5.

Splitting a single cause of action and its effects:

NORLINDA S. MARILAG v. MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ

G.R. No. 201892, July 22, 2015

FACTS: Rafael Martinez (Rafael), respondent's father, obtained from petitioner a loan in the amount of P160,000.00.
The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land.

Rafael failed to settle his obligation upon maturity and despite repeated demands, prompting petitioner to file a
Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before the RTC – Imus. When Rafael failed to file his
answer, he was declared in default, thus the RTC-Imus decided against Rafael’s favor.

Meanwhile, prior to Rafael's notice of the above decision, respondent (son of Rafael) agreed to pay his father's
obligation to petitioner. After making a total payment of P400,000.00, he then executed a promissory note binding
himself to pay the amount of P289,000.00, "representing the balance of the agreed financial obligation of [his] father
to [petitioner].

After learning RTC Imus decision, respondent refused to pay the amount covered by the subject PN, prompting
petitioner to file a complaint for sum of money (collection case).

Respondent contended that petitioner has no cause of action and added that the doctrine of res judicata finds
application in the instant case, considering that both the judicial foreclosure and collection cases were filed as a
consequence of the non-payment of Rafael's loan, which was the principal obligation secured by the real estate
mortgage and the primary consideration for the execution of the subject PN.

ISSUE: Whether or not the availment of an action for judicial foreclosure bars recourse to the subsequent filing of a
personal action for collection over the same debt

HELD: YES

A party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits as the whole
cause must be determined in one action. To be sure, splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping
by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where the ~round
of dismissal is litis pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be).

In this relation, it must be noted that the question of whether a cause of action is single and entire or separate is not
always easy to determine and the same must often be resolved, not by the general rules, but by reference to the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. The true rule, therefore, is whether the entire amount arises from one
and the same act or contract which must, thus, be sued for in one action, or the several parts arise from distinct and
different acts or contracts, for which a party may maintain separate suits.

In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of
action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of
sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are
alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself. Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee
opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the unpaid debt, except only for
the recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation of the debtor-mortgagor after deducting
the bid price in the public auction sale of the mortgaged properties. Accordingly, a deficiency judgment shall only
issue after it is established that the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for an amount less than the
outstanding obligation.
In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial foreclosure
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on Rafael's debt. In light of the
foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing of a personal action
for collection of the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis pendentia, considering that the foreclosure
case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained finality.

Rule 8:
HEIRS OF CABIGAS vs. LIMBACO
G.R. G.R. No. 175291
July 27, 2011

FACTS: Ines Ouano sold to Salvador Cobarde 2 lots in 1948. Notwithstanding the sale between Ouano and
Cobarde, and because the two lots remained registered in her name, Ouano was able to sell these same lots to the
National Airports Corporation on November 25, 1952 for its airport expansion project. The National Airports
Corporation promptly had the titles of these properties registered in its name. However, in1980, Cobarde sold these 2
lots to Lolita Cabigas and her late husband, Nicolas Cabigas.

When the airport expansion project fell through, the legal heirs of Ouano succeeded in reclaiming title to the two lots
through an action for reconveyance filed with the lower court. The heirs of Ouano then registered these lots in their
names and then subdivided them and sold them to New Ventures Realty Corporation, Eugenio Amores, Henry See,
Freddie Go, Benedict Que, Petrosa, and AWG. AWG, in turn, sold one of the parcels of land to UCB. All the buyers
registered the titles over their respective lots in their names.

The heirs of Cabigas filed this action for annulment of the said titles but the RTC dismissed their action saying that
the National Airport Corporation was a buyer in good faith, and having registered the lot in its name, Cobarde’s rights
to the properties had been cut off. Hence, under the Torrens system, the petitioners are strangers to the lots and they
had no legally recognized interest binding it in rem that the courts could protect and enforce against the world.

CA dismissed the case as it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since it raised a pure question of law. As
the appeal was dismissed based on a technicality, CA did not have the jurisdiction to order that the case be
remanded to the RTC.

