STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION_CHAPTER 6 & 7
[ G.R. No. L-8580, September 30, 1957 ] an employer who is ordered to pay them and necessitate the closure of
EMILIO FLORES, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. VICENTE SAN PEDRO, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.
REYES, A., J.:
This case deals with the prescription of action for the recovery of
overtime compensation under the Eight- Hour Labor Law (Com. Act No.
444).
The petitioners, former employees in respondents' electric and ice
plants in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, filed three suits on May 7, 1954, in the
Court of First Instance of that province to recover compensation for
overtime work alleged to have been rendered by them during the
period of their employment, the aggregate sum claimed, including
damages, interests and attorney's fees, being P152,473.34. The
defendants, now respondents herein, moved for the dismissal of the
suits on the ground of prescription, invoking the three-year prescriptive
period provided for in the Minimum Wage Law (Rep. Act No. 602) in
default of a prescriptive period for actions under the Eight-Hour Labor
Law. Upholding defendants theory that claims for overtime
compensation prescribe in three years, the lower court ordered the
complaints amended "so as to include only the claims for overtime
payments due to plaintiffs within three years before the filing of said
complaints and which accrued after May 7,1951." Reconsideration of
the order having been denied, plaintiffs brought "the present petition
for certiorari to have the said order annulled as violative of their vested
rights and rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents in
their answer question the propriety of the remedy, but they did not
press that point in their memorandum, and, with the petition already
given due course to clear up a disputed point of law, the same may well
be decided on the merits.
It is settled that the right to extra compensation for overtime work
cannot be validly waived and that the action for its recovery is not
barred by laches or estoppel. (Detective & Protective Bureau, Inc. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. L-4337, December 29,
1951; Manila Terminal Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., 43 Off.
Gaz., 2725.) But this does not necessarily mean that such action is
imprescriptible, for the principles underlying prescription on the one
hand and laches and estoppel on the other are not exactly the same.
Moreover, as this Court said in the case of Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc.
vs. Luzon Marine Department et al., G. R. No. L-9265, April 29, 1957,
"there may be cases in which the silence of the employee or laborer
who lets the time go by for quite a long period without claiming or
asserting his right to overtime compensation may favor the inference
that he has not worked any such overtime or that his extra work has
been duly compensated," And Congress, by the enactment of the law
for the recovery of overtime compensation could not have intended
that an employee might, before bringing his action, wait until the
passing of time had destroyed all the documentary evidence and the
memory of witnesses had faded or become dim (157 A. L. R. 548), for
that would render the action practically indefensible and might cause
such great accumulation of unpaid overtime wages as would bankrupt
Standard Act of the United States are regarded by most courts there as
his business to the detriment of the employees themselves.
A similar situation has confronted the courts of the United States under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of that country, which contains no
provision limiting the time for commencing actions thereunder. The
courts there hold that the right to overtime compensation under that
Act may neither be waived nor its enforcement defeated on the ground
of estoppel (56 C. J. S. 736-739); but they are also unanimous in the
opinion that actions for the recovery of such compensation are subject
to the state statutes of limitations. (56 C. J. S. 776; 157 A. L. R. 545-5A-
6.) Considering that our labor laws are patterned after those of the
United States, the ruling of the courts there is entitled to great weight.
The next question to determine is what period of prescription to apply
where the law itself, i. e., the Eight-Hour Labor Law, has not fixed the
period.
The court below ruled that the three-year period prescribed in the
Minimum Wage Law for enforcing a cause of action arising thereunder
should also apply to actions for enforcing the Eight-Hour Labor Law
since the latter law did not provide for a prescriptive period of its own.
(It should here be explained that on June 22, 1957 an amendment was
approved — Rep. Act No. 1993 — providing for such a period but with
the proviso that the same shall not affect actions already commenced.)
The ruling below cannot be upheld. The prescriptive period provided
for in the Minimum Wage Law (section 17, Rep. Act No. 602)
specifically refers to the enforcement of any cause of action under that
Act and its application cannot be extended to causes of action arising
under the Eight-Hour Labor Law on the theory propounded by the
lower court that the two laws are in pari materia, because in point of
fact they are not. Both, it is true, relate to labor. But they are distinct
and separate measures. One treats of minimum daily wages with no
provision for compensation for overtime work; the other deals with the
length of a working day in terms of hours with express provision for
compensation for service rendered beyond the required hours of work.
Also, the penalties prescribed in one are different from those in the
other. Moreover, the rule of pari materia is resorted to only as an aid to
statutory construction. We do not think its application should be
widened to the extent of supplying a deficiency of a prescriptive period
in one statute with a prescriptive period provided for in another.
On the other hand, the rule is that the general law shall supply
deficiencies in special laws. (Art, 16, old Civil Code; Leyte A. & M. Oil
Co. vs. Block, Johnston & Greenbaum, 52 Phil. 429; see also art. 18,
new Civil Code*) In the absence, therefore, of any prescriptive period in
the Eight-Hour Labor Law, the statute of limitations provided for in the
general law—in this case Act No. 190 (the old Code of Civil Procedure)
or the new Civil Code—applies.
On the theory that the laws in force at the time a contract is entered
into, in so far as applicable form part of the contract, actions for
recovery of wages or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor
actions upon contract. We find this view reasonable, and there being
no dispute that the contracts of employment in the present case were
oral, we have to hold that the period of prescription applicable to
petitioners actions in the lower court was, both under Act 190 and the
new Civil Code, six years. (Sec. 43, par. 2, Act 190; art. 1145, new Civil
Code.) That period should be counted — since there is no special
provision which ordains otherwise — from the day petitioners actions
could have been brought* (Art. 1969, old Civil Code; art. 1150 of the
new.) And such actions could have been brought at the end of each
regular pay period when payment of overtime compensation became
due.
In view of the foregoing, the order complained of is modified in the
sense that the petitioners1 complaints shall be amended to include
only those portions of petitioners claims for overtime payment as are
within the period of six years counted from the accrual of their
respective causes of action.
Vda de Urbano v GSIS (2001)
Facts
In 1971, petitioners mortgaged their 200 sqm property in Q.C. to Gsis
to secure a housing loan. Since they were unable to pay the loan, GSIS
foreclosed the mortgage in 1988. GSIS bid 154k on the property and
emerged as the highest bidder.
In 1984, the petitioners tried to reclaim their property. They wrote to
the GSIS Acquired Assets Department signifying their intent to reclaim.
On October 16, GSIS told them to pay the redemption price of 154k in
full before Nov 18, 1984.
The petitioners asked for more time to recover the property while the
Acquired Assets Dpeartment subsequently told them to pay 174k in
cash with an extension of 30 days to the November date. Failure to do
so forfeited the reclamation of the property and sold in a public
bidding.
The petitioners wrote again requesting for remortgage through
repurchase of the property. The Gsis AAD declined.
The petitioners wrote to the Board for an approval to file a loan worth
240,000 with the GSIS real estate department to repurchase their
foreclosed property. Despite attempts from Vice Governor Mathay to
adjust to a more liberal arrangement for the petitioners, the the
petitioners were unable to pay. GSIS then issued a TCT in its favor.
The respondent De La Cruz entered the picture and offered to purchase
the property for 250,000 spot cash. Without knowledge of the rival
offer, the petitioners then offered a 50,000 downpayment with the
124k balance to be paid in 5 years. He also enclosed 10k in check as
earnest money. The Board informed them that it had adopted reolution
881 that declined their offer to repurchase.
1
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION_CHAPTER 6 & 7
At the same time, GSIS negotiated with Dela Cruz for the purchase of
the property. They accepted her offer of purchase. A new TCT was
issued to her.
The petitioners, on the other hand, had their loan request rescinded
because a certificate of award or sale was not issued in favor of the
