live-action (bringing together and interacting with some of the
world’s most famous art world luminaries) video-film piece “Picasso
Baby: A Performance Art Film” shot at New York’s Pace Gallery in lower
Chelsea. Much like game-changing Spanish artist Pablo Picasso, “Picasso
Baby” shows-off Jay-Z’s extensive and wide-ranging cultural knowl-
edge and reach. This reach is evinced in his lyrical shout-outs to tower-
ing figures such as Mark Rothko, Jeff Koons, Francis Bacon, Jean-Michel
Basquiat, Andy Warhol and Mona Lisa.
The weight of this mind-blowing hip hop achievement is brought into
sharp relief with the caustic reminder by a Jay-Z fan who cautioned‚“The
art world, like the business world, is extremely white and scary. But Jay-
Z can handle them both.”3 No doubt about it, Jay-Z’s skill at forg-
ing black presence in traditionally “white” spaces where it continues to
remain absent is masterful, dexterous and full of street-wise ingenuity
learned on the tragic underside of America’s racism. The cultural-reach
and symbiotic magic of “Picasso Baby” is not only astounding in its abil-
ity to artistically unify the long-standing schisms of cultural difference—
but also—animates the short distance between the Chelsea gallery and
the rough and deprived geography of the Marcy Housing Projects where
Jay-Z grew up and spent much of his life trying to survive.
The (racial, class, and cultural) distances posed between the Gallery
and Marcy not only maps the actual expanse between the white art
world and black bodies—but also, serves as a metaphorical reminder that
much of humanism (historically, definitionally, organizationally, etc.)
looks like many white galleries—empty of those (philosophically and
racially) unlike them. On the level of representation, Jay-Z effectively
 7  THE ABSENCE OF PRESENCE: RELATING TO BLACK (NON)HUMANISMS …  135

brings bodies long absent (think here: non-humanist) in the white gal-
leries (think here: humanism) to life—carving space for the promise of
relationality across great divides of human difference. With the ques-
tion “How should humanism relate to a non-humanist world?” guid-
ing the conference whose proceedings led to this volume—this chapter
explores how humanism can relate to, and learn from, the cultural rep-
ertoire of one of the largest “non-humanist” demographics in the U.S.:
black Americans. And by “non-humanist,” I mean it here as a double
entendre: in a strict sense, black Americans are not usually thought of
as humanist, and yet, at the same time, many Americans don’t tend to
consider them, or treat them like, humans at all. Yet, black bodies and
the double-consciousness of blackness have been, historically and today,
thrust into social realities that necessitate a more general stance of skepti-
cism, and long-held hermeneutics of suspicion, for everyday survival and
recognition.
According to the latest report published in May of 2015, “America’s
Changing Religious Landscape” conducted by the Pew Research Center
in 2014,—the size encompassing historically black protestant tradi-
tions has seen relative stability with nearly 16 million members. While
they noted a growing proportion of “Unaffiliated” across racial and
ethnic groups, whites were still seen as “more likely” than their black
and Hispanic counterparts to say that they have no religion. Among
other groups, blacks overwhelmingly identified with Protestantism
at 71% in 2014, and overwhelmingly comprised 85% of those identi-
fied as Christian in 2007. In 2007, African-Americans were considered
“markedly religious on a variety of measures than the U.S. popula-
tion as whole” with 87% of this demographic “describing themselves as
belonging to one religious group or another.”4 In terms of stated belief,
not much has changed in this recent report, on almost every measure
(barring a few) broken down by race/ethnicity has blacks outnumber-
ing their counterparts as it co ncerns belief in god (83%), importance
of religion in one’s life (75%), attendance at religious service (47%), fre-
quency of prayer (73%), frequency of religious education, scripture study,
etc., (39%), frequency of meditation (52%), frequency of feeling spiritual
peace and wellbeing (69%), religion as source of guidance for right and
wrong (43%), frequency of reading scripture (54%), literal interpretation
of scripture (51%), belief in heaven (86%), and belief in hell (73%).5 Of
course—differences among gender, age, class, sexuality, region among
other measures of difference cut across such numbers in varying ways.
136  M.R. Miller

Although painted as “overly” and sometimes “naturally” religious—this

segment of the population also makes up those most impacted by the
effects of structural racism: mass-incarceration; underemployment; health
disparities; and the continued assault on black bodies through state sanc-
tioned and vigilante means, among others. In keeping this reality and the
larger question guiding this volume in mind—black Americans are not
only classified as “non-humanist” in terms of their highly-religious and
presumed theistic orientations—but more perniciously—“non-human”
in terms of America’s continued inability to accept the full humanity of
black bodies. In this way, in what follows, the “non-humanist” world
appealed to in this chapter comprises not only the presence of black
absence in humanist standpoints, structures, and life philosophies, but
also, and perhaps more philosophically, the relentless dehumanization
of black bodies culminating in persistent and proliferating black absence
in our contemporary historical moment. While humanist organizations
brainstorm ways to statistically increase their black membership, they are
dying in the streets faster than they are at liberty to join in on organi-
zational structures lacking in racial diversity, or espousing philosophi-
cal stances that are, more often than not, homogenously white and lack
awareness of the social realities of black lives.
The prospect of humanisms’ relationality to/with the non-humanist”
world—foregrounds and relies upon an assumption that all humans are
equitably valued as fully human. This chapter explores what humanism can
learn from black popular culture’s creative remixing of seemingly antago-
nistic interactions as “relationships” through the creative manipulation of
absence (difference—non-humanist) and presence (recognition—human-
ist). Here, I suggest that the only means of attending to the “how” as
posed in the above question of relating to a “non-humanist” world is to
recognize anew and connect with the unfolding humanisms (presence—
humanity) cultivated among marginalized people, places and spaces. I turn
next to discuss one extended example of what I have in mind.

Absence: Black Non-Human(i)s(ts) in a Human(ist)

World
Have you ever tried to convince a believer that they should stop believ-
ing in god? There is a similar difficulty associated with convincing a huge
number of Americans (historically and today) that they should believe
in black humanity. Many of us cannot see it. There is an ordinariness
 7  THE ABSENCE OF PRESENCE: RELATING TO BLACK (NON)HUMANISMS …  137

surrounding black dehumanization that situates black humanity as hid-

den, elusive, and hard-to-capture. Even the discourse surrounding
#blacklivesmatter is often treated with an affective apathy akin to what
humanists or atheists feel when hearing people debate theology. At best,
the debate turns into a political problem, treated as bad optics—black
noise.6 In America, black humanity remains a folk category; and the
unending reality of black death might have just become the new pop art.
Writing for Salon.com, Women’s and Gender Studies and Africana
Studies scholar Brittney Cooper suggested that, “Black folks are being
treated to an endless replay of this murder on cable news….Black death
has become a cultural spectacle…. In this cultural climate, it will take,
it seems, an ocean of Black bodies to convince white people that struc-
tural racism is a problem.”7 Over and against the continued assault on
black lives and humanity, one cannot help but to wonder if black death
has really become a spectacle for everyone—that is, something seen and
seen for its visual effect/impact. Granted, there is a current perceptual
groundswell of Americans (of all races/ethnicities) for whom black life
matters, accompanied by many people, spaces, and institutions sup-
porting black humanity with #blackspring events around the nation.
But these voices are overwhelmed by the continuous “pop, pop, pop,
pop, pop, pop, pop…pop” of 9 mms and 40 cal. revolvers. The pause
between the penultimate and final gun blasts is filled, we might imag-
ine, by the officer remembering their training: “Breathe, relax, and kill
this nigger.” The wisdom of Baldwin’s words from 1965 that, “One can
measure very neatly the white American’s distance from his conscience—
from himself—by observing the distance between White America and
Black America” are still tragically as relevant in 2017.
At various points and thresholds in history, America has been a black
death factory. We recurrently produce dead black men and women by
vigilante and law enforcement violence, and then we niggerize the vic-
tims, their families, and their defenders—effectively criminalizing the
dead person, such that the death is validated, authorized, and repeated.
An assembly line, workers and the product: ubiquitous anti-black dehu-
manization. Interpretively speaking, historical moments of (possi-
ble) social change have produced a social anxiety that is often met with
increasing violence. Such was the case during and after the period of
Reconstruction, when increased black participation in public and civic
spheres was met by murderous whites that massacred blacks all across
the south. Rather than learn to live with black Americans exerting their
138  M.R. Miller

agency and humanity, whites instead, killed them and enacted disen-
franchisement laws. Physical death, social death, and anti-black judi-
cial protraction made black humanity effectively invisible to whites—yet
omnipresent—to America and its cultural production. Violence erupted
again in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement, when many of the Jim
and Jane Crow Laws were finally overturned. Perhaps, we are seeing
today another such moment of heightened white anxiety. And so, they
kill, as a response to their racial apprehension. Add to this the symbolic
and psychological social impact of the first black president, in tandem
with being told by social scientists that whites are losing some aspect of a
normative demographic footing sure to continue over the next few dec-
ades. Thus, there’s little left to wonder as to why so many black men and
women, and for so long, are being transformed into dead black men and
women. America’s preoccupation with securing and maintaining white-
ness effectively ensures we function as a social factory, anesthetized to our
principle product, of which we are drowning, in a surplus of black bodies.
To this point, much of my work thinks with‚ and has been influenced
by‚ two primary groups: one that tends to think there is something to the
idea of religion that we cannot see, something essential, sui generis about
religion, god, or race, etc. The other group is intensely skeptical of those
positions, and suspicious that claims about “faith” and “religion” all too
often end up “religious”—for instance, “god is good.” This skeptical
group has taught me much about how to study religion without being
religious and in what way to critically position myself as a human scientist
studying the stuff we call “religion.” Much like the humanist and non-
humanist, neither of these groups has taught me much about how to talk
about one to the other—how to relate. What has, however—are the skills
of dexterity in the creative tensions posed between absence/presence
in hip hop culture—where I frequently figure many rappers as “Outlaw
Humanists.” In the volume What is Humanism and Why Does It Matter
(2013) edited by Anthony B. Pinn, I argued that an “Outlaw Humanist”
is someone that is either “outlawed” by the larger society for ideologi-
cal reasons of one sort or another, and also “outlawed” by humanist
camps that for reasons of epistemological unfamiliarity‚ social and cul-
tural difference‚ etc., don’t easily fit into traditional definitions and cat-
egorizations of humanist‚ secular or atheist. Thus‚ Outlaw humanism is
animated by an embodied, felt, experientially based wrestling with life’s
messiness, with the “funk” of life, that despite grand claims to freedom,
reason, scientific rationality, agency and the like, those who have had
 7  THE ABSENCE OF PRESENCE: RELATING TO BLACK (NON)HUMANISMS …  139

their freedom and agency truncated, are left with few options beyond
holding such ideas and platitudes as suspect. Being black in the Western
world has required a confrontation with slavery, Jim and Jane Crow,
skewed academic theories and establishments, a current prison industrial
complex assaulting black freedom and agency, along with the currently
(exposed) long-standing trend of police brutality and murder of black
bodies in the U.S. Are not these sorts of matters—of freedom, justice,
agency, and equity—issues important to both humanist and non-human-
ist alike beyond acceptance/rejection of theistic/anti-theistic standpoints?
Despite the social scientific portrait often painting communities of
color as overly religious (in terms of belief), much of what experts come
to count as “religious” among this demographic offers scant attention
to the manner in which religious vocabulary is often used as signifying
means of talking not about a metaphysical otherworldly place, but rather,
grammatical resource to call oneself into legibility. Many rap artists, for
example, don’t fear religious language or religious people—instead, they
play with it—often using and putting to work what they have cultivated
for re-mixed life options and the recognition of full humanity.

Manufactured Divides
Taken together, I approach the question framing this volume like I do
much of my scholarship in the academic study of religion: with a decon-
structive suspicion regarding what type of work, or heavy lifting, we
assume our categories (e.g., humanism vs. non-humanist) to be accom-
plishing in the varied work we set out to do in our respective spaces of
concern. Put differently, I am skeptical about the manner in which false
divides (e.g., meaningful vs. meaninglessness; good vs. bad; moral vs.
immoral) are perpetuated in humanist spaces, which maintain (and rely
upon) a hermeneutic of suspicion about ideas or groups deemed “non-
humanist.” What sorts of politics of distinction and orthodoxies are at
work in how humanists classify the classified of what we perceive to be
the non-humanist world? Is the majority of the world non-humanist, if
so by what account (philosophical standpoint, lack of appeals to assumed
reason, educational attainment, etc.)? Could it be that our classificatory
taxonomies; ethical normativities; overreliance on certainty; and stiff
“scientific” analytical frames are too firm, and shortsighted, to come to
grips with just how blurry the diverging and converging lines between
humanism and non-humanism are?
140  M.R. Miller

Might humanist interests (for a non-humanist world) be better served

by recalibrating and refocusing long-standing goal-oriented-efforts such
as increasing the numbers of humanist self-identification and participa-
tion? Or‚ reconfiguring the longstanding over-emphases on opposition
to traditional religious sensibilities and logics? Or, most palpably present‚
the unending theistic-like worship of science, and scientific reasoning as
“evidence” of a humanist par excellence?—if not only for in the service
of what the most marginalized of the “non-humanist” world could ben-
efit. Humanists know well that the “battle” between good and evil—god
and the devil—is a concocted and metaphysicalized invention. Many
pop-cultural artists like Jay-Z, who would by many accounts be classified
by humanists as a “non-humanist‚” have long freed themselves up from a
social belief in such things. Yet, unlike many humanists today—they have
not abandoned such vocabulary—rather—they have put it to work in
creative ways as to relate to a world that struggles to embrace the face of
difference through mutual recognition and regard. More often than not,
our narrow engagement with the so-called non-humanist world is ham-
pered by our limited scope of seeing (epistemological) often accompanied
by and powered through an aggressive defense-of-the-secular-faith like
tendency.
The lines that divide the interests and definition of groups such as
humanist and non-humanist might, at first glance appear natural, cer-
tain, and self-evident—they are not. Critical attention to the human
invention, politics, and social interests involved in seemingly opposi-
tional and antagonistic divides such as sacred vs. profane standpoints and
the assumed theism (among believer and non-believer alike) in catego-
ries such as theology is given thoughtful theoretical and methodologi-
cal (re)consideration in works by scholars of religion such as Russell T.
McCutcheon & William Arnal’s The Sacred is the Profane: The Political
Nature of Religion (2012) and Anthony B. Pinn’s The End of God-Talk:
An African American Humanist Theology (2012).
Although “Outlaw Humanism” remains largely tethered to the theo-
logical vocabulary of its socio-cultural and political inheritance—human-
ism, traditionally and historically defined—is more often than not cast
in opposition to what is conventionally referred to as religious (or the
sacred). On this point—in his attempt to make more complicated the
seemingly neat divide between these two terms that are frequently fig-
ured as natural distinctions, serving as a mechanism to sort what counts
as data for the study of religion—McCutcheon suggests that talk about
 7  THE ABSENCE OF PRESENCE: RELATING TO BLACK (NON)HUMANISMS …  141

religion—the sacred and profane—is simply that—mundane rheto-

ric. That is to say, these words retain little self-evidence in and among
themselves, rather, they arise within and among the space, the interstices
that organize particular social, cultural and political interests in society
at large. Moreover, these interests give life, shape and definition to the
illusory and arbitrary relationship that becomes the manufactured prod-
ucts categorizing, shaping and organizing social life. With that in mind,
terms—such as non-humanist—are always inventions, rhetorical moves
always-and-already political in nature. Throughout his body of work‚
to scholars in the academic study of religion‚ he asks‚ “Are we critics or
caretakers?”—are we to keep religion (or here insert whatever operative
category you are working with) around through self-interested protec-
tionist strategies or are we called to analytically uncover the social pro-
cesses that make such talk (of religion, or humanism, and so on) even
possible? In a word, we are dealing with artificial concepts that are syn-
thetic and arbitrary in nature—classifications imbued with meaning as
we go about classifying, excavating, arranging, and ordering the world
according to our interests. Therefore, our terms, and concepts have
no universal value as coherent entities themselves—rather—we must
approach such terms as always historical, contingent, and by-products of
specific and particular circumstances of the modern world. It is no sur-
prise then that black humanisms look radically different from the epis-
temological features of western modernity. A quote from Arnal and
McCutcheon, substituting their concern over religion for my interest
here in humanism, proves insightful:

It must be conceded that any effort to define [humanism] as such (i.e.,

as a human entity, culturally and functionally determined or otherwise,
that is meaningfully distinct from other types of human cultural produc-
tion) entails an implication or assumption that [humanism] is, in fact, sui
generis. It appears impossible to avoid this unfortunate conclusion, even
within functionalist approaches to [humanism].8

Do humanists, who work hard to demystify the ostensibly “mystical”

absurdities of talk about‚ and belief in‚ things such as metaphysical and
supernatural realities end up re-producing a similar hegemonic gaze
under which a secularized imposition (e.g., reason, rationality, scientific
method) begins to function in the same capacity as the very religious
structures one is trying to deconstruct? Put differently, and stated more
142  M.R. Miller

brashly, could it be that humanists risk reproducing similar technolo-

gies of certainty when we fail to take into account (acknowledge) and
develop more relational models of engagement with the multiplicity and
plurality of subjugated humanisms among us today—those we might,
at first glance, classify as making up much of the non-humanist world?
Is the world disproportionally non-humanist or do the limitations and
constraints of our scope, historical inheritances, definitions, and designa-
tions of humanism misrecognize how we come to understand the world
around us? Might the very distinctions that give our classifications life
and allow us to shape the world also have the capacity to serve as socio-
rhetorical devices of regulation that prove “useful” in “…their highly
competitive economies of signification?”9

Seeing the Presence (Behind) Absence

There is a ton that humanists and atheists are not aware of regarding black
humanism, but also, African American religion and culture more gener-
ally. A few brief points stand out as more important than others: First,
there’s nothing “new” about black humanism. In fact, we know that many
enslaved Africans traditionally remembered as singing spirituals in fields of
cotton efficiently used religious expressions like “heaven” and “Canaan
Land” as a signifying means of talking not about a metaphysical other-
worldly place, but instead, about the geographic and emancipated North.
That’s another aspect of outlaw humanists, too. These are folk who
are so secure in their pragmatic orientation; religious language or religious
people are not deemed abhorrent. They use the best—and worst—ideas of
such traditions to re-mix life options, and enable everyday survival.
Another point of significance concerning black humanisms is that they
intrinsically connect to normative humanism and by extension, norma-
tive forces that made life so difficult and terrible for so long for so many
sold into European and American slavery from the African continent.
This is a difficult point to make, but white folk are largely responsible
for part of ‘the look’ of this tradition. By this, in part, I mean the differ-
ent look, feel and texture of black humanisms as opposed to the standard
white erudite versions of humanism.
As their points of departure, black humanisms, much like traditional
forms of black religious expressions, wrestle with questions of survival,
identity, moral evil and ethical bankruptcy. Much of these longstanding
issues which many traditional religious options have failed to address,
 7  THE ABSENCE OF PRESENCE: RELATING TO BLACK (NON)HUMANISMS …  143

are often behind most humanists’ turn to humanism as more equitable

and just when it comes to valuing humanity. No doubt, black humanism
is connected to normative humanism on these wrestlings and concerns,
nonetheless, has done a better job maintaining focus on these issues (in
part, because many white humanists benefit from, and are as guilty of‚
perpetuating racialized injustices as Christians or Muslims or Jews). On
the sustained and continued grappling with moral evil, reworked itera-
tions of black humanism have much to offer historically, and a great deal
to contribute in the future‚ as the form, shape and expression of human-
ist orientations continues to grow and expand in form‚ look, and content.
Here I echo long-standing work in and around this area from schol-
ars such as Pinn among other African American humanists. Humanist
organizations, where race is concerned, look a whole lot more like white
Christian churches than they do places of mutual intellectual, civic, social
exchange and uplift. What I mean is that these establishments, like many
churches, often situate the institution as having more social and analytic
value than it might really hold. Given how institutions work and func-
tion, there is, in effect, nothing of innate value to an institution save
what it is doing for its members and really, larger society—for mem-
bership rolls to grow or change, response to human need is continually
necessitated. For example, concerning matters of racial diversity, it is not
enough to list on a website that “we’re not racist” or some version of
an equity statement. If an institution wants to grow, to change, to alter
its “color” so to speak—the matter is not resolvable by inviting people
inside your doors or to your conferences. Instead, go beyond your doors
and find people in the places that matter to them. For instance, imagine
what it might look like if the American Humanist Association attended
and set up tables at hip hop festivals like “Rock tha Bells.” If diversity
is a stated interest and concern, then tactics, strategies and approaches
in relating must likewise follow suit. A different yet equally powerful
example might be found in the Humanist Institute’s interest in offer-
ing diverse online course offerings on a range of topics from human-
ism and hip hop and more recently, a course on humanism and race,
a co-authored collaboration between myself and scholar of religion and
race, Christopher Driscoll. But we must also think deeper about just who
is going to take the time to participate in such courses—no doubt, the
folks we already have, the humanists wanting to learn more about, and
perhaps attempt to solve‚ some of these longstanding issues and chal-
lenges. Thus, those venues are important and appropriate, but there is
144  M.R. Miller

really nothing better in solving diversity questions and concerns than

actually, actively being diverse—part of this entails recognizing that the
traditional borders of humanist organizations are more fluid than we
have traditionally or historically recognized. Part of the task will also
involve making those borders more porous than they are now by branch-
ing out, building actual relationships, and demonstrating to African
American humanists and non-humanists alike that the humanist concern
for people of color and other marginalized groups is actually a humanis-
tic, human concern and not a desire for better PR or increased member-
ship in organizations.
There is something to be learned from African American human-
ism and African American culture more generally as it concerns a cer-
tain kind of knowledge about relating, about how to live with the kind
of uncertainty fundamentally undergirding much of freethought. Many
brands of humanism and atheism more specifically echo hollow sugges-
tions about knowing, with certainty, that we are alone, that science can
help us, that sound rational thinking will lead to logical equitable ends,
and thus the humanist task of fulfilling history, as such. To this extent,
certain folks—folks we love and read and listen to as prominent human-
ist voices—could do with a dose of humility made possible by recogni-
tion that life is, on most accounts, uncertain—and most days, tenuous.
Humanism, for many, is a life philosophy and orientation. And for that
reason, it is not so different, in my opinion, from white Christianity, if it
acts as if that orientation provides a certain and firm foundation for social
life. Life is hard, complicated and confusing—none of us have resolutions
to questions of why humans have so much trouble relating across differ-
ence, or continue to fear social difference and thus, are compelled to do
such dastardly things. If white humanists and atheists want to do bet-
ter to address white privilege, then they would do well to dislodge their
epistemological foundations from the moorings of erudite, philosophical
and scientific “certainty” so inherited from Enlightenment thinking. In
less poetic language, I simply mean that white privilege and the mainte-
nance of its normativity has a lot to do with feeling certain, secure, and
safe. If non-theists want to really tackle such longstanding problems and
challenges, then they would start off well by adopting a brand of athe-
ism or humanism rooted in uncertainty, inclusive flexibility, a celebration
of difference not simply for what benefits and beauty it holds, but for its
effects to affirmatively unsettle and disrupt. Learning to live uncertainly
 7  THE ABSENCE OF PRESENCE: RELATING TO BLACK (NON)HUMANISMS …  145

in an uncertain world is what humanism, at its best, is all about—much

of which I have learned from African American humanism.

(Presence): Getting Back to Jay-Z

Have you ever been to heaven?
Have you ever seen the gates?
Have you bowed unto your highness?
Do you know how heaven taste?
—Jay-Z, “Heaven”

In Jay-Z’s recent catalogue of work, we encounter examples that

require and necessitate a humanist posture of unsuspecting collaboration
in spaces, places, and with terms we ignore, overlook, and contest—espe-
cially when arising from those representative of the not yet fully human-
ized (here, I read humanism as the possibility of a democratic-like ethic
of recognizing and relating to difference enough to allow a certain type
of human flourishing without destruction of that difference for a relat-
able sameness). The above stanzas from Jay-Z’s track “Heaven” (off of
his 2013 album Magna Carta Holy Grail) confronts us with an irrecon-
cilable yet productive tension that lyrically—with apt precision—sonically
animates the best of black expressive cultures’ skill at recasting religions’
most troubling and contested terms anew as coded-quests to critique the
very thing they appear to be embracing—of course, with partially veiled
motives in mind. Unlike much of the growing debates over‚ and oppo-
sition to‚ the use of overly religious terms in the public sphere—artists,
like Jay-Z, with such ease, use their craft to turn (social) problems into
(human) possibility. This act of building and destroying (two very signifi-
cant domains for hip hop culture) reorganizes the epistemological foun-
dations of meaning (as presence: recognition of self and one’s subjectivity
in the larger world in which they live) and meaninglessness (as absence:
illegible identities)—ultimately, refusing to allow the footing of such terms
to be socially hijacked and only available to those with the power to con-
trol the field of signification. While the antennas of humanism might give
short shrift to the reception at the sound and shout-out to heaven, pro-
ducing anxious concerns over (assumed religious) theological usages—
such concerns slowly recede to the edges of Jay-Z’s powerful reminder,
that he is god body—a philosophically coded black reference underscoring
146  M.R. Miller

the Nation of Gods and Earths’ (Five-Percent Nation) radical and contro-
versial philosophy of god—understood as black people in their full human-
ity (arm, leg, leg, arm, head). Hip hop, in all of its wit and cleverness, is
extremely adept at flipping the script—much of which is learned through
its posture of uncertainty. Thinking back to the landscape and portrait of
unending black death in America sketched out at the beginning of this
chapter—any angst over the track’s christian-centric sensibilities is quickly
assuaged in the third stanza when Jay foregrounds the song’s “ultimate
concerns” for his listeners: “Knowledge, wisdom, freedom, understand-
ing—we just want our equality. Food, clothing, shelter—help a nigga find
some peace. Happiness for a gangsta ain’t no love in the streets.”
Between his lyrical construction of a heaven to “help a nigga find
some peace” and his bum rush of blackness into all-white galleries in
“Picasso Baby”—Jay-Z’s aesthetic manipulation of social distances com-
pellingly reconstructs the not-yet (absence) of blackness into full recogni-
tion (presence) through an amalgamation of lyrical, sonic, and embodied
uncertainty: “Question religion, question it all, question existence until
them questions are solved.” Can humanism discern the non-humanist-
illegible-black-gods-in-the-flesh among them? Even if, and when, the
language, source, and mode remain in opposition to the manufactured
antagonisms of what is‚ and isn’t‚ humanist/non-humanist, are human-
ist ears open enough to listen to what the other has to say? More prag-
matically put, if you are someone who would have avoided taking a listen
to Jay-Z’s track “Heaven” based on hostile antipathies of what is/isn’t
“properly” humanist—then these questions might be for you.
The altered and ever changing concerns over identity, authenticity,
and recognition entrenched in, and grappled among, much of hip hop
cultural products offers acute insight into, and a solid map of, what
humanists might consider navigating as they go about the business
of relating to the non-humanist world. Like Jay-Z’s turn to renowned
performance artist Marina Abromovic and the white gallery—consider
unlikely sites, improbable spaces, and unfamiliar people in efforts at col-
laborating and relationality.
In their respective crafts, black god-body Jay-Z and the one who
many consider the most high of performance art, Abramović—through
unsuspecting collaboration are able to bring together the familiar and the
strange; humans and those still yet-to-be considered fully human; high
art and low art culminating in a microcosm of what can be made of the
world when antagonisms of relationship are fused together. Notice how
 7  THE ABSENCE OF PRESENCE: RELATING TO BLACK (NON)HUMANISMS …  147

recognition (presence) is enabled and facilitated in “Picasso Baby”—by

coming face to face, in the flesh, in relation with the Other.
In this space—human possibility is invented at the rugged seams of
false divides and social distinctions—performance art and rap music;
street artist and formally trained artists; rich and poor, and so on.
Perhaps, convincing “nonbelievers” that #blacklivesmatter is not just
similar to trying to convince someone to give up the idea of god, but
also akin to, breaking down the barrier between high and low art, (as
in, high and low humanity, high and low knowledge‚ racialized binaries‚
etc.). Are there ways today that one of America’s fastest-selling products,
dead black bodies, might be the next soup can or Brillo box? Certainly,
we would all be better off if we chose the “Picasso Baby” model of
unsuspecting collaboration—in fact, it could save the lives of America’s
proliferating commodity.
Pop Art was a movement that sought to uncover and reveal the arbi-
trary distinctions of high and low art that seemingly carried so much
social weight but no intrinsic (or ontological) value. Remembered as
the star of the pop art movement, Andy Warhol—whose studio was
aptly enough named “The Factory,” forced the world to see art in the
ordinary, in the products. He created entire replicas of Brillo Boxes and
Campbell’s Soup Cans, inserting them into art galleries, forcing us to
square with the omnipresent cultural products all around us that we rely
on without realizing our reliance. What’s the real difference between a
Brillo Box produced by the company in a factory, and Warhol’s “Brillo
Box” produced in “The Factory?” For white America, what is the actual
difference between black bodies and dead black bodies? If America’s past
and present is any indicator, the answer is: nothing. The “freedom” in
“freethought” is by no means “free”—it requires presence and mutual
recognition—and the collective ability to transmute absence into existence.
On the idea of freedom, French philosopher and father of deconstruc-
tion, Jacques Derrida reminds us that caution must accompany and tem-
per our optimism for motivated action (such as the ability to distinguish
our fight for freedom vs. fights for freedoms)—without which we risk an
unfolding state of catastrophic totalization. Derrida goes on to suggest
that, “In my opinion, the most “free” thought is one that is constantly
coming to terms with the effects of the machine,”10 adding that, “I am
cautious about the word freedom…this word often seems to me to be
loaded with metaphysical presuppositions that confer on the subject or
on consciousness … a sovereign independence.”11 Thus, there is, as he
148  M.R. Miller

states, “…some machine everywhere, and notably in language.” In such

a system of fixity, calculability, repetition—what are humans to do? One
possible way out of, or around, such disastrous determinism might entail
a new humanist posture towards the world—one governed by efforts at
undecidability, incalculability, and the arrival of the Other.12 According
to Derrida, the only way to prepare ourselves for such an arrival and the
generosity it involves is to, “… think that is, to invent what is necessary
so that we do not close our eyes to the machine and to the extraordinary
progress of calculation, while still understanding, within and outside the
machine, this play of the other, this play with the other.”13 Hospitality
(and the labor involved)—albeit always conditional in some manner—
necessitates human risk and vulnerability.
We might take a cue from humanist thinkers such as Pinn who has
managed to maintain one foot in a world/space “not his own” (theol-
ogy, religion, African American religion/culture) and the other in a space
more familiar, yet, also on the margins (humanism—lacking black bod-
ies and tradition, and black humanism—largely invisible to most human-
ists) of a group that struggles, like any other space in America, with its
own limitations and myopia. In The End of God Talk (2012) Pinn makes
a compelling case for the usefulness of a term that many in the field of
religion considered “not his own”—theology—Pinn asserts that one
can indeed do theology without God.14 On one hand, he poses a chal-
lenge to scholars who, through their own confessionality, refuse to free
theology up outside of its metaphysically oriented self-referential nature,
on the other, Pinn offers a convincing proposal that assists in broaden-
ing humanism and non-theism beyond normative assumptions (as in,
non-theism = the absence of theology). In addition to redescribing theol-
ogy (as interpretive method for critical engagement; human articulation;
and discussion of deep existential and ontological questions of life) for
humanist thought and praxis, he encourages a turn towards new spaces
whereby new symbols premised on the need for community and embod-
ied meaning-making can flourish. Moreover, he offers a palpable way to
shift the excess of meaning from normative theological categories such as
soteriology (embodied soteriology as symmetry) to the mundane yet sig-
nificant aspects of everyday life, such as beauty. In so doing, traditional
understandings of community are re-presented as awareness—the reigni-
tion of the amnesia of absence through the conscious practice of presence.
Practicing the art of presence and uncertainty learned from unlikely
figures such as the prodigious hip hop aesthete Jay-Z, and a serious
 7  THE ABSENCE OF PRESENCE: RELATING TO BLACK (NON)HUMANISMS …  149

consideration of continued appeals for new sources and categories in the

study of humanism—holds much power for manipulating the arbitrary
antagonisms that disastrously continue to keep absence at relational bay
from presence.

