STO. TOMAS VS.

SALAC
The Facts and the Case
On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 that, for
among other purposes, sets the Government’s policies on overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and
promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.
G.R. 152642 and G.R. 152710 (Constitutionality of Sections 29 and 30, R.A. 8042)
Sections 29 and 30 of the Act1 commanded the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to begin deregulating within one year
of its passage the business of handling the recruitment and migration of overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five years
the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
On January 8, 2002 respondents Rey Salac, Willie D. Espiritu, Mario Montenegro, Dodgie Belonio, Lolit Salinel, and Buddy Bonnevie
(Salac, et al.) filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction against petitioners, the DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA) Secretary-General before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 96.2
Salac, et al. sought to: 1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 (DOLE DO 10) and POEA Memorandum Circular 15 (POEA MC
15); 2)prohibit the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from implementing the same and from further issuing rules and regulations that would
regulate the recruitment and placement of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs); and 3) also enjoin them to comply with the policy of
deregulation mandated under Sections 29 and 30 of Republic Act 8042.
On March 20, 2002 the Quezon City RTC granted Salac, et al.’s petition and ordered the government agencies mentioned to
deregulate the recruitment and placement of OFWs. 3 The RTC also annulled DOLE DO 10, POEA MC 15, and all other orders, circulars
and issuances that are inconsistent with the policy of deregulation under R.A. 8042.
Prompted by the RTC’s above actions, the government officials concerned filed the present petition in G.R. 152642 seeking to annul
the RTC’s decision and have the same enjoined pending action on the petition.
On April 17, 2002 the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. intervened in the case before the Court, claiming that the RTC
March 20, 2002 Decision gravely affected them since it paralyzed the deployment abroad of OFWs and performing artists. The
Confederated Association of Licensed Entertainment Agencies, Incorporated (CALEA) intervened for the same purpose. 4
On May 23, 2002 the Court5 issued a TRO in the case, enjoining the Quezon City RTC, Branch 96, from enforcing its decision.
In a parallel case, on February 12, 2002 respondents Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. and others (Arcophil, et al.)
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for TRO and preliminary injunction against the DOLE Secretary, the
POEA Administrator, and the TESDA Director-General,6 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 220, to enjoin the latter from
implementing the 2002 Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Overseas Workers and to cease and
desist from issuing other orders, circulars, and policies that tend to regulate the recruitment and placement of OFWs in violation of
the policy of deregulation provided in Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042.
On March 12, 2002 the Quezon City RTC rendered an Order, granting the petition and enjoining the government agencies involved
from exercising regulatory functions over the recruitment and placement of OFWs. This prompted the DOLE Secretary, the POEA
Administrator, and the TESDA Director-General to file the present action in G.R. 152710. As in G.R. 152642, the Court issued on May
23, 2002 a TRO enjoining the Quezon City RTC, Branch 220 from enforcing its decision.
On December 4, 2008, however, the Republic informed 7 the Court that on April 10, 2007 former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
signed into law R.A. 94228 which expressly repealed Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 and adopted the policy of close government
regulation of the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. R.A. 9422 pertinently provides: x x x x
SEC. 1. Section 23, paragraph (b.1) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995” is hereby amended to read as follows:
(b.1) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration – The Administration shall regulate private sector participation in the
recruitment and overseas placement of workers by setting up a licensing and registration system. It shall also formulate and
implement, in coordination with appropriate entities concerned, when necessary, a system for promoting and monitoring the
overseas employment of Filipino workers taking into consideration their welfare and the domestic manpower requirements.
In addition to its powers and functions, the administration shall inform migrant workers not only of their rights as workers but also
of their rights as human beings, instruct and guide the workers how to assert their rights and provide the available mechanism to
redress violation of their rights.
In the recruitment and placement of workers to service the requirements for trained and competent Filipino workers of foreign
governments and their instrumentalities, and such other employers as public interests may require, the administration shall deploy
only to countries where the Philippines has concluded bilateral labor agreements or arrangements: Provided, That such countries
shall guarantee to protect the rights of Filipino migrant workers; and: Provided, further, That such countries shall observe and/or
comply with the international laws and standards for migrant workers.
SEC. 2. Section 29 of the same law is hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. Section 30 of the same law is also hereby repealed. x x x x
On August 20, 2009 respondents Salac, et al. told the Court in G.R. 152642 that they agree9 with the Republic’s view that the repeal
of Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 renders the issues they raised by their action moot and academic. The Court has no reason to
disagree. Consequently, the two cases, G.R. 152642 and 152710, should be dismissed for being moot and academic.
G.R. 167590 (Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042)
On August 21, 1995 respondent Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) filed a petition for declaratory relief and
prohibition with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Manila, seeking to annul Sections 6,
7, and 9 of R.A. 8042 for being unconstitutional. (PASEI also sought to annul a portion of Section 10 but the Court will take up this
point later together with a related case.)
Section 6 defines the crime of “illegal recruitment” and enumerates the acts constituting the same. Section 7 provides the penalties
for prohibited acts. Thus:
SEC. 6. Definition. – For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad,
whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That such non-license or
non-holder, who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so
engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder,
licensee or holder of authority: x x x x SEC. 7. Penalties. –
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1)
day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine not less than two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than one
million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of
age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.10
Finally, Section 9 of R.A. 8042 allowed the filing of criminal actions arising from”illegal recruitment” before the RTC of the province
or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
The RTC of Manila declared Section 6 unconstitutional after hearing on the ground that its definition of “illegal recruitment” is vague
as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters11 and for that reason gives undue advantage to the non-
licensed recruiters in violation of the right to equal protection of those that operate with government licenses or authorities.
But “illegal recruitment” as defined in Section 6 is clear and unambiguous and, contrary to the RTC’s finding, actually makes a
distinction between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in “canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers” without the appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal
recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in
the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate government license or authority, are guilty of illegal
recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
