G.R. No.

210987 November 24, 2014 HELD:

THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE AND GENERAL The Court’s Ruling

INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents.
Facts
Petitioner Company (Philamlife) used to ownClass A shares in.
(PhilamCare), representing 49.89% of the latter's outstanding
capital stock. In 2009, petitioner offered and sold its
shareholdings in PhilamCare through competitive bidding
based on the prevailing exchange rate at the time of the sale,
to STI Investments, Inc as the highest bidder.3
After the sale ,Philamlife filed an application for a certificate
authorizing registration/tax clearance with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) Large Taxpayers Service Division to
facilitate the transfer of the shares. Months later, petitioner was
informed that it needed to secure a BIR ruling in connection
with its application due to potential donor’s tax liability.
Petitioner requested a ruling4 to confirm that the sale was not
subject to donor’s tax, pointing out the following:
1. that the transaction cannot attract donor’s tax liability since
there was no donative intent and,ergo, no taxable donation
2. that the shares were sold at their actual fair market value
and at arm’s length;
3. that as long as the transaction conducted is at arm’s
length––a sale for less than an adequate consideration is not
subject to donor’s tax;
The petition is unmeritorious.
Reviews by the Secretary of Finance pursuant to Sec. 4 of the
NIRC are appealable to the CTA
Petitioner essentially questions the CIR’s ruling that
Petitioner’s sale of shares is a taxable donation under Sec. 100
of the NIRC. The validity of Sec. 100 of the NIRC, Sec. 7
(C.2.2) and RMC 25-11 is merely questioned incidentally since
it was used by the CIR as bases for its unfavourable opinion.
Clearly, the Petition involves an issue on the taxability of the
transaction rather than a direct attack on the constitutionality of
Sec. 100, Sec.7 (c.2.2.) of RR 06-08 and RMC 25-11.
The price difference is subject to donor's tax
The absence of donative intent, if that be the case, does not
exempt the sales of stock transaction from donor's tax since
Sec. 100 of the NIRC categorically states that the amount by
which the fair market value of the property exceeded the value
of the consideration shall be deemed a gift.1âwphi1 Thus,
even if there is no actual donation, the difference in price is
considered a donation by fiction of law.
Moreover, Sec. 7(c.2.2) of RR 06-08 does not alter Sec. 100 of
the NIRC but merely sets the parameters for determining the
"fair market value" of a sale of stocks. Such issuance was
made pursuant to the Commissioner's power to interpret tax
laws and to promulgate rules and regulations for their
implementation.

4. and that donor’s tax does not apply to sale of shares sold in
an open bidding process.

CIR denied Philamlife’s request through BIR Ruling No. 015-

12. The Commissioner ruled that the difference between the
book value and the selling price in the sales transaction is
taxable donation subject to a 30% donor’s tax under Section
99(B) of the NIRC.Also BIR Ruling [DA-(DT-065) 715-09], on
which petitioner anchored its claim, has already been revoked
by Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 25-2011.8

Aggrieved, petitioner requested respondent Secretary of

Finance (Secretary) to review BIR Ruling No. 015-12.
Secretary affirmed the Commissioner’s assailed ruling in its
entirety.9

CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.ratiocinated

that it is the Court of Tax Appeals which has jurisdiction over
the issues raised.

Philamlife eventually sought reconsideration but the CA

maintained its earlier position. Hence, the instant recourse.

