G.R. No.

L-14639 March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.

City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.

MALCOLM, J.:

The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application for habeas corpus submits for
decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents
no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we give expression
to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary question
is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?

Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for other departments
of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice,
ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed.
Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably,
during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao,
Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the
Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of
police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates
into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect
their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They
had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region
and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the
steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling
passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco
Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear
as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila.
The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not
essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or less
clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a
goodly portion found means to return to Manila.

To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives
and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.
Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from
Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as including them. The application
set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ
was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts
relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper
parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu,
because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend
beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were
destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer
to question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ,
in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacenderoof Davao, to bring before the court the
persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.

Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners,
their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, December
2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that
three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service
to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when
pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the
answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and
offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila.
Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never
been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as
laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was
impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which
related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so,
and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and
Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of
Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made
compliance impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be
decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.

Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain detectives and policemen, and of the
provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of
First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the
women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents.
Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons
involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had succeeded
in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they
desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already
returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for
petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of
the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police
force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and
Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los
recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.

In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now
proceed to do so.

One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night,
without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board
steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that
such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that
these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and
practically admitted by the respondents.

With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of
Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We
turn to the statutes and we find —

Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-General can order
the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the
Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a
common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy,
to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted
of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a
leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or
regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the
Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another
locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or
regulation, compels any person to change his residence.

In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and
considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no
such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a
sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of
motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of
the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can do the same.
And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent
against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the
head of any citizen.

Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his
freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn
him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either
justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the
law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said
Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of
government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882],
106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another,
seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],
118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very
beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be
established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2)
criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.

The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still rest with the
parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now
before us.

As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:

Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines who
shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the
judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three
thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.

Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character in force in the
Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of
not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)

We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has violated this
provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same
official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar
to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to — "It would be a monstrous
anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the
confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the
slow process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised
and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the
individual at liberty.

Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The
fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3)
that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor
and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from
Davao.

The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the
expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was
consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ
of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty,
though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.

The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made
returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions
for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ
of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court
or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this
instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to
advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original
respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it
was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish
its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to
consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.

The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in
whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and
the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of
such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these
women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived
these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or
personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty
which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived
his right.

Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any municipality in the
Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when
called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the
official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he
should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before
the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of
law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her
liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a
close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very
persuasive in nature.

A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ of habeas
corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under
guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme
Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the
question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be
quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that
the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English
decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent passages
from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:

I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on the petition which was laid
before us. . . .

It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended upon the
Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his
speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension
of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that
evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy
as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper
remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .

The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment within the state — seems to
me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of
king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right,
but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .

The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and served upon,
not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves
it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release
his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to
for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other
means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important
to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his
grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as
greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other
remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)

The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193;
Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)

The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by the respondent. A
writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the
defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so.
His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his
custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court,
through Lord Esher, M. R., said:

A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ commanded the defendant to have the
body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together
with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed,
unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his
having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to
produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if
he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in
argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some
time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The
question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to
its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In
re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to have before the circuit
court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath
that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District of
Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The
evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The
court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court,
and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be
otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the
negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of
the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S.,
624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)

We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to
the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.

There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ
of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the
persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus
given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila
waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but
who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the
parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of
the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity
those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in
question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the
persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that
waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were
contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That
through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is
demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were
produced at the second hearing by the respondents.

The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of
contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were
far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas
corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court,
said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we said
that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must
advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and
that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did not show
that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic
action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the
judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.

In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit.
Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the
women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested
case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we
come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere
desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive
investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas
corpus proceedings.

Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this connection remains
to be done.

The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann,
chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto
Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of
Manila.

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only
occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must
falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a
court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined.
An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt
committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that any of the
respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority.
Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public
officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to
have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz,
would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of
any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings
him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was
primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the
steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city
government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the
city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ
of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.

It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying
the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would
reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this
stern view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court,
he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two extremes
appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and
embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A
nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive — such an amount is P100.

In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez,
Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall
pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal
of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs
shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.

In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark
the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.

[G.R. No. 100481. January 22, 1997]

PHILIPPINE INTERISLAND SHIPPING ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONFERENCE OF INTERISLAND SHIP-

OWNERS AND OPERATORS, UNITED PETROLEUM TANKER OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
LIGHTERAGE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and PILOTAGE INTEGRATED SERVICES
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, UNITED HARBOR PILOTS' ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. and MANILA PILOTS' ASSOCIATION, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 103716-17. January 22, 1997]

HON. PETE NICOMEDES PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of Transportation and Communications and the PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, UNITED HARBOR PILOTS' ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.

[G.R. No. 107720. January 22, 1997]

HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of Transportation and Communications and Chairman of the PHILIPPINE
PORTS AUTHORITY, COMMODORE ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of the Philippine Ports
Authority, and SIMEON T. SILVA, JR., in his capacity as the South Harbor Manager, Philippine Ports Authority, petitioners,
vs. HON. NAPOLEON R. FLOJO, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court - Manila, UNITED
HARBOR PILOTS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and the MANILA PILOTS' ASSOCIATION, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Private respondent United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines, Inc. (UHPAP) is the umbrella organization of various
groups rendering pilotage service in different ports of the Philippines. The service consists of navigating a vessel from a specific point,
usually about two (2) miles off shore, to an assigned area at the pier and vice versa. When a vessel arrives, a harbor pilot takes over the
ship from its captain to maneuver it to a berth in the port, and when it departs, the harbor pilot also maneuvers it up to a specific point
off shore. The setup is required by the fact that each port has peculiar topography with which a harbor pilot is presumed to be more
familiar than a ship captain.
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is the government agency which regulates pilotage. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 857,
it has the power "to supervise, control, regulate . . . such services as are necessary in the ports vested in, or belonging to the
Authority"[1] and to "control, regulate and supervise pilotage and the conduct of pilots in any Port District." [2] It also has the power "to
impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees. . . for the services rendered by the Authority or by any private
organization within a Port District.[3]
These cases arose out of the efforts of harbor pilots to secure enforcement of Executive Order No. 1088, which fixes the rates of
pilotage service, and the equally determined efforts of the PPA and its officials, the herein petitioners, to block enforcement of the
executive order, even as they promulgated their own orders which in the beginning fixed lower rates of pilotage and later left the matter
to self determination by parties to a pilotage contract.

I. THE FACTS

G.R. No. 103716

On February 3, 1986, shortly before the presidential elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, responding to the clamor of harbor
pilots for an increase in pilotage rates, issued Executive Order No. 1088, PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES
FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS.
The executive order increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously fixed by the PPA.
However, the PPA refused to enforce the executive order on the ground that it had been drawn hastily and without prior consultation;
that its enforcement would create disorder in the ports as the operators and owners of the maritime vessels had expressed opposition to
its implementation; and that the increase in pilotage, as mandated by it, was exorbitant and detrimental to port operations.[4]
The UHPAP then announced its intention to implement E.O. No. 1088 effective November 16, 1986. This in turn drew a warning
from the PPA that disciplinary sanctions would be applied to those who would charge rates under E.O. No. 1088. The PPA instead
issued Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, fixing pilotage fees at rates lower than those provided in E.O. No. 1088.
Consequently, the UHPAP filed on January 7, 1987 a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, against
the then Minister of Transportation and Communications, Hernando Perez, and PPA General Manager, Primitivo S. Solis, Jr. It sought
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the immediate implementation of E.O. No. 1088, as well as a temporary restraining order
to stop PPA officials from imposing disciplinary sanctions against UHPAP members charging rates in accordance with E.O. No. 1088.
The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 87-38913, was raffled to Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila which issued a
temporary restraining order, enjoining the PPA from threatening the UHPAP, its officers and its members with suspension and other
disciplinary action for collecting pilotage fees pursuant to E.O. No. 1088.
On March 16, 1987, the Chamber of Maritime Industries of the Philippines, William Lines, Inc., Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. and
Delsen Transport Lines, Inc., after obtaining leave, filed a joint answer in intervention.
On February 26, 1988, while the case was pending, the PPA issued Administrative Order No. 02-88, entitled IMPLEMENTING
GUIDELINES ON OPEN PILOTAGE SERVICE. The PPA announced in its order that it was leaving to the contracting parties, i.e.,
the shipping lines and the pilots, the fixing of mutually acceptable rates for pilotage services, thus abandoning the rates fixed by it (PPA)
under Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, as well as those provided in E.O. No. 1088. The administrative order provided:

Section 3. Terms/Conditions on Pilotage Service. The shipping line or vessel's agent/representative and the harbor pilot/firm chosen
by the former shall agree between themselves, among others, on what pilotage service shall be performed, the use of tugs and their
rates, taking into consideration the circumstances stated in Section 12 of PPA AO No. 03-85, and such other conditions designed to
ensure the safe movement of the vessel in pilotage areas/grounds.

The PPA then moved to dismiss the case, contending that the issuance of its order had rendered the case moot and academic and
that consequently E.O. No. 1088 had ceased to be effective. The UHPAP opposed the motion. Together with the Manila Pilots'
Association (MPA), it filed on May 25, 1988 a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC-Manila, questioning the validity of
A.O. No. 02-88. This petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-44726 (United Harbor Pilots' Association and Manila Pilots'
Association v. Hon. Rainerio Reyes, as Acting Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications and Chairman of
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) and Maximo Dumlao, Jr., as General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), et al.) and
raffled to Branch 2 of RTC-Manila. The factual antecedents of this case are discussed in G.R. No. 100481 below.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case 87-38913, the court, without resolving the motion to dismiss filed by the PPA, rendered a
decision[5] holding that A.O. No. 02-88 did not render the case moot and academic and that the PPA was under obligation to comply
with E.O. No. 1088 because the order had the force of law which the PPA could not repeal.
The then Transportation Minister Hernando Perez and the PPA filed a petition for review. The petition was filed in this Court
which later referred the case to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA G.R. SP. No. 18072. On the other hand the intervenors
appealed to the Court of Appeals where this case was docketed as CA G.R. No. 21590. The two cases were then consolidated.
In a decision rendered on October 4, 1991, the Twelfth Division [6] of the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court,
by dismissing CA G.R. No. 21590 and denying CA G.R. SP. No. 18072. Hence, this petition by the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications and the PPA. The intervenor shipping lines did not appeal.
G.R. No. 100481

Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari filed before RTC-Manila, Branch 2 (Civil Case No. 88-44726), the UHPAP and the MPA
sought the annulment of A.O. No. 02-88, which in pertinent parts provided:

Section 1. Statement of Policy. It is hereby declared that the provision of pilotage in ports/harbors/areas defined as compulsory in
Section 8 of PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, entitled, "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of
Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports" shall be open to all licensed harbor pilots/pilotage firms/associations appointed/accredited
by this authority to perform pilotage service.

Section 2. Persons Authorized to Render Pilotage. The following individuals, persons or groups shall be appointed/accredited by this
Authority to provide pilotage service:

a. Harbor Pilots of the present Pilotage Associations of the different pilotage districts in the Philippines. Their probationary
training as required under Section 31 of PPA AO No. 03-85 shall be undertaken by any member of said Association.

b. Members/employees of any partnership/corporation or association, including Filipino shipmasters/ captains of vessel

(domestic/foreign) of Philippine Registry and individuals who meet the minimum qualifications and comply with the
requirements prescribed in Sec. 29 of PPA AO No. 03-85, aforestated, and who are appointed by said firm or association and
accredited as harbor pilots by this authority. New Harbor Pilots who wish to be appointed/accredited by PPA under the open
pilotage system either as an individual pilot or as a member of any Harbor Pilot partnership/association shall be required to
undergo a practical examination, in addition to the written examination given by the Philippine Coast Guard, prior to their
appointment/ accreditation by this Authority.

The UHPAP and MPA, as petitioners below, contended (1) that A.O. No. 02-88 was issued without the benefit of a public hearing;
(2) that E.O. No. 1088 had not been repealed by any other Executive Order or Presidential Decree and, therefore, should be given effect;
and (3) that A.O. No. 02-88 contravened P.D. No. 857.
On August 21, 1989, the Philippine Interisland Shipping Association, Conference of Interisland Shipowners and Operators, United
Petroleum Tanker Operators of the Philippines, Lighterage Association of the Philippines, and Pilotage Integrated Services Corp., were
allowed to intervene.
On September 8, 1989, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the court, enjoining the PPA from implementing A.O. No.
02-88 and, on October 26, 1989, judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioners therein. The dispositive portion of the court's
decision[7] reads:

WHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted.

1. Respondents are hereby declared to have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in approving Resolution No. 860 and in enacting Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 02-88, the subject
of which is "Implementing Guidelines on Open Pilotage Service";

2. Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 02-88 is declared null and void;

3. The preliminary injunction issued on September 8, 1989 is made permanent; and

4. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Respondents and the intervenors below filed a joint petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 19570),
assailing the decision of the trial court. But their petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the issue raised was
purely legal.
The parties separately filed petitions for review before this Court. The first one, by the PPA and its officers, was docketed as G.R.
No. 100109 (Hon. Pete Nicomedes Prado, Philippine Ports Authority and Commodore Rogelio Dayan v. United Harbor Pilots'
Association of the Philippines and Manila Pilots' Association), while the second one, by the intervenors, was docketed as G.R. No.
100481 (Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines, Conference of Interisland Ship Owners and Operators, United
Petroleum Tanker Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. The Court of Appeals, United Harbor Pilots' Association of the
Philippines and Manila Pilots' Association.)
The petition filed by the government in G.R. No. 100109 was dismissed for failure of petitioners to show that the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error.[8] On the other hand, the petition of the intervenors in G.R. No. 100481 was given due course.

G.R. No. 107720

Following the denial of its petition in G.R. No. 100109, the PPA issued on July 31, 1992, Administrative Order No. 05-92, placing
harbor pilots under the control of the PPA with respect to the scheduling and assignment of service of vessels. The PPA cited as
justification "pilotage delays . . . under the set-up where private respondents (UHPAP & MPA) assign the pilots. Intentionally or
otherwise, several vessels do not receive the pilotage service promptly, causing them operational disruptions and additional
expenses/costs." [9]
Private respondents UHPAP and MPA viewed the matter differently. On October 28, 1992, they asked the RTC-Manila, Branch 2
which heard and decided Civil Case No. 88-44726 to cite PPA officials in contempt of court. On the same day, the trial court issued an
order restraining the herein petitioners from implementing Administrative Order No. 05-92. However, the PPA proceeded to implement
its order, prompting the UHPAP and MPA to move again to cite petitioners in contempt, even as they questioned the validity of A.O.
No. 05-92. Accordingly the trial court issued another order on November 4, 1992, reiterating its previous order of October 28, 1992 to
petitioners to refrain from implementing A.O. No. 05-92 pending resolution of the petitions.
Making a special appearance, petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the court and moved for the dismissal of the petitions for
contempt. Allegedly to prevent the disruption of pilotage services, petitioners created a special team of reserve pilots to take over the
pilotage service in the event members of UHPAP/MPA refused to render pilotage services.
For the third time respondents moved to cite petitioners in contempt of court. Again petitioners questioned the court's jurisdiction
and manifested that they were adopting their previous motion to dismiss petitions for contempt filed against them.
On November 17, 1992, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and set the contempt petitions for hearing on November 19,
1992. Hence, this petition, which was docketed as G.R. No. 107720 (Hon. Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. in his capacity as Secretary of
Transportation and Communications and Chairman of the Philippine Ports Authority, Commodore Rogelio A. Dayan, in his capacity as
General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority and Simeon T. Silva, Jr., in his capacity as the South Harbor Manager, Philippine
Ports Authority v. Hon. Napoleon Flojo, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, RTC, Manila, UHPAP and MPA).
Pending resolution of this case, the Court ordered the parties to maintain the status quo as of October 31, 1992.

II. THE ISSUES AND THEIR DISPOSITION

The issues raised are:

I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CHALLENGED DECISION
OF RTC-MANILA, BRANCH 41, WHICH RULED THAT:

(A) CIVIL CASE NO. 87-38913 HAS NOT BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC WITH THE ISSUANCE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 02-88; AND

(B) HEREIN PETITIONERS ARE BOUND TO COMPLY WITH E.O. NO. 1088;

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING CA G.R. SP.
NO. 19570 FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION?

III. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE NAPOLEON FLOJO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONS FOR CONTEMPT FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
AS A RESULT OF THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 05-92?

These issues will be discussed in seriatim.

A. Whether Executive Order No. 1088 is Valid and

Petitioners are Bound to Obey it
(G.R. Nos. 103716-17)

Executive Order No. 1088 reads:

EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 1088

PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO FOREIGN AND
COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE OR PUBLIC PHILIPPINE PORTS.

WHEREAS, the United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines has clamored for the rationalization of pilotage service charges,
through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports, whether public or
private;

WHEREAS, the plea of the Association has been echoed by a great number of Members of Parliament and other persons and groups;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution and by law, do hereby direct and order:

Section 1. The following shall be the rate of pilotage fees or charges based on tonnage for services rendered to both foreign and
coastwise vessels;
 For Foreign Vessels Rate in US $ or
its Peso
Equivalent

Less than 500GT $ 30.00

500GT to 2,500GT 43.33
2,500GT to 5,000GT 71.33
5,000GT to 10,000GT 133.67
10,000GT to 15,000GT 181.67
15,000GT to 20,000GT 247.00
20,000GT to 30,000GT 300.00
30,000GT to 40,000GT 416.67
40,000GT to 60,000GT 483.33
60,000GT to 80,000GT 550.00
80,000GT to 100,000GT 616.67
100,000GT to 120,000GT 666.67
120,000GT to 130,000GT 716.67
130,000GT to 140,000GT 766.67

Over 140,000 gross tonnage $0.05 or its peso equivalent every excess tonnage. Rate for docking and undocking anchorage, conduction
and shifting other related special services is equal to 100%. Pilotage services shall be compulsory in government and private wharves
or piers,

For Coastwise Vessels: Regular

100 and under 500 gross tons P 41.70

500 and under 600 gross tons 55.60
600 and under 1,000 gross tons 69.60
1,000 and under 3,000 gross tons 139.20
3,000 and under 5,000 gross tons 300.00
5,000 and over gross tons

SEC. 2. With respect to foreign vessels, payment of pilotage services shall be made in dollars or in pesos at the prevailing exchange
rate.

SEC. 3. All orders, letters of instruction, rules, regulations and other issuances inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly.

SEC. 4. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 3rd day of February, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-six.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President of the Philippines

By the President:

(Sgd.) JUAN C. TUVERA

Presidential Executive Assistant

Petitioners contend that E.O. No. 1088 was merely an administrative issuance of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and, as such,
it could be superseded by an order of the PPA. They argue that to consider E.O. No. 1088 a statute would be to deprive the PPA of its
power under its charter to fix pilotage rates.
The contention has no merit. The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power.[10] Indeed, the great battle over the validity of
the exercise of this power by administrative agencies was fought in the 1920s on the issue of undue delegation precisely because the
power delegated was legislative. The growing complexity of modern society, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations and the increased difficulty of administering the laws made the creation of administrative agencies and the delegation to
them of legislative power necessary.[11]
There is no basis for petitioners' argument that rate fixing is merely an exercise of administrative power; that if President Marcos
had power to revise the rates previously fixed by the PPA through the issuance of E.O. No. 1088, the PPA could in turn revise those
fixed by the President, as the PPA actually did in A.O. No. 43-86, which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the
fees to be paid for pilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract. The orders previously issued by the PPA were in the nature of
subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated power. As such these could only be amended or revised by law,
as the President did by E.O. No. 1088.
It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statute because that would imply the withdrawal of power
from the PPA. What determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its nature. Here, as we have
already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for services, including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in
character.
Nor is there any doubt of the power of the then President to fix rates. On February 3, 1986, when he issued E.O. No. 1088, President
Marcos was authorized under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was under the original
1973 Constitution, when he issued P.D. NO. 857 which created the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage service in
Philippine ports. Although the power to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it became necessary to rationalize the rates
of charges fixed by it through the imposition of uniform rates. That is what the President did in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the
President could delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without thereby withdrawing the
power vested by P.D. No. 857, Section 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees... for
the services rendered by the Authority or by any private organization within a Port District."
It is worthy to note that E.O. No. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates without withdrawing the power of the PPA to
impose, prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or fees. The reason is because E.O. NO. 1088 is not meant simply to fix new
pilotage rates. Its legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted
rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports."
The case presented is similar to the fixing of wages under the Wage Rationalization Act (R.A. No. 6727) whereby minimum wages
are determined by Congress and provided by law, subject to revision by Wage Boards should later conditions warrant their revision. It
cannot be denied that Congress may intervene anytime despite the existence of administrative agencies entrusted with wage-fixing
powers, by virtue of the former's plenary power of legislation. When Congress does so, the result is not the withdrawal of the powers
delegated to the Wage Boards but cooperative lawmaking in an area where initiative and expertise are required. The Court of Appeals
is correct in holding that

The power of the PPA to fix pilotage rates and its authority to regulate pilotage still remain notwithstanding the fact that a schedule
for pilotage fees has already been prescribed by the questioned executive order. PPA is at liberty to fix new rates of pilotage subject
only to the limitation that such new rates should not go below the rates fixed under E.O. 1088. The rationale behind the limitation is
no different from what has been previously stated. Being a mere administrative agency, PPA cannot validly issue orders or regulations
that would have the effect of rendering nugatory the provisions of the legislative issuance such as those of the executive order in
question.(emphasis supplied)

Petitioners refused to implement E.O. No. 1088 on the ground that it was issued without notice to the PPA and that it was nothing
but a "political gimmick" resorted to by then President Marcos. This perception obviously stemmed from the fact that E.O. No. 1088
was issued shortly before the presidential elections in 1986.
But lack of notice to the PPA is not proof that the necessary factual basis for the order was wanting. To the contrary, the presumption
is that the President had before him pertinent data on which he based the rates prescribed in his order. Nor is the fact that the order might
have been issued to curry favor with the voters a reason for the PPA to refuse to enforce the order in question. It is not unusual for
lawmakers to have in mind partisan political consideration in sponsoring legislation. Yet that is not a ground for invalidating a statute.
Moreover, an inquiry into legislative motivation is not proper since the only relevant question is whether in issuing it the President
violated constitutional and statutory restrictions on his power. The PPA did not have any objection to the order based on constitutional
ground. In fact the nearest to a challenge on constitutional grounds was that mounted not by the PPA but by the intervenors below which
claimed that the rates fixed in E.O. NO. 1088 were exorbitant and unreasonable. However, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
overruled the objections and the intervenors apparently accepted the ruling because they did not appeal further to this Court.
There is, therefore, no legal basis for PPA's intransigence, after failing to get the new administration of President Aquino to revoke
the order by issuing it own order in the form of A.O. NO. 02-88. It is noteworthy that if President Marcos had legislative power under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution[12] so did President Aquino under the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution[13] who could, had
she thought E.O. No. 1088 to be a mere "political gimmick," have just as easily revoked her predecessor's order. It is tempting to ask if
the administrative agency would have shown the same act of defiance of the President's order had there been no change of administration.
What this Court said in La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Capapas," [14]mutatis mutandis may be applied to the cases at bar:

Was it within the powers of the then Collector Ang-angco to refuse to collect the duties that must be paid? That is the crucial point of
inquiry. We hold that it was not.

Precisely, he had to give the above legal provisions, quite explicit in character, force and effect. His obligation was to collect the
revenue for the government in accordance with existing legal provisions, executive agreements and executive orders certainly not
excluded. He would not be living up to his official designation if he were permitted to act otherwise. He was not named Collector of
Customs for nothing. . . .

Certainly, if the President himself were called upon to execute the laws faithfully, a Collector of Customs, himself a subordinate
executive official, cannot be considered as exempt in any wise from such an obligation of fealty. Similarly, if the President cannot
suspend the operation of any law, it would be presumptuous in the extreme for one in the position of then Collector Ang-angco to
consider himself as possessed of such a prerogative. . . .

We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to comply with its provisions. The PPA may
increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088. Finally, the PPA cannot refuse to implement
E.O. No. 1088 or alter it as it did in promulgating Memorandum Circular No. 43-86. Much less could the PPA abrogate the rates fixed
and leave the fixing of rates for pilotage service to the contracting parties as it did through A. O. No. 02-88, Section 3. Theretofore the
policy was one of governmental regulation of the pilotage business. By leaving the matter to the determination of the parties, the PPA
jettisoned this policy and changed it to laissez-faire, something which only the legislature, or whoever is vested with lawmaking authority,
could do.

B. Whether the Court of Appeals had Jurisdiction over the

Appeal of Intervenors from the Decision of the
Trial Court Invalidating Administrative Order
No. 02-88 of the PPA
(G.R. No. 100481)
 The Court of Appeals dismissed the joint appeal of the government and the intervenors from the trial court's decision in Civil Case
No. 88-44726 on the ground that the issues raised were purely legal questions. [15] The appellate court stated:

After a painstaking review of the records We resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

From the facts, it is clear that the main issue proffered by the appellant is whether or not the respondent Philippine Ports Authority
could validly issue rules and regulations adopting the "open pilotage policy" pursuant to its charter (P.D. 857).

....

It must be noted that while the court a quo had clearly recognized the intricate legal issue involved, it nevertheless decided it on the
merits which apparently resolved only the procedural aspect that justified it in declaring the questioned order as null and void. While
We recognize the basic requirements of due process, the same cannot take precedence in the case at bar in lieu of the fact that the
resolution of the present case is purely a legal question.

Moreover, it appears that appellants in the court below had filed a manifestation and motion waiving their presentation of evidence.
Instead, they opted to submit a comprehensive memorandum of the case on the ground that the pivotal issue raised in the petition
below is purely legal in character. (p. 231, Records)

At this juncture, We are at a loss why appellants had elevated the present action before Us where at the outset they already noted that
the issue is purely legal.

If in the case of Murillo v. Consul (UDK-9748, Resolution en banc, March 1, 1990) the Supreme Court laid down the rule that "if an
appeal by notice of appeal is taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals, and in the latter Court, the appellant raised
naught but issues of law, the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (page 5, Resolution in Murillo)," then with more
reason where as in the case at bar public-appellants thru the Office of the Solicitor General in their memorandum manifested that the
controversy has reference to the pure legal question of the validity of the questioned administrative order. Consequently, We have no
other recourse but to dismiss the petition on the strength of these pronouncements.

As already stated, from this decision, both the government and the intervenors separately brought petitions for review to this Court.
In G.R. No. 100109, the government's petition was dismissed for lack of showing that the appellate court committed reversible error.
The dismissal of the government's petition goes far to sustain the dismissal of the intervenors' petition in G.R. No. 100481 for the review
of the same decision of the Court of Appeals. After all, the intervenors' petition is based on substantially the same grounds as those
stated in the government's petition. It is now settled that the dismissal of a petition for review on certiorari is an adjudication on the
merits of a controversy.[16] Such dismissal can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of the Court
of Appeals or that the decision sought to be reviewed is correct. [17]
It is significant to note that the Secretary of Transportation and Communications and the PPA, petitioners in G.R. No. 100109,
have conceded the finality of the dismissal of their appeal. [18]Thus, the administrative policy, the validity of which herein petitioners
seek to justify by their appeal, has already been abandoned by the very administrative agency which adopted it, with the result that the
question of validity of A.O. No. 02-88 is now moot and academic.

C. Whether the Trial Court has Jurisdiction to Hear and

Decide the Contempt Charges
against Petitioners
(G.R. No. 107720)

As already noted, following the dismissal of the government's appeal in G.R. No. 100109, the PPA abandoned A.O. No. 02-88
which provided for "Open Pilotage System." But it subsequently promulgated Administrative Order No. 05-92, under which the PPA
assumed the power of scheduling and assigning pilots to service vessels, allegedly regardless of whether the pilots assigned are or are
not members of the UHPAP and the MPA which theretofore had been the exclusive agencies rendering pilotage service in Philippine
ports. The UHPAP and the MPA saw the adoption of this system as a return to the "Open Pilotage System" and, therefore, a violation
of the trial court's decision invalidating the "Open Pilotage System." They considered this to be a contempt of the trial court.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the motions for contempt against them. They contend that even if the motions were filed as incidents
of Civil Case No. 88-44726, the RTC-Manila, Branch 2 did not have jurisdiction to hear them because the main case was no longer
before the court and the fact was that the contempt citation was not an incident of the case, not even of its execution, but a new matter
raising a new cause of action which must be litigated in a separate action, even as petitioners denied they had committed any
contumacious act by the issuance of A.O. No. 05-92.
Private respondents maintained that their petitions were mere incidents of Civil Case No. 88-44726 and that the trial court has
jurisdiction because in fact this Court had not yet remanded the case to the court a quo for execution of its decision. Private respondents
complain that petitioners are trying to circumvent the final and executory decision of the court in Civil Case No. 88-44726, through the
issuance of A.O. No. 05-92.
As already noted, however, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 88-44726 enjoined petitioners from implementing the
so called "Open Pilotage System" embodied in A O. No. 02-88. If, as alleged, A.O. No. 05-92 is in substance a reenactment of A.O. No.
02-88, then there is basis for private respondents' invocation of the trial court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt.
Still it is argued that the trial court lost jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 887426, upon the perfection of their appeal from its decision.
That is indeed true. "The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this last court becomes thereby charged with the
authority to deal with contempt's committed after perfection of the appeal." [19] The trial court would have jurisdiction only in the event
of an attempt to block execution of its decision and that would be after the remand of the case to the trial court. [20] Until then the trial
court would have no jurisdiction to deal with alleged contemptuous acts.
The fly in the ointment, however, is that by accepting the dismissal of their petition for review in G.R. No. 100109, petitioners
rendered execution of the decision of the trial court superfluous. Any attempt by them, therefore, to disobey the court's final injunction
as embodied in its decision would be properly subject to punishment for contempt. Petitioners' contention that private respondents'
complaint must be the subject of a separate action would nullify contempt proceedings as means of securing obedience to the lawful
processes of a court. Petitioners' theory would reward ingenuity and cunning in devising orders which substantially are the same as the
order previously prohibited by the court.
We hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the motions for contempt filed by private respondent, subject to any valid
defense which petitioners may interpose.

III. JUDGMENT

WHEREFORE, the several petitions in these cases are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., no part related to a counsel in G.R. No. 100481.

G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982

GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA
Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E.
ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO,
Minister of Justice, Respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any executive or legislative act in an appropriate cases,
has to resolve the crucial issue of the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." The task of judicial review, aptly characterized as exacting and delicate, is
never more so than when a conceded legislative power, that of judicial reorganization, 1 may possibly collide with the time-honored
principle of the independence of the judiciary 2 as protected and safeguarded by this constitutional provision: "The Members of the
Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior
courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3 For the assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges
of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of
Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is
the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of
tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded,

That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition 4 considered by this Court as an action for prohibited petition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget,
respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners 5 sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an
undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges
thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the very comprehensive
and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 6 it was pointed out that there is no valid justification for the attack on
the constitutionality of this statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the
judiciary, the allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and
devoid of any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on
October 13. After the hearing in the morning and afternoon of October 15, in which not only petitioners and respondents were heard
through counsel but also the amici curiae, 7 and thereafter submission of the minutes of the proceeding on the debate on Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed submitted for decision.

The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all the legal aspects of the case. After such
exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court,
it is our opinion and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.

1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls
within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be
considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate
opinion in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections: 10 "Then there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating at most
what they consider a public right and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to conjure the specter of the public right dogma
as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: 'The
protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered state there could be no
enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both in substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the
legal order.' Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply
demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by
the very decision of People v. Vera where the doctrine was first fully discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think we are
prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to the American Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v.
Frothingham with their claim that what petitioners possess 'is an interest which is shared in common by other people and is
comparatively so minute and indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that the judicial process can act on it.' That is to speak
in the language of a bygone era even in the United States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly pointed out in the later case of Flast v.
Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not breached has definitely been lowered." 11

2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good
faith does manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its antecedents.
They had laid themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth, On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on
Judicial Reorganization was organized. 12 This Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A., dated September 5
of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: "1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary
which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the
reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First
Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but excluding the Sandigan Bayan." 13 On October 17, 1980, a Report
was submitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: "The Committee on Judicial
Reorganization has the honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it
to study ways and means for what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system. There are
problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes,
admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people's faith in the
administration of justice could be shaken. It is imperative that there be a greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants,
especially those of modest means — much more so, the poorest and the humblest — can vindicate their rights in an expeditious and
inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts operate must be manifest to all members of the community
and particularly to those whose interests are affected by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the Committee addresses
itself and hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting point for an institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience
of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal
courts, has proven that reliance on improved court management as well as training of judges for more efficient administration does not
suffice. I hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial so stem it is worth noting that it will be the first of its kind
since the Judiciary Act became effective on June 16, 1901." 14 I t went to say: "I t does not admit of doubt that the last two decades of
this century are likely to be attended with problems of even greater complexity and delicacy. New social interests are pressing for
recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily those economically underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are
asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not proved inattentive. Its task has thus become even more
formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills of justice. Moreover, they are likewise to be quite novel. The need for an
innovative approach is thus apparent. The national leadership, as is well-known, has been constantly on the search for solutions that
will prove to be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued national progress." 15 After which comes: "To be
less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has been repeatedly stressed — and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its realization.
Nor, unlike in the past, was it to b "considered as simply the movement towards economic progress and growth measured in terms of
sustained increases in per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP). 16 For the New Society, its implication goes further than
economic advance, extending to "the sharing, or more appropriately, the democratization of social and economic opportunities, the
substantiation of the true meaning of social justice." 17 This process of modernization and change compels the government to extend
its field of activity and its scope of operations. The efforts towards reducing the gap between the wealthy and the poor elements in the
nation call for more regulatory legislation. That way the social justice and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be
effectively implemented." 18 There is likelihood then "that some measures deemed inimical by interests adversely affected would be
challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even if the question does not go that far, suits may be filed concerning their interpretation
and application. ... There could be pleas for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success of such moves would not, even so, result
in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the policies embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That
is not conducive to progress in development." 19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally of vital concern is the problem of clogged
dockets, which "as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most determined efforts exerted by the Supreme
Court, through the leadership of both retired Chief Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the
time supervision of the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more and more cases has
continued." 20 It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic development, the growth of population, the increasing
urbanization, and other similar factors, the judiciary is called upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted with what
appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became
even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage
before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Report as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is
worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most
thorough after four generations. 22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act generations . enacted in June of 1901, 23 amended in a
significant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of course, the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1935,
originally composed "of a Presiding Judge and ten appellate Judges, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, 24 It could "sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one
of six and another of five Judges, to transact business, and the two divisions may sit at the same time." 25 Two years after the
establishment of independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 1948 26 was passed. It continued the existing
system of regular inferior courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, 27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City
Courts, and the Justice of the Peace Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of
Appeals has been continuously increased. 28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be forty-five members, a Presiding Justice
and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions. 29 Special courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of Tax
Appeals in 1954, 30 next came the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955, 31 and then in the same year a Court of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955, 32 subsequently followed by the creation of two other such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City
in 1966. 33 In 1967, Circuit Criminal Courts were established, with the Judges having the same qualifications, rank, compensation, and
privileges as judges of Courts of First Instance. 34

4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was
introduced. After setting forth the background as above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's
instructions, this proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular attention to
certain objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and
a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper meeting out of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the
governmental and parliamentary leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead of
the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court merely to appellate adjudication, the preference has been
opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in order to enable it to effectively assist the Supreme Court. This preference has
been translated into one of the innovations in the proposed Bill." 35 In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the Bill was
sponsored by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to which it was referred. Thereafter,
Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such Committee to the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some
amendments. In the sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization. Thus: "On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization submitted its report to the
President which contained the 'Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization.' Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in
accordance with the options presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid report were not availed of upon
consultation with and upon consensus of the government and parliamentary leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill were
adopted by the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, to which The bill was referred, following the public
hearings on the bill held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished members of the bench and
the bar who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position papers on the bill upon the invitation of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government." 36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would,
firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice
dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes
introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the
court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future." 37 it may be observed
that the volume containing the minutes of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its
discussion. It is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well as exhaustive study before the act was signed by the
President on August 14, 1981. With such a background, it becomes quite manifest how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its
enactment is tainted by the vice of arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that characterized its
enactment from its inception to the affixing of the Presidential signature.

5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good
faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38reiterated such a doctrine: "We find
this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the
validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid
abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is
deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as
the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid,
the abolition must be made in good faith." 39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial
Governor, 40 two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it. 41 As with the offices in the other branches of the
government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously
present in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The
concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be any clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by
petitioner, claiming that he, and not respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of the Commonwealth, amending the
Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction known as the Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner
was the incumbent of such branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District, under
the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of then National Assembly disapproved the same, with
respondent being appointed in his place. He contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his
position This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Nonetheless, the
separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result reached, to repeat, reaffirms in no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to
preclude any doubt as to the abolition of an inferior court, with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: " I am of the
opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and
establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This
conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore
may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject
to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for
the security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of the Constitution must be
coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort. (Justice
Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed; 937)" 44 justice Laurel continued: "I am not insensible to the argument
that the National Assembly may abuse its power and move deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of
tenure to all judges, But, is this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or the opinion of
Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application of a legal or constitutional principle is necessarily factual and
circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically, however, that
cases may arise where the violation of the constitutional provision regarding security of tenure is palpable and plain, and that
legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it
will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed,
the purpose was the fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the legislative department and that Commonwealth Act
No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am
for sustaining the power of the legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was greater necessity for reorganization
consequent upon the establishment of the new government than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct
Philippine Legislature, and although in the case of these two Acts there was an express provision providing for the vacation by the
judges of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by its silence, this doubt should be
resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power." 45

6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta, reference was made to Act
No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of the Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 4007 47 on the reorganization of all branches of the
government, including the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance were replaced by new courts with
the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to
Commonwealth Act No. 145, where also the system of the courts of first instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out by
Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion flowing
"from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize
them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions." 48 The challenged statute creates an
intermediate appellate court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan
trial courts, 52 municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. 55 There is even less
reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new
inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be
differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals
only with the question of power. It bears mentioning that in Brillo v. Eñage 56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late
Justice Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: "La segunda question que el recurrrido plantea es que la Carta de Tacloban ha
abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha quedado extinguido el derecho de recurente a ocuparlo y a
cobrar el salario correspodiente. Mc Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 años de edad o
se incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no constitucionales." 57 Nonetheless, such
well-established principle was not held applicable to the situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City creating a city court in
place of the former justice of the peace court. Thus: "Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido. Solo se le ha
cambiado el nombre con el cambio de forma del gobierno local." 58 The present case is anything but that. Petitioners did not and could
not prove that the challenged statute was not within the bounds of legislative authority.

7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent
on the Executive, may give rise, however, to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept independent. The all-embracing scope
of the assailed legislation as far as all inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to municipal courts are concerned, with the exception
solely of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals 59 gave rise, and understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on such
cherished Ideal. The first paragraph of the section on the transitory provision reads: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately
carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance,
the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the
Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the
completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be
deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold the office." 60 There is all the more reason then why
this Court has no choice but to inquire further into the allegation by petitioners that the security of tenure provision, an assurance of a
judiciary free from extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of words. The amended Constitution adheres even more
clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong executive that antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former Vice-
Governor Hayden, a noted political scientist, President Claro M. Recto of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing
such a concept, categorically spoke of providing "an executive power which, subject to the fiscalization of the Assembly, and of
public opinion, will not only know how to govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed by vexatious
interferences by other departments, or by unholy alliances with this and that social group." 61 The above excerpt was cited with
approval by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil. 62 Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that once again the
principle of separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 "obtains not through
express provision but by actual division." 64 The president, under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief executive of the
Republic of the Philippines." 65Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided that all the powers he possessed under the 1935
Constitution are once again vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution
speaks categorically: "The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973
Constitution created the position of President as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there was a provision for a Prime Minister
as the head of government exercising the executive power with the assistance of the Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary
system was established. In the light of the 1981 amendments though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of
Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its
essentially presidential character." 71 The retention, however, of the position of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a majority of the
members of which shall come from the regional representatives of the Batasang Pambansa and the creation of an Executive
Committee composed of the Prime Minister as Chairman and not more than fourteen other members at least half of whom shall be
members of the Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of government that is now operative. 72 What is
equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang
Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in
a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision transferring
to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence
of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative
branches." 74

8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed
by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935
Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior
courts. 75 Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order
their dismissal." 76 Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested
with such power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be
no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment
of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to
its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to
be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its
view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle
that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not
have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case
where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried
and tested ways of judicial power, Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to
the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the present
incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
even one not readily discernidble except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in
accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would
invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. 78 There is an obvious way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into
and forms part of every act to avoid any constitutional taint must be applied Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 79 promulgated last January, has
this relevant excerpt: "It is true that other Sections of the Decree could have been so worded as to avoid any constitutional objection.
As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar
that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any
possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be committed. It commends
itself for approval." 80Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential Decree constituting Municipal Courts into Municipal
Circuit Courts, specifically provides: "The Supreme Court shall carry out the provisions of this Decree through implementing orders,
on a province-to-province basis." 81 It is true there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that informs it should not be ignored
in the Executive Order contemplated under its Section 44. 82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of
constitutionality. 83

9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or harmonize constitutional provisions. To be
specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish
existing ones. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their occupants, as a necessary consequence of such
abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the
essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting within the boundaries of its conceded competence.
That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutional system we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever
appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main,
"the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government, the overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins." 84 It is well to recall another classic
utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover buttressed by one of those insights for
which Holmes was so famous "The classical separation of government powers, whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy
of Aristotle, Locke, or Motesquieu or of the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of government. There is
more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a
case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down 'with mathematical precision and divide the branches into water-tight compartments' not
only because 'the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white but also because 'even the
more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other.'" 85 This too from Justice
Tuazon, likewise expressing with force and clarity why the need for reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh unavodiable under the
fundamental principle of separation of powers: "The constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of
governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental coordination." 86 In the same way that
the academe has noted the existence in constitutional litigation of right versus right, there are instances, and this is one of them, where,
without this attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case of power against power. That we should avoid.