applicant. Moreover, the applicant, Urbano the petitioner, was 81 years
old and no longer a member of the GSIS. It wasn’t given due
consideration.
Having learned about the transaction with dela Cruz, the petitioners
requested the formal investigation with the GSIS regarding the sale.
Not satisfied, they filed a case with the RTC of QC branch 102.
The petition was dismissed. The same view was upheld by the court of
appeals.
Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Do petitioners have a right to repurchase the subject property?
2. Does GSIS have a duty to dispose of the subject property through
public bidding?
3. Was Gsis in bad faith in dealing with petitioners?
Ruling: Petition Dismissed
Ratio:
1. No
Charter of the GSIS was PD 1146 which stipulated the power of the
GSIS to acquire, utilize, and dispose of real or personal properties in the
Philippines or elsewhere. It was amended by PD 1981 which gave the
GSIS the power to compromise or release any claim or settled liability
to the system.
SC- The laws granted the GSIS Board the power to exercise discretion in
determining the terms and condition of financial accommodations to
its members with the dual purpose of making the GSIS more responsive
to the needs of GSIS members. The laws also stipulated that the Board
could exercise discretion on whether to accept or reject petitioner’s
offer to repurchase the subject property taking into account the dual
purpose enunciated in the whereas clause of PD 1981 which made the
GSIS more responsive to the needs of its members.
With regard to the Board’s exercise of discretion, in Natino v IAC, the
Court also held that repurchase of foreclosed property after
redemption period imposes no such obligation on the purchaser (the
board in this case) to re-sell the property since the property belongs to
him (the board as well)
The board’s denial of petitioner’s request to purchase the subject
property was not based on whim but on a factual assessment of the
financial capacity of the petitioners to make good their repeated offers
to purchase the subject property. Based on the circumstances, the
petitioners were repeatedly unable to fulfill their obligations to pay. In
the comments of the AAD manager, the observationn was that the
petitioners lacked the capacity to pay up.
The petitioners are not entitled to a request for repurchase as a matter
of right. The Board exercised its discretion in accordance with law in
denying their requests and the GSIS can’t be faulted for their failure to
repurchase as it acted under the petitioner’s application under
Operation Pabahay. The sale to respondent can’t be annulled on such
invoked “right”.
2. No. The agreement with de la Cruz was valid.
Pets.- aver that Sec. 79 of PD 1445 and the COA Circular 86-264
mandated the GSIS to dispose of the assets through public bidding and
only upon its failure, through a public sale.
GSIS contended that SEC 79 of PD 1445 did not apply because it
covered unserviceable govt property and not acquired assets.
SC- Gsis was right. Why? The provision (SEC 79) applies only to
unserviceable govt property or those no longer needed. The house was
obviously not unserviceable. And it was still used by petitioners.
With regard to COA Circular 86-264 or the “General guidelines on the
divestment or disposal of assets of government owned corporations”
the law stipulated that it availed of an exception to the requirement
of disposition through public bidding and such exception applied to
sales of merchandise held for sale in the regular course of business.
The Court read it in relation to Coa circular 89-296 which provided for
“Audit Guidelines on the Disposal of Property and other Assets of
Government Agencies”, which also did not apply the public bidding
disposal requirement to merchandise or inventory held for sale in the
regular course of business nor to the disposal by gov’t financial
institutions of foreclosed assets or collaterals acquired in the regular
course of business and not transferred to the Govt under proclamation
no 50.
The modes of disposal included Public auction and sale thru
negotiation.
Doctrine: With regard to these 2 laws, the Court held the question
whether the subject property was covered by the said Circular or falls
under its exception. It held that 89-296 was to be interpreted with 86-
264 in adherence with stat con wherein statutes that relate to the
same thing ought to be taken in consideration in construing any one
of them, and it is an established rule of law that all acts in pari
material are to be taken together as if they were one law.
Moreover, the court looked into the intent of both laws and held that
these were used to generate more revenue for GOCC’S through the
disposition of its non-preforming assets. (Look into PD 50 or the asset
privatization trust in the case) According to the court, the policy intent
on the disposition of acquired assets then governed the case at bar.
Was the property covered by the public bidding exceptions in these
laws? The court said yes, which meant that their sale negotiation fell
under the regular course of business, and thus did not offend the
requirements of the said coa circulars.
3. No.
GSIS denial of petitioners’ further requests for repurchase of subject
property was based on a factual determination of the petitioners’
financial capacity and the GSIS charter, PD 1146. Also, GSIS sold the
property to dela Cruz only after giving them one year to repurchase.
The petitioners, on the strength of the Valmonte case, can’t also impute
bad faith on GSIS when it was secretly negotiating with Dela Cruz. In
the Valmonte case, the court held that the constitutional right to
information was limited to matters of public concern to transactions
involving public interest.The sale of the property was not imbued by
public interests as it was a purely private transaction. Pets. Can’t
demand to be informed of such public negotiation since they had no
interest on the subject property since they failed to comply with the
GSIS terms of repurchase and the denial to repurchase under the GSIS
terms.
C and C Commercial vs NAWASA
Facts:
The main issue in this appeal is, whether or not the call for bids for the
supply of steel and centrifugal cast iron pipes for the waterworks
projects in Manila and suburbs, and in the cities of Davao and Iloilo, the
National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) violated the
provisions of Republic Act 912, section 1.
There is contention on the interpretation of the word "practicable" as
used in Republic Act No. 912, i.e., whether it means that the cheapest
materials among the locally produced or manufactured products
should be preferred and specified in construction and repair works
undertaken by the Government.
C and C Commercial filed a complaint alleging that NAWASA violated RA
912 and law on public bidding when it excluded them and started
negotiating for the purchase of centrifugally cast iron pipes to Filipino
Pipe Foundry Corp. They alleged that they can supply instead asbestos
cement pressure pipes which are available, practicable and usable,
and will serve the purpose of the said project at a much lower cost. It
was dismissed.
C and C Commercial filed a supplemental complaint when NAWASA
called for bids for the supply of 24-inch steel pipes, asbestos, cement
pressure pipes, and cast iron pipes. They allege that in specifying steel
pipes for the project, which is admittedly imported material, without
giving preference to locally produced asbestos cement pressure pipes
manufactured by the plaintiff, violates the provisions of Republic Act
912.
2
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION_CHAPTER 6 & 7
In the bidding for Ilo-ilo Waterworks System, a bid was called for the
supply of 18-inch steel pipes, wherein C and C Commercial lost to Regal
Trading Corporation. It then filed a (2 nd) supplemental Complaint
alleging that NAWASA should use Philippine-made materials which are
available, practicable and usable. They seek to restrain NAWASA from
formalizing the award of the bidders.
When NAWASA advertised for bids for the supply of 30 to 42-inch steel
pipes for the use and improvement of the interim waterworks project
in the City of Manila and suburbs. C and C Commercial filed a (3 rd)
Supplemental Complaint alleging the same, then an injunction was
ordered and restrained NAWASA from holding the bid.
The lower court took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor of C and
C Commercial with additional costs. NAWASA appealed to the higher
court alleging that RA 912 only applies to those works undertaken by
the government and that they are not included in the term
“government” as used in the RA. Although it is a public corporation, It
is not a municipal corporation or agency of the State empowered to
regulate or administer the local affairs of a town or city.
Issue:
Whether or not the term government as used in the RA 912 includes
NAWASA, a public corporation?
Held:
1. A comparative analysis of Republic Act 912 and
Commonwealth Act 138, otherwise known as the "Flag Law" the latter
"An Act to give Native Products and Domestic Entities the Preference in
the Purchase of Articles for the Government", and the former "An Act
to Require the Use, Under Certain Conditions, of Philippine Made
Materials or Products in Government Projects or Public Works
Construction, Whether Done Directly by the Government or Awarded
thru Contracts", discloses that both relate to the same subject matter
and have the same nationalistic purpose or object: to give preference
to locally produced materials in purchases, works or projects of the
Government
