Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
2012
EJC27310.1177/0267323112455907European Journal of CommunicationAllen and Savigny
Article
Abstract
Financial scandals and controversies have recently attracted much attention in the British press.
The excesses of the bankers’ bonuses, MPs’ expenses scandals and those deemed ‘benefit
cheats’ and welfare scroungers have been given prominence by the print news media, and the
present Coalition government. The politicization of the current financial crisis has resulted in ‘the
privatization of loss and the socialization of costs’. Yet how do we make sense of this? Or how are
those responsible for financial wrongdoings able to ‘get away with it’? This article suggests that the
interests of business as a class remain largely uncontested in contemporary political discourse. Just
one way in which this is evident is through the coverage of financial crime, and this article offers as
illustration a case study of the political construction of business crime (price fixing) in the pages of
the British press. It is suggested that the way in which this crime is framed is reflective of a broader
ideological discursive commitment which privileges business interests over the public interest.
Keywords
Business as class, depoliticization, decriminalization, financial crime, journalism, news/information,
policy and law (media systems), political communication, public sphere
In contemporary public discourses in the UK, bankers have been vilified as greedy and
fat cats (which reflect the politer terms used) for their bonuses. The bankers themselves
seem to have little concern about the public condemnation of their actions; they have
sought to justify these payments as just desert for hard work, ‘fair remuneration’, and
argue that they are not doing anything legally reprehensible. At the other end of the spec-
trum, benefit claimants, like bankers, are regularly pilloried in the press. While criticism
is also connected to the size of payments, the difference between bankers and benefit
claimants (according to the right-wing press) is that the latter have obtained their income
Corresponding author:
Heather Savigny, The Media School, Bournemouth University, Weymouth House, Talbot Campus Poole,
Dorset BH12 5BB, UK.
Email: hsavigny@bournemouth.ac.uk
through nefarious and implicitly illegal means. Indeed, this (unsupported) assumption is
also one which the present Coalition government’s welfare reform agenda has been
premised upon. This vilification of benefit claimants, in particular, takes place in a con-
text in which businesses engaged in criminal activities are rarely held accountable in
public discourses (let alone subject to the demonization of those on welfare). (It is per-
haps worth noting here that the £7bn in bonuses that the City were rumoured to be paying
themselves in 2010, is roughly equivalent to the £7bn Osborne is axing from the welfare
budget [Treanor, 2010]). So why such a difference in response?
In the UK, a neoliberal political agenda is currently relentlessly pursued, markets are
liberalized and deregulated to prevent the ‘flight of capital’, politicians capitulate to the
demands of business, but what does this mean for the public? The rise of corporate
power and corporations as political actors is increasingly documented (see, for exam-
ple, Miller and Mooney, 2010) but what happens when they behave illegally? Or immor-
ally? How do the public institutions which are supposed to protect the public interest
respond? Much has been made of the failure of financial journalists in the recent finan-
cial crisis (see, for example, Tambini, 2010) but in a media environment generally sup-
portive of business interests, is this really surprising? The media are crucial to the
functioning of any democracy, and with the increasing political prominence of business
interests it becomes perhaps even more pertinent to ask questions about the relationship
between the media and business as a class. This article explores one aspect of that rela-
tionship, the coverage of business crime, in which we use the example of price fixing.
Price fixing may sound like an innocuous or inoffensive crime, although as Stephan has
observed (2008) chances are we have all been a victim of this crime. For example, the
dairy product price fixing case by some of the big supermarkets was said to have costs
consumers in the region of £270m (Attwood, 2007). On occasion companies are pros-
ecuted, yet these prosecutions fail to be met with the same levels of outrage in the press
that accompanies accusations of benefit ‘scrounging’. So why is this? While some of
this may be attributable to journalists themselves (see Tambini, 2010) it is also the case
that we need to consider the political context and structural features within which such
coverage takes place.
within the media, who operate as both structures and agents, not passively disseminating
dominant ideologies (as suggested by structural accounts) but playing an active role in
their creation, construction, articulation and communication. Our argument is located in
the context of the tension between business as a dominant class structure, but one which
incorporates the media (whose business desires clash with the democratic ideals of lib-
eral theory).
As such, the media, given their own pursuit of profit, also play a role in promoting the
interests of business as a dominant class, while, at the same time, appearing to provide a
site where ideologies are negotiated and contested. However, this clash of objectives
means that it is the politically and economically dominant groups in society who have the
capacity to define the parameters of debate; defining discourse and the way in which
dominant ideas are framed, produced and reproduced. While this may not necessarily be
an overt intention, arguably this is a consequence of interaction between media owners
seeking to act strategically in the pursuit of profit and power (e.g. Street, 2001). The
existence of the media in their own competitive marketplace means that they have a
vested interest in the maintenance of the system status quo, which translates into not
questioning the methods of business too closely.