10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative
power to the President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter
appointed. A more careful reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such an
issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices,
Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such
receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of
Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597." 87 The existence of a
standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body which is
entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statue in all its terms
and provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: 88 "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard,
which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise,
the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either
express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole." 89 The undeniably strong links that
bind the executive and legislative departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is accuracy, therefore, to this observation in the
Free Telephone Workers Union decision: "There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive
agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-
respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the 'dynamo of modern government.'" 90 He
warned against a "restrictive approach" which could be "a deterrent factor to much-needed legislation." 91 Further on this point from
the same opinion" "The spectre of the non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative
chambers." 92 Another objection based on the absence in the statue of what petitioners refer to as a "definite time frame limitation" is
equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical language of this provision: "The Supreme Court shall submit to the President,
within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act which
shall be the basis of the implementing order to be issued by the President in accordance with the immediately succeeding
section." 93 The first sentence of the next section is even more categorical: "The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out
in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President." 94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the
President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 95 In the meanwhile, the existing
inferior courts affected continue functioning as before, "until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by
the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease
to hold office." 96 There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished "shall cease to hold office." No
fear need be entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify their being named
anew, 97 in legal contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service. 98 It is equally reasonable to assume that
from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government service, private practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In the
event that in certain cases a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve reappointment,
it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its
implementation by the Executive. There is pertinence to this observation of Justice Holmes that even acceptance of the generalization
that courts ordinarily should not supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as earlier shown by the principle that to save a
statute that could be done, "there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean." 99 Where then is the unconstitutional flaw

11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to have the writer of this opinion and
Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-named was the chairman and the other two,
members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was made clear then and there that
not one of the three members of the Court had any hand in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were
not consulted. They did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. 100 Their
work was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization. That is more in the nature of
scholarly studies. That the undertook. There could be no possible objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had
administrative supervision over interior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to the way judicial business is conducted
and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973 Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer of this opinion that either the then
Chairman or members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines 101 consulted members of the Court in drafting
proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court
Review: "In the twentieth century the Chief Justice of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of
conditions have been responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among them has been the creation of explicit
institutional structures designed to facilitate reform." 102 Also: "Thus the Chief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct
involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well." 103

12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a
government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers.
Those they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the language of ambiguity:
"A public office is a public trust." 104 That is more than a moral adjuration It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official
certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that
standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that justices
and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more
likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of
base or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely
personal right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The challenged legislation Thus subject d to the most rigorous scrutiny
by this Tribunal, lest by lack of due care and circumspection, it allow the erosion of that Ideal so firmly embedded in the national
consciousness There is this farther thought to consider. independence in thought and action necessarily is rooted in one's mind and
heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 105 there is no surer guarantee of judicial
independence than the God-given character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a fixed tenure
of office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to be subservient to one administration after another, or to
cater to the wishes of one litigant after another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal.
Our judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the power of Congress — we do not say
unlimited but as herein exercised — to reorganize inferior courts." 106 That is to recall one of the greatest Common Law jurists, who at
the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King's order but "will do what becomes [him] as a judge." So
it was pointed out in the first leading case stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano, 107 The ponencia of
Justice Malcolm Identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in
accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent
and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government." 108 There is no
reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended with deleterious consequences to the
administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and
the Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence its
solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise be
of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is something to the
credit of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and
justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the Ideals and aspirations and to fulfilling the
hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in the Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice
Malcolm in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, 109 a decision promulgated almost half a century ago: "Just as the
Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department or the government,
so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic
Act." 110 To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court remains committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.

KIYOSHI HIRABAYASHI v. UNITED STATES, (1943)

No. 870
Argued: Decided: June 21, 1943
[320 U.S. 81, 82] Messrs. Frank L. Walters, of Seattle, Wash., and Harold Evans, of Philadelphia, Pa., for Hirabayashi.

Mr. Charles Fahy, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D.C., for the United States.

[320 U.S. 81, 83]

Mr. Chief Justice STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, was convicted in the district court of violating the Act of Congress of
March 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 173, 18 U.S.C.A. 97a, which makes it a misdemeanor knowingly to disregard restrictions made
applicable by a military commander to persons in a military area prescribed by him as such, all as authorized by an
Executive Order of the President.

The questions for our decision are whether the particular restriction violated, namely that all persons of Japanese ancestry
residing in such an area be within their place of residence daily between the hours of 8:00 p. m. and 6:00 a.m., was
adopted by the military commander in the exercise of an unconstitutional delegation by Congress of its legislative power,
and whether the restriction unconstitutionally discriminated between citizens of Japanese ancestry and those of other
ancestries in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

The indictment is in two counts. The second charges that appellant, being a person of Japanese ancestr , had on a specified
date, contrary to a restriction promulgated by the military commander of the Western Defense Command, Fourth Army,
failed to remain in his place of resi- [320 U.S. 81, 84] dence in the designated military area between the hours of 8:00
o'clock p. m. and 6:00 a.m. The first count charges that appellant, on May 11 and 12, 1942, had, contrary to a Civilian
Exclusion Order issued by the military commander, failed to report to the Civil Control Station within the designated area,
it appearing that appellant's required presence there was a preliminary step to the exclusion from that area of persons of
Japanese ancestry.

By demurrer and plea in abatement, which the court overruled (C.C., 46 F.Supp. 657), appellant asserted that the
indictment should be dismissed because he was an American citizen who had never been a subject of and had never borne
allegiance to the Empire of Japan, and also because the Act of March 21, 1942, was an unconstitutional delegation of
Congressional power. On the trial to a jury it appeared that appellant was born in Seattle in 1918, of Japanese parents who
had come from Japan to the United States, and who had never afterward returned to Japan; that he was educated in the
Washington public schools and at the time of his arrest was a senior in the University of Washington; that he had never
been in Japan or had any association with Japanese residing there.

The evidence showed that appellant had failed to report to the Civil Control Station on May 11 or May 12, 1942, as directed,
to register for evacuation from the military area. He admitted failure to do so, and stated it had at all times been his belief
that he would be waiving his rights as an American citizen by so doing. The evidence also showed that for like reason he
was away from his place of residence after 8:00 p.m. on May 9, 1942. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts
and appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three months on each, the sentences to run concurrently.

On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified to us questions of law upon which it desired in-[320 U.S. 81,
85] structions for the decision of the case. See 239 of the Judicial Code as amended, 28 U.S.C. 346, 28 U.S.C.A. 346.
Acting under the authority conferred upon us by that section we ordered that the entire record be certified to this Court so
that we might proceed to a decision of the matter in controversy in the same manner as if it had been brought here by
appeal. 63 S.Ct. 860, 87 L.Ed --. Since the sentences of three months each imposed by the district court on the two counts
were ordered to run concurrently, it will be unnecessary to consider questions raised with respect to the first count if we
find that the conviction on the second count, for violation of the curfew order, must be sustained. Brooks v. United
States, 267 U.S. 432, 441 , 45 S.Ct. 345, 347, 37 A.L. R. 1407; Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 33 , 61 S.Ct. 429, 436.

The curfew order which appellant violated, and to which the sanction prescribed by the Act of Congress has been deemed
to attach, purported to be issued pursuant to an Executive Order of the President. In passing upon the authority of the
military commander to make and execute the order, it becomes necessary to consider in some detail the official action
which preceded or accompanied the order and from which it derives its purported authority.

On December 8, 1941, one day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor by a Japanese air force, Congress declared war against
Japan. 55 Stat. 795, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, preceding section 1 note. On February 19, 1942, the President promulgated
Executive Order No. 9066. 7 Federal Register 1407. The Order recited that 'the successful prosecution of the war requires
every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises,
and national-defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the Act of
November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (50 U.S.C.A. 104)'. By virtue of the
authority vested [320 U.S. 81, 86] in him as President and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, the President
purported to 'authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time
designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military
areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or
all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be
subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his
discretion.'

On February 20, 1942, the Secretary of War designated Lt. General J. L. DeWitt as Military Commander of the Western
Defense Command, comprising the Pacific Coast states and some others, to carry out there the duties prescribed by
Executive Order No. 9066. On March 2, 1942, General DeWitt promulgated Public Proclamation No. 1. 7 Federal Register
2320. The proclamation recited that the entire Pacific Coast 'by its geographical location is particularly subject to attack, to
attempted invasion by the armed forces of nations with which the United States is now at war, and, in connection
therewith, is subject to espionage and acts of sabotage, thereby requiring the adoption of military measures necessary to
establish safeguards against such enemy operations'. It stated that 'the present situation requires as matter of military
necessity the establishment in the territory embraced by the Western Defense Command of Military Areas and Zones
thereof'; it specified and designated as military areas certain areas within the Western Defense Command; and it declared
that 'such persons or classes of persons as the situation may require' would, by subsequent proclamation, be excluded
from certain of these [320 U.S. 81, 87] areas, but might be permitted to enter or remain in certain others, under
regulations and restrictions to be later prescribed. Among the military areas so designated by Public Proclamation No. 1
was Military Area No. 1, which embraced, besides the southern part of Arizona, all the coastal region of the three Pacific
Coast states, including the City of Seattle, Washington, where appellant resided. Military Area No. 2. designated by the
same proclamation, included those parts of the coastal states and of Arizona not placed within Military Area No. 1.

Public Proclamation No. 2 of March 16, 1942, issued by General DeWitt, made like recitals and designated further military
areas and zones. It contained like provisions concerning the exclusion, by subsequent proclamation, of certain persons or
classes of persons from these areas, and the future promulgation of regulations and restrictions applicable to persons
remaining within them. 7 Federal Register 2405

An Executive Order of the President, No. 9102, of March 18, 1942, established the War Relocation Authority, in the Office
for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President; it authorized the Director of War Relocation
Authority to formulate and effectuate a program for the removal, relocation, maintenance and supervision of persons
designated under Executive Order No. 9066, already referred to; and it conferred on the Director authority to prescribe
regulations necessary or desirable to promote the effective execution of the program. 7 Federal Register 2165.

Congress, by the Act of March 21, 1942, 18 U.S.C.A. 97a, provided: 'That whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit
any act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive order of the President, by the
Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable
to any such area or zone or contrary [320 U.S. 81, 88] to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military
commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order
and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable' to fine or
imprisonment, or both.

Three days later, on March 24, 1942, General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 3. 7 Federal Register 2543. After
referring to the previous designation of military areas by Public Proclamations No. 1 and 2, it recited that '... the present
situation within these Military Areas and Zones requires as a matter or military necessity the establishment of certain
regulations pertaining to all enemy aliens and all persons of Japanese ancestry within said Military Areas and Zones ....' It
accordingly declared and established that from and after March 27, 1942, 'all alien Japanese, all alien Germans, all alien
Italians, and all persons of Japanese ancestry residing or being within the geographical limits of Military Area No. 1 ...
shall be within their place of residence between the hours of 8:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M., which period is hereinafter referred
to as the hours of curfew'. It also imposed certain other restrictions on persons of Japanese ancestry, and provided that
any person violating the regulations would be subject to the criminal penalties provided by the Act of Congress of March
21, 1942.

Beginning on March 24, 1942, the military commander issued a series of Civilian Exclusion Orders pursuant to the
provisions of Public Proclamation No. 1. Each such order related to a specified area within the territory of his command.
The order applicable to appellant was Civilian Exclusion Order No. 57 of May 10, 1942. 7 Federal Register 3725. It directed
that from and after 12:00 noon, May 16, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, be excluded
from a specified portion of Military Area No. 1 in Seattle, including appellant's place of residence, [320 U.S. 81, 89] and it
required a member of each family, and each individual living alone, affected by the order to report on May 11 or May 12 to
a designated Civil Control Station in Seattle. Meanwhile the military commander had issued Public Proclamation No. 4 of
March 27, 1942, which recited the necessity of providing for the orderly evacuation and resettlement of Japanese within
the area, and prohibited all alien Japanese and all persons of Japanese ancestry from leaving the military area until future
orders should permit. 7 Federal Register 2601.

Appellant does not deny that he knowingly failed to obey the curfew order as charged in the second count of the
indictment, or that the order was authorized by the terms of Executive Order No. 9066, or that the challenged Act of
Congress purports to punish with criminal penalties disobedience of such an order. His contentions are only that Congress
unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power to the military commander by authorizing him to impose the challenged
regulation, and that, even if the regulation were in other respects lawfully authorized, the Fifth Amendment prohibits the
discrimination made between citizens of Japanese descent and those of other ancestry.

It will be evident from the legislative history that the Act of March 21, 1942, contemplated and authorized the curfew order
which we have before us. The bill which became the Act of March 21, 1942, was introduced in the Senate on March 9th and
in the House on March 10th at the request of the Secretary of War who, in letters to the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Military Affairs and to the Speaker of the House, stated explicitly that its purpose was to provide means for
the enforcement of orders issued under Executive Order No. 9066. This appears in the committee reports on the bill,
which set out in full the Executive Order and the Secretary's letter. 88 Cong.Rec. 2722, 2725; H.R. Rep. No. 1906, 77th
Cong. [320 U.S. 81, 90] 2d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 1171, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. And each of the com ittee reports expressly
mentions curfew orders as one of the types of restrictions which it was deemed desirable to enforce by criminal sanctions.
When the bill was under consideration, General DeWitt had published his Proclamation No. 1 of March 2, 1942,
establishing Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2, and that Proclamation was before Congress. S.Rep. No. 1171, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.,
p. 2; see also 88 Cong.Rec. 2724. A letter of the Secretary to the Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, of
March 14, 1942, informed Congress that 'General DeWitt is strongly of the opinion that the bill, when enacted, should be
broad enough to enable the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander to enforce curfews and other
restrictions within military areas and zones'; and that General DeWitt had 'indicated that he was prepared to enforce
certain restrictions at once for the purpose of protecting certain vital national defense interests but did not desire to
proceed until enforcement machinery had been set up'. H.R. Rep. No. 1906, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3. See also letter of the
Acting Secretary of War to the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, March 13, 1942, 88 Cong.Rec. 2725.

The Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee explained on the floor of the Senate that the purpose of the
proposed legislation was to provide means of enforcement of curfew orders and other military orders made pursuant to
Executive Order No. 9066. He read General DeWitt's Public Proclamation No. 1, and statements from newspaper reports
that 'evacuation of the first Japanese aliens and American-born Japanese' was about to begin. He also stated to the Senate
that 'reasons for suspected widespread fifth-column activity among Japanese' were to be found in the system of dual
citizenship which Japan deemed applicable to American-[320 U.S. 81, 91] born Japanese, and in the propaganda
disseminated by Japanese consuls, Buddhist priests and other leaders, among American-born children of Japanese. Such
was stated to be the explanation of the contemplated evacuation from the Pacific Coast area of persons of Japanese
ancestry, citizens as well as aliens. 88 Cong.Rec. 2722-2726; see also pp. 2729, 2730. Congress also had before it the
Preliminary Report of a House Committee investigating national defense migration, of March 19, 1942, which approved
the provisions of Executive Order No. 9066, and which recommended the evacuation, from military areas established
under the Order, of all persons of Japanese ancestry, including citizens. H.R. Rep. No. 1911, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. The
proposed legislation provided criminal sanctions for violation of orders, in terms broad enough to include the curfew
order now before us, and the legislative history demonstrates that Congress was advised that curfew orders were among
those intended, and was advised also that regulation of citizen and alien Japanese alike was contemplated.

The conclusion is inescapable that Congress, by the Act of March 21, 1942, ratified and confirmed Executive Order No.
9066. Prize Cases (The Amy Warwick), 2 Black 635, 671; Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall, 73, 96, 97; United States v. Heinszen
& Co., 206 U.S. 370 , 382-384, 27 S.Ct. 742, 744, 745, 11 Ann.Cas. 688; Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 556 , 33 S.Ct. 585,
586; Isbrandtsen- Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139 , 146-148, 57 S.Ct. 407, 411; Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United
States, 300 U.S. 297 , 300-303, 57 S.Ct. 478, 479, 480; Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 186, 208 , 58 S.Ct. 233, 244.
And so far as it lawfully could, Congress authorized and implemented such curfew orders as the commanding officer
should promulgate pursuant to the Executive Order of the President. The question then is not one of Congressional power
to delegate to the President the promulgation of the Executive Order, but whether, acting in cooperation, Congress and the
Executive have constitutional authority to impo e the cur- [320 U.S. 81, 92] few restriction here complained of. We must
consider also whether, acting together, Congress and the Executive could leave it to the designated military commander to
appraise the relevant conditions and on the basis of that appraisal to say whether, under the circumstances, the time and
place were appropriate for the promulgation of the curfew order and whether the order itself was an appropriate means of
carrying out the Executive Order for the 'protection against espionage and against sabotage' to national defense materials,
premises and utilities. For reasons presently to be stated, we conclude that it was within the constitutional power of
Congress and the executive arm of the Government to prescribe this curfew order for the period under consideration and
that its promulgation by the military commander involved no unlawful delegation of legislative power.

Executive Order No. 9066, promulgated in time of war for the declared purpose of prosecuting the war by protecting
national defense resources from sabotage and espionage, and the Act of March 21, 1942, ratifying and confirming the
Executive Order, were each an exercise of the power to wage war conferred on the Congress and on the President, as
Commander in Chief of the armed forces, by Articles I and II of the Constitution. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 , 26 S.,
63 S.Ct. 2, 9, 10, 87 L.Ed. --. We have no occasion to consider whether the President, acting alone, could lawfully have
made the curfew order in question, or have authorized others to make it. For the President's action has the support of the
Act of Congress, and we are immediately concerned with the question whether it is within the constitutional power of the
national government, through the joint action of Congress and the Executive, to impose this restriction as an emergency
war measure. The exercise of that power here involves no question of martial law or trial by military tribunal. Cf. Ex parte
Milligan, 4 Wall. 2; Ex parte Quirin, supra. Appellant has been [320 U.S. 81, 93] tried and convicted in the civil courts
and has been subjected to penalties prescribed by Congress for the acts committed.

The war power of the national government is 'the power to wage war successfully'. See Charles Evans Hughes, War Powers
Under the Constitution, 42 A.B.A.Rep. 232, 238. It extends to every matter and activity so related to war as substantially
to affect its conduct and progress. The power is not restricted to the winning of victories in the field and the repulse of
enemy forces. It embraces every phase of the national defense, including the protection of war materials and the members
of the armed forces from injury and from the dangers which attend the rise, prosecution and progress of war. Prize Cases,
supra; Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268, 303, 314; Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 506, 507; Selective Draft Law Cases
(Arver v. United States), 245 U.S. 366 , 38 S.Ct. 159, L.R.A.1918C, 361, Ann.Cas.1918B, 856; McKinley v. United
States, 249 U.S. 397 , 39 S.Ct. 324; United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 , 623 S., 51 S.Ct. 570, 574. Since the
Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions
of warfare, it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion in determining the nature
and extent of the threatened injury or danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it. Ex parte Quirin, supra, 317
U.S. 28, 29 , 63 S.Ct. 10, 11, 87 L.Ed. --; cf. Prize Cases, supra, 2 Black 670; Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 29. Where, as
they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and discretion and for the choice of means by those
branches of the Government on which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of warmaking, it is not for any court
to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute it judgment for theirs.

The actions taken must be appraised in the light of the conditions with which the President and Congress were confronted
in the early months of 1942, many of which [320 U.S. 81, 94] since disclosed, were then peculiarly within the knowledge
of the military authorities. On December 7, 1941, the Japanese air forces had attacked the United States Naval Base at
Pearl Harbor without warning, at the very hour when Japanese diplomatic representatives were conducting negotiations
with our State Department ostensibly for the peaceful settlement of differences between the two countries. Simultaneously
or nearly so, the Japanese attacked Malaysia, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Wake and Midway Islands. On the
following day their army invaded Thailand. Shortly afterwards they sank two British battleships. On December 13th,
Guam was taken. On December 24th and 25th they captured Wake Island and occupied Hong Kong. On January 2, 1942,
Manila fell, and on February 10th Singapore, Britain's great naval base in the East, was taken. On February 27th the battle
for the Java Sea resulted in a disastrous naval defeat to the United Nations. By the 9th of March Japanese forces had
established control over the Netherlands East Indies; Rangoon and Burma were occupied; Bataan and Corregidor were
under attack.

Although the results of the attack on Pearl Harbor were not fully disclosed until much later, it was known that the damage
was extensive, and that the Japanese by their successes had gained a naval superiority over our forces in the Pacific which
might enable them to seize Pearl Harbor, our largest naval base and the last stronghold of defense lying between Japan
and the west coast. That reasonably prudent men charged with the responsibility of our national defense had ample
ground for concluding that they must face the danger of invasion, take measures against it, and in making the choice of
measures consider our internal situation, cannot be doubted.

The challenged orders were defense measures for the avowed purpose of safeguarding the military area in question, at a
time of threatened air raids and invasion [320 U.S. 81, 95] by the Japanese forces, from the danger of sabotage and
espionage. As the curfew was made applicable to citizens residing in the area only if they were of Japanese ancestry, our
inquiry must be whether in the light of all the facts and circumstances there was any substantial basis for the conclusion,
in which Congress and the military commander united, that the curfew as applied was a protective measure necessary to
meet the threat of sabotage and espionage which would substantially affect the war effort and which might reasonably be
expected to aid a threatened enemy invasion. The alternative which appellant insists must be accepted is for the military
authorities to impose the curfew on all citizens within the military area, or on none. In a case of threatened danger
requiring prompt action, it is a choice between inflicting obviously needless hardship on the many, or sitting passive and
unresisting in the presence of the threat. We think that constitutional government, in time of war, is not so powerless and
does not compel so hard a choice if those charged with the responsibility of our national defense have reasonable ground
for believing that the threat is real.

When the orders were promulgated there was a vast concentration, within Military Areas No. 1 and 2, of installations and
facilities for the production of military equipment, especially ships and airplanes. Important Army and Navy bases were
located in California and Washington. Approximately one-fourth of the total value of the major aircraft contracts then let
by Government procurement officers were to be performed in the State of California. California ranked second, and
Washington fifth, of all the states of the Union with respect to the value of shipbuilding contracts to be performed. 1 [320
U.S. 81, 96] In the critical days of March, 1942, the danger to our war production by sabotage and espionage in this area
seems obvious. The German invasion of the Western European countries had given ample warning to the world of the
menace of the 'fifth column.' Espionage by persons in sympathy with the Japanese Government had been found to have
been particularly effective in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. 2 At a time of threatened Japanese attack upon this
country, the nature of our inhabitants' attachments to the Japanese enemy was consequently a matter of grave concern. Of
the 126, 000 persons of Japanese descent in the United States, citizens and non- citizens, approximately 112,000 resided
in California, Oregon and Washington at the time of the adoption of the military regulations. Of these approximately two-
thirds are citizens because born in the United States. Not only did the great majority of such persons reside within the
Pacific Coast states but they were concentrated in or near three of the large cities, Seattle, Portland and Los Angeles, all in
Military Area No. 1.3

There is support for the view that social, economic and political conditions which have prevailed since the close of the last
century, when the Japanese began to come to this country in substantial numbers, have intensified their solidarity and
have in large measure prevented their assimilation as an integral part of the white population. 4 In addition, large
numbers of children of Japanese par- [320 U.S. 81, 97] entage are sent to Japanese language schools outside the regular
hours of public schools in the locality. Some of these schools are generally believed to be sources of Japanese nationalistic
propaganda, cultivating allegiance to Japan. 5Considerable numbers, estimated to be approximately 10,000, of American-
born children of Japanese parentage have been sent to Japan for all or a part of their education. 6

Congress and the Executive, including the military commander, could have attributed special significance, in its bearing
on the loyalties of persons of Japane e descent, to the maintenance by Japan of its system of dual citizenship. Children
born in the United States of Japanese alien parents, and especially those children born before December 1, 1924, are under
many circumstances deemed, by Japanese law, to be citizens of Japan. 7 No [320 U.S. 81, 98] official census of those
whom Japan regards as having thus retained Japanese citizenship is available, but there is ground for the belief that the
number is large. 8

The large number of resident alien Japanese, approximately one-third of all Japanese inhabitants of the country, are of
mature years and occupy positions of influence in Japanese communities. The association of influential Japanese
residents with Japanese Consulates has been deemed a ready means for the dissemination of propaganda and for the
maintenance of the influence of the Japanese Government with the Japanese population in this country. 9

As a result of all these conditions affecting the life of the Japanese, both aliens and citizens, in the Pacific Coast area, there
has been relatively little social intercourse between them and the white population. The restrictions, both practical and
legal, affecting the privileges and opportunities afforded to persons of Japanese extraction residing in the United States,
have been sources of irritation and may well have tended to increase their isolation, and in many instances their
attachments to Japan and its institutions.

Viewing these data in all their aspects, Congress and the Executive could reasonably have concluded that these conditions
have encouraged the continued attachment of members of this group to Japan and Japanese institutions. [320 U.S. 81,
99] These are only some of the many considerations which those charged with the responsibility for the national defense
could take into account in determining the nature and extent of the danger of espionage and sabotage, in the event of
invasion or air raid attack. The extent of that danger could be definitely known only after the event and after it was too late
to meet it. Whatever views we may entertain regarding the loyalty to this country of the citizens of Japanese ancestry, we
cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of
that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We cannot say that the war-
making branches of the Government did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not
readily be isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national defense and safety, which
demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard against it.

Appellant does not deny that, given the danger, a curfew was an appropriate measure against sabotage. It is an obvious
protection against the perpetration of sabotage most readily committed during the hours of darkness. If it was an
appropriate exercise of the war power its validity is not impaired because it has restricted the citizen's liberty. Like every
military control of the population of a dangerous zone in war ime, it necessarily involves some infringement of individual
liberty, just as does the police establishment of fire lines during a fire, or the confinement of people to their houses during
an air raid alarm-neither of which could be thought to be an infringement of constitutional right. Like them, the validity of
the restraints of the curfew order depends on all the conditions which obtain at the time the curfew is imposed and which
support the order imposing it.[320 U.S. 81, 100] But appellant insists that the exercise of the power is inappropriate and
unconstitutional because it discriminates against citizens of Japanese ancestry, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The
Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause and it restrains only such discriminatory legislation by Congress as
amounts to a denial of due process. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 , 338 S., 63 S.Ct. 297, 301, 87 L.Ed. --,
and cases cited. Congress may hit at a particular danger where it is seen, without providing for others which are not so
evident or so urgent. Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224, 227 , 34 S.Ct. 856.

Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on
race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,118 U.S. 356 , 6 S.Ct. 1064; Yu Cong
Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 , 46 S.Ct. 619; Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 , 62 S.Ct. 1159. We may assume that these
considerations would be controlling here were it not for the fact that the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war
and of threatened invasion, calls upon the military authorities to scrutinize every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of
populations in the danger areas. Because racial discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore
prohibited, it by no means follows that, in dealing with the perils of war, Congress and the Executive are wholly precluded
from taking into account those facts and circumstances which are relevant to measures for our national defense and for
the successful prosecution of the war, and which may in fact place citizens of one ancestry in a different category from
others. 'We must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding', 'a constitution intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human [320 U.S. 81, 101] affairs'. McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 407, 415. The adoption by Government, in the crisis of war and of threatened invasion, of measures for the
public safety, based upon the recognition of facts and circumstances which indicate that a group of one national extraction
may menace that safety more than others, is not wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution and is not to be condemned
merely because in other and in most circumstances racial distinctions are irrelevant. Cf. State of Ohio ex rel. Clarke v.
Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 , 47 S.Ct. 630, and cases cited.

Here the aim of Congress and the Executive was the protection against sabotage of war materials and utilities in areas
thought to be in danger of Japanese invasion and air attack. We have stated in detail facts and circumstances with respect
to the American citizens of Japanese ancestry residing on the Pacific Coast which support the judgment of the warwaging
branches of the Government that some restrictive measure was urgent. We cannot say that these facts and circumstances,
considered in the particular war setting, could afford no ground for differentiating citizens of Japanese ancestry from
other groups in the United States. The fact alone that attack on our shores was threatened by Japan rather than another
enemy power set these citizens apart from others who have no particular associations with Japan.

Our investigation here does not go beyond the inquiry whether, in the light of all the relevant circumstances preceding and
attending their promulgation, the challenged orders and statute afforded a reasonable basis for the action taken in
imposing the curfew. We cannot close our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by experience, that in time of war residents
having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry. Nor
can we deny that Congress, and the military authorities acting with its[320 U.S. 81, 102] authorization, have
constitutional power to appraise the danger in the light of facts of public notoriety. We need not now attempt to define the
ultimate boundaries of the war power. We decide only the issue as we have defined it-we decide only that the curfew order
as applied, and at the time it was applied, was within the boundaries of the war power. In this case it is enough that
circumstances within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for maintaining the national defense afforded
a rational basis for the decision which they made. Whether we would have made it is irrelevant.

What we have said also disposes of the contention that the curfew order involved an unlawful delegation by Congress of its
legislative power. The mandate of the Constitution, Art. 1, 1, that all legislative power granted 'shall be vested in a
Congress' has never been thought, even in the administration of civil affairs, to preclude Congress from resorting to the aid
of executive or administrative officers in determining by findings whether the facts are such as to call for the application of
previously adopted legislative standards or definitions of Congressional policy.

The purpose of Executive Order No. 9066, and the standard which the President approved for the orders authorized to be
promulgated by the military commander-as disclosed by the preamble of the Executive Order-was the protection of our
war resources against espionage and sabotage. Public Proclamations No. 1 and 2, by General DeWitt, contain findings that
the military areas created and the measures to be prescribed for them were required to establish safeguards against
espionage and sabotage. Both the Executive Order and the Proclamations were before Congress when the Act of March 21,
1942, was under consideration. To the extent that the Executive Order authorized orders to be promulgated by the military
commander to accomplish the declared purpose of the [320 U.S. 81, 103] Order, and to the extent that the findings in the
Proclamations establish that such was their purpose, both have been approved by Congress.

It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a particular standard to which orders of the military commander are to
conform, or require findings to be made as a prerequisite to any order. But the Executive Order, the Proclamations and the
statute are not to be read in isolation from each other. They were parts of a single program and must be judged as such.
The Act of March 21, 1942, was an adoption by Congress of the Executive Order and of the Proclamations. The
Proclamations themselves followed a standard authorized by the Executive Order-the necessity of protecting military
resources in the designated areas against espionage and sabotage. And by the Act, Congress gave its approval to that
standard. We have no need to consider now the validity of action if taken by the military commander without conforming
to this standard approved by Congress, or the validity of orders made without the support of findings showing that they do
so conform. Here the findings of danger from espionage and sabotage, and of the necessity of the curfew order to protect
against them, have been duly made. General DeWitt's Public Proclamation No. 3, which established the curfew, merely
prescribed regulations of the type and in the manner which Public Proclamations No. 1 and 2 had announced would be
prescribed at a future date, and was thus founded on the findings of Pro lamations No. 1 and 2.

The military commander's appraisal of facts in the light of the authorized standard, and the inferences which he drew from
those facts, involved the exercise of his informed judgment. But as we have seen, those facts, and the inferences which
could be rationally drawn from them, support the judgment of the military commander, that [320 U.S. 81, 104] the
danger of espionage and sabotage to our military resources was imminent, and that the curfew order was an appropriate
measure to meet it.

Where, as in the present case, the standard set up for the guidance of the military commander, and the action taken and
the reasons for it, are in fact recorded in the military orders, so that Congress, the courts and the public are assured that
the orders, in the judgment of the commander, conform to the standards approved by the President and Congress, there is
no failure in the performance of the legislative function. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 , 142-146, 657, 61
S.Ct. 524, 531, 533, and cases cited. The essentials of that function are the determination by Congress of the legislative
policy and its approval of a rule of conduct to carry that policy into execution. The very necessities which attend the
conduct of military operations in time of war in this instance as in many others preclude Congress from holding
committee meetings to determine whether there is danger, before it enacts legislation to combat the danger.

The Constitution as a continuously operating charter of government does not demand the impossible or the impractical.
The essentials of the legislative function are preserved when Congress authorizes a statutory command to become
operative, upon ascertainment of a basic conclusion of fact by a designated representative of the Government. Cf. The
Aurora, 7 Cranch 382; United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 12 , 47 S.Ct. 1, 5. The present statute, which
authorized curfew orders to be made pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066 for the protection of war resources from
espionage and sabotage, satisfies those requirements. Under the Executive Order the basic facts, determined by the
military commander in the light of knowledge then available, were whether that danger existed and whether a curfew
order was an appropriate means of minimizing the danger. Since his findings to [320 U.S. 81, 105] that effect were, as we
have said, not without adequate support, the legislative function was performed and the sanction of the statute attached to
violations of the curfew order. It is unnecessary to consider whether or to what extent such findings would support orders
differing from the curfew order.

The conviction under the second count is without constitutional infirmity. Hence we have no occasion to review the
conviction on the first count since, as already stated, the sentences on the two counts are to run concurrently and
conviction on the second is sufficient to sustain the sentence. For this reason also it is unnecessary to consider the
Government's argument that compliance with the order to report at the Civilian Control Station did not necessarily entail
confinement in a relocation center.

AFFIRMED.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS concurring.

While I concur in the result and agree substantially with the opinion of the Court, I wish to add a few words to indicate
what for me is the narrow ground of decision.

After the disastrous bombing of Pearl Harbor the military had a grave problem on its hands. The threat of Japanese
invasion of the west coast was not fanciful but real. The presence of many thousands of aliens and citizens of Japanese
ancestry in or near to the key points along that coast line aroused special concern in those charged with the defense of the
country. They believed that not only among aliens but also among citizens of Japanese ancestry there were those who
would give aid and comfort to the Japanese invader and act as a fifth column before and during an invasion. 1 If the
militar [320 U.S. 81, 106] were right in their belief that among citizens of Japanese ancestry there was an actual or
incipient fifth column, we were indeed faced with the imminent threat of a dire emergency. We must credit the military
with as much good faith in that belief as we would any other public official acting pursuant to his duties. We cannot
possibly know all the facts which lay behind that decision. Some of them may have been as intangible and as imponderable
as the factors which influence personal or business decisions in daily life. The point is that we cannot sit in judgment on
the military requirements of that hour. Where the orders under the present Act have some relation to 'protection against
espionage and against sabotage', our task is at an end.

Much of the argument assumes that as a matter of policy it might have been wiser for the military to have dealt with these
people on an individual basis and through the process of investigation and hearings separated those who were loyal from
those who were not. But the wisdom or expediency of the decision which was made is not for us to review. Nor are we
warranted where national survival is at stake in insisting that those orders should not have been applied to anyone without
some evidence of his disloyalty. The orders as applied to the petitioner are not to be tested by the substantial evidence
rule. Peacetime procedures do not necessarily fit wartime needs. It is said that if citizens of Japanese ancestry were
generally disloyal, treatment on a group basis might be justified. But there is no difference in power when the num- [320
U.S. 81, 107] ber of those who are finally shown to be disloyal or suspect is reduced to a small per cent. The sorting
process might indeed be as time-consuming whether those who were disloyal or suspect constituted nine or ninety-nine
per cent. And the pinch of the order on the loyal citizens would be as great in any case. But where the peril is great and the
time is short, temporary treatment on a group basis may be the only practicable expedient whatever the ultimate
percentage of those who are detained for cause. Nor should the military be required to wait until espionage or sabotage
becomes effective before it moves.
It is true that we might now say that there was ample time to handle the problem on the individual rather than the group
basis. But military decisions must be made without the benefit of hindsight. The orders must be judged as of the date
when the decision to issue them was made. To say that the military in such cases should take the time to weed out the loyal
from the others would be to assume that the nation could afford to have them take the time to do it. But as the opinion of
the Court makes clear, speed and dispatch may be of the essence. Certainly we cannot say that those charged with the
defense of the nation should have procrastinated until investigations and hearings were completed. At that time further
delay might indeed have seemed to be wholly incompatible with military responsibilities.

Since we cannot override the military judgment which lay behind these orders, it seems to me necessary to concede that
the army had the power to deal temporarily with these people on a group basis. Petitioner therefore was not justified in
disobeying the orders.

But I think it important to emphasize that we are dealing here with a problem of loyalty not assimilation. Loyalty is a
matter of mind and of heart not of race. That indeed is the history of America. Moreover, guilt is per- [320 U.S. 81,
108] sonal under our constitutional system. Detention for reasonable cause is one thing. Detention on account of
ancestry is another.

In this case the petitioner tendered by a plea in abatement the question of his loyalty to the United States. I think that plea
was properly stricken; military measures of defense might be paralyzed if it were necessary to try out that issue
preliminarily. But a denial of that opportunity in this case does not necessarily mean that petitioner could not have had a
hearing on that issue in some appropriate proceeding. Obedience to the military orders is one thing. Whether an
individual member of a group must be afforded at some stage an opportunity to show that, being loyal, he should be
reclassified is a wholly different question.

There are other instances in the law where one must obey an order before he can attack as erroneous the classification in
which he has been placed. Thus it is commonly held that one who is a conscientious objector has no privilege to defy the
Selective Service Act and to refuse or fail to be inducted. He must submit to the law. But that line of authority holds that
after induction he may obtain through habeas corpus a hearing on the legality of his classification by the draft
board. 2 Whether in the present situation that remedy would be available is one [320 U.S. 81, 109] of the large and
important issues reserved by the present decision. It has been suggested that an administrative procedure has been
established to relieve against unwarranted applications of these orders. Whether in that event the administrative remedy
would be the only one available or would have to be first exhausted is also reserved. The scope of any relief which might be
afforded-whether the liberties of an applicant could be restored only outside the areas in question-is likewise a distinct
issue. But if it were plain that no machinery was available whereby the individual could demonstrate his loyalty as a citizen
in order to be reclassified, questions of a more serious character would be presented. The United States, however, takes no
such position. We need go no further here than to deny the individual the right to defy the law. It is sufficient to say that he
cannot test in that way the validity of the orders as applied to him.

Mr. Justice MURPHY, concurring.

It is not to be doubted that the action taken by the military commander in pursuance of the authority conferred upon him
was taken in complete good faith and in the firm conviction that it was required by considerations of public safety and
military security. Neither is it doubted that the Congress and the Executive working together may generally employ such
measures as are necessary and appropriate to provide for the common defense and to wage war 'with all the force
necessary to make it effective.' United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 , 51 S.Ct. 570, 574. This includes authority to
exercise measures of control over persons and property hich would not in all cases be permissible in normal times. 1 [320
U.S. 81, 110] It does not follow, however, that the broad guaranties of the Bill of Rights and other provisions of the
Constitution protecting essential liberties are suspended by the mere existence of a state of war. It has been frequently
stated and recognized by this Court that the war power, like the other great substantive powers of government, is subject
to the limitations of the Constitution. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146,
156 , 40 S.Ct. 106, 108; Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 , 54 S.Ct. 231, 235, 88 A.L.R.
1481. We give great deference to the judgment of the Congress and of the military authorities as to what is necessary in the
effective prosecution of the war, but we can never forget that there are constitutional boundaries which it is our duty to
uphold. It would not be supposed, for instance, that public elections could be suspended or that the prerogatives of the
courts could be set aside, or that persons not charged with offenses against the law of war (see Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 ,
63 S.Ct. 2, 87 L. Ed. --) could be deprived of due process of law and the benefits of trial by jury, in the absence of a valid
declaration of martial law. Cf. Ex parte Milligan, supra.

Distinctions based on color and ancestry are utterly inconsistent with our traditions and ideals. They are at variance with
the principles for which we are now waging war. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that for centuries the Old World has
been torn by racial and religious conflicts and has suffered the worst kind of anguish because of inequality of treatment for
different groups. There was one law for one and a different law for another. Nothing is written more firmly into our law
than the compact of the Plymouth voyagers to have just [320 U.S. 81, 111] and equal laws. To say that any group cannot
be assimilated is to admit that the great American experiment has failed, that our way of life has failed when confronted
with the normal attachment of certain groups to the lands of their forefathers. As a nation we embrace many groups, some
of them among the oldest settlements in our midst, which have isolated themselves for religious and cultural reasons.

Today is the first time, so far as I am aware, that we have sustained a substantial restriction of the personal liberty of
citizens of the United States based upon the accident of race or ancestry. Under the curfew order here challenged no less
than 70,000 American citizens have been placed under a special ban and deprived of their liberty because of their
particular racial inheritance. In this sense it bears a melancholy resemblance to the treatment accorded to members of the
Jewish race in Germany and in other parts of Europe. The result is the creation in this country of two classes of citizens for
the purposes of a critical and perilous hour-to sanction discrimination between groups of United States citizens on the
basis of ancestry. In my opinion this goes to the very brink of constitutional power.
Except under conditions of great emergency a regulation of this kind applicable solely to citizens of a particular racial
extraction would not be regarded as in accord with the requirement of due process of law contained in the Fifth
Amendment. We have consistently held that attempts to apply regulatory action to particular groups solely on the basis of
racial distinction or classification is not in accordance with due process of law as prescribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Cf. Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 , 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1070; Yu Con Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 , 524-
528, 46 S.Ct. 619, 625, 626. See also Boyd v. Frankfort, 117 Ky. 199, 77 S.W. 669, 111 Am.St.Rep. 240; Opinion of the
Justices, 207 Mass. [320 U.S. 81, 112] 601, 94 N.E. 558, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 604. It is true that the Fifth Amendment, unlike
the Fourteenth, contains no guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Cf. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 , 59 S.Ct. 379,
386. It is also true that even the guaranty of equal protection of the laws allows a measure of reasonable classification. It
by no means follows, however, that there may not be discrimination of such an injurious character in the application of
laws as to amount to a denial of due process of law as that term is used in the Fifth Amendment. 2 I think that point is
dangerously approached when we have one law for the majority of our citizens and another for those of a particular racial
heritage.