2. It is clear that Commonwealth Act 138 also ordains that the
Purchase and Equipment Division of government-owned companies
authorized to purchase or contract for materials and supplies for public
use, buildings, or public works, shall give preference to locally produced
materials or products. Being statutes in pari materia they should be
construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national
policy. On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a
provision it has in mind the previous statutes relating to the same
subject matter, it is held that in the absence of any express repeal or
amendment therein, the new provision was enacted in accord with the
legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes, and they all should
be construed together. NAWASA therefore is included in the term
“government”.
The decision of the lower court was null and void since C and C
Commercial fall short of the standards needed by NAWASA, having in
its disposal asbestos cement pipes that are not beyond 12-inches.
Sec. 1. In construction or repair work undertaken by the Government,
whether done directly or through contract awards, Philippine made
materials and products, whenever available, practicable and usable,
and will serve the purpose as equally well as foreign made products or
materials, shall be used in said construction or repair work, upon the
proper certification of the availability, practicability, usability and
durability of said materials or products by the Director of the Bureau of
Public Works and/or his assistants
G.R. Nos. 124303-05. February 10, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs ALEJANDRO ATOP
@ ALI, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The trial court sentenced the appellant to death, holding that his
common-law relationship with the victims grandmother aggravated the
penalty. We hold, however, that Sec. 11 of RA 7659 prescribes the
capital penalty in rape, only when the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, and not
by reason of any other kinship. On the other hand, relationship as an
alternative aggravating circumstance under Art. 15 of the Revised Penal
Code encompasses only the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate,
natural or adopted brother or sister, and relative by affinity in the same
degrees. Outside these enumerations and consistent with the doctrine
that criminal laws must be liberally construed in favor of the accused,
no other relationship, kinship or association between the offender and
the victim may aggravate the imposable penalty for the crime
committed. The fact, then, that the offended party is the
granddaughter or descendant of appellants live-in partner cannot
justify the imposition of death upon the rapist.
The Case
This is a combined appeal from, and an automatic review of, the
Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, of Ormoc City,
finding Appellant Alejandro Atop, alias Ali, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of three (3) counts of rape and sentencing him to two (2) terms
of reclusion perpetua for the first two counts, and to death for the
third.
On April 21, 1995, Provincial Prosecutor I Rosario D. Beleta filed
four separate informations against accused-appellant charging him with
rape on three separate occasions -- on October 9, 1992, sometime in
1993 and on December 26, 1994 -- as well as with attempted rape on
December 31, 1994. The informations charging rape, except for the
date of commission and the age of the victim, similarly allege the
following:
That on or about the 9th day of October, 1992, at Sitio Tambunan,
Brgy. Sta. Rosa, Municipality of Matag-ob, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there wilfully [sic], unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the herein offended party REGINA GUAFIN, 11 years
old, the accused is the live-in partner of her grandmother with whom
she is living with [sic], against her will and without her consent, with
the use of a knife, mashed her breast, embraced, kissed and inserted
his penis over the victims genital organ to accomplish his lewd design,
to her damage and prejudice.
During his arraignment, appellant, assisted by Counsel de
Oficio Wenceslao Vanilla of the Public Attorneys Office, pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, the cases were tried jointly. In his Decision, the trial
judge disposed of the cases as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 4627-0 finding the accused
Alejandro Atop GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of RAPE
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. Appreciating the aggravating circumstances of
relationship and nighttime with no mitigating circumstance to
offset any of the two, this court imposes upon the said
ALEJANDRO ATOP the sentence of RECLUSION PERPETUA and
to indemnify Regina Guafin the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P30,000.00) and to pay the costs.
2. In Criminal Case No. 4628-0 finding the accused
Alejandro Atop GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of RAPE
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. Appreciating the aggravating circumstances of
relationship and nighttime with no mitigating circumstance to
offset any of the two, this court imposes upon the said
ALEJANDRO ATOP the sentence of RECLUSION PERPETUA and
to indemnify Regina Guafin the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P30,000.00) and to pay the costs.
3. In Criminal Case No. 4630-0 finding the accused
Alejandro Atop NOT GUILTY for insufficiency of evidence.
4. In Criminal Case No. 4629-0 finding the accused
ALEJANDRO ATOP guilty beyond reasonable doubt of RAPE
defined under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7659. Appreciating the aggravating
circumstances of relationship and nighttime with no mitigating
circumstance to offset any of the two, this court imposes upon
the said ALEJANDRO ATOP, also known as Ali, the sentence of
DEATH. Further, the same Alejandro Atop is directed to
indemnify Regina Guafin the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00) as moral damages and to pay the costs.
By reason of the imposition of two reclusion perpetua
and of the death penalties the jail warden is directed to
3
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION_CHAPTER 6 & 7
immediately commit the person of Alejandro Atop to the
National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila while
awaiting the review by the Supreme Court of this decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecutions evidence is narrated by the trial court as follows:
Private complainant Regina Guafin, told the court that she is a
granddaughter of Trinidad Mejos and that the accused Alejandro
Atop is the common law husband of said Trinidad Atop [sic]. Her
mother is a daughter of said Trinidad Atop [sic] and lives in
Pangasinan. She is an illegitimate child and she does not even
know her father. Since her early childhood she stayed with her
grandmother Trinidad Atop [sic] and the accused at Barangay Santa
Rosa, Matag-ob, Leyte. Sometime in 1991 when she was already 10
years of age the accused started having lustful desire on her. The
accused then inserted his finger into her vagina. She told her
grandmother about this but her grandmother did not believe her.
She was then told by her grandmother, Trinidad Mejos, that what
her grandfather did to her was just a manifestation of fatherly
concern. She continued staying with her grandmother and her
common law husband Alejandro Atop, the herein accused.
On October 9, 1992, she was called by the accused Alejandro Atop
to do something for him. When she approached him the accused
rushed towards her, removed her panty and inserted his male
organ into her vagina. She was not able to do anything to resist him
because the accused gagged her mouth and was carrying a knife
with him. She was then 12 years old when the first rape was
committed to her and at that time her grandmother was then
attending a delivery since her grandmother was a hilot. When her
grandmother returned home she told her what the accused did to
her but her grandmother, again, refused to believe her. She also
remember [sic] of another incident wherein she was raped again
by the accused Alejandro Atop. It was in the year 1993 but she
could not recall the month when it was committed. Only she and
the accused were then at their house at Barangay Santa Rosa,
Matag-ob, Leyte as her grandmother was at San Vicente attending
to a delivery. Again, she told her grandmother about the heinous
acts that the accused did to her but her Lola refused to believe her.
On December 26, 1994, the accused again raped her. She could not
ask for help because her mouth was gagged by the accused. Aside
from gagging her, the accused also carried a knife which he placed
at his side.
On December 31, 1994, while she together with her Aunt Gloria
Montealto and her two (2) nieces Rubilen and Jubilen Atop were
about to go to sleep, she noticed that the accused was looking for
her. Upon seeing her the accused rushed towards her and was
about to lay on top of her. She kicked him. After that, the accused
caressed and touched his nieces but his nieces also kicked him.
Thereafter, the accused stopped molesting her and his nieces and
went to sleep instead. In the following morning, January 1, 1995,
she went to the barrio to go to school. She then forgot that there
were no classes. She was not able to get a ride towards the school,
so she went directly to the house of her grandfather Zacarias Geva.
While she was at the house of her Lolo Geva, the accused arrived
and immediately entered the house of her grandfather. The