Notes
1. James Baldwin, “The White Man’s Guilt,” Originally published in Ebony,
1965.
2. James Baldwin, “The White Man’s Guilt,” Originally published in Ebony,
1965.
3. Himanshu Suri, “Heems Reviews Jay-Z’s ‘Picasso Baby’,” August 3,
2013. http://www.spin.com/2013/08/heems-jay-z-picasso-baby-per-
formance-art-film-hbo-review/. Accessed August 10, 2015.
4. “A Religious Portrait of African-Americans,” http://www.pewforum.
org/2009/01/30/a-religious-portrait-of-african-americans/#2, Pew
Research Center, 2009. Accessed in November 2013.
5. http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/racial-and-ethnic-
composition/. Accessed in June 2016.
6. “Man Who Killed Jordan Davis in “Loud Music” Case Sentenced to Life
in Prison,” by Ben Mathis-illey, http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slat-
est/2014/10/17/michael_dunn_life_sentence_jordan_davis_loud_
music_killer_given_indefinite.html. Accessed October 2014.
7. “Black death has become a cultural spectacle: Why the Walter Scott
tragedy won’t change White America’s mind, http://www.salon.
com/2015/04/08/black_death_has_become_a_cultural_spectacle_why_
the_walter_scott_tragedy_wont_change_white_americas_mind/?utm_
source=twitter&utm_medium=socialflow&hc_location=ufi. Accessed
June 1, 2015.
8. William Edward Arnal and Russell T. McCutcheon. The Sacred Is the
Profane: The Political Nature of Religion. Oxford University Press, 2012,
27.
9. Ibid., 133.
10. Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco. For What Tomorrow…: A
Dialogue. Translated by Jeff Fort. 1 edition. Stanford, Calif: Stanford
University Press, 2004, 48.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 58.
13. Ibid.
14. Anthony B. Pinn, The End of God-Talk: An African American Humanist
Theology. Oxford University Press, USA, 2012.
 CHAPTER 8

Rudy’s Paradox: The ALIENation

of Race and Its Non-Humans

Christopher M. Driscoll

On September 21, 1987, then President of the United States Ronald

Reagan during his Address to the 42nd Session of the United Nations
General Assembly movingly asked the following:

In our obsession with antagonisms of the moment, we often forget how

much unites all the members of humanity. Perhaps we need some outside,
universal threat to make us recognize this common bond. I occasionally
think how quickly our differences worldwide would vanish if we were fac-
ing an alien threat from outside the world. And yet, I ask you, is not an
alien force already among us?1

With the promise and peril of the Cold War’s impending end on the
world’s mind, a stoic (and by today’s standards, brilliant) Reagan
speaks here of a universal human “pilgrimage” linking all of humanity
in a quest for peace. Thirty years later, however, this quest has yet
to be achieved. Yet in these 1987 words invoked above, Reagan
seemingly gave rhetorical hope to the world that a particular brand of

C.M. Driscoll (*) 
Lehigh University, Bethlehem, USA

© The Author(s) 2017 151

M.R. Miller (ed.), Humanism in a Non-Humanist World, Studies
in Humanism and Atheism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57910-8_8
152  C.M. Driscoll

American exceptionalism—riddled with as much hypocrisy as hope—

offered a model for moving forward in the face of acute threats and
the (perhaps) bigger fear, turning our weapons back into plowshares.
Without the tools to explicate the grandness of the danger posed by
“outside” and “universal threats” and confront it for what it was, on its
own terms, here Reagan slips into a redemptive-suffering-like-theodicy
in an attempt to make sense of the inexplicable. Hope to and for
humanity is here seemingly offset by the manufacturing of a sociodicy
whereby a “common bond” is only made possible through a preceding
collective experience of suffering.
In convincing that the world’s humans need no longer fight amongst
one another, Reagan relied upon a somewhat strange reference to an
“alien force,” which would galvanize the world’s humans in solidarity
against the threat this posed by an unlike form or body of beings that
are non-human. MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow called the comment one
of his weirdest ever.2 The logic that seems to guide Reagan is one that
assumes larger efforts to overcome and resolve human difference, neces-
sitate first an even larger acknowledgement of non-human threats among
those unable to see their common humanity through continued social
antagonisms. Among some circles, Reagan’s address has taken on a bit
of a legendary status over the last 30 years. If you tune into cable televi-
sion programs exploring topics of the “UFOs” and “other realities” you
might find folks claiming that this piece of Reagan’s speech was a tacit
admission of alien life already living among us, whether it be of the tall
white, or the reptilian, or the small grays, we do not know what Reagan
might of had in mind. What we can say with relative certainty is that
Reagan was not here referring to resident aliens, as in irregular immi-
grants, those humans who have nowhere to go by no fault of their own.
On the contrary, indeed he was referencing the “little green men” variety
of aliens, akin to those long-discussed on television shows like Ancient
Aliens and Hangar 1 (and so many more), many of whom suggest, if
not outright promote, the notion that not only was Reagan a “believer”
(in aliens) but he was also one among few leaders who had the courage
to wink to us about “disclosure.”
Before proceeding, let me be clear so I am not misread in what fol-
lows. Humanists, atheists, free thinkers, skeptics, and the like, have
long placed a premium on reason and logical cohesion, and empirical
evidence. As such, across the strands of organizational and philosophi-
cal differences that exists among such groups, the larger task to remain
 8  RUDY’S PARADOX: THE ALIENATION OF RACE AND ITS NON-HUMANS  153

skeptical and suspicious of unsubstantiated claims has long held these

communities together. In invoking and somehow rhetorically validating
what remains empirically invalidated, Reagan’s turn to those other kinds
of aliens might perhaps be asking too much of our rational spider sense.
That said, however, there is much in/about the alien discussion that
humanists can use to relate to a non-humanist world, and that might
prove fruitful by way of necessary consideration of categorical clarifica-
tion and the (re)definition of terms in changing contexts of contingency
and historical moments. What is a humanist in a non-humanist world?
Does such a question, and those like it, already assume an overdeter-
mined human/nonhuman antagonistic dichotomy? How do we know
that the world is “non-humanist?” And, with Reagan’s comment in
mind, does this question assume an end to social problems only if the
terms of our debate and the categories organizing our lives (as human-
ists) are not tested by antagonistic and contrarian alien-like forces? Who
really then is the alien in the necessary accounting required to ade-
quately describe and animate such a term or topic? In so asking, does
such an inquiry find us constructing an “alien force” or “non-humanist”
world, as Reagan presumes? Moreover, what is an appropriate human-
ist response to our growing scientific certainty in the eventuality of find-
ing intelligent life on worlds not called Earth? Is our humanism really
ready for an “alien force” or invaders from the non-humanist edges of
outer space? And lastly, what is the appropriate humanist response to
those who may simultaneously offer a critique to the human race from
the standpoint of an “alien force already among us?”

Rhetorics of Exclusion

As a humanist, uncertain of that label as I am,3 I often imagine the

possibilities of the world uniting in universal abhorrence or, more
strongly stated, hatred of god. Admittedly, it piques my curiosity that
in our embrace of reason and rationality over a faith-like evidentiary
uncertainty we are so easily equipped (as humans) to abhor and discredit,
invisible and unknown forces. What’s more, histories of social inequity
across categories of difference well demonstrate that ontological evidence
of marginalized bodies and social actors have often proved insufficient
in deeming them as fully human, rendered as invincible while visible.
Hence, ought not our certainty in humanism be cautioned, existentially
pressed, if not downright vexed at the near and long-held wholescale
154  C.M. Driscoll

blindness we (as humans) maintain as we embark on the construction

of “alien forces” for whom to cast derision, fear, and hatred? Whether
such a force is constructed in the idea of (a mystery) god (there’s even a
term for this, misotheism, the hating/hatred of god)4 or through “alien
forces” of more familiar ilk (i.e. other humans), there is seemingly no
end to our rhetorical construction of what twentieth century continental
philosophers call the “Other.” In terms of critical thinking, or political
praxis, our general reflexive blindness has been, and is, dangerous to
new possibilities. Do not many of us (as humanists) often look like lesser
versions of the exaggeration offered by Reagan?
Reagan’s 1987 UN speech was by UFO enthusiast accounts substan-
tial. And by many other accounts, the reference to an “alien force” was
rhetorical throw-away, a means of lightening the weight of his words
and bringing a dose of levity to the room. But listening to his address,
the pathos he exudes makes it hard to imagine he is not serious, not in
the sense that actual space aliens exist, but in his belief that it will take
a threat against us for humans to unite even for the sake of peace. The
paradoxes of this perspective are numerous. How will peace be possible
if we begin from the posture of antagonism? Or, that humans occupy-
ing planet earth can only achieve resolution in social differences by
fighting against an invading “other” or through creating a false imagi-
nary of a perhaps-not-yet “other,” so empirically other in its otherness
that humans will be left to unite against a new (and believable) sense of
social difference? How would we wait to unite by awaiting an antago-
nistic threat to unite us as a unified threat to them? “Perhaps, we need
some universal, outside threat to perceive this common bond,” Reagan
suggests. The effect of such amounts to what linguistic philosopher
J.L. Austin might refer to as a particular effect of “doing things with
words.”5 In the sheer posing of the possibility, Reagan not-so-subtlety
presumes a “common” human identity only possible through a com-
mon recognition of an immense and impending strangeness. The threat,
according to this arrangement of words, would merely allow us to
“perceive” this bond.
However, the only rational locus for such an antagonistic social
arrangement rests with Reagan himself. There are no aliens in the pic-
ture for us to a priori assume the all-pervasive force of such an antag-
onistic  threat. He is responding to a threat of violence by presuming
that the penchant for human violence is somehow innate. Such an
arrangement may offer hope for unity, but this unity will necessarily
 8  RUDY’S PARADOX: THE ALIENATION OF RACE AND ITS NON-HUMANS  155

come at the expense of an alienized other. Rhetorically, as packaged

here, there is no seeming escape from the antagonism promoted by
social difference.
In certain respects, similar sentiments are at work in the very question
holding together this book: How should humanism, in fact, relate to a
non-humanist world? Such an asking forecloses, it seems, the possibil-
ity of acting, in the first instance, as if this world was already humanist
at some point in time before falling to its non-humanism or conceivable
that it was never really humanist at all. In practical terms, such a ques-
tion as the one framing this volume is legitimate as evinced in the cur-
rent and active assault on Atheism the world over. Even in a “religiously
tolerant” United States, attacks on non-theistic postures are often the
first taste many dominant culture folks have of some version of margin-
alization. And of course, as has been well documented and articulated,
Freethinkers of color are often doubly and triply marginalized in a world
that too often denigrates non-whites, women, non-believers, among so
many others.6 So, the question of what a humanist is to do about/with
a non-humanist world is indeed a practical and significant concern. Yet,
in form, the question somehow hinges on a similar rhetorical technique
offered by Reagan in the UN address.
With the notion of “alien forces” in mind, who is the alien? What is
an alien? What is an alien to a nonbeliever? Can those already human
see the “non-humanist” aliens among us? Are we only poised to believe
in the strangeness of another life form by way of the threat they pose to
us? Some of these issues are addressed in the sections that follow, but
here, Reagan’s (and our) rhetorical trap exposes us to tribalistic instincts
preventing anything but a recursive antagonism. Is antagonism, in the
end, all we stand to inherit? What good is humanism if not of a variety
that might allow us to not merely righteously proclaim reason as the seat
of our capacity to eventually move beyond such unreasonable antago-
nisms? In asking how we should relate to a non-humanist world, do we
not posit ourselves an outsider force in effort to alienate and organize
the “rest of the world” as antagonistic to the aims and interests of we,
the tribe of humanists?
Social and cultural theorist Michel Maffesoli offers guidance for
understanding how we protect and maintain these tribal borders.
Firstly, he lets go of assumptions about binaries between sacred and
profane, broadly conceived. Following what we might call an adjusted
Durkheimian model of society, Maffesoli holds that “any given entity,
156  C.M. Driscoll

from the micro-group to the structure of the state, is an expression of

the social divine, of a specific, even immanent, transcendence.”7 Seen
through this theoretical lens, the humanist relation to a non-humanist
world is flattened. Thus, the “non-humanist world” is not the sole pur-
veyor of sacrality; divinity is not limited to the believers. Here, I do not
mean to suggest a kind of atheistic divinity. Rather, if we let go of our
own penchant for making claims to divinity, belief, or an “alien” threat
we must fight against, the antagonism of the question is lessened. This
is not to let go of the concern to champion the reason and accountabil-
ity we so often perceive as lacking in “believers” but rather, to more
forcefully understand the social world as emphasizing that our rhetorical
strategies, whether Reagan’s effort to combat antagonism by reinforcing
antagonism, or ours here in this volume, are always in the end, rhetori-
cal. All of us, never far removed from our tribal roots, trade in rhetoric
for the sake of access to any variety of resources, safety and peace near
the top of this list of resources. We may be alien to friends or family,
and especially legislation that marginalizes humanist and atheist voices,
life philosophies, and worldviews. Yet, we find “common bond” sought
by Reagan in reflexively engaging the rhetorical techniques that shape
so much of how we understand alien others and above all, the alien in
ourselves.

The Humanist Tribe

As gestured above, a serious consideration of our rhetorical techniques
of exclusion require taking stock of the manner in which we are all—all
of us today—part and parcel to a tribalistic social arrangement. We have
various totems and taboos yet we maintain borders that are far more
fluid than we might be willing to admit. And each of our tribes have
sacred objects of orientation (e.g., reason) as well as our profane objects
(e.g., theism) in which we work hard to ensure little contact, interaction
and influence.
By many accounts, humanism is indeed a tribe. By extension, we
might imagine the American Humanist Association, the Center for
Inquiry, and the Richard Dawkins Foundation, as different sorts of
clans that collectively make up the larger “tribe” of freethought, skep-
ticism and rational inquiry. The organizational examples are easy to
see, yet our ideological variability constituting the differences among
these “clan” allegiances might prove more difficult. Some of us might
 8  RUDY’S PARADOX: THE ALIENATION OF RACE AND ITS NON-HUMANS  157

be “strong” humanists who have little time for dialogue with theists, or
patience for conceptions of theism.8 Others might self-identify more sim-
ply as “non-theists” for whom talk about god is simply confusing, and
therefore deemed illogical. Others may be agnostic skeptics, for whom
clan allegiance extends first to a critical skeptical method, with conclu-
sions serving as secondary effects. Whether framed in organizational or
ideological ways, we are composed of clans constituting a a much larger
tribal affiliation. For most of us, reason, science and critical thinking are
indeed the sacred objects we tend to glorify, dare we say worship. Such
“values” never have, really though, ensured the full humanity of those
seen without access to such critically-oriented “gifts.” Instrumentalizing
them (i.e. turning them into an object for our use and self-identification)
has never prevented human destruction and dehumanization, histori-
cally or at present. Belief in god or gods, religiously-motivated oppres-
sion, and other objects or ideas are those that must not come in contact
with our sacred objects, yet our identification as the antithesis of such is
reliant upon a negative dialectic9 that is constantly in tension with our
critique and disavowal of the legitimacy of such conceptions. God, and
religion, for many of us, pose risk to our sacred secular centers, risk-
ing the destabilization of a world incapable of legislating and living in
rational, reasonable and scientific ways. Of course, some aspects of these
profane (i.e. “outsider”) objects are worth fighting against, because they
pose acute risks to our hallowed objects of freedom, liberty and justice.
The teaching of creationism in schools, for instance, poses a clear risk to
not only the theory of evolution, but to our humanistic trust in a scien-
tific method we value as humanists and atheists. Talk of humanism as a
tribe, replete with sacred and profane objects, is not an effort to deni-
grate humanism. Following Maffesoli’s theoretical position, we can only
gain much knowledge about ourselves, and who we are, by beginning
to see ourselves as a tribe in a world of many other competing, and yet
overlapping, tribal affiliations.
And so, if we understand humanism as a tribe, what might it then
suggest about our particularist view of the world that we posit the
world as “non-humanist?” This would be akin to a tribe imagining itself
as alien to the world in which it finds itself, insomuch as whatever it is,
it believes the world to not, somehow be, constituted through similar
social registers. Such a position may have the effect of preventing
a rational outlook on the world as equally motivated by such tribal
impulses. Ironically, though, this effect is swiftly deconstructed when
158  C.M. Driscoll

considering the antagonism that is so much the focus of Reagan’s

claim. In other words, tribes can be more or less antagonistic towards
one another insomuch as some tribes form allegiances across tribes,
while others remain more sedentary and less pugnacious. Yet, on the
whole, antagonism is part and parcel of the social world not so much
as an option, but rather, more as an object of human social life that
must be addressed. Reagan seems to have understood at least part of
this, yet he fails in ensuring the necessary reflexivity. Is the problem
for Reagan “them” (i.e. those who would pose a threat) or is it the
antagonism noted here to remain in the abstract, as effect? No doubt,
as President, Reagan’s concerns could be read in light of actual threats,
but what of perceived threats to humanism and the subsequent danger
of overemphasizing antagonistic peril for humanist recognition to
be made possible? What good is a humanism that looks, in terms of
its emphases on self-preservation or legitimation, so eerily similar
to the non-humanist or the believers amongst us who are so quick to
rationalize violence and other modes of alienation as a result of “god’s
will” or innate human sinfulness (e.g. when we justify killing on grounds
of guilt vs. innocence)? Many have described the perils of this sort of
“Modern” or “Enlightened” mode of humanism, such as theorist Michel
Foucault10 (among many others) who long warned that our efforts at the
concretization of the humanist tribe do little to qualitatively distinguish
ourselves from the alien-makers in our midst, those who happen to be
already deemed or assumed to be human in this social world.
It may be that by taking seriously the tribalistic sensibilities we carry
today in the twenty-first century, we can affirmatively recast our gaze in
the direction of ideological culprits that do not allow us, or others, to
escape from the prison of presumptuous antagonism. Father of function-
alism Emile Durkheim, whose work builds the foundation for Maffesoli
and many other social scientists, suggests that the tribe’s central goal,
after all, is in fact the preservation of the tribe itself.11 Ahead of food,
before shelter, more significant than warfare, the principal mode of social
organization is plainly framed around the preservation of the totem—the
object that gives, after all, the tribe its identity. Such preservation is hard
work at least and a functionally necessary task at best.
Preservation of the totem also helps to underscore a “common bond”
linking our humanist tribe to the non-humanist tribal world. Whether
an “American” or “Iranian,” “Easterner” or “Westerner,” “atheist” or
“theist,” “Ethical Cultural Society” member or “Christian,” as members
 8  RUDY’S PARADOX: THE ALIENATION OF RACE AND ITS NON-HUMANS  159

of our tribes, we have not escaped the overwhelming urge to protect

them before putting these affiliations to creative use in the social world.
We double-down on our claims to various tribal identities before we take
hold of the fruits that such affiliations offer. Of course, we do the latter,
too, but not with the vigor or intensity we apply to preservation of those
identities we value as our own.
Take organizational resolutions as an example. When humanist
or Christian organizations pass resolutions condemning something
happening in the larger society, the effect is secondarily any possible activ-
ism and primarily, a reinforcing of the identity of that organization. In
like manner, when we ask how we might relate to a non-humanist world,
we principally end up reinforcing a totemic identity based on a desire
to preserve the “special-ness” of humanism, the identity-maker. For in
wanting to maintain important, even necessary distinctions that enable
our uniqueness, we unduly value our exclusivity ahead of the kind of
“common bond” spoken of by Reagan. And this makes perfect “tribal”
sense, for the highest failure of the tribe is, as noted by Durkheim, failure
to protect the totemic identity.12
Admitting to our tribal sensibilities, humanist to name but one,
what then? Members of the tribe are forgiven from the inescapable
antagonism, because it marks a fundamental feature of what it means to
be a human. This isn’t to exonerate us from the consequences of this
antagonism: war, famine, oppression, etc. It is simply to set it in social
context as one feature of who we are, as human. But what if we act as
social theorists for a moment? Maffesoli’s work is not a diatribe against
tribalistic thinking, but an effort to imagine what more we could see if
we took seriously our tribal sensibilities. In the next section, I want to
imagine ourselves as social theorists, removed from the concern over
protecting our tribal totem. Letting go of that concern might aid in
uncovering further common ground between ourselves as humanists and
aliens among us.

Fermi’s Paradox
Named after the physicist Enrico Fermi, Fermi’s paradox is the product
of a thoroughly critical, scientific mind.13 The story goes that one day
while at lunch, the topic of aliens from outer space came up. Surely, to
deny the possibility of alien life on other worlds is to somehow over-
determine and privilege humans. There are billions of galaxies, each with
160  C.M. Driscoll

billions of stars, with billions and billions of those stars likely surrounded
by countless planets, many of which are located in what we now refer
to as the “goldilocks” position—that position perfectly distanced from
the star so as to promote the development of life. On top of this, the
universe is billions of years old. Statistically, these numbers would
suggest it would be a miracle if we were the only life in the universe.
By this estimation, it is not a matter of if we are alone, but when we
will have proof that we are not alone. If we conclude that we are alone
based on lacking empirical evidence then we, humanists, run the risk
of perpetuating a hyper-humanocentric approach grounded in an over-
certainty of the human (mind) as the all-knowing axis mundi—namely,
a humanist gospel of science. If we, on the other hand, leave open the
possibility that we might not be alone, then such skepticism over and
about what it means to be human and distinguish the non-human(ist)
among us must likewise persist. Either way, the certainty of empirical or
rational scientific data is lacking, thus leaving us only with the reliability
of skeptical and statistical uncertainty on both ends.
To the question of the possibility of life beyond this world, the physicist
Fermi wasn’t convinced. Spacetime, for Fermi, presented a challenge.
Legend has it that he quipped: “Where are they?” So was born the
paradox adjudicating for the lack of any quantifiable evidence that we are
(or are not) alone in the universe. Based on the number of possible planets
and the time that has elapsed for other civilizations to evolve and make
contact with us, there is undoubtedly life elsewhere in the universe. Yet,
that same statistical proof for the existence of that life also proves that we
will never make contact with that life, as the distances are simply far too
great to overcome. So goes Fermi’s Paradox.
Although humanists and many humanist organizations see something
defensible about the rationality and reliability of science (especially over
faith), as atheists and skeptics, we aren’t really “supposed” to believe in
aliens, after all. Yet, science tells us they likely exist. Moreover, NASA,
SETI, and other legitimate scientific organizations are actively engaged
in the search for life (complex or basic) in space, under the premise of
“what makes humans unique”, or wanting to know if other planets are
habitable (for extraneous eventualities necessitating we pack our bags
quickly). The debate about believing in aliens, rather than following the
logic of believing in god (though these debates often overlap—a topic
for another essay), is a matter of holding the complexity of the Fermi
paradox in balance. Many scientists today “believe” in extraterrestrial life,
 8  RUDY’S PARADOX: THE ALIENATION OF RACE AND ITS NON-HUMANS  161

even though demonstrable proof has not yet been found. What they do
not believe in, saving a select few, is that we’ve made contact with them.
We are not supposed to “believe” that Area 51 and Wright Patterson
Air Force Base are holding little green men. It is bad form. We may
enjoy the television programs, with the big hair and even bigger claims
about contact, but there is simply no evidence to whet a humanist’s
empirically-motivated, rational whistle. Leave it to Fermi, and Reagan’s
rhetorical shout out to an “alien force” was purely political theatre.
Aliens do not walk among us, and they never will.
In steps Rudy.

Rudy, the Tall White Alien

Greetings, my human friends.

This is Rudolf of Germany, the tall white alien.14

These words mark the beginning of nearly every transmission  from

Rudolf, who refers to himself as the tall white Alien. Rudolf, an elderly
tall white man with a sizeable social media following, remixes  complex
conspiratorial musings on the world and politics, with sophisticated
social analysis. His considerations of global political events, to  say
nothing of physics, cosmology, religion, and economics, are by  many
accounts, out of this world. The case study of Rudy presents the
humanist with a paradox of their own. Let’s call it: Rudy’s paradox.
What good is humanism’s antagonism towards other humans on
earth when “alien forces” present themselves to us? Posed less
melodramatically, does our humanism allow us to learn from not only
non-humanists, but self-described non-humans? Can a humanist let go of
humanism long enough for humanism to become more than what it has
been or currently is? Is there space for aliens in humanism?
Head to Rudy’s YouTube channel and you’ll see some 300 videos on
wide-ranging subjects, and notice upwards of 10,000 subscribers. I first
encountered Rudy while doing research on historical and contemporary
myths of racial origin. A simple Google search led me to Rudy’s online
efforts, whose work is often focused on issues of contemporary global
race relations, and the changing “color” of Europe, North America,
and Africa. Concisely, in his words, Rudolf is the name of a “tall white”
162  C.M. Driscoll

alien personality that mounts the body of the German “Karl,” and then
Rudy (the alien) records himself offering biting social analysis on a wide
range of overlapping contemporary mythologies. Basically, in the person
of Karl, contemporary myths surrounding intergalactic alien races over-
laps with nineteenth century myths surrounding human racial categories.
By internet fame standards, Rudolf’s numbers are somewhat modest.
Yet, the thousands of subscribers to his YouTube Channel suggest that
many around the world (and maybe beyond the world) find uniqueness
and value in his messages. Could a humanist?
Rudolf published his first video onto YouTube on June 15, 2015
under the polemical title “White People Are Not Human. The Original
Confession.” As of February 2017, the video has over 700,000
views and 12,000 comments.15 Addressed to “dark-skinned people,”
particularly black Americans, Rudy offers them a strange sort of
confession in his German-accented English. In this commentary, Rudy
begins by confirming what he believes to be a long held suspicion of
many black folk: that “white people are not really human,”16 a claim to
which he offers this reply:

I want to admit today, to you, that white people (originating from

Northern Europe), are called al—not aliens—Aryans. These white
people are not really human from this earth like black people are, Indian
people are, Asian people are; yes, they are all humans. We white people
are actually a minority, and we are – let’s face the truth – also called the
“Tall Whites.” Not all of us are tall. Not all of us are completely white.
But in general, that’s what it is. And as some of you know, the tall whites
are not Earthly human, but we coming out of space, out of another galaxy
[sic]. We are not human as the rest of the human race. We came here from
another star, we white people, in order to control the world.17

Proclaiming that all white people share a secret language, Rudy confesses
that he feels awful about our shared “white” effort to control the rest of
the world’s races. Rudy holds that we whites have “no good intentions”
and that “we do not want to share our wealth …or knowledge…with
you.”18 The video concludes with Rudy apologizing to black folks for
the “bad behavior” of white folks for the last hundreds of years.19 While
Rudy attempts to offer an account of white peoples’ dehumanizing and
colonizing behaviors over the years, here he likewise seemingly flips the
frame of human(ist)/non-human(ist) by inverting the long-believed
 8  RUDY’S PARADOX: THE ALIENATION OF RACE AND ITS NON-HUMANS  163

superiority of white people as not human and not of this world as to

recalibrate the humanity of those treated as less than human. What’s
more, Rudy’s confession does not, it seems, come on the heels of some
sort of call for reconciliation, resolution, or a recalibrated whiteness that
learns to live (and die) with those racially unlike them. On the contrary,
Rudy not only confesses as to set the record straight here, but he also
does so without promise that white people’s non-humanism will at some
point recalibrate towards a more equitable relationality with people
of color. In this video and subsequent commentary, Rudy seems to be
offering both clarity and recursive warning of the continuation of white
destruction and dehumanization of others.
Rudy’s very first video is part of a series of 89 videos, all categorized
under the title “White People Are Not Human” with each one offering
a fascinating slice of a virtually mediated cosmology that seeks to
adjudicate for white uniqueness, impressions of white superiority in
history, while offering a “behind the scenes” look at white motivations
in a largely non-white world. In academic terms, Rudolf offers what
we might refer to as a post-modern racialized theodicy and ­cosmology.
What at first glance seems unhinged and bizarre, upon closer look, is
a cohesive cosmology with an intensely unapologetic, i­ntersectional,
and intergalactic twist. I am less interested here in morally a­ djudicating
Rudy’s claims as either truth or beyond-this-world quackery, instead
seeing something of value in using his online work as a ­ materialist
case study for thinking further about what it might mean for a white
­humanist to ask a question about humanism in a non-humanist world
when not all (of us) are regarded (by all of us) as fully human? On one
level, Rudy is throwing back onto the white world, in the visage of tall
white Alienhood, a nineteenth century Modern critique that we (as
white humans) have levied against the non-white world. That ­“primitive”
world that many suggested was guided by feeling, emotion, and
­unsubstantiated myth. That “savage” world that formidable humanist
scholars, not long ago, suggested lacked mental faculties of rationality
and capacity to reason. That world in which the promise of humanity
has not been fully afforded. These racialized narratives die hard, and we
are still left to square with them here in the twenty-first century. But
what might happen for our assumptions about how far we’ve come in
responding to those narratives if we took seriously the ­ confrontation
offered by Rudy, who would be considered by many accounts, a race
traitor of the highest order? Not only is he working to uncover a white
164  C.M. Driscoll

ontological disposition held by many whites, whom he calls “tall white

aliens” but he also seems to be offering through the manipulation of fact
and fiction an ardent critique of the manner in which white humans—
many, humanists—have navigated and reconciled the world ­historically
and today. By Rudy’s explicit accounting and by a critical racial
­accounting, white folks—who also happen to disproportionately account
for those literally awaiting intergalactic alien contact, through our
actions have ostensibly created the aliens we’ve awaited in the form of
ourselves. We have the audacity to reinforce a binary regarding ourselves
as ­alienated, as humanists are alienated, as humanists are alienated from a
non-humanist world, when in fact to take history seriously demonstrates
that we are uncomfortably close to taking as seriously claims that we are,
in fact, not human. So goes Rudy’s Paradox.

Making Contact—Alien Wisdom for the Humanists

Among Us
YouTuber Danaija Robinson comments:

You still have yet to contact me.

A creole black woman said that you contacted her. I am annoyed because I
asked for [alien] contact years ago and never received contact. What steps
must I take to contact you. [sic]

Rudolf the tall white Alien replies:

What is the problem? Send an email.20

What assumptions about reality guide our assessments and ­ opinions

regarding “proper” or “improper” humanist perspectives? Here,
one  woman takes to the internet airwaves, in a kind of new-fangled,
technological, new-age shout out to the aliens in the sky, and complains:
“A creole black woman” was once contacted. Here, this woman is
annoyed, because she has wanted “contact” and has not received it.
Playing with the irony, subtlety and trolling sensibilities offered by the
internet universe, the commenting woman signifies in two directions:
wanting extraterrestrial alien contact beyond this world, but also, con-
tact from an alien force, from an alien life and presence in this world.
 8  RUDY’S PARADOX: THE ALIENATION OF RACE AND ITS NON-HUMANS  165

The  commentator suggests something more than “alien contact,” but

contact with something unique, so as to emphasize her own uniqueness.
This might be suggestive of something more endemic to human need on
the part of the commentator, a “need” for some sort of legitimation to
the unique and peculiar condition in which she finds herself as a women
on a planet dominated by those who might claim superiority over her,
in racial/ethnic or gendered terms. Here, Danaija does not seem to be
beckoning, or calling for recognition of her full humanity by one who
is already full human, based on the brief comments above she does not
seem to be in need of being seen by one who is already. Rather, she calls
for a particular sort of relational-seeing by way of response-recognition
whereby she would be acknowledged by an “alien” presence.
Rudolf, whose body of online work signifies through double-­
entendre, talk of current events in a cosmological and mythological reg-
ister, and cosmological and mythological discourse by way of current
events, is ever a signifying alien. He replies to this appeal from a human
for a word from an alien voice, “what is the problem? Send an email.”
Did she, or do we, expect Rudy to respond with an esoteric series
of incantations meant to tap into a plane of existence that would link
presumed alien life with human life? A response from an “alien” would
undoubtedly suggest more than simply “send an email.” Yet, in Rudy’s
suggestion to send an email we find a kind of rationality at work in the
mind of a self-professed “Alien.” Why elaborate ritual or incantation,
why distribute secret spells when, in fact, we already possess the means
of communication with this “alien?” The YouTuber, after all, found
Rudy online, sending an email would seem the most likely and logical
means of transmission. Rudy seems to be critiquing the means by which
far too many of us (as humans) and for our purposes here (as humanists)
reinforce the objects of our disbelief by way of our assumed disconnec-
tions between the sacredness or specialness of those disbelieved objects
(e.g., Aliens) and hence, our capacity to navigate the world, from which
our beliefs arise and grow, in which we live. How many of us would
admit that our means of epistemological conclusions drawn (about alien
life in a galaxy far, far away) are the result of a disbelief in the object of
the alien, or a result of our disbelief in our capacity to be in contact with
that alien object?
Rudy’s suggestion to send an email disrupts this particular episte-
mological mode of construction, while likewise it offers a fairly basic
reminder of a too often taken for granted adage, “where there is a will,
166  C.M. Driscoll

there is a way.” Perhaps, in our efforts at “contact”—alien to human,

human to humanist, humanist to believer, humanist to alien, human to
human—we might be assuming the work to be far more difficult than
needed. In making this anti-Occamist leap, we guard against our abil-
ity to be changed, and made better, and more complete, by way of the
aliens and alien voices that we have access to at every turn of our lives.
In one video concerning the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, Rudy
refers to Democratic Vice Presidential candidate Tim Kaine as an “abso-
lute, Catholic, Jesuit spy for the Vatican.”21 Connected to this con-
spiratorial critique is his overall impression of Democratic presidential
candidate Hillary Clinton, which ranges from her working on behalf of
satanic forces to the suggestion that she was too ill to hold office, and
that if elected, her time in this world would be limited by her health.
Regarding Clinton working on behalf of such powers, the anti-Semitic
allusion and overtones are undeniable. With less of the history of race/
religion/ethnic marginalization in mind, it is a much larger statement
about the neo-liberal, globalist, New World Order agenda Clinton rep-
resents for many voters. In another video, Rudy explains his appreciation
for Donald J. Trump:

We now have a new opportunity to find a presidential candidate who is

working in our interest, in the interest of the tall white aliens. And this
candidate is Donald Trump. Because Donald Trump is a very jumpy per-
son. He has a very jumpy, unconcentrated mind. Most of the time, he does
not even know what he is speaking about. These are the perfect prerequi-
sites for us tall whites to take over his mind for several hours a day, to make
the most important decisions for the United States of America, through
his mouth.22

Rudy goes on to explain that anything that comes out of Trump’s

mouth will be “the will of the tall whites.”23 Sifting through the eso-
teric mythology is no small task. “His mind will be taken over by the
tall white alien race,”24 Rudy tells his audience. The German Karl is vic-
tim to an alien mounting, a twist on the old notion of spirit possession,
and through this possession we receive messages from Rudy. Rudy tells
us that largely the same process takes place with Donald Trump, who is
then compelled to act on behalf of tall whites everywhere.
In many respects, more than can be fully addressed here, to talk of an
alien race and the tall whites is overwhelmingly absurd and contradictory
 8  RUDY’S PARADOX: THE ALIENATION OF RACE AND ITS NON-HUMANS  167

to the rational and logical sensibilities that mark so many of us as

­humanists. This essay does not want to fight against those ­sensibilities.
Nor does it reinforce the specific claims made by Rudy or the acute
specifications of the world view or cosmology he offers. However, if
­
we can somehow see beyond the absurdity of his cosmology in order
to learn from it, what might be offered for a humanist interpretation
of this galaxy and world where tall whites are all too real, and their
­consequences are felt the world over?

Conclusion
Rudy offers a paradox to us in that he asks more from us than most are
willing (and maybe, able) to provide. As the world, the western one (par-
ticularly) continues to seemingly unravel through a wide array of shifts
in public sentiment, transfers of global power, and competing claims to
who the “West” represents, the notion of humanists giving serious atten-
tion to a self-proclaimed Alien in our midst seems a bit misguided. Don’t
the serious times require serious attention? Yes.
However, Rudy’s Paradox is serious, even if his rhetorical packaging
cuts against the better angels of our humanist sensibilities. Whether or
not we organize our humanist efforts in service of understanding aliens
(already among us), to say nothing of potential “alien forces” warned
of by Reagan, is perhaps no higher goal for humanists and humanisms,
today.
Continually, humanist organizations seek to make objects of the
other. How do we reach out to the LGBTQ community? Where can
we find more black humanists? These questions have practical answers,
and rightly, many humanists are interested in finding such answers. But
with respect to the white humanists among us, we’d do well to ­imagine
­ourselves as alien—threatening to humans (unlike us) precisely because
we have such difficulty hearing voices and stories that press our rational
or cultural faculties. Listening to the wisdom of Rudy is not a h
­ omology
for listening to black or brown or queer voices inside or out of the
humanist and secular tribe. Tribal affiliations will organize ­ according
to clan allegiances, regardless. Rather, coming to terms with Rudy’s
paradox involves accepting the limits of rhetorics and postures which
­
overemphasize the alienation we face as white humanists, and r­ esponding
to the antagonisms we promote in the world under service of “our”
168  C.M. Driscoll

humanism. This essay is but one small step in service to the giant leap
needed for any humanism worthy of its namesake, human.