The Manila RTC also declared Section 7 unconstitutional on the ground that its sweeping application of the penalties failed to make
any distinction as to the seriousness of the act committed for the application of the penalty imposed on such violation. As an
example, said the trial court, the mere failure to render a report under Section 6(h) or obstructing the inspection by the Labor
Department under Section 6(g) are penalized by imprisonment for six years and one day and a minimum fine of P200,000.00 but
which could unreasonably go even as high as life imprisonment if committed by at least three persons.
Apparently, the Manila RTC did not agree that the law can impose such grave penalties upon what it believed were specific acts that
were not as condemnable as the others in the lists. But, in fixing uniform penalties for each of the enumerated acts under Section 6,
Congress was within its prerogative to determine what individual acts are equally reprehensible, consistent with the State policy of
according full protection to labor, and deserving of the same penalties. It is not within the power of the Court to question the
wisdom of this kind of choice. Notably, this legislative policy has been further stressed in July 2010 with the enactment of R.A.
1002212 which increased even more the duration of the penalties of imprisonment and the amounts of fine for the commission of
the acts listed under Section 7.
Obviously, in fixing such tough penalties, the law considered the unsettling fact that OFWs must work outside the country’s borders
and beyond its immediate protection. The law must, therefore, make an effort to somehow protect them from conscienceless
individuals within its jurisdiction who, fueled by greed, are willing to ship them out without clear assurance that their contracted
principals would treat such OFWs fairly and humanely.
As the Court held in People v. Ventura,13 the State under its police power “may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will
secure or tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequence of ignorance and incapacity as
well as of deception and fraud.” Police power is “that inherent and plenary power of the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.” 14
The Manila RTC also invalidated Section 9 of R.A. 8042 on the ground that allowing the offended parties to file the criminal case in
their place of residence would negate the general rule on venue of criminal cases which is the place where the crime or any of its
essential elements were committed. Venue, said the RTC, is jurisdictional in penal laws and, allowing the filing of criminal actions at
the place of residence of the offended parties violates their right to due process. Section 9 provides:
SEC. 9. Venue. – A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in
court at the time of the effectivity of this Act.
But there is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress fixing an alternative venue for violations of Section 6 of R.A. 8042 that
differs from the venue established by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the latter Rules allows
exceptions provided by laws. Thus:
SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted.— (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. (Emphasis
supplied) x x x x Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to the rule on venue of criminal actions is, consistent with that law’s declared
policy15 of providing a criminal justice system that protects and serves the best interests of the victims of illegal recruitment.
G.R. 167590, G.R. 182978-79,16 and G.R. 184298-9917 (Constitutionality of Section 10, last sentence of 2nd paragraph)
G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 are consolidated cases. Respondent spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas) filed
a claim for death and insurance benefits and damages against petitioners Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. (Becmen)
and White Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) for the death of their daughter Jasmin Cuaresma while working as staff nurse in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the claim on the ground that the Cuaresmas had already received insurance benefits arising from
their daughter’s death from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA). The LA also gave due credence to the findings
of the Saudi Arabian authorities that Jasmin committed suicide.
On appeal, however, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) found Becmen and White Falcon jointly and severally liable for
Jasmin’s death and ordered them to pay the Cuaresmas the amount of US$113,000.00 as actual damages. The NLRC relied on the
Cabanatuan City Health Office’s autopsy finding that Jasmin died of criminal violence and rape.
Becmen and White Falcon appealed the NLRC Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). 18 On June 28, 2006 the CA held Becmen and
White Falcon jointly and severally liable with their Saudi Arabian employer for actual damages, with Becmen having a right of
reimbursement from White Falcon. Becmen and White Falcon appealed the CA Decision to this Court.
On April 7, 2009 the Court found Jasmin’s death not work-related or work-connected since her rape and death did not occur while
she was on duty at the hospital or doing acts incidental to her employment. The Court deleted the award of actual damages but
ruled that Becmen’s corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with their company for its failure to investigate the true
nature of her death. Becmen and White Falcon abandoned their legal, moral, and social duty to assist the Cuaresmas in obtaining
justice for their daughter. Consequently, the Court held the foreign employer Rajab and Silsilah, White Falcon, Becmen, and the
latter’s corporate directors and officers jointly and severally liable to the Cuaresmas for: 1) P2,500,000.00 as moral
damages; 2)P2,500,000.00 as exemplary damages; 3) attorney’s fees of 10% of the total monetary award; and 4) cost of suit.
On July 16, 2009 the corporate directors and officers of Becmen, namely, Eufrocina Gumabay, Elvira Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio and
Eddie De Guzman (Gumabay, et al.) filed a motion for leave to intervene. They questioned the constitutionality of the last sentence
of the second paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042 which holds the corporate directors, officers and partners jointly and solidarily
liable with their company for money claims filed by OFWs against their employers and the recruitment firms. On September 9, 2009
the Court allowed the intervention and admitted Gumabay, et al.’s motion for reconsideration.
The key issue that Gumabay, et al. present is whether or not the 2nd paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042, which holds the corporate
directors, officers, and partners of recruitment and placement agencies jointly and solidarily liable for money claims and damages
that may be adjudged against the latter agencies, is unconstitutional.
In G.R. 167590 (the PASEI case), the Quezon City RTC held as unconstitutional the last sentence of the 2nd paragraph of Section 10
of R.A. 8042. It pointed out that, absent sufficient proof that the corporate officers and directors of the erring company had
knowledge of and allowed the illegal recruitment, making them automatically liable would violate their right to due process of law.
The pertinent portion of Section 10 provides: SEC. 10. Money Claims. – x x x
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint
and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its
approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all
money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (Emphasis supplied)
But the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of corporate directors and officers is not
automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing
the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.19 In the case of Becmen and White
Falcon,20 while there is evidence that these companies were at fault in not investigating the cause of Jasmin’s death, there is no
mention of any evidence in the case against them that intervenors Gumabay, et al., Becmen’s corporate officers and directors, were
personally involved in their company’s particular actions or omissions in Jasmin’s case.
As a final note, R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb,
if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad. The rule is settled that every statute
has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by
the Legislative Department. Hence, in the absence of a clear and unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional, the Court
must uphold its validity.