ISSUES

Whether or not the price difference in petitioner’s adverted

sale of shares in PhilamCare attracts donor’s tax.
Article 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be
valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein
the property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or
in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect
unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor
shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall
be noted in both instruments.
HEIRS OF ROSENDO SEVILLA FLORENCIO, as
represented by ESTRELLITA FLORENCIO-CRUZ and
RODRIGO R. FLORENCIO vs. HEIRS OF TERESA SEVILLA
DE LEON as represented by VALERIANA MORENTE
G.R. No. 149570
Facts: Teresa Sevilla de Leon owned a residential lot covered
by a TCT in her name. In the 1960s, De Leon allowed the
spouses Rosendo and Consuelo Florencio to construct a
house on the said lot and stay therein without any rentals. In
1966, the De Leon spouses leased the parcel of land to
Bienvenido Santos.
In 1978, De Leon, then already a widow, died intestate. Her
heirs allowed Rosendo Florencio to continue staying in the
property. Florencio died intestate, but his heirs (petitioners)
remained in the property. The heirs of De Leon (respondents)
demanded that they vacate the property but the latter refused.
Respondents thereafter filed a complaint for ejectment against
the petitioners before the MTC.
Petitioners alleged that Teresa de Leon had executed a Deed
of Donation on October 1, 1976 over the said parcel of land in
favor of their predecessor, Rosendo Florencio. The latter
accepted the donation, as shown by his signature above his
typewritten name on page one of the deed. The petitioners
since then possessed the aforesaid property as owners.
Respondents also filed a complaint for ejectment against the
heirs of Bienvenido Santos before the MTC. The heirs of
Bienvenido Santos alleged that they did not occupy the
property by mere tolerance but on the basis of a contract of
lease executed by De Leon. Furthermore, De Leon donated
the property to Rosendo Florencio who allowed and permitted
them to continue and remain in possession of the property
without any compensation.
Respondents raised that petitioners’ possession of the
premises was merely on the tolerance of the late Teresa de
Leon and that the alleged Deed of Donation does not exist, is
patently a falsified document and can never be the source of
any right whatsoever.
The trial of the two cases was consolidated.
MTC: ruled in favor of petitioners.
RTC: reversed the decision of the MTC.
CA: dismissed the petition and affirmed RTC ruling. The deed
of donation was not a credible piece of evidence to support the
petitioners’ claim over the property; hence, did not transfer title
over the property in favor of the petitioners.
Issues: WON the petitioners, as heirs of Rosendo Florencio,
who appears to be the donee under the unregistered Deed of
Donation, have a better right to the physical or material
possession of the property over the respondents, the heirs of
Teresa de Leon, the registered owner of the property. NO
Ruling: The essential elements of donation are: (a) the
essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the
increase in the patrimony of the donee; and (c) the intent to do
an act of liberality or animus donandi. For a donation of an
immovable property, the law further requires that the donation
be made in a public document and that the acceptance thereof
be made in the same deed or in a separate public instrument.
Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered
irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the
property. The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during
the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It must be made
in the same deed or in a separate public document, and the
donee’s acceptance must come to the knowledge of the donor.
In order that the donation of an immovable property may be
valid, it must be made in a public document. Registration of the
deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or in the Assessor’s
Office is not necessary for it to be considered valid and official.
In this case, the deed of donation, on its face, appears to bear
all the essential requisites of a valid donation inter vivos.
However, the intention of the donation was questioned
because of the following:
1) Florencio did not produce a copy of the duplicate of the title,
nor registered the deed and secure title over the property
under his name.
2) Florencio failed to inform the heirs of De Leon that the latter
had executed a deed of donation in his favor. It was only 18
years after the death of De Leon (when respondents filed the
complaints) that the petitioners claimed, for the first time, that
De Leon had executed a deed of donation.
3) Respondents consistently paid the realty taxes for the
property while Florencio and heirs never paid a single centavo.
4) The petitioners never adduced in evidence the owner’s
duplicate of the title. Their possession of the duplicate would
have fortified their claim that indeed, De Leon had intended to
convey the property by donation to Florencio.