Notes
1.  Ronald Reagan. Address to the 42nd Session of the United Nations
General Assembly in New York, New York—September 21, 1987.
https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1987/092187b.
htm. Accessed February 17, 2017.
2. Kailani Koenig. Flashback: Reagan’s vision for a unifying alien invasion.
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/flashback-reagans-vision-unifying.
Accessed February 27, 2017.
3. Christopher M. Driscoll, White Lies: Race and Uncertainty in the Twilight
of American Religion (Routledge, 2016). See Chap. 3 for a discussion of
“uncertain humanism” for more information on this humanist posture.
4. Bernard Schweizer, Hating God: The Untold Story of Misotheism (Oxford
University Press, 2010).
5. J.L. Austin. How to Do Things with Words: Second Edition. Revised
(Cambridge: William James Lectures, 1975).
6. See Chap. 4 of this volume for more discussion of double and triple
­jeopardy as it relates to humanism.
7. Michel Maffesoli, The Time of the Tribes: The Decline of Individualism
in Mass Society. 1 edition. (London; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE
Publications Ltd, 1996), 21.
8.  Anthony B. Pinn, Why Lord: Suffering and Evil in Black Theology
(Continuum, 1995).
9. Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics (Bloomsbury Academic, 1981).
10. Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in Paul Rabinow, ed., The
Foucault Reader (Pantheon, 1984), 32–50.
11. Emile Durkheim. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (Dover
Publications, 2008).
12. Ibid.
13. “Fermi’s Paradox (i.e. Where are They?) http://abyss.uoregon.edu/~js/
cosmo/lectures/lec28.html. Accessed February 17, 2017.
14. “Eternal life for you and your loved ones! Rudolf the tall white alien.
No. 276.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AM-RIdsntew. Accessed
February 27, 2017.
15. Rudolf of Germany, the Tall White Alien. “White people are not human.
The original confession.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0k4eh
8Y2G90. Accessed February 27, 2017.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
 8  RUDY’S PARADOX: THE ALIENATION OF RACE AND ITS NON-HUMANS  169

18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCX9977Q36-GvegkIt-3N5Ew/
discussion. Accessed February 27, 2017.
21. “The truth about Hillary Clinton’s coughing fits! Rudolf of Germany.
Part 167” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DrsKJSj6Hc4. Accessed
February 27, 2017.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
 CHAPTER 9

Figuring in Scripture

Allen Dwight Callahan

Prologue
As a biblical scholar I see in Holy Writ a rich if unlikely opportunity
for communication between humanists and non-humanists, or to bor-
row from the prophetic genius of thinker and writer Toni Morrison, a
moment which enables one to boldly proclaim, “Something is missing
there. Something rogue. Something else you have to figure in before you
can figure it out.”1 Free of binding commitments to dogma and doc-
trine, Scripture might offer us a figural language for talking about urgent
matters of common concern to those of faith, those without it, and
those, as philosopher Roberto Unger puts it, who “split the difference.”2
Admittedly, the Bible does not appear to be a likely candidate to ren-
der such service. “To be fair,” writes Richard Dawkins, “much of the
Bible is not systematically evil but just plain weird, as you would expect
of a chaotically cobbled-together anthology of disjointed documents,
composed, revised, translated, distorted and ‘improved’ by hundreds
of anonymous authors, editors and copyists, unknown to us and mostly
unknown to each other, spanning nine centuries.”3 A compendium of
literary arcana compiled by multiple, anonymous editors long ago and

A.D. Callahan (*) 
Roxbury, MA 02119, USA

© The Author(s) 2017 171

M.R. Miller (ed.), Humanism in a Non-Humanist World, Studies
in Humanism and Atheism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57910-8_9
172  A.D. Callahan

far away, the Bible is neither written to, nor written for, people who live
in a world of AIDS and drones and apps and melting ice caps. The pre-
sumption of preachers ancient and modern notwithstanding, the Bible is
not, and cannot be about us.
Reading the Bible, though, is all about us—because when we read it,
it is we who decide that it is about us—or not. We come to the Bible
the way the analysand relates a dream to the analyst; both agree that the
dream can ‘tell’ them something. That something is neither the past
nor the future, though it relates to both. It is not about the dream. It is
about the dreamer.
In his famous essay, ‘Odysseus’s Scar,’ the philologist and literary
critic Eric Auerbach characterized the Biblical narrative as “tyrannous,”
in that it demands that we submit to its “tyranny of truth” and “claims
of absolute authority”: our refusal to do so makes us “rebels” against
that authority.4 And yet if we so choose, we can read Scripture not as
authority but as artifact, wrought in human minds and written with
human hands. As such, we may choose Scripture; it does not, cannot
choose us.
We need not be judged by the Bible. It is we who judge.
Our reading properly begins not with our being judged, but with our
judgments. In his Truth and Method, the German philosopher Hans-
Georg Gadamer observed that we all come to Scripture with Vorurteilen,
translated often as “biases” or “prejudices,” though Gadamer’s German
is innocent of the necessarily pejorative sense that attends the English:
a Vorurteil is but a judgment (Urteil) that comes before (vor), a ‘prior
judgment.’ To come to a judgment about Scripture, Gadamer argued, we
come to it with judgments, a process of interpretation he famously called
the hermeneutical circle.5
Those prior judgments may be checked and transcended, in
Gadamer’s words, by “the priority of the question.” That is, our read-
ing can begin and proceed according to what Gadamer called a “logic of
question and answer” that serves as our agenda for arriving at interpreta-
tions subject to revision. We may come to Scripture with biases, but we
may also come with questions.
Guided by questions, our prior judgments are but points of depar-
ture: they make possible the acts of creative interpretation that transcend
them. The Swiss developmental psychologist Jean Piaget discovered
that young children, who have yet to develop a sense of perspective in
their perceptions of objects at a distance, make sense of distant vistas
 9  FIGURING IN SCRIPTURE  173

with what he called “corrigible schemata.” Piaget reckoned that chil-

dren posit tentative interpretations of what they see, then correct them
as they become more familiar with what their eyes learn to see with a
perspectival view.6 The literary critic E.D. Hirsch drew a brilliant anal-
ogy from Piaget’s observation to the interpretation of literature. Hirsch
argued that as we read, we make judgments only to revise them; what we
think we know about the text is tacitly “corrigible”—we squint, blink,
and refocus as our perspective changes, thus changing our perspective.7
Ours is an age of the image and the icon, an age of looking with-
out seeing and hearing without listening; an age of fundamentalism,
strict constructionism, “original intent,” bibliolatry, and willful illit-
eracy. The public square often becomes a bully pulpit for those rever-
ing an authoritative text, and the Bible is often the text of choice. But a
humanist reading of the Bible would be a species of squinting, blinking,
and refocusing, with the schema perennially subject to revision. Reading
Scripture this way would be an adventure. Surprise would be welcome;
certainty, suspect.
In what follows I essay to show how we might so read three iconic
figures of the Bible: Moses, David, and Mary.

The Slayers of Moses

In a lecture on the figure of Moses, I once proposed to a group of semi-
nary students—the future leaders of the churches to which they would
be dispatched upon graduation—that Moses is a dispensable charac-
ter in the biblical story of the Exodus. I suggested that the story of the
enslaved Hebrews’ escape from Egypt could be, indeed had been told
without mention of him.
The seminarians were aghast. They knew the story: after all, they had
not only read the book, they had seen the movie. And they, of all people,
were persuaded of the indispensability of strong, divinely guided leadership.
So I asked them to read with me this passage from the Bible.

They tested God again and again, and provoked the Holy One of Israel.
They did not keep in mind his power, or the day when he redeemed
them from the foe; when he displayed his signs in Egypt, and his miracles
in the fields of Zoon. He turned their rivers to blood, so that they could
not drink of their streams. He sent among them swarms of flies, which
devoured them,
174  A.D. Callahan

and frogs, which destroyed them. He gave their crops to the caterpillar,
and the fruit of their labor to the locust. He destroyed their vines with hail,
and their sycamores with frost. He gave over their cattle to the hail, and
their flocks to thunderbolts. He let loose on them his fierce anger,

wrath, indignation, and distress,

a company of destroying angels.

He made a path for his anger;

he did not spare them from death,

but gave their lives over to the plague.

He struck all the firstborn in Egypt,

the first issue of their strength in the tents of Ham.

Then he led out his people like sheep,

and guided them in the wilderness like a flock.

He led them in safety, so that they were not afraid;

but the sea overwhelmed their enemies. (Psalm 78: 41–55)

I then asked them to read the following passage:

He it was who struck down the firstborn of Egypt,

both human beings and animals;

he sent signs and wonders

into your midst, O Egypt,

against Pharaoh and all his servants. (Psalm 135: 8–9)

We then read together this passage:

To him who struck Egypt through their firstborn,

for his steadfast love endures for ever;

and brought Israel out from among them,

 9  FIGURING IN SCRIPTURE  175

for his steadfast love endures for ever;

with a strong hand and an outstretched arm,

for his steadfast love endures for ever;

who divided the Red Sea in two,

for his steadfast love endures for ever;

and made Israel pass through the midst of it,

for his steadfast love endures for ever;

but overthrew Pharaoh and his army in the Red Sea,

for his steadfast love endures for ever;

who led his people through the wilderness,

for his steadfast love endures for ever. (Psalm 136: 10–15)

… And this one:

Thus says the Lord God: On the day when I chose Israel, I swore to the
offspring of the house of Jacob—making myself known to them in the land
of Egypt—I swore to them, saying, I am the Lord your God. On that day
I swore to them that I would bring them out of the land of Egypt into a
land that I had searched out for them, a land flowing with milk and honey,
the most glorious of all lands. … Then I thought I would pour out my
wrath upon them and spend my anger against them in the midst of the
land of Egypt. But I acted for the sake of my name, that it should not
be profaned in the sight of the nations among whom they lived, in whose
sight I made myself known to them in bringing them out of the land of
Egypt. So I led them out of the land of Egypt and brought them into the
wilderness. (Ezekiel 20: 5–10)

… And then, this one:

When the priest takes the basket from your hand and sets it down before
the altar of the Lord your God, you shall make this response before the
Lord your God: ‘A wandering Aramean was my ancestor; he went down
into Egypt and lived there as an alien, few in number, and there he became
a great nation, mighty and populous. When the Egyptians treated us
harshly and afflicted us, by imposing hard labour on us, we cried to the
176  A.D. Callahan

Lord, the God of our ancestors; the Lord heard our voice and saw our
affliction, our toil, and our oppression. The Lord brought us out of Egypt
with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm, with a terrifying display of
power, and with signs and wonders; and he brought us into this place and
gave us this land, a land flowing with milk and honey. (Deuteronomy 26:
4–9)

Moses was nowhere to be found in any of these passages about the

Exodus.
Likewise the following summary of the events of the Exodus that
appears earlier in Deuteronomy says nothing of Moses.

When your son asks you in time to come, “What is the meaning of the tes-
timonies and the statutes and the ordinances which the Lord our God has
commanded you?,” then you shall say to your son, “We were Pharaoh’s
slaves in Egypt; and the Lord brought us out of Egypt with a mighty
hand; and the Lord showed signs and wonders, great and grievous, against
Egypt and against Pharaoh and all his household, before our eyes; and he
brought us out from there, that he might bring us in and give us the land
which he swore to give to our fathers.” (Deuteronomy 6: 20–23)

Both of the accounts of the Exodus in the book of Deuteronomy offer a

narrative summary in which Moses does not appear. They are placed, as
is all the discourse in Deuteronomy, on the lips of Moses himself!
Moses’ centrality in the story of Exodus, as it turns out, is the robust
figment of ancient redaction. A careful reading of these ancient ver-
sions of the Exodus helps us to see clearly what the canonical history
of the Bible, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Cecil B. De Mille’s The Ten
Commandments, DreamWorks Animation’s Prince of Egypt, and, most
recently, Ridley Scott’s Exodus: Gods and Kings have all almost hopelessly
obscured: that from the beginning the story of the Exodus and the wil-
derness wanderings had been told and retold in ancient Israel without
mention of Moses.
In Moses and Monotheism, Freud infamously claimed that the Hebrews
killed Moses in the wilderness, and that the legends about him in the
Pentateuch are the canonical cover-up for their ancient crime and sub-
limated guilt. But by attending to its silences as well as its statements
about him, we see that it is the Bible that bestows upon Moses a life that
is larger than life.
And that it is the Bible that kills him.
 9  FIGURING IN SCRIPTURE  177

Then Moses went up from the plains of Moab to Mount Nebo, to the top
of Pisgah, which is opposite Jericho, and the Lord showed him the whole
land: Gilead as far as Dan, all Naphtali, the land of Ephraim and Manasseh,
all the land of Judah as far as the Western Sea, the Negeb, and the Plain—
that is, the valley of Jericho, the city of palm trees—as far as Zoar. The
Lord said to him, “This is the land of which I swore to Abraham, to Isaac,
and to Jacob, saying, ‘I will give it to your descendants’; I have let you see
it with your eyes, but you shall not cross over there.” Then Moses, the
servant of the Lord, died there in the land of Moab, at the Lord’s com-
mand. (Deuteronomy 34: 1–5)

The entry of the Hebrews into the Promised Land effectively begins
with the repeated announcement of Moses’ death.

After the death of Moses the servant of the Lord, the Lord spoke to
Joshua son of Nun, Moses’ assistant, saying, “My servant Moses is dead.
Now proceed to cross the Jordan, you and all this people, into the land
that I am giving to them, to the Israelites. Every place that the sole of your
foot will tread upon I have given to you, as I promised to Moses. (Joshua
1: 1–3)

The stories of Moses are the Bible’s attempt to convince us that he was
a great leader in spite of his famous failure to lead the Children of Israel
into the Promised Land; that though he was spectacularly ineffectual,
the Law that bears his name remains in effect; and that Moses left the
Hebrews a divine legacy even as he left them stranded on the Plains of
Moab.
But any great movement is greater than its leaders. Great movements
make great leaders—not the other way around. At the height of the
Civil Rights movement, when Martin Luther King, Jr. was being lauded
as “the Moses of his people,” the movement’s greatest strategist, Ella
Baker—a brilliant grassroots organizer and vocal critic of hierarchical,
messianic leadership—crisply chastened the young, star-struck activists
around her, “the Civil Rights movement made Martin, and not Martin
the movement.”
“Strong people,” Ella Baker insisted, “don’t need strong lead-
ers.” Some ancient Israelite griots knew that the Hebrews did not need
Moses, just as we do not need leaders who are greater than the move-
ments they lead, celebrities greater than their causes célébrés, and revolu-
tionaries greater than their revolutions.
178  A.D. Callahan

Who Killed Goliath?

The Hebrew Bible devotes more airtime to King David than any other
single character. The stories of David and his descendants are recounted
variously in 1 and 2 Samuel, 1 and 2 Kings, and 1 and 2 Chronicles. By
sheer heft, the legends of the House of David dominate the perspective
and propaganda of the Old Testament as we now have it.
Of his most famous exploit, his showdown with Goliath, the Bible
tells us with great fanfare that as a diminutive shepherd boy David slew
the Philistine giant.
Or did he?
2 Samuel 21: 19 tells us that a certain Elhanan from David’s home-
town of Bethlehem killed the giant Goliath. Famously, the King James
or Authorized Version of the Bible reads here, “And there was again
a battle in Gob, with the Philistines, where Elhanan the son of Iaare-
Oregim, a Bethlehemite, slew the brother of Goliath the Gittite, the staff
of whose spear was like a weaver’s beam” (italics in the original). The
KJV italicizes the words “the brother of” to indicate, as is its editorial
convention, that these words are not in the original Hebrew text.The
Greek Septuagint (ca. 200 B.C.), the Peshitta Syriac (100 A.D. or later),
and Jerome’s Latin Vulgate (ca. 400 A.D.), all scrupulously faithful,
even occasionally literal translations of the original Hebrew, agree with
all extant Hebrew manuscripts of 2 Samuel 21 that Elhanan, not David,
slew Goliath.
Another giant from Goliath’s hometown of Gath and bearing
Goliath’s description “taunted Israel,” and is slain by “Jonathan, son of
David’s brother Shimei” (2 Samuel 21: 20–21). Then in 1 Chronicles
20: 5 we read that Elhanan killed “Lahmi, the brother of Goliath,” and
some “Jonathan”—otherwise unidentified—slew an anonymous giant
again bearing a description identical to that of Goliath in 1 Samuel 17.
Even the books of Chronicles, which do all they can to enhance David’s
luster, agree with the rest of the Bible’s story tellers that there were sev-
eral giant-killers in Israel, but that David was not among them.
The narrative of David’s victory over Goliath in the seventeenth chap-
ter of 1 Samuel has come down to us as a composite account. One nar-
rative begins at 17: 1–11, resuming at 17: 32 and continuing to 17: 58.
A secondary account, 17: 12–31, is now nested in it. It recapitulates the
information about David’s family—the name of his father, the location of
the family homestead, the number of David’s brothers—information that
 9  FIGURING IN SCRIPTURE  179

the first narrative introduction in 1 Samuel 16: 14–23 already provides.

This secondary narrative is missing in some of the earliest manuscript tra-
ditions. Both the ancient Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible called
the Septuagint and the 2000 year old Hebrew copy of 1 Samuel found in
the middle of the twentieth century at Qumran on the northern shore of
the Dead Sea in Israel lack this secondary passage.
The secondary account, 17: 12–31, is an ancient interpolation.
Its absence is not the question: much of it is superfluous to the story
of David’s victory that is interrupted in 17: 11 and resumed in 17: 32.
The story reads quite well without the interpolation, as the scribes of the
Septuagint and of Qumran knew well. The question is not the absence of
the passage in the early manuscript traditions, but its presence in the later
ones. Just what is 1 Samuel 17: 12–31 doing between 1 Samuel 17: 11
and 1 Samuel 17: 32?
1 Samuel 17: 12–31 offers the features of a lively, thoughtfully con-
trived fable. That Goliath does 40 days of trash-talking (17: 16) is a
narrative detail that marks the story as legendary. “Forty days” is the ste-
reotypical period of ordeal in the Bible: 40 days and 40 nights of rain in
the story of the Flood (Genesis 7: 12); Moses communes with God on
Mount Sinai for 40 days and 40 nights (Exodus 24: 18; 34: 28); Israelite
spies reconnoiter Canaan for 40 days (Numbers 13: 25); Jesus fasts in
the wilderness for 40 days and 40 nights (Matthew 4: 2) . For those with
ears to hear the story for the fable that it is, “forty days” is the phatic
equivalent of’’once upon a time.’
The narrative is marked with fanciful detail throughout. Goliath’s
height is “six cubits and a span” (17: 4)—nine and a half feet tall; the
Septuagint and the Qumran manuscripts read a more plausible but
impressive four cubits and a span, i.e., six and a half feet tall. Goliath
wears one hundred twenty-five pounds of armor, and carries ten-pound
spearheads; one of the weapons in Goliath’s formidable arsenal is “a
spear the length of a weaver’s beam.” Now, every giant killed in the
Bible—every one of them—has a spear “the length of a weaver’s beam.
” Coincidence? Standard issue for all giants in Iron-Age Palestine? It
is more likely that the phrase is a convention for describing a very big
spear—but a mark of the fabulous in the narrative. Malcolm Gladwell
has argued that Goliath’s towering stature was due to agromegaly, a con-
dition caused by a benign tumor on the pituitary gland that spurs the
gland to overproduce human growth hormone.8 But the giant’s height,
as well as the ponderous weight of his armor and the extraordinary
180  A.D. Callahan

length of his spear, are all the features of legend. A diseased pituitary
gland is no more the cause of Goliath’s size than it is Paul Bunyan’s or
Thumbelina’s.
The story, then, bids us read it as the tall tale that it is—the way we
might read a fable of Aesop. Bees, primates, and cetaceans have their own
language, but that fact of biology does not help us to understand the gar-
rulousness of Aesop’s animals. In the same way that it would make little
sense to try to square Aesop’s story of a conversation between a scorpion
and a frog with the findings of contemporary scientific research on inter-
species communication, it makes little sense to try to square an Iron-Age
legend with the history and archaeology of Iron-Age Palestine.
The story of David and Goliath is just that—a story. It is not history.
Because we may recognize it to be a canny fiction, we need not, indeed
should not treat it as historical. Because we know it did not ‘happen’, we
need not expend all manner of sophisticated analysis and historiographic
ingenuity trying to figure out how it could have.
We also need not be troubled with theology. The episode of David
and Goliath is one of the longest discrete narratives of the Bible—and
one of the most secular. Yes, there is David’s pious rhetoric about “the
Lord of Hosts, the a God of the armies of Israel”; that “the battle is the
Lord’s” and that “there is a God in Israel.” But all the God-talk in the
story is found in the mouth of David, with the sole exception of Saul’s
lame benediction, “Go, and the Lord be with you” (1 Samuel 17: 37)
—little more than ancient Hebrew parlance for ‘good luck.’ The narra-
tor says nothing about God: there are no angels, no prophecies, and no
miracles. David is not divinely summoned to fight Goliath; he does so
entirely on his initiative. He takes the field without divine guidance, and
solicits none. At no time does David call upon God for help; when he
descends into the valley to fight Goliath, he does so literally without a
prayer.
If David is a hero—and the Bible is divided on the question—he is
a hero of desire. Psalm 23, popularly ascribed to David, begins, “the
Lord is my shepherd, I shall not want” (23: 1). David is quintessentially
a man who wants, sees what he wants, then risks everything to pursue
it. (Yes, all of David’s desires ultimately bring him to grief. But what is
the heart’s desire, if not the prelude to trouble?) And in this instance
David pursues his desire for wealth, status, and freedom by exploiting an
opportunity to tell, over and against the other stories told about him, an
assertive, grandiose version of his own story.
 9  FIGURING IN SCRIPTURE  181

The Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Aidichie has warned of “the dan-

ger of a single story,” the belief—always unfounded—that there is only a
single story, one single story.9 Woven into the text of David and Goliath
are no less than five stories about David, told cheek by jowl with each
other.
There is one narrator’s story about David:

Now David was the son of an Ephrathite of Bethlehem in Judah, named

Jesse, who had eight sons. In the days of Saul the man was already old
and advanced in years. The three eldest sons of Jesse had followed Saul to
the battle; the names of his three sons who went to the battle were Eliab
the firstborn, and next to him Abinadab, and the third Shammah. David
was the youngest; the three eldest followed Saul, but David went back and
forth from Saul to feed his father’s sheep at Bethlehem. (17: 12–15)

Then there is another narrator’s story about David:

So Saul said to his servants, “Provide for me someone who can play well,
and bring him to me.” One of the young men answered, “I have seen a
son of Jesse the Bethlehemite who is skillful in playing, a man of valor,
a warrior, prudent in speech, and a man of good presence; and the Lord
is with him.” So Saul sent messengers to Jesse, and said, “Send me your
son David who is with the sheep.” Jesse took a donkey loaded with bread,
a skin of wine, and a kid, and sent them by his son David to Saul. And
David came to Saul, and entered his service. Saul loved him greatly, and
he became his armor-bearer. Saul sent to Jesse, saying, “Let David remain
in my service, for he has found favor in my sight.” And whenever the evil
spirit from God came upon Saul, David took the lyre and played it with his
hand, and Saul would be relieved and feel better, and the evil spirit would
depart from him. (1 Sam. 16: 17–23)

Eliab tells an unflattering story about David:

His eldest brother Eliab heard him talking to the men; and Eliab’s anger
was kindled against David. He said, “Why have you come down? With
whom have you left those few sheep in the wilderness? I know your pre-
sumption and the evil of your heart; for you have come down just to see
the battle.” (17: 28)

Then Saul, apparently in the light of first impressions (see 1 Sam. 17:
55–58), tells his own unflattering story about David:
182  A.D. Callahan

Saul said to David, “You are not able to go against this Philistine to
fight with him; for you are just a boy, and he has been a warrior from his
youth.” (17: 33)

And then there is David’s immodest story about himself:

But David said to Saul, “Your servant used to keep sheep for his father;
and whenever a lion or a bear came, and took a lamb from the flock, I
went after it and struck it down, rescuing the lamb from its mouth; and
if it turned against me, I would catch it by the jaw, strike it down, and
kill it. Your servant has killed both lions and bears; and this uncircum-
cised Philistine shall be like one of them, since he has defied the armies of
the living God.” David said, “The Lord, who saved me from the paw of
the lion and from the paw of the bear, will save me from the hand of this
Philistine.” (17: 37)

It is this last story that proves decisive—the story of a daring young man
who has a plan for his life when there is no sign that God does.
The story of David, then, is a story neither about history nor about
theology, but about stories. It suggests that those who dare to get what
they want must tell their own story. They must tell that story over and
against the stories told about them. In the story that they tell about
themselves, they must be victorious, infallible, unstoppable. And so
to tell their story the way they must tell it, they must say things about
themselves that are dubious, that are unsubstantiated, even exaggerated.
They must tell such a story about themselves, and then they must stake
their life on it.
David, the stripling with a sling, is the Bible’s poster child for such
audacious story-telling.

Hail Mary, Full of Piss and Vinegar

Traditionally called the “Magnificat,” the song is so named for the first
word of its first verse in the Latin Vulgate translation of the Bible: mag-
nificat anima mea Dominum, “my soul magnifies the Lord.”

My soul magnifies the Lord,

and my spirit rejoices in God my Savior,

 9  FIGURING IN SCRIPTURE  183

for he has looked on the humble estate of his servant.

For behold, from now on all generations will call me blessed;

for he who is mighty has done great things for me,

and holy is his name.

And his mercy is for those who fear him

from generation to generation.

He has shown strength with his arm;

he has scattered the proud in the thoughts of their hearts;

he has brought down the mighty from their thrones

and exalted those of humble estate;

he has filled the hungry with good things,

and the rich he has sent away empty.

He has helped his servant Israel,

in remembrance of his mercy,

as he spoke to our fathers,

to Abraham and to his offspring forever. (Luke 1: 46–55)

The Magnificat is the longest speaking part of any woman in the New
Testament, though in Christian iconography an image of Mary speaking
is very, very hard to come by. (Try finding one.) It is the first of three
songs in the opening chapters of the Gospel Luke that now number
among the greatest hits of ancient Christian hymnody. The second is
the “Benedictus” (Benedictus, ‘Blessed be’) of Zachariah, the father of
John the Baptist (Luke 1: 68–79); the third is the aged Simeon’s “Nunc
Dimittus” (Nunc Dimittus, ‘now you are dismissing,’ Luke 2: 29–32).
All three songs are paeans of praise to the God who is a savior (1: 47),
who has promised to save (1: 71), and whose salvation has been made
manifest (2: 30).
Many commentators have noted the Magnificat owes much in form
and content to the song of Hannah in the Hebrew Bible’s book of 1
Samuel.
184  A.D. Callahan

Hannah prayed and said,

“My heart exults in the Lord;
my strength is exalted in my God.
My mouth derides my enemies,
because I rejoice in my victory.
There is no Holy One like the Lord,
no one besides you;
there is no Rock like our God.
Talk no more so very proudly,
let not arrogance come from your mouth;
for the Lord is a God of knowledge,
and by him actions are weighed.
The bows of the mighty are broken,
but the feeble gird on strength.
Those who were full have hired themselves out for bread,
but those who were hungry are fat with spoil.
The barren has borne seven,
but she who has many children is forlorn.
The Lord kills and brings to life;
he brings down to Sheol and raises up.
The Lord makes poor and makes rich;
he brings low, he also exalts.
He raises up the poor from the dust;
he lifts the needy from the ash heap,
to make them sit with princes
and inherit a seat of honor.
For the pillars of the earth are the Lord’s,
and on them he has set the world.
He will guard the feet of his faithful ones,
 9  FIGURING IN SCRIPTURE  185

but the wicked shall be cut off in darkness;

for not by might does one prevail.
The Lord! His adversaries shall be shattered;
the Most High will thunder in heaven.
The Lord will judge the ends of the earth;
he will give strength to his king,
and exalt the power of his anointed.”
(1 Samuel 2: 1–10)

The Gospel writer has also lifted—‘sampled’, as it were—language

from the Psalms and other hymnic portions of the Septuagint to round
out the composition. Some of the more obvious instances:

My soul magnifies the Lord,

and my spirit rejoices in God my Savior (1: 46–47)//
.. yet I will rejoice in the Lord; I will exult in the God of my salva-
tion (Habakkuk 3: 18)

His mercy is for those who fear him

from generation to generation (1: 50)//
But the steadfast love of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting
on those who fear him,
and his righteousness to children’s children (Psalm 103: 17)

… he has filled the hungry with good things (1: 53)//

For he satisfies the thirsty,
and the hungry he fills with good things (Psalm 107: 9)

He has helped his servant Israel,

in remembrance of his mercy (1: 54)//
He has remembered his steadfast love and faithfulness
to the house of Israel (Psalm 98: 3)
186  A.D. Callahan

This lyric pastiche of antique hymnody is almost word for word stolen
poetry from the literary heritage of ancient Israel. The writer has com-
posed the Magnificat—as well as the Benedictus and the Nunc Dimittus,
which are also mash-ups of ancient Israelite hymnody—in much the
same way Thucydides and Tacitus composed the speeches that they put
into the mouths of the protagonists of their histories.
But unlike the protagonists in the histories of Thucydides and Tacitus,
Mary and Zachariah and Simeon are not independently attested in impe-
rial annals or court archives or archaeological remains: they are not, as
Pericles or Nero, figures of history. The Gospel writer is the librettist
here: these songs attest to the theology of the writer, not the theology
that may have been held by three people who have no historical exist-
ence. Unlike Pericles and Nero, they were not real people. There can be
no ‘search for the historical Mary’. The singer of the Magnificat does
not, properly speaking, have a history.
But the Magnificat does. And it is that history that is important here.
In many Christian churches the Magnificat is read a few weeks before
Christmas, when millions are spending billions buying what many want
and none need. Yet Advent originally celebrated a poor, unwed moth-
er’s positive pregnancy test; it is an affirmation that God has filled her
and those like her “with good things,” and an ominous warning to the
lords of Lord & Taylor that God “has sent them away empty.” The rhet-
oric does not mix well with the Muzak: it is a discourse on power far
removed from power shopping. And so, in the frenetic season of enti-
tled materialism that Advent has become, we hear few strains of the
Magnificat at the local mall.
Yet the Magnificat is one of the world’s oldest hymns, and has pro-
vided the lyrics for centuries of Christian hymnody. It is a canticle in the
Catholic office of Vespers, in the Anglican Evensong, and in the mag-
isterial oratorios of Monteverdi, Bach, Vivaldi, Rachmaninoff, and John
Rutter. Martin Luther insisted that Mary’s song “must be learned well
and remembered by all.” The German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer
found her song “at once the most passionate, the wildest, one might
even say most revolutionary Advent hymn ever sung… the tones of
the… prophets of the Old Testament now come to life.” Too popular to
remain in Advent, the Magnificat has appeared under the hymnal rubrics
of “Praise,” “Justice,” and “New Creation” in contemporary Christian
hymnals, in the poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins, and on the amulets of
devout Nicaraguan peasants.
 9  FIGURING IN SCRIPTURE  187

And the song has been banned. Repeatedly.

During the British rule of India, the Magnificat was prohibited from
being sung in Anglican churches, and the Archbishop of Canterbury
instructed his priests never to read it in public. In Buenos Aires, the
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo—whose children were “disappeared” dur-
ing the Dirty War—placed the words of the song on posters throughout
the capital plaza. The military junta of Argentina then outlawed any pub-
lic recitation of the song and forbid the public display of its lyrics. And
in the 1980s, while waging a genocidal civil war against the indigenous
Maya, the right-wing government of Guatemala banned the public reci-
tation of the song.
Mary’s song is a lyrical response to the impossible possibility of grace
in the face of disgrace—and in the shadow of death, a very real possibil-
ity for this lone young woman who appears to have committed a capi-
tal offense. Several centuries after Mary’s canticle had been published in
the New Testament, the Talmud would describe the traditional Jewish
penalties for pregnancy out of wedlock: depending upon the attendant
circumstances of the offense, she was to be stoned, strangled to death
(Kethuboth 44b–45a), or burned alive (Sanhedrin 9: 1).
According to the Magnificat, the destruction of the high and the
mighty is a done deal. God has confounded them, taken them down, and
has left the wealthy broke and rejected. All this appears to be a matter
of record, proclaimed in the perfect tense—reported as though it had
already happened.
But had any of these wonderful things happened anywhere in first-
century Palestine? Mary’s words are so far from the plight of a poor,
young, unwed Palestinian mother-to-be as to be downright impossi-
ble. The passage of time, the centuries of countless victories of might
over right have made them even more impossible—if that were possible.
Outrageous claims so ridiculously, flamboyantly utopian—could anyone
ever have taken this song seriously?
At the height of its power, the British Empire took it quite seriously.
So did the Dirty Warriors of Argentina’s military junta. And so did the
state terrorists of Guatemala. And apparently they all were deathly afraid
of what might happen if others did, too.
Apparently, just singing this song is an affirmation that the impossible
has happened: the mighty have been brought down from their thrones,
the humble have been exalted, the hungry have been filled with good
things, and the rich have been sent away empty. The verbs, though
188  A.D. Callahan

rendered in English in the perfect tense, are aorists, signifying completed

action at a point in the past. This strident judgment against the One
Percent is not safely sequestered in eschatology: there is no future tense
of the someday-that-may-never-come, no present tense of the divine pre-
rogative-that-may-never-be-exercised. The aorist verbs have made this
declared class warfare against the rich a matter of record.
It is this seditious grammar that has made the Magnificat a threat
to all regimes of ‘full spectrum dominance’ with a strong tradition of
Marian devotion, setting the Magnificat apart from the other opening
numbers of the Lukan musical, and from much of the rest of the Bible.
And so Mary’s Song has put the fear of God into more modern repres-
sive regimes than anything else in scripture – including anything in scrip-
ture attributed to her illustrious Son.