NY TIMES VS. US

Facts of the case

In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and
Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United
States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was
decided together with United States v. Washington Post Co.
Question
Did the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the publication of what it termed "classified information" violate the First
Amendment?

Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint
of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the
fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable,
direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified. Any system of prior restraints
on expression comes to the Supreme Court bearing a heavy presumption against its invalidity. The Government “thus creates a
heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a restraint.”
Curiam Decision: The decision of the Court stated that the government “carries a heavy burden" of providing justification for
restraining the freedom of expression granted by the Constitution. The lower courts held that the government had not met that
burden, with which the Supreme Court agreed. Thus, the order of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was affirmed and
the stays entered on June 25, 1971, were vacated.
Majority Opinions: Justices Black and Douglas wrote joint concurring opinions in which they condemned the government’s actions,
calling it a “flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment." Black and Douglas stated that the language of
the First Amendment is clear and supports the view that “the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without
censorship, injunctions or prior restraints." They further concluded that to give the President the power to withhold certain articles
from the press would “wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and security of the very people the
government hopes to make secure." Lastly, Black and Douglas discussed the issue of governmental secrecy, calling it anti-
democratic, and noted that, “open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our nation’s health."
Justices Stewart and White joined in concurring opinions. They held that an “alert, aware, and free" press most critically serves the
purpose of the First Amendment. Further, they reasoned that in the absence of an informed and free press, there cannot be
“enlightened" people. Finally, Stewart and White argued that while a need for secrecy exists in many national defense issues “the
responsibility must be where the power is." Since the Executive is given a large, unshared power in foreign affairs and national
security, its duty must be to “determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to exercise that power successfully."
The majority clearly frowned on the actions of the Executive. The six concurring Justices in this case agreed that issuing an
injunction, a prior restraint, would be a harsh violation of the First Amendment regardless of the “secret" nature of the proposed
publishings.