accused was met by Rubilen Atop who was about to box him but
they immediately went out of the house and the accused followed
them. The accused wanted to bring her back to their house but she
refused. So, the accused pulled her. The accused kept on holding
her until they reached the waiting shed were the accused smashed
her to the concrete wall.
She reported the incidents of rape that happened in 1992, 1993
and 1994 only in January 1995. It took her so long to report the
said incidents because she was afraid. The accused threatened to
kill her should she tell anybody about the incidents. She was
accompanied by her Aunts Fe Decio and Rosenda Andales in
reporting the said incidents to the police. Her statement was taken
by the police at the police headquarters. Thereafter, she filed a
complaint with the Municipal Trial Judge of Matag-ob, Leyte. x x x
In her sworn statement which was also marked as Exhibit 1 for the
defense, she only stated therein that what was inserted into her
vagina on July 1991 was only the finger of the accused. Out of fear,
she deliberately concealed from the investigator what actually had
happened to her because at that time, because the accused was
not yet apprehended and she was afraid that the accused would
kill her. Then she filed complaints with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor and requested the fiscal to make a re-investigation in
these cases. She told the Fiscal the truth of what was done to her
by the accused because at that time the accused was already
arrested. x x x
Another prosecution witness Fe Decio, an aunt of the private
offended party Regina Guafin, testified that she knows the accused
Alejandro Atop, the latter being her stepfather. She pointed in
court the said accused. She testified also that when her niece
Regina Guafin went to her residence at Himarco, Palompon, Leyte
on January 2, 1995, she noticed that Regina Guafin had abrasions
on her body and was then crying. She asked her the reason why
she cried and Regina told her that on January 1, 1995 the accused
again tried to rape her but did not succeed because she fought
back and was able to resist. The abrasions in her body was the
result of the maltreatments made by the accused who forcibly
pulled her back to their house. Further, Regina told her that the
said accused Alejandro Atop had raped her 3 to 4 times. She was
told by Regina when the said incidents happened but she forgot
the actual dates that the latter told to her. She accompanied
Regina to the police authorities of Matag-ob, Leyte and reported
the said incidents. During the time that Regina was investigated by
the police authorities, the accused had also fled. Thereafter, she
submitted Regina for a medical examination at the Ormoc District
Hospital. Then, Regina Guafin filed a complaint at the MCTC of
Matag-ob, Leyte.
On cross examination, she testified that they offer no objection
with the relationship of the accused to her mother. In fact during
the time that the accused and her mother were living together,
they were in good terms with the accused. She denied the fact of
sending her mother to Manila for the purpose of separating her
from the accused Alejandro Atop because it was only the decision
of her mother to have a vacation in Manila. She testified also that
the age of her mother is more than 50 years old.
The third prosecution witness, Dr. Judith V. Lomocso who was a
resident gynecologist at the Ormoc District Hospital, testified that she
examined Regina Guafin. Her findings were reduced in writing, as
follows:
External Findings:
1. Incised wound with scab formation (L) middle finger.
2. Tenderness (L) breast.
OB-Gyne Findings:
External genetalia [sic] - grossly normal
- negative pubic hair
Vaginal canal - admits 2 fingers with ease
hymen - healed laceration
uterus - small
LMP - December 4, 1994
Version of the Defense
Appellant denied the accusations of Guafin and imputed ill motive
upon her aunts, who were the daughters of his live-in partner. The
trial court summed up his testimony this wise:
Accused Alejandro Atop [then 37 years old] testified that he and
Trinidad Mejos had been living together as husband and wife for
about 10 years already. When they started living together, Trinidad
Mejos was already a widow with eight (8) children of her previous
marriage. When he started to live with Trinidad Mejos the latters
children became mad at him because their mother was already old
and he was still young. He personally knew Regina Guafin, the latter
being their adopted child. Regina Guafin was still 2 years old when he
and his wife took care of her. That Regina Guafin continuously resided
at Sta. Rosa, Matag-ob, Leyte. The other persons who also lived with
them aside from Regina Guafin, were the three sons of Trinidad and
his two (2) nieces whom he took from Butuan City and sent them to
school. He denied committing rape against Regina Guafin on October
9, 1992, in the year 1993 and on December 26, 1994. On December
31, 1994, while he was at his house, Regina went to the barrio proper
to go to school. In the afternoon of the same date, he went to fetch
Regina Guafin because at that time classes were not regular yet. At
that time, the companions of Regina were Jovelyn and Rubilyn. He
also denied committing an offense against Regina Guafin on
4
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION_CHAPTER 6 & 7
December 31, 1994. He testified also that he did not evade arrest by
going out of Matag-ob, Leyte because during that time he was
working in Hideco as a laborer. The reason why Regina Guafin filed a
case against him because the said private complainant was coached
by her aunt who wanted him and his wife Trinidad to be separated.
On cross examination, he testified also that he was told by his cousin
Nicolas Valencia that her [sic] wife Trinidad was prevented by her
children from visiting him in jail upon her arrival from Manila.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The court a quo evaluated the testimony of the offended party in this
manner:
x x x this court observed both the complainant and the accused when
both were on the witness stand. The tears that spontaneously flowed
from the private complainants eyes and the sobs that punctuated
complainants testimony when asked about her experience with the
accused eloquently conveyed the hurt, the pain, and the anguish the
private complainant has suffered and lived with during all the years.
When she told the court that she was raped by the accused she said it
all with candor. The mixed expression of sadness and anger shown in
the private complainants face during her testimony convinced this
court that she was telling the truth. This court then found nothing in
the evidence which would indicate in any way that the said Regina
Guafin was motivated in narrating to the court her ordeal other than
her quest for justice. The defenses claim that Regina was coached by
her aunts to fabricate her rape story in order to force their mother
Trinidad Mejos to separate from the accused is nothing but a mere
speculation [upon] which this court found no probative value. This
court then gives the testimony of the private offended party full faith
and credit.
The trial court also ruled that the circumstances of nighttime and
relationship aggravated all the three incidents of rape, but that there
was no sufficient evidence proving attempted rape on December 31,
1994. Considering that the last rape occurred after the effectivity of
RA 7659, the death penalty law, the court meted out the capital
punishment to accused-appellant.
Issues
In his appeal before us, appellant assigns the following errors:
I. The trial court erred in appreciating the circumstances of
nighttime and relationship as aggravating the penalty imposable for
the rape allegedly committed on October 9, 1992, in 1993 and on
December 26, 1994.
II. The trial court erred in finding accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. We find that the alleged aggravating
circumstances were not duly proved.
First Issue: Nighttime and Relationship
The time-settled rule is that nocturnity, as an aggravating
circumstance, must have been deliberately sought by the offender to
facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade his capture or
facilitate his escape. The culprit must have purposely taken advantage
of the cover of night as an indispensable factor to attain his criminal
purpose.
We find merit in Appellant Atops contention, to which the solicitor
general agrees, that the prosecution failed to prove that nighttime
was deliberately sought by appellant to facilitate his dastardly acts. In
fact, the prosecution failed to show that appellant consummated his
carnal designs at night, except only for the December 26, 1994
incident which the victim said occurred at 11:00 p.m. Much less is
there any evidence substantiating the trial courts conclusion that
appellant intentionally sought the darkness to advance his criminal
exploits.
Neither can we appreciate relationship as an aggravating
circumstance. The scope of relationship as defined by law
encompasses (1) the spouse, (2) an ascendant, (3) a descendant, (4) a
legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or (5) a relative by
affinity in the same degree. Relationship by affinity refers to a relation
by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity
therefore are those commonly referred to as in-laws, or stepfather,
stepmother, stepchild and the like; in contrast to relatives by
consanguinity or blood relatives encompassed under the second,
third and fourth enumeration above. The law cannot be stretched to