5) Petitioners failed to adduce in evidence Atty. Manguiat’s
counter-affidavit to the said complaint, or, at the very least, a
separate affidavit explaining the facts and circumstances
surrounding the notarization of the deed of donation.
6) At the deed, Florencio was to subscribe and swear to the
truth of his acceptance of the donation before Municipal Mayor
Marcelo G. Aure of San Miguel, Bulacan. However, the mayor
did not affix his signature above his typewritten name.
The deed of donation relied upon by the petitioners is
unreliable as evidence on which to anchor a finding that the
latter have a better right over the property than the
respondents.
Petition is denied. RTC ruling affirmed.
[G.R. No. 198636, October 08, 2014.] respondents, there was a clear intention for a return of the
amounts which the respondents spent for the acquisition,
ESPERANZA C. CARINAN, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES transfer and renovation of the subject property. The
GAVINO CUETO AND CARMELITA CUETO, respondents. respondents then reasonably expected to get their money back
from Esperanza. Esperanza’s claim that the expenses and
REYES, J p: payments in her behalf were purely gratuitous remained
unsupported by records.
FACTS:
1 . Esperanza and her husband, Jose Carinan, acquired Esperanza’s refusal to pay back would likewise result in unjust
from one Roberto Ventura the rights over a parcel of enrichment, to the clear disadvantage of the respondents. “The
land under the name of GSIS. Their transaction as main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to
covered by a Deed of Assignment and Transfer of prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another
Rights with Assumption of Obligation. Esperanza and without just cause or consideration.” While Esperanza claims
Jose were to assume the payment of the applicable that her brother’s generosity was the consideration for the
monthly amortization for the subject land to GSIS. respondents’ payment of her obligations, this was not
2 . Several amortization remained unpaid by Esperanza sufficiently established, that even the respondents vehemently
and Jose, resulting in an impending cancellation in denied the allegation.
2005 of GSIS’ conditional sale of the subject property
to Roberto. Esperanza sought assistance from her Although the Court affirms the trial and appellate courts’ ruling
brother Gavino in October 2005. The responednts that, first, there was no donation in this case and, second, the
then paid from their conjugal savings Esperanza’s respondents are entitled to a return of the amounts which they
obligation. spent for the subject property, it still cannot sustain the
3 . The respondent alleged that Esperanza and Jazer, respondents’ plea for Esperanza’s full conveyance of the
(son of Esperanza) undertook to execute a Deed of subject property. To impose the property’s transfer to the
Absolute Sale in favor of the respondents once the respondents’ names would totally disregard Esperanza’s
title over the subject property was transferred to their interest and the payments which she made for the property’s
names, subject to the condition that thye would be purchase. Thus, the principal amount to be returned to the
given the first option to buy it back within 3yrs by respondents shall only pertain to the amounts that they actually
reimbursing the expenses incurred by the paid or spent.
respondents on the property. Respondents also paid
for the transfer of the subject property from Roberto to DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Esperanza and the renovation of the residential house Decision dated June 30, 2011 and Resolution dated
erected on the land. The TCT under the name of September 15, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
Esperanza was surrendered to the respondents. No. 94700 are AFFIRMED.
4 . Respondents demanded from Esparanza and Jazer
the fulfillment of their commitment to transfer the
subject property to the respondents’ names through
the execution of a deed of sale, however, Esperanza
failed to comply.
5 . Respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for
specific performance with damages.
6 . Esperanza and Jazer argued that there was neither a
written or verbal agreement for the transfer of the
disputed property to the respondent’s names, nor a
promise for the repayment of the amounts that were
paid by the respondents.
7 . RTC rendered decision in favor of respondents and
ruled that the money paid by the respondents for
Esperanza’s arrears could not have been given,
gratuitously, but was intended as a loan that
demanded a repayment. The RTC further held that
Esperanza and Jazer could not be compelled to
convey the subject property to the respondents. Even
granting that a promise to sell was made by
Esperanza, the same was unenforceable as it was not
reduced into writing.
8 . On appeal, the CA affirmed the rulings of the RTC.
The CA held that to prevent unjust enrichment by
Esperanza, she would refund the payments which the
respondents made to GSIS, the expenses for transfer
of title, and the cost of improvements introduced on
the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to