PPI VS. COMELEC

Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No 2772 directing newspapers to provide free print space of not
less than ½ page for use as “Comelec Space” from 06March1995 to 06May1995. COMELEC Commisssioner
sent letters to publishers informing them of the same. PPI seek to declare the resolution unconstitutional
and void on the ground of taking private property w/o just compensation. TRO was enforced. SocGen
argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as
mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State.
COMELEC Chair stated that they will clarify the resolution that the letter was intended to solicit and not to
compel. Resolution No. 2772-A was promulgated.
Issue: Whether or not Resolution 2772 is void on the ground of deprivation of use w/o compensation of
newspaper?
Decision: To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to “taking” of private
personal property for public use. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial measured by
the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas.

The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of
expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of
private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is
the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by
respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space
at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. It has not been suggested that Comelec has been
granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A
reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by
Comelec must be shown. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the
Constitution, but not without payment of “just compensation.” Also Resolution No. 2772 does not
constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of
existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publish. However,
Sec 8 still stands as it is within the power of COMELEC to control the media influences of candidates to
prevent unequal campaigns.

To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" of the dimensions specified in Section
2 of Resolution No. 2722, amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes…xxx

The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or
restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the
advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very
substantial indeed. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation
for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to
"donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate
free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. The threshold requisites for a lawful
taking of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the
legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent
Comelec…xxx
Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent
domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and
the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed. . . .
Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

TIO vs. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

Citation: 151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; June 18, 1987
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.

DOCTRINES:
Validity of law; title of bill – The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently
complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which
a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end
that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts
of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in
the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject and title.

Taxation; security against oppressive taxation – The power to impose taxes is one so
unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare
that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the
authority which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents.
This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.

Taxation as a revenue and regulatory measure – The tax imposed by the DECREE is not
only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings
of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected
to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. . . . The
levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer
the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant
film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the
proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the
DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

Undue delegation of legislative power – The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of

authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the
government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such
agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation
of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what
it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid
objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of
the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the
deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD."
That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not
stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved
parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

FACTS:
Valentin Tio is a videogram establishment operator adversely affected by
Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board".

P.D. No. 1987 provides for the levy of a tax over each cassette sold (Sec.
134) and a 30% tax on the gross receipts of a videogram establishment,
payable to the local government (Sec. 10). The rationale for this decree is
set forth in its preambulatory/whereas clauses to wit:
1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including,
among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes ... have greatly prejudiced the operations of
moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by
at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of [taxes] thereby
resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government
revenues;

2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per

annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not
been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million
in taxes each year;

3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected

the viability of the movie industry, ...;

5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only
alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry ..., but also provide an
additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time rationalize
the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms;

6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features

constitutes a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth
[READ: PORN], and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to support
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and
promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;

8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the
people [AGAIN, READ: PORN] and betraying the national economic recovery program,
bold emergency measures must be adopted with dispatch; (emphasis supplied and
certain passages omitted)

ISSUES:
The petioner, among others, raised the following issues:

1. Whether or not the imposition of the 30% tax is a rider and the same is
not germane to the subject matter of the law.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of power and authority; and

HELD:
1. No, the tax is not a rider and is germane to the purpose and subject of
the law.

The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied
with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose
which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express
each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement
is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the
subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject and title.

Reading section 10 of P.D. No. 1987 closely, one can see that the foregoing
provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the law, which is the regulation of
the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in
its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that
general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.

Aside from revenue collection, tax laws may also be enacted for the
purpose of regulating an activity. At the same time, the videogram industry
is also an untapped source of revenue which the government may validly
tax. All of this is evident from preambulatory clauses nos. 2, 5, 6 and 8,
quoted in part above.