Postscript
The Apostle Paul writes to the Romans, “whatever was written in for-
mer days was written for our instruction.” He is talking about “what-
ever was written” in the Scriptures of ancient Israel—the Law of Moses,
the Prophets, the Psalms. Speaking of a story he had read in those
Scriptures, he writes in one of his letters to the Corinthians, “all these
things… are written for our admonition.” The narcissism is so quaint, so
apt and urgent: “for our admonition,” “for our instruction”: the notion
that somehow, “all these things” in the Bible were written for us, even
though none of them were written to us, and none of them were written
by people who either knew us or knew of us.
But eschewing the narcissism—and the anachronism, and the sol-
ipsism—of readers like the Apostle Paul, Scripture in our time is ripe
to be read another way. The way the ancient Ionian philosophers read
Greek mythology and came up with allegory; or the way Freud read
Greek tragedy and came up with the Oedipus Complex; or the way Tom
Stoppard read Hamlet and came up with Rosenkrantz and Guilderstern
are Dead. That is to say, the Bible might be read as a book about us,
the living; not a book of history, but a book of stories—our stories. Its
figural language might yet be made to reflect “something missing,”
“something rogue” about our contemporary condition, which we all—as
people of faith, people without it, and people who split the difference—
are desperately trying to figure out.
 9  FIGURING IN SCRIPTURE  189

Notes
1. Toni Morrison, Jazz (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 228.
2. Roberto Unger, The Religion of the Future (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2014), 123.
3. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (New York: Random House, 2009),
268.
4. Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western
Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask. Princeton, 1953, repr. 1974), 3–23.
5. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury, 1975),
235–245.
6. See Jean Piaget, The Child’s Conception of the World (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1928).
7. E. D. Hirsch, The Aims of Interpretation (New York: University of Chicago
Press, 1976), 32–34.
8. Malcolm Gladwell, David and Goliath: Underdogs, Misfits, and the Art of
Battling Giants (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2014), 13–14.
9. Chimamanda Aidichie, https://www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adi-
chie_the_danger_of_a_single_story/transcript?language=en.
 PART III

Humanism in a Non-Humanist World

 CHAPTER 10

A Case for Community: Within and Beyond

the Four Walls

Mike Aus

A Humanist Beginning
After working in various forms of Christian ministry for more than
20 years, in March 2012 I publicly came out as a non-believer in a tel-
evision interview with MSNBC’s Chris Hayes. I fully expected Christian
friends not to understand my decision, and there was certainly plenty of
criticism that followed. However, I did not anticipate one development
and it caught me completely by surprise. Gradually, former church mem-
bers I had once ministered to began to approach me, expressing and con-
fiding in me about their own doubts about the faith. Several said they too
could no longer accept the dogmas and metaphysical claims of religion.
Indeed, some remarked they had not really believed the theology for
many years. They stayed in religion largely for the other benefits it offered,
or simply out of social decorum. One retired man, who had been an active
church member his entire life and had probably served on virtually every
conceivable church committee, stated the following, “I haven’t bought
into any of this for a long time. Long ago I concluded that Jesus was just

M. Aus (*) 
Houston, TX, USA

© The Author(s) 2017 193

M.R. Miller (ed.), Humanism in a Non-Humanist World, Studies
in Humanism and Atheism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57910-8_10
194  M. Aus

a really good salesman.” Some of these non-believing church members

began to wonder if we could find a new way to continue living in commu-
nity without the theological baggage of religion. At the same time these
conversations were happening, I was also encountering people in local
freethought groups who were interested in exploring a new type of organ-
ization that would fill different needs than what current groups provided.
We formed a planning team, about half of whom were long-time free-
thinkers and the other half representative of those who had recently left
religion. The purpose was to create a completely secular alternative to
church, grounded in reason and Humanist values, and gathering together
for education, inspiration, service and mutual support. After meeting
weekly for most of the summer, the planning team launched Houston
Freethought Oasis in September of 2012. (We typically refer to the group
as “Houston Oasis”). When the organization launched, we had no strong
sense of the need for, or solidity of, a market for a completely secular
alternative to church in our city. The first weekly gathering was attended
by around 20 people. Now the group regularly draws between 90–100
people to its weekly gatherings, with well over one hundred on special
occasions. Every week, new people show up to participate.
Of course Houston Oasis is not unique; secular, godless congrega-
tions are beginning to emerge around the country. Some such groups,
such as the Harvard Humanist Community, have been around for years.
A year and a half after the foundation of Houston Oasis, a sister com-
munity, “Kansas City Oasis” launched. As these types of communities
continue to spread and grow across the country, they have the poten-
tial to serve as catalysts for introducing the non-humanist world to the
Humanist message in new ways. Beyond the freethought blogosphere
and the annual cycle of humanist, skeptic and atheist conventions that
have largely defined the freethought movement to this point, the crea-
tion of such communities offer a new and exciting way to promote, and
introduce others to Humanist values.
America is swiftly becoming dramatically more secular. Numerous
studies have confirmed that the religiously unaffiliated segment of the
population—“the Nones”—are growing more quickly than any other
“religious” group. Additionally, church attendance continues to decline,
and many prominent denominations are struggling with the impact of
decreasing membership, and hence financial resources. Yet, while secular-
ism is ascendant due to an increasing jettisoning of religious belief, the
Humanist option is still not widely known or recognized. In the United
 10  A CASE FOR COMMUNITY: WITHIN AND BEYOND THE FOUR WALLS  195

States, Humanism is still not a household word, and the brand is cer-
tainly not as widely acknowledged as the Catholic, Baptist, or Methodist
brands—or, for that matter, the brand of just about any other Christian
denomination, or sect of traditional religious faith. The size of major
national freethought groups, such as the American Humanist Association
and Center for Inquiry, is not currently commensurate with a movement
hoping to have pervasive national significance. The membership rosters of
these groups are still in the thousands or tens of thousands, not hundreds
of thousands or millions. Not to in any way denigrate the significant work
these vital groups do, the size of their current membership would barely
qualify as small district or diocese in a mainline religious denomination.
The annual national conventions of these organizations also tend to be
fairly small, and certainly do not garner the same kind of national media
attention as the annual meetings of religious groups such as the Southern
Baptist Convention. National freethougtht organizations undeniably play
a unique and essential role, yet there are inherent constraints on the abil-
ity of such groups alone to convey their message to a broad cross-section
of mainstream America. The occasional billboard campaign or full-page
ad in the New York Times may raise some awareness of secular humanism,
but probably do not do much work towards generating robust enthusi-
asm or commitment to the Humanist movement at the grassroots level.
In his recent book Religion for Atheists, Alain de Botton suggests that
the cultural impact of skeptics, atheists and other freethinkers has been lim-
ited by their zealous efforts at critiquing religion and over-focusing on pub-
lishing books, rather than building secular institutions which could serve as
viable alternatives to religious institutions. In this text, De Botton notes:

While laying out ideas in books—which might sell anywhere from a few
hundred to a few hundred thousand copies at very best—may seem a
noble enough ambition, the medium itself claims a dispiritingly meagre
reach compared to the wide-ranging influence which institutions can wield
in the development and perpetuation of attitudes and behaviours….writing
books can’t be enough if one wishes to change things. Thinkers must mas-
ter the power of institutions for their ideas to have any chance of achieving
a pervasive influence in the world.1

This trenchant observation aptly describes the current situation at

work. The so-called “Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse” (Dawkins,
Dennett, Hitchens and Harris) have all written thorough and devastating
196  M. Aus

bestsellers critiquing the metaphysical claims of religion. Yet, despite

such prolific efforts, religion did not suddenly wither and disappear.
Much of the literary attacks launched by the “New Atheists” have, so
far, had little impact on the numerous evangelical mega-churches pop-
ping up, and sweeping America, such as Lakewood, Saddleback, Willow
Creek, and the Potters House, all of which continue to thrive as institu-
tions even in a time of increasing secularism. The demise of the once-
mighty Crystal Cathedral may be a harbinger of mega-church decline,
but might also just be an anomaly.

Human Needs in a Non-Humanist World

Religious institutions succeed and endure because they meet concrete
human needs that arise on a daily basis—both the needs of their mem-
bers and the needs of the greater community. One such example is the
Mormon Church which has recently made significant inroads among
the Navajo in New Mexico and Arizona by teaching home gardening
techniques. The program started 4 years ago with 25 home gardens,
which has now expanded to over one-thousand eight-hundred gar-
dens. By stepping in and filling a social need that was not being met,
the Mormons established a relationship with the Navajo that successfully
opened doors for conversation about Mormon teachings.2 Humanist
communities could benefit by adopting similar models. Certainly many
Humanist organizations around the country are already engaged in
various charitable works. At a local Humanist meeting I once attended,
there was a plea for donations for overseas disaster relief—a worthwhile
but also a somewhat anonymous way to render assistance. By becoming
the focus of ongoing service projects that engage the local community
in more personal ways, Humanist congregations could help make the
Humanist brand much more visible. Humanist communities are in a
unique position to be the local human face of Humanism and to embody
Humanist values to people for whom Humanism is a new concept.
Leveraging the publicity value of local service projects to open doors
for the Humanist message is not disingenuous; it is simply good mar-
keting. This is certainly not a “bait-and-switch” strategy. On the con-
trary, what could be more consistent with Humanist values than
concerted efforts to identify and meet real human needs? Unlike most
religious groups, Humanists do not have any ulterior motives of convert-
ing or baptizing the people they are helping, they have no end-goal of
 10  A CASE FOR COMMUNITY: WITHIN AND BEYOND THE FOUR WALLS  197

conveying esoteric theologies because Humanism is simply a commit-

ment to the well-being of humans wherever they are. The core concepts
of Humanism are easy to grasp: protecting the dignity of every person,
working for the well-being of humanity, and solving human problems
through a reliance on reason rather than revelation. There is no better
way to communicate these values than by demonstrating them concretely
and consistently. As Humanist congregations continue to emerge and,
hopefully, flourish around the nation, they could become well-known to
the local community as havens of human empowerment.
The ways in which humanist congregations could become centers of
human development are almost endless. At Houston Oasis we experi-
ment with different types of service to discern the best ways our par-
ticular Humanist community can serve the greater Houston area. So far,
most of our service work has been in partnership with already-existing
volunteer programs in the area. We regularly sponsor blood drives and
we have volunteered with Meals on Wheels, Special Olympics, and the
Houston Food Bank. Nearly fifty volunteers from Houston Oasis spent
two consecutive Saturdays renovating a home through Rebuilding
Houston Together. Every time we are out in the community doing vol-
unteer work, we have had opportunities to discuss who we are and what
our Humanist group is about, and we almost always encounter people
who have never heard of Humanism before.
Service projects like these not only provide good publicity and
teachable moments; they also strengthen the fabric of our own group.
Working side by side with other Oasis members for a few hours, peo-
ple inevitably have conversations they might not normally have and strike
up new friendships. At one service project I overheard part of a conver-
sation between two people who had been painting next to each other
for an hour. It went like this: “You know, we should grab a beer some
time.” “Yes, that’s a great idea.” That is precisely how communities are
formed—one conversation at a time.
Local Humanist congregations could also become effective conduits
for the work of national secular organizations, alongside the already-
existing affiliates and local chapters of those groups. For example,
Humanist congregations could sponsor the work of organizations like
Secular Sobriety. We have found that there is a demand for a secular path
to addiction recovery. Secularists struggling with addiction issues do not
need their path recovery complicated by the theological claims which are
so often common in groups like AA. In the same way that a recovering
198  M. Aus

alcoholic can find an AA meeting in almost every city in America, per-

haps someday Humanist congregations across America could provide a
vast network of secular addiction recovery programs.
Humanist congregations can also serve as effective watchdogs for
issues of separation of church and state, bringing local problems to the
attention of national organizations with the legal resources to challenge
the encroachment of religion into the public sphere. With the help of the
Freedom from Religion Foundation, a Houston Oasis member recently
successfully challenged the customary opening prayer at a local school
board meeting. Yes, he could have fought this battle on his own without
help from others, but he found strength in the moral support and advice
of both the Oasis community and FFRF. Taking a stand on a difficult issue
becomes less daunting with the backing of a caring community of friends.
Religious communities have traditionally provided tangible benefits to
their members that are typically not found in other arenas of life, and
there is no reason why secular humanist communities could not provide
many of those same advantages to their members. Churches, synagogues,
and mosques are frequently great places for networking with others on
a variety of life issues. Business contacts develop, and leads on new jobs
are shared. The age diversity of the typical religious community is also a
bonus in this regard, with the membership spanning from infants to the
elderly. Apart from church, most people do not belong to other groups
with such a mixture of ages and life backgrounds. Frequently the older
members impart their life wisdom through informal mentoring. A young
adult member of Oasis expressed this in a talk she gave at one of our
weekly gatherings. She said, “Since coming out as atheist, I’ve missed
the inter-generational interaction that was really prevalent in the Catholic
community. However, Houston Oasis has taken the role that church
used to have because now I have models for families and successful adults
who live without religion.” She further added, “I mean, Carl Sagan is
great and everything, but he’s not going to find me a baby sitter.”3 Here,
she makes an important point. There is far more to life in a humanist
congregation than debunking religion and promoting science. After the
theological underpinnings of religion have been dismantled, what next?
Real human needs remain, needs that are often best met within the con-
text of community life: Where do I find a babysitter who won’t want to
say a bedtime prayer with the kids? Who will drive me to the medical
exam when I cannot drive myself? Where will people be able to share
holiday meals with others when their families live far away? These are just
a few of the practical questions that communities can easily address.
 10  A CASE FOR COMMUNITY: WITHIN AND BEYOND THE FOUR WALLS  199

When Houston Oasis started, we had no formal structure, such as a

“care committee” responsible for tending to the internal needs of the
community. Nevertheless, habits of caring that we often associate with
church life quickly developed spontaneously. During times of illness,
people started requesting visits at the hospital. Community pot-luck
suppers regularly happen all over the city. Oasis members deliver meals
to others in times of illness and other crisis. Such tangible examples of
mutual care often generate good feelings and a deeper sense of personal
commitment to the community’s mission. As secular humanists we prob-
ably don’t want to use the term “pastoral care,” but the need for some-
thing like a secular humanists version of pastoral care clearly exists.
If new secular communities of care and compassion continue to
spread, they could ultimately provide a grassroots donor base for some
significant, large-scale social services and charities similar to what reli-
gious bodies have traditionally offered, such as adoption services, schools,
immigration and refugee services, and much more. Many of the main-
line denominations that support these charitable works are facing budget
shortfalls as membership and worship attendance continue to decline. As
the ability of religious groups to provide social service wanes, government
agencies alone simply will not be able to suddenly fill the void. Networks
of emerging humanist communities could step into the breach and could
even ultimately create a Humanist social service agency with reach and
name-recognition of organizations like Catholic Charities or the Salvation
Army. Something similar could be accomplished with establishing secular
retreats and summer camps for youth programming as well.
Age-appropriate secular programming for youth and children will
become another important contribution made by local Humanist con-
gregations. At first, Houston Oasis only provided basic child care during
the regular weekly meeting. Now, the children receive a simple, reason-
based lesson generally accompanied by a hands-on learning activity. In
addition, this past summer the community sponsored Camp Oasis, a sec-
ular alternative to Vacation Bible School. Participation in the day camp
was not limited to Houston Oasis members. Enrollment was open to any
child. As this program grows it could become another point of Humanist
engagement with the non-humanist world.
In the long run the secular humanist parents at Houston Oasis hope
to develop a full range of ongoing secular programs for middle school
and high school aged youth as well. Houston is still a relatively reli-
gious area, and local Christian youth groups are an important hub of
200  M. Aus

social activity for many young people. Frequently, even young people
from freethinking families end up at Christian youth group events and
Bible camps by default. They go where their friends go, and there are no
enticing secular equivalents to those experiences. Having a viable secular
alternative to the neighborhood Christian youth group would be a posi-
tive development.
For some in the Humanist world all of this talk of building Humanist
institutions undoubtedly sounds too much like church, and anything that
smacks of religion should be avoided by secularists. But it would be a ter-
rible mistake to believe that the legacy of religion has been nothing but
an unmitigated disaster for humanity. While Humanists rightly reject the
metaphysics and superstitions of religion, over the centuries religion has
learned some important lessons about the art of effective community
organizing which anybody interested in creating intentional communi-
ties would do well to heed. Part of the genius of Christianity has been
its ability to adapt to and adopt local customs and culturally contextual
best-practices wherever it has gone. The stereotype of the culturally–impe-
rialistic helmet-wearing Western missionary converting the heathen is
only partially true. Religionists have also worked to preserve local cultures
and languages around the world, and religions have even borrowed freely
from other religions as it suited their purposes. Just as religionists have not
been reticent to borrow from other religions and other cultures, secular
humanist congregations can borrow effective community-building prac-
tices from religion without fear of jeopardizing their core secular values.
For instance, the fact that so many religions have the practice of meet-
ing for weekly services suggests that something about this weekly model
which benefits the creation of strong communities. In reality, most mem-
bers of any organization do not have perfect attendance records at every
meeting. If a group meets only once a month or so, members may actu-
ally only see each other once every 2 or 3 months, which makes build-
ing relationships more difficult. Such infrequency even makes learning
names of new members more difficult. Some secular humanist congrega-
tions have opted for a weekly meeting model not because they want to
imitate church, but simply because the model works. Also some groups
have their meetings on Sundays, not as any acknowledgment of the day’s
sacredness but simply because in our society, Sunday is the day most peo-
ple are available and it is easier to gather a critical mass of people.
The atmosphere and the contents of the local humanist congrega-
tion’s weekly meeting will naturally vary from place to place and will
 10  A CASE FOR COMMUNITY: WITHIN AND BEYOND THE FOUR WALLS  201

be influenced by local culture and context. There is clearly no need for

something like a common Humanist “liturgy” to be used everywhere.
What works for Humanists in the Bible Belt may not work in the
Northeast or Pacific Northwest. At Houston Oasis the group has made
a concerted effort to design a weekly gathering that feels like a distinc-
tively different experience from a church service, yet still retains ele-
ments of uplift and inspiration. Because we did not want a hierarchical
model where a main speaker presents the “truth” for the day from the
podium up front, the leadership intentionally works to bring a variety
of fresh voices to the table each week, using guest speakers from both
within the Oasis community and from outside. The Executive Director
currently presents the main talk only about once a month. Examples of
the wide range of topics discussed each week include: neuroscience, sepa-
ration of church/state issues, domestic abuse, evolutionary psychology,
and the relationship between art and humanism. The goal of each week’s
gathering is simply to explore life together from a secular, reason-based
perspective and to come away learning something new and useful about
humanity’s existence. All presentations typically involve a significant
question and answer period with the audience, along with other forms
of group interaction, such as small group discussion. The end result is
a time of learning and inspiration that looks nothing like the traditional
church service format.
The community has also taken other steps to insure that the weekly
secular humanist gathering is not confused with a religious activity.
The weekly get-together is referred to as a “meeting” or “gathering’;
the term “service” is avoided altogether. There are no times of silence
for meditation and reflection, no pseudo-religious ceremonies, no de-
baptism ceremonies, no candle, incense or anything that might hint at
“spirituality.” To date there have been no funerals, but there has been
some discussion in the community about how to honor and celebrate
the end of a life when that time comes, according to the wishes of the
deceased.

The Art of Humanism

Live music performances are an essential part of each weekly gathering,
but there is no congregational singing. The group’s consensus was that
the act of singing in unison would feel too conformist for a freethought
community. Instead, Houston Oasis relies on the large pool of music
202  M. Aus

talent in the Houston area and some of the best local singer-songwrit-
ers perform each week. Every attempt is made at finding music which
represents the diversity of the human experience and the diversity of the
city in which we live. The music one hears at a typical meeting might be
folk, alt country, blues, jazz, rock or Latin. Developing and maintain-
ing relationships within the music community has proven to be another
significant point of interaction with people beyond the Oasis group. We
are always very clear with the musicians about the nature of our group,
and our music director ensures that no music with religious themes will
sneak in under the radar. Occasionally, regular fans of the musicians will
follow them to a Sunday morning performance and end up becoming
part of the community. A few of the guest musicians have even used the
opportunity to declare their non-theistic, secular perspective for the first
time in public.
In addition to music, the community finds ways to celebrate other
creative arts. One member who is an art history professor, led a field trip
to a local museum, and more museum trips are planned. Community
members routinely share poems that have touched them, and some have
expressed interest in forming a small drama group. Currently the empha-
sis has primarily been on music because the community uses a rented
room for the weekly gathering, and our options for decorating the room
are limited. But once the group has secured a more permanent venue, we
would like painting, sculpture and other arts to have a more prominent
role in our community life.
Religions have long been patrons of the arts, and their patronage
has made possible some of the most stunning art, music, and architec-
ture humans have ever produced. In the past, many freethinking artists
and composers have, out of necessity, had to do their work for religious
institutions. For instance, the Italian Renaissance painter Raphael was an
atheist, as was composer Ralph Vaughn Williams who wrote the musical
setting to the most beloved All Saints’ Day hymn, “For All the Saints.”
As local secular congregations proliferate, grow and build local humanist
centers, perhaps they could provide more opportunities for artists and
musicians to freely do their work without the constraints of religious
dogma.
The idea of humanist communities as local centers for creative and
performing arts holds unique potential as school boards continue to
struggle with severe funding constraints. Over and again we have seen
too often that when local school boards face budget shortfalls, music,
 10  A CASE FOR COMMUNITY: WITHIN AND BEYOND THE FOUR WALLS  203

arts, and drama are frequently the first subjects to be cut from the cur-
riculum because they are sometimes seen as non-essential. But what
could be more essential to the human experience than the creative
arts? From pre-historic hand axes and cave paintings to today, the crea-
tive arts have been inextricably linked to the development of humanity.
Local Humanist congregations could find ways to support and encour-
age young artists, musicians, and writers. Humanist centers could be
designed by visionary architects and filled with the best local art so that
visiting a humanist center would be a stunning, sensory experience. Such
a place would stand as a reminder that humans need more than facts
and pure reason to cope with life’s challenges. We also crave inspiration,
beauty and poetry to motivate us to strive for a better world and lead
better lives.

Making and Marking Humanist Difference

Efforts to carefully differentiate humanist congregations from religion
while simultaneously incorporating some of the best practices of religion
into new humanist institutions may not be enough to sway critics within
the secular humanist movement. For some secular humanists, almost
any form of community seems to be anathema. Tom Flynn, Executive
Director for the Council on Secular Humanism, expressed his misgivings
in a recent issue of “Free Inquiry” where he writes the following:

Still from my admittedly secular humanist perspective, there is something

tragic in the rising popularity of congregational humanism among the
young…. Young atheists escaping from the mega-churches and other pil-
lowy evangelical settings have been victimized by infantilizing institutions.
How sad that the most energetic sects of Christianity’s last few decades
are now disgorging refugees so wounded that real secularism is more than
many of them can grasp for.”4

In response I might first ask, what is wrong with being “pillowy? That
sounds like a good adjective to me. We all need a good pillow to lay
our weary heads on from time to time when buffeted by the challenges
of life. Why does a secular humanism that finds its expression in local
community anything less than “real secularism?” And who gets to define
“real secularism” anyway?
204  M. Aus

It seems that one of the points of “real secularism” would be to

understand and embrace our species as it is, as natural selection has actu-
ally shaped humanity. Homo Sapiens is an intensely tribal species. Why
denigrate the comfort and support that many people find in company of
others when most humans are hard-wired by evolution for just that kind
of existence? Community is the way our ancestors survived and thrived.
Life in community shaped our brains, gave us a Theory of Mind, and
set our Dunbar Number around one-hundred and fifty. Like all human
proclivities and behaviors, the need for community falls on a continuum.
Some people need and desire more community, others less. Some ancient
Christian hermitic monks were apparently quite happy to live out their
lives in near total isolation from others. On the other extreme some reli-
gious groups have emphasized life in extremely tight-knit communes. A
similar spectrum probably exists among freethinkers as well. It is quite
possible that the early pioneers in the freethought movement necessar-
ily had tendencies towards individualism and rigorous self-sufficiency.
Perhaps in the past, when non-theism was even more socially unaccep-
table than it is today, to be an atheist, agnostic, freethinker, or secular
humanist, one had to be comfortable in the role of a non-conformist and
be ready to go against the tide alone.
Some veterans in the freethought movement likely get their mini-
mal needs for human community satisfied by at attending regional or
national conferences and conventions. These are grand events where
movement insiders can re-connect and rekindle old friendship—just like
class reunions. At four such events I have attended, I observed a large
overlap in both the people attending the conferences and the roster of
speakers. Familiar faces make the rounds. This is in no way a criticism of
the convention circuit. In fact, conventions have been a standard feature
of religious life as well, going all the way back at least to the Council of
Nicea in 325 AD. People in all walks of life continue going to conven-
tions and conferences because those events work at several levels. They
generate enthusiasm and inspiration for the cause. The camaraderie expe-
rienced strengthens the bonds of relationships within the movement.

Humanism and the Rest of us

My question is this: What about Humanism for the rest of us? What
about Humanism for the masses of mainstream Americans who may res-
onate with Humanist values but do not have the time or the resources to
 10  A CASE FOR COMMUNITY: WITHIN AND BEYOND THE FOUR WALLS  205

attend the standard national or regional events? What about Humanism

for soccer moms, football dads, and skateboarding kids? By providing
excellent music, speaking, and fellowship, local Humanist congregations
could recreate the uplift of the convention experience in miniature week
after week in communities around the nation, exponentially increas-
ing exposure to the Humanist option that many people may not yet be
familiar with.
Petro-chemical engineers tell us that America is close to achieving
complete energy independence because new technologies are making it
possible to recover large reserves of petroleum that had not been previ-
ously accessible. That may well be an apt analogy for what lies ahead for
the freethought movement; we too have vast reserves of as-yet-untapped
human resources. Secularism and unbelief will most likely continue to
rise in America, and many of the new non-believers were once active
church members. Furthermore, who knows how many crypto-human-
ists are sitting in the pews right now, still attending church but might be
willing to leave if there were a viable alternative to religious community?
And as the stigma of being a non-believer continues to fade, it will be
easier for more and more people to be honest about their unbelief. All of
these people could well form the next new wave of freethinkers.
Yes, countless people have been harmed by religion, but no experi-
ence in life—including religion—is purely a black and white matter.
Many former religionists also have fond memories of their time in reli-
gion: gathering together for fellowship, pot-lucks, inspiration, educa-
tion, retreats, service projects, and the unique feeling of security that
comes from being in a community that offers acceptance and love. In a
world that often feels lonely and uncaring, experiencing a sense of con-
nection to an accepting community can make a difference, and, as many
studies have indicated, can even strengthen mental health and prolong
life expectancies. Garrison Keillor’s portrayals of church life in Lake
Woebegon have resonated with so many for so long because capture the
best of what religious community can offer: community, belonging and
security.
Of course, Lake Woebegone is an idealized version of religion’s role
in American life. Churches frequently talk about acceptance and uncon-
ditional love, but inevitably the dogmas of religion add restrictions that
make the communal love much less unconditional. Depending upon the
particular denomination, any number of life situations could result in
less than full acceptance in the life of the community: drinking, smoking,
206  M. Aus

divorce, re-marriage, and sexual orientation are still common reasons for
judgment in many religious groups. In the prosperity-gospel churches,
financial struggles or even illness are sometimes seen as marks of divine
disfavor. It is a sign of just how desperate people can be for commu-
nity and acceptance that they would often choose to remain in religious
communities while at the same time being subjected to the communi-
ty’s judgment. Many divorced Catholics would rather continue going to
Mass and not receiving Communion rather than rejecting the Catholic
label altogether. The need for a tribal identity still matters for so many
today.
Thus far, I have been suggesting that the emerging Humanist congre-
gations could provide a new kind of community freed from the dogmas
of religion while retaining some of the benefits that religious life typically
provided. But perhaps that is actually underestimating the potential of
what could be achieved. As communities guided by reason and dedicated
to protecting the dignity of all people, Humanist congregations could
be in a position to create an experience that transcends anything religion
ever accomplished, an experience of genuine acceptance based on our
common humanity and our common struggles. Humanist congregations
could finally deliver the goods that religious community so often prom-
ises but so rarely delivers.
Finally, as I stated previously, the emergence of local Humanist con-
gregations is in no way a threat to the excellent national freethought
organizations that already exist. On the contrary, there is the potential
for tremendous synergies between local and national groups. National
groups could be strengthened like never before through connections to
local humanist congregations. Brochures and membership information
for national groups could be displayed regularly at local weekly meetings.
Veterans of the freethought movement could contribute by reaching out
and making themselves available to speak at local gatherings. Making the
weekly gathering a high-quality experience worth the time of the partici-
pants is crucial for the growth of the community, and high-quality speak-
ers can help make that happen. Initially, nascent congregations will likely
lack the resources to contribute much towards travel expenses and hono-
rariums of well-known speakers. So local congregations and nationally-
known freethought speakers could work together to find creative ways
of facilitating guest speaking gigs. If a speaker is in the area for another
event, why not tack on an extra day of travel to stick around for the
weekly meeting of the local Humanist congregation? Members of local
 10  A CASE FOR COMMUNITY: WITHIN AND BEYOND THE FOUR WALLS  207

groups could also donate excess frequent flyer miles to help underwrite
the speaker’s visit. When FFRF’s Dan Barker visited Oasis, he was already
in town at the invitation of a local Christian group for a debate on the
existence of God. Occasionally bringing in speakers with name-recogni-
tion can help raise visibility for the local congregation and provide an
incentive for new people to come through the doors.
These are exciting times to be a secular humanist in the United States.
A country that has been one of the most religious nations on earth is
becoming open to secularism in new ways. Courageous freethought pio-
neers of earlier generations have prepared the way, and now is the time
to build on that foundation to establish lasting Humanist institutions
that will appeal to the hearts and minds of Americans on a daily basis.
This task will be a marathon, not a sprint, and it will require Humanists
who are willing to make sacrifices similar to the sacrifices made by reli-
gionists who once covered this land with churches. I believe that human-
ist congregations will play a vital role in the future of Humanism.
Through a deep commitment to the well-being of the communities
where they are located, Humanist congregations will be uniquely poised
to interpret the Humanist message to Main Street USA.
The marketing team at Houston Oasis has recently been looking at
designs for the organization’s first t-shirts. This was in response to popu-
lar demand from the group’s members who are ready to broadcast their
Humanist perspective loudly and clearly for the world to hear. One of
the selected shirt designs simply says this on the front of the shirt, “Ask
Me About My Secular Humanist Community.” These are Humanists
who are eager to engage the world and start conversations with their
neighbors and friends because they know Humanism is too good an idea
to keep to themselves.

Notes
1. Alain de Botton, Religion for Atheists (Vintage International: New York,
2012), 278–279.
2. Fernanda Santos, “Some Find Path to Navajo Roots Through Mormon
Church,” The New York Times (October 30, 2013).
3. Sarah Krusleski in a presentation given at Houston Freethought Oasis,
November 10, 2013.
4. Tom Flynn, “Religious Humanism: Is It Dead, Alive, or Bifurcating—
Introduction,” Free Inquiry, October/November 2013, Vol. 33, No 6, 22.
 CHAPTER 11

Uncanny Nihilism and Cornel West’s Tragic

Humanism

Eike Brock

Introduction: The Uncanniest of All

Guests Enters the Parlor
In a very clear and well-known expression, philosopher Friedrich
Nietzsche, considering the late nineteenth century, states: “Nihilism
stands at the door”, and right in the same breath he asks himself where-
from “this uncanniest of all guests” indeed may come.1 Given the global
and social complexities and tragedies part and parcel to the first 2 dec-
ades of the twenty-first century, perhaps this “uncanniest of guests” is no
longer standing at our door, but rather, has entered our “parlor” with
signs of staying for a while. Could it be that this meaningless of life is
not just threatening, but has already influenced us? What’s more, beyond
arrival status, nihilism’s influence might even be increasing.2 Perhaps,
nihilism is a guest who has not only settled in Europe, but also globally
(at least in the Western industrial states). As a result, it is worth investi-
gating whether the mood in the “parlor” (i.e. the western world, with

E. Brock (*) 
Ruhr Universitat Bochum, Bochum, Germany

© The Author(s) 2017 209

M.R. Miller (ed.), Humanism in a Non-Humanist World, Studies
in Humanism and Atheism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57910-8_11
210  E. Brock

special attention given to the U.S.) has altered as a consequence of his

arrival and entrance.
In the winter of 1885–1886, Nietzsche wrote about nihilism as an
uncanny guest. I imagine this change of mood scenically as follows: An
icy wind is blowing around the snow-covered houses outside, and we have
cozied up to the fireplace inside. Here we feel cozy (possibly with a cup of
tea and a good book or, electively, with coffee and a cigarette). Suddenly
there is a knock at the door. Outside there is somebody who wants to
come in. Following the rules of hospitality we ask the guest to come in.
In this way, of course a bit of the unloved coldness provides unrequested
entrance. That is, our hand is seemingly forced to invite the guest inside.
The guest carries the cold indoors unavoidably changing the mood of
the parlor. There he is standing now in the middle of the room, with his
snow-covered coat and with dirty boots. Dirt and snow silently drop from
him, making the floor wet and muddy. Though the door has now been
closed, and the room’s temperature is back on the rise, a deeper feeling
of cold leaves us feeling shivery and uncomfortable. Initially, we cannot
make sense of why we feel this icy dread. But upon closer examination
of the guest we begin to see. We understand: The guest has not only
brought in coldness from outside; coldness, which will, thanks to the heat
from the fireplace, be gone very soon. Rather, the guest himself is the
coldness. And this coldness radiates and spreads in such a way that even
the heat from the fireplace is not strong enough to ban it. The guest’s
coldness constrains our limbs in such a way that we cannot move them.
In a word, nihilism paralyzes us. It proves to be a kind of shadow
which threatingly lays upon our mind. Nihilism, so to speak, is a kind
of soul-eclipse. The American philosopher and public intellectual Cornel
West presents to us a similar, especially psychological, understand-
ing of nihilism. Like Nietzsche in the treated notation,3 West declares
the creepiest of all guests to be “a disease of the soul”4 in his highly
acclaimed book Race Matters (1993, 2001). Just like alcoholism and
drug addiction this illness can “never be completely cured, and there is
always the possibility of relapse.”5 Nevertheless, there is, according to
West, a cure to this disease of the soul, he writes: “[T]here is always a
chance for conversion—a chance for people to believe that there is hope
for the future and a meaning to struggle.”6
Like Nietzsche about 100 years ago, West realizes nihilism as one of
the greatest dangers facing humankind, both in the present and future.
Such recognition and warning is not only important for individuals,
 11  UNCANNY NIHILISM AND CORNEL WEST’S TRAGIC HUMANISM  211

but also, for whole societies. Given its’ numerous faces and expres-
sions, nihilism, as both concept and condition, proves to be a difficult
to understand which provokes trouble at different levels. In what fol-
lows, under recourse to Nietzsche’s reasoning, I attempt to examine
the core of nihilism. In other words, I want to give an answer to the
question what nihilism essentially means. The answering of this basic
question will, at the same time, provide information about what exactly
makes nihilism so threatening; and thus respectively, what makes it
so uncanny. Subsequently, I will also provide attention to West’s criti-
cism of society in broad outline, as his analysis addresses and is centered
around the problem of nihilism. The influences on West as a thinker are
undoubtedly influenced by Christian thought—not by chance he calls
his own philosophy a prophetic pragmatism.7 In contrast, todays’ human-
ist thought, organized in national and international societies like the
International Humanist and Ethical Union, seems, in its overwhelm-
ing majority, to be united by the rejection of the ‘concept’ of God.
Regardless of variations and differences between humanist positions, this
description seems to be valid and constant among them. To the basic
point of such humanistic thinking belongs a deep skepticism opposed to
religious belief (and superstition):

[H]umanists are either atheists or at least agnostics. They are also skepti-
cal about the claim that there exists a god or gods. They are also skeptical
about angels, demons, and other such supernatural beings.8

But there are nonetheless good reasons to call West’s philosophical

thinking a form of humanism, as aptly described in his own words as
humanistic:

I would want to conceive of philosophy grounded in the very long human-

ist tradition of the best of the West that is open to the East and North and
South, but what I mean by that is that I began with ‘humando,’ which
means burial. I begin with the humanity and the humility […].9

As finite beings, humans are indeed the starting point of West’s phi-
losophy.10 Consequentially, his thinking may offer insights applicable to
(believing) and (nonbelieving) humanists, alike as well as an opportunity
to broaden and think more complexly about the human at the center of
humanism. At the center of West’s philosophy, stand the living, not the
212  E. Brock

“dead” but the dying. These living human beings stand out because of
their recognition of their own mortality and hence, forthcoming death.
Plainly put, they know that they are humans subject to mortality. Again and
again, West’s work deals with the problem of being human, how one can
nevertheless live and, trusting in one’s wisdom or world-view, live well at
the sight of the tragic knowledge which radically questions the sense of life:

The question for me is, how do we love wisdom – philosophia – in the face
of impending catastrophe given the kind of thinking, loving, caring, lov-
ing, dancing animals that we are?11

Insofar as humans, and especially their humanity (the human condition)

which in turn includes notably their vulnerability and mortality, represent
the core of West’s intellectual cosmos, I understand his philosophy as a
tragic humanism—a humanism emphasizing human value and worth in
the face of the very aspects of social life that give pause to any sugges-
tion that human life has meaning.12 With this, I move to explore some
of West’s ideas that deal with how to respond to nihilism13 for herein lies
the rub: nihilism changes the world into a non-humanistic place. This
“non-humanist world,” in my estimation, impedes the unfolding of some
of humans’ best capabilities namely: deliberation, autonomy, empathy,
solidarity and, finally, love.