In view, however, of the critical military situation which prevailed on the Pacific Coast area in the spring of 1942, and the
urgent necessity of taking prompt and effective action to secure defense installations and military operations against the
risk of sabotage and espionage, the military authorities should not be required to conform to standards of regulatory
action appropriate to normal times. Because of the damage wrought by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor and the availability
of new weapons and new techniques with greater capacity for speed and deception in offensive operations, the immediate
possibility of an attempt at invasion somewhere along the Pacific Coast had to be reckoned with. However desirable such a
procedure might have been, the military authorities could have reasonably concluded at [320 U.S. 81, 113] the time that
determinations as to the loyalty and dependability of individual members of the large and widely scattered group of
persons of Japanese extraction on the West Coast could not be made without delay that might have had tragic
consequences. Modern war does not always wait for the observance of procedural requirements that are considered
essential and appropriate under normal conditions. Accordingly I think that the military arm, confronted with the peril of
imminent enemy attack and acting under the authority conferred by the Congress, made an allowable judgment at the
time the curfew restriction was imposed. Whether such a restriction is valid today is another matter.

In voting for affirmance of the judgment I do not wish to be understood as intimating that the military authorities in time
of war are subject to no restraints whatsoever, or that they are free to impose any restrictions they may choose on the
rights and liberties of individual citizens or groups of citizens in those places which may be designated as 'military areas'.
While this Court sits, it has the inescapable duty of seeing that the mandates of the Constitution are obeyed. That duty
exists in time of war as well as in time of peace, and in its performance we must not forget that few indeed have been the
invasions upon essential liberties which have not been accompanied by pleas of urgent necessity advanced in good faith by
responsible men. Cf. Mr. Justice Brandeis concurring in Whitney v. Cal fornia, 274 U.S. 357, 372 , 47 S.Ct. 641, 647.

Nor do I mean to intimate that citizens of a particular racial group whose freedom may be curtailed within an area
threatened with attack should be generally prevented from leaving the area and going at large in other areas that are not in
danger of attack and where special precautions are not needed. Their status as citizens, though subject to requirements of
national security and [320 U.S. 81, 114] military necessity, should at all times be accorded the fullest consideration and
respect. When the danger is past, the restrictions imposed on them should be promptly removed and their freedom of
action fully restored.

Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, concurring.

I concur in the Court's opinion, except for the suggestion, if that is intended (as to which I make no assertion), that the
courts have no power to review any action a military officer may 'in his discretion' find it necessary to take with respect to
civilian citizens in military areas or zones, once it is found that an emergency has created the conditions requiring or
justifying the creation of the area or zone and the institution of some degree of military control short of suspending habeas
corpus. Given the generating conditions for exercise of military authority and recognizing the wide latitude for particular
applications that ordinarily creates, I do not think it is necessary in this case to decide that there is no action a person in
the position of General De Witt here may take, and which he may regard as necessary to the region's or the country's
safety, which will call judicial power into play. The officer of course must have wide discretion and room for its operation.
But it does not follow there may not be bounds beyond which he cannot go and, if he oversteps them, that the courts may
not have power to protect the civilian citizen. But in this case that question need not be faced and I merely add my
reservation without indication of opinion concerning it.

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC
NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO
CITY, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but hear me first!" It is this cry
that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.

The said executive order reads in full as follows:

WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect
to age;

WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition
against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the
disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in
me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture
by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.

(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President

Republic of the Philippines

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by
the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the
merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for
lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come
before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without
according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the
measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the
legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4

While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question raised there was
the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed
the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor
General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court
may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be
rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the
hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least
resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more
deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or
loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of
merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were
faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever
in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to
act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees,
orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the
exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order.
Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase
that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate
occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.

It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to avoid
controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule
was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the
Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because
due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command
for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was
meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may
require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a
legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated.
Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of
inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme
Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process — and in so doing sums it all up — as nothing more and nothing
less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed
against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby
won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow
that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent
or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his
cause.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is
formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must
also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is
indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination
of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the
pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive
regimes, the insolence of power.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because
they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the
jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient
rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the
law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the
law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of
every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due
process clause into a worn and empty catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The
conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human
experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are
instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per
se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the
people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The
passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has
fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public
morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the
property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due
process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The
individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still
after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is
a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare,
its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin
maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests
to the benefit of the greater number.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive
Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason,
as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit
of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the
worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have
been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.

A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of
large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for
having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed.
The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by
farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in
agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the
consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and
branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as
follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. ...

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration
was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural
work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from
the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of
momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of
the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a
direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure
is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the
above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if
male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for
farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with
equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original
measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing
that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to
be achieved by the questioned measure is missing

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering
that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by
simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter
cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that
the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported,
to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged
measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after
he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner
without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the
usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in
administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however.
there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected
and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties
involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited
by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal
in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have
had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned
executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see
fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse,
and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the
said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the
fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer,
they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly
profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable
in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was
his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the
President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court,
in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we
now annul.

The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never have
reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become a faitaccompli despite its invalidity. We
commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another
violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the
limbo of relinquished rights.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are
ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as
weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if
they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court
of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995

CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third District, South Cotobato) ADELBERT W. ANTONINO (First District, South
Cotobato), WILFREDO G. CAINGLET (Third District, Zamboanga del Norte), HILARION RAMIRO, JR. (Second Division,
Misamis Occidental), ERNESTO S. AMATONG (Second District, Zamboanga del Norte), ALVIN G. DANS (Lone District, Basilan),
ABDULLAH M. DIMAPORO (Second District, Lanao del Norte), and CONGRESSWOMAN MARIA CLARA A. LOBREGAT
(Lone District, Zamboanga City) petitioners,
vs.
HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary; COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SEC. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CABINET OFFICERS
FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS X AND XII, CHAIRMAN OF THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
COUNCIL FOR REGION X, CHAIRMAN JESUS V. AYALA, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR
REGIONS XI and XII, DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY SECRETARIAT, PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT STAFF, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of the
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT; and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCUM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.

IMMANUEL JALDON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR M. ORBOS, HON. FIDEL RAMOS, HON. SECRETARY LUIS SANTOS, AND HON.
NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALINA CAJUCOM, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:

These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No.
6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative determination the regions remaining after the
establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing for
the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao." A temporary restraining order prayed for by the petitioners was issued
by this Court on January 29, 1991, enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Executive Order and statute in question.

The facts are as follows:

Pursuant to Art. X, §18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in the provinces of Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and
the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. In the ensuing
plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these provinces became the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, § 13 of R.A. No.
6734 provides,

That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shall be included in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided, however, that the President may, by
administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on October 12, 1990 Executive Order
No. 429, "providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao." Under this Order, as amended by E.O. No.
439 —

(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of Region IX.

(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X will become parts of Region IX.

(3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.

(4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.

(5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.

(6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 are, or at least at the time of the filing of their petition, members of Congress representing various
legislative districts in South Cotobato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City. On November 12, 1990,
they wrote then President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that

There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within the existing regions —
some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite as in the case of the province of Misamis Occidental and the
cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz — and restructure them to new administrative regions. On the other hand,
the law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that "the provinces and cities which in the
plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions."

The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from Region X to Region IX; Lanao del Norte from Region XII
to Region IX, and South Cotobato from Region XI to Region XII are alterations of the existing structures of
governmental units, in other words, reorganization. This can be gleaned from Executive Order No. 429, thus

Whereas, there is an urgent need to reorganize the administrative regions in Mindanao to

guarantee the effective delivery of field services of government agencies taking into consideration
the formation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

With due respect to Her Excellency, we submit that while the authority necessarily includes the authority to merge,
the authority to merge does not include the authority to reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority under RA
6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be construed to include the authority to reorganize them. To do so will
violate the rules of statutory construction.

The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order 429 is actually a restructuring (reorganization) of
administrative regions. While this reorganization, as in Executive Order 429, does not affect the apportionment of
congressional representatives, the same is not valid under the penultimate paragraph of Sec. 13, Art. XIX of R.A.
6734 and Ordinance appended to the 1986 Constitution apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives of
Congress of the Philippines to the different legislative districts in provinces and cities. 1
As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New Administrative Region IX were scheduled on January 26,
1991, petitioners brought this suit for certiorari and prohibition.

On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a resident of Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity
of taxpayer and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.

Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, §13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative
power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no
standard for the exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.

In addition, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by Art. XIX,
§13 to the President is only to "merge regions IX and XII" but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and
certainly not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.

The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by E.O. No. 429 as merely the exercise of a power
"traditionally lodged in the President," as held in Abbas v. Comelec,2 and as a mere incident of his power of general supervision over
local governments and control of executive departments, bureaus and offices under Art. X, §16 and Art. VII, §17, respectively, of the
Constitution.

He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant of the power to "fill up" or provide the details of
legislation because Congress did not have the facility to provide for them. He cites by analogy the case of Municipality of Cardona
v. Municipality of Binangonan,3 in which the power of the Governor-General to fix municipal boundaries was sustained on the ground
that —

[such power] is simply a transference of certain details with respect to provinces, municipalities, and townships,
many of them newly created, and all of them subject to a more or less rapid change both in development and centers
of population, the proper regulation of which might require not only prompt action but action of such a detailed
character as not to permit the legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently.

The Solicitor General justifies the grant to the President of the power "to merge the existing regions" as something fairly embraced in
the title of R.A. No. 6734, to wit, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," because it
is germane to it.

He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in which the provinces and cities which took part in the
plebiscite are located but that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous region.

Finally, he invokes P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 which provides:

1. The President of the Philippines shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the National Government. In
exercising this authority, the President shall be guided by generally acceptable principles of good government and
responsive national government, including but not limited to the following guidelines for a more efficient, effective,
economical and development-oriented governmental framework:

(a) More effective planning implementation, and review functions;

(b) Greater decentralization and responsiveness in decision-making process;

(c) Further minimization, if not, elimination, of duplication or overlapping of purposes, functions,

activities, and programs;

(d) Further development of as standardized as possible ministerial, sub-ministerial and corporate

organizational structures;

(e) Further development of the regionalization process; and

(f) Further rationalization of the functions of and administrative relationships among government
entities.

For purposes of this Decree, the coverage of the continuing authority of the President to reorganize
shall be interpreted to encompass all agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units of the National
Government, including all government owned or controlled corporations as well as the entire
range of the powers, functions, authorities, administrative relationships, acid related aspects
pertaining to these agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units.

2. [T]he President may, at his discretion, take the following actions:

xxx xxx xxx

f. Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge, or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities, and
units of the National Government, as well as expand, amend, change, or otherwise modify their
 powers, functions and authorities, including, with respect to government-owned or controlled
corporations, their corporate life, capitalization, and other relevant aspects of their charters.

g. Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of
this Decree.

Considering the arguments of the parties, the issues are:

(1) whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in character, as petitioners contend, or whether it is executive in
character, as respondents claim it is, and, in any event, whether Art. XIX, §13 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the
President's discretion;

(2) whether the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute; and

(3) whether the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities in which either did not take part
in the plebiscite on the creation of the Autonomous Region or did not vote in favor of it; and

(4) whether the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City
to Pagadian City.

It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose for their creation. On September 9, 1968,
R.A. No. 5435 was passed "authorizing the President of the Philippines, with the help of a Commission on Reorganization, to
reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government, including banking
or financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it." The purpose was to promote "simplicity, economy and efficiency
in the government."4 The Commission on Reorganization created under the law was required to submit an integrated reorganization
plan not later than December 31, 1969 to the President who was in turn required to submit the plan to Congress within forty days after
the opening of its next regular session. The law provided that any reorganization plan submitted would become effective only upon the
approval of Congress.5

Accordingly, the Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated Reorganization Plan which divided the country into eleven
administrative regions. 6 By P.D. No. 1, the Plan was approved and made part of the law of the land on September 24, 1972. P.D. No.
1 was twice amended in 1975, first by P.D. No. 742 which "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and
Tawi-Tawi" and later by P.D. No. 773 which further "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao and divid[ed] Region IX
into two sub-regions." In 1978, P.D. No. 1555 transferred the regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga City.

Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to
him by law. In conferring on the President the power "to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" following the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation
dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the
division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of
executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. As this Court observed in Abbas, "while the power to
merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with
the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [seeArt. X, §4 of the Constitution]."
The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." 7 The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to
adjust municipal boundaries8 which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General9 or as "administrative in nature."

There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative
regions. The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of
the power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the title of the law.

First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. 10 Nor need it be
found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. 11

With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant
to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and
efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic
development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business." 12 Indeed, as the original eleven administrative
regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by
administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now
constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of
administrative regions.

Nor is Art. XIX, §13 susceptible to charge that its subject is not embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734. The constitutional requirement
that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" 13 has always been
given a practical rather than a technical construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is a sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are germane to
that subject. 14 Certainly the reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is germane to the general subject of R.A. No.
6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Finally, it is contended that the power granted to the President is limited to the reorganization of administrative regions in which some
of the provinces and cities which voted in favor of regional autonomy are found, because Art. XIX, §13 provides that those which did
not vote for autonomy "shall remain in the existing administrative regions." More specifically, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 claims:

The questioned Executive Order No. 429 distorted and, in fact, contravened the clear intent of this provision by
moving out or transferring certain political subdivisions (provinces/cities) out of their legally designated regions.
Aggravating this unacceptable or untenable situation is EO No. 429's effecting certain movements on areas which
did not even participate in the November 19, 1989 plebiscite. The unauthorized action of the President, as effected
by and under the questioned EO No. 429, is shown by the following dispositions: (1) Misamis Occidental, formerly
of Region X and which did not even participate in the plebiscite, was moved from said Region X to Region IX; (2)
the cities of Ozamis, Oroquieta, and Tangub, all formerly belonging to Region X, which likewise did not participate
in the said plebiscite, were transferred to Region IX; (3) South Cotobato, from Region XI to Region XII; (4) General
Santos City: from Region XI to Region XII; (5) Lanao del Norte, from Region XII to Region IX; and (6) the cities of
Marawi and Iligan from Region XII to Region IX. All of the said provinces and cities voted "NO", and thereby
rejected their entry into the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as provided under RA No. 6734. 15

The contention has no merit. While Art. XIX, §13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject to the qualification that "the
President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions." This means that while non-assenting provinces and cities
are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with
contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require.

The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative
regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the
efficient delivery of essential services. There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as they may
thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.

The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments,
which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be
overemphasized that administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political
representation.

Petitioners nonetheless insist that only those regions, in which the provinces and cities which voted for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region are located, can be "merged" by the President.

To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, §13 is not so limited. But the more fundamental reason is that the President's power cannot be so
limited without neglecting the necessities of administration. It is noteworthy that the petitioners do not claim that the reorganization of
the regions in E.O. No. 429 is irrational. The fact is that, as they themselves admit, the reorganization of administrative regions in E.O.
No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (2) transportation and communication facilities;
(3) cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and population; (5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-
economic development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.

What has been said above applies to the change of the regional center from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. Petitioners contend that
the determination of provincial capitals has always been by act of Congress. But as, this Court said in Abbas, 16 administrative regions
are mere "groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, . . . [They] are not territorial and political subdivisions like
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays." There is, therefore, no basis for contending that only Congress can change or
determine regional centers. To the contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773 and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize
administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center.

It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City may entail the expenditure of
large sums of money for the construction of buildings and other infrastructure to house regional offices. That contention is addressed
to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality and it is settled that courts are not the arbiters of the wisdom or expediency of
legislation. In any event this is a question that we will consider only if fully briefed and upon a more adequate record than that
presented by petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by
Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila,respondents.

Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:

I. The case and issue, in general

This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and
far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also
poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist.
Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the
alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic
independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible
measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be
free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?

II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main
provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail
trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are
allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary
retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical
persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of
licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and
other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged
in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail
business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other
matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a
provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months
for purposes of liquidation.

III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to
enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its
provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100%
Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5,
Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the
police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has
only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession,
only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved

a. The police power. —

There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that its exercise in this
instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before
proceeding to the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind certain basic and
fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal
protection clauses related to it? What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts?
These consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with
clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-
extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most
essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of
nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as
the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise
stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world,
so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve
interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set
forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.

b. Limitations on police power. —

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution:

SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to
citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.
(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)

c. The, equal protection clause. —

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

d. The due process clause. —

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public
interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved;
or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than
real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever
exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State
can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —

Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first place,
that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of
the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law
promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public
interest. On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance
to interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable
arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and
courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.

V. Economic problems sought to be remedied

With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If the disputed legislation were
merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it
goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more complex because its
subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which from the immemorial has always been open to residents,
irrespective of race, color or citizenship.

a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. —

In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they produce, the dealer, of course, is
unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in communities producing more than what they consume and needing
an infinite number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big communities and
specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which
man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer,
because thru him the infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail
dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members
of the communities comprising the nation.

There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He ministers to the resident's daily
needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his
customers around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to
sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the
owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait. —

The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of population (Time there was when he was
unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and
big centers of population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear, ministering to the
daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many
communities the alien has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and
forbearance of a slave.

Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent neighbors and
customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to
be harmless and extremely useful.

c. Alleged alien control and dominance. —

There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the controlling and dominant position that
the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents
mostly through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent control over
distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other
goods and articles. And were it not for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control
over principal foods and products would easily become full and complete.

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and
the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism.
Alienage, it is said, is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control virtually
impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion within
the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.

The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between the constitutional
convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with
fears and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably
point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade, as witness the following tables:

Assets Gross Sales

Year and Retailers No.- Per cent Per cent
Pesos Pesos
Nationality Establishments Distribution Distribution
1941:
Filipino .......... 106,671 200,323,138 55.82 174,181,924 51.74
Chinese ........... 15,356 118,348,692 32.98 148,813,239 44.21
Others ............ 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05
1947:
Filipino .......... 111,107 208,658,946 65.05 279,583,333 57.03
Chinese ........... 13,774 106,156,218 33.56 205,701,134 41.96
Others ........... 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01
1948: (Census)
Filipino .......... 113,631 213,342,264 67.30 467,161,667 60.51
Chinese .......... 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,227 38.20
Others .......... 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29
1949:
Filipino .......... 113,659 213,451,602 60.89 462,532,901 53.47
Chinese .......... 16,248 125,223,336 35.72 392,414,875 45.36
Others .......... 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17
1951:
Filipino ......... 119,352 224,053,620 61.09 466,058,052 53.07
Chinese .......... 17,429 134,325,303 36.60 404,481,384 46.06
Others .......... 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 87

AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT
Item Gross
Year and Retailer's
Assets Sales
Nationality
(Pesos) (Pesos)
 1941:
Filipino ............................................. 1,878 1,633

Chinese .............................................. 7,707 9,691

Others ............................................... 24,415 8,281
1947:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 2,516

Chinese ........................................... 7,707 14,934

Others .............................................. 24,749 13,919

1948: (Census)
Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,111

Chinese ............................................. 7,707 24,398

Others .............................................. 24,916 23,686
1949:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,069

Chinese .............................................. 7,707 24,152
Others .............................................. 24,807 20,737
1951:
Filipino ............................................. 1,877 3,905

Chinese ............................................. 7,707 33,207

Others ............................................... 24,824 22,033

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census,
issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)

The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino establishments already include mere
market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..

The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the
years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap
through their assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in
retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more.
The same official report, pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino
retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the
Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.

d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. —

It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's target in the enactment
of the disputed nationalization would never have been adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this
alien dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of the
Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been
either pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of
the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers
from alien interests that had already brought under their control the commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco,
Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the constitutional convention for the economic life
of the citizens, in connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:

But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the country is not desirable and that if
such a situation should remain, political independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private
capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of recent
formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the government as the instrumentality
of the national will, has to step in and assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of
the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages
an organized movement for the protection of the nation not only against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its
economic subjugation by alien interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)

Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino businessmen, manufacturers and producers
believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is
Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar resolution,
approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes,
and fears, alien predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien
stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the
sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.

e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing
feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough
organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices,
the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles
they would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of
national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike can be placed
completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because
the producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its
introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one
as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the
prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise
correspondingly suppressed.

We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien domination. Grave abuses have
characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly
overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien
participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which would
suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice,
creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the
inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and
Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control
laws, especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168),
authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret combinations among
themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest
merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are
believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated import and export
prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in
corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a
matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic
representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.

The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the future. The present dominance of the
alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other
calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are
well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of
population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While
the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential
enemy of the State.

f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of racial hostility,
prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized
representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its
disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope
of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.

VI. The Equal Protection Limitation

a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal
protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and
the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for
personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor
immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his
living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage
of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his
beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers
and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and
wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would
help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and temporary, it
would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of
commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation
of which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals,
show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the
legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the
national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for
a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.

b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —

The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient
grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's
classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is
actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not
declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the
equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited,
we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the
application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:

. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state the power to classify in the
adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done
only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable
basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it
results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One
who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis
but is essentially arbitrary."

c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. —

The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already been affirmatively decided in
this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the
validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels
engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to
aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The
legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands
from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its
constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of
the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In
rendering said decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9
Wheat., I, as follows:

"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers
of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the
object of which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations.
Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege
in favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give
the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her
enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the
Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well
as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."

The rule in general is as follows:

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the
limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a
class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between
citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of hawkers and peddlers, which provided
that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for
the following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to have regard for the
welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs.
State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors,
was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that
an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this
particular business to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71
L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of
licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not
follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made
the basis of permitted classification, and that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed
for the legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The
case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30
(Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting it to
citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained
in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said
that aliens are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibitions of
issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of
constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the
licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's findings that the exercise of the business by
the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and
Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible
to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over immigration, and because there is no public interest in
the mere claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further
added that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented on the
theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257
(Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of
age, was declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction
from the daily wage of an employee.

d. Authorities contra explained. —

It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold that the distinction between aliens
and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary,
unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public
interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a
Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local
dialect, but the main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of
distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right to be advised
of their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit would
be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on
their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent in the
operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that
there was no reason for the discrimination which attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive
thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and
peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the
classification was proposed.

The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens do not naturally possess the
sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster
the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land.
These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis
and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and
significance of the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:

. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the intimate knowledge of our laws,
customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different
psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born, whose
allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment and control have been engendered and
formed under entirely different regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they
as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the government itself. Further
enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the
Legislature was without plausible reason for making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against
aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .

VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.

a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. —

We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated by the highest authority in the
United States that:

. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to
adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by
legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the
 legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect
renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)

Another authority states the principle thus:

. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the scope of the police power in a
constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire
whether the restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it
imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it affects, must not be
for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)

In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:

. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .

Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of constitutionality:

In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate the operation of a
business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised
has a sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use
of that power, without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.

b. Petitioner's argument considered. —

Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago recognized as essential to
the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the
legislature to prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e.,
that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest
creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace,
tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly
abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the
occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.

The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this,
Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and
pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law
in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien
control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.)
The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its
purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be
considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill, which later was enacted into law:

This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from
having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones
who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no permanent
stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security,
will be at the mercy of other people.

In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of the Philippines
of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national security it
respects existing rights.

The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none the less legitimate. Freedom and
liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their
own race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one of the noblest
motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the
constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of
legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action. —

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of due process on the attainment of
such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the
Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the supreme happiness
of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a
resolution expressing their belief that the legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the
their Resolution:

That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of retail trade; but it abstain from
approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is
convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the
privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of
the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)

It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a
principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the
Philippines the exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that
"no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of
the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a
primary objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the
provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?

The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval of the radical measures is,
therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of
the nationals with the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public interest and
national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and
meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.

d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. —

A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is
made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest
of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to
those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the
privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the
law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the
Court will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is
primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and
though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of
the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but
its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised
against the law, some of which are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of
employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate
replacement is problematical; that there may be general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of
these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative prerogative; they do not
import invalidity.

VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law

A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it
conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The
constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:

No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the legislators or the public of the nature,
scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration
of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not
readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and
objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been
included within the term regulation.

Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the sale of intoxicating
liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)

Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the
title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an actprohibiting the sale of such
liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the subject of
regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
 The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and prohibition of acts usually done
in connection with the thing to be regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no
absolute reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a thing the
best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p.
42 of Answer.)

The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title need not be an index to the entire
contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in
question adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules
for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title
changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title
which would have made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the
drafting of statutes, under which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions
found in the body of the Act.

One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the
purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action
and study of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the
nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of
the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot
be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.

IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations

Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the United Nations
and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations
Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United
Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the
Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and
Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in
domestic trade are adopted.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be
violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as
the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other countries,
except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail
trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of
the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

X. Conclusion

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and
control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of
law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident
— as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the
segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty
has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.

Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less harsh in its impact on the
aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time
comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and
does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness
of the law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN.
EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to
nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines
(the Marines) to join the Philippine National Police (the PNP) in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in
a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and
suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the
PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with
the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction
02/2000[1] (the LOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be
conducted.[2] Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24
January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. [3] In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire
to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police
patrols.[4] The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is
necessary.[5] Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the
AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. [6] Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the
anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved.[7]
The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols as follows:
xxx

2. PURPOSE:

The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines partnership in the conduct of
visibility patrols in Metro Manila for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to national security.

3. SITUATION:

Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized syndicates whose
members include active and former police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline and firepower prove well-above the
present capability of the local police alone to handle. The deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the conduct of
police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former
police/military personnel.

4. MISSION:

The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro Manila streets
crime-free, through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated
by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former
PNP/Military personnel.

5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS:

a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police Office] and the Philippine
Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of the state against insurgents and other serious
threat to national security, although the primary responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rests upon the AFP.

b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes perpetrated by organized crime
syndicates operating in Metro Manila. This concept requires the military and police to work cohesively and unify efforts to ensure a
focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing crime prevention. Along this line, the role of the military and police aside from
neutralizing crime syndicates is to bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein delivery of basic services to the people and development is
achieved. Hand-in-hand with this joint NCRPO-Philippine Marines visibility patrols, local Police Units are responsible for the
maintenance of peace and order in their locality.

c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional Task Force TULUNGAN shall be organized to provide the
mechanism, structure, and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and assessing the security situation.

xxx.[8]
The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center,
Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport. [9]
 On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare
the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:
I

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN
THAT:

A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE
DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF
ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;

B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF

GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;

C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE
CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

II

IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING

THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. [10]

Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a Resolution, [11] dated 25 January 2000, required the Solicitor General to
file his Comment on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General submitted his Comment.
The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the Marines, contending,
among others, that petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny
since the same involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of
one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the Presidents
factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the
armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military
and the civilian character of the PNP.
The petition has no merit.
First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the
petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit
a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.[12]

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. [13] The term interest means a material interest,
an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest.[14] The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.[15]
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by
the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in
this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated,
the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section
2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien
to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the
IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members
of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized
the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned
governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the
operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have
been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement
which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed
injury not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since
petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the
personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has
absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this
Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not
satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved.[16] In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal
attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people.[17] Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure.[18] In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat
and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy
raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the
rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the President of the necessity of calling the armed
forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits that the deployment of the military
personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP questions,
however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines under the aforestated provision. According to the IBP, no emergency exists that
would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police force. It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
exist to warrant the calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court review the sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop
[Marine] deployment.[19]
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining to the necessity of calling the armed forces is not proper
for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this
Court.
As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent of judicial review. But,
while this Court gives considerable weight to the parties formulation of the issues, the resolution of the controversy may warrant a
creative approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power
exercised by the President is the power to call out the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved may be no more
than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general welfare. [20] For one, the realities on the ground do not show that
there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the citizenry,
a point discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus:

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The American
Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times
of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of
law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in
the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be
said to exclude the Presidents exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.

xxx[21]
Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the Presidents power to call out the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will reach a similar result.
We now address the Solicitor Generals argument that the issue involved is not susceptible to review by the judiciary because it
involves a political question, and thus, not justiciable.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review. [22] It pertains to
issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically
assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution.One class of cases
wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are political questions. The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the
separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear
need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
 As Taada v. Cuenco[23] puts it, political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of government. Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a
particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice
Brennan in Baker v. Carr,[24] [p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question.
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that (T)he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.[25] Under
this definition, the Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of
this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of legality or validity, not
its wisdom.[26] Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. [27] When political questions
are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.[28]
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. [29] Under this definition, a court is without
power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to
substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in
grave abuse of discretion.[30] A showing that plenary power is granted either department of government, may not be an obstacle to
judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy. [31]
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises
a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution
itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist
no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was
committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy
over the military. In the performance of this Courts duty of purposeful hesitation [32] before declaring an act of another branch as
unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Presidents judgment. To
doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed
forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

xxx
The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied
and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:
xxx

Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of
all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by
the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for
a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency
of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action
to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law
and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply
lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters.[33] That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the
President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, to wit:

FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-in-
Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.

When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is
subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But
when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment
cannot be reviewed by anybody.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first sentence: The
President may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is
sufficient for handling imminent danger.

MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the First Sentence:
The President....may call out such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that is
sufficient for handling imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or suspending the writ of habeas
corpus, he must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces of the Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea?

MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review. [34]

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest
leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and
review by this Court.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public
safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that
whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion."
The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two
other powers.
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot
undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily
quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors
which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity,
information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be
difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there
is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may
be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may
be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the
decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect
at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill
over the other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny
could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining
order every time it is exercised.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full
discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment
deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.
The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he
categorically asserted that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro
Manila...[35] We do not doubt the veracity of the Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present
developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public
utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we
hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional
power.

The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police
force.

Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the
deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Section 3, Article II [36] of the Constitution.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the
conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of
the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces
are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief
is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.[37] Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or
orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. [38] It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. [39] It is,
likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. [40] In view of the
foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of
the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution. [41]
In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian
law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority in these
operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case,
it does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually participates in the Task Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or
control over the same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to
civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character
of the PNP.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such,
there can be no insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution.
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The
Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and execution of
certain traditionally civil functions. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, some of the multifarious activities wherein military
aid has been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian and the military together in a relationship of cooperation,
are:
1. Elections;[42]
2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;[43]
3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;[44]
4. Amateur sports promotion and development;[45]
5. Development of the culture and the arts;[46]
6. Conservation of natural resources;[47]
7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program; [48]
8. Enforcement of customs laws;[49]
9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;[50]
10. Conduct of licensure examinations;[51]
11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students; [52]
12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;[53]
13. Sanitary inspections;[54]
14. Conduct of census work;[55]
15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;[56]
16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;[57]
17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units. [58]
This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued
to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned. [59] What we have here is mutual support and cooperation between the
military and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy.
In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards the use of military force for domestic purposes has
persisted,[60] and whose Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly provide for the power to call, the use of military personnel by
civilian law enforcement officers is allowed under circumstances similar to those surrounding the present deployment of the Philippine
Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Act[61] of the US, the use of the military in civilian law enforcement is generally prohibited, except
in certain allowable circumstances. A provision of the Act states:

1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part
of the Army or the Air Force as posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both.[62]

To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in the use of military personnel, the US courts[63] apply the
following standards, to wit:

Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee in such a manner that the military
personnel subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory[64] George
Washington Law Review, pp. 404-433 (1986), which discusses the four divergent standards for assessing acceptable involvement of
military personnel in civil law enforcement. See likewise HONORED IN THE BREECH: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO
EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale Law Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973. 64 in nature, either presently or
prospectively?

xxx

When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it to mean that military involvement, even when not expressly
authorized by the Constitution or a statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it actually regulates, forbids or compels
some conduct on the part of those claiming relief. A mere threat of some future injury would be insufficient.(emphasis supplied)

Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case to determine whether there is permissible use of the
military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution
is committed. On this point, the Court agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General:

3. The designation of tasks in Annex A[65] does not constitute the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military
power. First, the soldiers do not control or direct the operation. This is evident from Nos. 6, [66]8(k)[67] and 9(a)[68] of Annex
A. These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or condemn. In No. 9(d)[69] of Annex A, all arrested persons are
brought to the nearest police stations for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers apply no coercive force. The materials or
equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c) [70] of Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in character. The conclusion is
that there being no exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military power, the deployment of a handful of Philippine
Marines constitutes no impermissible use of military power for civilian law enforcement. [71]

It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy,
and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The power to call the armed forces is just
that - calling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the President
has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to
overrule the Presidents determination of the factual basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained that his
political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility
and the civil liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only
when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.

Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.

Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan

City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648; DELEGATION OF

LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS. — The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to
determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act,
to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National
Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
"whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and
interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of
the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use
of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road
or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the
duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion
is the making of the law.

2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. — Commonwealth Act No. 548 was
passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and
regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to
public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected
to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus,
31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without
which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the
government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that
the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.

3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by
the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance
of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
the greatest number."

DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of
prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director
of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City
of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from
1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m.
to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the
resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-
drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on
August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public
Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles,
between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick
up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the
use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This
contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has
nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases,
namely: ’The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as
to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.’ (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Comm’rs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio
St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to
an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to
whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. v. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing
tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the ’necessity’ of the case."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use
of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain provisions
controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads.
Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized
representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by
acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all
classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience
and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment
of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the
use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the
road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is
confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of
such discretion is the making of the law. As was said in Locke’s Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law, because
it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law
is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the
court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to
stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to
the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v.
Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)

In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan
Transportation v. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe
that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in
practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting
a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the
promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.

The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state.

Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly
was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which
is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons
and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of
the state (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline,
so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater
authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people.
The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.

The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S.
223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future,
because of the changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be
required to yield to the public good." And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing
within the police power of the state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of
civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of
the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many
questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered."cralaw virtua1aw library

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however,
is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all
the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic
life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons,
and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."cralaw virtua1aw library

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents
ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA
SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO
and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE
II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN
ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her
parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by
his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and
MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE,
MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and
HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents
BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents
ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by
their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors
and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all
surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA,
DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL,
and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch
66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the
issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests
and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared
for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary,
the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —
 (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and
fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat
of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that
in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per
cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the
distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as
(a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and
streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be
found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and
agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum —
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied
flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous
cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h)
increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural
plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion
peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric
power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic
climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to
present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting
roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or
four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of
the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to
various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this
ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work
great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may
never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection
by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
 16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs
served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme
prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in
the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D.
1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of
natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of
plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds,
namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action
presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited
by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to
rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning
their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural
law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right
to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not
apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby
before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of
law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the
same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of
the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without
the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit.
The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil
case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens
of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of
them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as
follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For
although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking
to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a
matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle
of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time
in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:
 Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation —
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and
advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to
come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the
debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air,
water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for
impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related
provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom
for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and
other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable
access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources,
not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in Section 1
thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration
and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with
the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment
and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably
accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental
cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes
particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
 Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for
the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention
to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy)
and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create,
develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the
attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the
other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty —
under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and
advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a
cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation
of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter
should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed
hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the
judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence
thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted,
what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well
as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed
violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing,
however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the
executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a
right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question
doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive
and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this
Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of
conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon
even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which
provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting
of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree
No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be
invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot
still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have
only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of
the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General,30 to wit:
 Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and
not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the
private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin
the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases
of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not
entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge
of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead
as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO,
FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I.
LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B.
MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES,
BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989

ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO,
PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros
Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO,
CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after
performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but
Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they
continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his body was
touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and
crushed him to death.

Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died.

The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and death, of men and
women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our
people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent
demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.

Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State
shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership
and profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at
emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil." 3

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII
on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people.
These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:

SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers,
to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution
of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,
taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall
further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of
the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by
P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private
lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.

The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987,
President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and
providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on
July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229,
providing the mechanics for its implementation.

Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President and
started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after
almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments,
nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4

The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions, including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above. They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution, The
different antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however, and will first be explained hereunder.

G.R. No. 79777

Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.

The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and
a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of
these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process,
equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also
for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover,
it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a court of justice
and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay 5 andManotok v. National Food
Authority. 6 Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of
bonds or other things of value.

In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as
protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian
problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.

The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them,
E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem
because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases ofChavez v.
Zobel, 7 Gonzales v. Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform
Council. 9 The determination of just compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the
questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any
rate, the challenge to the order is premature because no valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of
Agrarian Reform. The petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the maximum retention
limit of 7 hectares.

Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for retention limits on tenanted lands and
that in any event their petition is a class suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain that
the determination of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the cases invoked by the
public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was the
validity of the imposition of martial law.

In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and
21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it
suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures.

A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1. 83- hectare land, who
complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he
had reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the allegations in the
basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.

G.R. No. 79310

The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner
Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.

The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs
to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was
convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim
legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating
the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection.

They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:

Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY
BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to
1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten
wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good Government and such other sources as government may deem
appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose
authorized in this Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover the cost of the
contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.

Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e.,
with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof
provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the government,
which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain
controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in
money but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment
in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the
PARC.

The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of the sugar planters'
situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the
sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with problems
exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated.

A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which claims a
membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention
was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were granted by the Court.

NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that, in any event, the appropriation is
invalid because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide
for an initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the maximum authorized amount. This is
not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount has not been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available.

Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for
the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land for an amount equal
to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation he
is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.

In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for the expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and
submits that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the
people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation.

On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and
should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and
scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.

The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public money without the
corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only money already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. Finally,
the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually the maximum
sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional amounts may be appropriated later when necessary.

On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No.
229. In addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because:

(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;

(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;

(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and

(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the House of
Representatives.

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for
just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were
subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.

On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer and
asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on
December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had
not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they
directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.

The petitioner now argues that:

(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.

(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken
without due process or just compensation.

(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution.

The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary,
besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions
refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.

The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of his small
parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him
just compensation for his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:

Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance
payment for the land.

is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of even small landowners in the
program along with other landowners with lands consisting of seven hectares or more is undemocratic.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for reconsideration filed with the
Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were
enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:

The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of
agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be
considered amortization payments.

In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on December 14, 1987. An
appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the
validity of the public respondent's acts.

G.R. No. 78742

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven
hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are
occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his
farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been
determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of
Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court
for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.

In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from
persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not
fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975
(Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No.
11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981
(Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their
Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention
under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.

The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the pendency of their
appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done,
involves the exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if this function is
entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the government.

In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven
hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are
nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in Tanada v.
Tuvera.10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the
presidential decree.

Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the government, the judiciary is
nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the
fundamental law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly
assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of
their functions and of their respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive as
unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was
done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the Constitution would
not be breached.

In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the
concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their
session en banc.11 And as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if
it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. 12

With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the
petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts
or measures complained of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion
of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.

In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with
the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We
have since then applied this exception in many other cases. 15

The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.

In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues like the ones now
before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion,
its only criterion will be the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose.
Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as
intimidation.

For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily," to
use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of these departments, or of any public official, betray the people's will as expressed
in the Constitution.

It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that —

... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16

The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically resolve. And so we shall.

II

We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious challenges to the constitutionality of
the several measures involved in these petitions.

The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained
in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to
promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution, quoted above.

The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally
convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because
E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22,
1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they
continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso
facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's
loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.

Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures
and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed,
some portions of the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of
E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the CARP Law. 18

That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid
appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide
for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of
which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. 19 The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective
of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.

It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not
applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the
House of Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been convened when the
proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were,
both houses of Congress.

The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for
retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such
limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares:

Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly,
any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-
sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications:
 (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the
farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to
keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long
as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its
title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if
the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 20

The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the force
and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners
do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. The
important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time.

But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement for publication as
this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code,
they could not have any force and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was
published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)

Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the
performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but is
subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of
the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only
but not specific action.

Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of
such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of
mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is
purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public
official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great
detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave
it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require that
jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22

And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available from
the administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a question of law. 23

III

There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of
both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24for example, where a law required the
transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the
power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property
condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which
should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner.

In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a famous aphorism: "The
general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking." The regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of structures for human
habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its
mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held the
law could not be sustained without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that there was a
valid exercise of the police power. He said:

Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some
right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making
compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a
taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains
in the possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents the
owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases
to be noxious — as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions — the restriction will have to be
removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.

Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of eminent domain, with
the latter being used as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a
police purpose has long been accepted. 26 As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois
College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which sustained a zoning law under the
police power) makes the following significant remarks:
 Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent domain powers on different
planets. Generally speaking, they viewed eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property for
improvements that would be available for public use," literally construed. To the police power, on the other hand,
they assigned the less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a point reflected in the Euclid opinion's
reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. So long as suppression of a privately
authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure need have
afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive growth of government's involvement in land use, the
distance between the two powers has contracted considerably. Today government often employs eminent domain
interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police power-- a trend expressly approved in the Supreme
Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to
match that of the police power's standard of "public purpose." 27

The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the District of Columbia as a proper
exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:

If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.

Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is
clear.

For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S Supreme Court sustained the
respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a
multi-story office building over the Terminal, which had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation of the landmark was held
to be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however, was that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the right
to use the airspace above it although other landowners in the area could do so over their respective properties. While insisting that
there was here no taking, the Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it
said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called it, was explained by Prof.
Costonis in this wise:

In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was authorized to transfer to neighboring
properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's designation as a landmark — the rights which
would have been exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk
restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal
site by constructing or selling to others the right to construct larger, hence more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the
measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation
of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of
the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of
eminent domain.

Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several measures before us are challenged as
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses.

The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are prescribed has already been
discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in
Congress, the retention limits finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not
discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed violations of due process in connection with our examination of the
adequacy of just compensation as required under the power of expropriation.

The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also
become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also
the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the
ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the
Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.

Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each
other in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must
apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here
challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the
liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform
must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will
not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the
detriment of the Bill of Rights.

It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful
subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class
require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been
laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the
validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify
the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with
the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral
conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights.
It is no exaggeration to say that a, person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as
against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.

That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his
property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation.

This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.

IV

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public
use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is
willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed
upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions
offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the
State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public
interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the
supreme law.

But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The
limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation"
and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper
exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.

Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute public agricultural
lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural
lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls
for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner
prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified
in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.

A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is known as the
political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Tañada v. Cuenco: 36

The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
"those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of judicial power, which now includes the
authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even so, this should not be construed as a license for
us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may not coincide with ours.

The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution of private landholdings
(even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is first provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public Land Act and
other cognate laws). The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we believe that the political
decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be so.

In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company,38 it was held:

Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St. Mary's river between the
American bank and the international line, as well as all of the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its
entire length, was "necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters, and the waters connected therewith," that
determination is conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted by the United States under that Act, and there is
no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself No less than the 1987
Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the
prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration
of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public use, as pronounced
by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.

The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful examination.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. 39 It has been
repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. 40 The word "just" is used to intensify the
meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full, ample. 41

It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands
under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their
property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the
Constitution.

As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the
expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.

Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the condemned
property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of
taxation may be employed in raising the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:

Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The
DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.

Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the administrative
authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the
rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land-

... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by
requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the
land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is
deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for
decision.

To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other
branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos
providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property by the
government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court
held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:

The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment
on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it
for final determination.

Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just
compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the
lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be
useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy
the due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial
proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the
proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the
valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court
cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could
substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.

xxx

In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D. No.
1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and
authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint
commissioners for such purpose.
 This time, we answer in the affirmative.

xxx

It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is
unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a
minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented,
and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.

A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the challenged
decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties
are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly, the determination
of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for
Section 16(f) clearly provides:

Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.

The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will
still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.

The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved.

This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:

SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as
may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in
Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just
compensation for the land.

The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:

(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:

(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is
concerned — Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any time.

(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares —
Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial
instruments negotiable at any time.

(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five percent (35%)
cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at
any time.

(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other
qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;

(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;

(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:

(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent
(10%) of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of
issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That should the landowner choose
to forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid
correspondingly in LBP bonds;

(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the
landowner, his successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their
face value, for any of the following:

(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including

assets under the Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by
government financial institutions in the same province or region where the lands
for which the bonds were paid are situated;
 (ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled
corporations or shares of stock owned by the government in private
corporations;

(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused
persons, or for performance bonds;

(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the
proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a
small and medium- scale industry, in the same province or region as the land for
which the bonds are paid;

(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the use of
these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of the
outstanding balance of the financial instruments; Provided, further, That the
PARC shall determine the percentages mentioned above;

(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder
in government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;

(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in
government hospitals; and

(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.

The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of
the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. In
support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:

The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the
money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)

In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:

It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking.
Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the
expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned
property is entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy,
and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for such
property. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight of authority is also to the effect that
just compensation for property expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus —

The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot compel the owner to
accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis than
the value of the property in money at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes.
When the power of eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment, binding upon both
parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)

Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a reliable and constant
standard of compensation. 48

"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money, which must be paid at
least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for such
payment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage. 49(Emphasis supplied.)

It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so,
conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional
excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited
area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.

What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of
the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular
community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the
impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in
time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of
Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer
and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that
it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers
of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance.

Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to
expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount
of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully
available at this time.

We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority
project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also
intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method.
There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be
enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that
their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance
(if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value.
We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the
law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they presumably agreed in principle.

The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the members regarding the
meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated.
There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was also felt that they should
"leave it to Congress" to determine how payment should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-
beneficiaries. Such innovations as "progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also proposed. In the end,
however, no special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the Commission. 50

On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the general sentiments
and intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of
the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator.

With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore-
quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities
and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see
the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing
decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's
hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in
our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.

Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the
proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the
lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in
money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in
bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are
"negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable
because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to
the amount of just compensation.

Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. As already
remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of
the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of
agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail.

The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any more as it appears
that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as
embodied in the earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register the land, the
valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the
just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section
16.

The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just
compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain.

The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.
Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just
compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain
Act, or the commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51

... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in
the owner until payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the condemnor
until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838,
in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it was held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent to the
investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not to the appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the
Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment
of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further
said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the
property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his
consent, until just compensation has been made to him."

Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 56 that:

If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent
that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of
land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid ... . (Emphasis
supplied.)

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be
deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be
actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was
understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional
requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the
farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its
Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of
ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land."

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.

Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must
also be rejected.

It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are
retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that
"the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by
them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time
of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."

In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of
the President has already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not
preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative level,
especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects
of their petition.

Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention
rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657,
which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.

The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of bitter attack from those who point to
the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed,
they should be continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better protection of the farmer's
rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain
fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to
use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we venture forward, and, if
necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle as
best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.

By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way
for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation
and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last
the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but
also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more
fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the
music and the dream."

WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the
constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.

2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to
their respective owners.

3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.

4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention
rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.

5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103882 November 25, 1998

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, respondents, CULTURAL
CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.

G.R. No. 105276 November 25, 1998

PASAY CITY AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.:

At bar are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Here, the Court is
confronted with a case commenced before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal in Pasay City, in 1961,
more than 3 decades back, that has spanned six administrations of the Republic and outlasted the tenure of ten (10) Chief Justices of
the Supreme Court.

In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines, as petitioner, assails the Decision, dated January 29, 1992 and Amended
Decision, dated April 28, 1992, of the Court of Appeals1 which affirmed with modification the Decision of the former Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Branch 7, Pasay City) in Civil Case No. 2229-P, entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Pasay City and Republic
Real Estate Corporation".

The facts that matter are, as follows:

Republic Act No. 1899 ("RA 1899"), which was approved on June 22, 1957, authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by
chartered cities and municipalities. Section I of said law, reads:

Sec. 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own
expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to
establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such
municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications.

On May 6, 1958, invoking the a forecited provision of RA 1899, the Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the
reclamation of Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City, empowering the City Mayor to award and enter into
reclamation contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions therefor. The said Ordinance was amended on April 21, 1959 by
Ordinance No. 158, which authorized the Republic Real Estate Corporation ("RREC") to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under
certain terms and conditions.

On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an Agreement 2 for the reclamation of the foreshore lands in Pasay City.

On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines ("Republic") filed a Complaint 3 for Recovery of Possession and Damages
with Writ of Preliminary Preventive injunction and Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 2229-P before the former Court
of First Instance of Rizal, (Branch 7, Pasay City).

On March 5, 1962, the Republic of the Philippines filed an Amended Complaint 4 questioning subject Agreement between Pasay City
and RREC (Exhibit "P") on the grounds that the subject-matter of such Agreement is outside the commerce of man, that its terms and
conditions are violative of RA 1899, and that the said Agreement was executed without any public bidding.

The Answers 5 of RREC and Pasay City, dated March 10 and March 14, 1962, respectively, averred that the subject-matter of said
Agreement is within the commerce of man, that the phrase "foreshore lands" within the contemplation of RA 1899 has a broader
meaning than the cited definition of the term in the Words and Phrases and in the Webster's Third New International Dictionary and
the plans and specifications of the reclamation involved were approved by the authorities concerned.

On April 26,1962, Judge Angel H. Mojica, (now deceased) of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch 7, Pasay City)
issued an Order6 the dispositive portion of which was to the following effect:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby orders the defendants, their agents, and all persons claiming under them, to refrain
from "further reclaiming or committing acts of dispossession or dispoilation over any area within the Manila Bay or
the Manila Bay Beach Resort", until further orders of the court.

On the following day, the same trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction 7 which enjoined the defendants, RREC and Pasay
City, their agents, and all persons claiming under them "from further reclaiming or committing acts of dispossession."

Thereafter, a Motion to Intervene8, dated June 27, 1962, was filed by Jose L. Bautista, Emiliano Custodio, Renato Custodio, Roger de
la Rosa, Belen Gonzales, Norma Martiner, Emilia E. Paez, Ambrosio R. Parreno, Antolin M. Oreta, Sixto L. Orosa, Pablo S.
Sarmiento, Jesus Yujuico, Zamora Enterprises, Inc., Industrial and Commercial Factors, Inc., Metropolitan Distributors of the
Philippines, and Bayview Hotel, Inc. stating inter alia that they were buyers of lots in the Manila Bay area being reclaimed by RREC,
whose rights would be affected by whatever decision to be rendered in the case. The Motion was granted by the trial court and the
Answer attached thereto admitted.9

The defendants and the intervenors then moved to dismiss 10 the Complaint of the Republic, placing reliance on Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 5187, which reads:

Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects

xxx xxx xxx

m. For the construction of seawall and limited access highway from the south boundary of the City of Manila to
Cavite City, to the south, and from the north boundary of the City of Manila to the municipality of Mariveles,
province of Bataan, to the north, including the reclamation of the foreshore and submerged areas: Provided, That
priority in the construction of such seawalls, highway and attendant reclamation works shall be given to any
corporation and/or corporations that may offer to undertake at its own expense such projects, in which case the
President of the Philippines may, after competitive didding, award contracts for the construction of such project,
with the winning bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to be paid in terms of percentage fee of the
contractor which shall not exceed fifty percent of the area reclaimed by the contractor and shall represent full
compensation for the purpose, the provisions of the Public Land Law concerning disposition of reclaimed and
foreshore lands to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, finally, that the foregoing provisions and those of other
laws, executive orders, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, existing rights, projects and/or
contracts of city or municipal governments for the reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands shall be
respected. . . . . (emphasis ours).

Since the aforecited law provides that existing contracts shall be respected, movants contended that the issues raised by the
pleadings have become "moot, academic and of no further validity or effect."

Meanwhile, the Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. ("PLCU") moved to intervene 11, alleging as legal interest in the matter in
litigation the avowed purpose of the organization for the promotion of good government in Pasay City. In its Order of June 10, 1969,
the lower court of origin allowed the said intervention 12.

On March 24, 1972, the trial court of origin came out with a Decision, disposing, thus:

WHEREFORE, after carefully considering (1) the original complaint, (2) the first Amended Complaint, (3) the
Answer of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation to the first Amended Complaint, (4) the Answer of
Defendant Pasay City to the first Amended Complaint, (5) the Second Amended Complaint, (6) the Answer of
Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation to the Second Amended Complaint, (7) the Answer of Defendant Pasay
City to the Second Amended Complaint, (8) the Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction of Plaintiff, (9)
the Memorandum In Support of the Opposition to the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction of Defendant Pasay City
 and Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (10) the Answer in Intervention of Intervenors Bautista, et. al.,
(11) Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion to Intervene, (12) the Reply to Opposition to Motion to Intervene of
Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (13) the Stipulation of Facts by all the parties, (14) the Motion for Leave to Intervene of
Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (15) the Opposition to Motion For Leave to Intervene of
Intervenors Bautista, et. al., (16) the Reply of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (17) the
Supplement to Opposition to Motion to Intervene of Defendant Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation
(18) the Complain in Intervention of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (19) the Answer of
Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (20) the Answer of Intervenor Jose L. Bautista, et. al., to Complaint in
Intervention, (21) the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, and Intervenors
Bautista, et. al., (22) the Opposition of Plaintiff to said Motion to Dismiss, (23) the Opposition of Intervenor Pasay
Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (24) the Memorandum of the Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation, (25)
the Memorandum for the Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc., (26) the Manifestation of Plaintiff filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General, and all the documentary evidence by the parties to wit: (a) Plaintiff's Exhibits
"A" to "YYY- 4", (b) Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation's Exhibits "1-RREC" to "40-a" and (c) Intervenor
Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc's., Exhibits "A-PLACU" to "C-PLACU", the Court hereby:

(1) Denies the "Motion to Dismiss" filed on January 10, 1968, by Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and
Intervenors Bautista, et. al., as it is the finding of this Court that Republic Act No. 5187 was not passed by Congress
to cure any defect in the ordinance and agreement in question and that the passage of said Republic Act No. 5187
did not make the legal issues raised in the pleadings "moot, academic and of no further validity or effect;" and

(2) Renders judgment:

(a) dismissing the Plaintiff's Complaint;

(b) Dismissing the Complaint in Intervention of Intervenor Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc.,

(c) Enjoining Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City to have all the plans and
specifications in the reclamation approved by the Director of Public Works and to have all the contracts and sub-
contracts for said reclamation awarded by means of, and only after, public bidding; and

(d) Lifting the preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on April 26, 1962, as soon as Defendant Republic Real
Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City shall have submitted the corresponding plans and specifications to the
Director of Public Works, and shall have obtained approval thereof, and as soon as the corresponding public bidding
for the award to the contractor and sub-contractor that will undertake the reclamation project shall have been
effected.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (See Court of Appeals' Decision dated January 28, 1992; pp. 6-8)

Dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Republic appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals. However, on January 11, 1973, before
the appeal could be resolved, Presidential Decree No. 3-A issued, amending Presidential Decree No. 3, thus:

Sec. 1. Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 3, dated September 26, 1972, is hereby amended by the addition of the
following paragraphs:

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore
or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it under a proper contract.

All reclamations made in violation of this provision shall be forfeited to the State without need of judicial action.

Contracts for reclamation still legally existing or whose validity has been accepted by the National Government
shall be taken over by the National Government on the basis of quantum meruit, for proper prosecution of the
project involved by administration.

On November 20, 1973, the Republic and the Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP") signed a
Contract13 for the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project (Phases I and II) which contract included the reclamation and development of
areas covered by the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC. Then, there was issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 which
transferred to the Public Estate Authority ("PEA") the rights and obligations of the Republic of the Philippines under the contract
between the Republic and CDCP.

Attempts to settle amicably the dispute between representatives of the Republic, on the one hand, and those of Pasay City and RREC,
on the other, did not work out. The parties involved failed to hammer out a compromise.

On January 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals came out with a Decision 14 dismissing the appeal of the Republic and holding, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
 1. The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and submission of RREC's plans specification to the
Department Public Works and Highways in order that RREC may continue the implementation of the reclamation
work is deleted for being moot and academic;

2. Ordering the plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and possession over all vacant spaces in
the twenty-one hectare area already reclaimed by Pasay City and RREC at the time it took over the same. Areas
thereat over which permanent structures has (sic) been introduced shall, including the structures, remain in the
possession of the present possessor, subject to any negotiation between Pasay City and the said present possessor, as
regards the continued possession and ownership of the latter area.

3. Sustaining RREC's irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%) percent of the Twenty-One (21) hectares of land
already reclaimed by it, to be exercised within one (1) year from the finality of this decision, at the same terms and
condition embodied in the Pasay City-RREC reclamation contract, and enjoining appellee Pasay City to respect
RREC's option.

SO ORDERED.

On February 14, 1992, Pasay City and RREC presented a Motion for Reconsideration of such Decision of the Court of Appeals,
contending, among others, that RREC had actually reclaimed Fifty-Five (55) hectares, and not only Twenty-one (21) hectares, and the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in not awarding damages to them, movants.

On April 28, 1992, the Court of Appeals acted favorably on the said Motion for Reconsideration, by amending the dispositive portion
of its judgment of January 28, 1992, to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of our Decision dated January 28, 1992 is hereby AMENDED to read as
follows:

1. The requirement by the trial court on public bidding and the submission of the RREC's plans and specification to
the Department of Public Works and Highways in order that RREC may continue the implementation of the
reclamation work is deleted for being moot and academic.

2. Ordering plaintiff-appellant to turn over to Pasay City the ownership and possession of the above enumerated lots
(1 to 9).

3. Sustaining RREC's irrevocable option to purchase sixty (60%) percent of the land referred to in No. 2 of this
dispositive portion, to be exercised within one (1) year from the finality of this Decision, at the same terms and
condition embodied in the Pasay City-RREC reclamation contract, and enjoining Pasay City to respect RREC's
irrevocable option.

SO ORDERED.

From the Decision and Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals aforementioned, the Republic of the Philippines, as well as Pasay
City and RREC, have come to this Court to seek relief, albeit with different prayers.

On September 10, 1997, the Court commissioned the former thirteenth Division of Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on
the controversy. The corresponding Commissioner's Report, dated November 25, 1997, was submitted and now forms part of the
records.

On October 11, 1997, the Cultural Center of the Philippines ("CCP") filed a Petition in Intervention, theorizing that it has a direct
interest in the case being the owner of subject nine (9) lots titled in its (CCP) name, which the respondent Court of Appeals ordered to
be turned over to Pasay City. The CCP, as such intervenor, was allowed to present its evidence, as it did, before the Court of Appeals,
which evidence has been considered in the formulation of this disposition.

In G.R. No. 103882, the Republic of the Philippines theorizes, by way of assignment of errors, that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF PASAY CITY

ORDINANCE NO. 158 DATED APRIL 21, 1959 AND THE RECLAMATION CONTRACT
ENTERED INTO BETWEEN PASAY CITY AND RREC;

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RREC HAD RECLAIMED 55

HECTARES AND IN ORDERING THE TURN-OVER TO PASAY CITY OF THE
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF NINE (9) LOTS TITLED IN THE NAME OF CCP.

In G.R. No. 105276, the petitioners, Pasay City and RREC, contend, that:

I
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 3-
A UNCONSTITUTIONAL;

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF

PASAY CITY AND RREC.

Let us first tackle the issues posed in G.R. No. 103882.

On the first question regarding the validity of Pasay City Ordinance No. 158 dated April 21, 1959 and the Agreement dated April 24,
1959 between Pasay City and RREC, we rule in the negative.

Sec. 1 of RA 1899, reads:

Sec. 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry
out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore
lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate
docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in
consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.

It is the submission of the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, that there are no foreshore lands along the seaside of Pasay City 15;
that what Pasay City has are submerged or offshore areas outside the commerce of man which could not be a proper subject matter of
the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC in question as the area affected is within the National Park, known as Manila Bay
Beach Resort, established under Proclamation No. 41, dated July 5, 1954, pursuant to Act No. 3915, of which area it (Republic) has
been in open, continuous and peaceful possession since time immemorial.

Petitioner faults the respondent court for unduly expanding what may be considered "foreshore land" through the following
disquisition:

The former Secretary of Justice Alejo Mabanag, in response to a request for an opinion from the
then Secretary of Public Works and Communications as to whether the term, "foreshore areas" as
used in Section I of the immediately aforequoted law is that defined in Webster's Dictionary and
the Law of Waters so as to make any dredging or filling beyond its prescribed limit illegal, opined:

According to the basic letter of the Director of Public Works, the law of Waters
speaks of "shore" and defines it thus: "that space movement of the tide. Its
interior or terrestrial limit in the line reached by highest equinoctial tides."

Webster's definition of foreshore reads as follows:

That part of the shore between high water and low-water marks usually fixed at
the line to which the ordinary means tide flows: also, by extension, the beach,
the shore near the water's edge.

If we were to be strictly literal the term foreshore or foreshore lands should be

confined to but a portion of the shore, in itself a very limited area. (p. 6,
Intervenors-appellees' brief).

Bearing in mind the (Webster's and Law of Waters) definitions of "shore" and of
foreshore lands, one is struck with the apparent inconsistency between the areas
thus described and the purpose to which that area, when reclaimed under the
provision of Republic Act No. 1899, shall be devoted. Section I (of said Law)
authorizes the construction thereat of "adequate docking and harbor facilities".
This purpose is repeated in Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.

And yet, it is well known fact that foreshore lands normally extend only from 10
to 20 meters along the coast. Not very much more if at all. In fact certain parts in
Manila bordering on Manila Bay, has no foreshore to speak of since the sea
washes the sea wall.

It does not seem logical, then, that Congress had in mind. Webster's limited
concept of foreshore when it enacted Republic Act No. 1899, unless it intends
that the wharves, piers, docks, etc. should be constructed parallel to the shore,
which is impractical.

Since it is to be presumed that Congress could not have intended to enact an

ineffectual measure not one that would lead to absurd consequences, it would
seem that it used "foreshore" in a sense wider in scope that defined by
Webster. . . .
To said opinion on the interpretation of the R.A. 1899, plaintiff-appellant could not offer any
refutation or contrary opinion. Neither can we. In fact, the above construction is consistent with
the "rule on context" in statutory construction which provides that in construing a statute, the same
must be construed as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered
in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole (see Araneta vs.
Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709). There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the force and significance of
particular expressions will largely depend upon the connection in which they are found and their
relation to the general subject-matter of the law. The legislature must be understood to have
expressed its whole mind on the special object to which the legislative act is directed but the
vehicle for the expressions of that meaning is the statute, considered as one entire and continuous
act, and not as an agglomeration of unrelated clauses. Each clause or provision will be illuminated
by those which are cognate to it and by the general tenor of the whole statute and thus obscurities
end ambiguities may often be cleared up by the most direct and natural means. Secondly effect
must be given, if it is possible, to every word and clause of the statute, so that nothing shall be left
devoid of meaning or destitute of force. To this end, each provision of the statute should be read in
the light of the whole. For the general meaning of the legislature, as gathered from the entire act,
may often prevail over the construction which would appear to be the most natural and obvious on
the face of a particular clause. If is by this means that contradiction and repugnance between the
different parts of the statute may be avoided. (See Black, Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., pp. 317-
319).

Resorting to extrinsic aids, the "Explanatory Note" to House Bill No. 3830, which was
subsequently enacted as Republic Act No. 1899, reads:

In order to develop and expand the Maritime Commerce of the Philippines, it is

necessary that harbor facilities be correspondingly improved and, where
necessary, expanded and developed. The national government is not in a
financial position to handle all this work. On the other hand, with a greater
autonomy many chartered cities and provinces are financially able to have credit
position which will allow them to undertake these projects. Some cities, such as
the City of Bacolod under R.A. 161, has been authorized to reclaim foreshore
lands bordering it.

Other cities end provinces have continuously been requesting for authority to
reclaim foreshore lands on the basis of the Bacolod City pattern, and to
undertake work to establish, construct on the reclaimed area and maintain such
port facilities as may be necessary. In order not to unduly delay the undertaking
of these projects, and inorder to obviate the passage of individual pieces of
legislation for every chartered city and province, it is hereby recommended that
the accompanying bill be approved. It covers Authority for All chartered cities
and provinces to undertake this work. . . . (emphasis supplied)

Utilizing the above explanatory note in interpreting and construing the provisions of R.A. 1899,
then Secretary of Justice Mabanag opined:

It is clear that the "Bacolod City pattern" was the basis of the enactment of the
aforementioned bill of general application. This so-called "Bacolod City pattern"
appears to be composed of 3 parts, namely: Republic Ad No. 161, which grants
authority to Bacolod City to undertake or carry out . . . the reclamation . . . of
any [sic] carry out the reclamation project conformably with Republic Act No.
161; and Republic Act No. 1132 authorizing Bacolod City to contract
indebtedness or to issue bonds in the amount not exceeding six million pesos to
finance the reclamation of land in said city.

Republic Act No. 161 did not in itself specify the precise space therein referred
to as "foreshore" lands, but it provided that docking and harbor facilities should
be erected on the reclaimed portions thereof, while not conclusive would
indicate that Congress used the word "foreshore" in its broadest sense.
Significantly, the plan of reclamation of foreshore drawn up by the Bureau of
Public Works maps out an area of approximately 1,600,000 square meters, the
boundaries of which clearly extend way beyond Webster's limited concept of the
term "foreshore". As a contemporaneous construction by that branch of the
Government empowered to oversee at least, the conduct of the work, such an
interpretation deserves great weight. Finally, Congress in enacting Republic Act
No. 1132 (supplement to RA 161), tacitly confirmed and approved the Bureau's
interpretation of the term 'foreshore' when instead of taking the occasion to
correct the Bureau of over extending its plan, it authorized the city of Bacolod to
raise the full estimated cost of reclaiming the total area covered by the plan. The
explanatory note to House Bill No. 1249 which became Republic Act No. 1132
states among the things:
 The Bureau of Public Works already prepared a plan for the reclamation of
about 1,600,000 square meters of land at an estimated costs of about
P6,000,000.00. The project is self-supporting because the proceeds from the
sales or leases of lands so reclaimed will be more than sufficient to cover the
cost of the project.

Consequently, when Congress passed Republic Act No. 1899 in order to

facilitate the reclamation by local governments of foreshore lands on the basis of
the Bacolod City pattern and in order to obviate the passage of individual pieces
of legislation for every chartered city and provinces requesting authority to
undertake such projects, the lawmaking body could not have had in mind the
limited area described by Webster as "foreshore" lands. . . . .

If it was really the intention of Congress to limit the area to the strict literal meaning of
"foreshore" lands which may be reclaimed by chartered cities and municipalities, Congress would
have excluded the cities of Manila, Iloilo, Cebu, Zamboanga and Davao from the operation of RA
1899 as suggested by Senator Cuenco during the deliberation of the bill considering that these
cities do not have 'foreshore' lands in the strict meaning of the term. Yet, Congress did not approve
the proposed amendment of Senator Cuenco, implying therefore, that Congress intended not to
limit the area that may be reclaimed to the strict definition of "foreshore" lands.

The opinion of the then Secretary of Justice Mabanag, who was at that time the chief law officer
and legal adviser of the government and whose office is required by law to issue opinions for the
guidance of the various departments of the government, there being then no judicial interpretation
to the contrary, is entitled to respect (see Bengzon vs. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, 68
Phil. 912).

We are not unmindful of the Supreme Court Resolution dated February 3, 1965 inPonce vs.
Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce vs. City of Cebu (L-2266), by a unanimous vote of six (6) justices
(the other five (5) members deemed it unnecessary to express their view because in their opinion
the questions raised were not properly brought before the court), which in essence applied the
strict dictionary meaning of "foreshore lands" as used in RA 1899 in the case of the city of Cebu.
But this was promulgated long after the then Secretary of Justice Mabanag rendered the above
opinion on November 16, 1959 and long after RREC has started the subject reclamation project.

Furthermore, as held by the lower court, Congress, after the Supreme Court issued the
aforementioned Resolution, enacted RA 5187. In Sec. 3 (m) of said law, Congress appropriated
money "for the construction of the seawall and limited access highway from the South boundary
of the city of Manila to Cavite City, to the South, and from the North boundary of the city of
Manila to the municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, to the North (including the
reclamation of foreshore and submerged areas . . . provided . . . that . . . existing projects and/or
contracts of city or municipal governments for the reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands
shall be respected . . ." This is a clear manifestation that Congress in enacting RA 1899, did not
intend to limit the interpretation of the term "foreshore land" to its dictionary meaning.

It is presumed that the legislature was acquainted with and had in mind the judicial construction
given to a former statute on the subject, and that the statute on the subject, and that the statute was
enacted having in mind the judicial construction that the prior enactment had received, or in the
light of such existing judicial decisions as have direct bearing upon it (see 50 Am. Jur., Sec. 321,
pp. 312-313). But notwithstanding said interpretation by the Supreme Court of RA 1899 in the
Ponce cases, Congress enacted a law covering the same areas previously embraced in a RA 1899
(as mentioned earlier, cities without foreshore lands which were sought to be excluded from the
operation of RA 1899 were not excluded), providing that respect be given the reclamation of not
only foreshore lands but also of submerged lands signifying its non-conformity to the judicial
construction given to RA 1899. If Congress was in accord with the interpretation and construction
made by the Supreme Court on RA 1899, it would have mentioned reclamation of "foreshore
lands" only in RA 5187, but Congress included "submerged lands" in order to clarify the intention
on the grant of authority to cities and municipalities in the reclamation of lands bordering them as
provided in RA 1899. It is, therefore, our opinion that it is actually the intention of Congress in
RA 1899 not to limit the authority granted to cities and municipalities to reclaim foreshore lands
in its strict dictionary meaning but rather in its wider scope as to include submerged lands.

The Petition is impressed with merit.

To begin with, erroneous and unsustainable is the opinion of respondent court that under RA 1899, the term "foreshore lands" includes
submerged areas. As can be gleaned from its disquisition and rationalization aforequoted, the respondent court unduly stretched and
broadened the meaning of "foreshore lands", beyond the intentment of the law, and against the recognized legal connotation of
"foreshore lands". Well entrenched, to the point of being elementary, is the rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. 16 So also, resort to extrinsic aids, like the
records of the constitutional convention, is unwarranted, the language of the law being plain and unambiguous. 17 Then, too, opinions
of the Secretary of Justice are unavailing to supplant or rectify any mistake or omission in the law. 18 To repeat, the term "foreshore
lands" refers to:
 The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide. (Words and Phrases, "Foreshore")

A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the
low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave
wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New International
Dictionary)

The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning, much less widen the
coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did
not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term "foreshore lands".

Neither is there any valid ground to disregard the Resolution of this Court dated February 3, 1965 in Ponce v. Gomez (L-21870)
and Ponce v. City of Cebu (L-22669) despite the enactment of Republic Act No. 5187 ("RA 5187"), the relevant portion of which,
reads:

Sec. 3. Miscellaneous Projects

xxx xxx xxx

m. For the construction of seawall and limited access highway from the south boundary of the City
of Manila to Cavite City, to the south, and from the north boundary of the City of Manila to the
municipality of Mariveles, province of Bataan, to the north, including the reclamation of the
foreshore and submerged areas:Provided, That priority in the construction of such seawalls,
highway and attendant reclamation works shell be given to any corporation and/or corporations
that may offer to undertake at its own expense such projects, in which case the President of the
Philippines may, after competitive bidding, award contracts for the construction of such projects,
with the winning bidder shouldering all costs thereof, the same to be paid in terms of percentage
fee of the contractor which shall not exceed fifty percent of the area reclaimed by the contractor
and shall represent full compensation for the purpose, the provisions of the Public Land Law
concerning disposition of reclaimed and foreshore lands to the contrary notwithstanding:Provided,
finally, that the foregoing provisions and those of other laws, executive orders, rules and
regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, existing rights, projects and/or contracts of city or
municipal governments for the reclamation of foreshore and submerged lands shall be
respected. . . . .

There is nothing in the foregoing provision of RA 5187 which can be interpreted to broaden the scope of "foreshore lands." The said
law is not amendatory to RA 1899. It is an Appropriations Act, entitled — "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR PUBLIC
WORKS, SYNCHRONIZING THE SAME WITH PREVIOUS PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATIONS."

All things viewed in proper perspective, we reiterate what was said in Ponce v. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce v. City of Cebu (L-
22669) that the term "foreshore" refers to "that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the
ordinary flow of the tides." As opined by this Court in said cases:

WHEREAS, six (6) members of the Court (Justices Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera,
Dizon and Jose P. Bengzon) opine that said city ordinance and contracts are ultra vires and hence,
null and void, insofar as the remaining 60% of the area aforementioned, because the term
"foreshore lands" as used in Republic Act No. 1899 should be understood in the sense attached
thereto by common parlance; (emphasis ours)

The aforesaid ruling was applied by then Secretary of Justice Claudio Teehankee, in his opinion dated December 22, 1966, in a case
with analogous facts as the present one, to wit:

December 22, 1966

The Secretary of Agriculture

and Natural Resources

Diliman, Quezon City

Sir:

xxx xxx xxx

I. Facts —

1. On January 19, 1961, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1899, the Municipality of
Navotas enacted Ordinance No. 1 authorizing the Municipal Mayor to enter into a reclamation
contract with Mr. Chuanico.
 2. On March 15, 1961, a reclamation contract was concluded between the Municipality of
Navotas, represented by the Municipal Mayor, and Mr. Chuanico in accordance with the above
ordinance. Thereunder, Mr. Chuanico shall be the attorney-in-fact of the Municipality in
prosecuting the reclamation project and shall advance the money needed therefor; that the actual
expenses incurred shall be deemed a loan to the Municipality; that Mr. Chuanico shall have the
irrevocable option to buy 70% of the reclaimed area at P7.00 per square meter; that he shall have
the full and irrevocable powers to do any and all things necessary and proper in and about the
premises," including the power to hire necessary personnel for the prosecution of the work,
purchase materials and supplies, and purchase or lease construction machineries and equipment,
but any and all contracts to be concluded by him in behalf of the Municipality shall be submitted
to public bidding.

xxx xxx xxx

3. On March 16, 1961, the Municipal Council of Navotas passed Resolution No. 22 approving and
ratifying the contract.

xxx xxx xxx

III. Comments —

1. The above reclamation contract was concluded on the basis of Navotas Ordinance No. 1 which,
in turn, had been enacted avowedly pursuant to Republic Act No. 1899. This being so, the
contract, in order to be valid, must conform to the provisions of the said law.

By authorizing local governments "to execute by administration any reclamation work," (Republic
Act No. 1899 impliedly forbids the execution of said project bycontract. Thus, in the case
or Ponce et al. vs. Gomez (February 3, 1966), five justices of the Supreme Court voted to annul
the contract between Cebu Development Corporation and Cebu City for the reclamation of
foreshore lands because "the provisions of said . . . contract are not . . . in accordance with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1899," as against one Justice who opined that the contract
substantially complied with the provisions of the said law. (Five Justices expressed no opinion on
this point.)

Inasmuch as the Navotas reclamation contract is substantially similar to the Cebu reclamation
contract, it is believed that the former is likewise fatally defective.

2. The Navotas reclamation project envisages the construction of a channel along the Manila Bay
periphery of that town and the reclamation of approximately 650 hectares of land from said
channel to a seaward distance of one kilometer. In the basic letter it is stated that "practically, all
the 650 hectares of lands proposed to be reclaimed under the agreement" do not constitute
foreshore lands and that "the greater portion of the area . . . is in fact navigable and presently being
used as a fishing harbor by deep-sea fishing operators as well as a fishing ground of sustenance
fisherman. Assuming the correctness of these averments, the Navotas reclamation contract
evidently transcends the authority granted under Republic Act No. 1899, which empowers the
local governments to reclaim nothing more than "foreshore lands, i.e., "that part of the land
adjacent to the see which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides." (26
C.J. 890.) It was for this reason that in the cited case Ponce case, the Supreme Court, by a vote of
6-0 with five Justices abstaining, declared ultra vires and void the contractual stipulation for the
reclamation of submerged lands off Cebu City, and permanently enjoined its execution under
Republic Act No. 1899.

xxx xxx xxx

In accordance with the foregoing, I have the honor to submit the view that the Navotas
reclamation contract is not binding and should be disregarded for non-compliance with law.

Very truly yours,

(SGD) CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE

Secretary of Justice

The said opinion of Justice Secretary Teehankee who became Associate Justice, and later Chief Justice, of this Court, did, in our
considered view, supersede the earlier opinion of former justice Secretary Alejo Mabanag, aforestated, as the cases, in connection with
which subject opinions were sought, were with similar facts. The said Teehankee opinion accords with RA 1899.

It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement
under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.
What is worse, the same Agreement was vitiated by the glaring absence of a public bidding.

Obviously, there is a complete dearth of evidence to prove that RREC had really reclaimed 55 hectares. The letter of Minister Baltazar
Aquino relied upon by RREC is no proof at all that RREC had reclaimed 55 hectares. Said letter was just referring to a tentative
schedule of work to be done by RREC, even as it required RREC to submit the pertinent papers to show its supposed accomplishment,
to secure approval by the Ministry of Public Works and Highways to the reclamation plan, and to submit to a public bidding all
contracts and sub-contracts for subject reclamation project but RREC never complied with such requirements and conditions sine qua
non.

No contracts or sub-contracts or agreements, plans, designs, and/or specifications of the reclamation project were presented to reflect
any accomplishment. Not even any statement or itemization of works accomplished by contractors or subcontractors or vouchers and
other relevant papers were introduced to describe the extent of RREC's accomplishment. Neither was the requisite certification from
the City Engineer concerned that "portions of the reclamation project not less than 50 hectares in area shall have been accomplished or
completed" obtained and presented by RREC.

As a matter of fact, no witness ever testified on any reclamation work done by RREC, and extent thereof, as of April 26, 1962. Not a
single contractor, sub-contractor, engineer, surveyor, or any other witness involved in the alleged reclamation work of RREC testified
on the 55 hectares supposedly reclaimed by RREC. What work was done, who did the work, where was it commenced, and when was
it completed, was never brought to light by any witness before the court. Certainly, onus probandi was on RREC and Pasay City to
show and point out the as yet unidentified 55 hectares they allegedly reclaimed. But this burden of proof RREC and Pasay City
miserably failed to discharge.

So also, in the decision of the Pasay Court of First Instance dismissing the complaint of plaintiff-appellant, now petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, the lifting of the writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on April 26, 1962 would become effective only "as soon as
Defendant Republic Real Estate Corporation and Defendant Pasay City shall have submitted the corresponding plans and
specifications to the Director of Public Work, and shall have obtained approval thereof, and as soon as corresponding public bidding
for the award to the contractor and sub-contractor that will undertake the reclamation project shall have been effected." (Rollo, pp.
127-129, G.R. No. 103882)

From the records on hand, it is abundantly clear that RREC and Pasay City never complied with such prerequisites for the lifting of
the writ of Preliminary Injunction. Consequently, RREC had no authority to resume its reclamation work which was stopped by said
writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962.

From the Contract for Dredging Work, dated November 26, 1960, marked Exhibit "21-A" for RREC before the lower court, and
Exhibit "EE" for CCP before the Court of Appeals, it can be deduced that only on November 26, 1960 did RREC contract out the
dredging work to C and A Construction Company, Inc., for the reclamation of the 55 hectares initially programmed to be reclaimed by
it. But, as stated by RREC itself in the position paper filed with this Court on July 15, 1997, with reference to CDCP's reclamation
work, mobilization of the reclamation team would take one year before a reclamation work could actually begin. Therefore, the
reclamation work undertaker by RREC could not have started before November 26, 1961.

Considering that on April 26, 1962 RREC was enjoined from proceeding any further with its reclamation work, it had barely five (5)
months, from November, 1961 to April, 1962, to work on subject reclamation project. It was thus physically impossible for RREC to
reclaim 55 hectares, with the stipulated specifications and elevation, in such a brief span of time. In the report of RREC (Exhibit "DD"
for CCP), it was conceded that due to the writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962, C and A Construction Co., Inc. had
suspended its dredging operation since May, 1962.

The "graphical report" on the Pasay Reclamation project, as of April 30, 1962, attached to the Progress Report marked Exhibit "DD",
is a schematic representation of the work accomplishment referred to in such Progress Report, indicating the various elevations of the
land surface it embraced, ranging from 0.00 meters to the highest elevation of 2.5 meters above MLLW. Such portrayal of work
accomplished is crucial in our determination of whether or not RREC had actually "reclaimed" any land as under its Contract for
Dredging Work with C and A Construction Company (Exhibit "EE", the required final elevation for a completely reclaimed land was
3.5 meters above MLLW, as explicitly provided in said Contract for Dredging Work. So, the irresistible conclusion is — when the
work on subject RREC-Pasay City reclamation project stopped in April, 1962 in compliance with the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court of origin, no portion of the reclamation project worked on by RREC had reached the stipulated elevation of
3.5 meters above MLLW. The entire area it worked on was only at sea level or 0.00 meter above MLLW. In short, RREC had not yet
reclaimed any area when the writ of preliminary injunction issued in April 1962.

On this point, the testimonies of Architect Ruben M. Protacio, Architect and Managing partner of Leandro V. Locsin and partners,
Architect and City Planner Manuel T. Mañoza, Jr. of Planning Resources and Operation System, Inc., Rose D. Cruz, Executive
Assistant, Office of the President, from 1966 to 1970, and Dr. Lucrecia Kasilag, National Artist and member of CCP Advisory
Committee, come to the fore. These credible, impartial and knowledgeable witnesses recounted on the witness stand that when the
construction of the Main Building of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) began in 1966, the only surface land available was
the site for the said building (TSN, Sept. 29, 1997, pages 8, 14 and 50), what could be seen in front of and behind it was all water
(TSN, Sept. 29, 1997 pages 127-128). When the CCP Main Building was being constructed, from 1968 to 1969, the land above sea
level thereat was only where the CCP Main Building was erected and the rest of the surroundings were all under water, particularly
the back portion fronting the bay. (TSN, Sept. 13, 1997, pp. 181, 182, 185, 186, 188). Dr. Lucrecia R. Kasilag stressed that on April
16, 1966, during the ground breaking for the CCP Main Building, it was water all around (TSN, Sept. 30, 1997, pp. 320, 324, 325).