include persons attached by common-law relations. Here, there is no
blood relationship or legal bond that links the appellant to his victim.
Thus, the modifying circumstance of relationship cannot be
considered against him.
Neither is the following provision of Sec. 11, RA 7659 applicable:
Sec. 11. Article 335 of the [Revised Penal] Code is hereby amended to
read as follows:
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common
law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
Undisputed is the fact that appellant is not the common law
spouse of the parent of the victim. He is the common law husband of
the girls grandmother. Needless to state, neither is appellant the
victims parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree. Hence, he is not
encompassed in any of the relationships expressly enumerated in the
aforecited provision.
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are
to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. i Courts must not bring
cases within the provision of a law which are not clearly embraced by
it. No act can be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by
statute; so, too, no person who is not clearly within the terms of a
statute can be brought within them. Any reasonable doubt must be
resolved in favor of the accused.
Second Issue: Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
However, we do not agree with the claim of appellant that the
prosecution evidence was not sufficient to prove his guilt. In the main,
appellant relies on the disparity between, on the one hand, the
allegations of Regina in her sworn statement executed before MCTC
Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez Jr. of Matag-ob, Leyte which merely prove
acts of lasciviousness; and, on the other, her testimony in court
showing three counts of rape.
Such disparity, which at first glance may raise some doubts on
the truthfulness of complainants statements, was cogently and
satisfactorily explained by her thus:
Q x x x why did you state in your affidavit that only the finger
that [sic] was inserted into your vagina?
A Because during the time of the investigation, I did not tell
what was really true because he was not yet apprehended,
sir.
Q So, you deliberately conceal[ed] from the investigator what
actually happened out of fear?
A Yes, your Honor.
CONTINUE PROSECUTOR
Q And when you appeared before the Office of the Provl.
Fiscal, were you investigated?
A Yes, maam.
Q And did you tell the Fiscal the truth of what had this accused
done to you?
A Yes, maam.
Q And what was that statement you have given to the Fiscal?
A I told the Fiscal the truth because the accused was already
arrested.
Q And what was the truth?
A The truth that it was his penis that was inserted to my
vagina.
Q How many times did the accused inserted [sic] his penis into
your vagina?
A Many times maam but I can remember only three (3) to four
(4) times.
Q And the first time that [sic] was on October 9, 1992?
A Yes, maam.
Q When was the second time he inserted his penis into your
vagina?
5
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION_CHAPTER 6 & 7
A In the year 1993.
Q And the third time?
A On December 26, 1994.
From the testimony of Regina, the crimes evidently committed
by appellant on the aforestated dates were consummated rapes, not
merely acts of lasciviousness. Initially, she hesitated to completely
divulge her ravishment by appellant because of his threats to kill her
should she tell anybody of his assaults. With his arrest and detention,
she mustered the courage to finally and completely reveal her
embarrassing story.
No simple barrio lass would so candidly admit before the public
that a man who had lived as common-law husband to her grandmother
had inserted his penis in her vagina for so many times in the past. It is
unthinkable that complainant, a young lady of fifteen years, would
allow her private parts to be examined and would withstand the rigors
of a public trial -- along with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of
exposing her own mortifying defilement -- if she was not in fact
ravished. A careful examination of her testimony does not reveal any
hint of prevarication. Rather, her straightforward and unequivocal
statements, during both her direct and her cross-examinations, show
indelible badges of truth. As the trial judge keenly observed, The tears
that spontaneously flowed from the private complainants eyes and the
sobs that punctuated [her] testimony when asked about her experience
with the accused eloquently conveyed the hurt, the pain, and the
anguish the private complainant has suffered and lived with during all
the years. When she told the court that she was raped by the accused,
she said it all with candor. The mixed expression of sadness and anger
shown in the private complainants face during her testimony convinced
this court that she was telling the truth. We find it apt to say once again
that when a woman, especially a minor, says that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the crime was
committed.
Appellants contention that private complainant was merely
induced by her aunts who had objected to his relationship with their
mother, Trinidad Mejos, is a trite defense that is completely
undeserving of credit. It is unnatural and unbelievable for Reginas
aunts to concoct a story of rape of their own very young niece, that
would bring shame and scandal not only to her but to the entire family,
especially to their mother. There could have been so many ways to
alienate appellant from their mother, so many crimes to impute to him
without dragging the familys honor into it. The preposterousness of
appellants assertion becomes more obvious in light of the fact that this
case was instituted only after ten (10) years of his illegitimate union
with Reginas grandmother. If Reginas aunts truly wanted them to
discontinue such relationship, the long wait is inexplicable.
Consequently, in the face of private complainants positive and
unequivocal testimony, appellants plain denial of the accusations
against him cannot prevail. It is well-settled that denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative self-
serving assertion which deserves no weight in law. The recognized rule expression of sadness, pain and anger.
is that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature are
each worthy of full credence. WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION that Appellant Alejandro Atop shall not suffer
Time and again, we have also held that when the question deals the penalty of death but shall SERVE three (3) terms of reclusion
with the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, the trial courts perpetua, one for each of the three (3) counts of rape for which he was
observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often found GUILTY by the trial court, and is ordered to PAY Regina Guafin
accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or indemnity in the amount of P150,000 plus moral damages of P50,000.
circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, SO ORDERED.
misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered,
would alter the results of the case. The trial judge has the valuable
edge of observing the witness deportment and manner of testifying,
her furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or
sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an
oath-- all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a
witness honesty and sincerity. After a thorough review of all the
evidence on record, the Court finds no reason to reverse the trial courts
findings on the guilt of appellant.
Penalties Imposable
For the rape incidents on October 9, 1992 and sometime in
1993, the court a quo correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each of the two criminal acts. The third rape incident,
however, occurred after the effectivity of RA 7659, the law which
imposed the death penalty on certain heinous crimes. Under this
amendatory law, the penalty for rape committed with the use of a
deadly weapon is reclusion perpetua to death. This provision is
applicable in the instant case, since private complainant was
threatened with a knife when appellant consummated his beastly acts
on her.
In cases where the penalty prescribed is composed of two
indivisible penalties and there is neither an aggravating nor a mitigating
circumstance in the commission of the felony, the lesser penalty should
be applied. Since there was no modifying circumstance even in the
third rape, the penalty therefor should be reclusion perpetua, not the
graver penalty of death as imposed by the court a quo. As earlier
explained, the attendant relationships enumerated under Sec. 11 of RA
7659 do not apply either.
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we increase the civil
indemnity imposed upon appellant by the trial court to P50,000 for
each count of rape. The Court notes that, for appellants third
conviction, the trial court ordered him to indemnify the victim in the
amount of P30,000 as moral damages. Civil indemnity under Art. 100 of
the Revised Penal Code is separate and distinct from moral damages
under Arts. 2217 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Conformably, Appellant
Atop should indemnify Regina Guafin in the total amount of P150,000
for the three counts of rape -- separately from payment of moral
damages which we find justified under the circumstances. The moral
sufferings of private complainant were obvious during the court
proceedings where, as observed by the trial judge and also noted in the
transcripts, she spontaneously cried and sobbed, and showed a mixed
6
i

Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076 (January 13, 2009)

Facts:
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) filed a complaint for theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code against Baynet Co., Ltd.
(Baynet) for stealing its business. PLDT alleged that Baynet offered phone cards to people in Japan to call their friends and relatives in the
Philippines using PLDT’s facilities and equipment.

Issue:
Whether or not the PLDT's business of providing telecommunication services is a personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

Held:

No, PLDT's business of providing telecommunication services is not a personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
Personal property under the Revised Penal Code covers both tangible and intangible properties but must be considered with the word "take" in the
law. There is "taking" of personal property, and theft is consummated when the offender unlawfully acquires possession of personal property even
if for a short time; or if such property is under the dominion and control of the thief. The statutory definition of "taking" clearly indicates that not all
personal properties may be the proper subjects of theft. The general rule is that only movable properties, which have physical or material existence
and susceptible of occupation by another are proper subjects of theft. Movable properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code should be
distinguished from the rights or interest to which they relate to. While the rights or interests are properties, they are not considered personal
properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

PLDT's business is intangible and cannot be taken by another and not the proper subjects of theft because they are without form or substance.

14 Phil. 128
US v. GO CHICO

MORELAND, J.:
The defendant is charged with the violation of section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission, which reads as follows:

"Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his own premises, or who shall expose, or cause to be exposed,
to public view, either on his own premises or elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine
Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device used or adopted at any
time by the public enemies of the United States in the Philippine Islands for the purposes of public disorder or of rebellion or insurrection against
the authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device of the Katipunan Society, or which is commonly
known as such, shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not less
than three months nor more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court."

The defendant was tried in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 8th day of September, 1908. After hearing the evidence adduced
the court adjudged the defendant guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him under that judgment to pay a fine of P500, Philippine currency, and
to pay the costs of the action, and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment during the time and in the form and in the place prescribed by law until said
fine should be paid. From that judgment and sentence the defendant appealed to this court.

A careful examination of the record brought to this court discloses the following facts:

That on or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, the appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the windows and one of the show
cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature
the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate and identify
those in armed insurrection against the United States. On the day previous to the one above set forth the appellant had purchased the stock of
goods in said store, of which the medallions formed a part, at a public sale made under authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On the day in
question, the 4th of August aforesaid, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the purpose of displaying them to the public and in so doing
placed in his showcase and in one of the windows of his store the medallions described. The appellant was ignorant of the existence of a law against
the display of the medallions in question and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts above stated are admitted.

The appellant rests his right to acquittal upon two propositions:

First. That before a conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Second. That the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the identical banners, devices, or emblems actually used during the Philippine
insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United States.

In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory
enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent
influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases the act complained of is itself that which produces
the pernicious effect which the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result
whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. The case at bar is a perfect illustration of this. The display of a flag or
emblem used, particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of the Government tends to incite resistance to governmental functions and
insurrection against governmental authority just as effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display
itself, without the intervention of any other factor, is the evil. It is quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by the common law or
by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the public depends upon the corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act. If A discharges a
loaded gun and kills B, the interest which society has in the act depends, not upon B's death, but upon the intention with which A consummated the
act. If the gun were discharged intentionally, with the purpose of accomplishing the death of B, then society has been injured and its security
violated; but if the gun was discharged accidentally on the part of A, then society, strictly speaking, has no concern in the matter, even though the
death of B results.

The reason for this is that A does not become a danger to society and its institutions until he becomes a person with a corrupt mind. The mere
discharge of the gun and the death of B do not of themselves make him so. With those two facts must go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case at
bar, however, the evil to society and to the Government does not depend upon the state of mind of the one who displays the banner, but upon the
effect which that display has upon the public mind.

In the one case the public is affected by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself.

It is stated in volume 12 of Cyc, page 148, that-

"The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission a crime without regard to the intent of the doer, and if such an
intention appears the courts must give it effect although the intention may have been innocent. Whether or not in a given case the statute is to be
so construed is to be determined by the court by considering the subject-matter of the prohibition as well as the language of the statute, and thus
ascertaining the intention of the legislature."