What is Nihilism?
Whoever deals with nihilism unavoidably enters an icy as well as wide
field; it is to risk not just an unwanted parlor guest, but also akin to fall-
ing below the ice on a frozen lake in a snowstorm. It is easy to lose one’s
orientation, and the consequences of such a loss are usually tragic. This
loss of orientation is not itself an integral component of the problem of
nihilism in existential terms as it concerns both our being in the world
and as the world. But, if uncertainty is a motivating force behind the per-
ceived need for orientation, then nihilism can jar us away from any sense
of meaning. However, confusion also arises when in the first instance
it’s only the question to understand it more exactly from the conceptual
point of view. This is, I suggest, a result of nihilism’s colorfulness and
variability as it concerns meanings and implications. Consequently, it is a
mentor for totally different trends and points of view within the history
of philosophy, more generally.
 11  UNCANNY NIHILISM AND CORNEL WEST’S TRAGIC HUMANISM  213

The common (popular) understanding of nihilism, as noted already

and more extensively in note 2, is this meaninglessness or what might
be called voidness of sense, respectively, the latter concerning when the
tone (of investigation) becomes more moral, about the loss of values or
even the vacuum of values. But closer consideration of the term, espe-
cially as utilized in philosophy as demonstrated by a brief look into the
common encyclopedias of philosophy, reveals a term more capacious and
varied. For example, in the traditional German Historische Wörterbuch
der Philosophie, it states: “In the course of his history the idea of nihilism
was used for partly very different philosophical points of view and direc-
tions […].”14 This statement is as right as it is confusing. The English
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy confirms the idea of nihilism’s lack
of contour by distinguishing among varied terminological meanings.
According to the Encyclopedia definition, nihilism is taken with a grain
of salt, all and nothing, so long as it deals with the void or that which is
mystical: “As its name implies (from Latin nihil ‘nothing’) philosophical
nihilism is a philosophy of negation, rejection or denial of some or all
aspects of thought or life.”15 Following this trajectory, there is no “nihil-
ism” as such. Nevertheless, such a huge definitional range can be found,
a “confusing multiplicity”,16 oscillating from metaphysical solipsism—
which believes that the world and every being in the world is nothing
else than a perception of the imagining I or subject; to pessimism—which
takes the view that this world is a place one cannot admire, something
that shouldn’t have been at all. While a philosophy like metaphysi-
cal solipsism puts into question the existence of the outer-world (e.g.,
“heaven”) and in this sense, expresses its nihil (the consciousness of a
thinking subject), the same philosophical approach does not seem to care
much about a more general sense of human social life. Hence, it seems
unconcerned with and about the (range of) problems more and immedi-
ately associated with the conditions indicative of nihilism. Yet, with such a
denial of the sense of life it finds the crucial nihil of pessimism.
Neither Nietzsche nor West seem too interested in or concerned
about what we might think of as ontological forms of nihilism that have
propensity to challenge the existence of the outer-world. Throughout
his work, West eagerly and carefully emphasizes the daily suffering of
people who face harsh oppression. His desire to produce relief is palpa-
ble. For West, even the most radical forms of ontological nihilism that
would seem to contradict the reality of suffering must appear as the cyni-
cal culmination of a quasi-autistical, even solipsistically assessed, ‘talking
214  E. Brock

philosophy’, which deals with the (indeed difficult but bookish) prob-
lems of philosophers and risks forgetting human beings outside of these
purviews of exclusivity. In other words, it is not a long shot to wonder if
philosophical discourses about nihilism can only result in an intellectu-
alized naval gazing as such philosophies can only result in an elaborate
and ongoing monologue. Although it would be a gross error to declaire
Nietzsche and West as pessimists, conversely, they are both to a greater
degree, chiefly focused a version of existential nihilism which con-
cerns itself mainly with the question of meaning.17 Both thinkers seem
invested in a vociferous scrutinizing of the world that takes seriously the
unavoidable reality of harm endemic to life. And yet, they neither fall
into utter resignation nor wish the world at the devil. In fact, they seem
dedicated to a quest for meaning in a world which is under suspicion of
being meaningless, should such be without success, they seem commit-
ted to filling it with meaning.
With a brief working understanding of the different “nihilisms” that
show up in philosophy, the rest of this essay follows Nietzsche and West
to consider existential nihilism. My understanding of nihilism is based on
an extended involvement with Nietzsche’s overall philosophy, and builds
on his work as to understand nihilism as a radically negative judgment
of the world and of one’s self. In Nietzsche’s notation below, we find a
definition of nihilism, respectively of the nihilist, which shows a tendency
in this direction:

A nihilist is a man who judges that the real world ought not to be, and that
the world as it ought to be does not exist.18

Whereas a life in the world which indeed shall be but unfortunately is not
would be worthy to work towards, such a life becomes easy prey of the
verdict of senselessness in the world which shall not be but unfortunately
is; at least according to the nihilist. The nihilist concludes in direct con-
nection to his nihilistic judgment of the world: “According to this view,
our existence (action, suffering, willing, feeling) has no meaning.”19
With this in mind, I propose to add to Nietzsche’s definition of nihil-
ism20 the following sentence:

A nihilist is the human being who passes judgment on himself what he is

like he should not be and who passes judgment on himself that what he
should be he isn’t.21
 11  UNCANNY NIHILISM AND CORNEL WEST’S TRAGIC HUMANISM  215

In other words, a nihilist is someone who judges themselves according

to what they are not, and acts according to what they are not for hav-
ing denied what they are. This negative self-judgment is, so to speak,
the personal alternative to Nietzsche’s general definition of the nihilis-
tic position. As analogue to the nihilist who condemns the world, the
nihilist who condemns himself damns his very being. But whereas the
negator of the world considers his being as equally senseless as all exist-
ence in general and in consequence of this performs a nihilistic leveling
of all existence (as equally meaningless), the nihilistic self-rejection of the
mere self-negator does not follow inclusively but exclusively. In the first
instance, his nihilistic judgment is valid only for him: ‘Because I as I exist
shall not be, but the person I shall be, does not exist my being (acting,
willing, feeling) has no sense.’ How this affects the recognition of other
human beings is a different matter—at least for now.
With a sense of nihilism at group and individual levels in place, we
can now work to understand the uncanny, mysterious dimension of the
threat of nihilism. The negation of the world and or of oneself, which
is connected to nihilism, can express itself in different ways. The first
includes active-destructive ways of behavior. The second includes pas-
sive-auto-destructive ones. That is to say: nihilism can find expression in
different forms of destruction and/or resignation.
(1) Nihilists of the active type are destructors. As to simplify the dis-
cussion, here I am only treating this active type as destructive, though
exceptions certainly exist. Admittedly, they are sometimes able to put
forward immense power, but they don’t use this talent in a productive
way. The latter is why they derive their power from negative sources,
from resentment and desperation, respectively from nihilism. “[A]ctive
nihilism is,” as Michael Allen Gillespie writes, “ultimately a manifes-
tation not of joy and superabundance, but of negation and despair.”22
Of course, destruction of some sort might sometimes be necessary to
improve future living conditions. But active nihilists are only a scourge
for the present. In the meantime, they really don’t encourage a better
future through their actions. For this they lack the affirmative mind.
Those who neither know to say yes to himself or to the world, neverthe-
less are capable of negation directed at the other. The active nihilist “can-
not […] affirm himself. His action is always reaction, and his reaction is
always rejection and negation. While the active nihilist clears the ground
in an act of convulsive self-destruction, he creates no future.”23
216  E. Brock

(2) Nihilists of the passive type are self-destructors. Again, I am over-

simplifying for sake of space and simplicity, but in general, passive nihil-
ists are marked by self-destruction. Whereas the activity of the active
nihilism can be described more precisely as a kind of eccentricity, as a
kind of aggressive vigilance, the passivity of the passive nihilism vice versa
seems to be more a kind of exhaustion, even more precisely: a kind of
resignative fatigue.24 The passive nihilist, who perceives the status of the
world as unbearable, chooses the retreat into the inwards. He considers
himself detached from the world behind the protective walls of his ‘inner
castle.’ In a word, he is tired of the world. If the passive nihilist does
not only consider the world, but also his self-being, respectively himself,
as unbearable, he will feel uncomfortable also in his ‘inner castle.’ But
he doesn’t direct the power to activate his self-negation outwards as it
occurs with the active nihilist. Quite often the passive nihilism comes out
as depression and melancholy as described ever so precisely by Romano
Guardini in the following:

His name says melancholia. Sadness of the mind. A burden lies on the
human being which presses him down so that he sinks down; so that the
tension of the limbs and organs decreases; so that senses, instincts, ideas
and thoughts wane; so that the will, drive and motivation for work and
fight get weak. An inner fetter from mind hinders everything that nor-
mally arises freely, moves and takes effect. The spontaneousness of making
decisions, the power of clear and sharp outlining, the courageous grip of
shaping – all this becomes tired, unconcerned. Man is no longer able to
manage life.25

So, here there is the destructive potential in nihilism to push the self into
desperation and thus set fire to the world. In this way, we get a vivid por-
trait of the great danger that nihilism is and can pose. Such is true for
those individuals fighting with it, as well as for societies overall which are
threatened by it. As the passive nihilist is too tired, too exhausted and too
fed-up with politics to fulfill his role as political subject honestly; the active
nihilist meanwhile doesn’t accept the democratic values. Treating them
electively with scorn or even fighting against them, nihilism is especially
toxic for, and to democracies. Whether attacked unconcealed or in open
sight, that he tries to undermine them in a concealed and conspiratorial
way is damnably tragic.26 In what follows next, I turn to a case study of
sorts that explores nihilism as particularly expressed in the United States.
 11  UNCANNY NIHILISM AND CORNEL WEST’S TRAGIC HUMANISM  217

The Nihilistic Society in America

In the formidable text Democracy Matters: Winning the fight against
imperialism (2004), West takes continues a thread already begun in his
classic Race Matters. In the former, West practices a social criticism that
takes serious the idea and reality of nihilism. While a concern over nihil-
ism in black America primarily occupies Race Matters, West dives into
the broader field of nihilism in America across lines of social difference
in Democracy Matters. As highlighted above, nihilism indeed is a danger
for democracy which must be taken seriously. American nihilism might
be, at first glance, regarded as awkward insomuch as it seems to operate
concurrently on two fronts. On one hand, it attacks democracy in its
violently erupting active nihilism from the outside. While on the other
hand, it clandestinely creeps into politics itself. So, at once, democracy
is attacked from the inside, as a worm in a foul system. West’s analysis
of the manner in which nihilism has come to be concealed in politics
is of great merit in enabling its visible dimensions. So long as nihil-
ism operates in such a covert manner, chances for its disruption seem
impossible.
The immense influence that economic greed wields in increasing
measure over individuals and politics is of great importance for the work-
ings of nihilism in America.27 The frightening virulence of nihilism has
much to do with the increasing influence and legitimation of economic
thinking in many significant spheres of life. This development is espe-
cially problematic in so far as it decisively also shapes our moral imag-
inings and ideas of a good life. The veiled threat of this coinage is that
(mere) striving for profit is not at all desirable for determining moral
decisions. More recently, thinkers such as Michael Sandel have vehe-
mently hinted at this problem in factual concordance with West when
he argues that a moral which is led by the striving for profit inevitably
leads with its logic of buying and selling to “a society in which every-
thing is up for sale”.28 This again produces above all two strange effects:
inequality and corruption.29 In this way, not only does our moral sys-
tem of coordination get corrupted, but also our perception of the world
in general. Even more precisely, it is tragically cut down. Here, Sandel
points out the expensive and aggressive character of the market economy
which at best pushes aside ideas not oriented around the market or at
worst downright swallows them:
218  E. Brock

Economists often assume, that markets do not touch or taint the goods
they regulate. But this is untrue. Markets leave their mark on social norms.
Often, market incentives erode or crowd out nonmarket incentives.30

As more non-market alternative norms for social life fall prey to the
appetite of the market and disappear in its omnivorous stomach, the
more one-dimensioned our view of the world becomes. What’s more,
our world experience eo ipso becomes consequently a one-track under-
taking. With this in mind, consider the many commonplace phrases,
which have quietly risen to axioms, such as ‘time is money.’ Such a nar-
row view of the world coupled with the restriction of one’s world experi-
ence goes hand in hand with a decrease of the dimensions informing the
meaning of life. Thus, the question for the sense of life is pushed into
the Procrustean bed of the market. Hence, nihilism is, as West explains,
brought about by the “saturation of market forces in American life,”
which ultimately “generates a market morality that undermines a sense of
meaning and larger purpose.”31 By now, American society is in the grip
of unleashed market forces:

The dogma of free-market fundamentalism has run amok, and the pursuit
of profits by any legal (or illegal) means – with little or no public account-
ability – guides the behavior of the most powerful and influential institu-
tions in our lives.32

The democratic system in the U.S. is “corrupted all the way up” by the
nihilist, market-fundamentalist dogma. By targeting closer the political
sphere, West is able to link nihilism and power by recognizing a direct
connection between the powerlessness of the citizens and the superiority of
the leading political actors who through the permanent accumulation and
securing of such power have thrown the democratic principles over board:

Our leadership elite may still want to believe in democratic principles –

they certainly profess that they do – but in practice they have shown them-
selves all too willing to violate those principles in order to gain or retain
power. The flip side of the nihilism of despair is this nihilism of the unprin-
cipled abuse of power.33

Political nihilism can be characterized as a dishonest and merely power

oriented politics that is accompanied by the attempt to silence any criti-
cism on the abuse of political power. West distinguishes three forms of
 11  UNCANNY NIHILISM AND CORNEL WEST’S TRAGIC HUMANISM  219

political nihilism: evangelical nihilism, paternalistic nihilism, and senti-

mental nihilism.
(1) Evangelical nihilism takes the form of “might makes right”34 as
uttered by the sophist Thrasymachos against Socrates in Plato’s Republic.
It stands for a political orientation towards “raw power rather than moral
principles.”35 This form of self-righteousness, for many, might be found
in the Republican Party, especially as it concerns the fields of foreign and
defense policies, where American power is often used as a moral justifica-
tion for claims of geo-political dominance.
(2) Paternalistic nihilism as described by West is resignation before
corrupting political structures, clinging to the hope, that while these
structures might not be changed, one could still make the best out of
them. This is the sort of nihilism that West’s well-publicized critiques
of Barack Obama help to demonstrate, in that through capitulation to
neo-liberal market forces and demands, Obama might be helping to fos-
ter some of the ongoing nihilism faced in the United States. For West,
a deeper nihilism hides in what seems to be a mere resignation before
overwhelming adversary powers. Namely, the basic lack of belief in
people’s ability to live together in justice and solidarity. West finds this
absence of belief deeply troubling and nihilistic. What’s more, this deeper
dimension is further animated in West’s references to the allegory of the
Grand Inquisitor in Dostoyevsky’s novel The Brother’s Karamazov where
the Grand Inquisitor witnesses the second coming of Christ. But instead
of being overwhelmed by joy he, fearing that his Gospel will overburden
the people, is knowingly poised to kill Jesus Christ. Hence, paternalistic
nihilism is not only a form of resignation; it is a form of cynicism.
(3) Sentimental nihilism, widespread in the media, is the tendency to
place feelings above truth as to gain higher approval ratings and legitima-
tion. For sentimental nihilists in the media, positions appealing to sen-
timent and resentment replace the reporting of hard and often hurtful
truths. This “cowardly lack of willingness to engage in truth telling, even
at the cost of social ills, is the fundamental characteristic of sentimental
nihilism.”36 West further characterizes the nature of sentimental nihil-
ism as being “content to remain on the surface of problems rather than
pursue their substantive depths.”37 This, of course, is received well with
the media consumers, who themselves show a willingness to succumb to
sentimental nihilism, which enables them to feel the pleasures of society’s
distractions, while not being confronted with the painful reality of the
truth.38
220  E. Brock

One major obstacle in the fight against nihilism is that nihilism is

something not generally recognized, especially among decision makers in
U.S.-American society. As something that is often not as much acknowl-
edged as the cause of social distortion, nihilism cannot, as already men-
tioned above, be confronted and therefore tackled. In their elucidations
for social ills such as poverty, Democrats often find resolution in blan-
ket monetary approaches to state institutions that should help the poor,
while Republicans tend to remind them of their own responsibility for
their wellbeing. Here, both “liberals” and “conservatives” seemingly fail
to grasp the larger root of such ongoing problems: nihilism.
These three tightly interwoven “nihilistic threats […] shape every
dimension of our lives, from the bedroom to the corporate meeting
room, from street to suite”39 and obscure the site of the problems fac-
ing U.S.-American society and culture. They do not, however, present
a completely new and unheard of threat to American Democracy as
such, but rather, are part and parcel of the American democratic experi-
ment, and other democracies like it, from the start. In his brief but use-
ful genealogy of U.S.-American history, West outlines the imperial, racist
and xenophobic elements that have been endemic to the development of
American Democracy from its inception, that which West characterizes
as the “nightside” of the American democratic experiment.40 In this way,
West reminds us, and the world, that American democracy has only been
made possible by antidemocratic means:

The most painful truth in the making of America – a truth that shatters all
pretensions to innocence and undercuts all efforts of denial – is that the
enslavement of Africans and the imperial expansion over indigenous peo-
ples and their lands were undeniable preconditions for the possibility of
American democracy.41

Contra Nihilism: The Policy of Conversion and the

Ethic of Love
Before considering West’s proposals and convictions regarding how
to confront nihilism suitably, the former statements shall be reviewed
briefly: From a cultural-historical point, nihilism has been conceived as a
phenomenon which leaves a deep mark in and on our time. Beyond its
birth and proliferation, it has already begun to affect many in the here
and now. In other words, the uncanny guest, as it were, is already and at
 11  UNCANNY NIHILISM AND CORNEL WEST’S TRAGIC HUMANISM  221

once, amidst us. As such, nihilism was defined and approached as a radical
negation of the world, others and one’s self. Insofar as humans, according
to their character, always act in a self-referred way,42 such self-aspersion,
even as a slight possibility, is undeniably an anthropological fact. This nihil-
ism belongs to the realm of the Conditio humana, the human condition.
Furthermore, we gestured at the danger to be found within nihilism for
individuals and societies more generally. On the political level, it stands
to threaten one of the highest achievements of the latter political history
of mankind in its threat against democracy. With the context of the U.S.
in mind, West argues that nihilism, masquerading in different robes, has
infiltrated the realm of politics itself. By focusing more on power than on
democratic principles, the political elite do not tend to look after the com-
mon interests of the population symmetrically nor consider their pain and
fears in a serious manner, as a legitimate reality. In consequence of this,
the nihilism of the population is not contained by the domain of politics.
On the contrary, following West, American politics does more to inspire
and stimulate the condition and reality of nihilism. By focusing more
on economic expansion of the country than on the general education of
the citizens, the political elite hinder the growth of a sophisticated and
self-confident generation of citizens who carry in themselves the power
to confront the threat of nihilism. It is safe to assume that West’s socio-
critical diagnoses is applicable not only to the U.S. but also to Europe and
other parts of the world—especially to the so-called Western world.
To prevent nihilism from gaining speed and growing stronger, it is
of great importance to strengthen those who stand at risk of its pangs—
humanity. But such a responsibility cannot be held on the back of
individuals alone, as they too are in deep need of institutional recogni-
tion and help. In other words, there is an urgent need here of sweep-
ing change on the level of policy. The stark necessity of such a change
of thinking will only be understood by somebody who dares to seriously
consider the (many) abysses of nihilism, and the many at-risk of its dan-
gers, and those already affected by its violence. The illumination of this
nihilistic abyss also implies a need for a deep struggle with the deleterious
beginings and ongoing side-effects of democracy. To confront, and pos-
sibly overcome this current state of nihilism haunting U.S. culture and
society, Americans might consider confronting their legacy of race and
empire, patriarchy and homophobia, and the overwhelming manner in
which the desire for wealth accumulation—and, greed—causes many to
often ignore, disregard, and look upon the poor with disgust and scorn.
222  E. Brock

Taking stock of itself in this reflexive manner would unleash “our often-
untapped democratic energies of Socratic questioning, prophetic witness,
and tragicomic hope.”43 West goes on to further explain that “the aim
of this Socratic questioning is democratic paideia—the cultivation of an
active, informed citizenry—in order to preserve and deepen our demo-
cratic experiment.”44 Socratic questioning puts the self and the society in
which it is performed to a critical test. In accordance with West’s tragic
humanism, the Socratic questioning is especially aimed at the question
of what it means to lead a humane life, which is really to ask what does it
mean to lead a human life. It doesn’t take years and years of contempla-
tive exercise and a deep Socratic reflection to understand that a human
life is far more than the sum total of a person’s market compliant behav-
ior.45 To a greater degree, a human life deals first of all with love, hope,
responsibility and sense. Beyond that, the human life, as life (always
lived) together with other human beings means that it is never detached
from moral decisions and obligation. But for leading a (somehow) gen-
uine moral, satisfactory, hopeful life—what for some people may sound
kitchy, but what is of great importance—one carried in and by love we
must, to borrow from Carl Philipp Moritz, work towards the affirmative
development of “Selbstzutrauen” (self-confidence), which cannot grow
in isolation and without appreciation by others. In other words, it is not
something that comes into existence ex nihilo, able to alone sustain and
blossom like a seed which has always been inherent in us. Self-confidence
is something that only prospers as consequence of fulfilled love and assur-
ance that has been set and established through external processes of con-
fidence building. In other words, the inner traits and characterizations of
self-confidence demand external influence and recognition to burgeon.46
In his psychologically innovative novel Anton Reiser (4 Parts: 1785–
1790),47 Moritz narrates the mournful story of the childhood and youth
of the protagonist Anton Reiser, who is confronted with different kinds
of suppression and humiliation right from the cradle48; a circumstance
which urges him more and more into a state of nihilistic self-denial. In
view of an especially deeply humiliating experience of the protagonist, it
is said in the novel:

In such a moment you feel like destroyed and would risk your life for con-
cealing from the world. – The self-confidence [Selbstzutrauen], which is
as necessary for moral activity as the breathing for bodily movement, gets
such an enormous push that it is difficult to get well again.49
 11  UNCANNY NIHILISM AND CORNEL WEST’S TRAGIC HUMANISM  223

Against the odds, Reiser uses his poetic talent for getting back on his
feet by placing reliance upon the meaningful occupation of reading and
writing as well as the glorifying power of the theatre.50 Thus he refers to
cultural resources for winning self-confidence which is so direly needed
for a humane life among humans in a not yet humanist world. For but
a moment in the book, it appears that he has found himself and a per-
sonal exit out of the existential impasse of nihilism. In the end, however,
fate (once again) seems to play a dirty trick on him, so that the in what
remains of the novel is not-so-much a story of the healing power of art,
but rather, one of an existential failure. In contrast to this narrative, West
puts great confidence in the anti-nihilistic power of art throughout his
work. What for Anton Reiser’s theatre could have been ideally a kind of
existential lifeline, music, for many people of color who like Reiser have
found themselves in similarly mangled situations of humiliation, music
has become a palpable social salve.
In particular, as West so aptly bears witness to, Afro-American music
like Bebop, Soul, Funk or Rap is namely “first and foremost […] a coun-
tercultural practice Counter-Cultural Practice with deep roots in modes
of religious transcendence and political opposition,”51 which is why it
works well for fostering points of connection useful for identity, espe-
cially for disoriented, disappointed young people across racial and ethnic
difference, in search of meaning and contact. “Therefore,” West notes,
“it is seductive to rootless and alienated young people disenchanted with
existential meaninglessness, disgusted with flaccid bodies and dissatis-
fied with the status quo.”52 For Afro-Americans especially, it is a source
of pride of the own cultural heritage. As a result, it heals open wounds
caused by the dehumanizing invectives of racism.53 What is valid for
music54 is generally applicable to the cultural practice across social strata
and ethnic groups: it offers plenty of anti-nihilistic potential. Yet precisely
the cultural bulwarks which offered resistance for a long time against
nihilism are eroding increasingly. Hence more and more people, seen in
cultural terms, find themselves, in a way, naked:

[T]he cultural buffers that sustained people and countered despair in past
generations, namely church, family, and civic institutions, have been under-
mined by the predominance of market values. People have become ‘cultur-
ally naked.’55
224  E. Brock

West does not simply write about the significances of culture, he himself
bears witness to his own situativity as firmly rooted in culture, as such.
Not only does the philosophical-humanistic heritage give him the nec-
essary power for resistance to restore hope in the face of nihilism, but
also aids in restoring the representational hope of others. Additionally,
as a self-identified Christian of the prophetic ilk, West does not divorce
religion and culture, as if one is sacred and the other, profane. He is con-
scious however of living in an era—in a Secular Age (Charles Taylor)—
in which, for many, the bridges to religion are ultimately broken down.
On this point, West brings a realistic understanding to his humanist
Christianity, and Christian humanism such that underprivileged young
people who will not find their salvation in the likes of Chechov, Kafka
or Nietzsche, can do so through a prophetically pragmatic mode that
takes serious humanism’s potential for religious weight, and vice-versa.56
Because we occupy a culture saturated by nihilism—“permeated by sci-
entific ethos, regulated by racist patriarchal, capitalist norms and per-
vaded by debris of decay”57—the time is ripe for “a new world view, a
countermovement, ‘a new gospel of the future.’”58 In light of such intri-
cate circumstances there may be little hope for optimism, but still, reason
enough for a new model that has as much potential for circumstantial
flexibility as it does space for utopic possibility.
West’s prophetic pragmatism, respectively his tragic humanism, is
designed to act as such a utopian “countermovement” and “new gos-
pel of the future.” As West so earnestly acknowledges, in order for the
future to not collapse into an unfettered period of darkness, despite all
nihilistic tendencies, a profound societal change of attitude and outlook
is necessary. Among others, Rosemary Cowan has tried to examine how
the pragmatic possibilities of West’s framework as it concerns such a
largescale change in thinking can take place in concreto. At first, every
individual is asked to examine and put their life plan to the test through
Socratic questioning, Cowan writes:

[P]eople must individually reform their attitudes. They must question their
personal addiction to market values of stimulation and titillation and the
way in which this addiction has displaced human interaction with others.59

Taking a step further, with Nietzsche in mind, we might deem what is

necessary and possible as a ‘transvaluation of values’—that is, an “act
of highest stocktaking of oneself.”60 That is, the unmasking of the old
 11  UNCANNY NIHILISM AND CORNEL WEST’S TRAGIC HUMANISM  225

values as nihilistic, by the devaluation of the (old) values after all, the
ground for the installation of new values is prepared:

From this premise people can advance to the second stage, where non-
market values of equality and community can be articulated through inter-
personal toleration and the creation of bonds of trust that will enable one
to treat others with respect despite the presence of strong ideological dif-
ferences.61

As worthy as this might be, this is neither sufficient nor realizable in a soci-
ety where Socratic questioning (with its awkward tendency to rigidity) is
not figured prominently in the public sphere, especially among discussion.
As a result, urgent social problems require more than rhetorical appeal and
finesses. Rather, an approach to social fractures necessitates much more
than lip service, and open itself up to a more basic attitude of open and
ongoing discourse. On this point, Cowan discerns a deep need for some-
thing much more than respect or regard opting instead to understand it as:

An attempt to understand the arguments of others. This requires the

reconstitution of the public sphere as an area where disparate groups can
dialogue and discover tentative areas of common ground to supercede cul-
tural fragmentation.62

Taken together, one can hear and feel West’s influence on Cowan’s
claims, but West’s ideas seem to have capacity for further reach consid-
ering his aims and demands for largescale policy of conversion which
requires, and is not possible without, moral basis, namely an ethic of
love. At first glance such a demand might appear too eager, but in light
of the tremendous threat posed by nihilism, perhaps not. If the core of
nihilism is truly animated by, and consists of, the negation of the self
(and thus, the world) therefore depicting a kind of poisoning of the soul,
then love as the origin of self-affirmation, itself the originator and foun-
tain of a new kind of love, then such benevolence might in fact be the
most promising antidote:

Nihilism is not overcome by arguments or analyses; it is tamed by love and

care. Any disease of the soul must be conquered by a turning of one’s soul.
This turning is done through one’s own affirmation of one’s worth – an
affirmation fueled by the concerns of others. A love ethic must be at the
center of a politics of conversion.63
226  E. Brock

The idea of the reversal or redirection of the soul, so important for West,
is profoundly at its core, Socratic. In fact, the concern about the soul,64
respectively the self65 which leads to the reversal of the (mislead) soul
is no less than the very foundation of a Socratic philosophy. Especially
with its concern for self-care as being furthermore of the highest politi-
cal relevance. It is the merit of Plato, Socrates’ most important student,
to have made the political significance of self-care, being above all the
concern about one’s own soul, into a philosophical topic.66 He did so
in contrast to the predominant idea of self-care as being identical with
the concern about creature comforts and the provision of essentials, an
idea already apparent and propagated in ancient Athens. Only the one
who, as a result of Socratic self-care, has become virtuous, can really cope
with the core business of the true politician striving for justice, has capac-
ity to convey virtue.67 In this way, the politician does not only provide
the single citizen a service, but also pushes forward to a high degree the
matter of justice, on a level which concerns the development of society as
a whole. Here, the politician, who for Plato is at once the philosopher,
puts himself eagerly in harm’s way.
In his famous allegory of the cave, Plato impressively illustrates the
brisance of the political-pedagogical enterprise. The setting of the alle-
gory of the cave is sufficiently known, so I will not describe its details
in full here.68 But significant for the contemporary context is the man-
ner in which the cavemen are bound, and, in such a way, cannot avoid
(and do not perceive the compulsion) to look in a predetermined direc-
tion, namely in the way of the wall of the cave. On this wall (illuminated
by a burning fire behind the caveman) a shadow play is taking place
(objects are being carried around behind the backs of the cavemen—
by whomsoever—casting shadows) in which those bound by childhood
take as reality. But beyond the cave, there is a world, a real one com-
prised of incessant sun-drenched ideas, the location of origin for all truth
and beauty. Notwithstanding, the meaning of the allegory of the cave
is indeed complex and chock full of variable meaning. In it, the philo-
sophical threads of ontology, epistemology and ethics converge, making
it as much artful as it is complicated concurrently. Furthermore, together
with the sun and line-parables, it creates the climax of a parable-triad
which, so to speak, contains Plato’s philosophy in a nutshell. With admi-
ration, we notice but yet can only follow up on Plato’s idea that some-
one among the group of the bound cavemen has become, inexplicably,
free and notices that he is situated in a cave where the wall of the cave
 11  UNCANNY NIHILISM AND CORNEL WEST’S TRAGIC HUMANISM  227

is not the world, but rather, a dead-end street. Because of this aware-
ness, the freed person dares to climb up out of the cave into the wide
open. Exhausting as this climbing out is, in the end, there is a reward.
The outside of the cave is indeed much more expansive, and aestheti-
cally pleasing than within the cave itself. Despite this however, and given
the descent back into the cave will presumably prove similarly exhaust-
ing as was the climb out, the individual opts to go back into the cave
because he feels obliged towards those cavemen left-behind, indebted to
show them the ways of the real world. Here, the person is conscious of
the probability that he will meet opposition, but namely how probable
it will be that he will be received with open arms as a liberator remains
an open question. Sedimented in their ways, the cavemen have become
used to the cave, routinized by it, any elaborate change of their way of
living may not appear, at first glance, a welcoming supposition. If too
insistent, the potential liberator could find themselves in harm’s way. But
the person, driven by a sense of commonality, nevertheless decides to go
back and climb down towards the others. As you can understand from
the reflections of the Politeia, the matter in question in the allegory of
the cave is the graphic statement of an educational process which ena-
bles the human being to free himself from the addiction to unreal things,
in order to better recognize the ways in which reality ought invoke the
true, the beautiful, and the good. The very middle of this process is the
reversal or converting of the soul.69 The allegory of the cave makes clear
that this process is time consuming, painful and laborious. It also dem-
onstrates that through an epistemological process, the existence of a new
world view is possible where values attached to the old and familiar must
be examined critically and often enough, even thrown overboard. In this
way, the educational process also becomes one of deep acquisition and
refutation. But, in the end, order for progress to proceed and be made
successful, help from the outside is vitally necessitated. That is, some-
body must accompany and loosen the cavemen’s chains, and assist the
now freed ones during their ascent. Plato’s allegory demands much from
us. But this objection doesn’t change anything concerning Plato’s con-
viction that the realization of the dream of an upright society is only pos-
sible by going along this weary path of education.
Overall, Plato’s philosophy in the same way as West’s thinking aims,
in ethic-political ways, at a conversion of society as a whole. Naturally,
West’s policy of conversion is decidedly democratic and because of that is
not compatible with Plato’s authoritarian-aristocratic draft of a state. But
228  E. Brock

there are remarkable parallels regarding the fires which get enlightened
by the common focal point of self-care (epimeleia). Both thinkers are
Socratics and situated in a particular iteration of eros. But as an entrance
to truth, West’s eros is more focused on the human being than on sci-
ence and philosophy as in Plato’s worldview. In no abstract terms, West
prefers and emphasizes truth as concrete of being human being, with all
his weaknesses and possibilities. Thus, West’s philosophy, as put forward
at the beginning, is indeed, a tragic humanism.