There was indeed no legal and factual basis for the Court of Appeals to order and declare that "the requirement by the trial court on
public bidding and the submission of RREC's plans and specification to the Department of Public Works and Highways in order that
RREC may continue the implementation of the reclamation work is deleted for being moot and academic." Said requirement has never
become moot and academic. It has remained indispensable, as ever, and non-compliance therewith restrained RREC from lawfully
resuming the reclamation work under controversy, notwithstanding the rendition below of the decision in its favor.

Verily, contrary to what the Court of Appeals found, RREC had not reclaimed any area with the prescribed elevation of 3.5 meters
above MLLW, so much so that in 1978, it (RREC) opted to file with the former Ministry of Public Highways, a claim for
compensation of P30,396,878.20, for reclamation work allegedly done before the CDCP started working on the reclamation of the
CCP grounds. On September 7, 1979, RREC asked the Solicitor General to settle its subject claim for compensation at the same
amount of P30,396,878.20. But on June 10, 1981, guided by the cost data, work volume accomplished and other relevant information
gathered by the former Ministry of Public Highways, the Solicitor General informed RREC that the value of what it had
accomplished, based on 1962 price levels, was only P8,344,741.29, and the expenses for mobilization of equipment amounted to
P2,581,330.00. The aforesaid evaluation made by the government, through the then Minister of Public Highways, is factual and
realistic, so much so that on June 25, 1981, RREC, in its reply letter to the Solicitor General, stated:

We regret that we are not agreeable to the amount of P10,926,071.29, based on 1962 cost
data, etc., as compensation based on quantum meruit. The least we would consider is the amount
of P10,926,071.29 plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 1962 to the time of payment. We
feel that 6% is very much less than the accepted rate of inflation that has supervened since 1962 to
the present, and even less than the present legal rate of 12% per annum. 19

Undoubtedly, what RREC claimed for was compensation for what it had done, and for the dredge fill of 1,558,395 cubic meters it
used, on subject reclamation project.

Respondent Court likewise erred in ordering the turn-over to Pasay City of the following titled lots, to wit:

LOT NO. BUILDING AREA OCT/TCT

42 Gloria Maris 9,516 sq.m. OCT 159 in the

Restaurant name of GSIS

3 Asean Garden 76,299 sq.m. OCT 10251 in the

name of CCP

12 Folk Arts Theater 1.7503 hec. TCT 18627 in the

and PICC parking name of CCP

space

22 landscaped with 132,924 sq.m. TCT 75676 in the

sculpture of Asean name of CCP

Artists-site of

Boom na Boom

23 open space, back 34,346 sq.m. TCT 75677 in the

of Philcite name of CCP

24 Parking space for 10,352 sq.m. TCT 75678 in the

Star City, CCP, name of CCP

Philcite

25 open space 11,323 sq.m. TCT 75679 in the

occupied by Star name of CCP

City

28 open space, 27,689 sq.m. TCT 75684 in the

beside PICC name of CCP

29 open space, 106,067 sq.m. TCT 75681 in the

 leased by El name of CCP

Shaddai

We discern no factual basis nor any legal justification therefor. In the first place, in their answer to the Complaint and
Amended Complaint below, RREC and Pasay City never prayed for the transfer to Pasay City of subject lots, title to which
had long become indefeasible in favor of the rightful title holders, CCP and GSIS, respectively.

The annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title covering the said lots is of no moment. It did not vest in Pasay City
and RREC any real right superior to the absolute ownership thereover of CCP and GSIS. Besides, the nature of the action did not
really warrant the issuance of a notice of lis pendens.

Sec. 14 of Rule 13, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, reads:

Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens. — In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real
properly, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may
record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a
notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the
object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected thereby.
Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the
property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action,
and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.

The notice of lis pendens herein above mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court,
after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is
not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.

Under the aforecited provision of law in point, a notice of lis pendens is necessary when the action is for recovery of possession or
ownership of a parcel of land. In the present litigation, RREC and Pasay City, as defendants in the main case, did not counterclaim for
the turnover to Pasay City of the titled lots aforementioned.

What is more, a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not,
may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or annul it. (Halili vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 257 SCRA 174,
Cimafranca vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 611.) Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the germane provision of
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, that a certificate of title can never be the subject of a collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding instituted in accordance with law.

Although Pasay City and RREC did not succeed in their undertaking to reclaim any area within subject reclamation project, it
appearing that something compensable was accomplished by them, following the applicable provision of law and hearkening to the
dictates of equity, that no one, not even the government, shall unjustly enrich oneself/itself at the expense of another 20, we believe;
and so hold, that Pasay City and RREC should be paid for the said actual work done and dredge-fill poured in, worth P10,926,071.29,
as verified by the former Ministry of Public Highways, and as claimed by RREC itself in its aforequoted letter dated June 25, 1981.

It is fervently hoped that long after the end of our sojourn in this valley of tears, the court, for its herein historic disposition, will be
exalted by the future generations of Filipinos, for the preservation of the national patrimony and promotion of our cultural heritage. As
writer Channing rightly puts it: "Whatever expands the affections, or enlarges the sphere of our sympathies — Whatever makes us feel
our relation to the universe and all that it inherits in time and in eternity, and to the great and beneficent cause of all, must
unquestionably refine our nature, and elevate us in the scale of being."

WHEREFORE:

In G.R. No. 103882, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision, dated January 28, 1992, and Amended Decision, dated April 28, 1992,
of the Court of Appeals, are both SET ASIDE; and Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, dated May 6, 1958, and Ordinance No. 158, dated
April 21, 1959, as well as the Reclamation Agreements entered into by Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) as
authorized by said city ordinances, are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires, and contrary to Rep. Act 1899.

The writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 26, 1962 by the trial court a quo in Civil Case No. 2229-P is made permanent and
the notice of lis pendens issued by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51349 ordered CANCELLED. The Register of Deeds of
Pasay City is directed to take note of and annotate on the certificates of title involved, the cancellation of subject notice of lis pendens.

The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, is hereby ordered to pay Pasay City and Republic Real Estate Corporation the sum of TEN
MILLION NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND SEVENTY-ONE AND TWENTY-NINE CENTAVOS (P10,926,071.29)
PESOS, plus interest thereon of six (6%) percent per annum from May 1, 1962 until full payment, which amount shall be divided by
Pasay City and RREC, share and share alike.

In G.R. No. 105276, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN,
BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T.
ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES,
DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY
MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO
CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA
HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY
MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L.
GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL,
LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN,
VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C.
AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL,
MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE
ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-
CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY,
JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY
DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG,
SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS
MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father
MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA,
represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO
B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and
Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to
implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the
IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is
of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples
and prays that the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano
Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples
(Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying
for the dismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus
Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to
protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the
petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of
Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the
NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they
reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water,
mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration
of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements
with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains
and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected
areas, forest cover or reforestation." 2

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which
might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners. 3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary
law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate
the due process clause of the Constitution.4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on
the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon
notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and
Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of
said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with
respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or
ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples;
and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous
peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which
provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous
relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of
control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. 6

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from
implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to
cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist from
disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
 "(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply with
his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization
and conservation of Philippine natural resources." 7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing,
and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion
sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not
raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that
Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the
constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose
rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and
57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of
Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However,
after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and
Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion

Footnotes

1
Rollo, p. 114.

2
Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.

3
Id. at 23-25.

4
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

5
Rollo, pp. 25-27.

6
Id. at 27-28.

7
Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp. 5-6.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO, J.:

PRECIS

A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On the Uses and Disadvantages of
History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard Posner 1 wrote:2

"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most 'past-dependent,' of the professions. It
venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom,
seniority, gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation,
discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants
to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with history."

When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system
which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense
and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This
Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by
Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land
but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.

This Opinion discusses the following:

I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.

A. The Laws of the Indies

B. Valenton v. Murciano

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

D. The Philippine Constitutions

II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

A. Indigenous Peoples

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

2. Their Concept of Land

III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.

A. Legislative History

IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.

A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of the land
of the public domain.

1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired

2. The concept of native title

(a) Cariño v. Insular Government

(b) Indian Title to land

(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique

3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does
not include the right to alienate the same.

1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.

1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands

2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral domains does not deprive the
State of ownership over the natural resources, control and supervision in their development and exploitation.

(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7(a) of the
law on ownership of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.
 (b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA is allowed under Paragraph
3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Consitution.

(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA may be harmonized with
Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous Movement.

DISCUSSION

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.

A. The Laws of the Indies

The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.3 This was the foundation for the early Spanish
decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first
introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies,
i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish
Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:

"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our
royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are
held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or
to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which
are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after
distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them
more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.

We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate at such time as shall to them seem most
expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court
officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and
receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be disposed of at our will."4

The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all lands became the exclusive patrimony and
dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and
concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian.5 Private land titles could only be acquired from the government either by
purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the Crown.6

The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of 1893.7 The Spanish Mortgage Law provided
for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the
Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the
Laws of the Indies, as already amended by previous orders and decrees. 8 This was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the
Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.

Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights,
interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the
Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act.

B. Valenton v. Murciano

In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano.9

Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had
entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land
from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to
the land by not objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse possession,
as an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as against everyone,
including the State; and that the State, not owning the land, could not validly transmit it.

The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those special laws which from earliest time have
regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies." 10 The question posed by the Court was: "Did these special laws recognize
any right of prescription as against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what extent was it recognized?"

Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of land in the Philippines. However, it was
understood that in the absence of any special law to govern a specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the
Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that until regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the Philippine
Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754.11

Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, the court interpreted it as follows:
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the Crown which have not been
granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there might be lands
not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands,
because some private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants of the
public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those
who had good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of the law
that mere possession for a length of time should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed by them without any action on
the part of the authorities."12

The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him,
belonged to the Crown.13 For those lands granted by the king, the decree provided for a system of assignment of such lands. It also
ordered that all possessors of agricultural land should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown.14

The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown's principal subdelegate to issue a
general order directing the publication of the Crown's instructions:

"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the promulgation and publication of said
order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not x x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to said subdelegates
the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties
interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated, without a just and valid reason therefor,
they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others." 15

On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully occupied" by private individuals in the
Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of
the law, and concluded that plaintiffs' case fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it did under
the earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:

"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet
it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed,
and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner."16

In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs
could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any action by the State." 17 Valenton had no rights other than those
which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the
provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.

As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish Government from earliest times, requiring
settlers on the public lands to obtain title deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by the American Government in
Act No. 926."18

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed
the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions
of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of
Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in
the Philippine Islands remained in the government;19 and that the government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and
other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States.20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, 21 and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands. 22

Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This new law was passed under the Jones Law. It
was more comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other
countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges.23 After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936
by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it is essentially the same as
Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the transitory provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations
during the Commonwealth period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations.24

Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Act 496, or the Land Registration Law of
1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system.
The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898, 25 which, in turn, followed the
principles and procedure of the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant
Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the
fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or
the law warrants or reserves.26 The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted
upon issuance of said certificate. This system highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation.27

D. The Philippine Constitutions

The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country. 28There was an overwhelming sentiment
in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine.29 State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's power to
control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. 30 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew
that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain
whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the
Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.31

Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," reads as follows:

"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at
the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization
of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and
the limit of the grant."

The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the "National Economy and the Patrimony of the
Nation," to wit:

"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated,
and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."

The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on "National Economy and Patrimony," to wit:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it
may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided
by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

x x x."

Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated therein, whether on public or private land,
belong to the State. It is this concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.

II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.

Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/
Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in
Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and
defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary
law which traces its origin to native title.

Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:

- the right to develop lands and natural resources;

- the right to stay in the territories;

- the right in case of displacement;

- the right to safe and clean air and water;

- the right to claim parts of reservations;

 - the right to resolve conflict;32

- the right to ancestral lands which include

a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and
traditions of the community concerned;

b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if the transfer is to a non-
member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an unconscionable
consideration.33

Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance and empowerment,34 social
justice and human rights,35 the right to preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and
the right to develop their own sciences and technologies.36

To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an
independent agency under the Office of the President and is composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each
of the ethnographic areas- Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan,
Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central
Mindanao.37 The NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural
Communities created by former President Corazon Aquino which were merged under a revitalized structure. 38

Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When still unresolved, the matter may be
brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers.39 The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a
petition for review.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to, unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon
ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in accordance with customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years and/or
fined from ₱100,000.00 to ₱500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages. 40

A. Indigenous Peoples

The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous
Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987 Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary international language in the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 16941 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.42

ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:

"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies identified by
self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined
territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing
common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social
and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of
Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations
which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures,
or the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political
institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral
domains."

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies who have
continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have
actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds
of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads
of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also
include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own
social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have
resettled outside their ancestral domains.

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte,
and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:

1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or
Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya;
Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.

2. In Region III- Aetas.

 3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or
Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon,
Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.

4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog, and Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta,
and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.

5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of Negros Occidental; the Corolano and
Sulod.

6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.

7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur; the Kalibugan of Basilan, the
Samal, Subanon and Yakat.

8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon, Bukidnon, Matigsalog, Talaanding of
Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis
Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and and Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan
provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and Bukidnon.

9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte;
B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the Surigao
provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog
of Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur and South
Cotabato.

10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal, and Iranon. 43

How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early as 25,000 to 30,000 B.C.

Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays. 44 The
strains from these groups eventually gave rise to common cultural features which became the dominant influence in ethnic
reformulation in the archipelago. Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millenium B.C. augmented
these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and traders. Indian
influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society.45

The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering became supplementary activities as reliance on them
was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the soil. 46 From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our ancestors evolved
an essentially homogeneous culture, a basically common way of life where nature was a primary factor. Community life
throughout the archipelago was influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The generally benign tropical climate and the
largely uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences. 47 Life was essentially subsistence but not harsh.48

The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They had languages that traced their origin to the
Austronesian parent-stock and used them not only as media of daily communication but also as vehicles for the expression of their
literary moods.49 They fashioned concepts and beliefs about the world that they could not see, but which they sensed to be part of their
lives.50 They had their own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the soul and life after death. Their rituals
were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the environmental
spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the objects
of Nature as something to be respected. They venerated almost any object that was close to their daily life, indicating the importance
of the relationship between man and the object of nature. 51

The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which
transported them to these shores.52 The barangay was basically a family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred
families. Each barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule and govern his
subjects and promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the functions of government. He
was the executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of war. 53

Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from generation to generation and
constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They were preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of the elder persons
in the community.54 The written laws were those that the chieftain and his elders promulgated from time to time as the necessity
arose.55 The oldest known written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D. Other old codes are the
Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu.56 Whether customary or written, the laws dealt with various subjects, such
as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and punishment, property rights, family relations and adoption. Whenever
disputes arose, these were decided peacefully through a court composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as "jury."
Conflicts arising between subjects of different barangays were resolved by arbitration in which a board composed of elders from
neutral barangays acted as arbiters.57

Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in land. The chiefs merely administered the
lands in the name of the barangay. The social order was an extension of the family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the
community. Each individual, therefore, participated in the community ownership of the soil and the instruments of production as a
member of the barangay.58 This ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual sharing of resources so
that no individual, regardless of status, was without sustenance. Ownership of land was non-existent or unimportant and the right
of usufruct was what regulated the development of lands. 59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal
communities depended for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing concept similar to those in land
communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains and elders, by virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some
economic privileges and benefits. But their rights, related to either land and sea, were subject to their responsibility to protect the
communities from danger and to provide them with the leadership and means of survival. 61

Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu was established
and claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga. Four ethnic
groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon. 62The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato
toward Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. 63

The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in common but was private in use. This is
clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has no
provision for the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land. 64

The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies where most production was geared to the
use of the producers and to the fulfillment of kinship obligations. They were not economies geared to exchange and
profit.65 Moreover, the family basis of barangay membership as well as of leadership and governance worked to splinter the population
of the islands into numerous small and separate communities. 66

When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the Filipinos living in barangay settlements
scattered along water routes and river banks. One of the first tasks imposed on the missionaries and the encomenderos was to
collect all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion.67 As early as 1551, the Spanish government assumed an unvarying solicitous
attitude towards the natives.68 The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity to civilize these less fortunate
people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and material advantages" of community life and the
"protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws." 69

The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and convent would be constructed. All the new Christian
converts were required to construct their houses around the church and the unbaptized were invited to do the same. 70 With
the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using the convento/casa
real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make the Filipinos law-abiding
citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately adopt Hispanic culture and civilization. 71

All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all lands not assigned to them and the
pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land
grants were made to non-Filipinos.72

The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept of public domain were the most
immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and law. 73 The concept that the Spanish king was the owner of
everything of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives, and the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights
to land.74

Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious, classified the Filipinos according to their
religious practices and beliefs, and divided them into three types . First were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who generally
came from the lowland populations. Second, were the Moros or the Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or
the indigenous communities.75

The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the Spaniards and was allowed certain status
although below the Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest classes.76

The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven from Manila and the Visayas to
Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep interior. The upland societies were
naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and
inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial administration,
were not only able to preserve their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization process, separating themselves from the newly
evolved Christian community.78 Their own political, economic and social systems were kept constantly alive and vibrant.

The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility
between the Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on the other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise
culturally and historically related populace through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.79

President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, addressed the existence of the infieles:

"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress in
permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under which
many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to
conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference,
constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs." 80

Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of civilization, the American government chose
"to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national conscience." 81
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-Christian Filipinos. The term "non-Christian"
referred not to religious belief, but to a geographical area, and more directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities."82

Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they passed Act No. 253 creating the Bureau of
Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to conduct ethnographic research
among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the most practicable means
for bringing about their advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after the bureau dealing with
American Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in Philippine cultural minorities and produced a wealth of
valuable materials about them.83

The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The raging issue then was the conservation of
the national patrimony for the Filipinos.

In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more rapid and complete manner the economic,
social, moral and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and
permanent the integration of all said national cultural minorities into the body politic, creating the Commission on National
Integration charged with said functions." The law called for a policy of integration of indigenous peoples into the Philippine
mainstream and for this purpose created the Commission on National Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was given, more or less, the
same task as the BNCT during the American regime. The post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial policy of
assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship.85

The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the Spaniards and Americans, government
attempts at integration met with fierce resistance. Since World War II, a tidal wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of
Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open spaces in Mindanao. 86Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land
Acts and the Torrens system resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names. With government initiative
and participation, this titling displaced several indigenous peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples were also displaced by
projects undertaken by the national government in the name of national development. 87

It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:

"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural communities in the formulation and
implementation of State policies."88

For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural minorities" were addressed by the highest
law of the Republic, and they were referred to as "cultural communities." More importantly this time, their "uncivilized" culture
was given some recognition and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered by the State in the formulation
and implementation of State policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser
on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the ethnic groups that sought full integration into the
larger community, and at the same time "protect the rights of those who wish to preserve their original lifeways beside the larger
community."89 In short, while still adopting the integration policy, the decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve
their way of life.90

In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral Lands Decree. The decree provided for the
issuance of land occupancy certificates to members of the national cultural communities who were given up to 1984 to register their
claims.91 In 1979, the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which provided a
mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal Filipinos. 92

Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000 Kalingas and Bontoks of the Cordillera region
were displaced by the Chico River dam project of the National Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land
bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development Company was
authorized by law in 1979 to take approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie plantation in Agusan del
Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives.93 Timber concessions, water projects, plantations, mining, and cattle
ranching and other projects of the national government led not only to the eviction of the indigenous peoples from their land but also
to the reduction and destruction of their natural environment. 94

The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of preservation. Invoking her powers under
the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and
the Office for Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the President. 95

The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of
life.96 This Constitution goes further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their
ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and domains, the State has
effectively upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their own.

2. Their Concept of Land

Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream. They are non-Christians. They live in
less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of self-government not dependent upon the laws of the central
administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of
the rest of the population.97 The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked well to their
advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which
had become peripheral to colonial administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture.
The political systems were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of power and authority. The economic
activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient communalism and mutual help. The social structure which emphasized division
of labor and distinction of functions, not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties of social
courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant. 98

Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no traditional concept of permanent, individual, land
ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control.
The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of
ownership, and the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners. Under the concept of
"trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong to the present generation but the future ones as well. 99

Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the gods and spirits, and that those who work
the land are its mere stewards.100 Customary law has a strong preference for communal ownership, which could either be
ownership by a group of individuals or families who are related by blood or by marriage, 101 or ownership by residents of the same
locality who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary laws draws its meaning
from the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team
occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards,
pasture and burial grounds should be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right to a common economic
base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land are shared in common.

Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions individual ownership.The residential lots
and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system of individual ownership. It is limited because while the individual owner has
the right to use and dispose of the property, he does not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil
Code.103 Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly discouraged except in marriage and
succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops. 104 Moreover, and to be
alienated should first be offered to a clan-member before any village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a
non-member of the ili.105

Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept of individual land ownership under
the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and governmental policies frown upon
indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent. 106

III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.

A. The Legislative History of the IPRA

It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, by
their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a
consolidation of two Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.

Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a consolidation of four proposed measures referred
to the Committees on Cultural Communities, Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance. It adopted
almost en toto the comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which was a result of six regional consultations and
one national consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide. 108 At the Second Regular Session of the Tenth Congress, Senator
Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a background on the situation of indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:

"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered from the dominance and neglect of
government controlled by the majority. Massive migration of their Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory and
many of the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the
massive exploitation of their natural resources by the elite among the migrant population, they became marginalized. And the
government has been an indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It
organized and supported the resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which was massive during the Commonwealth and early
years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal Decree
of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government passed laws to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy
titling or grant of lands to migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."109

Senator Flavier further declared:

"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for the land long before any central government
was established. Their ancestors had territories over which they ruled themselves and related with other tribes. These territories- the
land- include people, their dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment in its
totality. Their existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through political, economic, socio-cultural and spiritual
practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to this.

Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it; and depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease
to exist as distinct peoples."110

To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept
of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws" and jurisprudence passed by the State have "made exception to the doctrine." This exception
was first laid down in the case of Cariño v. Insular Government where:

"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the cultural communities as one of private
ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native title." This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent
cases."111

Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D. 410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized
"native title" or "private right" and the existence of ancestral lands and domains. Despite the passage of these laws, however, Senator
Flavier continued:

"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not implemented the policy. In fact, it was more
honored in its breach than in its observance, its wanton disregard shown during the period unto the Commonwealth and the early years
of the Philippine Republic when government organized and supported massive resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs."

Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their ancestral land. The bill was prepared also
under the principle of parens patriae inherent in the supreme power of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition.
This principle mandates that persons suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position of actual
inequality in their relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.

Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting in favor and none against, with no
abstention.112

House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on Cultural Communities. It was originally
authored and subsequently presented and defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.113

Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:

"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that would promote, recognize the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.

Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and ascertain that these rights shall be well-
preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the indigenous laws that remained long before this Republic was established shall be
preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters seriously and early approval of the substitute bill
shall bring into reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that they be considered in the
mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000." 114

Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as mandated in the Constitution. He also emphasized
that the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in Cariño v. Insular Government which recognized the fact that they had vested
rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish and American regimes.115

After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding amendments, was approved on Second Reading
with no objections.

IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.

A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous Peoples and Do Not Constitute Part of the
Land of the Public Domain.

The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands.Ancestral lands are not
the same as ancestral domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:

"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands,
inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic,
social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually
owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and
other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had
access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans
who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement
by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and
private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms
and tree lots."
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters,
coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other
lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral
and other natural resources. They also include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still
nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.116

Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands
and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or
traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
swidden farms and tree lots.117

The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures embodied in Department Administrative Order
(DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel
Alcala.118 DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral domains by special task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of
Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.

The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power conferred by the IPRA on the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).119 The guiding principle in identification and delineation is self-delineation.120 This means that the
ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the boundaries of their domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto. 121

The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA. The
identification, delineation and certification of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.

Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon finding by the NCIP that the application is
meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community concerned. 122 The
allocation of lands within the ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the
ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and traditions. 123 With respect to ancestral lands outside the ancestral
domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT). 124

CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the Register of Deeds in the place where the
property is situated.125

(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both
ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to
ancestral lands only.

(2) The Concept of Native Title

Native title is defined as:

"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held
under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held
that way since before the Spanish Conquest." 126

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as
memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way
since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of
native title shall be recognized and respected.127 Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified
and delineated.128

Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title, however, is a right of private
ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and
domains held by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably
presumed to have never been public lands and are private.

(a) Cariño v. Insular Government129

The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v. Insular Government.130 Cariñofirmly established a
concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.

In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court 146 hectares of land in Baguio Municipality,
Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had been possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial; that his
grandfather built fences around the property for the holding of cattle and that his father cultivated some parts of the land. Cariño
inherited the land in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no document
issued from the Spanish Crown.131 In 1901, Cariño obtained a possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage Law. 132 The
North American colonial government, however, ignored his possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him to seek
a Torrens title to his property in the land registration court. While his petition was pending, a U.S. military reservation133 was
proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a military detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle and
trespassers, including Cariño, off the land.134

In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño's application for absolute ownership to the land. Both the Government of the
Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the land registration court and dismissed
Cariño's application. The Philippine Supreme Court135 affirmed the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cariño took the case to the
U.S. Supreme Court.136 On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and contended that Cariño failed to
comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required registration of land claims within a limited period of
time. Cariño, on the other, asserted that he was the absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed part of the
public domain.

In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme Court held:

"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps
the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone
of civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the
United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines,
the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may
vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it
shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide." 137

The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was with the new colonizer. Ultimately, the
matter had to be decided under U.S. law.

The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of "due process" as well as the pronounced
policy "to do justice to the natives." 138 It was based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that
"No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny
to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." The court declared:

"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United States. Whatever consideration may
have been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy land. It is obvious
that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as
consistent with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to
exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the
property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is
reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its
attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of
the laws.' In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to
declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which
had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as
public land what they, by native custom and by long association,- of the profoundest factors in human thought,- regarded as their
own."139

The Court went further:

"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient
to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been
public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit
of the doubt."140

The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as testimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of
private ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to "never have been public land."

Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in the 1904 decision ofValenton v. Murciano.
The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof that the Spanish decrees did not honor native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed
in Valenton appeared to recognize that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in
the preamble of the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles were admitted to exist beyond the
powers of the Crown, viz:

"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to
satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error
seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other
words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For
instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v.
Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs
them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of
feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was
that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books." (Emphasis
supplied).141

The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over unconquered territories. The wording of the
Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as to convey to the natives that failure to register what to them has always been their own
would mean loss of such land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to establish it;" it was "not calculated
to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it."

By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It was frank enough, however, to admit the
possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of his land under Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees
and concomitantly, the various interpretations which may be given them. But precisely because of the ambiguity and of the strong
"due process mandate" of the Constitution, the court validated this kind of title.142 This title was sufficient, even without
government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes explained:

"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not without difficulties for courts of a
legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of
Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion
that law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and
belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain." 143

Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares in Baguio Municipality in his
name.144

Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it upheld as "native title." It simply said:

"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his argument, characterized as a savage tribe
that never was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the
Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was
entitled by the Spanish Laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical
position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the
present government seized his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an important part
of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to
enforce."145

This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire length of the Cariño decision. It is observed
that the widespread use of the term "native title" may be traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the
University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in
the Philippine Law Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.146 This article was made after Professor
Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the country and studied the origin and development of Philippine land
laws.147 He discussed Cariño extensively and used the term "native title" to refer to Cariño's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court in said case.

(b) Indian Title

In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" as defined by Justice Holmes in Cariño "is
conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the American Indians. 148 This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that
during the American regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference to native Americans. 149 This
was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.150

In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial governor to remove the Mangyans from
their domains and place them in a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to
be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who was imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation, filed for
habeas corpus claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the ground of police
power. It upheld government policy promoting the idea that a permanent settlement was the only successful method for educating the
Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving their health and morals, and protecting the public forests in which they
roamed.151 Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the court said:

"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United States for the Indian
Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is
said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes.
Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.

From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized
relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the
Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of
the United States.152

x x x.

As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of
facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of
the country and placed on these reservations, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located,
they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be
drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive
branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned
governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the
segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States." 153

Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An Indian reservation is a part of the public domain
set apart by proper authority for the use and occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians. 154 It may be set apart by an act of Congress, by
treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be established by custom and prescription.155

Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also covers the "aboriginal right of possession or
occupancy."156 The aboriginal right of possession depends on the actual occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or nation as
their ancestral home, in the sense that such lands constitute definable territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or
nation.157 It is a right which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action, although in numerous instances treaties
have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal possession and delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and
adjusting their boundaries.158

American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land they have held and occupied before the
"discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme Court on the nature of
aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh.159

In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the chiefs of two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S.
Supreme Court refused to recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs being private persons. The only conveyance that was recognized
was that made by the Indians to the government of the European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out
that the potentates of the old world believed that they had made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new world by bestowing
civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the court, they found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting
settlements and consequent war, to establish the principle that discovery gives title to the government by whose subjects, or by
whose authority, the discovery was made, against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by
possession.160 The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from
the natives and establishing settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court further stated that:

"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus
acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.

In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were
necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as
just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they
pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.

While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be
in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in
possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian
right of occupancy."161

Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to acquire Indian land and extinguish Indian
titles. Only to the discoverer- whether to England, France, Spain or Holland- did this right belong and not to any other nation or
private person. The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by
purchase or conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as
well as just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were held
to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased the land from the
Indians or conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer gained an absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.

The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a title paramount to the title of the United
States itself to other parties, saying:

"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession has never been questioned. The
claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of
acquiring that right."162

It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves the universal recognition of this principle.163

The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands without having to invalidate conveyances
made by the government to many U.S. citizens.164

Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the State of Georgia enacted a law requiring all white
persons residing within the Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit from the Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law
was deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not obtain said license and were thus charged with
a violation of the Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the treaties established between the United States
and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the relationship between the
United States government and the Indians as:

"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign potentate for the supply of their essential wants,
and for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into their country. That power was naturally termed their protector. They
had been arranged under the protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and the
establishment of that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they were
under the protection of the United States, and of no other power. They assumed the relation with the United States which had before
subsisted with Great Britain.

This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their
national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master." 166

It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct territorial boundaries and recognize their right of
occupancy over all the lands within their domains. Thus:

"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat
them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and
especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities,
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those
boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.

x x x.

"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original
natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by
irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of
the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the
Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from others." x x x. 167

The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this
nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States."168

The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer as against all other European governments.
Designated as the naked fee,169 this title was to be consummated by possession and was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The
discoverer acknowledged the Indians' legal and just claim to retain possession of the land, the Indians being the original inhabitants of
the land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land- either by purchase, "defensive" conquest,
or cession- and in so doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only the discoverer could extinguish Indian title because it alone asserted
ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations of Europe respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all
asserted the ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves. 170

As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to the lands occupied by the Indians when the
colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign- first the discovering European nation and later the original 13 States and the
United States- a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government continued the
policy of respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which it accorded the protection of complete
ownership.171 But this aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes "permission" from the whites to occupy the land, and means mere
possession not specifically recognized as ownership by Congress. 172 It is clear that this right of occupancy based upon aboriginal
possession is not a property right.173 It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal government who, as sovereign, possessed
exclusive power to extinguish the right of occupancy at will. 174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title
rests on actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time. 175 It entails that land owned by Indian title must be used
within the tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold to another sovereign government nor to any citizen. 176 Such title as
Indians have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in the
tribal property usually depends upon tribal membership, the property of the tribe generally being held in communal ownership.177

As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily used to designate such lands as are subject to
sale or other disposal under general laws.178 Indian land which has been abandoned is deemed to fall into the public domain. 179 On the
other hand, an Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of Indians. 180 Once set
apart by proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title is extinguished, no one but Congress can
initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the nation's power to dispose of, them. 181

The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land claims of indigenous Americans.182 And two
things are clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second, indigenous property systems are also recognized. From a legal point of
view, certain benefits can be drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native Americans. 183 Despite the similarities between
native title and aboriginal title, however, there are at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American Indians may be
cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians over their land; title to the land,
however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically
recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress. 184 The protection of aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment
by persons other than the Federal Government.185 Although there are criticisms against the refusal to recognize the native Americans'
ownership of these lands,186 the power of the State to extinguish these titles has remained firmly entrenched.187
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the ancestral domains and ancestral lands. 188 The
IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any similarities between its application in the Philippines vis-à-vis American Jurisprudence
on aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of each case.

(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique

In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in the IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form,
of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is private and was never public. Cariño is the only case that
specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long line of cases citing Cariño did not touch on native title and the
private character of ancestral domains and lands. Cariñowas cited by the succeeding cases to support the concept of
acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act which is a different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land
sought to be registered must be public agricultural land. When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act are
complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the land. 189 The land
ceases to be part of the public domain,190 ipso jure,191 and is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the
prescribed statutory period.

It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared that the rule that all lands that were not acquired from
the government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public domain has an exception. This exception would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. It is this kind of
possession that would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private
property even before the Spanish conquest.193 Oh Cho, however, was decided under the provisions of the Public Land Act
and Cariño was cited to support the applicant's claim of acquisitive prescription under the said Act.

All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept
of owner of public agricultural land. It is this long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of thirty years
both for ordinary citizens194 and members of the national cultural minorities195 that converts the land from public into private and
entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate of title.

(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the Land is Private.

The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further strengthened by the option given to
individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and the
Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by
the State. The necessary implication is that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural
land simply for registration purposes. To wit:

"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496-
Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to their individually-owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time
immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and uncontested by the
members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands under the provisions of Commonwealth Act
141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.

For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and actually used for agricultural,
residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified
as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.

The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the approval of this Act." 196

ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their individually-owned ancestral lands. This option is limited
to ancestral lands only, not domains, and such lands must be individually, not communally, owned.

Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest,
have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial197 or for a period of
not less than 30 years, which claims are uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the individually-owned
ancestral lands are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, provided, they are agricultural in
character and are actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified as public
agricultural lands regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.

The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Act and the
Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public Land Act, deals specifically with lands of the public domain. 198 Its provisions apply to
those lands "declared open to disposition or concession" x x x "which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor
appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x x or which having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so." 199 Act 496,
the Land Registration Act, allows registration only of private lands and public agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains and lands
are private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his ancestral land,
regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or over, 200 from private to public agricultural land for
proper disposition.

The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless a limited period. This option
must be exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the date of approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private and belong to the
ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public
domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same
Article XII mentions ancestral lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To
classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA
lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is
loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs. 201

The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands"
and that "Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domain."202 It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral domains and lands that
breathes life into this constitutional mandate.

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does
not include the right to alienate the same.

Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership under the civil law. This
ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative
legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles. Thus:

"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares and who since July
fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a
tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has
not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such
tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.

A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right
granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is not the
owner of any real property secured or disposable under the provision of the Public Land Law. 203

x x x.

"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands
or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:

(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to
the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof."204

Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public agricultural land but because of adverse
possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at least thirty years (judicial confirmation), the land has become private. Open, adverse,
public and continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper application therefor. The possession has to be
confirmed judicially or administratively after which a torrens title is issued.

A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to all the rights of ownership under the civil law.
The Civil Code of the Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427, 428 and 429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the
Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may be exercised over things
or rights. It primarily includes the right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right to enjoy and dispose of the
thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces, 205 the right to consume the thing by its use,206 the right to alienate,
encumber, transform or even destroy the thing owned, 207 and the right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned by any other
person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing. 208

1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.

Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain.
Thus:
"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources
found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that
ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold,
disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."

The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the indigenous concept of
ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is
private simply because it is not part of the public domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned
in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral domains,
whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally held. 209 These communal rights, however, are not exactly the same as
co-ownership rights under the Civil Code.210 Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property held in
common. The Civil Code expressly provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned. 211 To allow such a right over ancestral
domains may be destructive not only of customary law of the community but of the very community itself. 212

Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property, much less corporate condominium
rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of another fifty years in any single
instance.213 Every stockholder has the right to disassociate himself from the corporation. 214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be
dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily.215

Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land but extends to all generations of the
ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain. This is the reason why the ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs
themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.

Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands are communal. These lands, however, may be
transferred subject to the following limitations: (a) only to the members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary laws and
traditions; and (c) subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a non-
member of the ICCs/IPs.

Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent
of ancestral domains,"216 the IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept that has long
existed under customary law.217

Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a source of law. 218 Some articles of the
Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable. 219 In other words, in the
absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities.220

Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does
not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is
specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration.221

To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The CADT is merely a "formal recognition" of
native title. This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:

"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be
recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."

The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to the land, being people of the land- by sheer
force of having sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is
fidelity of usufructuary relation to the land- the possession of stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of
blessings between man and land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man. 222

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine Enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.

1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands

The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Section 7 provides for the rights over
ancestral domains:

"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be
recognized and protected. Such rights include:

a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by
ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains;

b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, the right to develop, control and use
lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the
territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and
 utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the
formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains
and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to
effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"

c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to be removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be
relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. x x x;

d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of natural catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to
resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have temporary life support systems: x x x;

e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and organizations into their
domains;

f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access to integrated systems for the
management of their inland waters and air space;

g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains which have been reserved for
various purposes, except those reserved and intended for common and public welfare and service;

h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary laws of the area where the land is
located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice
whenever necessary."

Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:

"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall be recognized
and protected.

a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to transfer land or property rights to/among members of
the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned.

b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights by virtue of any agreement or
devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an
unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not
exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer."

Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to
develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the
right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains
as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws.

Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the
right to transfer the land or property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the
option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the ancestral lands, but not to domains.

2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains Does Not Deprive the State of
Ownership Over the Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their Development and Exploitation.

The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources is declared in Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, viz:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or, it
may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided
by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve
its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the state shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution."223

All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources- are owned by the State. The
Constitution provides that in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources, the State exercises full control
and supervision, and may undertake the same in four (4) modes:

1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or

2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified
corporations;

3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens;

4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President
may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.

As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and responsibility in the exploration, development and
utilization of these natural resources. The State may directly undertake the exploitation and development by itself, or, it may allow
participation by the private sector through co-production,224joint venture,225 or production-sharing agreements.226 These agreements
may be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through Congress, may allow the small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale exploration of these resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils, the State, through the President, may enter into technical and financial assistance agreements with foreign-owned
corporations.

Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types
of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture or production-sharing, may apply to both large-scale227 and small-scale
mining.228 "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods
and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment." 229

Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined
and limited in Section 7 (a) as:

"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by
ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;"

The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs,
sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains." It will be
noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in
the traditional hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural
resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover
"waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, floraand fauna and all other natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the State.

The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies with the Regalian doctrine.

(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And is
Unconstitutional.

The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:

"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters, and natural resources and all improvements
made by them at any time within the ancestral domains/ lands. These rights shall include, but not limited to, the right over the fruits,
the right to possess, the right to use, right to consume, right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights or interests over
land and natural resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost through fraud or any form or vitiated consent
or transferred for an unconscionable price."

Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands, waters and natural resources." The term
"natural resources" is not one of those expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and jurisprudence clearly
declare that the right to claim ownership over land does not necessarily include the right to claim ownership over the natural resources
found on or under the land.231 The IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and natural resources. Section 7 (a) speaks of
the right of ownership only over the land within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law that speak of
natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over these
resources.

The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not specifically and categorically challenged by
petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in general. 232Nevertheless, to avoid any
confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II,
Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution.

(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of
Article XII of the Constitution.

Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b) merely grants the ICCs/IPs the right to manage
them, viz:

"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and
territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resourceswithin the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found
therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring
ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed
and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact
upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the
project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon
these rights;"

The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA enumerates the following rights:

a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;

b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future
generations;

c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein;

d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources for the purpose of ensuring
ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;

e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or
private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages
which they may sustain as a result of the project;

f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these
rights.233

Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted
the right to "manage and conserve" them for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their allocation and
utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring ecological and
environmental protection and conservation measures." It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the
natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental protection of,
and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and development of natural resources.

Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of management or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs
may use these resources and share in the profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the same time,
however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within their ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and
that the "utilization" of these resources must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national and customary laws. 234

The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate small-scale utilization of natural
resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in the third
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the plight of forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal
fishermen and others similarly situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival." 235 Section 7 (b) also
expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and ensure environmental and ecological protection within
the domains, which duties, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.

(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 57 of the IPRA provides:

"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may
be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years
renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs
concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided finally,
That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same
contract."

Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural resources within ancestral domains" and
"gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The terms "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation" of any natural
resources within the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is utilization not merely for subsistence but for
commercial or other extensive use that require technology other than manual labor. 236 The law recognizes the probability of requiring
a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and utilization of the natural resources and thereby allows such
participation for a period of not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. This may be done on condition that a formal
written agreement be entered into by the non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.

Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the natural resources. Instead, the law only
grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority
rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there is
a superior entity that owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to whosoever
itself chooses.

Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine that all natural resources found
within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the
provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution237 in relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources, may directly undertake the
development and exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of the
ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the natural resources are found by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreement with them. The State may likewise enter into any of said agreements with a non-member of the
ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
or allow such non-member to participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter into an agreement with a
non-ICC/IP member, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the
agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.

To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral domains, the State, as owner of these resources, has
four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may
recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for such development and exploitation; or (3) it
may enter into an agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may allow
such non-member to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.