ISSUES: The CA committed grave and serious error in dismissing the appeal and in holding that a summary
judgment is appealable only through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to the Supreme Court.

HELD: NO

We AFFIRM the assailed CA resolutions. When there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or
not the conclusion drawn from these facts is correct is a question of law. When the petitioners assailed the
summary judgment, they were in fact questioning the conclusions drawn by the RTC from the undisputed facts, and
raising a question of law. As astutely observed by the CA, the RTC resolution merely collated from the pleadings the
facts that were undisputed, admitted, and stipulated upon by the parties, and thereafter ruled on the legal issues
raised by applying the pertinent laws and jurisprudence on the matter. In other words, the RTC did not resolve any
factual issues, only legal ones.

In light of the foregoing, jurisdiction over the petitioners’ appeal properly lay with this Court via an appeal by certiorari,
and the CA was correct in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Rendition of summary judgment was proper. Even if we overlook the procedural lapse and resolve the case on the
merits, we still affirm the assailed CA resolutions.

Under the Rules of Court, a summary judgment may be rendered where, on motion of a party and after hearing, the
pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that, "except as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.

In Asian Construction and Development Corporation v. Philippine Commercial International Bank , summary or
accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of
litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. Under the Rules, summary judgment is
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial.
Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that
such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The
determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as
to any material fact.

Rule 14
Mason v Court of Appeals (2003)

FACTS: Petitioners spouses Efren and Digna Mason owned two parcels of land located along EDSA in Pasay
City. On March 30, 1993, petitioners and private respondent Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation (hereafter
Columbus) entered into a lease contract, under which Columbus undertook to construct a building worth P10M at the
end of the third year of the lease.

Because private respondent failed to comply with this stipulation, the petitioners on November 13, 1998, filed a
complaint for rescission of contract with damages against private respondent before the RTC of Pasay City.

Summons was served upon private respondent through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the
summons described Rejalde as a secretary of Columbus, the sheriff’s return described Rejalde as a secretary to the
corporate president, duly authorized to receive legal processes.

Private respondent failed to file its answer or other responsive pleading, hence petitioners filed a motion to declare
private respondent in default. The motion was granted and petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex-
parte. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision.

RTC: The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners declaring the contract of lease rescinded,
terminated and cancelled. That decision became final on May 12, 1999.

1. The following day, private respondent filed a motion to lift order of default, which was opposed by
petitioners. The trial court denied the motion to lift order of default.

2. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.

3. Undaunted, private respondent filed a manifestation and motion to lift the writ of execution. It suffered
the same fate as the motion for reconsideration for being dilatory. The branch sheriff was directed to
proceed with the enforcement of the decision.
CA: Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which ruled in its favor. The CA held that the trial court
erred when it denied private respondent’s motion to lift order of default. The appellate court pointed out that private
respondent was not properly served with summons, thus it cannot be faulted if it failed to file an Answer.

Petitioner filed a petition for review.

ISSUES: Whether there was valid service of summons on private respondent for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction

HELD: NO

There was no valid service of summons. Service through Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk of private respondent
and not one of those enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is invalid.

The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant case.

In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address
at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo, Parañaque, Metro
Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a sale with development agreement with
private respondent Imperial Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with its contractual
obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for breach of contract and damages at the Regional Trial Court
of Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, was served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at
Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of improper service of summons and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and
ruled that there was substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over Villarosa. The
latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for certiorari. We decided in Villarosa’s favor and
declared the trial court without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. We held that there was no valid
service of summons on Villarosa as service was made through a person not included in the enumeration in
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964
Rules of Court. We discarded the trial court’s basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private
respondent’s substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and fully agreed with petitioner’s
assertions that the enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and exclusive, following the rule in
statutory construction that expression unios est exclusion alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision
Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, we said, it could have easily done so by
clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance
with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in Millenium to support their position for said case is not on all fours
with the instant case. We must stress that Millenium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were still in force
and effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the case cited by petitioners where
we upheld the doctrine of substantial compliance must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the
later case.