Notes
1. Nietzsche, Friedrich (1988): Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe
(= KSA), 15 Bände, hrsg. von Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari, 2.
durchges. Aufl., München/Berlin/New York: De Gruyter. (NL 1885–
1887, KSA 12, 2[127], 125) “Der Nihilismus steht vor der Thür: woher
kommt uns dieser unheimlichste aller Gäste?”
2. Nihilism primarily means the absence of meaning and significance. It
negates the (especially metaphysical) validity of our highest values (see
Nietzsche, NL 1885–1887, KSA 12, 9[35], 350) Consequent nihil-
ism leads directly into valuelessness resp. worthlessness. Thus, it can be
understood as a crisis of orientation. One essential landmark in the his-
tory of nihilism is the death of God, prominently featured in Nietzsches
work (see especially Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft, KSA 3, § 125). Secular
societies such as the US-American society, or the societies of large parts
of Europe, thus naturally have to struggle with nihilism, as the high-
est moral authority and the guarantee for a meaning that transcends
the profane earthly existence, have with God vanished from said exist-
ence. Certainly, I do not claim, that secular societies automatically fall
victim to nihilism. However, for the reasons stated, they will have to
deal with it. Furthermore, the increasing technization of all aspects of
life and the hegemony of the neoliberal zeitgeist in late-modern socie-
ties play into the hand of nihilism in some respects. Byung-Chul Han,
an important figure in the German philosophical discourse, has tried
to prove in a series of much-noticed cultural-critical essays, that we live
in a world, from which the resistive and the negative increasingly fade
away. This world is arranged to enable an unimpended consumption of
commodities and a free, smooth flow of capital, data and information.
Transperency has become an ideology. However, transparency and tran-
scendence do not seem to be reconcilable. They even seem to contra-
dict each other. According to Han, this leads to significance’s and deep
meaning’s gradual disappearance from human life. The disappearance
 11  UNCANNY NIHILISM AND CORNEL WEST’S TRAGIC HUMANISM  229

of negativity is accompanied by the emergence of a ‘hyperpositivity’,

which, to some extent, cannot be processed by humans anymore. Han
identifies this as a specifically positive form of violence. That hyperactiv-
ity and hypercommunication of all things should compensate for the loss
of deeper meaning and mysteriousness makes everything worse accord-
ing to Han’s diagnosis of the contemporary situation (see Han, Byung-
Chul (2013): Big Data. Dataismus und Nihilismus, in: Zeit-Online
http://www.zeit.de/digital/internet/2013-09/big-data-han-dataismus
(Accessed: 03.13.2015). The phenomena of hyperactivity and hyper-
communication characterize our age. Consequentally, its’ leading ill-
nesses are also owed to hyperpositivity. Pathologically speaking, we are
now (according to Han) living in a neurological, and not any longer in an
immunological age: “neuronal illnesses like depression, attention defecit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), borderline personality disorder (BPD)
or burnout-syndrom define the pathologic landscape of the twenty-first
century. They are not infections, they are infarcts, that are not caused
by negativity, but by an excess of positivity” (Han, Byung-Chul (2010):
Müdigkeitsgesellschaft, 3. Aufl., Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 5, translation
by EB). However, especially burnout and depression can be understood
as the expressions of the passive, meaning world-weary nihilism of over-
challenged individuals. Regarding nihilism today, as well as the kinship
of nihilism and depression compare Brock, Eike (2015): Nietzsche und
der Nihilismus, (Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung 68)
Berlin/München/Boston: De Gruyter, chapter X, pp. 387–417. On
nihilism today with a special focus on the works of Byung-Chul Han
compare Müller, Robert (2015): Vom Verlust der Bedeutungsschwere.
Eine Zeitdiagnose des Nihilismus, Dresden: Text & Dialog, especially pp.
21–71. As we will see, Cornel West, too suspects the present age to be a
nihilistic one. West sees a connection between the advancing erosion of
cultural resources, like religios faith or the lifeform of the family and the
observable economization of all aspects of life. Furthermore, as will be
shown, West detects an infiltration of Americas political sphere by nihilist
forces (compare chapter II of this article).
3. At this juncture it is important to point out that Nietzsche not only takes
nihilism into account as a psychological phenomenon. He also reflects
on nihilism as a cultural problem. Moreover Nietzsche’s writings urge us
to understand nihilism as something that belongs genuinely to human
nature, i.e. that nihilism is a dimension of the human condition (cf. Brock
2015, esp. chapter VIII, 312–337).
4. Cornel West, Race Matters. 1st ed. Beacon Press, 2001, 29.
5. West, 2001, 29.
6. West, 2001, 29.
230  E. Brock

7. West comments on the religious character of his version of pragmatism

as follows: “My own version of prophetic pragmatism is situated within
the Christian Tradition. Unlike Gramsci I am religious not only for politi-
cal aims but also by personal commitment. To put it crudely, I find exis-
tential sustenance in many of the narratives in the biblical scriptures as
interpreted by streams in the Christian heritage; and I see political rel-
evance in the biblical focus on the wretched of the earth. […] Yet the
Christian epic, stripped of static dogmas and decript doctrines, remains
a rich source of existential empowerment and political engagement
when viewed through modern lenses […].” (West, Cornel (1989): The
American Evasion of Philosophy. A Genealogy of Pragmatism, Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 233) But West’s pragmatism is pro-
phetic also in a philosophical sense. When West takes up the Jewish and
Christian prophets of the Bible he doesn’t bear them in mind as soothsay-
ers. Rather he thinks of their courage to speak the truth against all risks,
which is a deeply philosophical quality: “I have dubbed it [his version
of Pragmatism; E.B.]‘prophetic’ in that it harks back to the Jewish and
Christian tradition of prophets who brought urgent and compassionate
critique to bear on the evils of their day. The mark of the prophet is to
speak the truth in love with courage—come what may. Prophetic pragma-
tism proceeds from this impulse. It neither requires a religious foundation
nor entails a religious perspective, yet prophetic pragmatism is compatible
with certain religious outlooks.” (Ibid.)
8. Law, Stephen (2011): Humanism. A very short Introduction, Oxford/
New York: Oxford University Press, 2.
9. West, Cornel (2013): “Was es heißt, ein Mensch zu sein! Eduardo
Mendieta im Gespräch mit Cornel West”, in: Manemann, Jürgen/
Arisaka, Yoko/Drell, Volker/Hauk, Anna Maria: Prophetischer
Pragmatismus. Eine Einführung in das Denken Cornel Wests, 2. Aufl.,
München: Fink, 129–161, 129.
10. Insofar, West envisages man from his death. The end (of man) stands at
the beginning of West’s considerations. Now the crucial point is not that
man dies generally, but rather in a sense that firstly, he knows that one
day he inevitably will die. And secondly he encounters his mortality in
the form of a solemn ritual (funeral). So bringing up the question of the
Differentia specifica, i.e. the specific difference between human beings
and animals, West could reply: the human being is the animal that buries
(inhumes) his kind.
11. West 2013, 129. West obviously harks back to the Platonic Socrates,
who teaches that to study philosophy is to learn to die (cf. Plato Phaedo
64a–b, 80d: philosophy is to care about death (melete thanatou)).
In the course of Plato’s Phaedo it becomes apparent, that this Socratic
 11  UNCANNY NIHILISM AND CORNEL WEST’S TRAGIC HUMANISM  231

proposition implies to not lose faith in philosophy (and to fall into “miso-
logy” cf. ibid., 89d) in defiance of the mortality of man and the perish-
ability of everything on earth.
12. Humanism in its classical form seeks to foster the best qualities in the
human being. By means of a special program of education (reading the
Western classics) the rational and emphatic aspects of the human being
as animal rationale shall be invigorated against its brutish nature. West’s
version of humanism too aims for the education of the best in the human
being—he is convinced that this would be the best for the human being
as well. Like William James, West understands happiness as the best for
the human being; but he places a stronger emphasis than James on the
tragic dimension of life and the philosophy of pragmatism in general
do. The focus on the tragic character of being is something West shares
with the prophets of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Considered from
this angle, West’s humanism deserves to be called prophetic or tragic.
In conclusion one could say that West weaves a new and unique version
of humanism out of classical humanistic, pragmatist and prophetic com-
ponents—a tragic humanism that is born by human kindness and which
deserves our (philosophical) attention.
13. If it is true that nihilism is an anthropological fact there is no permanent
solution to the challenge of nihilism. Thus I prefer to speak of an “ade-
quate dealing with” nihilism, rather than of a solution to it.
14. Müller-Lauter, Wolfgang (1984): Art. “Nihilismus”, in: Ritter, Joachim/
Gründer, Karlfried (Hrsg.): Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Bd. 6
(Mo–O), Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 846–854, 846;
transl. E.B.
15. Crosby, Donald A. (1998): Art. “Nihilism”, in: Craig, Edward (Hrsg.):
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 7, London/New York:
Routledge, 1–5, 1.
16. Große, Jürgen (2005): “Nihilismusdiagnosen. Ihr theoretischer und ethis-
cher Status”, in: Dialektik: Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie 2005, Heft 1,
97–122, 99; transl. E.B.
17. A convincing analysis of different patterns of nihilism can be found
at Crosby, Donald A. (1988): The Specter of the Absurd. Sources and
Criticism of Modern Nihilism, Albany: State University of New York
Press, 8–36.
18. NF 1885–1887, 9[60], KSA 12, 366 “Ein Nihilist ist der Mensch,
welcher von der Welt, wie sie ist, urtheilt, sie sollte nicht sein, und von
der Welt, wie sie sein sollte, urtheilt, sie existiert nicht.”
19. Ibid. “Demnach hat dasein (handeln, leiden, wollen, fühlen) keinen
Sinn.”
232  E. Brock

20. In Nietzsche’s corpus remains (notations) you will certainly find numer-
ous attempts to define nihilism as exactly as possible in an effort to get
to the bottom of the phenomenon ‘nihilism’ in his entire spectrum. I
have made an attempt to analyze each and all of Nietzsche’s definitions in
Brock 2015, chapter VII, 288–311.
21. It becomes really nihilistic only then when the realization of the world as
it should be, respectively, the self as it should be is excluded or at least is
regarded as impossible.
22.  Gillespie, Michael Allen (1995): Nihilism before Nietzsche, Chicago/
London 1995, 180.
23. Gillespie 1995, 181f.
24.  Thus Nietzsche defines the passive nihilism as “tired nihilism which
doesn’t attack anymore” (as “müde[n] Nihilism, der nicht mehr angreift
[…]” (NL 1885–1887, KSA 12, 9 [35], 351).
25. Guardini, Romano (2003): Vom Sinn der Schwermut, 8. Aufl., Kevelaer,
24; transl. E.B.
26. One textbook example for this would be the anti-democratic New Right
that is at the moment gaining grounds in different European countries.
While talking in the jargon of democracy, far right parties push for anti-
democratic and inhumane policies against refugees.
27. And, as I want to add, for the nihilism in all western industrial countries.
28.  Sandel, Michael (2012): What money can’t buy, (New York: Penguin
Books), 8. Sorrowfully Sandel states: “[W]e have drifted from having a
market economy to being a market society,” 10.
29. Sandel, 8.
30. Sandel, 64.
31. West, Cornel (2004): Democracy Matters. Winning the fight against impe-
rialism, New York: Penguin Books, 27.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 28.
34. Ibid., 30.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 38.
37. Ibid., 38f.
38. A completely similar diagnosis is made for the German media scene by
Ulrich Greiner, the longtime chief editor of the renowned German news-
paper DIE ZEIT. Today media ought to be not only critical but, more
than that, also “optimistic and full of empathy” (Greiner, Ulrich (2014):
Schamverlust. Vom Wandel der Gefühlskultur, 2. Aufl., Reinbek bei
Hamburg: Rowohlt 2014, 320; transl. E.B.). Hiding behind this heavy
word ‘empathy’, as it is used by the media, isn’t any real compassion, as
you could think, but rather “pure sentimentality” (ibid., 321).
 11  UNCANNY NIHILISM AND CORNEL WEST’S TRAGIC HUMANISM  233

39. West, 2004, 40.

40. Ibid., 41.
41. Ibid., 40.
42. Here I follow the anthropological trace of Sören Kierkegaard, who con-
siders the human being as self-relation: “Man is spirit. But what is
spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation which
relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation [which accounts
for it] that the relation relates itself to its own self […].” (Kierkegaard,
Sören (1941): The Sickness unto Death [1849], Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 9). Also Kierkegaard emphasizes that this self-
relation is permanently threatened by the danger to behave to itself in a
destructive way. The self then gets into misbalance and thus into despair.
43. West, 2004, 41.
44. Ibid.
45. In societies in which the prerogative of the market is valid and which con-
sequently set “pleasure-seeking over love and care” (Cowan, Rosemary
(2003): Cornel West. The Politics of Redemption, Oxford: Polity Press,
135) the Socratic questioning of course has a tough act to follow. This
is in so far that admittedly it possesses as occupation for some individual-
ists (as for example for Socrates) passion-potential indeed, but in general
it is rather felt as exhausting. A “passion-killer” in the sense of the sen-
timental nihilism it will at least become when it brings to light unloved
realizations and throws the one off course of the pleasant intimacy who
asks Socratic questions (the classic example for this is offered in Platon’s
dialogue Menon which presents a young Menon who is quasi paralyzed at
heart and soul because of Socratic questioning (cf. Menon 79e–80b).
46. Moritz, Karl Philipp (2006): Anton Reiser. Ein psychologischer Roman
[1785–1790], in: Karl Phillip Moritz. Dichtungen und Schriften zur
Erfahrungsseelenkunde, hrsg. von Heide Hollmer und Albert Meier,
Frankfurt/M: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 85–518, 199f.
47. Seen from psychological point of view this novel is path breaking inter
alia because, a long time before the inauguration of psychoanalysis by
Sigmund Freud (1895 Freud’s and Josef Breuer’s book Studien zur
Hysterie (Studies in Hysteria)—so to say the Charta of psychoanalysis—
was published), it ascribes the failure of the protagonist to his devastating
experiences during his childhood.
48. cf. Moritz 2006 [1785–1790], 91.
49. Ibid., 226; transl. E.B.
50. With Stanley Cavell (A Pitch of Philosophy. Autobiographical Exercises,
1994) one could probably speak of the struggle to find one’s own voice
(pitch).
234  E. Brock

51. West, Cornel (1999a): “On Afro-American Music. From Bebop to Rap”,

in: The Cornel West Reader, New York, Great Britain: Civitas Books, 474–
484, 474.
52. Ibid.
53. Referring to soul music for example, West states it is “the populist applica-
tion of bebop’s aim: racial self-conscious assertion among black people
in light of their rich musical heritage” (West 1999a, 476). Apart from
that, particularly the ‘black nihilism’—fired by racism—elucidates to what
extent the destruction of self-confidence is related to nihilism—because
racism is not least the denial of the other’s humanity. Thus, racism is
the dehumanization of the other (cf. Manemann/Arisaka/Drell/Hauk
2012, 2013, 77f). In this aspect, it means a massive attack on the sense
of self-worth of its victims, which easily leads into nihilistic self-denial. Cf.
Cowan 2003, 137: “Because Afro Americans have been told repeatedly
that they are somehow less than human, their minds, bodies, and souls
have been colonized by self-hatred.”
54. I account West’s conjunction of the spiritual with the musical as remark-
able. In conversation with Eduardo Mendieta, West declares (the con-
versation took place in Princeton in May 2011): “I am a blues man in
the life of the mind. And the blues is an autobiographical chronicle of
a personal catastrophe expressed lyrically in tragicomic terms. So that
I’m a jazz man in the world of ideas. Jazz is a free exercise of creative
expression in the face of a darkness, a catastrophic darkness that tends
to be playful as well as, at its best, profound. I consider myself a funk
man, too. In the tradition of James Brown, George Clinton, and Bootsy
Collins because the funk acknowledges that we all emerge from the funk
in our mother’s womb. And there’s freedom and love in that funk, in
that womb. We would’t be here without our mother’s love push. So we
became an embodiment of that love in that mess, in that funk. Our bod-
ies will be a culinary delight of terrestrial worms one day; that’s a differ-
ent kind of funk in terms of death. In between that short amount of time,
that light between both darknesses that Beckett talks about in Waiting
for Godot, that’s where we have our possibilities of agency, of existential
agency, or radical democratic agency.” (West 2013, 136).
55. Cowan 2003, 135.
56. With this in mind West criticizes the philosophy of Richard Rorty (whom
West in general respects highly): “And Rorty’s ingenious conception
of philosophy as cultured conversation rests upon a nostalgic appeal
to the world of men (and women) of letters and decades past.” (West,
Cornel (1999b): “Nietzsche’s Prefiguration of Postmodern American
Philosophy”, in: The Cornel West Reader, New York, Great Britain:
 11  UNCANNY NIHILISM AND CORNEL WEST’S TRAGIC HUMANISM  235

Civitas Books, 188–210). Thus Rorty’s philosophy is not convenient to

create an intellectual spirit of optimism in all social classes.
57. West 1999b, 210.
58. Ibid., 209.
59. Cowan 2003, 140.
60. NF Ecce homo; Schicksal (fate) 1, KSA 6, 365; transl. E.B.
61. Cowan 2003, 140.
62. Ibid.
63. West 2001, 29.
64. cf. Platon (2004): Sämtliche Dialoge, 7 Bände, übersetzt, herausgegeben
und mit Einleitungen, Literaturübersichten, Anmerkungen und Registern
versehen von Otto Apelt, Hamburg: Meiner, Phaidon 82d
65. cf. Plato Alkibiades I 132b–c
66. cf. Ibid., 129b–13a
67. cf. Ibid., 134b–d.
68. cf. Plato Republica 514a–517a
69. Periagoge cf., ibid., 518d.
 CHAPTER 12

Relating to a “Non-Humanist” World:

Participating in Democracy, on Why the
Humanist Viewpoint Matters

Toni Van Pelt

In invoking John Dewey’s social and political philosophy, John J. Stuhr

rightly and thoughtfully notes the philosophically oriented dimensions of
Democracy beyond more common and rigid governmental notions. On
this point, he writes:

Democracy does not arise or perpetuate itself automatically,” but rather,

“It demands persistent social inquiry, imaginative vision and courageous
action,” that, “…makes demands on people, on you and me. Democracy
fundamentally is a way of life and not simply a form of government.1

Democracy in the United States (U.S.) is frequently referred to as “gov-

ernment of the people, by the people, for the people,” to borrow a par-
tial quote from Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. However, for
far too long a majority of those who identify as evidence-based thinkers2

T. Van Pelt (*) 
Institute for Science and Human Values, Tampa, FL, USA

© The Author(s) 2017 237

M.R. Miller (ed.), Humanism in a Non-Humanist World, Studies
in Humanism and Atheism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57910-8_12
238  T. Van Pelt

(e.g., Secular Humanists, Skeptics, Atheists, Humanists, Rationalists,

Naturalists and Agnostics) have been missing from public discourse and
action concerning the electoral process, law making and the establish-
ment of public policy on local, state and federal legislative and regulatory
levels. Perhaps they have been cowed into believing that those who live
life to the fullest here and now, without the need to rely on, or imagine
a “higher power,” are not welcomed or would not be heard or consid-
ered as an important sector in the U.S. democratic political process. In
the past, such an assumption may well have been true. However, as the
public face and ranks of these groups increase, so does the influence of
this minority population. It is time for this segment of U.S. citizens to
focus on, and actively participate in the political process, thereby creating
a recognized social movement and political force.

Defining Humanists
An apt definition that animates the thinking of this diverse group might
be found in “an outlook or system of thought attaching prime impor-
tance to human rather than divine or supernatural matters. Humanists’
beliefs stress the potential value and goodness of human beings, empha-
size common human needs, and seek solely rational ways of solving
human problems.”3 Many Humanists agree with “The Affirmations
of Humanism, a Statement of Principles”4 offered by Paul Kurtz,
who is commonly known as the father of secular humanism.5 As the
Affirmations outline, Humanists:

are committed to the application of reason and science to the understand-

ing of the universe and to the solving of human problems. We deplore
efforts to denigrate human intelligence, to seek to explain the world in
supernatural terms, and to look outside nature for salvation. We believe
that scientific discovery and technology can attribute to the betterment of
human life. We believe in an open and pluralistic society and that democ-
racy is the best guarantee of protecting human rights from authoritarian
elites and repressive majorities. We are committed to the principle of the
separation of church and state.”

These beliefs are the basis for, and foundation of, secular humanist val-
ues. With this in mind, for brevity, people who hold these beliefs shall be
referred to as Humanists throughout this chapter.
 12  RELATING TO A “NON-HUMANIST” WORLD: PARTICIPATING …  239

Who are the Non-Humanists?

Many but not all Non-Humanists may be defined as faith-based thinkers
who believe right decisions are justified by invoking God as the ultimate
authority. They are more commonly known and referred to as ‘believ-
ers’ generally belonging to, or affiliated with, organized religious groups
or traditions. It is important to recognize that many of these faith-based
thinkers and the religious organizations to which they belong, herewith
referred to as Theocrats, actively participate in the democratic process
endeavoring to pervert and instill religious tenets in “secular” govern-
ment. And, their ultimate goal, we might ask? Forcefully put, I suggest
to subvert secular democracy, thereby instituting theocracy, “a form of
government in which God or a deity is recognized as the supreme civil
ruler, the God’s or deity’s laws being interpreted by the ecclesiastical
authorities.”6
It is vital that our point of departure is situated within an awareness
of how the “Non-Humanist” world functions politically in the U.S.
and throughout the planetary community. In many cases, Theocrats
demand to be exempt from secular laws because of this belief in a
“higher” power. Some of the laws undergirding such exemptions
among faith-based organizations relate to discrimination in hiring,
proselytizing in return for services, employment protection for work-
ers, Internal Revenue Service rules and regulations, and the payment
of taxes. In the past, because of the First Amendment, U.S. secular
government allowed for these exemptions as long as they were applied
using only private, religious funds to promote religious dogma to self-
identified membership.
In addition, Theocrats have become very adept at influencing laws
and public policy, as many within this demographic pay special attention
to and actively participate in electoral districting and public elections.
Likewise, they track and lobby bills introduced in legislatures promul-
gated by federal regulations. Theocrats run for office, write draft legisla-
tive bills and acts (to be introduced by federal, state and local legislative
bodies, including school boards), and lobby elected representatives at
home, and the legislative capital. They also influence policy written
to implement laws. These are some of the methods used by the Non-
Humanist world to advance its mission in the United States and world-
wide. Humanists can and should use this strategy as a blueprint for their
own activities.
240  T. Van Pelt

How Humanism Can be Forwarded

First, movement members need to cultivate and establish values that are
recognized as secular humanist values in local communities. As Kurtz
stated boldly, “These include a commitment to the enhancement of
human values and scientific inquiry, combining both compassion and
reason in realizing ethical wisdom. It focuses on the principles of per-
sonal integrity: individual freedom and responsibility. It includes a com-
mitment to social justice, planetary ethics, and developing shared values
for the human family.”7 Much progress in and around social justice is not
realized because of religious discrimination. Humanists must add their
voice and presence to push back against policy rooted in religious doc-
trine. It strengthens a civil society informed by humanistic values when
Humanists show up and speak out against injustice and for social justice
issues.

Goals
This chapter explores the U.S. landscape as it stands with regard to state
and religious entanglement and considers what Humanists, recognizing
the assault against secular government is intense and on-going, can do to
bring about social change. Here, I want to suggest that there are three
broad initiatives Humanists need to focus on to amend government
accordingly: (1) lobby to stop the corrosion of the U.S. Constitution
and the subversion of the secular, democratic government; (2) root out
and reverse overtly and covertly religious influence and interference in
policy; and (3) advocate for law and evidence-based policy based on the
scientific method and the common moral decencies of secular humanist
values, (the most fundamental principles deeply ingrained in long-stand-
ing social traditions supported by habit and custom, enacted into law
and even considered sacred by various religions).8
In what follows, I endeavor to convince the Humanist reader of the
importance and necessity for U.S. democracy, indeed, representative gov-
ernment worldwide, of changing the current paradigm of absence and
indifference by taking action and participating actively in government.
Keep in mind that bringing about societal change requires acquiring pas-
sion for the electoral process, law, and public policy.
 12  RELATING TO A “NON-HUMANIST” WORLD: PARTICIPATING …  241

A Citizen’s Duty and Responsibility

As one of the first public policy directors representing the U.S. Humanist
movement for the past several years, my explicit goal has been to protect
and advance a neutral, secular democratic government while forwarding
and defending the scientific method, scientific research, and evidenced
based policies. Accomplishing this mission entails combatting and put-
ting an end to religious intrusion in governmental law and public policy,
and thus, requires active participation by an informed citizenry. Members
of the Humanism movement must accept the citizen’s duty to participate
in the electoral process and the democratic government, thereby posi-
tively influencing the electoral process, laws, and public policy. To this
end, I have worked to educate, rally, and organize Humanists as to bet-
ter familiarize them with the workings of U.S. federal and state govern-
ments, with the intent of lobbying elected officials, on the local (school
boards and county commissions), state (legislatures and governors), and
federal (U.S. Congress, federal agencies and the President) levels. Along
with lobbying, Humanists must also introduce elected officials to the
Humanist community and inform them of secular humanist values. I
have witnessed firsthand the influence and success Humanists have when
they stand up, make themselves known, and speak out. Unbeknownst to
many, evidence based thinkers are rather welcomed by many elected offi-
cials.
At first glance, Humanistic values may be assumed to conflict with
conservative religious values, and in many cases, they are. However, on
the political front, Humanists are well advised to work in coalition with
religious organizations and their adherents in areas where a common
agenda and common values exist. Of the sixteen recommendations of the
“Neo-Humanist Statement of Secular Principles and Values: Personal,
Progressive, and Planetary,” the first calls on Humanists, “to aspire to be
more inclusive by appealing to both non-religious and religious human-
ists and to religious believers who share common goals.”9
One of the most important elements of agreement is found in the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution: the free exercise of
religion. Many people, including Humanists and liberal religionists, and
even some conservative religionists, interpret the First Amendment as
supporting a government neutral in matters of religion; that is, no one
religious sect or its beliefs is designated, identified, or privileged as an
242  T. Van Pelt

official state religion, nor is one religion’s beliefs entwined in law and
public policy to the disadvantage of others. Thus a secular governing
body recognizing the rule of law is the ideal democratic government
sought by both Humanists and these religionists.
To have Humanists’ values taken seriously in the political arena,
Humanism must become known for its grassroots organizing. Local
groups will bring acclaim to the movement as they are recognized by
the media and government officials as active, dynamic participants in the
democratic process. In this way, Humanists will be able to influence out-
comes in law and policy to advantage social justice based on their secular
humanist values.
The aim is to imprint secular humanist values to benefit humankind
within law and public policy, while at the same time advocating for
and maintaining a secular government separated from religion, thereby
ensuring a culture that is neutral when it comes to religion. In principle,
this is in direct opposition to the Theocrats’ wish to force all citizens to
abide by the dictates of a particular God considered the ultimate ruler
and creator. Citizens must become aware that, since the introduction of
the Religion Freedom Restoration Act, religious doctrine has been and
continues to be infused within government law and policy at a very rapid
pace. It is like an ivy vine winding its way up and around each branch
of government, choking off science and reason. Theocrats cite various
objections when accusing government of regulations that burden reli-
gious practice as opposed to remaining neutral. These include: opposing
civil and human rights for those who disagree with these religious dicta,
refusing to abide by civil law, denying tolerance of others’ philosophy,
and ignoring scientific discovery and data that conflicts with the per-
ceived word of God as interpreted by religious leadership. It is urgent
that Humanists join forces with others of like mind to counter these
growing, successful theocratic attempts to pervert democracy in whatever
way and on whatever level they are able.
Humanists should sustain activism in three areas: local, state, and fed-
eral. In addition, experienced citizens and professional lobbyists teach
that the best way to be effective and influential is to work in coalition
with others. Outlined below is an example of successful coalition lob-
bying: a case study of the Coalition Against Religious Discrimination
(CARD) working in opposition to the concept of charitable choice, an
attempted tactic to implant religious doctrine into law at the end of the
twentieth, beginning of the twenty-first century.
 12  RELATING TO A “NON-HUMANIST” WORLD: PARTICIPATING …  243

CARD and Charitable Choice

Many secular and religious congressional lobbyists actively participate
in the (CARD), a federal coalition of secular and religious organiza-
tions that work together to maintain and protect the separation of state
and religion. They include groups such as the American Association of
University Women, Institute for Science and Human Values, Equal
Partners in Faith, American Civil Liberties Union, Hindu American
Foundation, American Humanist Association, Human Rights Campaign,
American Jewish Committee, Interfaith Alliance, Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, Jewish Council for Public Affairs,
Anti-Defamation League, NA’AMAT USA, Baptist Joint Committee
for Religious Liberty, National Education Association, B’nai B’rith
International, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Catholics for
Choice, Action Fund OMB Watch, People For the American Way,
Central Conference of American Rabbis, Secular Coalition for America,
Disciples Justice Action Network, Council for Secular Humanism,
National Council of Jewish Women, National Council of La Raza, Sikh
Council on Religion and Education, Union for Reform Judaism, United
Methodist Church, General Board of Church and Society, and Women
of Reform Judaism. Charitable choice, as described below, hit CARD’s
radar screen early on its inception.
The government has long granted tax dollars to non-secular reli-
gious social service providers, such as Catholic Charities and the Jewish
Federation, that did not proselytize, nor deny people employment or ser-
vices based on faith. Government and faith-based organizations (FBOs)
co-existed amicably. Hence, citizens were not required to participate in
religious activities to receive social services which were provided in non-
sectarian buildings or rooms devoid of religious symbols or icons. The
providers established non-profit 501(c)3 organizations keeping funding
in bank accounts segregated from private or religious funds.

What Changes were Sought, and Why?

In the early 1990s then Senator John Ashcroft developed the charita-
ble choice concept, insisting there was discrimination against religious
organizations in the dissemination of federal funding because regula-
tions imposed an undue burden on FBOs. His aim was to remove neu-
tral safeguards to permit hiring and volunteering discrimination based
244  T. Van Pelt

on affiliation and the beliefs of the FBO, and to allow taxpayers’ dol-
lars to be mingled with religious funds without oversight. If instituted,
charitable choice provisions would effectively give religious organiza-
tions special status, while secular groups would be required to continue
to follow the original regulations. In 1996, then President Bill Clinton
agreed to the concept and deployment of charitable choice in law. It was
an election year, and both men wanted to demonstrate political biparti-
sanship. However, President Clinton decided to use presidential signing
statements to limit the scope of charitable choice provisions, essentially
declaring that he had little or no intention of fully implementing the
bills he was signing into law. The problem with this compromise on the
President’s part was that future Presidents could and, in this case, did,
decide not to honor the statements.

What is a Presidential Signing Statement?

“A signing statement is a written pronouncement issued by the President
of the United States upon the signing of a bill into law. They are usu-
ally printed along with the bill in United States Code Congressional and
Administrative News (USCCAN).”10 In July 2006, a task force of the
American Bar Association (ABA) stated that the use of signing statements
to modify the meaning of duly enacted laws serves to “undermine the
rule of law and our constitutional system of separation of powers.”11 Even
so, signing statements have a long history and continue in use. Charitable
choice provisions allowed government funds to flow directly to houses of
worship and other religious organizations. Furthermore, these provisions
granted religious social service providers the right to discriminate, pros-
elytize, and play by different rules than other charities while spending tax
dollars. At the time, CARD believed that if these efforts were successful,
social workers, psychologists, counselors, teachers, and others seeking to
work in tax-funded social service programs could be denied jobs solely
because of their faith or lack of faith. Because they believed these provi-
sions violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, a broad coali-
tion of groups led by CARD opposed charitable choice amendments in
legislation. Indeed, civil rights, labor, secular, education, health, religious,
and advocacy organizations working to defend the First Amendment and
the religious liberty of all Americans opposed charitable choice.
Secular and religious groups working together were able to lobby the
Congress during the George W. Bush presidency and prevail in stopping
 12  RELATING TO A “NON-HUMANIST” WORLD: PARTICIPATING …  245

or deleting charitable choice provisions in bills and acts. Although

CARD’s success is an instructive and encouraging example of working in
coalition, it is important to note that the struggle continues. Humanists
must realize Theocrats will never stop seeking to reinterpret democ-
racy from theistic and religious perspectives. As such. Humanists must
develop the will and grit to never give up defending democracy and rein-
forcing the wall of separation between state and religion.

Faith-Based Initiatives
Because Congress failed to pass the Charitable Choice amendments,
the George W. Bush administration decided to change the name and
the strategy by implementing Charitable Choice provisions via execu-
tive orders and departmental regulations. President Bush, determined to
satisfy Theocratic supporters, opened the first office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives12 in the White House to fund religious organiza-
tions to provide social services with taxpayer dollars through federal gov-
ernment agencies.
CARD members believe churches and other houses of worship have
the right to perform their religious mission with the use of their own pri-
vate funds. They also believe that federally funded religious discrimination
is always wrong. The coalition believes, as do a majority of Americans,13
that faith-based organizations receiving government funds must be held
to the same civil rights standards as other social service providers. The
concern for Humanists is that these standards are slowly being stripped
away. Proposals to funnel government dollars directly into houses of
worship and other religious organizations endanger both the sanctity
of religion and the integrity of government. The government is prohib-
ited by the Constitution of favoring one religion over another. However,
Humanists must acknowledge the divisions within the U.S. population,
and that this situation is causing the walls of separation to crumble.
Furthermore, charitable choice and faith-based initiatives do not pro-
tect the religious freedom of program beneficiaries. The religious free-
dom of beneficiaries may be violated by subjecting them to religious
indoctrination while they are participating in programs to obtain their
government benefits. Currently, religious organizations are able to com-
bine government funded social services with various forms of religious
indoctrination, such as religious teaching or the display of religious icons
or symbols.
246  T. Van Pelt

Although charitable choice requires that no direct funds may be used

for proselytization, there is no restriction on a religious organization
using its private resources, including volunteers, to include a religious
message and materials as part of the provision of public services. Even as
there is a requirement that notice be given to beneficiaries of their right
to receive services without being discriminated against and that they
have a right to an alternative, including a nonreligious alternative, there
is no accountability enacted by the government to ensure that religious
organizations are informing individuals of this right and directing them
to accessible alternative services.
There is concern among CARD members that the government is not
adequately providing beneficiaries with a range of alternative secular
providers, particularly in rural and less populated areas, where the clos-
est alternative may be a great distance away. In addition, the beneficiary
must object to the religious program before being informed of any alter-
natives. Disadvantaged citizens should not have to choose between ser-
vices they desperately need and rights to which they are entitled.
Funding religious discrimination runs afoul of the First Amendment’s
prohibitions against the use of direct government funding to promote
religious beliefs. When government programs operated by faith-based
organizations discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring for govern-
ment-funded positions, the government becomes associated with promo-
tion of a religious mission in a manner that the Establishment Clause was
designed to prevent.
Furthermore, allowing all religious institutions, including houses of
worship, to directly receive federal funding to administer social services
on behalf of the government creates constitutional concerns. In the
past, religious institutions and houses of worship participated in govern-
ment programs by setting up separate affiliates (separate 501(c)3s) that
provided a legal firewall between the house of worship and the govern-
ment. These religiously affiliated entities, like Jewish Federations and
Catholic Charities, have a longstanding history of receiving government
funds.
Unfortunately, CARD was not able to stem the tide of the Executive
Branch’s assault on the Constitution during the Bush administration.
Under Charitable Choice and faith-based provisions, a house of worship
may directly receive grant funds. In fact, some Charitable Choice provi-
sions do not even require a separate account for the public funds. As a
 12  RELATING TO A “NON-HUMANIST” WORLD: PARTICIPATING …  247

result, there is no longer a legal firewall between the religious institu-

tion and the government, and any audits and liability fall squarely on the
house of worship.