The levy of the 30% tax is also for a public purpose. It was imposed
primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly
because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual
property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while
it was also an objective of the law to protect the movie industry, the tax
remains a valid imposition.

2. No. There was no undue delegation of law making authority.

Petitioner was concerned that Section 11 of P.D. No. 1987 stating that the
videogram board (Board) has authority to "solicit the direct assistance of
other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and
limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to
perform enforcement functions for the Board" is an undue delegation of
legislative power.

This is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of

authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and
implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter,
no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the
decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed
and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to
the direction and control of the Board."

The petition was DISMISSED.

ORTIGAS VS. CA
Facts: On 25 August 1976, Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land located in
Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila (TCT 0737) with conditions duly annotated on the
certificate of title issued to Emilia. In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now MMDA) enacted
MMC Ordinance 81-01 (Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region), which reclassified as
a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills
Subdivision where the lot is located. On 8 June 1984, Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia
Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.. The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease.
Thereupon, Mathay constructed a single story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car
sales company. On 18 January 1995, Ortigas filed a complaint against Emilia Hermoso with the RTC Pasig
(Branch 261, Civil Case 64931), seeking the demolition of the said commercial structure for having
violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. The complaint was later amended to implead
Ismael G. Mathay III and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp., which have 10% interest in the lot. In his answer,
Mathay III denied any knowledge of the restrictions on the use of the lot and filed a cross-claim against
the Hermosos. On 16 June 1995, the trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction. On 29 June 1995,
Mathay III moved to set aside the injunctive order, but the trial court denied the motion. Mathay III then
filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari (CA-GR SP 39193), ascribing to the trial court grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. He claimed that MMC Ordinance 81-01
classified the area where the lot was located as commercial area and said ordinance must be read into the
25 August 1976 Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise of police power. Ortigas & Company averred that
restrictions duly annotated on the title must prevail over the ordinance. On 25 March 1996, the appellate
court granted the petition, nullified and set aside the assailed orders. The appellate court held that the
MMC Ordinance effectively nullified the restrictions allowing only residential use of the property in
question. Ortigas seasonably moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied it on 13 August
1996. Ortigas filed the petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not MMC 81-01 be given retroactive effect and impair vested rights and contracts?

Decision: Yes In general, laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit,
non respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable
thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later
law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract
necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the
constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts. One exception involves police power. A law
enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be
given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is
applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non-impairment of
contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of
police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of
the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract. MMC
Ordinance 81-01 is a legitimate police power measure as previously held in Sangalang vs. IAC. Thus,
following the ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 (1979), the contractual
stipulations annotated on the Torrens Title must yield to the ordinance. When that stretch was reclassified,
the restrictions in the contract of sale were deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation of the
zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced. While Philippine legal system upholds the sanctity of
contract so that a contract is deemed law between the contracting parties, nonetheless, stipulations in a
contract cannot contravene “law, morals, good customs.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner

vs.
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; DIRECTOR GENERAL
HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE PNP, et al., respondents
G.R. No. 157036. June 9, 2004

Facts:
Petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the “Guidelines in the Implementation of
the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence” (Guidelines) issued by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr.,
Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG to
reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present
petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry
L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.

Issues:
1. whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines;
2. whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power?;

Ruling:
1. Authority of the PNP Chief

It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and
substantially independent departments: the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance
of the matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.

The power to make laws – the legislative power – is vested in Congress. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that “delegata potestas non potest delegari” – “delegated power may not be
delegated.”
 The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing
power to certain persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors,
bureaus and directors. Such licensing power includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations.

Act No. 1780 delegated upon the Governor-General (now the President) the authority (1) to approve or disapprove
applications of any person for a license to deal in firearms or to possess the same for personal protection, hunting and
other lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any time. Further, it authorized him to issue regulations which
he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the Act.

By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the PNP absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the PNP
Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latter’s licensing authority. Section
24 thereof specifies, as one of PNP’s powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in
accordance with law. This is in conjunction with the PNP Chief’s “power to issue detailed implementing policies and
instructions” on such “matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties” of the
PNP.

2. Police Power
At any rate, assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution, the same
cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the State’s police power. All property in
the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare.

The Court laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus:
(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the
police power; and
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.

It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the
society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the New People’s Army (NPA), which
tends to disturb the peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban.
Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.