The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives the
ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale utilization of
these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does not
mandate the State to automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is within its discretion to
choose which option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely undertake the large-
scale development of the natural resources within their domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour always under State
supervision or control. This indicates that the State does not lose control and ownership over the resources even in their exploitation.
Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land where the natural
resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and survival.

Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the following provision:

"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from
issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement. without prior
certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued
after a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no certification
shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further,
That no department, government agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or
production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the
right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process."

Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of natural resources shall not be issued, renewed or
granted by all departments and government agencies without prior certification from the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement
does not overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification shall be issued only after a field-based investigation shall have
been conducted and the free and prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-compliance with the consultation
requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any project granted by any department or government agency.

As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any concession, license or agreement over natural
resources, that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie within any ancestral domain.
The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any
concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the
agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the certification applies to agreements over natural resources that
do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA
apply.
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL
MOVEMENT.

The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism stretching back to prehistoric times. The movement
received a massive impetus during the 1960's from two sources. First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the limelight
the possibility of peoples controlling their own destinies. Second, the right of self-determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration
on Human Rights.238 The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the attention of North American Indians,
Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the possibility of fighting for fundamental rights and freedoms.

In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded, 239 and during the 1980's, indigenous affairs were on the
international agenda. The people of the Philippine Cordillera were the first Asians to take part in the international indigenous
movement. It was the Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out successful campaigns against the building of the Chico River Dam
in 1981-82 and they have since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world.240

Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This came as a result of the increased publicity
focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights and the destruction of the indigenous peoples' environment, together
with the national governments' inability to deal with the situation.241Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and
environmental protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for the international agenda.242

International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies, programs and specific rules concerning IPs in
some nations. The World Bank, for example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of the dismal experience of projects in Latin
America.243 The World Bank now seeks to apply its current policy on IPs to some of its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an
influential model for the projects of the Asian Development Bank. 244

The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and declares as a State policy the promotion of their
rights within the framework of national unity and development. 245 The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with the
international category of IPs,246 and is heavily influenced by both the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the
United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 247

ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries" 248 and was
adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and many other international instruments on the
prevention of discrimination.249 ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957.
Developments in international law made it appropriate to adopt new international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to
removing the assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of these peoples to exercise control
over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development." 250

CONCLUSION

The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and religious differences. These differences were
carried over and magnified by the Philippine government through the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign in
origin or derivation.251 Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society,
specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of Philippine culture and
are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems. 252 It is through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators to
understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in the course of history. The Philippines
became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people into a
democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing
democratization,253 it is this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm
their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system.

With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.

G.R. No. 127882 January 27, 2004

LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Chairman F'LONG MIGUEL M. LUMAYONG,
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, PONCIANO BENNAGEN, JAIME TADEO, RENATO R. CONSTANTINO, JR., F'LONG
AGUSTIN M. DABIE, ROBERTO P. AMLOY, RAQIM L. DABIE, SIMEON H. DOLOJO, IMELDA M. GANDON, LENY
B. GUSANAN, MARCELO L. GUSANAN, QUINTOL A. LABUAYAN, LOMINGGES D. LAWAY, BENITA P.
TACUAYAN, minors JOLY L. BUGOY, represented by his father UNDERO D. BUGOY, ROGER M. DADING, represented
by his father ANTONIO L. DADING, ROMY M. LAGARO, represented by his father TOTING A. LAGARO, MIKENY
JONG B. LUMAYONG, represented by his father MIGUEL M. LUMAYONG, RENE T. MIGUEL, represented by his
mother EDITHA T. MIGUEL, ALDEMAR L. SAL, represented by his father DANNY M. SAL, DAISY RECARSE,
represented by her mother LYDIA S. SANTOS, EDWARD M. EMUY, ALAN P. MAMPARAIR, MARIO L. MANGCAL,
ALDEN S. TUSAN, AMPARO S. YAP, VIRGILIO CULAR, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, JULIA REGINA CULAR, GIAN
CARLO CULAR, VIRGILIO CULAR, JR., represented by their father VIRGILIO CULAR, PAUL ANTONIO P.
VILLAMOR, represented by his parents JOSE VILLAMOR and ELIZABETH PUA-VILLAMOR, ANA GININA R. TALJA,
represented by her father MARIO JOSE B. TALJA, SHARMAINE R. CUNANAN, represented by her father ALFREDO M.
CUNANAN, ANTONIO JOSE A. VITUG III, represented by his mother ANNALIZA A. VITUG, LEAN D. NARVADEZ,
represented by his father MANUEL E. NARVADEZ, JR., ROSERIO MARALAG LINGATING, represented by her father
RIO OLIMPIO A. LINGATING, MARIO JOSE B. TALJA, DAVID E. DE VERA, MARIA MILAGROS L. SAN JOSE, SR.,
SUSAN O. BOLANIO, OND, LOLITA G. DEMONTEVERDE, BENJIE L. NEQUINTO,1 ROSE LILIA S. ROMANO,
ROBERTO S. VERZOLA, EDUARDO AURELIO C. REYES, LEAN LOUEL A. PERIA, represented by his father ELPIDIO
V. PERIA,2 GREEN FORUM PHILIPPINES, GREEN FORUM WESTERN VISAYAS, (GF-WV), ENVIRONMETAL
LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTER (ELAC), PHILIPPINE KAISAHAN TUNGO SA KAUNLARAN NG KANAYUNAN AT
REPORMANG PANSAKAHAN (KAISAHAN),3 KAISAHAN TUNGO SA KAUNLARAN NG KANAYUNAN AT
REPORMANG PANSAKAHAN (KAISAHAN), PARTNERSHIP FOR AGRARIAN REFORM and RURAL
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, INC. (PARRDS), PHILIPPINE PART`NERSHIP FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN
RESOURCES IN THE RURAL AREAS, INC. (PHILDHRRA), WOMEN'S LEGAL BUREAU (WLB), CENTER FOR
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, INC. (CADI), UPLAND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (UDI),
KINAIYAHAN FOUNDATION, INC., SENTRO NG ALTERNATIBONG LINGAP PANLIGAL (SALIGAN), LEGAL
RIGHTS AND NATURAL RESOURCES CENTER, INC. (LRC), petitioners,
vs.
VICTOR O. RAMOS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
HORACIO RAMOS, DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU (MGB-DENR), RUBEN TORRES,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, and WMC (PHILIPPINES), INC.4 respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

The present petition for mandamus and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942, 5 otherwise known as the
PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the Philippines and WMC (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), a corporation
organized under Philippine laws.

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 279 6 authorizing the DENR Secretary to
accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. In entering into such proposals, the President
shall consider the real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country that will be realized, as well as the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources that will be promoted by the proposed contract or agreement. Until
Congress shall determine otherwise, large-scale mining, for purpose of this Section, shall mean those proposals for contracts or
agreements for mineral resources exploration, development, and utilization involving a committed capital investment in a single
mining unit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in United States Currency (US $50,000,000.00).7

On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and
processing of all mineral resources." 8 R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations,9 outlines the
procedure for their filing and approval, 10 assignment/transfer11 and withdrawal,12and fixes their terms.13 Similar provisions govern
financial or technical assistance agreements.14

The law prescribes the qualifications of contractors15 and grants them certain rights, including timber,16 water17 and easement18 rights,
and the right to possess explosives.19 Surface owners, occupants, or concessionaires are forbidden from preventing holders of mining
rights from entering private lands and concession areas.20 A procedure for the settlement of conflicts is likewise provided for. 21

The Act restricts the conditions for exploration,22 quarry23 and other24 permits. It regulates the transport, sale and processing of
minerals,25 and promotes the development of mining communities, science and mining technology, 26and safety and environmental
protection.27

The government's share in the agreements is spelled out and allocated, 28 taxes and fees are imposed,29 incentives granted.30 Aside from
penalizing certain acts,31 the law likewise specifies grounds for the cancellation, revocation and termination of agreements and
permits.32

On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of general
circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect.33 Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President
entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
Cotabato.34

On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995,
otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996
which was adopted on December 20, 1996.

On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation
of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40,35 giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt36 to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to
respond or act on petitioners' letter.37

Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They allege
that at the time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million
hectares,38 64 of which applications are by fully foreign-owned corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one
by a fully foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.39

Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction:
 I

x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being
unconstitutional in that it allows fully foreign owned corporations to explore, develop, utilize and exploit mineral resources in a
manner contrary to Section 2, paragraph 4, Article XII of the Constitution;

II

x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being
unconstitutional in that it allows the taking of private property without the determination of public use and for just compensation;

III

x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being
unconstitutional in that it violates Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution;

IV

x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being
unconstitutional in that it allows enjoyment by foreign citizens as well as fully foreign owned corporations of the nation's marine
wealth contrary to Section 2, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;

x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being
unconstitutional in that it allows priority to foreign and fully foreign owned corporations in the exploration, development and
utilization of mineral resources contrary to Article XII of the Constitution;

VI

x x x in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being
unconstitutional in that it allows the inequitable sharing of wealth contrary to Sections [sic] 1, paragraph 1, and Section 2, paragraph
4[,] [Article XII] of the Constitution;

VII

x x x in recommending approval of and implementing the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between the President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Western Mining Corporation Philippines Inc. because the same is illegal and unconstitutional. 40

They pray that the Court issue an order:

(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements;

(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void;

(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative
Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and

(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as
unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.41

Impleaded as public respondents are Ruben Torres, the then Executive Secretary, Victor O. Ramos, the then DENR Secretary, and
Horacio Ramos, Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau of the DENR. Also impleaded is private respondent WMCP, which
entered into the assailed FTAA with the Philippine Government. WMCP is owned by WMC Resources International Pty., Ltd.
(WMC), "a wholly owned subsidiary of Western Mining Corporation Holdings Limited, a publicly listed major Australian mining and
exploration company."42 By WMCP's information, "it is a 100% owned subsidiary of WMC LIMITED." 43

Respondents, aside from meeting petitioners' contentions, argue that the requisites for judicial inquiry have not been met and that the
petition does not comply with the criteria for prohibition and mandamus. Additionally, respondent WMCP argues that there has been a
violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts.

After petitioners filed their reply, this Court granted due course to the petition. The parties have since filed their respective
memoranda.

WMCP subsequently filed a Manifestation dated September 25, 2002 alleging that on January 23, 2001, WMC sold all its shares in
WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (Sagittarius), a corporation organized under Philippine laws. 44WMCP was subsequently renamed
"Tampakan Mineral Resources Corporation." 45 WMCP claims that at least 60% of the equity of Sagittarius is owned by Filipinos
and/or Filipino-owned corporations while about 40% is owned by Indophil Resources NL, an Australian company. 46 It further claims
that by such sale and transfer of shares, "WMCP has ceased to be connected in any way with WMC." 47
By virtue of such sale and transfer, the DENR Secretary, by Order of December 18, 2001, 48 approved the transfer and registration of
the subject FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius. Said Order, however, was appealed by Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. (Lepanto) to
the Office of the President which upheld it by Decision of July 23, 2002. 49 Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
Office of the President by Resolution of November 12, 2002,50 Lepanto filed a petition for review51 before the Court of Appeals.
Incidentally, two other petitions for review related to the approval of the transfer and registration of the FTAA to Sagittarius were
recently resolved by this Court.52

It bears stressing that this case has not been rendered moot either by the transfer and registration of the FTAA to a Filipino-owned
corporation or by the non-issuance of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction to stay the above-said July 23, 2002
decision of the Office of the President.53 The validity of the transfer remains in dispute and awaits final judicial determination. This
assumes, of course, that such transfer cures the FTAA's alleged unconstitutionality, on which question judgment is reserved.

WMCP also points out that the original claimowners of the major mineralized areas included in the WMCP FTAA, namely,
Sagittarius, Tampakan Mining Corporation, and Southcot Mining Corporation, are all Filipino-owned corporations,54 each of which
was a holder of an approved Mineral Production Sharing Agreement awarded in 1994, albeit their respective mineral claims were
subsumed in the WMCP FTAA;55 and that these three companies are the same companies that consolidated their interests in
Sagittarius to whom WMC sold its 100% equity in WMCP. 56 WMCP concludes that in the event that the FTAA is invalidated, the
MPSAs of the three corporations would be revived and the mineral claims would revert to their original claimants.57

These circumstances, while informative, are hardly significant in the resolution of this case, it involving the validity of the FTAA, not
the possible consequences of its invalidation.

Of the above-enumerated seven grounds cited by petitioners, as will be shown later, only the first and the last need be delved into; in
the latter, the discussion shall dwell only insofar as it questions the effectivity of E. O. No. 279 by virtue of which order the questioned
FTAA was forged.

Before going into the substantive issues, the procedural questions posed by respondents shall first be tackled.

REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

When an issue of constitutionality is raised, this Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
present:

(1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case;

(2) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;

(3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and

(4) The constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. 58

Respondents claim that the first three requisites are not present.

Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that "(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." The power of judicial review, therefore, is limited to
the determination of actual cases and controversies.59

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory,60 lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 61 The power does not extend to hypothetical
questions62 since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated
to actualities.63

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, 64alleging more than a generalized
grievance.65 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."66 Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or
ordinance, he has no standing.67

Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among them are La Bugal B'laan Tribal Association, Inc., a farmers and indigenous
people's cooperative organized under Philippine laws representing a community actually affected by the mining activities of WMCP,
members of said cooperative,68 as well as other residents of areas also affected by the mining activities of WMCP. 69 These petitioners
have standing to raise the constitutionality of the questioned FTAA as they allege a personal and substantial injury. They claim that
they would suffer "irremediable displacement" 70 as a result of the implementation of the FTAA allowing WMCP to conduct mining
activities in their area of residence. They thus meet the appropriate case requirement as they assert an interest adverse to that of
respondents who, on the other hand, insist on the FTAA's validity.

In view of the alleged impending injury, petitioners also have standing to assail the validity of E.O. No. 279, by authority of which the
FTAA was executed.
Public respondents maintain that petitioners, being strangers to the FTAA, cannot sue either or both contracting parties to annul it.71 In
other words, they contend that petitioners are not real parties in interest in an action for the annulment of contract.

Public respondents' contention fails. The present action is not merely one for annulment of contract but for prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioners allege that public respondents acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the FTAA, which they submit is
unconstitutional. As the case involves constitutional questions, this Court is not concerned with whether petitioners are real parties in
interest, but with whether they have legal standing. As held in Kilosbayan v. Morato: 72

x x x. "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from
questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements
are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of
the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.["] (FRIEDENTHAL, KANE
AND MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 328 [1985])

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the
public interest. Hence, the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L.Ed.2d 633 [1962].)

As earlier stated, petitioners meet this requirement.

The challenge against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40 likewise fulfills the requisites of justiciability.
Although these laws were not in force when the subject FTAA was entered into, the question as to their validity is ripe for
adjudication.

The WMCP FTAA provides:

14.3 Future Legislation

Any term and condition more favourable to Financial &Technical Assistance Agreement contractors resulting from repeal or
amendment of any existing law or regulation or from the enactment of a law, regulation or administrative order shall be considered a
part of this Agreement.

It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40 contain provisions that are more favorable to WMCP, hence, these laws, to
the extent that they are favorable to WMCP, govern the FTAA.

In addition, R.A. No. 7942 explicitly makes certain provisions apply to pre-existing agreements.

SEC. 112. Non-impairment of Existing Mining/Quarrying Rights. – x x x That the provisions of Chapter XIV on government share in
mineral production-sharing agreement and of Chapter XVI on incentives of this Act shall immediately govern and apply to a mining
lessee or contractor unless the mining lessee or contractor indicates his intention to the secretary, in writing, not to avail of said
provisions x x x Provided, finally, That such leases, production-sharing agreements, financial or technical assistance agreements shall
comply with the applicable provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

As there is no suggestion that WMCP has indicated its intention not to avail of the provisions of Chapter XVI of R.A. No. 7942, it can
safely be presumed that they apply to the WMCP FTAA.

Misconstruing the application of the third requisite for judicial review – that the exercise of the review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity – WMCP points out that the petition was filed only almost two years after the execution of the FTAA, hence, not raised at
the earliest opportunity.

The third requisite should not be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality must be raised immediately after the execution of
the state action complained of. That the question of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to
allow it to be raised later.73 A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by
the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the same.

PROPRIETY OF PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

Before the effectivity in July 1997 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 65 read:

SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. – When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions
judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further
proceeding in the action or matter specified therein.

Prohibition is a preventive remedy.74 It seeks a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an
act perceived to be illegal.75
The petition for prohibition at bar is thus an appropriate remedy. While the execution of the contract itself may be fait accompli, its
implementation is not. Public respondents, in behalf of the Government, have obligations to fulfill under said contract. Petitioners seek
to prevent them from fulfilling such obligations on the theory that the contract is unconstitutional and, therefore, void.

The propriety of a petition for prohibition being upheld, discussion of the propriety of the mandamus aspect of the petition is rendered
unnecessary.

HIERARCHY OF COURTS

The contention that the filing of this petition violated the rule on hierarchy of courts does not likewise lie. The rule has been explained
thus:

Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that should initially pass upon the issues of a case. That
way, as a particular case goes through the hierarchy of courts, it is shorn of all but the important legal issues or those of first
impression, which are the proper subject of attention of the appellate court. This is a procedural rule borne of experience and adopted
to improve the administration of justice.

This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts. Although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with
the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction, such concurrence does not give a party unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The resort to this Court's
primary jurisdiction to issue said writs shall be allowed only where the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or
where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify such invocation. We held in People v. Cuaresma that:

A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first
level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only where there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and
to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket x x x. 76 [Emphasis supplied.]

The repercussions of the issues in this case on the Philippine mining industry, if not the national economy, as well as the novelty
thereof, constitute exceptional and compelling circumstances to justify resort to this Court in the first instance.

In all events, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or
legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. 77 When the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, this
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. 78

II

Petitioners contend that E.O. No. 279 did not take effect because its supposed date of effectivity came after President Aquino had
already lost her legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution.

And they likewise claim that the WMC FTAA, which was entered into pursuant to E.O. No. 279, violates Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution because, among other reasons:

(1) It allows foreign-owned companies to extend more than mere financial or technical assistance to the State in the
exploitation, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, and even permits foreign owned
companies to "operate and manage mining activities."

(2) It allows foreign-owned companies to extend both technical and financial assistance, instead of "either technical or
financial assistance."

To appreciate the import of these issues, a visit to the history of the pertinent constitutional provision, the concepts contained therein,
and the laws enacted pursuant thereto, is in order.

Section 2, Article XII reads in full:

Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve
its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming,
with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution.

THE SPANISH REGIME AND THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE

The first sentence of Section 2 embodies the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia. Introduced by Spain into these Islands, this feudal
concept is based on the State's power of dominium, which is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property. 79

In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal rights, or those rights which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives. In
Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of property or propriedad. These
were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the sovereign.

The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King, and while the use of lands was granted out
to others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the title. By fiction of law, the
King was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands were held. The
theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest. 80

The Philippines having passed to Spain by virtue of discovery and conquest, 81 earlier Spanish decrees declared that "all lands were
held from the Crown."82

The Regalian doctrine extends not only to land but also to "all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth." 83 Spain, in
particular, recognized the unique value of natural resources, viewing them, especially minerals, as an abundant source of revenue to
finance its wars against other nations.84 Mining laws during the Spanish regime reflected this perspective. 85

THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND THE CONCESSION REGIME

By the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded "the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands" to the United States. The
Philippines was hence governed by means of organic acts that were in the nature of charters serving as a Constitution of the occupied
territory from 1900 to 1935.86 Among the principal organic acts of the Philippines was the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, more
commonly known as the Philippine Bill of 1902, through which the United States Congress assumed the administration of the
Philippine Islands.87 Section 20 of said Bill reserved the disposition of mineral lands of the public domain from sale. Section 21
thereof allowed the free and open exploration, occupation and purchase of mineral deposits not only to citizens of the Philippine
Islands but to those of the United States as well:

Sec. 21. That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby
declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and purchase, and the land in which they are found, to occupation and
purchase, by citizens of the United States or of said Islands: Provided, That when on any lands in said Islands entered and occupied as
agricultural lands under the provisions of this Act, but not patented, mineral deposits have been found, the working of such mineral
deposits is forbidden until the person, association, or corporation who or which has entered and is occupying such lands shall have
paid to the Government of said Islands such additional sum or sums as will make the total amount paid for the mineral claim or claims
in which said deposits are located equal to the amount charged by the Government for the same as mineral claims.

Unlike Spain, the United States considered natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals and saw fit to allow both Filipino
and American citizens to explore and exploit minerals in public lands, and to grant patents to private mineral lands. 88 A person who
acquired ownership over a parcel of private mineral land pursuant to the laws then prevailing could exclude other persons, even the
State, from exploiting minerals within his property. 89 Thus, earlier jurisprudence90 held that:

A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the United
States, has the effect of a grant by the United States of the present and exclusive possession of the lands located, and this exclusive
right of possession and enjoyment continues during the entire life of the location. x x x.

x x x.

The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a valid mineral location perfects his claim and his location not only against
third persons, but also against the Government. x x x. [Italics in the original.]

The Regalian doctrine and the American system, therefore, differ in one essential respect. Under the Regalian theory, mineral rights
are not included in a grant of land by the state; under the American doctrine, mineral rights are included in a grant of land by the
government.91

Section 21 also made possible the concession (frequently styled "permit", license" or "lease") 92 system.93 This was the traditional
regime imposed by the colonial administrators for the exploitation of natural resources in the extractive sector (petroleum, hard
minerals, timber, etc.).94
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural
resource within a given area.95 Thus, the concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country's natural
resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction. 96 In consideration for the
right to exploit a natural resource, the concessionaire either pays rent or royalty, which is a fixed percentage of the gross proceeds. 97

Later statutory enactments by the legislative bodies set up in the Philippines adopted the contractual framework of the
concession.98 For instance, Act No. 2932,99 approved on August 31, 1920, which provided for the exploration, location, and lease of
lands containing petroleum and other mineral oils and gas in the Philippines, and Act No. 2719, 100 approved on May 14, 1917, which
provided for the leasing and development of coal lands in the Philippines, both utilized the concession system.101

THE 1935 CONSTITUTION AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

By the Act of United States Congress of March 24, 1934, popularly known as the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the People of the Philippine
Islands were authorized to adopt a constitution.102 On July 30, 1934, the Constitutional Convention met for the purpose of drafting a
constitution, and the Constitution subsequently drafted was approved by the Convention on February 8, 1935. 103 The Constitution was
submitted to the President of the United States on March 18, 1935. 104 On March 23, 1935, the President of the United States certified
that the Constitution conformed substantially with the provisions of the Act of Congress approved on March 24, 1934. 105 On May 14,
1935, the Constitution was ratified by the Filipino people. 106

The 1935 Constitution adopted the Regalian doctrine, declaring all natural resources of the Philippines, including mineral lands and
minerals, to be property belonging to the State. 107 As adopted in a republican system, the medieval concept of jura regalia is stripped
of royal overtones and ownership of the land is vested in the State. 108

Section 1, Article XIII, on Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources, of the 1935 Constitution provided:

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as
to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

The nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country was one of the fixed and dominating objectives of the
1935 Constitutional Convention.109 One delegate relates:

There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the
adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of
the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. The delegates of the Constitutional Convention
very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were
not certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in
the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.

The adoption of the principle of state ownership of the natural resources and of the Regalian doctrine was considered to be a necessary
starting point for the plan of nationalizing and conserving the natural resources of the country. For with the establishment of the
principle of state ownership of the natural resources, it would not be hard to secure the recognition of the power of the State to control
their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization. 110

The nationalization of the natural resources was intended (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an
instrument of national defense, helping prevent the extension to the country of foreign control through peaceful economic penetration;
and (3) to avoid making the Philippines a source of international conflicts with the consequent danger to its internal security and
independence.111

The same Section 1, Article XIII also adopted the concession system, expressly permitting the State to grant licenses, concessions, or
leases for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources. Grants, however, were limited to Filipinos or
entities at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.lawph!l.ne+

The swell of nationalism that suffused the 1935 Constitution was radically diluted when on November 1946, the Parity Amendment,
which came in the form of an "Ordinance Appended to the Constitution," was ratified in a plebiscite. 112 The Amendment extended,
from July 4, 1946 to July 3, 1974, the right to utilize and exploit our natural resources to citizens of the United States and business
enterprises owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States: 113

Notwithstanding the provision of section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution,
during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines with the President of the United
States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven
hundred and thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventy-four, the disposition,
exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the
operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions
imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.

The Parity Amendment was subsequently modified by the 1954 Revised Trade Agreement, also known as the Laurel-Langley
Agreement, embodied in Republic Act No. 1355. 114

THE PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949 AND THE CONCESSION SYSTEM

In the meantime, Republic Act No. 387,115 also known as the Petroleum Act of 1949, was approved on June 18, 1949.

The Petroleum Act of 1949 employed the concession system for the exploitation of the nation's petroleum resources. Among the kinds
of concessions it sanctioned were exploration and exploitation concessions, which respectively granted to the concessionaire the
exclusive right to explore for116 or develop117 petroleum within specified areas.

Concessions may be granted only to duly qualified persons118 who have sufficient finances, organization, resources, technical
competence, and skills necessary to conduct the operations to be undertaken. 119

Nevertheless, the Government reserved the right to undertake such work itself. 120 This proceeded from the theory that all natural
deposits or occurrences of petroleum or natural gas in public and/or private lands in the Philippines belong to the State. 121 Exploration
and exploitation concessions did not confer upon the concessionaire ownership over the petroleum lands and petroleum
deposits.122 However, they did grant concessionaires the right to explore, develop, exploit, and utilize them for the period and under
the conditions determined by the law.123

Concessions were granted at the complete risk of the concessionaire; the Government did not guarantee the existence of petroleum or
undertake, in any case, title warranty.124

Concessionaires were required to submit information as maybe required by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
including reports of geological and geophysical examinations, as well as production reports. 125Exploration126 and
exploitation127 concessionaires were also required to submit work programs.lavvphi1.net

Exploitation concessionaires, in particular, were obliged to pay an annual exploitation tax,128 the object of which is to induce the
concessionaire to actually produce petroleum, and not simply to sit on the concession without developing or exploiting it. 129 These
concessionaires were also bound to pay the Government royalty, which was not less than 12½% of the petroleum produced and saved,
less that consumed in the operations of the concessionaire. 130 Under Article 66, R.A. No. 387, the exploitation tax may be credited
against the royalties so that if the concessionaire shall be actually producing enough oil, it would not actually be paying the
exploitation tax.131

Failure to pay the annual exploitation tax for two consecutive years, 132 or the royalty due to the Government within one year from the
date it becomes due,133 constituted grounds for the cancellation of the concession. In case of delay in the payment of the taxes or
royalty imposed by the law or by the concession, a surcharge of 1% per month is exacted until the same are paid. 134

As a rule, title rights to all equipment and structures that the concessionaire placed on the land belong to the exploration or
exploitation concessionaire.135 Upon termination of such concession, the concessionaire had a right to remove the same. 136

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was tasked with carrying out the provisions of the law, through the Director of
Mines, who acted under the Secretary's immediate supervision and control. 137 The Act granted the Secretary the authority to inspect
any operation of the concessionaire and to examine all the books and accounts pertaining to operations or conditions related to
payment of taxes and royalties.138

The same law authorized the Secretary to create an Administration Unit and a Technical Board. 139 The Administration Unit was
charged, inter alia, with the enforcement of the provisions of the law. 140 The Technical Board had, among other functions, the duty to
check on the performance of concessionaires and to determine whether the obligations imposed by the Act and its implementing
regulations were being complied with.141

Victorio Mario A. Dimagiba, Chief Legal Officer of the Bureau of Energy Development, analyzed the benefits and drawbacks of the
concession system insofar as it applied to the petroleum industry:

Advantages of Concession. Whether it emphasizes income tax or royalty, the most positive aspect of the concession system is that the
State's financial involvement is virtually risk free and administration is simple and comparatively low in cost. Furthermore, if there is a
competitive allocation of the resource leading to substantial bonuses and/or greater royalty coupled with a relatively high level of
taxation, revenue accruing to the State under the concession system may compare favorably with other financial arrangements.

Disadvantages of Concession. There are, however, major negative aspects to this system. Because the Government's role in the
traditional concession is passive, it is at a distinct disadvantage in managing and developing policy for the nation's petroleum resource.
This is true for several reasons. First, even though most concession agreements contain covenants requiring diligence in operations
and production, this establishes only an indirect and passive control of the host country in resource development. Second, and more
importantly, the fact that the host country does not directly participate in resource management decisions inhibits its ability to train
and employ its nationals in petroleum development. This factor could delay or prevent the country from effectively engaging in the
development of its resources. Lastly, a direct role in management is usually necessary in order to obtain a knowledge of the
international petroleum industry which is important to an appreciation of the host country's resources in relation to those of other
countries.142
Other liabilities of the system have also been noted:

x x x there are functional implications which give the concessionaire great economic power arising from its exclusive equity holding.
This includes, first, appropriation of the returns of the undertaking, subject to a modest royalty; second, exclusive management of the
project; third, control of production of the natural resource, such as volume of production, expansion, research and development; and
fourth, exclusive responsibility for downstream operations, like processing, marketing, and distribution. In short, even if nominally,
the state is the sovereign and owner of the natural resource being exploited, it has been shorn of all elements of control over such
natural resource because of the exclusive nature of the contractual regime of the concession. The concession system, investing as it
does ownership of natural resources, constitutes a consistent inconsistency with the principle embodied in our Constitution that natural
resources belong to the state and shall not be alienated, not to mention the fact that the concession was the bedrock of the colonial
system in the exploitation of natural resources.143

Eventually, the concession system failed for reasons explained by Dimagiba:

Notwithstanding the good intentions of the Petroleum Act of 1949, the concession system could not have properly spurred sustained
oil exploration activities in the country, since it assumed that such a capital-intensive, high risk venture could be successfully
undertaken by a single individual or a small company. In effect, concessionaires' funds were easily exhausted. Moreover, since the
concession system practically closed its doors to interested foreign investors, local capital was stretched to the limits. The old system
also failed to consider the highly sophisticated technology and expertise required, which would be available only to multinational
companies.144

A shift to a new regime for the development of natural resources thus seemed imminent.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 87, THE 1973 CONSTITUTION AND THE SERVICE CONTRACT SYSTEM

The promulgation on December 31, 1972 of Presidential Decree No. 87, 145 otherwise known as The Oil Exploration and Development
Act of 1972 signaled such a transformation. P.D. No. 87 permitted the government to explore for and produce indigenous petroleum
through "service contracts."146

"Service contracts" is a term that assumes varying meanings to different people, and it has carried many names in different countries,
like "work contracts" in Indonesia, "concession agreements" in Africa, "production-sharing agreements" in the Middle East, and
"participation agreements" in Latin America.147 A functional definition of "service contracts" in the Philippines is provided as follows:

A service contract is a contractual arrangement for engaging in the exploitation and development of petroleum, mineral, energy, land
and other natural resources by which a government or its agency, or a private person granted a right or privilege by the government
authorizes the other party (service contractor) to engage or participate in the exercise of such right or the enjoyment of the privilege, in
that the latter provides financial or technical resources, undertakes the exploitation or production of a given resource, or directly
manages the productive enterprise, operations of the exploration and exploitation of the resources or the disposition of marketing or
resources.148

In a service contract under P.D. No. 87, service and technology are furnished by the service contractor for which it shall be entitled to
the stipulated service fee.149 The contractor must be technically competent and financially capable to undertake the operations required
in the contract.150

Financing is supposed to be provided by the Government to which all petroleum produced belongs. 151 In case the Government is
unable to finance petroleum exploration operations, the contractor may furnish services, technology and financing, and the proceeds of
sale of the petroleum produced under the contract shall be the source of funds for payment of the service fee and the operating
expenses due the contractor.152 The contractor shall undertake, manage and execute petroleum operations, subject to the government
overseeing the management of the operations.153 The contractor provides all necessary services and technology and the requisite
financing, performs the exploration work obligations, and assumes all exploration risks such that if no petroleum is produced, it will
not be entitled to reimbursement.154 Once petroleum in commercial quantity is discovered, the contractor shall operate the field on
behalf of the government.155

P.D. No. 87 prescribed minimum terms and conditions for every service contract. 156 It also granted the contractor certain privileges,
including exemption from taxes and payment of tariff duties, 157 and permitted the repatriation of capital and retention of profits
abroad.158

Ostensibly, the service contract system had certain advantages over the concession regime.159 It has been opined, though, that, in the
Philippines, our concept of a service contract, at least in the petroleum industry, was basically a concession regime with a production-
sharing element.160

On January 17, 1973, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos proclaimed the ratification of a new Constitution. 161Article XIV on the
National Economy and Patrimony contained provisions similar to the 1935 Constitution with regard to Filipino participation in the
nation's natural resources. Section 8, Article XIV thereof provides:

Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and
the limit of the grant.
While Section 9 of the same Article maintained the Filipino-only policy in the enjoyment of natural resources, it also allowed
Filipinos, upon authority of the Batasang Pambansa, to enter into service contracts with any person or entity for the exploration or
utilization of natural resources.

Sec. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources of the Philippines shall be
limited to citizens, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of which is owned by such citizens. The Batasang
Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such citizens, corporations or associations to enter into service contracts for financial,
technical, management, or other forms of assistance with any person or entity for the exploration, or utilization of any of the natural
resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance are hereby
recognized as such. [Emphasis supplied.]

The concept of service contracts, according to one delegate, was borrowed from the methods followed by India, Pakistan and
especially Indonesia in the exploration of petroleum and mineral oils.162 The provision allowing such contracts, according to another,
was intended to "enhance the proper development of our natural resources since Filipino citizens lack the needed capital and technical
know-how which are essential in the proper exploration, development and exploitation of the natural resources of the country." 163

The original idea was to authorize the government, not private entities, to enter into service contracts with foreign entities.164 As
finally approved, however, a citizen or private entity could be allowed by the National Assembly to enter into such service
contract.165 The prior approval of the National Assembly was deemed sufficient to protect the national interest. 166 Notably, none of the
laws allowing service contracts were passed by the Batasang Pambansa. Indeed, all of them were enacted by presidential decree.

On March 13, 1973, shortly after the ratification of the new Constitution, the President promulgated Presidential Decree No.
151.167 The law allowed Filipino citizens or entities which have acquired lands of the public domain or which own, hold or control
such lands to enter into service contracts for financial, technical, management or other forms of assistance with any foreign persons or
entity for the exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of said lands. 168

Presidential Decree No. 463,169 also known as The Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974, was enacted on May 17, 1974.
Section 44 of the decree, as amended, provided that a lessee of a mining claim may enter into a service contract with a qualified
domestic or foreign contractor for the exploration, development and exploitation of his claims and the processing and marketing of the
product thereof.

Presidential Decree No. 704170 (The Fisheries Decree of 1975), approved on May 16, 1975, allowed Filipinos engaged in commercial
fishing to enter into contracts for financial, technical or other forms of assistance with any foreign person, corporation or entity for the
production, storage, marketing and processing of fish and fishery/aquatic products. 171

Presidential Decree No. 705172 (The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines), approved on May 19, 1975, allowed "forest products
licensees, lessees, or permitees to enter into service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance . . .
with any foreign person or entity for the exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of the forest resources." 173

Yet another law allowing service contracts, this time for geothermal resources, was Presidential Decree No. 1442, 174 which was signed
into law on June 11, 1978. Section 1 thereof authorized the Government to enter into service contracts for the exploration, exploitation
and development of geothermal resources with a foreign contractor who must be technically and financially capable of undertaking the
operations required in the service contract.

Thus, virtually the entire range of the country's natural resources –from petroleum and minerals to geothermal energy, from public
lands and forest resources to fishery products – was well covered by apparent legal authority to engage in the direct participation or
involvement of foreign persons or corporations (otherwise disqualified) in the exploration and utilization of natural resources through
service contracts.175

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND TECHNICAL OR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS

After the February 1986 Edsa Revolution, Corazon C. Aquino took the reins of power under a revolutionary government. On March
25, 1986, President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3, 176 promulgating the Provisional Constitution, more popularly referred to as the
Freedom Constitution. By authority of the same Proclamation, the President created a Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) to draft
a new constitution, which took effect on the date of its ratification on February 2, 1987. 177

The 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine. The first sentence of Section 2, Article XII states: "All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State."

Like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, the 1987 Constitution, in the second sentence of the same provision, prohibits the
alienation of natural resources, except agricultural lands.

The third sentence of the same paragraph is new: "The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State." The constitutional policy of the State's "full control and supervision" over natural resources
proceeds from the concept of jura regalia, as well as the recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources, not only for
national economic development, but also for its security and national defense. 178 Under this provision, the State assumes "a more
dynamic role" in the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources. 179

Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions authorizing the State to grant licenses,
concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the
utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through "license, concession or lease" is no longer allowed under the 1987
Constitution.180

Having omitted the provision on the concession system, Section 2 proceeded to introduce "unfamiliar language": 181

The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements
with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.

Consonant with the State's "full supervision and control" over natural resources, Section 2 offers the State two "options." 182 One, the
State may directly undertake these activities itself; or two, it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or entities at least 60% of whose capital is owned by such citizens.

A third option is found in the third paragraph of the same section:

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming,
with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

While the second and third options are limited only to Filipino citizens or, in the case of the former, to corporations or associations at
least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos, a fourth allows the participation of foreign-owned corporations. The fourth
and fifth paragraphs of Section 2 provide:

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution.

Although Section 2 sanctions the participation of foreign-owned corporations in the exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources, it imposes certain limitations or conditions to agreements with such corporations.

First, the parties to FTAAs. Only the President, in behalf of the State, may enter into these agreements, and only with
corporations. By contrast, under the 1973 Constitution, a Filipino citizen, corporation or association may enter into a service
contract with a "foreign person or entity."

Second, the size of the activities: only large-scale exploration, development, and utilization is allowed. The term "large-scale
usually refers to very capital-intensive activities."183

Third, the natural resources subject of the activities is restricted to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the intent being
to limit service contracts to those areas where Filipino capital may not be sufficient. 184

Fourth, consistency with the provisions of statute. The agreements must be in accordance with the terms and conditions
provided by law.

Fifth, Section 2 prescribes certain standards for entering into such agreements. The agreements must be based on real
contributions to economic growth and general welfare of the country.

Sixth, the agreements must contain rudimentary stipulations for the promotion of the development and use of local scientific
and technical resources.

Seventh, the notification requirement. The President shall notify Congress of every financial or technical assistance
agreement entered into within thirty days from its execution.

Finally, the scope of the agreements. While the 1973 Constitution referred to "service contracts for financial, technical,
management, or other forms of assistance" the 1987 Constitution provides for "agreements. . . involving either financial or
technical assistance." It bears noting that the phrases "service contracts" and "management or other forms of assistance" in
the earlier constitution have been omitted.

By virtue of her legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution, 185 President Aquino, on July 10, 1987, signed into law E.O. No.
211 prescribing the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization
of minerals. The omission in the 1987 Constitution of the term "service contracts" notwithstanding, the said E.O. still referred to them
in Section 2 thereof:

Sec. 2. Applications for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, including renewal applications and
applications for approval of operating agreements and mining service contracts, shall be accepted and processed and may be approved
x x x. [Emphasis supplied.]
The same law provided in its Section 3 that the "processing, evaluation and approval of all mining applications . . . operating
agreements and service contracts . . . shall be governed by Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and
their implementing rules and regulations. . . ."

As earlier stated, on the 25th also of July 1987, the President issued E.O. No. 279 by authority of which the subject WMCP FTAA
was executed on March 30, 1995.

On March 3, 1995, President Ramos signed into law R.A. No. 7942. Section 15 thereof declares that the Act "shall govern the
exploration, development, utilization, and processing of all mineral resources." Such declaration notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7942 does
not actually cover all the modes through which the State may undertake the exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources.

The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded the primary power and responsibility in the exploration, development
and utilization thereof. As such, it may undertake these activities through four modes:

The State may directly undertake such activities.

(2) The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified
corporations.

(3) Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens.

(4) For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President
may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.186

Except to charge the Mines and Geosciences Bureau of the DENR with performing researches and surveys, 187 and a passing mention
of government-owned or controlled corporations,188 R.A. No. 7942 does not specify how the State should go about the first mode. The
third mode, on the other hand, is governed by Republic Act No. 7076 189(the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991) and other
pertinent laws.190 R.A. No. 7942 primarily concerns itself with the second and fourth modes.

Mineral production sharing, co-production and joint venture agreements are collectively classified by R.A. No. 7942 as "mineral
agreements."191 The Government participates the least in a mineral production sharing agreement (MPSA). In an MPSA, the
Government grants the contractor192 the exclusive right to conduct mining operations within a contract area 193 and shares in the gross
output.194 The MPSA contractor provides the financing, technology, management and personnel necessary for the agreement's
implementation.195 The total government share in an MPSA is the excise tax on mineral products under Republic Act No.
7729,196 amending Section 151(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. 197

In a co-production agreement (CA),198 the Government provides inputs to the mining operations other than the mineral
resource,199 while in a joint venture agreement (JVA), where the Government enjoys the greatest participation, the Government and
the JVA contractor organize a company with both parties having equity shares.200 Aside from earnings in equity, the Government in a
JVA is also entitled to a share in the gross output.201The Government may enter into a CA202 or JVA203 with one or more contractors.
The Government's share in a CA or JVA is set out in Section 81 of the law:

The share of the Government in co-production and joint venture agreements shall be negotiated by the Government and the contractor
taking into consideration the: (a) capital investment of the project, (b) the risks involved, (c) contribution of the project to the
economy, and (d) other factors that will provide for a fair and equitable sharing between the Government and the contractor. The
Government shall also be entitled to compensations for its other contributions which shall be agreed upon by the parties, and shall
consist, among other things, the contractor's income tax, excise tax, special allowance, withholding tax due from the contractor's
foreign stockholders arising from dividend or interest payments to the said foreign stockholders, in case of a foreign national and all
such other taxes, duties and fees as provided for under existing laws.