reimbursement for the payment of petitioner’s obligation.

HELD: Yes.
Taking into account the foregoing rules, the Court adopts the
RTC’s and CA’s finding that between Esperanza and the
Victor YAM and Yek Sun Lent v CA and ManPhil
Investment
Facts:
1. May 10, 1979, parties entered into a Loan Agreement with
Assumption of Solidary Liability whereby petitioners were
given a loan of 500,000PHP from private respondent:
 12% annual interest; 2% monthly penalty; 1 ½%
monthly service charge; and 10% attorney’s fees;
 Denominated – first Industrial Guarantee and Loan
Fund (IGLF);
 Secured by a chattel mortgage on the printing
machinery in petitioners’ establishment;
2. A second IGLF load worth 300,000PHP was subsequently
obtained by petitioners evidenced by two promissory
notes, dated July 3, 1981 and September 30, 1981. For
this purpose, a new loan agreement was entered into by
the parties containing the same provisions with the first
one, except:
 To the annual interest which was increased to 14%;
and the service charge which was reduced to 1% per
annum.
The deed of chattel mortgage was amended
correspondingly.
3. By April 2, 1985, petitioners paid the first loan of 500k. On
November 4, 1985, private respondent was placed
receivership by the Central Bank and Ricardo Lirio and
Cristina Destajo were appointed as receiver and in-house
examiner, respectively.
4. On May 17, 1986, petitioners paid partial payment of 50k
on the second loan. They wrote to private respondent on
June 18, 1986, proposing to settle the obligation. On July
2, 1986, private respondent counter offered saying it
would reduce the penalty charges up to 140k if petitioners
can pay on or before July 30, 1986.
5. As of July 31, 1986, petitioners’ liability to private
respondent was 727,001.35, broken down as follows:
Prinicpal P 295,496.47
Interest 165.385.00
Penalties 254,820.55
Service Charges 11,326.33
TOTAL P 717,001.35
On same date, petitioners paid 410,853.47 by means of a
Pilipans Bank check. Corresponding voucher was notated
“full payment of IGLF LOAN”.
6. The amount of 410,853 was the sum of principal and
interest less the partial payment of 50k. The private
respondent sent two demand letters seeking payment of
the 266,146.88 balance but petitioners made no response.
7. Hence, private respondents filed suit for collection of sum
of money.
8. Petitioners’ Answer claimed that they had fully paid their
obligation. They contended that sometime after receiving
the July 2 counteroffer, petitioners met with Carlos
Sobrepeñas, president of respondent corporation, who
agreed to waive the penalties and service charges if
petitioners would pay the principal and interest less the
earlier payment of 50k; this was reflected in the voucher
notated “full payment of IGLF LOAN.”
9. RTC favoured private respondent and ordered petitioners
to pay the balance; CA affirmed in toto.
Issue:
W/N petitioners are liable for the payment of the penalties
and service charge.
Held and Ratio:
Yes, they are liable.
 Article 1270(2) of CC provides that express
condonation must comply with the forms of donation.
 Article 748(3) – donation and acceptance of a
movable, the value of which exceeds 5,000.00PHP,
must be made in writing, otherwise, the same shall be
void.
 Article 417(2), obligations, actually referring to credits,
are considered movable property.
 In this case, the alleged agreement to condone
266,146.88 of the second IGLF loan was not reduced
in writing.
 Annotation of “full payment of IGLF loan”:
 Merely states petitioners’ intention in making the
payment, but in no way does it bind private
respondent;
 Though it would be a different matter if the
notation appeared in a receipt issued by
respondent corporation, thru its receiver,
because then it would be an admission against
interest;
 Petitioners should have asked for a certificate of
full payment, as they did in the first IGLF loan
 Contention that it was the Central Bank examiner
assigned to respondent corporation who signed the
voucher in question (so it should be valid as full
payment)
 Examiner said she merely took note of the
amount and the check number indicated therein,
she failed to notice that the amount was being
given in “full payment”;
 Examiner doesn’t have authority to condone any
indebtedness, her duties being limited to issuing
receipt, preparing check vouchers and
documentation;
 Also, the corporation had already been placed under
receivership since November 4, 1985, Sobrepeñas
had no authority to condone any debt since “the
appointment of a receiver operates to suspend the
authority of a [corporation] and of its directors and
officers over its property and effects, such authority
being reposed in the receiver”;
 Petitioners must not feign ignorance since Mrs.
Yam already testified that when sought the
release of the chattel mortgage over their
property, they were told only the CB would
authorize the same because it is the receiver;
 Contention that there were no received two letters –
finding of fact which the lower court found otherwise.