In the case of The People vs. Kibler (106 N. Y., 321) the defendant was charged with the sale of adulterated milk under a statute reading as follows:

"No person or persons shall sell or exchange or expose for sale or exchange any unclean, impure, unhealthy, adulterated, of unwholesome milk."

It was proved in that case that one Vandenburg purchased at the defendant's store 1 pint of milk which was shown to contain a very small
percentage of water more than that permitted by the statute. There was no dispute about the facts, but the objection made by the defendant was
that he was not allowed, upon the trial, to show an absence of criminal intent, or go to the jury upon the question whether it existed, but was
condemned under a charge from the court which made his intent totally immaterial and his guilt consist in having sold the adulterated article
whether he knew it or not and however carefully he may have sought to keep on hand and sell the genuine article.

The opinion of the court in that case says:

"As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no element of the offense. The act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime.

* * * * * *
"It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to proportions so enormous as to menace the health and safety of the people.
Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the careless and heedless consumers are exposed to increasing perils. To redress such evils is a plain duty but
a difficult task. Experience has taught the lesson that repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer's knowledge
or of his intent to deceive and defraud are of little use and rarely accomplish their purpose. Such an emergency may justify legislation which throws
upon the seller the entire responsibility of the purity and soundness of what he sells and compels him to know and to be certain."

In the case of Gardner vs. The People (62 N. Y., 299) the question arose under a statute which provided that an inspector of elections of the city of
New York should not be removed from office except "after notice in writing to the officer sought to be removed, which notice shall set forth clearly
and distinctly the reasons for his removal and further provided that any person who removed such an officer without such notice should be guilty of
a misdemeanor. An officer named Sheridan was removed by Gardner, the defendant, without notice. Gardner was arrested and convicted of a
misdemeanor under the statute. He appealed from the judgment of conviction and the opinion from which the following quotation is made was
written upon the decision of that appeal. Chief Justice Church, writing the opinion of the court, says in relation to criminal intent:

"In short, the defense was an honest misconstruction of the law under legal advice. The court ruled out the evidence offered, and held that
intentionally doing the act prohibited constituted the offense. It is quite clear that the facts offered to be shown, if true, would relieve the
defendant from the imputation of a corrupt intent, and, indeed, from any intent to violate the statute. The defendants made a mistake of law. Such
mistakes do not excuse the commission of prohibited acts. 'The rule on the subject appears to be, that in acts mala in se, the intent governs but in
those mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?'

* * * * * * *
"The authorities seem to establish that to sustain an indictment for doing a prohibited act, it is sufficient to prove that the act was knowingly and
intentionally done.

* * * * * * *
"In this case, if the defendants could have shown that they believed that in fact notice had been given to the inspector, although it had not, they
would not have been guilty of the offense, because the intention to do the act would have been wanting. Their plea is: True, we intended to
remove the inspector without notice, but we thought the law permitted it. This was a mistake of law, and is not strictly a defense.

* * * * * **
"If the offense is merely technical, the punishment can be made correspondingly nominal; while a rule requiring proof of a criminal intent to violate
the statute, independent of an intent to do the act which the statute declares shall constitute the offense, would, in many cases, prevent the
restraining influence which the statute was designed to secure."

In the case of Fiedler vs. Darrin (50 N. Y., 437) the court says:

"But when an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial."

In the case of The Commonwealth vs. Murphy (165 Mass., 66) the court says:

"In general, it may be said that there must be malus animus, or a criminal intent. But there is a large class of cases in which, on grounds of public
policy, certain acts are made punishable without proof that the defendant understands the facts that give character to his act.
"In such cases it is deemed best to require everybody at his peril to ascertain whether his act comes within the legislative prohibition.

* * * ** **
"Considering the nature of the offense, the purpose to be accomplished, the practical methods available for the enforcement of the law, and such
other matters as throw light upon the meaning of the language, the question in interpreting a criminal statute is whether the intention of the
legislature was to make knowledge of the facts an essential element of the offense, or to put upon everyone the burden of finding out whether his
contemplated act is prohibited, and of refraining from it if it is."

In the case of Halsted vs. The State (41 N. J. L., 552; 32 Am. Rep., 247), the question of a criminal intent arose under a statute, under which the
defendant was convicted of a crime, providing that if any township committee or other body shall disburse or vote for the disbursement of public
moneys in excess of appropriations made for the purpose, the persons constituting such board shall be guilty of a crime. The defendant was one
who violated this law by voting to incur obligations in excess of the appropriation. He was convicted and appealed and the opinion from which the
quotation is taken was written upon a decision of that appeal. The court says:

"When the State had closed, the defense offered to show that the defendant, in aiding in the passage and effectuation of the resolution which I have
pronounced to be illegal, did so under the advice of counsel and in good faith, and from pure and honest motives, and that he therein exercised due
care and caution.

* * * * * * *
"As there is an undoubted competency in the lawmaker to declare an act criminal, irrespective of the knowledge or motive of the doer of such act,
there can be, of necessity, no judicial authority having the power to require, in the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown.
In such instances the entire function of the court is to find out the intention of the legislature, and to enforce the law in absolute conformity to such
intention. And in looking over the decided cases on the subject it will be found that in the considered adjudications this inquiry has been the judicial
guide."

In the case of Rex vs. Ogden (6 C. & P., 631; 25 E. C. L., 611), the prisoner was indicted for unlawfully transposing from one piece of wrought plate to
another the lion-poisson contrary to the statutes. It was conceded that the act was done without any fraudulent intention. The court said:

"There are no words in the act of Parliament referring to any fraudulent intention. The words of it are, 'Shall transpose or remove, or cause or
procure to be transposed or removed, from one piece of wrought plate to another.' "

In the case of The State vs. McBrayer (98 N. C, 623) the court stated:

"It is a mistaken notion that positive, wilful intent to violate the criminal law is an essential ingredient in every criminal offense, and that where there
is an absence of such intent there is no offense; this is especially true also to statutory offenses. When the statute plainly forbids an act to be done,
and it is done by some person, the law implies conclusively the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the
law he violates. When the language is plain and positive, and the offense is not made to depend upon the positive, wilful intent and purpose,
nothing is left to interpretation."

In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Weiss (139 Pa. St., 247), the question arose on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment requiring him to
pay a penalty for a violation of the statute of the State which provided that any person would be liable to pay a penalty "who shall manufacture, sell,
or offer or expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell," oleomargarine, etc. At the trial the defendant requested the court to
instruct the jury that, if they believed, from the evidence, that the defendant did not knowingly furnish or authorize to be furnished, or knew of
there being furnished, to any of his customers any oleomargarine, but, as far as he knew, furnished genuine butter, then the verdict must be for the
defendant. The court refused to make the charge as requested and that is the only point upon which the defendant appealed.