In order to think about what is meant by ‘crime’, we need to understand the way in
which public discourses present and define crime. One way to do this is through analysis
of who gets to speak. Most literature highlights the role of elites, be they state managers
or intellectuals (Welch et al., 1998) or state officials, union leaders and pressure groups
(Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). Those who speak about crime are thus structurally priv-
ileged and able to define what crime is. Carrabine (2008) argues that we need to under-
stand the social character of the construction of ‘crime’, that is the way in which crime
stories are produced, circulated and consumed. This means that the way in which crime
is constructed in the media becomes reflective of the agenda and interests of those speak-
ing, rather than representative of the interests of society more generally. In this way the
social construction of crime can have an ideological function (Hall et al., 1978), legiti-
mating and reinforcing dominant ideologies and ideas (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) and
assumptions about what constitutes crime (i.e. theft from other people or property) and
what doesn’t (such as theft from the taxpayer in the form of tax evasion). The media stud-
ies literature more widely draws our attention to perhaps the most significant effect of
media coverage: its capacity to produce effects which are ‘broadly ideological rather
than narrowly attitudinal’ (Sacco, 1995: 141). For us, the political dimension of this cov-
erage therefore lies in the question: in whose interests is the coverage presented? We
argue that the political dimension of business crime coverage is about more than the
state’s ability to control its citizens through the enforcement of legislation. Thus the
political dimension relates to not only what is said by political and economic elites, but
what is not said. The bigger issue of course, is whose interests this discourse benefits.
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the publick, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It
is impossible to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would
be consistent with liberty and justice. (Smith, 2008 [1776]: Book I x: 129)
He argues that it is not possible to prevent companies and individuals in the pursuit of
profit, from meeting to collude to fix prices. Indeed, he implies that price fixing is an
inevitable consequence of free, unregulated trade (and on a deeper level, human nature).
This recognition of weaknesses with ‘free markets’ draws attention to the existence of
inequality within the market: given the self-interest of those producers within markets,
there was an almost inevitable likelihood of exploitation of the consumer.
Smith also argued that it was not possible to legislate against this type of behaviour
(2008 [1776]: 129), and successive UK governments had accepted that view until 2002
when legislation was introduced. This brought the UK into line with EU policy in this
area. The British Enterprise Act 2002, which made price fixing illegal, followed on from
the prohibition of cartels in the Competition Act. This allowed for the prosecution of
individuals within companies (where previously when price fixing was first criminalized
in 2000 under the Competition Act, it allowed only for the prosecution of business rather
than individuals). The Competition Act was introduced in 1988; it was a key piece of
legalisation designed to promote and protect competition (in markets), which enshrined
the normative political values of neoliberalism: a commitment to free markets, competi-
tion and light touch regulation. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) is charged with ensur-
ing the implementation of Competition Policy. According to its website it functions to
‘make markets work well for consumers’ and as such, it states that ‘We achieve this by
promoting and protecting consumer interests throughout the UK, while ensuring that
businesses are fair and competitive’ (OFT, 2009). Here the OFT both claims it is regula-
tor, in its mission statement, and enshrines a neoliberal commitment to markets ulti-
mately as provider of consumer interests.
Competition policy illustrates the way in which economic theory itself has been
important in informing policy (as economic modelling has played a key role in informing
the formulation and implementation of said policy). This is not something which has
happened in isolation, rather it is representative of a broader shift in the way in which
Anglo-American politics of the last 30 years has evolved. The Thatcher/Reagan era ush-
ered in a period which arguably marked the beginning of an era of neoliberal consensus
(e.g. Hay, 1997) as subsequent British and US governments have both accepted eco-
nomic monetarist policies. It is too simplistic to attribute change to one individual, but
this shift was also heavily influenced by the Montpelier group and, in the UK, a decline
in manufacturing base, the rise of financial institutions and the destruction of the unions.
In short, the broader picture in which this policy was situated was one of a reassertion of
the role of capital against the increasing power of labour.