JUDGMENT: CA AFFIRMED
Maglasang vs Cabatingan
Facts
 Conchita Cabatingan executed 5 deeds of conditional
donation in favor of the following persons
o Her brother, Nicolas Cabatingan
o Petitioner Estela Maglasang
o Merly Cabatingan
 Provided in the said donation are the following
o Donation for and in consideration of the love
and affection of the donor to the donee
o Donation to become effective upon the death
of the donor
o That in the event that the donee should die
before the donor, the donation shall be
deemed automatically rescinded and of no
further force and effect
 Conchita Cabatingan then died and her heirs, upon
learning about the existence of the donations, filed
before the RTC an action for Annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of deeds of donation and
accounting
o The heirs allege the following:
 donations were made through
sinister machinations and strategies
and taking advantage of Conchita’s
fragile condition
 the documents are void for failing to
comply with the provisions of the
Civil Code regarding formalities of
wills and testaments considering
that the donations are mortis causa
o Petitioners Maglasang, on the other hand,
contend that
 Conchita freely, knowingly and
voluntarily caused the preparation
of the instruments
 Are donations inter vivos as they
were made in consideration of love
and affection, and not of death
 That the stipulation on rescission in
case they die ahead of Conchita is
a resolutory condition that confirms
the nature of donation inter vivos
 RTC decided in favor of the heirs
o Donations are mortis causa and therefore
null and void for failure to comply with the
requisites of Art. 806 on solemnities of wills
and testaments
Issue: WON the donations are mortis causa (Yes)
Ratio:
 Donation mortis causa
o The right of disposition is not transferred to
the donee while the donor is still alive
o Characteristics
 It conveys no title or ownership to
the transferee before the death of
the transferor; or what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor
should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property
while alive
 That before his death, the transfer
should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved
power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed
 That the transfer should be void if
the transferor should survive the
transferee
 Case at bar, the following are indications of donation
mortis causa
o That the donations do not contain any clear
provision that intends to pass proprietary
rights to Maglasangs prior to Conchita’s
death
o The phrase “to become effective upon the
death of the donor” admits of no other
interpretation but that Cabatingan did not
intend to transfer the ownership of the
properties to Maglasangs during her lifetime
o Maglasangs expressly confirmed the
donations as mortis causa in their
acceptance and attestation clauses
o Expressly provided that the donations shall
be rescinded in case donees predecease
Conchita
 That the donations were made in consideration of
love and affection of the donor do not qualify the
donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis
causa may also be made for the same reason
 In contemplation of death - meaning
o That the full or naked ownership of the
donated properties will pass to the donee
because of the donor’s death
 Form of donation mortis causa
o Should partake of the nature of testamentary
provisions
o Must be executed in accordance with the
requisites on solemnities of wills and
testaments
o Civil Code provisions
 Article 805. Every will, other than a
holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's
name written by some other person
in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of one another.
 The testator or the person
requested by him to write his name
and the instrumental witnesses of
the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page
thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each
page.
The attestation shall state the
number of pages used upon which
the will is written, and the fact that
the testator signed the will and
every page thereof, or caused
some other person to write his
name, under his express direction,
in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and
all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one
another.
If the attestation clause is in a
language not known to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them.
 Article 806. Every will must be
acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall
not be required to retain a copy of
the will, or file another with the
office of the Clerk of Court.
o Case at bar, although the deeds were
acknowledged before a notary public, the
documents were not executed in the manner
required by law. Hence, null and void.
DEL ROSARIO vs. FERRER
G.R. No. 187056
September 20, 2010
Facts:
Spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a
document entitled "Donation Mortis Causa" in favor of their two
children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter,
Jarabini del Rosario covering the spouses’ 126-square meter
lot and the house on it in equal shares. Few months after the
death of Guadalupe, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a
deed of assignment of his rights and interests in subject
property to their daughter Asuncion. He died in June 1972. In
1998 Jarabini filed a petition for the probate of the deed of
donation mortis causa. Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking
his father Leopoldo’s assignment of his rights and interests in
the property to her. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision
finding that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos. On
Asuncion’s appeal to the CA, the latter rendered a decision
reversing that of the RTC. It held that Jarabini cannot, through
her petition for the probate of the deed of donation mortis