The court says:

"The prohibition is absolute and general; it could not be expressed in terms more explicit and comprehensive. The statutory definition of the
offense embraces no word implying that the forbidden act shall be done knowingly or willfully, and, if it did, the designed purpose of the act would
be practically defeated. The intention of the legislature is plain, that persons engaged in the traffic so engage in it at their peril and that they can not
set up their ignorance of the nature and qualities of the commodities they sell, as a defense."

The following authorities are to the same effect: State vs. Gould (40 la., 374); Commonwealth vs. Farren (9 Allen, 489); Commonwealth vs. Nichols
(10 Allen, 199); Commonwealth vs. Boynton (2 Allen, 160); Wharton's Criminal Law, section 2442; Commonwealth vs. Sellers (130 Pa., 32); 3
Greenleaf on Evidence, section 21; Farrell vs. The State (32 Ohio State, 456); Beekman vs. Anthony (56 Miss., 446); The People vs. Roby (52 Mich.,
577).

It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration the legislature did not intend that a criminal intent should be a necessary
element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly or
willfully. The wording is plain. The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to interpretation.

Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. The accused
did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself-intent
and all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are inseparable. The act is the crime. The accused intended to put the device in
his window. Nothing more is required to commit the crime.

We do not believe that the second proposition of the accused, namely, that the law is applicable only to the identical banners, etc., actually used in
the late insurrection, and not to duplicates of those banners, can be sustained.

It is impossible that the Commission should have intended to prohibit the display of the flag or flags actually used in the insurrection, and, at the
same time, permit exact duplicates thereof (Saving, perhaps, size) to be displayed without hindrance. In the case before us, to say that the display
of a certain banner is a crime and that the display of its exact duplicate is not is to say nonsense. The rules governing the interpretation of statutes
are rules of construction, not destruction. To give the interpretation contended for by the appellant would, as to this particular provision, nullify the
statute altogether.

The words "used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States'
mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. This description refers not to a particular flag,
but to a type of flag. That phrase was used because there was and is no other way of describing that type of flag. While different words might be
employed, according to the taste of the draftsman, the method of description would have to be the same. There is no concrete word known by
which that flag could be aptly or properly described. There was no opportunity, within the scope of a legislative enactment, to describe the physical
details. It had no characteristics whatever, apart from its use in the insurrection, by which it could, in such enactment, be identified. The great and
only characteristic which it had upon which the Commission could seize as a means of description and identification was the fact that it was used in
the insurrection. There was, therefore, absolutely no way in which the Commission could, in the Act, describe the flag except by reciting where and
how it was used. It must not be forgotten that the Commission, by the words and phrases used, was not attempting to describe a particular flag, but
a type of flag. They were not describing a flag used upon a particular field or in a certain battle, but a type of flag used by an army-a flag under
which many persons rallied and which stirred their sentiments and feelings wherever seen or in whatever form it appeared. It is a mere incident of
description that the flag was used upon a particular field or in a particular battle. They were describing the flag not a flag. It has a quality and
significance and an entity apart from any place where or form in which it was used.

"Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense, and the literal interpretation of a statute may
lead to an absurdity, or evidently fail to give the real intent of the legislature. When this is the case, resort is had to the principle that the spirit of a
law controls the letter, so that a thing which is within the intention of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter, and a
thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the makers, and the statute should be so
construed as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief contemplated by the framers, (U. S. vs. Kirby, 7 Wall., 487; State vs. Bolden, 107 La.,
116, 118; U. S. vs. Buchanan, 9 Fed. Rep., 689; Green vs. Kemp, 13 Mass., 515; Lake Shore R. R. Co. vs. Roach, 80 N. Y., 339; DeMeld vs. Brady, 108 N.
Y., 524; Doyle vs. Doyle, 50 Ohio State, 330.)

"The intention of the legislature and the object aimed at, being the fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, are to control the literal
interpretation of particular language in a statute, and language capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in that sense which will harmonize
with such intention and object, and effect the purpose of the enactment." (26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 602.)

Literally hundreds of cases might be cited to sustain this proposition.

"The preamble is no part of the statute, but, as setting out the object and intention of the legislature, it is considered in the construction of an act.
Therefore, whenever there is ambiguity, or wherever the words of the act have more than one meaning, and there is doubt as to the subject-matter
to which they are to be applied, the preamble may be used." (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72; Platt vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 99 U. S.,
48; Myer vs. Western Car Co., 102 U. S., 1; Holy Trinity Church vs. U. S., 143 U. S., 457; Coosaw Mining Co. vs. South Carolina, 144 U. S., 550; Cohn vs.
Barrett, 5 Cal., 195; Barnes vs. Jones, 51 Cal., 303; Field vs. Gooding, 106 Mass., 310; People vs. Molineaux, 40 N. Y., 113; Smith vs. The People, 47 N.
Y., 330; The People vs. Davenport, 91 N. Y., 574; The People vs. O'Brien, 111 N. Y., 1.)

"The statute, then, being penal, must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant and at the same time
preserve the obvious intention of the legislature. If the language be plain, it will be construed as it reads, and the words of the statute given their
full meaning; if ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial. In both cases it
will endeavor to effect substantial justice." (Bolles vs. Outing Co., 175 U. S., 262, 265; U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat,, 76, 95; U. S. vs. Reese, 92 U. S.,
214.)

"It is said that notwithstanding this rule (that penal statutes must be construed strictly) the intention of the lawmakers must govern in the
construction of penal as well as other statutes. This is true, but this is not a new, independent rule which subverts the old. It is a modification of the
known maxim and amounts to this-that though penal statutes are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the
obvious purpose of the legislature." (U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76; Taylor vs. Goodwin. L. R. 4, Q. B. Div., 228.)

In the latter case it was held that under a statute which imposed a penalty for "furiously driving any sort of carriage" a person could be convicted for
immoderately driving a bicycle.

"It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render them operative and effective, and to prevent
persons from eluding or defeating them. Accordingly, in case of any doubt or obscurity, the construction will be such as to carry out these objects."
(Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 106.)

In The People vs. Supervisors (43 N. Y., 130) the court said:

"The occasion of the enactment of a law may always be referred to in interpreting and giving effect to it. The court should place itself in the
situation of the legislature and ascertain the necessity and probable object of the statute, and then give such construction to the language used as
to carry the intention of the legislature into effect, so far as it can be ascertained from the terms of the statute itself." (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R,
Co., 91 U. S., 72, 79.)

We do not believe that in construing the statute in question there is necessity requiring that clauses should be taken from the position given them
and placed in other portions of the statute in order to give the whole Act a reasonable meaning. Leaving all of the clauses located as they now are in
the statute, a reasonable interpretation, based upon the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, requires that the Act should be held
applicable to the case at bar.

The judgment of the court below and the sentence imposed thereunder are hereby affirmed. So ordered.

Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His services were contracted by PICOP.
Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods,
chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of
Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the
property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.

After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made representations to retain possession of the property of
Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him.
In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility.

Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property. On March 8,
1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision
mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently
denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR as a custodian of distrained property.

Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will
have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a
public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.

The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense
under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime
charged.

Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained
by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election.
Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for
the distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a
private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public
officer.