President Obama’s White House Office of Faith-based

and Neighborhood Partnerships14

It was CARD’s hope that President Obama would end this cozy relation-
ship between government and religion. Instead, he put his own stamp on
it: first by changing the name to the White House Office of Faith-Based
and Neighborhood Partnerships and then by establishing the President’s
Advisory Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships.15 The
President tasked the Advisory Council with the creation of several initia-
tives to ostensibly find new ways for both secular and faith-based organi-
zations to better serve their communities. Although the terms “secular,”
“neighborhood” and “community” are frequently included in these
presidential committee names and instructions, the outcomes and deter-
minations appear to empower and favor theocratic, religious organiza-
tions to the exclusion of others.
The Advisory Council created task forces in six key areas16:

• Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families

• Economic Recovery and Domestic Poverty
• Reform of the Office
• Environment and Climate Change
• Inter-religious Cooperation
• Global Poverty and Development

Each task force wrote a preliminary report and suggested recommenda-

tions, which the Advisory Council further discussed. In general, each
report focused on new ways to connect religious and secular nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) with organizations and agencies within
the government. After each of the reports was deliberated, there was an
opportunity for public comment. Although many groups filed sugges-
tions and objections, there was little or no change to the reports.
Perhaps the most important report from the Humanist point of view
came from the Reform of the Office Task Force, which was charged with
reforming the Office of Faith Based and Neighborhood Partnerships to
248  T. Van Pelt

match President Obama’s vision of the organization’s mandate. Its rec-

ommendations included:

• Strengthening Constitutional and Legal Footing for Partnerships

• Clarifying Prohibited Uses of Direct Federal Financial Assistance
• Emphasizing Separation Requirements and Protections for
Religious Identity
• Increasing Transparency Regarding Federally Funded Partnerships

All of these goals have the intent of ensuring that all federal assistance
complies with constitutional requirements of separation of church and
state and the Establishment Clause. In the end, the lone voice for rea-
son, Rev. Barry Lynn of Americans United for Separation of Church and
State (AU), a member of the task force and CARD leadership, did not
prevail. After all it cannot be expected that one person alone will be able
to quell the religious fervor that has the United States and the Advisory
Council in its grip. This is a very important reason the Humanism move-
ment must coalesce and take vigorous action. CARD’s voice, presence‚
and strength relies on its member organizations’ grassroots visibility and
vocal support.

Concerns About President Obama’s Executive Order

In the fifth year of his presidency, President Obama appointed Melissa
Rogers, a member of the Advisory Council, as the Director of the Office
of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships. In coalition with other
organizations, the Institute for Science and Human Values (ISHV)
pointed out important concerns about President Obama’s Executive
Order in a letter to Director Rogers.17
“In particular, we believe it is important to have exacting language in
the following areas:

• the right of beneficiaries to have access to an alternative provider if

they object to
the religious character of a social service provider;
• the requirement that beneficiaries be informed of their rights;
• the constitutional requirement that government money may not
fund “explicitly
religious activities” and the definition of such activities; and
 12  RELATING TO A “NON-HUMANIST” WORLD: PARTICIPATING …  249

• the mandate that agencies perform oversight and provide transpar-

ency to ensure
that constitutional mandates are respected.”

Further we ask an end to federally funded employment discrimination:

Traditionally, religiously affiliated organizations that accepted govern-

ment funds to provide social services were bound by the same rules as
other non-religious providers, including the ban on discriminating in hir-
ing based on religion for positions funded with taxpayer money. When
the Bush Administration implemented its Faith-Based Initiative, it fun-
damentally changed these rules, allowing religious organizations to take
government funds and use those funds to discriminate in hiring a quali-
fied individual based on nothing more than her or his religious beliefs. We
strongly opposed this change, as the federal government should never sub-
sidize workplace discrimination. Instead of correcting this egregious ruling
the Obama administration sidestepped it by referring complaints of hiring
discrimination to the Justice Department for review and perhaps action on
a case by case basis. We wonder how a beneficiary knows they have the
right to submit a complaint.

We ask that the Administration fulfill its campaign promise and end
taxpayer-funded employment discrimination through the actions listed
below.

• Rescind Regulations, Policies, and Guidance that Permit Federally

Funded Employment Discrimination
After Congress rejected legislation that would have sanctioned
employment discrimination in most federally funded social ser-
vice programs, the implementation of that policy through execu-
tive orders and regulations across federal agencies during the Bush
Administration. To date, these policies remain in place. In order to
effectuate the promise of ending federally funded employment dis-
crimination, the Administration must revoke the executive orders
and regulations and any accompanying or supporting policies and
guidance documents.
• Review and Withdraw the June 29, 2007, Office of Legal Counsel
Memorandum re: the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA)
250  T. Van Pelt

The White House should direct the Justice Department’s Office

of Legal Counsel (OLC) to review and withdraw its June 29,
2007, Memorandum interpreting RFRA, titled “Application of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to the Award of a Grant
Pursuant to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act.”
The OLC memo wrongly asserts that RFRA is “reasonably con-
strued” to require that a federal agency categorically exempt religious
organizations from explicit federal nondiscrimination provisions tied
to grant programs. This interpretation of RFRA, which provides for a
blanket override of statutory religious nondiscrimination provisions,
is not justified under applicable legal standards and threatens core
civil rights and religious freedom protections. Accordingly, CARD
renews its request for the review and withdrawal of this OLC memo.
(Update: In 2012, religious conservatives in Congress attempted
to build on RFRA 1993 when Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) intro-
duced the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 2012. A primary
Congressional finding of this bill states that “laws ‘neutral’ toward
religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to
interfere with religious exercise.” Furthermore, one of the stated
purposes of the law is “to provide a claim or defense to persons
whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.”
Although the bill died in committee, look for it to be reintroduced
in the future.)
• Restore Executive Order 11246
Executive Order 11246 prohibits religious discrimination in all gov-
ernment contracts.
This Executive Order, signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson
in 1965, expanded upon decades of executive orders signed by
Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, which
barred private organizations from discriminating in hiring using
federal funds. Yet, in 2002, President George W. Bush rolled
back these traditional safeguards and core civil rights protections.
Section 4(c) of Executive Order 13279 exempts religious organiza-
tions that receive government contracts from the requirements of
Executive Order 11246 and allows them to discriminate in hiring
based on religion. This civil rights rollback remains in place today.
We ask, therefore, that the Administration restore Executive Order
11246 to its original form, reinstating the nondiscrimination provi-
sion for all organizations that contract with the government.”
 12  RELATING TO A “NON-HUMANIST” WORLD: PARTICIPATING …  251

Coalitions and Grassroots
Federal coalitions like CARD are very important because they provide
the staff, finances, networking and experience it takes to advocate and
lobby for the protection and maintenance of a government necessary
for a robust democracy. Yet federal coalitions cannot do this job alone.
The Humanist community must add its heft to these struggles. Its mem-
bers must participate in and be recognized for grassroots organizing as a
movement. This requires vibrant activism, and activism requires involve-
ment, starting with registering new voters.

An Untapped Demographic—Millennial Hispanics

Why is it important for the Humanist movement to register new voters
now? Because there is an urgent need, an opportunity, and the time is
right. The results of a 2013 poll commissioned by ABC News/Fusion is
eye-opening, showing:

• “Fewer than half of all adults, 45%, say political leaders should rely
somewhat or a great deal on their religious beliefs when making
policy decisions. But again the range is wide: six in 10 conservatives,
as many Republicans and 65% of conservative Republicans hold
this view. That falls sharply to 39% of Democrats and independents
alike, four in 10 moderates and 32% of liberals.
• On the role of religion, not surprisingly, a broad 74% of evangeli-
cal white Protestants say political leaders should rely at least some-
what on their religious beliefs in making policy decisions. That falls
to half as many non-evangelical white Protestants, 37%, and drops
further, to 16%, among Americans who profess no religion.
• [Millennials] are 12 points less apt than their elders to say politi-
cians should base policy positions on their religious beliefs, a result
that fits with customarily lower levels of religiosity among young
adults.
• There’s another difference among millennials vs. older adults,
reflecting another longstanding attribute of young Americans:
their comparative lack of engagement in politics. Among adults age
18–31, just 54% report that they’re registered to vote. That soars
to 87% among those 32 and older. Indeed it increases steadily with
age, peaking at 94% of seniors.”18
252  T. Van Pelt

These numbers are both a warning and opportunity for the Humanist
movement. Yet these views are seemingly not being taken seriously by
U.S. government officials. This one fact alone is why Humanists must
devote time and attention to the work of registering new voters. We can-
not, after all, win if we do not do our part to register voters and drive
new voters to the polls. As can be seen during our last presidential elec-
tion between candidates Hilary Clinton and Donald Trump, voter turn-
out is essential to success in an election. The statistics cited here and in
other articles and reports demonstrate that a majority of U.S. citizens
back the removal of at least some religious influence in governance.

Office of Faith-based Community Initiatives19

U.S. policy also affects the rest of the world. According to the U.S.
government website the federal office of the Office of Faith-Based
Community Initiatives is described as:

the State Department’s portal for engagement with religious leaders and
organizations around the world. Headed by Special Advisor Shaun Casey,
the office reaches out to faith-based communities to ensure that their
voices are heard in the policy process, and it works with those commu-
nities to advance U.S. diplomacy and development objectives. In accord-
ance with the U.S. Strategy on Religious Leader and Faith Community
Engagement, the office guarantees that engagement with faith-based com-
munities is a priority for Department bureaus and for posts abroad, and
helps equip our foreign and civil service officers with the skills necessary
to engage faith-communities effectively and respectfully. The office col-
laborates regularly with other government officials and offices focused
on religious issues, including the Ambassador-at-Large for International
Religious Freedom, the Department’s Office of International Religious
Freedom, and the White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood
Partnerships.”

A 2013 article in Religious Dispatches Magazine written by Sarah Posner,

Interfaith Alliance (IA) president Rev. C. Welton Gaddy was quoted call-
ing attention to, “Obama’s decision to permit federally funded religious
organizations to hire only candidates that suit their religious preferences,
and fire ones who don’t.” He continued, “faith-based organizations
receive taxpayer dollars, they should be required to follow the same rules
as all other non-profit organizations who receive such funds.” IA is a
 12  RELATING TO A “NON-HUMANIST” WORLD: PARTICIPATING …  253

long-time strong partner in CARD. Two of the more significant passages

from Posner’s article are as follows:

Thanks to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request from the

American Civil Liberties Union, (ACLU) we now know that the Justice
Department, under Obama, has adopted a policy of granting certificates
of exemption to taxpayer-funded religious organizations that request one.
It has not however, revealed how many organizations have received such
exemptions from federal anti-discrimination law.

And

Civil liberties and religious organizations opposed to the rule have spent
the past four years since Obama launched the OFBNP urging the president
to require these groups to comply with anti-discrimination laws if they
accept taxpayer money, to no avail.

Given the heightened awareness of the threatened state of secularism

in the U.S. government, the Humanist community must recognize the
urgent need for advocacy from members who are ready to take action.

How Humanism can Relate to a Non-Humanism World

The purpose of this chapter has been to outline many, but certainly not
all, of the Theocratic threats to secular democracy and to discuss why it
is so important for individuals that identify as members of the Humanism
movement to take a stand and speak up against religious interference in
the rule of law. My hope is that you, dear reader, are persuaded it is time
to do so. If you are, the following steps will help you launch your activism.

Identify Where Your Interest and Enthusiasm Lie

Choose whether you are most passionate about electoral politics, legisla-
tion, or public policy and if you will work on the local, state, or national
level, or all three. Start connecting to others who are of like mind—
personally, one-to-one, online (e.g., via Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn,
Action Elerts, list serves, webinars), by attending meetings, or all of
the above. Your level of commitment will, of course, depend on time,
money, and enthusiasm.
254  T. Van Pelt

Decide How You Learn and Work Best

Are you more comfortable making phone calls, knocking on doors, writ-
ing (reports, emails, blogs, letters to the editor, campaigns postcards),
generating Facebook and Twitter comments, starting a petition, making
presentations? Citizens need ongoing education in many of these areas to
feel confident when engaging. Take classes to stay abreast of new meth-
ods of engagement. Today there are numerous online courses, videos and
webinars that make learning easy and fun from the comfort of your own
home. Some topics include how to write a press release or a letter to the
editor, social media 101, how to do a media interview, and dealing with
the business of running a grassroots group (a most important topic!).
Participate in discussions, talks, debates, dialogue, and attend school board
and government community meetings in your home town. This partici-
pation will inform you and stimulate action. There are local grassroots
groups that offer classes, and national organizations often host trainings
at national meetings and locally. Participate in civic days in Washington,
D.C., and your state capital to lobby your representatives. Civic days gen-
erally include training on the legislative process, current proposed legisla-
tion, talking points for discussion with your legislator and other lobbying
opportunities, such as attending legislative committee meetings.

Join a Local Group and Take a Leadership Role

This is easy enough to do. If you don’t know of one near you try to
find one through Meetup, Google, or an online or print calendar of
events. Another way is to check the websites of larger national Secular
Humanist/Skeptic/Atheist groups for a listing of their affiliates. If there
aren’t any in your area, you may start one (create a page on Facebook or
try a Meetup posting). Ideally your local group will form an affiliation
with like-minded state and national groups to strengthen its membership
and increase grassroots representation on state and federal levels. If there
is no group in your area or starting a group is not your cup of tea, you
might consider joining a state or national group.

Join State and/or National Groups to Inform Your Activism

Sign up for action alerts, and then take action when asked to send an
email or make a phone call. This is a good way to become educated and
 12  RELATING TO A “NON-HUMANIST” WORLD: PARTICIPATING …  255

a positive way to engage public servants. Your thoughts will be shared,

recorded and counted—they do make a difference. ISHV, the Secular
Coalition for America (SCA) and the American Humanist Association
(AHA) work with the following groups on the state and federal level,
and many of them belong to CARD. If any of them look interesting to
you, contact them locally or online.

• Americans United for Separation of Church and State (AU)20: The

AU is a nonpartisan educational organization dedicated to preserv-
ing the constitutional principle of church-state separation as the
only way to ensure religious freedom for all Americans.
• The National Organization for Women (NOW)21: Since its found-
ing in 1966, NOW’s goal has been to take action to bring about
equality for all women. NOW works to eliminate discrimina-
tion and harassment in the workplace, schools, the justice system,
and all other sectors of society; secure abortion, birth control and
reproductive rights for all women; end all forms of violence against
women; eradicate racism, sexism and homophobia; and promote
equality and justice in our society.
• Americans Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)22: For almost 100 years, the
ACLU has worked to defend and preserve the individual rights and
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
• National Council of Jewish Women (NCJW)23: NCJW is a grass-
roots organization of volunteers and advocates who turn progres-
sive ideals into action. Inspired by Jewish values, NCJW strives for
social justice by improving the quality of life for women, children,
and families and by safeguarding individual rights and freedoms.

Connect with Like-minded Groups

Once you have connected with a group whether on the local, state or
national level, look for other local organizations who share your goals
when it comes to elections, lobbying, public policy and advocacy work.
Purposely network to build local alliances.

Form Short-Term, Issue-Oriented, Local Coalitions

Identify possible coalition partners by inviting speakers to meetings to
explain their organization’s legislative interests and activism. This is a
256  T. Van Pelt

way to identify common ground. When thinking of the non-Humanist

world and public policy, think of two camps: one liberal, with leaders
who work to maintain a secular government and the other, fundamental-
ist, with leaders that push hard to infuse and intertwine religion into law,
public policy and governmental departments. People and life stances are
complex. Do not assume that because you do not like another person’s
religion that you will not be able to work together on issues of grave
concern that you may share.

Next Steps
Once your group and its allies have identified common areas of inter-
est, the coalition can take action by coordinating and participating in
advocacy efforts and promoting active engagement on priority issues.
It is helpful for local coalitions to meet with both state and federally
elected officials in their hometowns. The two most significant concerns
of elected officials are votes and money, with votes being the number
one concern. Because officials want to be re-elected, they are driven by
the voters at home. They need to hear from the Humanist community in
person on their home turf.

Electoral Strategies of Engagement

Humanists can participate in many important election season activities,
as individuals or in groups. Early preparation is key, and it is never too
early to participate in the democratic process.

• Participate in voter registration drives.

• Prepare a questionnaire to be filled out by the candidates including
judicial candidates. (Very good samples can be found online).
• Interview candidates in person.
• Invite all the candidates running for the same office to appear in
a forum to present their positions and answer questions from the
audience.
• Volunteer to work in political campaigns. You may make phone
calls, write postcards, attend rallies, walk with candidates in parades,
knock on doors, enter data—there is a job for every skill you may
have.
 12  RELATING TO A “NON-HUMANIST” WORLD: PARTICIPATING …  257

• Work the polls. Hand out palm cards, wave signs, give voters a lift
to the voting place
• Run for office. We must field candidates that hold shared secular
humanist values.

Relating Further—International Politics

and the “See Change” Campaign24

Although this chapter has focused on three levels of government, there

is a fourth, the international. An example of a global challenge Humanist
groups could take up as a top priority is the reassignment of the official
status of the Vatican, known as the Holy See, from the United Nations
(UN). Catholics For Choice (CFC) is currently engaged in an ongoing
campaign to remove the Holy See from its influential perch in the UN.
It is asking planetary citizens to call on their governments to urge the
UN to treat the Holy See as a religion, like other religious groups and
non-governmental organizations (NGO), not as a permanent observer,
and not as a state. In an address to the UN in 1965, Pope Paul VI
declared the Holy See as “an expert in humanity. Our mission: We are
the bearer of a message for all mankind.” The harm caused by privileging
the Catholic religion is the denial of consensus of policy. As one egre-
gious example, women’s reproductive justice is obstructed world-wide
and with it, population control. If possible, it is desirable and necessary
for Humanist groups to take part in UN conferences and meetings to
effect the establishment of global Secular Humanism values and norms.

Government of the People, by the People

and for the People

Until the Humanist movement becomes known as a strong player in

the electoral process and democratic government, influencing law, pub-
lic policy and the society by its grassroots organizing, its full worth will
never be realized or recognized. Local groups will bring acclaim to the
movement when they are identified by the media and government offi-
cials as participants in the democratic process. It takes a sense of duty,
action and enthusiasm. YOU “are the people” and your viewpoint—the
Humanist viewpoint—matters.
258  T. Van Pelt

Notes
1. John J. Stuhr, “Dewey’s Social and Political Philosophy,” in Reading
Dewey: Interpretations for a Postmodern Generation, Larry Hickman, ed.
Indiana University Press, pp. 85–86.
2. “Evidence-Based thinking”, Accessed April 21, 2015, http://www.issue-
pedia.org/Evidencebased_thinking.
3. “Humanist”, Dictionary, Apple, Version 2.2.1 (156).
4. Paul Kurtz, “The Affirmations of Humanism, a Statement of Principles”,
Human Prospect: A Neohumanist Perspective, Summer 2014, Vol 4 #1, 70.
5. “Paul Kurtz - The New Atheism and Secular Humanism”, Point of
Inquiry Podcast, September 14, 2007, http://www.pointofinquiry.org/.
6. “Theocracy,” Accessed April 21, 2015, http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/Theocracy.
7. Paul Kurtz, “Mission Statement”, Institute for Science and Human Values,
Accessed October 18, 2013, http://instituteforscienceandhumanvalues.
com/articles/mission%20statement.htm.
8. Paul Kurtz, Forbidden Fruit: The Ethics of Secularism (Amherst, NY:
Prometheus Books, 2008), pp. 133–170.
9. Paul Kurtz, Neo-Humanist Statement of Secular Principles and Values,
Institute of Science and Human Values, http://instituteforscienceandhu-
manvalues.com/articles/neohumaniststatement.htm.
10. Signing Statement, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Accessed April 22,
2015, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signing_statement.
11. American Bar Association “Blue-Ribbon Task Force Finds President
Bush’s Signing Statements Undermine Separation of Powers” Wikipedia,
the free encyclopedia, Accessed April 22, 2015, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Signing_statement
12. Executive Order 13199, 29 January 2001, Establishment of White House
Office of Faith- Based and Community Initiatives Delivered, Office of
Federal Register, Accessed April 22, 2015, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/WCPD-2001-02-05/pdf/WCPD-2001-02-05-Pg235.pdf.
13. The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Surveys, http://www.pewfo-
rum.org/2009/11/16/faith-based-programs-still-popular-less-visible/
14. Executive Order 13498—Amendments to Executive Order 13199 and
Establishment of the President’s Advisory Council for Faith-Based
and Neighborhood Partnerships, The American Presidency Project,
Accessed April 29, 2015, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
php?pid=85734.
15. “Inaugural Advisory Council,” Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood
Partnerships, Accessed April 28, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
administration/eop/ofbnp/about/2009-2010.
 12  RELATING TO A “NON-HUMANIST” WORLD: PARTICIPATING …  259

16.  Charitable Choice and Faith-based Campaign, Institute for

Science and Human Values, Accessed April 29, 2015, http://
www.instituteforscienceandhumanvalues.com/index_htm_files/
CharitableChoiceandFaithbasedCampaign.pdf.
17. Letter to Melissa Rogers, 26 Jun, 2013.The Coalition Against Religious
Discrimination, Institute for Science and Human Values, Accessed April 21,
2015, http://www.instituteforscienceandhumanvalues.com/elected%20offi-
cial%20letters%202.htm.
18. “Poll Finds Vast Gaps in Basic Views on Gender, Race, Religion and Politics,”
ABC News, Accessed October 13, 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/
politics/2013/10/poll-finds-vast-gapsin-basic-views-on-gender-race-reli-
gion-and-politics/.
19. “Remarks at the Launch of the Office of Faith-Based Community
Initiatives,” John Kerry, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of
State, Accessed April 29, 2015, http://www.state.gov/secretary/
remarks/2013/08/212781.htm.
20. “Americans United for Separation of Church and State,” Our Mission,
Accessed October 18, 2013, https://www.au.org/about/our-mission.
21. “National Organization for Women,” Who We Are, Accessed October 18,
2013, http://now.org/about/who-we-are/.
22. “American Civil Liberties Union,” Accessed April 28, 2015, https://
www.aclu.org.
23. “National Council of Jewish Women,” Mission and Resolutions, http://
www.ncjw.org/content_76.cfm?navID=26.
24. “Catholics for Choice,” See Change Campaign, http://www.catholicsfor-
choice.org/campaigns/AbouttheSeeChangeCampaign.asp.
 CHAPTER 13

Postscript

Monica R. Miller

Humanism “is not a prejudice.”1

To see the world from a human point of view is not an absurd thing for
human beings to do. It is sometimes said that such a view implies that we
regard human beings as the most important or valuable creatures in the
universe. This would be an absurd thing to do, but it is not implied. To
suppose that it is, is to make the mistake of identifying the point of view of
the universe and the human point of view. No one should make any claims
about the importance of human beings to the universe: the point is about
the importance of human beings to human beings.2

The above words from philosopher Bernard Williams present an image

of humanism in both its exaggerated blindness and its best light (at
once). Humanism, rather than overdetermined or overdetermining itself
as an object, is most basically about relating. As humans, such is our task
whether we like it or not. Humanists, however, transform this necessity
into a virtue.
This collection of essays has meant to foster conversations involving
relationships not between humans and the universe, but humans (and
even aliens) and other humans existing together inside of a universe.

M.R. Miller (*) 
Lehigh University, Bethlehem, USA

© The Author(s) 2017 261

M.R. Miller (ed.), Humanism in a Non-Humanist World, Studies
in Humanism and Atheism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57910-8_13
262  M.R. Miller

To suggest humans have dominion over the universe would be as ethi-

cally abrasive as it would be rationally misinformed. Yet, to give attention
to “the importance of human beings to human beings” may be the high-
est task and charge for humanism in this non-humanist world. But can
(or, will) humanism achieve such a task?
Philosopher Michel Foucault was no fan of humanism. For him, it
was too much an intellectual as well as ethical failure. Further, it was far
too closely connected to notions of modernity and the Enlightenment,
a connection he regarded as a problem.3 At times, the humanism seen
here is party to, and in the legacy of, the humanist “thematic”4 Foucault
found troubling. To this extent, he helps to cast a critical gaze onto these
proceedings while also being part of the cadre of voices working to cre-
ate the “non-humanist world” taken up as the theme of this volume. For
humanists unfamiliar with his critique, and as a needed reminder of past
humanism’s sins and the non-humanist world’s overreaching outlook on
humanism, Foucault’s perspective is worth relaying here:

Humanism is something entirely different [from the Enlightenment]. It is

a theme or rather a set of themes that have reappeared on several occa-
sions over time in European societies; these themes always tied to value
judgments have obviously varied greatly in their content as well as in the
values they have preserved. Furthermore they have served as a critical prin-
ciple of differentiation. In the seventeenth century there was a humanism
that presented itself as a critique of Christianity or of religion in general;
there was a Christian humanism opposed to an ascetic and much more
theocentric humanism. In the nineteenth century there was a suspicious
humanism hostile and critical toward science and another that to the con-
trary placed its hope in that same science. Marxism has been a humanism;
so have existentialism and personalism; there was a time when people sup-
ported the humanistic values represented by National Socialism and when
the Stalinists themselves said they were humanists.

From this we must not conclude that everything that has ever been linked
with humanism is to be rejected but that the humanistic thematic is in
itself too supple too diverse too inconsistent to serve as an axis for reflec-
tion. And it is a fact that at least since the seventeenth century what is
called humanism has always been obliged to lean on certain conceptions of
man borrowed from religion science or politics. Humanism serves to color
and to justify the conceptions of man to which it is after all obliged to take
recourse.5
 13 POSTSCRIPT  263

Foucault is of the mind that the Enlightenment is an event in his-

tory. The event where western Europe came out of a long philosophi-
cal and social slumber, the period giving rise to some of humanism’s
most favored sons—Hume, Kant, etc. The Enlightenment is marred by
its own set of indiscretions, many of which are the same as those levied
against humanism here by Foucault. Yet, who, we might ask, is responsi-
ble? Foucault clearly states humanism is, but our opinion on the matter
will await later treatment. Here, in his construction of “hostile” human-
ism, he creates an antagonism that might be rendered as humanism vs.
non-humanist (even, “anti-humanist” as he is remembered). Many
pieces in this volume give critical attention to the humanist shaping of
the “non-humanist world,” and such appraisals are helpful. Nevertheless,
Foucault pulls no punches in blaming humanism for past failures that
could as easily be the result of other intellectual themes. Of course, his
vision of the Enlightenment (as event) could easily be thematically re-
rendered as Enlightenment. Rather than a non-humanist world marked
by billions of “believers” in god (or, whatever else), here Foucault the
critical, postmodern thinker, becomes an unlikely constructor of a non-
humanist world in which humanism (and humanists) must live.
With critique and critique of the critic in mind, this book has come
together by way of a commitment to learning in unlikely places, and
from forging unlikely conversations between humanists and non-human-
ists. The effort has been such that firm definitions of what these moni-
kers purport to mean have either varied, or been left unaddressed. Yet,
any humanism worth its intellectual or social weight needs no defenses
(from Foucault or anywhere else) and thusly, growth among humanism
(as a philosophy) and in its institutions means building bridges across
troubling waters and upon unlikely shores.
In this spirit, and by way of drawing this volume to a close, it may
be that in his distaste for humanism, Foucault offers an ironic means of
packaging what humanism may be tomorrow, and how it has been pre-
sented in the preceding pages of this book. Of “modernity,” Foucault
writes that we might imagine it “rather as an attitude”…

a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by

certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of
acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of
belonging and presents itself as a task.6
264  M.R. Miller

Perhaps, in a non-humanist world, humanism is charged with giving

more credit to others than they may receive in return. How do we find
value in places and people and things that show little regard towards us?
How do we prevent ourselves from falling into the ruts carved out by
past failures of humanism(s) and humanists?
Relating is an action. Relationship is also a state of being. The sheer
act of relating to others is not a humanist mandate, but a human respon-
sibility thrust upon us all by virtue of who we are (humans) and where
we are (a universe we still don’t understand). With these features of what
we do/do not know in mind, alongside such a focus on humanism as
“an attitude…a mode of relating to contemporary reality…a choice”
towards “belonging,” humanism in a non-humanist world knows well
what its task will involve: relationships between human beings, and being
human.
Humanism in a Non-Humanist World is a small mark on so vital and
vast a “task.”

Notes
1. Williams, Bernard. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1986, 118.
2. Williams, 1986, 118.
3. Foucault, Michel. “What is Enlightenment?” The Foucault Reader. Edited
by Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon, 1984.
4. Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, 1984.
5. Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, 1984.
6. Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?”, 1984.
 Index

A African American
Ability, 5, 13, 25, 28, 45, 134, 147, African American churches, 62
166, 195, 199, 200, 219 African American secular human-
Abolition, 64 isms, 76
Abramović, Marina, 134, 146 African Americans for humanism,
Absence, 88, 91, 136, 138, 145–149, 28, 77, 101, 110
179, 219, 240 Afro-American
Abstraction, 25 Afro-American music, 223
Abyss, 128, 221 Agnosticism, 17, 58
Academia, 4 Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), 104
Accountability, 156, 218, 246 Alien
Activism alien force, 29, 151–155, 161, 164,
Everyday activism, 79 167
Adolf Hitler, 9 alienhood, 163
Adorno, Theodor W., 118, 123 alien wisdom, 164
Advisory Council on Faith-Based and Rudy the tall white alien, 161, 164,
Neighborhood Partnerships, 247 166
Advocacy, 64, 66, 244, 253, 255, 256 Alienation
Aesthetics modes of alienation, 158
aesthete, 148 Alternative
Affiliation, 75, 81, 157, 159, 167, alternative fact, 2
244, 254 alternative religious institutions, 195
Africa America
African humanists, 103, 108 American
African women, 104

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017 265

M.R. Miller (ed.), Humanism in a Non-Humanist World, Studies
in Humanism and Atheism, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57910-8
266  Index

American democracy, 30, 220; Aryan, 162

American democratic experi- Ashcroft, John, 243
ment, 220 Assumptions, 4, 13, 21, 24–26, 30,
American culture, 14, 93, 144 78, 82, 87, 103, 136, 141, 148,
Americas, 13 155, 163, 238
black America, 133, 137, 217 Atheist
mainstream America, 195 anti-religious atheists, 77
New World, 13, 166 atheism
American Atheists Group, 96 aggressive atheism, 47; Western
American Bar Association (ABA), 244 atheism, 91
American Civil Liberties Union, 61, atheistic, 13, 44, 48, 124, 156
243, 253 atheists of color, 75, 80, 84, 86,
American Ethical Union, 68 89, 93
American Humanist Association, 76, functional atheist, 57
143, 156, 195, 243, 255 new atheists, 47, 89, 100, 103, 196
Americans United for Separation of Athens, 226
Church and State, 61, 243, 248, Auerbach, Eric, 172
255 Auschwitz, 126
Ancestors, 22–25, 124, 126, 176, 204 Austin, J.L., 154
Ancient Authority
Ancient Greek, 5, 6, 179 absolute authority, 172
Animal authoritarian, 7, 17, 238
animal rights, 20 authorities, 239
Antagonism overlooked authority, 128
antagonistic, 20, 37, 136, 140, under-recognized authority, 128
153–155, 158
Anti-Defamation League, 243
Apathy, 3, 137 B
Application, 11, 58, 238 Bach, 186
Approaches, 4, 101, 141, 143, 220 Bacon, Francis, 134
Arab world, 103 Baker, Ella, 177
Archbishop of Canterbury, 187 Baker, Josephine, 133
Archeological, 5 Baldwin, James, 133
Area 51, 161 Baptist Joint Committee for Religious
Aristocracy Liberty, 61, 243
aristocratic, 227 Basquiat, Jean-Michel, 134
Arnal, William, 140 Bariona, 119–121, 128
Art BBC, 106
art world, 134 Beauty
high art, 146 beautiful, 227
low art, 146 Being
pop Art, 137, 146 being-in-the-world, 37, 45, 47, 50

non-Human Beings, 20
Belief
Beliefs
supernatural beliefs, 58, 68
believer, 48, 83, 84, 90, 91, 156,
239, 241; non-believers, 44,
88, 205; religious believers, 48,
241
believing, 37, 81, 89, 238
blind belief, 82, 105
disbelief, 65, 109, 165
economy of belief, 88
nonbelief, 90
stated belief, 135
Belonging
social belonging, 88
Bible
Bible Belt, 59, 201
Biblical Books
Chronicles, 178; Deuteronomy,
176; Exodus, 173, 176;
Ezekiel, 175; Luke, 110, 183;
Matthew, 179; New Testament,
183, 187; Pentateuch, 176;
Psalm, 64, 180, 185, 188;
Romans, 188; Samuel, 178–
180
Biblical Events/Places
Bethlehem, 178, 181; Canaan,
142, 179; Flood, 179; Gath,
178; House of David, 178;
Iron-Age Palestine, 179, 180
Israel, Ancient Israel, 177; Law
of Moses, 188; Mount Sinai,
44, 179; Wandering, 175, 176;
Wilderness, 88, 176, 179
Biblical Figures
Ancient Israelite Griots, 177;
Bethlehemite, 178; David,
178, 180–182; Elhanan, 178;
Giants, 179; Goliath, 178, 181;
Hannah, 183; Hebrews, 173,
Index   267
177; Iaare-Oregim, 178; John
the Baptist, 183; King David,
178; Lord, 186; Mary, 183,
186; Philistine Giant, 178;
Prophets, 186, 188; Scribes,
179; Simeon, 183, 186;
Zachariah, 183, 186
Biblical Injunction
The Ten Commandments, 176
Biblical literalists, 69
Biblical narratives, 123
Biblical Song
Benedictus, 183, 186; Magnificat,
182, 183, 186–188; Nunc
Dimittus, 183, 186
Biblical Stories, 86
Versions of the Bible
Greek Septuagint, 178; King
James Version (KJV), 178;
Latin Vulgate, 178, 182;
Peshitta Syriac, 178; Qumran,
179
Binary
binaries
rhetorical binaries, 4; us vs. them,
27
Biological
biological determination, 105
biological distinction, 19
Black Atheist Alliance, 77
Black Atheists of America, 77, 110
Black Lives Matter Movement, 137
Black Nonbelievers, Inc., 77, 90
Black Non-believers of Atlanta, 110
Black Nonbelievers of Dallas, 77
Black Nonbelievers of Houston, 77
Black Skeptics of Los Angeles, 110
Bond
common bond, 152, 159
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, 186
Boundaries, 39, 45, 46
Bragg, Raymond, 9
268  Index

British Empire, 187 Christopher, Jim, 104

Bush, George W., 105, 244, 245, 250 Church
atheistic churches, 156
church history, 81
C Mormon, 196
Campaign Roman Catholic, 6
billboard, 105, 195 separation of church and state, 198,
Capacity 238, 248
cognitive, 25, 40; cognitive Unitarian Church, 68
dimensions, 38, 42 Cicero, Marcus Tullius, 7
speech, 8, 25 Citizen
Capitalism informed citizenry, 241
capital, 20, 99; social capital, 20, Civic, 76, 133, 137, 143, 223, 254
99 Civilization
Carson, Ben, 2 civilized, 18
Carter, Jimmy, 61 Civil Rights
Cartesian, 25 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 63
Category Civil Rights Movement, 138, 177
categorical clarification, 153 Clan
categories, 14, 79, 153; categories clan allegiances, 167
of difference, 153 Class, 16, 58, 64, 66, 107, 111, 134,
categorization, 39 135, 188, 204
Catholic Classical
Catholic Charities, 199, 243, 246 classical greek, 6
Catholics for Choice, 243 classical learning, 8
Center for Inquiry, 76, 77, 156, 195 classical world, 7
Center for Reason and Science, 76 classics, 231
Certainty Clinton, Bill, 244
uncertainty, 144, 153, 160 Clinton, Hillary, 166
Charitable choice, 243–246 Coalition Against Religious
Charleston City Council, 64, 65 Discrimination (CARD), 242
Chechov, 224 Cold War, 151
Chimamanda Adichie, 180 Colonize
Christian colonizing, 162
ancient christian hermitic monks, Committee for Religious Liberty, 61,
204 243
ancient christianity, 183, 204 Community
christian iconography, 183 communication, 59, 80, 171
Christian ministry, 193 communities
Christian religious service, 51 coummunities of color, 90,
Christian thought, 211 139; lived communities, 51
denomination, 195, 205 community needs, 68
hymnody, 183, 186 community organizing, 200
 Index   269