The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive. In the instant case, the assailed
Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of
firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-
apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime
incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of
their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns.
On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.

The petition is hereby DISMISSED.

MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association, Inc

FACTS:
Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery
of basic servicesin Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein,
received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for
the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient
movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to
MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that
the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenuewould be demolished.

The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a
preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the
MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to
open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice
police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.

ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed with police power.

HELD:
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. A local government is a
“political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.” The Local Government
Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a “body politic and corporate”– one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of
the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. Local government units are the
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.

Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in
Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The legislative body of the provincial
government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal
government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991
empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code x
x x.” The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to “enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon.”
Metro-wide services” are those “services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge
expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units comprising Metro
Manila.”There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning;
(2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage management; (5)
urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and
(7) public safety.
The implementation of the MMDA’s plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the local government units, national government
agencies, accredited people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For
this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with
these bodies for the delivery of the required services within Metro Manila
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No.
7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated
any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that
empowers the MMDA or its Council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare”
of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a “development authority.” It is an agency
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in natureIt is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is
not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a “special metropolitan
political subdivision” as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution.
Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has
no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.

PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION VS. ARLENE DE GUZMAN, ET AL., June 21, 2004
POLICE POWER/Public Health; THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE A PROFESSION

Facts:

After the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) released the names of successful examinees in the Medical
Licensure Examination, the Board of Medicines observed that the grades of the 79 Fatima College of
Medicine successful examinees were unusually and exceptionally high in the two (2) most difficult subjects of
the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and Obstetrics and Gynecology.

The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from
Fatima College of Medicine. Compared with other examines from other schools, the results of those from Fatima
were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. The NBI Investigation found that the
“Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.”

On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel
the PRC to give them their licenses to practice medicine. Meanwhile on July 21, 1993, the Board of medicine
issued Resolution No. 21 charging the respondents of immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud and deceit and
recommended that the test results of the Fatima Examinees be nullified.

On December 19, 1994, the RTC of Manila promulgated its decision ordering the PRC to allow the respondents to
take the physician’s oath and to register them as physicians. The same was appealed by the PRC to the Court of
Appeals which sustained the RTC decision.

Hence, this petition.

Held:

It must be stressed that the power to regulate the practice of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be
exercised by the State in an arbitrary, despotic or oppressive manner. However, the regulating body has the right
to grant or forbid such privilege in accordance with certain conditions.
But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, their exercise may be regulated pursuant to the
police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of
the people. As such, mandamus will not lie to compel the Board of Medicine to issue licenses for the respondents
to practice medicine.

RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of the
candidates for the board examination, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for the denying of
the issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a license that has been issued. It is therefore clear that the
examinee must prove that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by law and the
licensing authority to be granted the privilege to practice medicine. In short, he shall have all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications. The petition is therefore granted. After 11 long years, 11 graduates of
the Fatima College of Medicine who passed the 1993 medical board examination with "unusually
high scores" in two difficult subjects still cannot take their oaths as doctors.

The Supreme Court (SC) has upheld the authority of the government not to recognize them as
duly licensed physicians.

In a 30-page decision penned by Justice Dante Tinga, the SC Second Division reversed a decision
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in 2000 ordering the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) and
the Board of Medicine to administer the physician’s oath to the 11 respondents: Arlene de
Guzman, Celerina Navarro, Rafael Tolentino, Bernardita Sy, Gloria Jularbal, Hubert Nazareno,
Nancy Chavez, Ernesto Cue, Heminio Fernandez Jr, Maria Victoria Lacsamana and Merly Sta. Ana.

Many other Fatima graduates contested the PRC’s refusal to recognize them as licensed
physicians, but most lost interest in pursuing their case.

The CA affirmed the 1994 decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court that favored the Fatima
graduates. After they lost their appeal, the PRC and the Board elevated the case to the SC.

In its decision, the SC cited an established rule that the license to practice a "technical" profession
like medicine was a privilege granted by the government.

The SC said that the "desire" of an individual to practice a profession must be balanced against the
need to safeguard the welfare of the public.

"Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical
knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen
careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public
from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would
practice medicine," it said.

The SC said the Board of Medicine was justified in filing before the PRC an administrative case
against the Fatima examinees to determine their mental and moral fitness to practice medicine.

"Grave doubts" were raised after the Board observed that the grades of 79 medical board
examinees from Fatima were exceptionally high in two subjects – Biochemistry and Obstetrics and
Gynecology.

Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100 percent in Biochemistry while 11 scored 99 percent. In Ob-
Gyne, 10 scored 100 percent while 21 scored 99 percent. The Board also noted that many of the
Fatima examinees got marks of 95 percent or better in both subjects and none scored lower than
90 percent.

A comparison with the performance of candidates from other schools revealed that the unusual
clustering of high scores was true only of the Fatima examinees.

The Board issued a resolution withholding the registration of all Fatima examinees as physicians
and asked an expert in statistics, Fr. Bienvenido Nebres, to analyze the results of the examination.

The PRC also brought in the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to find out if any irregularity
marred the conduct of the tests.

In his report, Nebres said that the scores of the Fatima examinees in the Biochemistry and Ob-
Gyne tests were not only incredibly high but "unusually clustered close to each other."

He concluded that the Fatima scores lacked "the normal variations that one should expect from
the examinees in terms of talent effort, energy."

The NBI was more damning in its conclusion that the Fatima examinees may have "gained early
access to the test questions."

With these findings, the Board filed charges against the examinees and recommended the
nullification of their test results.

In its petition, the PRC argued that the respondents could not compel it to administer their oaths
since such an act was not ministerial but discretionary on its part.

But the respondents contended that the issuance of the certificate of registration can be denied
only to candidates who had been convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude, found
guilty of immoral or dishonorable conduct or declared insane. They said that none of the
circumstances were present in their case.

But in siding with the PRC and the Board of Medicine, the SC focused on a provision in Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 2382 that requires a person who intends to practice medicine to have
"satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board examination."

"The operative word here is ‘satisfactorily,’ defined as ‘sufficient to meet a condition or obligation’
or ‘capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance.’ Gleaned from Board Resolution No. 26, the licensing
authority apparently did not find that the respondents ‘satisfactorily passed’ the licensure
examinations," it said.

JMM VS, CA

FACTS:

The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for brevity) filed a class suit on January 27, 1995
assailing that the Department Order No. 3 which establishes various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists
under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former and other related issuance, principally
contending that the said orders, 1.)violated the constitutional right to travel; 2.) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3.)
deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP also averred that the issuance of the Artist Record
Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of the constitutional right to life liberty and property. FETMOP
prayed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the orders.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary International, Inc. (Kary for brevity) filed a motion for
intervention in the civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15, 1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the trial
court issued an order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the compliant. An appeal was
made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also however, dismissed. As a consequences, ARB requirement was issed.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and concluded that the said issuance constituted a valid exercise of Police
power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.

RULING:

Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant
to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been
upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state particularly when their conduct afffects either the
execution of a legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals.
According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a fashion so as to not disturb others) it must
of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own
property so as not to pose injury to himself or others. In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of property,
the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements
violates due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice
of various trades or profession. Professional leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are
deemed fit to practice their trade. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right
under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation
exists.
The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the
general welfare of the people under the State's police power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all
public needs,"[2] this "least limitable"[3] of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, as
parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.

Describing the nature and scope of the police power, Justice Malcolm, in the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro[4]
wrote:

"The police power of the State," one court has said...'is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed 'the law
of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.' Carried onward by the current of legislature, the judiciary rarely attempts to
dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean
security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual."[5]

Thus, police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden
rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or
was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.

A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed orders compels us to rule that the Artist
Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor
pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.
Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists ended up as prostitutes abroad
(many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced into prostitution), and following the deaths of a number of these women, the
government began instituting measures aimed at deploying only those individuals who met set standards which would qualify them
as legitimate performing artists. In spite of these measures, however, a number of our countrymen have nonetheless fallen victim to
unscrupulous recruiters, ending up as virtual slaves controlled by foreign crime syndicates and forced into jobs other than those
indicated in their employment contracts. Worse, some of our women have been forced into prostitution.

Thus, after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation schemes, the Secretary of Labor issued on August 16, 1993, D.O. No. 28,
establishing the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), the policy advisory body of DOLE on entertainment industry
matters.[9] Acting on the recommendations of the said body, the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued the assailed orders.
These orders embodied EIAC's Resolution No. 1, which called for guidelines on screening, testing and accrediting performing
overseas Filipino artists. Significantly, as the respondent court noted, petitioners were duly represented in the EIAC,[10] which gave
the recommendations on which the ARB and other requirements were based.

Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3.
Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high risk" destinations, a measure which would
only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing
artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately
prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the
room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.