This has not simply been about changes at the material level. The ideological assault
of neoliberalism has been as significant. For Thatcher and the policies which emanated
from her administration, ‘Economics [were] the method . . . but the object [has been] to
change the soul’ (cited in Harvey, 2005: 23). Harvey’s phrase the ‘construction of con-
sent’ highlights the way in which the dominant classes have organized against labour,
and the way in which business has refined its capacity to act as a class, protecting its own
interest. It is not only through lack of regulation that businesses benefit, where legisla-
tion is enacted, what becomes clear is that business benefits through its obscurity (Harvey,
2005). As Stephan (2010) observes, the workings of the anti-competitive practices legis-
lation in the UK is so obscure as to make the pursuit of prosecutions extremely difficult:
the broader context in which the extreme generation of wealth is legitimated.
The second part of our analysis explored the qualitative nature of news coverage, and
the language used in the description of the case, the crime and the responses of consum-
ers and companies, and this is discussed in the section ‘what was said’, below. To ensure
consistency two coders used the same coding frame, and cross-checked each other’s
coding.
defined as ‘the range of tools, mechanisms and institutions through which politicians can
attempt to move to an indirect governing relationship and/or seek to persuade the demos
that they can no longer reasonably be held responsible for a certain issue, policy field or
specific decision’ (Flinders and Buller, 2006: 295–296; emphasis in original).
Depoliticization narratives highlight the way in which policy issues are devolved away
from ministers and politicians to civil servants, agencies or regulatory bodies (in this
analysis this is the OFT). Politicians are thus able to distance themselves from policy
outcomes. In our case study, the ‘political’ voice sees only 7% of reported coverage
reflecting comments or views by politicians, and 30% of reported coverage reflecting the
OFT. Not only is this issue depoliticized in that accountability and responsibility is being
devolved from politicians to unelected bodies, but at the same time the dominant voice
in the coverage is that of business. While business voices, and therefore interests, domi-
nate coverage, devolved political accountability takes second place. In political science,
there is a tendency to focus upon the discourse of individual politicians and policy per se
(e.g. Kettell, 2008; Rogers, 2009), rather than the manner in which this is uncritically
reproduced within the media. What our case study highlights is the way in which the
media also play a role in the reproduction of a depoliticized discourse.
How was it said: The privileged role of public relations, or the PR-
ization of news
Having explored whose voice dominated the news coverage, we then sought to analyse
how that voice was presented. As public relations increasingly dominate the news
agenda, we were interested to see the extent to which businesses now used PR – in a bid
to mitigate the effects of potentially adverse news coverage.
The rise of PR as a means for influencing news coverage is not only something which
politicians engage in. Aeron Davis (2005) demonstrates the way in which corporate
elites have manipulated the business news agenda through the extensive and aggressive
use of PR and in so doing have gained competitive advantage over their rivals. While he
recognizes that there may be tensions between journalistic objectives and those of busi-
ness, nonetheless he argues that corporate elites are ultimately successful in pursuing
their own agenda through the pages of the press. This process serves to exclude the pub-
lic, and business news becomes a site whereby business elites compete and communicate
with each other. One of the key conclusions that Davis (2005) draws is that as a conse-
quence of this, a significant proportion of financial activity, corporate regulation and
economic policy-making takes place largely to benefit corporate elites, and out of view
of the public. In this way, the public sphere becomes a quasi-marketplace, where com-
petitive advantage is being sought out by rival elites. Moreover, exclusion of the public
from this space also serves to generate an elite space where business and economic inter-
ests are privileged over those of society, negating any notion of a ‘public good’.
The focus upon the PR-ization of news (Jackson and Moloney, 2010) is one developed
by Nick Davies (2008) whose political economy of the media industry draws attention to
the way in which PR dominates as a consequence of economic constraints which hamper
journalists. He argues that this reliance on PR has two key effects. First it enables business
to represent its view unchallenged and often uncritically repeated. Second, through
providing copy to journalists, Davies observes, the view of business is more likely to be
represented, in the way that business would like it to be. In short, the use of PR reinforces
the notion that both quantity and quality of coverage matter. As we see in Figure 2, where
the voice of business is presented, this is predominantly in terms of PR (56%) rather than
direct quotes of business people themselves. If we accept Davies’ argument about the way
in which newsrooms operate, then we can safely assume that through the use of PR com-
panies are having their words reprinted word for word by an overworked, but ultimately
compliant press. While the stories about companies prosecuted for price fixing activities
may be potentially damaging for firms, successful use of PR may well mitigate adverse
perceptions on the part of other political and economic elites.