Competition, 60 cultural impact, 195

Congregation cultural influence, 61, 89
godless congregations, 194 cultural locations, 103
Congress, 61, 241, 245, 249, 250 cultural policing, 75
Connor, Bull, 64 customs
Conscience foreign culture, 3
consciousness, 52, 135 dominant culture, 92, 93
unconsciousness, 26 new culture, 92
Conservative, 1, 67, 70, 220, 241, non-white cultures, 87, 90
250 racial culture, 92
Constitution, 59, 245, 246, 255
Contingency
contingencies, 37 D
Cooper, Brittney, 137 Dalai Lama, 51
Conviction Darrell Fasching, 123
convictions, 39, 45, 53, 220; Darwin
ultimate convictions, 39 Darwinian, 107
Cooperation Dawkins, Richard, 66, 76, 100, 156,
cooperative, 60, 64; inter-reli- 171
gious Cooperation, 247 Death
Corruption, 217 dying, 212
Council for Secular Humanism, 101, de Botton, Alain, 195
243 Debt, 125, 127
Council of Nicea, 204 de Greiff, Pablo, 127
Cowan, Rosemary, 224 Deify, 103
Creation, 48, 69, 76, 120, 124, 194, Deification, 125
200, 225, 247 deities, 39, 67
Creativity, 80, 136, 140, 202, 203, entities, 39, 141, 246
206 objects, 39
Creed spooks, 39
local creed, 51 De Mille, Cecil B., 176
Critical Democracy
critical examinations, 4 democratic, 10, 52, 216; demo-
criticism, 100 cratic government, 242, 257;
criticizing, 66 democratic societies, 50
Critique Dennett, Daniel, 66
critic, 263 Derrida, 147
Culture Despair
Counter-Cultural Practice, 223 politics of despair, 120
cultural difference, 103, 134
cultural formations, 6
270  Index

Development, 10, 14, 18, 20, 37, 40, E

160, 193, 195, 197, 200, 203, Earth, 43, 58, 67, 69, 154, 161, 162,
217, 220, 222, 226, 252 207
Devil, 140, 214 Economic
Dewey, John, 9, 27, 37, 38, 237 economic recovery, 247
Dialogue economic status, 6
debate, 254 economic structure, 102
Dichotomy, 153 economists, 218
Difference, 3, 8, 18, 22, 27, 36, 48, Education
70, 145, 147, 155, 217, 223, 251 educational access, 7
Digital formal education, 5
digital media, 76 secondary education, 6
digital stories, 79, 80 Egypt, 173, 176
digital storytelling, 28, 76, 78, 79, Eighteenth Century, 100
92 eighteenth century, 14
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 46 Elections
Discrimination, 58–60, 67, 72, 75, elected officials, 241, 256
239, 243, 245, 246, 249, 250, Electoral process, 238, 240, 257
255 Elites, 10
Distance Emancipation
cultural distance, 133 emancipated, 125
geographic distances, 133 Embodiment
social distance, 146 black bodies, 148
Distinction, 7, 8, 15, 17, 20, 26, 27, embodied forms of life, 88
35, 37, 38, 57, 142, 159 geographies of embodied life, 88
Diversity Empirical
age diversity, 198 empirically verifiable, 45
racial diversity, 136 empirical research, 38
Divide empirical truth, 6
division, 14, 110 Employment
divisiveness, 2 employment discrimination, 249
manufactured divides, 139 Enlightenment
Divine Age of the Enlightenment, 5
divinity, 156 Counter-Enlightenment, 14, 15
Doctrine enlightened, 51, 122, 158, 228
indoctrination, 245 enlightenment age, 8
Dogma enlightenment ideals, 4
dogmaticism, 6 enlightenment thinkers, 13, 15, 16
theological dogmaticism, 4 mainstream enlightenment, 5
Dostoyevsky, 219 Radical Enlightenment, 15
Durkheim Environment, 10, 19, 41–45, 64, 110,
Durkheimian Model, 155 247
Duty, 30, 127, 241, 257
 Index   271

Environment and Climate Change, Ex nihilo, 222

247 Exodus, 173, 176, 179
environments Experience
local environments, 45 human experience, 37, 38, 40, 42,
Epistemology 46–48, 202, 203
epistemological, 227 one-dimensional, 126
Escape ordinary experience, 40–44, 52
escapisms, 12 Experimentation, 23, 105
inescapable, 13, 159
Esoteric, 165, 166, 197
Establishment, 105, 108, 111, 139, F
143, 238, 246, 248, 257 Fable
Ethics Aesop, 180
ethical culture, 17 Fabrications, 3
ethical ideals, 4 Facebook, 1, 77, 79, 253, 254
unethical behavior, 90 Fact
Ethnicity, 58, 135 factually, 42
Eugenics Failure, 14, 159, 177, 223, 262–264
eugenics programs, 106 Faith
European blind faith, 7
Eastern Europeans, 103 Falwell, Jerry, 69, 71
Non-Europeans, 15 Family
White Europeans, 90 familial structures of affinity, 88
Evaluation healthy families, 247
evaluative, 42 Federal
evaluative attitude, 43 Federal Financial Assistance, 248
Evangelical federal government agencies, 245
evangelicism, 70 Federally Funded Partnerships, 248
evangelists, 69; counter-evange- federal regulations, 239
list, 70 Female Genital Mutilation (FGM),
Evil, 10, 126, 140, 142 103
Evolution Fermi, Enrico, 159
evolutionary, 23, 201 Feminism, 91, 102, 112
Exceptionalism Fifteenth century, 6
American exceptionalism, 152 First Amendment
Exclusion First Amendment Establishment
rhetorics of exclusion, 153 Clause, 244
Exemptions, 239, 253 Five Percent Nation, 146
Exile, 134 Flesh, 147
Existence Flew, Antony, 108
historical existence, 186 Flynn, Tom, 203
Existential Force, 7, 24, 27–29, 66, 69, 73, 83,
existentialism, 5, 262 88, 110, 118, 142, 153–155,
272  Index

166, 212, 218, 219, 238, 242, Genus

244, 247, 248 genus proximum, 37
Foucault, Michel, 158, 262 Germany, 9, 118, 119, 126
Fourteenth century, 5 Gillespie, Allen, 215
Fox News, 1 GIs, 134
France, 6, 133 Gladwell, Malcolm, 179
Freedom, 4, 41, 58, 69, 110, 121, Global
138, 139, 146, 147, 157, 180, global achievements, 103
240, 245, 250, 255 global crises, 3
Freedom of Information Act global poverty, 247
(FOIA), 253 global world, 2, 3
Freedom from Religion Foundation globe, 2, 3
(FFRF), 198 God, 57, 58, 70, 117, 157, 211
Free-thought belief in god, 135, 157
freethinkers, 23, 57, 61, 89, 100, concept of God, 211
107, 155, 194, 195, 204, 205 godless
Freethought Books Project, 76 Godless March on Washington,
Free will, 110 100
Freud, 176, 188 God-talk, 48, 49, 180
Fuller, Millard, 61 In God We Trust, 63
Functional, 48 Good Without God, 58, 70
Fundamentalist so help me God, 105
fundamentalism Goodwill
free-market fundamentalism, 218; human goodwill, 8
Islamic fundamentalism, 47; Gospel
Jewish fundamentalism, 47 good news, 89
Future, 10, 58, 80, 92, 118, 124, 143, Government
172, 173, 188, 210, 215, 224, government and faith-based organi-
244, 250 zations (FBOs), 243
government officials, 242, 252, 257
integrity of government, 245
G legislative branch, 238, 255
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 172 nongovernmental organizations
Gelernter, David, 35 (NGOs), 247
Gender, 10, 28, 58, 86, 90, 107, 135 secular government, 72, 73, 239,
General Board of Church and Society, 240, 242, 256
243 Guatemala, 105, 187
Generalizations Guilt, 30, 82, 126, 127, 158, 176
generalized, 39, 45, 46
Generation
generational, 125 H
intergenerational, 198 Habermas, Jürgen, 122
Genocide, 100, 106, 110 Habitat for Humanity, 61
 Index   273

Harmony, 125 human affairs, 6, 7, 13, 16

Harlem Community Center for human condition, 13, 45, 47, 58,
Inquiry, 77 59, 86, 212, 221
Harris, William T., 18 human difference, 2, 112, 135, 152
Hart, William, 89 human dignity, 5, 12, 48
Harvard Humanist Community, 194 human distinction, 7
Hayes, Chris, 193 human diversity, 14
Health humaneness, 40
health care, 108 human existence, 120
Heidegger, Martin, 35 human flourishing, 26, 44, 45, 52,
Heritage 145
archeological heritage, 5 human identity, 154
humanistic heritage, 224 human inequality, 2
Hermeneutic humanizing
hermeneutical, 172 dehumanizing, 162, 223
hermeneutical circle, 172 humankind, 5, 8, 10, 17, 42, 49,
hermeneutic of suspicion, 135, 139 210, 242
Hervey Johnson, James, 107 human life, 3, 6, 12, 29, 41, 118,
Hierarchy 165, 212, 222, 238
hierarchical, 19, 20, 177, 201 human nature, 6, 38
Higher power, 3, 104, 238 humanocentric, 160
Hindu American Foundation, 243 human problems, 17, 58, 197, 238
Hip hop human project, 38
hip hop culture, 28, 134, 138, 145 human reason, 5, 9, 12, 13
Hirsch, E.D., 173 human rights, 3, 10, 19, 22, 43, 44,
Hispanic, 135 51, 52, 65, 103, 238, 242
Historical human value, 40–45, 48, 240
historisization, 5 posthumanism, 18, 20
History of science, 103 Humanism
Hitchens, Christopher, 66 Affirmations of Humanism, 238
HIV/AIDS, 108, 109 anamnestic humanism, 28, 118,
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 106 119, 123, 124, 127, 128
Holocaust, 10, 17 enlightened humanism, 7, 25, 158
Homogenous generic humanism, 52
homogeneity, 101 hostile humanism, 38, 262, 263
Homophobia, 3, 26, 78, 103, 221, humanism/non-humanism divide,
255 4, 23, 24
Hope humanismus, 6
hopelessness, 120 independent humanism, 52
Horkheimer, Max, 126 memory-based humanism, 118
Houston Freethought Oasis, 194 middle-range humanism, 47, 49,
Human 52, 53
anti-human, 102 modern humanism, 158
274  Index

naturalist humanism, 38 57, 101–104, 107, 109, 112,

non-humanism(s), 16, 21, 25, 37, 117, 119, 135, 136, 139, 140,
112, 139, 155, 163 142, 146, 153, 155–158, 163,
online humanism, 27, 76 164, 194, 199
Orthodox-Marxian atheistic human- secular humanists, 38, 57, 62, 63,
ism, 124 75–77, 80, 89–93, 199, 203,
outlaw humanism, 138, 140 238
religious humanism, 8, 9 Humanist Manifesto
secular humanism, 37, 44, 48–52, Manifesto I, 9, 11
75, 76, 78, 81, 86, 89, 91, 93, Manifesto II, 10–12, 16, 17
96, 195, 203, 238 Humanities, 7, 8, 26
subjective humanism, 35 liberal arts, 7, 8
world-view independent humanism, studia humanitatis, 6
52 Humanity, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 17, 24,
Humanist 47, 58, 110, 111, 118, 136–139,
humanist communities, 196, 198, 143, 146, 147, 151, 152, 157,
199, 202 163, 165, 197, 200, 201, 203,
humanist complexity, 6 204, 206, 211, 212, 221, 257
humanist difference, 102, 203 Hume, 15, 263
humanist ethics, 108
humanistic
humanistic stance, 35, 36, 39 I
humanist ideals, 103 Idealism
humanist institutions, 200, 203, 207 idealistic, 10
humanist manifesto, 9, 11, 12 idealized, 50, 205
humanist misrecognition, 102 Identity
humanist orientation, 6, 143 identification
humanist practice, 75, 203 modes of identification, 92
humanist reflection, 4 identities
humanist task, 3, 144 illegible identities, 145
humanist thought, 5, 75, 103, 148, identity-based, 3
211 Ideology
humanist tribe, 158 ideological, 27, 90, 138, 156–158,
humanist worldviews, 103, 104 225
non-humanist, 3, 7, 11, 13, 17, Immigrant
18, 27, 29, 53, 100, 103, 104, immigration, 199
106, 107, 110, 111, 119, 121, India, 187
135, 136, 138–140, 144, 146, Indifference
158, 161, 171, 239, 263 cultural, 3
non-humanist world, 3, 5, 11, 12, social, 3
21, 22, 24–30, 38, 47, 51, 52, Indigenous
 Index   275

indigenous Maya, 187 J

Individuality James, William, 27, 37, 46, 51
individual, 6, 9, 46, 62, 224 Jay Z, 134, 140, 145, 146, 148
individualization Jesus
religious individualization, 51 Jesus Christ, 2, 219
Inequality, 103, 107, 111, 217 Jewish Council for Public Affairs, 243
Ingersoll, Robert Green, 100 Joas, Hans, 51
Inheritance, 81, 140, 142 Johnson, Lyndon B., 250
Institute for Humanist Studies (IHS), Judaism, 68, 176, 243
4 Judgement
Institute for Science and Human prior judgment(s), 172
Values (ISHV), 29, 107, 109, Justice
243, 248 injustice, 3, 10, 30, 71, 80, 127,
Institution 143, 240
institutional, 78, 221
secular institutions, 75, 195
Integration K
des-Integration, 43 Kafka, 224
Intellectual Kaine, Tim, 166
intellectualism, 40 Kant, 14, 15, 39, 263
Intent Kasich, John, 1
intentionality, 8, 19, 105, 106, 109, Kirabo, Sincere, 28, 76, 89
200 Kitcher, Philip, 38, 53
original intent, 173 Knowledge
Interaction, 41–45, 48, 81, 86, 87, causal knowledge, 41, 43
136, 156, 198, 201, 202, 224 cultural knowledge, 134
Interfaith Alliance (IA), 61, 243, 252 epistemic knowledge, 43
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 239 objects of knowledge, 41
International tragic knowledge, 212
international politics, 257 Koons, Jeff, 134
International Humanist and Ethical Kurtz, Paul, 108, 238
Union, 211
Interpretation
creative interpretation, 172 L
Intersectionality, 81 Land, Richard, 69
Intolerance, 58, 65 Language
IQ, 107 figural, 171, 188
Islam, 84, 87, 101, 176 linguistic, 7, 154
Israel, 15, 16, 106, 173, 174, 176– Latin
180, 183, 186, 188 Latin texts, 5, 6
Israel,Jonathan, 15 Law
Law of Unintended Consequences,
63, 65
276  Index

Law, Stephen, 117 Marx

Leadership Karl Marx, 125
leaders, 2, 61, 101, 108, 152, 173, marxism, 262
177, 251, 252, 256 Materialist
Legislation material conditions, 80
legislative, 3, 22, 239, 254, 255 Mathematics
legislative capital, 239 math, 13
Legitimation Matthew Ratcliffe, 45
institutional legitimacy, 78 Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
legitimate, 37, 39, 46, 48, 52, 155, Anthropology, 23
160, 221 Meaning
Lenhardt, Christian, 124 diverse meanings, 67
Life Media
life options, 12, 22, 139, 142 computer graphics, 81
ways of life, 49 logic of the media, 79
Life philosophy mediated process
life philosophies, 18, 136, 156 virtually mediated cosmology, 163
Lindsay, Ronald, 111 mediated stories, 79
Literature mediation, 78, 123
literary, 171–173, 186, 196 mediatization, 78
Lobbying Medieval, 5
lobbyists, 242, 243 Memory
special interest groups, 60 memoria
Logic memoria passionis, 128
logical cohesion, 152 memories, 118, 123, 128, 205
Lundby, Knut, 78 Metaphysical
Luther, Martin, 186 metaphysical solipsism, 213
metaphysics, 41, 42, 200
Method
M methodological naturalism, 39–42,
Macintyre, Alisdair, 89 44, 49
Mackie, John, 44 methods, 3, 17, 28, 239, 254
Maffesoli, Michel, 155 non-methodological experience, 46
Malcolm X, 101 skeptical method, 157
Malik, Kenan, 15 Middle Ages, 37, 51
Marcuse, Herbert, 123, 130 Middle Easterners, 103
Marginal Military Religious Freedom
marginalized, 4, 63, 66, 67, 75, 90, Foundation (MRFF), 105
140, 153, 155 Millennials, 251
marginalized groups, 69, 107, 144 Mind, 2, 3, 7–11, 16, 18, 19, 22, 25,
marginal status, 4 35, 36, 43, 45, 51, 61, 62, 70,
Martin Luther King, Jr., 101, 177 71, 73, 81, 89, 92, 104, 106,
 Index   277

112, 127, 129, 136, 141, 145, N

151–153, 155, 159, 165, 166, NAACP, 65, 72
172, 173, 210, 214–216, 218, Narratives, 5, 78, 80, 81, 86, 106,
221, 224, 238, 240, 242, 253, 128, 163, 172, 176, 178–180,
263, 264 223
Minority NASA, 23, 160
minorities, 66, 76 Nassaka, Betty, 109
minority groups Nation, 104, 108, 175, 207
black, 60, 67, 72, 91; gay, 60, nationality, 58
64, 67, 69, 71, 72; Jew, 60 National Council of Jewish Women,
Miracles, 1, 14, 173, 180 243, 255
Miscegenation, 107 National Council of La Raza, 243
Misotheism, 154 National Gay and Lesbian Task Force,
Modern 243
Modern West, 5 National Organization for Women
modern world, 9, 141 (NOW), 255
MoMA, 134 Naturalism
Mona Lisa, 134 naturalism-cum-humanism, 48
Moral naturalistic frameworks, 38
moral action, 128 naturalistic metaphysics, 41, 42
moral aspirations, 40 naturalistic methodology, 38
moral compass, 90 naturalist(s), 38, 41, 57, 89
morality, 9, 16, 35, 39, 42, 52, 69, ordinary naturalism, 49
109, 218 Nature, 3, 5, 9, 12, 17, 40–44, 47–50,
moral principles, 45, 219 52, 53, 120, 141, 148, 202, 219,
Moritz, Karl Philipp, 233 238
Morrison, Toni, 171 Neanderthal
Moses, 173, 176, 177, 179 Neanderthal Genome Project, 23
Movements Negation
countermovement, 224 radical negation, 221
MSNBC, 152, 193 Neighborhood, 200, 247
Multiplicity, 142, 213 Neo-liberal, 166, 219
Music, 5, 6, 17, 78, 80, 134, 147, Nero, 186
202, 205, 223 Networking, 72, 80, 93, 198, 251
Muslim, 143 New age, 5, 10, 12
Mythology Niethammer, F.J., 6
Greek mythology, 67, 188 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 209
myth, 2, 21, 121, 161–163 Nihilism
mythological, 2, 22, 165 American nihilism, 217
mythologies, 2, 86, 162 evangelical nihilism, 219
nihilist
278  Index

active nihilist, 215, 216; passive organisms, 42, 43

nihilist, 216 Organizing
nihilistic grassroots organizing, 242, 251,
anti-nihilistic, 223; nihilistic 257
judgment, 214, 215 Orientation, 18, 46, 58, 65, 136, 142,
ontological nihilism, 213 144, 156, 206, 212, 219
paternalistic nihilism, 219 Origin, 25, 26, 161, 225, 226
political nihilism, 218
sentimental nihilism, 219
uncanny nihilism, 29 P
Nineteenth century, 15, 100, 209 Paideia, 7, 222
Nones, 68, 69, 73, 194 Paine, Thomas, 100
Non-profit, 243, 252 Paradox
Non-theistic, 4, 41, 53, 110, 155, 202 Fermi’s paradox, 159, 160
Norm Allen, Jr., 77 Rudy’s paradox, 29, 161, 164, 167
Normative Participation, 22, 75, 104, 137, 140,
normatively, 42 199, 241, 254
Past, 12, 28, 83, 88, 106, 111, 118,
124, 125, 127, 147, 172, 188,
O 199, 202, 204, 223, 238, 239,
Obama, Barack, 219 241, 246, 253, 262–264
Obligation, 30, 126, 127, 222 Patriarchy
Online white supremacist capitalist patriar-
online communities, 77, 96 chy, 91
online content, 77, 80 Paul, Apostle, 188
online news, 79 Peace, 10, 64, 135, 146, 151, 154,
Ontology 156
ontological Pensky, Max, 127
ontological evidence, 153 Performance
Oppression performativity, 81
oppressed, 106, 124 Pericles, 186
oppressive, 19 Pessimism, 213
Optimism, 10, 120, 147, 224, 235 Peukert, Helmut, 126, 130
optimistic, 232 Pew Research Center
Options America’s Changing Religious
life options, 12, 22, 139, 142 Landscape, 135
living options, 51, 53 Phenomenon
no options, 51 epiphenomenal, 40
single options, 51 phenomena, 229
Organism Philosophy, 13, 19, 22, 50, 214
organic philosophers
inorganic nature, 52 Ionian philosophers, 188

philosophical
philosophical argumentation, 38
philosophy of god, 146
Piaget, Jean, 172
Picasso, Pablo, 134
Pinker, Steven, 40
Pinn , Anthony B., 88, 138, 140
Planet
planetary, 17, 108, 239–241, 257
Plato
allegory of the cave, 226, 227
Pledge of Allegiance, 64
Pluralism, 20, 50, 51
Political
political campaign, 59, 256
political change, 5, 10
political climate, 2
political communication, 80
political engagement, 7
political philosophies, 50
political transformation, 6
Politics
politicians, 2, 60, 61, 70, 72, 251
Pop-cultural
pop-culture, 28, 136
Post-factual
post-factish, 2
Poverty, 10, 103, 107, 108, 220, 247
Power
corporate power, 108
power structures, 124
separation of powers, 244
Practices, 4, 42, 78, 103, 122, 200,
217
Pragmatism
pragmatic
pragmatic possibilities, 224
Prayer
National Day of Prayer, 65
Prejudice, 15, 65, 108, 172, 261
Index   279
Presence, 28, 29, 77, 88, 134, 136,
138, 145–148, 164, 179, 181,
225, 240, 248
Present, 4, 8, 72, 103, 108, 118, 124,
127, 147, 157, 161, 188, 210,
215, 220, 256, 261
Preservation, 24, 158, 159
A priori, 154
Profane
profane objects, 156, 157
Progress
human progress, 10, 12, 13, 16–18
permanent progress, 126
Proselytize
proselytization, 246
proselytizing, 89, 239
Protection, 61, 109, 133, 239, 250,
251
Protestant Reformation, 6
Public
general public, 58, 68
private sphere, 65
public forums, 76
public office, 59, 71
public policy, 238–242, 253,
255–257
public sphere, 145, 198, 225
Putnam, Hilary, 42
Q
Quantitative, 3
Quinn, Bernard J., 119, 129, 130
R
Race
American racism, 133
anti-racist, 14
people of color, 76, 82, 101, 144,
163, 223
racial categorization, 15, 162
280  Index

racial classifications non-reductive, 38, 43, 48

racial differences, 105, 107 non-reductive naturalism, 37, 38,
racism 41, 44, 47
structural racism, 136, 137 reduce, 7, 10, 39, 46, 125
racist, 21, 91, 107, 110, 143, 220, reductionist attitudes, 52
224 reductionist naturalism, 40
Rachel Maddow, 152 Reflection, 19, 20, 25, 30, 41, 50,
Radical 118, 201, 222, 227, 262
radical perspectives, 5 Reflexive
Radical Humanist Working Group, reflexivity, 158
102 Reform, 110, 224, 247
Raphael (Italian Renaissance painter), Regulation, 142, 239, 242, 243, 245,
202 249
Rationality Rejection
irrational, 11 rejection of traditional values, 90
rational Relationality
rational inquiry, 156 relatedness, 43
rationalism, 15, 17 relating, 3, 143, 146, 264
rationalist, 57, 238 relations
Rawls, John, 50 ; casual relations, 40, 41
Reagan, Ronald, 151 Religion
Reality competing religions, 51
embodied reality, 25 market place of religion, 87
other realities, 152 nontheistic religion, 68
social realities, 20, 135, 136 sanctity of religion, 245
ultimate reality, 40, 44–46, 48–50, theistic religions, 52
52, 53 traditional religions, 16, 51, 99
Reason world religions, 47, 87
In Reason We Trust, 63 Religion Freedom Restoration Act,
practical reason, 39 242
reasonable, 66, 122, 157 Religious
reasoning, 3, 8, 25, 27, 71, 107, assumed religious affiliation, 86
140, 211 naturally religious, 44, 200
The Reason Rally, 100 non-religious, 36, 100, 104, 241,
Reception, 145 249; non-religious alternative,
Recognition 246; non-religious identifica-
misrecognition, 102 tion, 75
Reconcile overly-religious, 139, 145
reconciliation, 163 religionists, 241; conservative
reconciling, 38 religionists, 66, 68, 70, 241;
Redemption liberal religionists, 61, 68
redemptive suffering, 152 religiosity, 37, 251; black religios-
Reductionist ity, 87
 Index   281

religious affiliation, 75, 81 rhetorical appeal, 2, 225

religious allies, 61, 69 rhetorical moves, 141
religious attitudes, 36 Rights
religious authority, 4 African American, 62
religious belief, 9; religious belief equal rights, 63, 69
and identification, 90; tradi- human rights, 103, 242, 243
tional religious belief, 13, 75 protective rights, 52
religious communities, 206 reproductive rights, 255
religious community, 198, 205, 206 special rights, 62, 63
religious consumers, 87 women, 64
religious convictions, 39; anti- workers, 64, 137
religious convictions, 48 Risk, 21, 88, 91, 92, 109, 118, 123,
religious denomination, 195 142, 147, 157, 180, 212, 214,
religious dogma, 202, 239 221, 222
religious expressions, 142 Ritual, 68, 165
Religious Freedom Restoration Act Romano Guardini, 216
of 1993 (RFRA), 249 Rothko,Mark, 134
religious function, 47 Rubio, Marco, 2, 250
religious fundamentalism, 52 Russell T. McCutcheon, 140
religious funds, 244
religious ideas, 8
religious invocations, 65 S
religious liberty, 65, 244 Sacred
religious meaning, 37 sacred objects, 156
religious options, 142 sacred texts, 99
religious right, 64, 67 Sacrilegious, 86
religious studies, 82 Salvation
religious views, 65, 67 salvation army, 199
traditional religious faith, 11, 195 Sandel, Michael, 217
Remembrance, 123, 126 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 2, 28, 119
Renaissance Science
renaissance humanism, 5 physical science, 43
Resignation, 121, 214, 219 pseudo-science, 103
Resolution, 22, 25, 144, 154, 159, scientific approach, 41
163, 220 scientific inquiry, 42, 240
Responsibility, 7, 40, 41, 58, 69, scientific knowledge, 36–38, 40,
220–222, 240, 264 43, 50
Revelation scientific method, 4, 17, 157, 241
self-revelation, 44 scientific research, 40, 180, 241
Revolution scientific revolution, 4, 10
revolutionary, 125, 186 scientism, 37, 44, 47, 50, 52
Rhetoric scientist, 35, 138
rhetorical, 141, 156 scientistic, 36, 38, 39, 41
282  Index
social science, 17
Scott, Ridley, 176
Scripture, 1, 135, 171–173, 188
Secular
secular age, 5, 224
secular alternative, 104, 194, 200
secular charities, 104
secular communities, 60, 199
secular humanist organizations, 76
secular humanists, 38, 93, 199
secular humanists of color, 77, 80,
92
secularism, 80, 111, 112, 194, 195,
203, 205, 207
secularists, 75, 112, 197, 200
secular laws, 239
secular movement, 57, 112
secular programming, 199
Secular Coalition, 27, 61, 243, 255
Secular Coalition for America (SCA),
27, 61, 243, 255
Secular Humanists of the Lowcountry
(SHL), 62, 63, 65, 66
Secular Organizations for Sobriety
(SOS), 104
Secular Voices of Color project, 76,
80, 81, 87–89
Self
negative self-judgement, 215
self-critique, 103
self-deception, 118
self-disclosure, 90
self-identification, 37
self-identified membership, 239
self-identify, 157
self-interpretation, 51
self-representation, 78
self-righteousness, 30
Self-evidence, 141
SETI, 160
Sexism, 20, 26, 78, 100, 103, 110,
111, 255
Sexuality
LGBTQI, 102, 103
Signification
signify, 22, 100
Sikh Council on Religion and
Education, 243
Sikuvu Hutchinson, 91
Simone, Nina, 133
Sin
original Sin, 84
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 109
Sixteenth century, 5
Skepticism
Skeptic, 103, 157, 160
Skill, 134
Slave
chattel slavery, 17
enslaved, 142, 173
slave bodies, 105
slaves, 104
Social
social arrangement, 154, 156
social causes, 64
social change, 137
social concerns, 103
social difference, 19, 155
social distortion, 220
social equality, 14
social equitability, 3
social events, 84
social ills, 7, 220
social inequality, 2
social injustice, 10
social interactions, 86
socialism
anarcho-socialism, 101
socialization
early socialization, 86
social libertarianism
social libertarian humanists, 102
social life, 141, 144, 158, 212
social ostracizing, 75
 Index   283

social problems, 153, 225 new humanist/atheist subjectivity,

social suicide, 90 86, 88
Social justice, 76, 240, 255 secular subjects, 129
Social media Suffering, 20, 58, 83, 121, 124, 127,
social networking, 80, 93 128, 152
Society, 7, 13, 16, 17, 85, 106, 123, Sui generis, 138, 141
138, 141, 155, 211, 217, 220, Supernatural
222, 227, 255 traditional supernaturalism, 47
market-driven society, 123 Superstition, 14, 21, 103, 200
physical structures, 45 Supreme Being, 101
social structures, 45 Supreme Court
Society for Humanistic Judaism, 68 South Carolina Supreme Court, 59
Sociodicy, 152 Survival, 11, 111, 142
Socrates Suspicion, 4, 14, 23, 139, 162, 214
socratic questioning, 222, 225 Symbols, 128, 148, 243, 245
Solidarity
anamnestic solidarity, 124, 126–128
solidary, 117, 118 T
Solution Taboos, 156
solutions, 3 Tacitus, 186
South Carolina legislature, 63 Talmud, 187
South Carolina progressive network, Task
64 task of humanism, 30
Southern Baptist Convention, 69, 195 Taylor, Charles, 44, 224
Specialize Technology
specializing, 43 computer models, 36
Species technological, 10, 41, 164
con-species, 36 Ted Cruz, 1
species-species, 37 Teemu Tiara, 77
survival, 43 Theism
Spirituality, 22, 51, 201 anti-thesists, 8, 57, 139
State nontheistic, 59, 60, 68, 103;
state religion, 242 nontheistic groups, 60
Stereotype, 62, 78, 86 nontheists, 57, 60–62, 73
racialized stereotypes, 91 theistic, 8, 26, 30, 44, 48, 53, 61;
Stoppard, Tom, 188 overly-theistic, 136, 245
Stories, 28, 75–77, 79, 80, 86, 89, Theocrats, 29, 239, 242, 245
124, 178, 188 Theo Goldberg, David, 15
Stuhr, John J., 237 Theology
Subjectivity theologians, 9
black astheist subjectivity, 91 theological
284  Index

theological positions, 58, 64, 68, U

100, 140, 145, 148, 194, 197, UFO, 152, 154
198 Uganda, 108
unifying theology, 57 Ugandan Humanist Effort to Save
Theory, 16, 23, 44, 48, 50, 60, 91, Women (UHESWO), 109
110, 124, 157, 204 Unger, Roberto, 171
Thrasymachos, 219 Unaffiliated, 135, 194
Threat, 7, 16, 29, 40, 44, 61, 65, 75, Uncertainty
112, 121, 151, 152, 154, 156, evidentiary uncertainty, 153
188, 215, 221, 253 Understanding, 3–5, 22, 25, 41, 102,
Thucydides, 186 103, 118, 128, 146, 148, 167,
Tolerance 210, 213, 214, 238
religiously tolerant, 155 Unitarian
Totality unitarian ministers, 9
totalitarian, 10 unitarian universalists, 83
totalizing, 6, 37 United Nations General Assembly, 151
Trade, 14, 108, 156 United Nations (UN), 257
Tradition United States
traditional, 16, 17, 72, 90, 148; United States Of America, 2, 166
traditional religious faith, 11, U.S. Constitution, 240
195; traditional religious logics, U.S. Presidency, 1
3; traditional religious reason- Unity
ing, 8 traditional unity, 51
Tragic united, 2
tragic humanism, 29, 212, 222, 224 uniting, 153
Transcendent Universal
transcendence, 156, 223 universalist, 83
Transnational, 108 University of Chicago, 9
Tribe
tribal affiliation, 157, 167
tribal identities, 159 V
tribalistic, 155, 158, 159 Value
Trump, Donald J. analytic value, 143
Donald Trump, 166 secular humanist values, 238, 241,
Truth, 3, 219 242
halve-truths, 2 universal values, 49, 52; universal-
tyranny of truth, 172 istic values, 40, 43
Truth Seeker Company, 107 valuation, 8, 42
Tumblr, 79 value-generalizations, 51, 52
Twentieth century, 107, 179 value-orientation, 41
Twenty-first century, 3 values, 51, 196
Twitter, 79, 253 Variety, 3, 16, 47

Vaughn Williams, Ralph, 202
Veterans, 204, 206
Violence
antagonistic threat, 154
law enforcement, 137
threat of violence, 154
vigilante, 136, 137
violent, 7, 19, 86
Vivaldi, 186
Voltaire, 15, 100
Voters, 166, 251, 252, 256, 257
W comprehensive world-view, 38,
Walker, Scott, 2
Warhol, Andy, 134, 147
Washington, Harriet A., 105
Washington, George, 105
Wellbeing, 106, 135, 220
West
Western achievements, 103
Western conceptions, 6
Western humanists, 104
Western industrial states, 209
Western world, 5, 209
West, Cornel, 29, 128
White
white people, 162, 163
Wilderness, 88, 176
Williams, Bernard, 261
Wisdom, 17, 137, 146, 167, 198,
212, 240
Wolfe, Cary, 18
Women
black women, 91
Women of Reform Judaism, 243
Index   285
Woman of the Free World
Organization (WOFEWO), 108
Woolsey, Teller, 107
World
contemporary world, 4, 12
humanist world, 200, 223
innerworldly, 39
non-human world, 25
non-humanist world, 3, 5, 21, 26,
104, 263
non-white world, 163
outer-world, 213
world-view
39, 44, 46, 48, 50; fallibility,
50, 52; insecurity, 50; world-
view independence, 44; world-
views, 27, 36, 51
Wright, Donald, 77
WWII, 134
X
Xenophobia
xenophobic, 103, 220
Y
YouTube, 76, 77, 80, 112, 161, 162