causa, collaterally attack Leopoldo’s deed of assignment in
Asuncion’s favor. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s
donation to Asuncion, Emiliano, and Jarabini was a donation
mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a donation inter
vivos.
Ruling:
It was a donation inter vivos. The fact that the document in
question was denominated as a donation mortis causa is not
controlling if a donation by its terms is inter vivos. In Austria-
Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "irrevocability" is
a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances
mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the essence of
the act. In the present case, the donors plainly said that it is
"our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable
and shall be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to
make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the
proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of
the donation. Thus, given that the donation was indeed inter
vivos, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and
interests in the property to Asuncion is void.
Abello v. CIR
G.R. No. 120721
February 23, 2005
Topics: gift not defined in the Tax Code – Civil Code
definition on donation applies; election contributions
are subject to gift tax – they are not exempt even if such
transfers are with intentions, motives or purpose
Facts: During the 1987 national elections, petitioners, who are
partners in the Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz
(ACCRA) law firm, contributed P882,661.31 each to the
campaign funds of Senator Edgardo Angara, then running for
the Senate. BIR assessed each of the petitioners P263,032.66
for their contributions. Petitioners questioned the assessment
to the BIR, claiming that political or electoral contributions are
not considered gifts under the NIRC so they are not liable for
donor’s tax. The claim for exemption was denied by the
Commissioner. The CTA ruled in favor of the petitioners, but
such ruling was overturned by the CA, thus this petition for
review.
Issue: Whether or not electoral contributions are subject to
donor’s tax.
Held: Yes, they are. The NIRC does not define transfer of
property by gift. However, Article 18 of the Civil Code, states:
“In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and
special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the
provisions of this Code.” Thus, reference may be made to the
definition of a donation in the Civil Code. Article 725 of said
Code defines donation as: “. . . an act of liberality whereby a
person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it.”
Donation has the following elements: (a) the reduction of the
patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the
donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus
donandi.
The present case falls squarely within the definition of a
donation. Petitioners each gave P882,661.31 to the campaign
funds of Senator Edgardo Angara, without any material
consideration. All three elements of a donation are present.
The patrimony of the four petitioners were reduced by
P882,661.31 each. Senator Angara’s patrimony
correspondingly increased by P3,530,645.24. There was intent
to do an act of liberality or animus donandi was present since
each of the petitioners gave their contributions without any
consideration. Taken together with the Civil Code definition of
donation, Section 91 of the NIRC is clear and unambiguous,
thereby leaving no room for construction.
Since animus donandi or the intention to do an act of liberality
is an essential element of a donation, petitioners argue that it is
important to look into the intention of the giver to determine if a
political contribution is a gift. Petitioners’ argument is not
tenable. First of all, donative intent is a creature of the mind. It
cannot be perceived except by the material and tangible acts
which manifest its presence. This being the case, donative
intent is presumed present when one gives a part of ones
patrimony to another without consideration. Second, donative
intent is not negated when the person donating has other
intentions, motives or purposes which do not contradict
donative intent. This Court is not convinced that since the
purpose of the contribution was to help elect a candidate, there
was no donative intent. Petitioners’ contribution of money
without any material consideration evinces animus donandi.
Petitioner’s claim that since the purpose of electoral
contributions is to influence the results of the elections,
donative intent is not present. They claim that the purpose of
electoral contributions is brought on by the desire of the giver
to influence the result of an election by supporting candidates
who would influence the shaping of government policies that
would promote the general welfare and economic well-being of
the electorate, including the giver himself. Petitioners attempt
to place the barrier of mutual exclusivity between donative
intent and the purpose of political contributions. This Court
reiterates that donative intent is not negated by the presence of
other intentions, motives or purposes which do not contradict
donative intent. Petitioners’ attempt is strained. The fact that
petitioners will somehow in the future benefit from the election
of the candidate to whom they contribute, in no way amounts
to a valuable material consideration so as to remove political
contributions from the purview of a donation. Senator Angara
was under no obligation to benefit the petitioners. The proper
performance of his duties as a legislator is his obligation as an
elected public servant of the Filipino people and not a
consideration for the political contributions he received. In fact,
as a public servant, he may even be called to enact laws that
are contrary to the interests of his benefactors, for the benefit
of the greater good.