In our case study, we found the discussion of those who committed the crimes took
place in sympathetic terms. The following is perhaps illustrative of a wider sympathy for
business criminals as not having committed a ‘real’ crime: under the headline ‘A white
collar Guantanamo’ The Times goes on to describe how,
Ian Norris is a frightened man. He fears he may be removed against his will from Britain and
thrown into jail in the United States to languish for a year or more awaiting trial, without having
had chance to profess his innocence in a British court. . . . If he were someone that the American
authorities suspected was plotting to blow up the White house or contaminate water supplies, then
such draconian measures might be understandable. . . . Mr Norris, however, stands accused of
being involved in the dastardly crime of fixing the prices of carbon brushes. (Wheatcroft, 2005)
Norris’s personalization and the description of his ‘fear’, and the analogous depiction
of the US torture camp, are aimed to evoke sympathy with the criminal, rather than anger
at. Here then not only is the ‘crime’ decriminalized, but we are encouraged to feel sym-
pathy for the criminal, who has not committed a real crime.
For crime to be ‘successfully’ discussed it needs personification, to be presented as
the consequence of the actions of an individual (Kappeler et al., 1996). Yet the represen-
tation of Norris is unusual, not only for the extremity of analogy, but for its personaliza-
tion. In price fixing cases the company is often presented as the ‘criminal’ rather than any
individual. By denying agency to firms, this denies their capacity to commit crime. The
decriminalization of these white collar crimes represents a way in which moral discus-
sions about the way in which markets operate and the assumptions which underlie this
are removed from the public agenda. While the morality of actors within markets may be
discussed, these are individuals, personalized, implying that it is a personality flaw which
leads these characters to behave in this way, rather than a problem with the market per se.
The media discuss greedy bankers, implying an almost as innate, natural or at least
human attribute, rather than any kind of systemic problem. This denies the possibility
that it is the market itself that structures those choices that individuals (i.e. bankers) may
make. This is not to negate the autonomy or choices that bankers have made, rather we
suggest it is an interaction of bankers in the market context that they operate in which
leads to these outcomes. Depersonalizing the behaviour of firms suggests that there is no
criminal, and therefore no immoral activity. If we restore agency to firms we may begin
to reopen the discussion about the nature of morality within markets per se, in which the
personalization of white collar crime has been excluded from the public debate.
Conclusion
Business does not operate in a vacuum. If we are to make sense of the wider lack of
accountability with which our business elites are subjected to publicly, we might begin
with a glance around our political classes. Mandelson famously remarked that Labour
was ‘intensely relaxed about people getting filthy rich’, and ‘a Labour government
which hands out ASBOs to the poor and peerages to the financiers’ (Irvin, 2008: 206).
An observation made prior to the banking crisis, perhaps presciently noted the actions
of the bankers collecting their bonuses irrespective of public opinion: ‘Today’s super
rich feel that they deserve their rewards irrespective of the jobs that are lost through
downsizing, the deteriorating working conditions entailed by locking out trade unions
or the environmental damage resulting from relaxing emissions standards and the dete-
riorating public provision from lobbying for corporate and personal tax breaks’ (Irvin,
2008: 206; emphasis added). This culture of ‘deserving’ rich is a phrase more recently
articulated by the Coalition government, but in part has been reinvigorated, or revived
from its Victorian roots in contemporary neoliberalism.
While much has been made of the individuals caught up in the recent financial crises,
less attention has been paid to the way in which businesses behave within markets. In the
UK, with the decline of manufacturing, the lessening of the power of the trade unions,
Britain’s economy has emphasized finance and big business as a necessary and good
thing. Business power is reinforced as elite policy-makers seem reluctant to introduce
progressive taxation measures – maybe for fear of the flight of capital (see, for example,
Peston, 2008), but this is also reinforced through public discourse.
We have looked at the way in which public discourse is constructed around business
crime through a case study of press coverage of ‘price fixing’. We are not suggesting a
monolithic dominant media discourse, but what we have sought to do is reflect upon the
way in which consensus is negotiated through public discourses. That individual bankers
were still able to claim their bonuses, despite their role in the financial crisis, perhaps
reveals something about the way in which we view business wrongdoing. The credit
crunch may have shaken our economic system, and required responses from political
elites of ‘outmoded’ fiscal Keynesian policies (Crouch, 2009; Watson, 2009), but it could
be argued that the foundations of consensus around the methods, behaviour and morality
of business were solid. The failure of the press to condone immoral, illegal behaviour of
businesses prior to the financial crisis reveals much about the dominant ideology thesis.
Where the very real tensions of a neoliberal hegemonic agenda were exposed within the
financial crisis, dominant discourses had already excluded the vocabulary through which
alternative viewpoints of the relationship between the economy and society and the role
of markets in society might be legitimately debated.
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