Dela Cruz v. Paras Digest

Facts:
1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is
invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners
at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously
given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and
Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their
Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.'

The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance
the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling
alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title,
however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.

3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation
of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted
remains that of regulation, not prohibition.
 4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The
lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari
by way of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid

NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed
power to prohibit.

1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is
no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by
the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory
power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative
Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs.

2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of
which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A
construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.

3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under
review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to
grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the
legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to
compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary
termination of their business.

3. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to
prohibit.

G.R. No. L-18841 January 27, 1969

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, defendant-appellant
Facts:
The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one
of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications.
The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for short), is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise,
to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines.
BOT soon after its creation set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by
renting the trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. The Bureau has extended its services to the general
public. Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way
that the latter could make a call to the former.
BOT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications (an American Co. party not in interest of the case), Inc. for a joint telephone
service whereby the BOT would convey radio-telephone overseas call received by RCA to and from local residents.
PLDT complained that BOT violated conditions since BOT had used the trunk lines not only for government offices but even to serve private
persons or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. PLDT sever the telephone connections of BOT resulting to isolation
of the Philippines on telephone services from the rest of the world except the US.
The BOT had proposed that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing
through the interconnecting facilities from the GTS to the PLDT. 18 The PLDT replied that it was willing to enter into an agreement on
overseas telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the BOT would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the
Public Service Commission and in consideration sharing of the gross revenues. The proposals were not accepted by either party.
The plaintiff commenced suit against the defendant, praying in its complaint for judgment; (1) commanding the PLDT to execute a contract
with plaintiff, through the BOT, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and
conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and; (2) for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain
the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the
parties were not in agreement;
Both parties appealed.
Issue/s:
Whether or not interconnection of Government Telephone System and PLDT can be subject for expropriation.
Ruling:
Yes.
 The Republic of the Philippines through Bureau of Telecommunications may in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain,
require the Telephone Company to permit interconnection of the Government Telephone System and that of the PLDT, as the needs of
the government service may required, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.
 The Republic’s cause of action is predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of the BOT facilities from the outside world if the
severance of interconnection were to be carried out by the PLDT, thereby preventing the BOT from properly discharging its functions, to
the prejudice of the general public. The case should be for the compulsory rendering of interconnection of services by the telephone
company upon such terms and conditions as the court may determine to be just.
 Since the lower court should have proceeded to treat the case as one of condemnation of such services independently of contract and
proceeded to determine the just and reasonable compensation for the same, instead of dismissing the petition.
Under Section 79 of EO 94 paragraph (b)
To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain wire-telephone or radio telephone communication service throughout the Philippines by utilizing
such existing facilities in cities, towns, and provinces as may be found feasible and under such terms and conditions or arrangements with the present owners or
operators thereof as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned.
Under Section 6 Article XIII 1935 Constitution “Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources.”
The State may, in the exercise of national welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of transportation and communication, and upon
payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government.
Charter of PLDT expressly provides that Section 14.
The rights therein granted shall not be exclusive, and the rights and power to grant to any corporation, association or person other than the grantee franchise for
the telephone or electrical transmission of message or signals shall not be impaired or affected by the granting of this franchise.
PLDT’s right to just compensation for the services rendered to the GTS and its users is herein recognized and preserved. To uphold PLDT’s contention is to
subordinate the needs of the general public to the right of the PLDT to deprive profit from the future expansion of its services under its non exclusive franchise.
 The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial
purposes, continuously since 1948, implies assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time and the
public has patronized both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its
facilities, and it is not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines.
 There is high authority for the position that, when such physical connection has been voluntarily made, under a fair and workable arrangement and guaranteed
by contract and the continuous line has come to be patronized and established as a great public convenience, such connection shall not in breach of the
agreement be severed by one of the parties. In that case, the public is held to have such an interest in the arrangement that its rights must receive due
consideration.
 "Such physical connection cannot be required as of right, but if such connection is voluntarily made by contract, as is here alleged to be the case, so that the
public acquires an interest in its continuance, the act of the parties in making such connection is equivalent to a declaration of a purpose to waive the primary
right of independence, and it imposes upon the property such a public status that it may not be disregarded"
 "Where private property is by the consent of the owner invested with a public interest or privilege for the benefit of the public, the owner can no longer deal with
it as private property only, but must hold it subject to the right of the public in the exercise of that public interest or privilege conferred for their benefit.