All mineral agreements grant the respective contractors the exclusive right to conduct mining operations and to extract all mineral
resources found in the contract area.204 A "qualified person" may enter into any of the mineral agreements with the Government. 205 A
"qualified person" is

any citizen of the Philippines with capacity to contract, or a corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative organized or
authorized for the purpose of engaging in mining, with technical and financial capability to undertake mineral resources development
and duly registered in accordance with law at least sixty per centum (60%) of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the
Philippines x x x.206

The fourth mode involves "financial or technical assistance agreements." An FTAA is defined as "a contract involving financial or
technical assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources." 207 Any qualified person with
technical and financial capability to undertake large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources in the
Philippines may enter into such agreement directly with the Government through the DENR.208 For the purpose of granting an FTAA,
a legally organized foreign-owned corporation (any corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative duly registered in accordance
with law in which less than 50% of the capital is owned by Filipino citizens)209 is deemed a "qualified person."210

Other than the difference in contractors' qualifications, the principal distinction between mineral agreements and FTAAs is the
maximum contract area to which a qualified person may hold or be granted.211 "Large-scale" under R.A. No. 7942 is determined by
the size of the contract area, as opposed to the amount invested (US $50,000,000.00), which was the standard under E.O. 279.
Like a CA or a JVA, an FTAA is subject to negotiation. 212 The Government's contributions, in the form of taxes, in an FTAA is
identical to its contributions in the two mineral agreements, save that in an FTAA:

The collection of Government share in financial or technical assistance agreement shall commence after the financial or technical
assistance agreement contractor has fully recovered its pre-operating expenses, exploration, and development expenditures,
inclusive.213

III

Having examined the history of the constitutional provision and statutes enacted pursuant thereto, a consideration of the substantive
issues presented by the petition is now in order.

THE EFFECTIVITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 279

Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 279, the law in force when the WMC FTAA was executed, did not come into effect.

E.O. No. 279 was signed into law by then President Aquino on July 25, 1987, two days before the opening of Congress on July 27,
1987.214 Section 8 of the E.O. states that the same "shall take effect immediately." This provision, according to petitioners, runs
counter to Section 1 of E.O. No. 200,215 which provides:

SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.216 [Emphasis supplied.]

On that premise, petitioners contend that E.O. No. 279 could have only taken effect fifteen days after its publication at which time
Congress had already convened and the President's power to legislate had ceased.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the validity of E.O. No. 279 was settled in Miners Association of the Philippines v.
Factoran, supra. This is of course incorrect for the issue in Miners Association was not the validity of E.O. No. 279 but that of DAO
Nos. 57 and 82 which were issued pursuant thereto.

Nevertheless, petitioners' contentions have no merit.

It bears noting that there is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a law from taking effect on a date other than – even before – the 15-
day period after its publication. Where a law provides for its own date of effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O.
No. 200. Indeed, this is the very essence of the phrase "unless it is otherwise provided" in Section 1 thereof. Section 1, E.O. No. 200,
therefore, applies only when a statute does not provide for its own date of effectivity.

What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and what due process requires, as this Court held in Tañada v. Tuvera, 217is the publication of
the law for without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis n[eminem]
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is not a ground for its invalidation since the
Constitution, being "the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation," is deemed written in the law.218 Hence, the due
process clause,219 which, so Tañada held, mandates the publication of statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279. Additionally,
Section 1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for publication "either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines," finds suppletory application. It is significant to note that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in the Official
Gazette220 on August 3, 1987.

From a reading then of Section 8 of E.O. No. 279, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200, and Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court holds that E.O. No.
279 became effective immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.

That such effectivity took place after the convening of the first Congress is irrelevant. At the time President Aquino issued E.O. No.
279 on July 25, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution. 221 Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution explicitly states:

Sec. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.

The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers by President Aquino; it did not prevent the
effectivity of laws she had previously enacted.

There can be no question, therefore, that E.O. No. 279 is an effective, and a validly enacted, statute.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE WMCP FTAA

Petitioners submit that, in accordance with the text of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, FTAAs should be limited to
"technical or financial assistance" only. They observe, however, that, contrary to the language of the Constitution, the WMCP FTAA
allows WMCP, a fully foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than mere financial or technical assistance to the State, for it
permits WMCP to manage and operate every aspect of the mining activity. 222
Petitioners' submission is well-taken. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must be so construed
as to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. 223 This intention is to be sought in the constitution itself, and the
apparent meaning of the words is to be taken as expressing it, except in cases where that assumption would lead to absurdity,
ambiguity, or contradiction.224 What the Constitution says according to the text of the provision, therefore, compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.225 Accordingly,
following the literal text of the Constitution, assistance accorded by foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils should be limited to "technical" or "financial" assistance only.

WMCP nevertheless submits that the word "technical" in the fourth paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. No. 279 encompasses a "broad
number of possible services," perhaps, "scientific and/or technological in basis."226 It thus posits that it may also well include "the area
of management or operations . . . so long as such assistance requires specialized knowledge or skills, and are related to the exploration,
development and utilization of mineral resources."227

This Court is not persuaded. As priorly pointed out, the phrase "management or other forms of assistance" in the 1973 Constitution
was deleted in the 1987 Constitution, which allows only "technical or financial assistance." Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est. A
person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 228 As will be shown later, the
management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, was precisely
the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate.

Respondents insist that "agreements involving technical or financial assistance" is just another term for service contracts. They
contend that the proceedings of the CONCOM indicate "that although the terminology 'service contract' was avoided [by the
Constitution], the concept it represented was not." They add that "[t]he concept is embodied in the phrase 'agreements involving
financial or technical assistance.'"229 And point out how members of the CONCOM referred to these agreements as "service
contracts." For instance:

SR. TAN. Am I correct in thinking that the only difference between these future service contracts and the past service
contracts under Mr. Marcos is the general law to be enacted by the legislature and the notification of Congress by the
President? That is the only difference, is it not?

MR. VILLEGAS. That is right.

SR. TAN. So those are the safeguards[?]

MR. VILLEGAS. Yes. There was no law at all governing service contracts before.

SR. TAN. Thank you, Madam President.230 [Emphasis supplied.]

WMCP also cites the following statements of Commissioners Gascon, Garcia, Nolledo and Tadeo who alluded to service
contracts as they explained their respective votes in the approval of the draft Article:

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, I vote no primarily because of two reasons: One, the provision on service contracts. I
felt that if we would constitutionalize any provision on service contracts, this should always be with the concurrence of
Congress and not guided only by a general law to be promulgated by Congress. x x x. 231 [Emphasis supplied.]

x x x.

MR. GARCIA. Thank you.

I vote no. x x x.

Service contracts are given constitutional legitimization in Section 3, even when they have been proven to be inimical to the
interests of the nation, providing as they do the legal loophole for the exploitation of our natural resources for the benefit of
foreign interests. They constitute a serious negation of Filipino control on the use and disposition of the nation's natural
resources, especially with regard to those which are nonrenewable. 232[Emphasis supplied.]

xxx

MR. NOLLEDO. While there are objectionable provisions in the Article on National Economy and Patrimony, going over
said provisions meticulously, setting aside prejudice and personalities will reveal that the article contains a balanced set of
provisions. I hope the forthcoming Congress will implement such provisions taking into account that Filipinos should have
real control over our economy and patrimony, and if foreign equity is permitted, the same must be subordinated to the
imperative demands of the national interest.

x x x.

It is also my understanding that service contracts involving foreign corporations or entities are resorted to only when no
Filipino enterprise or Filipino-controlled enterprise could possibly undertake the exploration or exploitation of our natural
resources and that compensation under such contracts cannot and should not equal what should pertain to ownership of
capital. In other words, the service contract should not be an instrument to circumvent the basic provision, that the
exploration and exploitation of natural resources should be truly for the benefit of Filipinos.
 Thank you, and I vote yes.233 [Emphasis supplied.]

x x x.

MR. TADEO. Nais ko lamang ipaliwanag ang aking boto.

Matapos suriin ang kalagayan ng Pilipinas, ang saligang suliranin, pangunahin ang salitang "imperyalismo." Ang ibig sabihin
nito ay ang sistema ng lipunang pinaghaharian ng iilang monopolyong kapitalista at ang salitang "imperyalismo" ay buhay na
buhay sa National Economy and Patrimony na nating ginawa. Sa pamamagitan ng salitang "based on," naroroon na ang free
trade sapagkat tayo ay mananatiling tagapagluwas ng hilaw na sangkap at tagaangkat ng yaring produkto. Pangalawa,
naroroon pa rin ang parity rights, ang service contract, ang 60-40 equity sa natural resources. Habang naghihirap ang
sambayanang Pilipino, ginagalugad naman ng mga dayuhan ang ating likas na yaman. Kailan man ang Article on National
Economy and Patrimony ay hindi nagpaalis sa pagkaalipin ng ating ekonomiya sa kamay ng mga dayuhan. Ang solusyon sa
suliranin ng bansa ay dalawa lamang: ang pagpapatupad ng tunay na reporma sa lupa at ang national industrialization. Ito ang
tinatawag naming pagsikat ng araw sa Silangan. Ngunit ang mga landlords and big businessmen at ang mga komprador ay
nagsasabi na ang free trade na ito, ang kahulugan para sa amin, ay ipinipilit sa ating sambayanan na ang araw ay sisikat sa
Kanluran. Kailan man hindi puwedeng sumikat ang araw sa Kanluran. I vote no. 234 [Emphasis supplied.]

This Court is likewise not persuaded.

As earlier noted, the phrase "service contracts" has been deleted in the 1987 Constitution's Article on National Economy and
Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to retain the concept of service contracts under the 1973 Constitution, it could have simply
adopted the old terminology ("service contracts") instead of employing new and unfamiliar terms ("agreements . . . involving either
technical or financial assistance"). Such a difference between the language of a provision in a revised constitution and that of a similar
provision in the preceding constitution is viewed as indicative of a difference in purpose.235 If, as respondents suggest, the concept of
"technical or financial assistance" agreements is identical to that of "service contracts," the CONCOM would not have bothered to fit
the same dog with a new collar. To uphold respondents' theory would reduce the first to a mere euphemism for the second and render
the change in phraseology meaningless.

An examination of the reason behind the change confirms that technical or financial assistance agreements are not synonymous to
service contracts.

[T]he Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if
any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 236

As the following question of Commissioner Quesada and Commissioner Villegas' answer shows the drafters intended to do away with
service contracts which were used to circumvent the capitalization (60%-40%) requirement:

MS. QUESADA. The 1973 Constitution used the words "service contracts." In this particular Section 3, is there a safeguard
against the possible control of foreign interests if the Filipinos go into coproduction with them?

MR. VILLEGAS. Yes. In fact, the deletion of the phrase "service contracts" was our first attempt to avoid some of the abuses
in the past regime in the use of service contracts to go around the 60-40 arrangement. The safeguard that has been introduced
– and this, of course can be refined – is found in Section 3, lines 25 to 30, where Congress will have to concur with the
President on any agreement entered into between a foreign-owned corporation and the government involving technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of natural resources. 237 [Emphasis supplied.]

In a subsequent discussion, Commissioner Villegas allayed the fears of Commissioner Quesada regarding the participation of
foreign interests in Philippine natural resources, which was supposed to be restricted to Filipinos.

MS. QUESADA. Another point of clarification is the phrase "and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State." In the 1973 Constitution, this was limited to citizens of the Philippines; but it was
removed and substituted by "shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Was the concept changed so that
these particular resources would be limited to citizens of the Philippines? Or would these resources only be under the full
control and supervision of the State; meaning, noncitizens would have access to these natural resources? Is that the
understanding?

MR. VILLEGAS. No, Mr. Vice-President, if the Commissioner reads the next sentence, it states:

Such activities may be directly undertaken by the State, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens.

So we are still limiting it only to Filipino citizens.

x x x.

MS. QUESADA. Going back to Section 3, the section suggests that:

The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources… may be directly undertaken by the State, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture or production-sharing agreement with . . . corporations or associations at least sixty per cent of whose voting
stock or controlling interest is owned by such citizens.

Lines 25 to 30, on the other hand, suggest that in the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, the
President with the concurrence of Congress may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations even for technical or financial
assistance.

I wonder if this part of Section 3 contradicts the second part. I am raising this point for fear that foreign investors will use their
enormous capital resources to facilitate the actual exploitation or exploration, development and effective disposition of our natural
resources to the detriment of Filipino investors. I am not saying that we should not consider borrowing money from foreign sources.
What I refer to is that foreign interest should be allowed to participate only to the extent that they lend us money and give us technical
assistance with the appropriate government permit. In this way, we can insure the enjoyment of our natural resources by our own
people.

MR. VILLEGAS. Actually, the second provision about the President does not permit foreign investors to participate. It is only
technical or financial assistance – they do not own anything – but on conditions that have to be determined by law with the
concurrence of Congress. So, it is very restrictive.

If the Commissioner will remember, this removes the possibility for service contracts which we said yesterday were avenues used in
the previous regime to go around the 60-40 requirement.238 [Emphasis supplied.]

The present Chief Justice, then a member of the CONCOM, also referred to this limitation in scope in proposing an amendment to the
60-40 requirement:

MR. DAVIDE. May I be allowed to explain the proposal?

MR. MAAMBONG. Subject to the three-minute rule, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. It will not take three minutes.

The Commission had just approved the Preamble. In the Preamble we clearly stated that the Filipino people are sovereign and that one
of the objectives for the creation or establishment of a government is to conserve and develop the national patrimony. The implication
is that the national patrimony or our natural resources are exclusively reserved for the Filipino people. No alien must be allowed to
enjoy, exploit and develop our natural resources. As a matter of fact, that principle proceeds from the fact that our natural resources
are gifts from God to the Filipino people and it would be a breach of that special blessing from God if we will allow aliens to exploit
our natural resources.

I voted in favor of the Jamir proposal because it is not really exploitation that we granted to the alien corporations but only for them to
render financial or technical assistance. It is not for them to enjoy our natural resources. Madam President, our natural resources are
depleting; our population is increasing by leaps and bounds. Fifty years from now, if we will allow these aliens to exploit our natural
resources, there will be no more natural resources for the next generations of Filipinos. It may last long if we will begin now. Since
1935 the aliens have been allowed to enjoy to a certain extent the exploitation of our natural resources, and we became victims of
foreign dominance and control. The aliens are interested in coming to the Philippines because they would like to enjoy the bounty of
nature exclusively intended for Filipinos by God.

And so I appeal to all, for the sake of the future generations, that if we have to pray in the Preamble "to preserve and develop the
national patrimony for the sovereign Filipino people and for the generations to come," we must at this time decide once and for all that
our natural resources must be reserved only to Filipino citizens.

Thank you.239 [Emphasis supplied.]

The opinion of another member of the CONCOM is persuasive 240 and leaves no doubt as to the intention of the framers to eliminate
service contracts altogether. He writes:

Paragraph 4 of Section 2 specifies large-scale, capital-intensive, highly technological undertakings for which the President may enter
into contracts with foreign-owned corporations, and enunciates strict conditions that should govern such contracts. x x x.

This provision balances the need for foreign capital and technology with the need to maintain the national sovereignty. It recognizes
the fact that as long as Filipinos can formulate their own terms in their own territory, there is no danger of relinquishing sovereignty to
foreign interests.

Are service contracts allowed under the new Constitution? No. Under the new Constitution, foreign investors (fully alien-owned) can
NOT participate in Filipino enterprises except to provide: (1) Technical Assistance for highly technical enterprises; and (2) Financial
Assistance for large-scale enterprises.

The intent of this provision, as well as other provisions on foreign investments, is to prevent the practice (prevalent in the Marcos
government) of skirting the 60/40 equation using the cover of service contracts. 241 [Emphasis supplied.]

Furthermore, it appears that Proposed Resolution No. 496, 242 which was the draft Article on National Economy and Patrimony,
adopted the concept of "agreements . . . involving either technical or financial assistance" contained in the "Draft of the 1986 U.P.
Law Constitution Project" (U.P. Law draft) which was taken into consideration during the deliberation of the CONCOM. 243 The
former, as well as Article XII, as adopted, employed the same terminology, as the comparative table below shows:
DRAFT OF THE UP LAW
CONSTITUTION PROJECT
Sec. 1. All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, flora and
fauna and other natural resources of
the Philippines are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. The exploration,
development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State.
Such activities may be directly
undertaken by the state, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture,
production sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens or corporations or
associations sixty per cent of whose
voting stock or controlling interest is
owned by such citizens for a period of
not more than twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-
five years and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law.
In case as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.
The National Assembly may by law
allow small scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens.
The National Assembly, may, by two-
thirds vote of all its members by
special law provide the terms and
conditions under which a foreign-
owned corporation may enter into
agreements with the government
involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, or
utilization of natural resources.
[Emphasis supplied.]
PROPOSED RESOLUTION NO. 496
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION
Sec. 3. All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests,
flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State.
Such activities may be directly
undertaken by the State, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture,
production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens or corporations or
associations at least sixty per cent of
whose voting stock or controlling
interest is owned by such citizens.
Such agreements shall be for a period
of twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, and
under such term and conditions as
may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries or industrial uses
other than the development for water
power, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant.
The Congress may by law allow
small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens, as well
as cooperative fish farming in rivers,
lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President with the concurrence of
Congress, by special law, shall
provide the terms and conditions
under which a foreign-owned
corporation may enter into agreements
with the government involving either
technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of natural resources.
[Emphasis supplied.]
ARTICLE XII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision
of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture,
or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum
of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for
a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such
terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In case of water
rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's
marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and
enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow
small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens, as well
as cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and
fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.
The President may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided
by law, based on real contributions to
the economic growth and general
welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote
the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
[Emphasis supplied.]
 The President shall notify the
Congress of every contract entered
into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution.

The insights of the proponents of the U.P. Law draft are, therefore, instructive in interpreting the phrase "technical or financial
assistance."

In his position paper entitled Service Contracts: Old Wine in New Bottles?, Professor Pacifico A. Agabin, who was a member of the
working group that prepared the U.P. Law draft, criticized service contracts for they "lodge exclusive management and control of the
enterprise to the service contractor, which is reminiscent of the old concession regime. Thus, notwithstanding the provision of the
Constitution that natural resources belong to the State, and that these shall not be alienated, the service contract system renders
nugatory the constitutional provisions cited." 244 He elaborates:

Looking at the Philippine model, we can discern the following vestiges of the concession regime, thus:

1. Bidding of a selected area, or leasing the choice of the area to the interested party and then negotiating the terms and
conditions of the contract; (Sec. 5, P.D. 87)

2. Management of the enterprise vested on the contractor, including operation of the field if petroleum is discovered; (Sec. 8,
P.D. 87)

3. Control of production and other matters such as expansion and development; (Sec. 8)

4. Responsibility for downstream operations – marketing, distribution, and processing may be with the contractor (Sec. 8);

5. Ownership of equipment, machinery, fixed assets, and other properties remain with contractor (Sec. 12, P.D. 87);

6. Repatriation of capital and retention of profits abroad guaranteed to the contractor (Sec. 13, P.D. 87); and

7. While title to the petroleum discovered may nominally be in the name of the government, the contractor has almost
unfettered control over its disposition and sale, and even the domestic requirements of the country is relegated to
a pro rata basis (Sec. 8).

In short, our version of the service contract is just a rehash of the old concession regime x x x. Some people have pulled an old rabbit
out of a magician's hat, and foisted it upon us as a new and different animal.

The service contract as we know it here is antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources restated in the same
article of the [1973] Constitution containing the provision for service contracts. If the service contractor happens to be a foreign
corporation, the contract would also run counter to the constitutional provision on nationalization or Filipinization, of the exploitation
of our natural resources.245 [Emphasis supplied. Underscoring in the original.]

Professor Merlin M. Magallona, also a member of the working group, was harsher in his reproach of the system:

x x x the nationalistic phraseology of the 1935 [Constitution] was retained by the [1973] Charter, but the essence of nationalism was
reduced to hollow rhetoric. The 1973 Charter still provided that the exploitation or development of the country's natural resources be
limited to Filipino citizens or corporations owned or controlled by them. However, the martial-law Constitution allowed them, once
these resources are in their name, to enter into service contracts with foreign investors for financial, technical, management, or other
forms of assistance. Since foreign investors have the capital resources, the actual exploitation and development, as well as the
effective disposition, of the country's natural resources, would be under their direction, and control, relegating the Filipino investors to
the role of second-rate partners in joint ventures.

Through the instrumentality of the service contract, the 1973 Constitution had legitimized at the highest level of state policy that
which was prohibited under the 1973 Constitution, namely: the exploitation of the country's natural resources by foreign nationals.
The drastic impact of [this] constitutional change becomes more pronounced when it is considered that the active party to any service
contract may be a corporation wholly owned by foreign interests. In such a case, the citizenship requirement is completely set aside,
permitting foreign corporations to obtain actual possession, control, and [enjoyment] of the country's natural resources. 246 [Emphasis
supplied.]

Accordingly, Professor Agabin recommends that:

Recognizing the service contract for what it is, we have to expunge it from the Constitution and reaffirm ownership over our natural
resources. That is the only way we can exercise effective control over our natural resources.

This should not mean complete isolation of the country's natural resources from foreign investment. Other contract forms which are
less derogatory to our sovereignty and control over natural resources – like technical assistance agreements, financial assistance
[agreements], co-production agreements, joint ventures, production-sharing – could still be utilized and adopted without violating
constitutional provisions. In other words, we can adopt contract forms which recognize and assert our sovereignty and ownership over
natural resources, and where the foreign entity is just a pure contractor instead of the beneficial owner of our economic
resources.247 [Emphasis supplied.]

Still another member of the working group, Professor Eduardo Labitag, proposed that:

2. Service contracts as practiced under the 1973 Constitution should be discouraged, instead the government may be allowed, subject
to authorization by special law passed by an extraordinary majority to enter into either technical or financial assistance. This is
justified by the fact that as presently worded in the 1973 Constitution, a service contract gives full control over the contract area to the
service contractor, for him to work, manage and dispose of the proceeds or production. It was a subterfuge to get around the
nationality requirement of the constitution.248[Emphasis supplied.]

In the annotations on the proposed Article on National Economy and Patrimony, the U.P. Law draft summarized the rationale therefor,
thus:

5. The last paragraph is a modification of the service contract provision found in Section 9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution as
amended. This 1973 provision shattered the framework of nationalism in our fundamental law (see Magallona, "Nationalism and its
Subversion in the Constitution"). Through the service contract, the 1973 Constitution had legitimized that which was prohibited under
the 1935 constitution—the exploitation of the country's natural resources by foreign nationals. Through the service contract, acts
prohibited by the Anti-Dummy Law were recognized as legitimate arrangements. Service contracts lodge exclusive management and
control of the enterprise to the service contractor, not unlike the old concession regime where the concessionaire had complete control
over the country's natural resources, having been given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource and, in effect,
having been assured of ownership of that resource at the point of extraction (see Agabin, "Service Contracts: Old Wine in New
Bottles"). Service contracts, hence, are antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, as well as the
constitutional provision on nationalization or Filipinization of the exploitation of our natural resources.

Under the proposed provision, only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements may be entered into, and only for large-
scale activities. These are contract forms which recognize and assert our sovereignty and ownership over natural resources since the
foreign entity is just a pure contractor and not a beneficial owner of our economic resources. The proposal recognizes the need for
capital and technology to develop our natural resources without sacrificing our sovereignty and control over such resources by the
safeguard of a special law which requires two-thirds vote of all the members of the Legislature. This will ensure that such agreements
will be debated upon exhaustively and thoroughly in the National Assembly to avert prejudice to the nation. 249 [Emphasis supplied.]

The U.P. Law draft proponents viewed service contracts under the 1973 Constitution as grants of beneficial ownership of the country's
natural resources to foreign owned corporations. While, in theory, the State owns these natural resources – and Filipino citizens, their
beneficiaries – service contracts actually vested foreigners with the right to dispose, explore for, develop, exploit, and utilize the same.
Foreigners, not Filipinos, became the beneficiaries of Philippine natural resources. This arrangement is clearly incompatible with the
constitutional ideal of nationalization of natural resources, with the Regalian doctrine, and on a broader perspective, with Philippine
sovereignty.

The proponents nevertheless acknowledged the need for capital and technical know-how in the large-scale exploitation, development
and utilization of natural resources – the second paragraph of the proposed draft itself being an admission of such scarcity. Hence,
they recommended a compromise to reconcile the nationalistic provisions dating back to the 1935 Constitution, which reserved all
natural resources exclusively to Filipinos, and the more liberal 1973 Constitution, which allowed foreigners to participate in these
resources through service contracts. Such a compromise called for the adoption of a new system in the exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources in the form of technical agreements or financial agreements which, necessarily, are distinct concepts
from service contracts.

The replacement of "service contracts" with "agreements… involving either technical or financial assistance," as well as the deletion
of the phrase "management or other forms of assistance," assumes greater significance when note is taken that the U.P. Law draft
proposed other equally crucial changes that were obviously heeded by the CONCOM. These include the abrogation of the concession
system and the adoption of new "options" for the State in the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources. The
proponents deemed these changes to be more consistent with the State's ownership of, and its "full control and supervision" (a phrase
also employed by the framers) over, such resources. The Project explained:

3. In line with the State ownership of natural resources, the State should take a more active role in the exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources, than the present practice of granting licenses, concessions, or leases – hence the provision that said
activities shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. There are three major schemes by which the State could
undertake these activities: first, directly by itself; second, by virtue of co-production, joint venture, production sharing agreements
with Filipino citizens or corporations or associations sixty per cent (60%) of the voting stock or controlling interests of which are
owned by such citizens; or third, with a foreign-owned corporation, in cases of large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of
natural resources through agreements involving either technical or financial assistance only. x x x.

At present, under the licensing concession or lease schemes, the government benefits from such benefits only through fees, charges, ad
valorem taxes and income taxes of the exploiters of our natural resources. Such benefits are very minimal compared with the
enormous profits reaped by theses licensees, grantees, concessionaires. Moreover, some of them disregard the conservation of natural
resources and do not protect the environment from degradation. The proposed role of the State will enable it to a greater share in the
profits – it can also actively husband its natural resources and engage in developmental programs that will be beneficial to them.

4. Aside from the three major schemes for the exploration, development, and utilization of our natural resources, the State may, by
law, allow Filipino citizens to explore, develop, utilize natural resources in small-scale. This is in recognition of the plight of marginal
fishermen, forest dwellers, gold panners, and others similarly situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and
survival.250
Professor Agabin, in particular, after taking pains to illustrate the similarities between the two systems, concluded that the service
contract regime was but a "rehash" of the concession system. "Old wine in new bottles," as he put it. The rejection of the service
contract regime, therefore, is in consonance with the abolition of the concession system.

In light of the deliberations of the CONCOM, the text of the Constitution, and the adoption of other proposed changes, there is no
doubt that the framers considered and shared the intent of the U.P. Law proponents in employing the phrase "agreements . . . involving
either technical or financial assistance."

While certain commissioners may have mentioned the term "service contracts" during the CONCOM deliberations, they may not have
been necessarily referring to the concept of service contracts under the 1973 Constitution. As noted earlier, "service contracts" is a
term that assumes different meanings to different people.251 The commissioners may have been using the term loosely, and not in its
technical and legal sense, to refer, in general, to agreements concerning natural resources entered into by the Government with foreign
corporations. These loose statements do not necessarily translate to the adoption of the 1973 Constitution provision allowing service
contracts.

It is true that, as shown in the earlier quoted portions of the proceedings in CONCOM, in response to Sr. Tan's question,
Commissioner Villegas commented that, other than congressional notification, the only difference between "future" and "past"
"service contracts" is the requirement of a general law as there were no laws previously authorizing the same. 252 However, such
remark is far outweighed by his more categorical statement in his exchange with Commissioner Quesada that the draft article "does
not permit foreign investors to participate" in the nation's natural resources – which was exactly what service contracts did – except to
provide "technical or financial assistance."253

In the case of the other commissioners, Commissioner Nolledo himself clarified in his work that the present charter prohibits service
contracts.254 Commissioner Gascon was not totally averse to foreign participation, but favored stricter restrictions in the form of
majority congressional concurrence.255 On the other hand, Commissioners Garcia and Tadeo may have veered to the extreme side of
the spectrum and their objections may be interpreted as votes against any foreign participation in our natural resources whatsoever.

WMCP cites Opinion No. 75, s. 1987,256 and Opinion No. 175, s. 1990257 of the Secretary of Justice, expressing the view that a
financial or technical assistance agreement "is no different in concept" from the service contract allowed under the 1973 Constitution.
This Court is not, however, bound by this interpretation. When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is
the courts that finally determine what the law means.258

In any case, the constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs with foreign-owned corporations is an exception
to the rule that participation in the nation's natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be
construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. As Commissioner Villegas emphasized, the provision is "very
restrictive."259 Commissioner Nolledo also remarked that "entering into service contracts is an exception to the rule on protection of
natural resources for the interest of the nation and, therefore, being an exception, it should be subject, whenever possible, to stringent
rules."260 Indeed, exceptions should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exception. 261

With the foregoing discussion in mind, this Court finds that R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts.
Although the statute employs the phrase "financial and technical agreements" in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it actually
treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.

Section 33, which is found under Chapter VI (Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement) of R.A. No. 7942 states:

SEC. 33. Eligibility.—Any qualified person with technical and financial capability to undertake large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of mineral resources in the Philippines may enter into a financial or technical assistance agreement directly with the
Government through the Department. [Emphasis supplied.]

"Exploration," as defined by R.A. No. 7942,

means the searching or prospecting for mineral resources by geological, geochemical or geophysical surveys, remote sensing, test
pitting, trending, drilling, shaft sinking, tunneling or any other means for the purpose of determining the existence, extent, quantity
and quality thereof and the feasibility of mining them for profit. 262

A legally organized foreign-owned corporation may be granted an exploration permit,263 which vests it with the right to conduct
exploration for all minerals in specified areas,264 i.e., to enter, occupy and explore the same.265Eventually, the foreign-owned
corporation, as such permittee, may apply for a financial and technical assistance agreement.266

"Development" is the work undertaken to explore and prepare an ore body or a mineral deposit for mining, including the construction
of necessary infrastructure and related facilities.267

"Utilization" "means the extraction or disposition of minerals." 268 A stipulation that the proponent shall dispose of the minerals and
byproducts produced at the highest price and more advantageous terms and conditions as provided for under the implementing rules
and regulations is required to be incorporated in every FTAA.269

A foreign-owned/-controlled corporation may likewise be granted a mineral processing permit. 270 "Mineral processing" is the milling,
beneficiation or upgrading of ores or minerals and rocks or by similar means to convert the same into marketable products.271
An FTAA contractor makes a warranty that the mining operations shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No.
7942 and its implementing rules272 and for work programs and minimum expenditures and commitments.273 And it obliges itself to
furnish the Government records of geologic, accounting, and other relevant data for its mining operation. 274

"Mining operation," as the law defines it, means mining activities involving exploration, feasibility, development, utilization, and
processing.275

The underlying assumption in all these provisions is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources, just like the foreign
contractor in a service contract.

Furthermore, Chapter XII of the Act grants foreign contractors in FTAAs the same auxiliary mining rights that it grants contractors in
mineral agreements (MPSA, CA and JV).276 Parenthetically, Sections 72 to 75 use the term "contractor," without distinguishing
between FTAA and mineral agreement contractors. And so does "holders of mining rights" in Section 76. A foreign contractor may
even convert its FTAA into a mineral agreement if the economic viability of the contract area is found to be inadequate to justify
large-scale mining operations,277 provided that it reduces its equity in the corporation, partnership, association or cooperative to forty
percent (40%).278

Finally, under the Act, an FTAA contractor warrants that it "has or has access to all the financing, managerial, and technical
expertise. . . ."279 This suggests that an FTAA contractor is bound to provide some management assistance – a form of assistance that
has been eliminated and, therefore, proscribed by the present Charter.

By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, the above-cited provisions of R.A. No.
7942 have in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation's mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with
nothing but bare title thereto.

Moreover, the same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60%-40%
capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine
natural resources.

In sum, the Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:

(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit:

Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an
exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit.

(2) Section 23,280 which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a
financial or technical assistance agreement,

(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance agreement;

(4) Section 35,281 which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance agreement;

(5) Section 39,282 which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a
mineral production-sharing agreement;

(6) Section 56,283 which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a financial and technical
assistance agreement;

The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing provisions and cannot stand on
their own:

(1) Section 3 (g),284 which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement.

Section 34,285 which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 36,286 which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 37,287 which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance agreement
proposals;

Section 38,288 which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 40,289 which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 41,290 which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA;

The second and third paragraphs of Section 81,291 which provide for the Government's share in a financial and technical
assistance agreement; and
 Section 90,292 which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors;

When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations
for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the
legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus
dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them. 293

There can be little doubt that the WMCP FTAA itself is a service contract.

Section 1.3 of the WMCP FTAA grants WMCP "the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilise[,] process and dispose of all Minerals
products and by-products thereof that may be produced from the Contract Area." 294 The FTAA also imbues WMCP with the following
rights:

(b) to extract and carry away any Mineral samples from the Contract area for the purpose of conducting tests and studies in
respect thereof;

(c) to determine the mining and treatment processes to be utilised during the Development/Operating Period and the project
facilities to be constructed during the Development and Construction Period;

(d) have the right of possession of the Contract Area, with full right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same,
subject to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 512 (if applicable) and not be prevented from entry into private ands by
surface owners and/or occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting for minerals therein;

xxx

(f) to construct roadways, mining, drainage, power generation and transmission facilities and all other types of works on the
Contract Area;

(g) to erect, install or place any type of improvements, supplies, machinery and other equipment relating to the Mining
Operations and to use, sell or otherwise dispose of, modify, remove or diminish any and all parts thereof;

(h) enjoy, subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations and the rights of third Parties, easement rights and the use of timber,
sand, clay, stone, water and other natural resources in the Contract Area without cost for the purposes of the Mining
Operations;

xxx

(i) have the right to mortgage, charge or encumber all or part of its interest and obligations under this Agreement, the plant,
equipment and infrastructure and the Minerals produced from the Mining Operations;

x x x. 295

All materials, equipment, plant and other installations erected or placed on the Contract Area remain the property of WMCP, which
has the right to deal with and remove such items within twelve months from the termination of the FTAA. 296

Pursuant to Section 1.2 of the FTAA, WMCP shall provide "[all] financing, technology, management and personnel necessary for the
Mining Operations." The mining company binds itself to "perform all Mining Operations . . . providing all necessary services,
technology and financing in connection therewith," 297 and to "furnish all materials, labour, equipment and other installations that may
be required for carrying on all Mining Operations." 298> WMCP may make expansions, improvements and replacements of the mining
facilities and may add such new facilities as it considers necessary for the mining operations. 299

These contractual stipulations, taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the
State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the
vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring
must be struck down.

In arguing against the annulment of the FTAA, WMCP invokes the Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments
between the Philippine and Australian Governments, which was signed in Manila on January 25, 1995 and which entered into force on
December 8, 1995.

x x x. Article 2 (1) of said treaty states that it applies to investments whenever made and thus the fact that [WMCP's] FTAA was
entered into prior to the entry into force of the treaty does not preclude the Philippine Government from protecting [WMCP's]
investment in [that] FTAA. Likewise, Article 3 (1) of the treaty provides that "Each Party shall encourage and promote investments in
its area by investors of the other Party and shall [admit] such investments in accordance with its Constitution, Laws, regulations and
investment policies" and in Article 3 (2), it states that "Each Party shall ensure that investments are accorded fair and equitable
treatment." The latter stipulation indicates that it was intended to impose an obligation upon a Party to afford fair and equitable
treatment to the investments of the other Party and that a failure to provide such treatment by or under the laws of the Party may
constitute a breach of the treaty. Simply stated, the Philippines could not, under said treaty, rely upon the inadequacies of its own laws
to deprive an Australian investor (like [WMCP]) of fair and equitable treatment by invalidating [WMCP's] FTAA without likewise
nullifying the service contracts entered into before the enactment of RA 7942 such as those mentioned in PD 87 or EO 279.
This becomes more significant in the light of the fact that [WMCP's] FTAA was executed not by a mere Filipino citizen, but by the
Philippine Government itself, through its President no less, which, in entering into said treaty is assumed to be aware of the existing
Philippine laws on service contracts over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources. The execution of the
FTAA by the Philippine Government assures the Australian Government that the FTAA is in accordance with existing Philippine
laws.300 [Emphasis and italics by private respondents.]

The invalidation of the subject FTAA, it is argued, would constitute a breach of said treaty which, in turn, would amount to a violation
of Section 3, Article II of the Constitution adopting the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
One of these generally accepted principles is pacta sunt servanda, which requires the performance in good faith of treaty obligations.

Even assuming arguendo that WMCP is correct in its interpretation of the treaty and its assertion that "the Philippines could not . . .
deprive an Australian investor (like [WMCP]) of fair and equitable treatment by invalidating [WMCP's] FTAA without likewise
nullifying the service contracts entered into before the enactment of RA 7942 . . .," the annulment of the FTAA would not constitute a
breach of the treaty invoked. For this decision herein invalidating the subject FTAA forms part of the legal system of the
Philippines.301 The equal protection clause302 guarantees that such decision shall apply to all contracts belonging to the same class,
hence, upholding rather than violating, the "fair and equitable treatment" stipulation in said treaty.

One other matter requires clarification. Petitioners contend that, consistent with the provisions of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, the President may enter into agreements involving "either technical or financial assistance" only. The agreement in
question, however, is a technical and financial assistance agreement.

Petitioners' contention does not lie. To adhere to the literal language of the Constitution would lead to absurd consequences.303 As
WMCP correctly put it:

x x x such a theory of petitioners would compel the government (through the President) to enter into contract with two (2) foreign-
owned corporations, one for financial assistance agreement and with the other, for technical assistance over one and the same mining
area or land; or to execute two (2) contracts with only one foreign-owned corporation which has the capability to provide both
financial and technical assistance, one for financial assistance and another for technical assistance, over the same mining area. Such an
absurd result is definitely not sanctioned under the canons of constitutional construction. 304 [Underscoring in the original.]

Surely, the framers of the 1987 Charter did not contemplate such an absurd result from their use of "either/or." A constitution is not to
be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should be
avoided.305 Courts are not to give words a meaning that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences and a literal interpretation
is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. 306 That is a strong argument against its adoption.307 Accordingly,
petitioners' interpretation must be rejected.

The foregoing discussion has rendered unnecessary the resolution of the other issues raised by the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares unconstitutional and void:

(1) The following provisions of Republic Act No. 7942:

(a) The proviso in Section 3 (aq),

(b) Section 23,

(c) Section 33 to 41,

(d) Section 56,

(e) The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, and

(f) Section 90.

(2) All provisions of Department of Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Order 96-40, s. 1996 which are not
in conformity with this Decision, and

(3) The Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
WMC Philippines, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. The
petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations
with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further
seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.

The Facts

On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The
contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the
works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked
PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" 2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP).

On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll
future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of
Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which stated:

"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in the MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the
parties, to be paid according to progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed upon, subject
to price escalation, retention and other terms and conditions provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing
required for such works shall be provided by PEA.

xxx

(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the
rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of
December 30, 1981 which have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas
consist of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in the Financial Center
Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and approximately Three Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred
Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above Mean Low Water Level located
outside the Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood Unit." 3

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels
of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million
nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of
Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering
the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,
Parañaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and
Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares.

On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop
the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these
islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and
AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding.4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its
Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA.5 On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres, approved the JVA.6

On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as
the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported
the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. 7 Among the conclusions of their
report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the
government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the
Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.

On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force
to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force
were the Secretary of Justice,8 the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,9 and the Government Corporate Counsel.10 The Legal Task Force
upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.11

On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-going renegotiations between
PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw,
PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.

On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court
dismissed the petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper
court."12

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government
stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the
terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right
of the people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a
blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to
private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of
public dominion.

After several motions for extension of time,13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998,
respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the
renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for hearing on oral
argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution
dated June 22, 1999.

In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective
memoranda.

On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May 28,
1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory
grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."14

The Issues

The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15 and AMARI16 are as follows:

I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC
BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;

II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE GOVERNING
THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;

III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;

IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;

V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ON-

GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;

VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TO
AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; AND

VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE AMENDED
JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

The Court's Ruling

First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because of subsequent events.

The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the on-going negotiations for a new agreement." The
petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA from "privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any new agreement with
AMARI."

PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the
signed Amended JVA containing the terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioner's
prayer for a public disclosure of the renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA is now
moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has
approved the Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.

Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply fast-tracking the signing and approval of the
Amended JVA before the Court could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it
from the ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President cannot operate to moot the
petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the
signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA
and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its
violation of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public domain to
private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and
if already implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.

The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of
reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now becomes more compelling for the Court
to resolve the issue to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the national
patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave
violation of the Constitution. In the instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent the
transfer of title and ownership of alienable lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI. Even in cases where supervening
events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public.17

Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, 18 covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which
acquired the lands from private parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the right to judicial
confirmation of their imperfect titles19 under Title II of Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for brevity). In the instant case,
AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes
by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the Amended
JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the
lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945
or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987.20

Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the possible transfer at any time
by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to
AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA even
allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project.21

Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle governing the hierarchy of courts.

PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court. The principle of hierarchy
of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving
factual issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public.22 The Court can
resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls
under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary
jurisdiction over the instant case.

Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose publicly certain information without first asking
PEA the needed information. PEA claims petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. It also violates the rule that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

PEA distinguishes the instant case from Tañada v. Tuvera23 where the Court granted the petition for mandamus even if the petitioners
there did not initially demand from the Office of the President the publication of the presidential decrees. PEA points out that in
Tañada, the Executive Department had an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil Code24 and Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63825 to publish the presidential decrees. There was, therefore, no need for the petitioners in Tañada to make
an initial demand from the Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA claims it has no affirmative statutory duty to disclose
publicly information about its renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that the Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies to the instant case in view of the failure of petitioner here to demand initially from PEA the needed
information.

The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government corporation. Under Section 79 of the
Government Auditing Code,26 the disposition of government lands to private parties requires public bidding. PEA was under a
positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA to make this
public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original
JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative
statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial
intervention.

Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the
issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question. 27 The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire
lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations.
We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.

Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional right to information
without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that
petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus,
there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.

The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional
duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern.
Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of
government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust
of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the
Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.

Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez v. PCGG,28 the Court upheld the right of a
citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus -

"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of 'transcendental
importance to the public.' He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the
validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,'
and if they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the people.'

Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, such as in this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which have set aside the procedural
matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public interest.

xxx

In Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain
the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that
petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters
of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that
laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In
ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced 'is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.'

Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Tañada, further declared that 'when a mandamus proceeding involves
the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and,
therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the right.'

Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been involved under the questioned
contract for the development, management and operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, 'public interest
[was] definitely involved considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of the
country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.' We concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure
provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the petitioner's standing.

Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official records, documents
and papers — a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is
a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's
legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar
should be allowed."

We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights - to information and to
the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
agreement.

Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of public concern in this manner:

"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
(Emphasis supplied)

The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters
of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:

"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as
well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential
to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens,
whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are
also essential to hold public officials "at all times x x x accountable to the people," 29 for unless citizens have the proper information,
they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public
discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to
the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As explained by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30 –

"An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the
end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to
the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the
discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit."

PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information is limited to "definite
propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations
or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory
stage'."

Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or before the closing of the transaction. To
support its contention, AMARI cites the following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional Commission:

"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or
whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract
itself?

Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract
and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.

Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction.

Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.

Mr. Suarez: Thank you."32 (Emphasis supplied)

AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right. Requiring government officials to
reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government
officials will hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public dissemination of their
discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.

We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly, and information the
constitutional right to information requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its
own and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property. These include the size,
location, technical description and nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties
qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the
start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public
bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding
process.

Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is
not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts,
transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises
a "definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen
can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,33 the Court ruled as follows:

"Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as
well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have
decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain
to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the
"exploratory" stage. There is need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as
discussed earlier – such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other
classified information." (Emphasis supplied)

Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the right to
information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction."Certainly, a consummated
contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no
contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.1âwphi1.nêt

Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from
participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We
can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest."

The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The
first category refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials. The second
category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official
acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or
processed, owned by the government and used in formulating government policies.

The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and
expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the
JVA. However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the
renegotiation of the JVA.34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect
and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is
also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government
operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying. 35

The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of
powers.36 The right does not also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and
information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long
recognized as confidential.37 The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by law.

There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers.
The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings
which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of
Congress,38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A
frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. 39 This is not the
situation in the instant case.

We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiationsbefore a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized
exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several legislations. 41

Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the
Constitution.

The Regalian Doctrine

The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State
owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and
possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. 42 The King, as the sovereign ruler and representative of the people,
acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.

The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the State, in lieu of the King, as the
owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land
ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain."43 Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian
doctrine.

Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands

The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the
Philippines. On May 18, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the lease, but not the sale, of
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature
approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the
Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and
individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this day as the general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain.

The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889

Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within the maritime zone of the Spanish
territory belonged to the public domain for public use.44 The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the reclamation of the sea under
Article 5, which provided as follows:
 "Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or
private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise
provided by the terms of the grant of authority."

Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party undertaking the reclamation, provided the
government issued the necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the State.

Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:

"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is –

1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks,
shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;

2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some public service, or
in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and
mines, until granted to private individuals."

Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property devoted to public service referred
to property used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the property.

Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property not so used but employed to
develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public dominion although employed for some economic or
commercial activity to increase the national wealth.

Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of public dominion into private property, to wit:

"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the territory, shall become
a part of the private property of the State."

This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must declare the
property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private
parties.45

Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission

On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The
salient provisions of this law were as follows:

"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law, and the title to all Government or public
lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise throughout the Philippine Islands, shall be
retained by the Government without prejudice to vested rights and without prejudice to rights conceded to the City of Manila
in the Luneta Extension.

Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government
by dredging or filling or otherwise to be divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets and alleyways located thereon,
and shall cause plats and plans of such surveys to be prepared and filed with the Bureau of Lands.

(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give notice to the public that such parts of the
lands so made or reclaimed as are not needed for public purposes will be leased for commercial and business purposes, x
x x.

xxx

(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and best bidder therefore, subject to such regulations
and safeguards as the Governor-General may by executive order prescribe." (Emphasis supplied)

Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the government. The Act also vested in the
government control and disposition of foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the government only if these
lands were no longer needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public bidding in the lease of government reclaimed lands.
Act No. 1654 made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other public lands which the government could sell to
private parties, these reclaimed lands were available only for lease to private parties.

Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit private parties
from reclaiming parts of the sea under Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with
government permission remained private lands.

Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature

On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act.46 The salient provisions of Act No.
2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:

"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall
from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into –

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands, x x x.

Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the Governor-General,
upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands
are open to disposition or concession under this Act."

Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited or
classified x x x.

xxx

Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified as suitable
for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural purposes, and
shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.

Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:

(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;

(b) Foreshore;

(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;

(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.

x x x.

Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed of to private parties by lease
only and not otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under
this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act."
(Emphasis supplied)

Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of the public domain into x x x alienable or
disposable"47 lands. Section 7 of the Act empowered the Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession." Section 8 of the Act limited alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."

Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title 48 shall be classified" as government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands, as well as other lands. All these lands, however, must be suitable for residential, commercial, industrial or other
productive non-agricultural purposes. These provisions vested upon the Governor-General the power to classify inalienable lands of
the public domain into disposable lands of the public domain. These provisions also empowered the Governor-General to classify
further such disposable lands of the public domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public domain, as well
as other non-agricultural lands.

Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public domain classified as government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands "shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise." The Governor-General, before
allowing the lease of these lands to private parties, must formally declare that the lands were "not necessary for the public service."
Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and not to sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public
domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act No. 1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis,
as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain that the government could not sell to private parties.

The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural
purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only
allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these lands for some future public service.

Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands into other non-agricultural
lands under Section 56 (d). Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural purposes the government could
sell to private parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to
private parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their sale.49
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government permission remained private lands.

Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution

On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the Filipino people. The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the
Regalian doctrine, declared in Section 1, Article XIII, that –

"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant."
(Emphasis supplied)

The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural
resources the State could alienate. Thus, foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural resources, became inalienable by
constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The government could alienate foreshore
lands only after these lands were reclaimed and classified as alienable agricultural lands of the public domain. Government reclaimed
and marshy lands of the public domain, being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the classification of public agricultural
lands.50 However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public agricultural lands,
could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.

The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain was
only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit
individuals and corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain that were classified as
agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provided as follows:

"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess of one
thousand and twenty four hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred and
forty hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four
hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation,
or association." (Emphasis supplied)

Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of Act No. 2874 to open for sale to private
parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain. On the contrary, the legislature continued the long established
State policy of retaining for the government title and ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain.

Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly

On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, which
compiled the then existing laws on lands of the public domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day the existing general
law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands. 51

Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into "alienable or disposable" 52 lands of the
public domain, which prior to such classification are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141
authorizes the President to "declare what lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the
government can declare open for disposition or concession only lands that are "officially delimited and classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8
of CA No. 141 read as follows:

"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time
classify the lands of the public domain into –

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, 53 for the purpose of their administration
and disposition.

Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this Act.
 Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and
classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor
appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized
and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have
ceased to be so. x x x."

Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the President must first officially classify these
lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or concession. There must be no law reserving these lands
for public or quasi-public uses.

The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, are as follows:

"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, is intended to be used for
residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, and is open to
disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.

Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:

(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;

(b) Foreshore;

(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;

(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.

Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation, or
association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. x x x.

Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine shall be disposed of to private parties by lease
only and not otherwise, as soon as the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that
the same are not necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class
(d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)

Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section 58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All these lands are intended for residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only the lease of such lands to private parties.
The government could sell to private parties only lands falling under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-agricultural
purposes not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands,
however, became inalienable under the 1935 Constitution which only allowed the lease of these lands to qualified private parties.

Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public domain intended for residential, commercial, industrial
or other productive purposes other than agricultural "shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise."
Under Section 10 of CA No. 141, the term "disposition" includes lease of the land. Any disposition of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141,54 unless a
subsequent law amended or repealed these provisions.

In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court of Appeals,55Justice Reynato S. Puno
summarized succinctly the law on this matter, as follows:

"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands reclaimed by the government by
dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that the control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water
remained in the national government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing' of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919
and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed by the government were to be "disposed of to private parties by
lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing, however, the Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, had first to determine that the land reclaimed was not necessary for the public service.
This requisite must have been met before the land could be disposed of. But even then, the foreshore and lands under water
were not to be alienated and sold to private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land was only by lease. The land
remained property of the State." (Emphasis supplied)

As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act No. 141 has remained in effect at present."

The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public
domain, first implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect. The prohibition on the
sale of foreshore lands, however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution. Foreshore lands became inalienable as
natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the government and classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which
case they would fall under the classification of government reclaimed lands.

After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to
be only leased and not sold to private parties.56 These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain the government could not sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands
of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not authorize the President to
reclassify government reclaimed and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands classified under
Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes that the government could sell to private parties.

Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority before lands under Section 59 that the government
previously transferred to government units or entities could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 declares that –

"Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, be reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease is requested, and shall not exceed one
hundred and forty-four hectares: Provided, however, That this limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, or transfers
made to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government for the purposes deemed by said entities
conducive to the public interest; but the land so granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality or branch or
subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title,
except when authorized by Congress: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative authority required in Section 56 of Act No.
2874.

One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted government units and entities from the
maximum area of public lands that could be acquired from the State. These government units and entities should not just turn around
and sell these lands to private parties in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of lands for non-
agricultural purposes to government units and entities could be used to circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain. In the same manner, such transfers could also be used to evade the statutory prohibition in
CA No. 141 on the sale of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141
constitutes by operation of law a lien on these lands.57

In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under Section 59 of CA No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a
public bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 provide as follows:

"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed for public purposes, the Director of Lands
shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural Resources) for authority to dispose of the
same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director of Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in the same manner as
in the case of leases or sales of agricultural public land, x x x.

Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder. x x x."
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or sales of alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain.58

Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private
parties could still reclaim portions of the sea with government permission. However, the reclaimed land could become private land
only if classified as alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to disposition under CA No. 141. The 1935 Constitution
prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands.

The Civil Code of 1950

The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of public dominion found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles
420 and 422 of the Civil Code of 1950 state that –

"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

x x x.

Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State."

Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no longer needed for public use or public service,
before the same could be classified as patrimonial property of the State. 59 In the case of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the
public domain, the declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of their disposition, is governed by the applicable
provisions of CA No. 141.

Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of public dominion those properties of the State which,
without being for public use, are intended for public service or the "development of the national wealth." Thus, government reclaimed
and marshy lands of the State, even if not employed for public use or public service, if developed to enhance the national wealth, are
classified as property of public dominion.

Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution

The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution stated that –

"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall
not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of
the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)

The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the exception of "agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural
resources except "public agricultural lands." However, the term "public agricultural lands" in the 1935 Constitution encompassed
industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain.60 If the land of public domain were neither timber nor
mineral land, it would fall under the classification of agricultural land of the public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
therefore, prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain.

The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the
Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned by Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of
the public domain unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution declared that –

"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological, and development requirements of the natural
resources, shall determine by law the size of land of the public domain which may be developed, held or acquired by, or
leased to, any qualified individual, corporation, or association, and the conditions therefor. No private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area nor
may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in
excess of twenty-four hectares. No private corporation or association may hold by lease, concession, license or permit, timber
or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares. However, such area may be
increased by the Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority."
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. Only
individuals could now acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and private corporations became absolutely barred from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of alienable lands of the
public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands
of the public domain.

PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA, a wholly government
owned and controlled corporation with a special charter. Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA with the following purposes and
powers:

"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:

(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging, filling or other means, or to acquire
reclaimed land;

(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands, buildings,
estates and other forms of real property, owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government;

(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for the efficient, economical and beneficial
utilization of the above properties.

Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying out the purposes for which it is created, have
the following powers and functions:

(a)To prescribe its by-laws.

xxx

(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute.

(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume x x x.
 xxx

(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for the attainment of the purposes and objectives
herein specified." (Emphasis supplied)

PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Foreshore areas are those covered
and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide. 61 Submerged areas are those permanently under water regardless of the ebb and flow of
the tide.62 Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the public domain 63 and are inalienable unless reclaimed, classified
as alienable lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service.

The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain did not apply to PEA
since it was then, and until today, a fully owned government corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, as it still applies now,
only to "private corporations and associations." PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold lands of the public domain" even "in
excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute." Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of
the public domain.

In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain, there must be legislative
authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No.141, which
states –

"Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the
Government shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress; x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the
public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would
be subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. Hence, such
legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.

Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution

The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted the Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution
declares that all natural resources are "owned by the State," and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural
resources cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that –

"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. x x x.

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations
may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the
Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase,
homestead, or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian
reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held,
or leased and the conditions therefor." (Emphasis supplied)

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable
lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private
corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.

The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban

The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except through lease, alienable lands of the public domain
is not well understood. During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the commissioners probed the rationale
behind this ban, thus:

"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line 5 which says:

`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area.'

If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this was introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In
effect, it prohibits private corporations from acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not been very clear in jurisprudence
 what the reason for this is. In some of the cases decided in 1982 and 1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this is to
prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent of this provision?

MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.

FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not
allowed to acquire a mere 313-square meter land where a chapel stood because the Supreme Court said it would be in
violation of this." (Emphasis supplied)

In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in this way:

"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands by private corporations is
to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm' and to prevent
a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest."

However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable
lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who
could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12
hectares under the 1987 Constitution.

If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation would be more
effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the
owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the
continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next.

In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed
area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of
alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own
as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his
nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on
acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.

The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the
public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available
alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful
adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem,
is the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.

The Amended Joint Venture Agreement

The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause, consists of three properties, namely:

1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio Aguinaldo Boulevard in Paranaque and Las
Pinas, Metro Manila, with a combined titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;"

2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands;" and

3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or less to regularize the configuration of the
reclaimed area."65

PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom Islands and further reclamation of about 250 hectares
x x x," plus an option "granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x." 66

In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project
have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.

Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's "actual cost" in partially reclaiming
the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom Islands. AMARI will further
shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will share, in
the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total
reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for common areas. Title to AMARI's share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares,
will be issued in the name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides that –

"x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining
to AMARI's Land share based on the Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall then cause
the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of title covering AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI, x x x;
provided, that if more than seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any given time pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver
to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the titles pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a corresponding
proportionate area of additional land pertaining to PEA has been titled." (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be
titled in its name.

To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint venture PEA's statutory authority, rights
and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states that –

"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal
Development as well as own the Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive right, authority
and privilege to undertake the Project in accordance with the Master Development Plan."

The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 and its supplemental agreement dated
August 9, 1995.

The Threshold Issue

The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of
reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which state
that:

"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. x x x.

xxx

Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x."(Emphasis supplied)

Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas

PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain. In its Memorandum,67 PEA admits that –

"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain:

'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:

(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means;

x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted under Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 admitted in its Report and
Recommendation to then President Fidel V. Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain."69 The Legal Task Force concluded that –

"D. Conclusion

Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory authority, the rights of ownership and disposition
over reclaimed lands have been transferred to PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may validly convey the same to any
qualified person without violating the Constitution or any statute.

The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding public land, except by lease (Sec. 3, Art.
XVII,70 1987 Constitution), does not apply to reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory grant."

Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the
public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged
areas "shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these
areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them
for some public or quasi-public use.71

Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially
delimited and classified."72 The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia, 73 the Executive Department
attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the Philippine Government for use as the Chancery
of the Philippine Embassy. Although the Chancery had transferred to another location thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that,
under Article 42274 of the Civil Code, a property of public dominion retains such character until formally declared otherwise. The
Court ruled that –
 "The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert
it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and
Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership 'until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from
being such' (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]." (Emphasis supplied)

PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the
foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517
in the name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands. Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the
Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section
103 of PD No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates of title corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates of title
are still in the name of PEA.

PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an
official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and
President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public
service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to
qualified parties.

At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already reclaimed the Freedom Islands although
subsequently there were partial erosions on some areas. The government had also completed the necessary surveys on these islands.
Thus, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks." Being neither timber,
mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the
public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may
alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters x x x owned by the State" forming
part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a private corporation, reclaimed the islands under a
contract dated November 20, 1973 with the Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866, argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party constructing the works, then it cannot be
said that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the State may not alienate." 75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters
reads as follows:

"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or
private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise
provided by the terms of the grant of authority." (Emphasis supplied)

Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim from the sea only with "proper permission" from
the State. Private parties could own the reclaimed land only if not "otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." This
clearly meant that no one could reclaim from the sea without permission from the State because the sea is property of public
dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership of the reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the
sea from which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a private person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State
could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land which would remain property of public dominion like the sea it replaced. 76 Article 5
of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 adopted the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." 77

Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently enacted on the disposition of public lands. In
particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public domain must first be classified as alienable or disposable before the
government can alienate them. These lands must not be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes.78 Moreover, the contract between
CDCP and the government was executed after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which barred private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This contract could not have converted the Freedom Islands into private
lands of a private corporation.

Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws authorizing the reclamation of areas under water and
revested solely in the National Government the power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared that –

"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or
inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it under a proper contract. (Emphasis
supplied)

x x x."

PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation of areas under water could now be
undertaken only by the National Government or by a person contracted by the National Government. Private parties may reclaim from
the sea only under a contract with the National Government, and no longer by grant or permission as provided in Section 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.

Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the National Government's implementing arm to undertake
"all reclamation projects of the government," which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it
with any person or entity." Under such contract, a private party receives compensation for reclamation services rendered to PEA.
Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of portions of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind only if
the reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or disposable land open to disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public
service.

The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming
part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no
dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the
State," forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these
submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the State
may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these lands
as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public
service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the
commerce of man.

The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or disposable lands open to disposition is
necessary because PEA is tasked under its charter to undertake public services that require the use of lands of the public domain.
Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the functions of PEA include the following: "[T]o own or operate railroads, tramways and other
kinds of land transportation, x x x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such systems of sanitary sewers as may be necessary; [T]o
construct, maintain and operate such storm drains as may be necessary." PEA is empowered to issue "rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the proper use by private parties of any or all of the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its
properties and to impose or collect fees or tolls for their use." Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held by the
PEA would actually be needed for public use or service since many of the functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute essential
public services.

Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government." The same section also states that "[A]ll
reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or
through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; x x x." Thus, under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD
No.1084, PEA became the primary implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the
public domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as the government entity "to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure their
maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests."79 Since large portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously be
needed for public service, there must be a formal declaration segregating reclaimed lands no longer needed for public service from
those still needed for public service.1âwphi1.nêt

Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by the PEA," could not
automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed
foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain would automatically become alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not
classified as alienable or disposable.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO No. 525, vests in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) the following powers and functions:

"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:

(1) x x x

xxx

(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the
process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy and collect such
revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources;

xxx

(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of licenses, permits, concessions, lease agreements and
such other privileges concerning the development, exploration and utilization of the country's marine, freshwater, and
brackish water and over all aquatic resources of the country and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our
natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel such privileges upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulation,
order, and for all other causes which are in furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national
interest;

(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve as the
sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate
agencies."80 (Emphasis supplied)

As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises "supervision and control over alienable
and disposable public lands." DENR also exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the
public domain." Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be
reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila
Bay, or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public domain. Hence, DENR decides whether
reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as alienable under Sections 6 81 and 782 of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides that the
reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the lands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. We note that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.
countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.

In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with the power to
undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to
classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA
is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.

Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government
of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA.

Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that
these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such an
official classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open
to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III 83 of CA No. 141 and other applicable laws.84

PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands

PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, the reclaimed lands shall be
disposed of in accordance with CA No. 141, the Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that reclaimed lands
transferred to a branch or subdivision of the government "shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x."85 (Emphasis by PEA)

In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states that –

"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the Government is authorized by law to be
conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following: x x x."

Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property belonging to the Government. The Court declared that -

"It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must
be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence." (Emphasis
supplied)

PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No.
1085, issued on February 4, 1977, provides that –

"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to the contract for the reclamation and
construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines dated November 20, 1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation covering the
same area is hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and administration of the Public Estates
Authority established pursuant to PD No. 1084; Provided, however, That the rights and interests of the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid contract shall be recognized and respected.

Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines (Department of Public Highways) arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.

In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates Authority shall issue in favor of the Republic of
the Philippines the corresponding shares of stock in said entity with an issued value of said shares of stock (which) shall be
deemed fully paid and non-assessable.

The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates Authority shall execute such contracts or
agreements, including appropriate agreements with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, as may
be necessary to implement the above.

Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of the Public Estates Authority
without prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the contractor or his assignees of such portion or portions of the land
reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided for in the above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such patents, the Land
Registration Commission shall issue the corresponding certificate of title." (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides that -

"Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which shall be responsible for its
administration, development, utilization or disposition in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084.
 Any and all income that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be used in accordance with
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084."

There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely
transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands
reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose of its reclaimed lands
"in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084," the charter of PEA.

PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any
and all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87(Emphasis supplied) There is,
therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
may sell to private parties its patrimonial propertiesin accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's
patrimonial lands.

PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private individuals since, with the legislative authority,
there is no longer any statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to individuals. PEA, however,
cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority benefits only individuals. Private corporations remain barred
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, including government reclaimed lands.

The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his
assignees" (Emphasis supplied) would not apply to private corporations but only to individuals because of the constitutional ban.
Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands

Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition, and further declared no
longer needed for public service, PEA would have to conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these lands. PEA must observe the
provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting PEA from holding a
public auction.88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084,
"supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This is an acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to
the disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise provided by law. Executive Order No. 654, 89 which
authorizes PEA "to determine the kind and manner of payment for the transfer" of its assets and properties, does not exempt PEA from
the requirement of public auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in kind and in
installment, but does not authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.

Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell
valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that –

"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any cause, or is no longer needed, it shall, upon
application of the officer accountable therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or his duly authorized representative in
the presence of the auditor concerned and, if found to be valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their presence. If
found to be valuable, it may be sold at public auction to the highest bidder under the supervision of the proper committee
on award or similar body in the presence of the auditor concerned or other authorized representative of the Commission, after
advertising by printed notice in the Official Gazette, or for not less than three consecutive days in any newspaper of
general circulation, or where the value of the property does not warrant the expense of publication, by notices posted for a
like period in at least three public places in the locality where the property is to be sold. In the event that the public auction
fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned
and approved by the Commission."

It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the Commission on Audit must approve the
selling price.90 The Commission on Audit implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code through Circular No. 89-
29691 dated January 27, 1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of only through public auction, and a
negotiated sale can be resorted to only in case of "failure of public auction."

At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of
the public domain. Private corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10, 1991. PEA imposed a condition that the winning
bidder should reclaim another 250 hectares of submerged areas to regularize the shape of the Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing
of the additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder. 92 No one, however, submitted a bid. On December 23, 1994, the
Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the Freedom Islands through negotiation, without need of another public
bidding, because of the failure of the public bidding on December 10, 1991. 93

However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be
reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the
reclamation area to 750 hectares.94 The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, 95 is not a
valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public
bidding happened on December 10, 1991, more than three years before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The
economic situation in the country had greatly improved during the intervening period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code

The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is absolute and clear: "Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x." Even Republic Act No. 6957 ("BOT
Law," for brevity), cited by PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell reclaimed lands to private parties, recognizes the
constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states –

"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any infrastructure projects
undertaken through the build-operate-and-transfer arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the provisions of this Act,
the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the revenue of the project or other non-monetary
payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional
requirements with respect to the ownership of the land: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain in view of the constitutional ban.

Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and AMARI, authorizes local governments in land reclamation
projects to pay the contractor or developer in kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:

"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management of Infrastructure Projects by the Private
Sector. x x x

xxx

In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment plan may consist of the grant of a portion or
percentage of the reclaimed land or the industrial estate constructed."

Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso similar to that of the BOT Law, the constitutional
restrictions on land ownership automatically apply even though not expressly mentioned in the Local Government Code.

Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid
with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed land, not
exceeding 12 hectares96 of non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in view of the legislative authority allowing
such conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local Government Code can avoid a direct collision
with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Registration of lands of the public domain

Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to public respondent PEA transformed such
lands of the public domain to private lands." This theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that the "issuance of the special patent
leading to the eventual issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land of public domain and converts the property into
patrimonial or private property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend that with the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the
corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares comprising the Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In support
of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite the following rulings of the Court:

1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where the Court held –

"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was issued, the land ceased to be part of the public
domain and became private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."

2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court declared -

"After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land
covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided
therein."3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,99 where the Court ruled -

"While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only so long as the land remains part
of the public domain and continues to be under his exclusive control; but once the patent is registered and a certificate of title
is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has
neither control nor jurisdiction."

4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,100 where the Court held –

"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free patents were issued covering the same in
favor of the private respondents, the said lots ceased to be part of the public domain and, therefore, the Director of Lands lost
jurisdiction over the same."

5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,101 where the Court stated –

 "Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical
Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial registration under
the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a 'fee simple' title or absolute title in favor of petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public
lands, provides that 'Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to
the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same
shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act (Land Registration Act, Act 496) and shall become registered
lands.'"

The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the corresponding certificates of titles issued to private
parties. These four cases uniformly hold that the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or that upon issuance of the
certificate of title the land automatically comes under the Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves the registration under the
Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National Government to Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit
under the Department of Health. The National Government transferred the 12.8-hectare public land to serve as the site for the hospital
buildings and other facilities of Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a public service. The Court affirmed the registration of
the 12.8-hectare public land in the name of Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example
of a public land being registered under Act No. 496 without the land losing its character as a property of public dominion.

In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PEA, a wholly government owned
corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued to any private party. No
one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEA's patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PEA's
certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by these certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain,
should not be sold to a private corporation.

Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private or public ownership of the land.
Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized
modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the registrant had prior to the
registration.102 The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into
private lands.103

Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain
automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom Islands to
PEA was made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then President
Aquino, to wit:

"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines and in conformity with the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby
granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land containing a total area of one million nine
hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters; the technical description of which are hereto
attached and made an integral part hereof." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141
prohibits, "except when authorized by Congress," the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are transferred to government
units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien affecting title" of the
registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title. 104Alienable lands of the public domain held by government entities
under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law
authorizing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain because of the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.

The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert
alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to
qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or
patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private
or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to
acquire directly from government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly public lands.

Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged
areas of the public domain. Thus, EO No. 525 declares that –

"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525

Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible for all Reclamation Projects

Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being proposed to be undertaken in various parts of the
country which need to be evaluated for consistency with national programs;

Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the Government's declared policy to provide for a coordinated,
economical and efficient reclamation of lands;

Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas shall be limited to the National Government or
any person authorized by it under proper contract;
 Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National Government which shall ensure a coordinated and
integrated approach in the reclamation of lands;

Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates Authority as a government corporation to undertake
reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and interests; and

Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing authority to reorganize the national
government including the transfer, abolition, or merger of functions and offices.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416, do hereby order and direct the following:

Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating
all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. All reclamation projects shall be approved by the
President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it
with any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation projects of any national government agency or entity authorized under
its charter shall be undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon approval of the President.

x x x ."

As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA
took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The
reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable
lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these
lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of
disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.

Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain" as well as "any and all kinds of lands."
PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the
Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not automatically make such
lands private.

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of
the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn
around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be
reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.

This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can "acquire x x x any and
all kinds of lands." This will open the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds of hectares of alienable
lands of the public domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are private lands. This will result in corporations
amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this country - creating the very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to
prevent. This will completely reverse the clear direction of constitutional development in this country. The 1935 Constitution allowed
private corporations to acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of public lands. 105 The 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations
from acquiring any kind of public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.

The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, automatically become
private lands is contrary to existing laws. Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be registered under the Torrens System
or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands. Section 122 of Act No. 496, and Section 103 of PD
No. 1529, respectively, provide as follows:

Act No. 496

"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x x Government of the Philippine Islands are
alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or the public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under
the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands."

PD No. 1529

"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any
person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree." (Emphasis supplied)

Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in Section 103 of PD No. 1529 includes conveyances of public
lands to public corporations.

Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the
Government," as provided in Section 60 of CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens System pursuant to Section 103 of PD
No. 1529. Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land "shall not be
alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress." This provision
refers to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or
encumbered unless expressly authorized by Congress. The need for legislative authority prevents the registered land of the public
domain from becoming private land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public domain may be registered under the Torrens
System. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states –

"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the Government is authorized by law to be
conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:

(1) x x x

(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any
corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a public wharf may be titled in the name of a
government corporation regulating port operations in the country. Private property purchased by the National Government for
expansion of an airport may also be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to administer the airport. Private property
donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled in the name of the municipality. 106 All
these properties become properties of the public domain, and if already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain
registered land. There is no requirement or provision in any existing law for the de-registration of land from the Torrens System.

Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent domain become unquestionably part of the public
domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National Government
new certificates of title covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states –

"Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or interest therein, is expropriated or taken by
eminent domain, the National Government, province, city or municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising
such right shall file for registration in the proper Registry a certified copy of the judgment which shall state definitely by an
adequate description, the particular property or interest expropriated, the number of the certificate of title, and the nature of
the public use. A memorandum of the right or interest taken shall be made on each certificate of title by the Register of
Deeds, and where the fee simple is taken, a new certificate shall be issued in favor of the National Government, province,
city, municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right for the land so taken. The legal expenses
incident to the memorandum of registration or issuance of a new certificate of title shall be for the account of the authority
taking the land or interest therein." (Emphasis supplied)

Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public
domain may also be registered pursuant to existing laws.

AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the Freedom Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed
from submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint venture with a stipulation
for reimbursement of the original cost incurred by PEA for the earlier reclamation and construction works performed by the CDCP
under its 1973 contract with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended
JVA requires PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land Share in the name of
AMARI."107

This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that private corporations "shall not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease." The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly means that
AMARI will "hold" the reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a "disposition" of the reclaimed
lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141,108 the Government Auditing Code,109 and Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution.

The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are
inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless
converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the government
are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent
potential as areas for public use or public service. Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural
resources, are to be distributed equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions have barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Those who
attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of lands of
the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.

We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of
PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until
classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can
 these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can
alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares 110of the Freedom
Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares 111 of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas.
Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer
needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in
view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.

Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 112 of the Civil
Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and
void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the
Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to
the government.

Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a
trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation
are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby
declared NULL and VOID ab initio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.

Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:p

The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower court decision are the mother and the uncle of a minor beneficiary of
the proceeds of an insurance policy issued on the life of her deceased father. The dispute centers as to who of them should be entitled
to act as trustee thereof. The lower court applying the appropriate Civil Code provisions decided in favor of the mother, the plaintiff in
this case. Defendant uncle appealed. As noted, the lower court acted the way it did following the specific mandate of the law. In
addition, it must have taken into account the principle that in cases of this nature the welfare of the child is the paramount
consideration. It is not an unreasonable assumption that between a mother and an uncle, the former is likely to lavish more care on and
pay greater attention to her. This is all the more likely considering that the child is with the mother. There are no circumstances then
that did militate against what conforms to the natural order of things, even if the language of the law were not as clear. It is not to be
lost sight of either that the judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of the State as parens patriae, with an even greater stress on
family unity under the present Constitution, did weigh in the balance the opposing claims and did come to the conclusion that the
welfare of the child called for the mother to be entrusted with such responsibility. We have to affirm.

The appealed decision made clear: "There is no controversy as to the facts. " 1 The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian
Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed on October
10, 1964. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured himself and instituted as beneficiary,
his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint
by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code.
Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. 2

After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965, rendered judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the proceeds
of the policy in question to plaintiff. Its main reliance was on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: "The
father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the
property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First
Instance."3 The latter states: "The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or
by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental
authority and whose company he lives; ...4

Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in this portion of the appealed decision: "The insurance proceeds belong to the
beneficiary. The beneficiary is a minor under the custody and parental authority of the plaintiff, her mother. The said minor lives with
plaintiff or lives in the company of the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this property by lucrative title. Said property, therefore,
belongs to the minor child in ownership, and in usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother. Since under our law the usufructuary is entitled to
possession, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the insurance proceeds. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted
provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should
file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total
amount of P5,000.00."5

It is very clear, therefore, considering the above, that unless the applicability of the two cited Civil Code provisions can be disputed,
the decision must stand. There is no ambiguity in the language employed. The words are rather clear. Their meaning is unequivocal.
Time and time again, this Court has left no doubt that where codal or statutory norms are cast in categorical language, the task before
it is not one of interpretation but of application.6 So it must be in this case. So it was in the appealed decision.

1. It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief for the defendant-appellant7 to blunt the force of legal commands
that speak so plainly and so unqualifiedly. Even if it were a question of policy, the conclusion will remain unaltered. What is
paramount, as mentioned at the outset, is the welfare of the child. It is in consonance with such primordial end that Articles 320 and
321 have been worded. There is recognition in the law of the deep ties that bind parent and child. In the event that there is less than
full measure of concern for the offspring, the protection is supplied by the bond required. With the added circumstance that the child
stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the
strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased
is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle. Manresa, commenting on Article 159 of the Civil Code of Spain, the
source of Article 320 of the Civil Code, was of that view: Thus "El derecho y la obligacion de administrar el Patrimonio de los hijos es
una consecuencia natural y lógica de la patria potestad y de la presunción de que nadie cuidará de los bienes de acquéllos con mas
cariño y solicitude que los padres. En nuestro Derecho antiguo puede decirse que se hallaba reconocida de una manera indirecta
aquelia doctrina, y asi se desprende de la sentencia del Tribunal Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de 1864, que se refiere a la ley 24, tit.
XIII de la Partida 5. De la propia suerte aceptan en general dicho principio los Codigos extranjeros, con las limitaciones y requisitos
de que trataremos mis adelante."8

2. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the
judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a
minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, as it did occur here, that family relations may press their respective claims.
It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. it
could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority.
Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her
plea. In a recent case,9 there is this quotation from an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens
patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no
affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the
destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall
strengthen the family as a basic social institution." 10 If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be
strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional
mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.

WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs against defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989

SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,

vs.
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY
TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO
SINSUAT, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner.

Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are as follows:

1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang
Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur.

2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of
Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and
Pakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections their respective certificates of
candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew from
the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions as members of the Assembly.

4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads:

The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and dialogues with local
government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional leaders on the recent and
present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.

The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chart the autonomous
governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to constitute
immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission.

You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your respective assembly
on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of the Philippines. Your presence,
unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.

5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the
Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as "our presence in the house
committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook ... ."

6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the members of
the Assembly the following telegram:

TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN
OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID
COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV.
1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION
IN NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF
CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG
PAMPOOK OF MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.

7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice, with the following
assemblymen present:

1. Sali, Salic

2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

3. Dagalangit, Rakil

4. Dela Fuente, Antonio

5. Mangelen, Conte

6. Ortiz, Jesus

7. Palomares, Diego

8. Sinsuat, Bimbo

9. Tomawis, Acmad

10. Tomawis, Jerry

After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On
Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the
chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with
the following Assemblymen present:

1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer

2. Ali Salic

3. Ali Salindatu
 4. Aratuc, Malik

5. Cajelo, Rene

6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

7. Dagalangit, Rakil

8. Dela Fuente, Antonio

9. Ortiz, Jesus

10 Palomares, Diego

11. Quijano, Jesus

12. Sinsuat, Bimbo

13. Tomawis, Acmad

14. Tomawis, Jerry

An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:

HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the presence of our colleagues who
have come to attend the session today, I move to call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their
votes on the previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I move also that the
designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in
the session last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's session.

HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.

PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented? Me chair hears none and the
said motions are approved. ...

Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant; one abstained and none
voted against. 1

Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that-

(a) This Petition be given due course;

(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from
proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter;

(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session on November
2, 1987 as null and void;

(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII held
on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and

(e) Making the injunction permanent.

Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable. 2

Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook,
"EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS
REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the
salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for
the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that any
request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . ." 4 and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and
emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner
"had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and
emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the
Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," 7 for which the respondents now submit
that the petition had become "moot and academic". 8
The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot and
academic.

We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the
petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it
academic.

On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the
first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard
in his defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears
in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner
has not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook." 9 "To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory
gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City," 10 but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and
settled." 11Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute
for the notice and hearing contemplated by law.

While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and that a party
need only be given the opportunity to be heard, 12 it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that
he had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any
opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant
expulsion.

In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner
arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been
filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the
Assemblyman act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as representative of the
people" 13 an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, 14 and, unless
the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.

We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly
is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of
due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are
nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.

It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene in
their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of
Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-
government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?

The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. 1618 15 promulgated on
July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" 16 in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," 17 with legislative and executive
machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities 18specified therein.

It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions," 19 except
to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government," 20 "which include, but are not
limited to, the following:

(1) National defense and security;

(2) Foreign relations;

(3) Foreign trade;

(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing,

(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources;

(6) Air and sea transport

(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;

(8) Customs and quarantine;

(9) Immigration and deportation;

(10) Citizenship and naturalization;

(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and

 (12) General auditing. 21

In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over the
Autonomous Regions ..." 22

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." 24 At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" 25 over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according
to law." 26 He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. 27

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare
to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation,"
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. 28

But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to
decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local
government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy
now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper case.

Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided. 29

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30

xxx xxx xxx

See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. 31

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an
autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the
President (and the Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the
latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress
of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our
jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that
they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-
immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." 33 In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to
discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:

SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local legislative powers
over regional affairs within the framework of national development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas:

(1) Organization of regional administrative system;

(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;

(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;

(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;

(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;

(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;

(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the Autonomous Region;

(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services, programs and facilities;
 (9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture indigenous to the Autonomous
Region; and

(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of such measures as may be necessary
for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region.

The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that enactment and acts of the Sangguniang
Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation,
policies, plans and programs.

The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. 34

Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we
review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on November
2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang
Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of
quorum.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the
Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook," 35
but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." 36 Of course, there is
disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987
is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it
was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists
in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this
regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly
called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules. 38 Hence, there
can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own,
we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether
or not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it
does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions
themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we
uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the Assembly from
bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced that the invitation was what
precipitated it.

In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not
be validly declared without a session having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte
blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.

Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly,
it can do so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed
with enough coercive remedies to thwart them. 39

In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1)
REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO

SANCHEZ,petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.

H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.

Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.

PARAS, J.:
A TV ad proudly announces:

"The new PAGCOR — responding through responsible gaming."

But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because —

A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City
government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;

B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right
to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;

C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most
other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;

D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free
enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)

In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the "new restored
democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and
therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present
Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).

The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of the
Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds
mentioned above.

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and
was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or
water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino
"Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure
and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.

Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games
of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy —

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of
chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:

(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one corporate entity to be
controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.

(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools, (basketball,
football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed
by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of additional revenue to fund
infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects,
Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other essential public services; (2) create
recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize,
if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of
gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)

To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all
laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.

It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau
of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in
form of franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored
other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private
associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a
total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly
supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.

But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to
morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection
clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human
Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values)
of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court,
involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial
department of the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).

As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government We need not be
reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every
presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity.
Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution,
We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).

In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the —

. . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtain in the
instant cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the
challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of
a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.
(Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v.
Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v.
Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162
SCRA 521, 540)

Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of petitioners to file the instant
petition.

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution
and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and
has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)

With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the same is satisfied
by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a
result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still
within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and
resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if
we must technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).

Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.

Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the
Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As
defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable
of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine
Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).

Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power
and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it
succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police
power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v.
National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of change.

What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?

P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of
chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating
and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity — the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to
society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social
impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas
Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions
that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.

Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the
exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D.
1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as
fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."

(2) Income and other taxes. — a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees, charges
or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise from the
Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax
of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise.
Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees
or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or national
government authority (Section 13 [2]).

Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:

(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil.
870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must
plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power
to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the
"inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).

(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere
creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal
corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541).
Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if
Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the
power.

(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local
governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested
exclusively on the National Government, thus:

Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other local governments to
issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other
forms of gambling is hereby revoked.

Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other
forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper application and verification of the qualification of
the applicant . . .

Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the
power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City
of Manila.

(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or
controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In
addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:

Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. — The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the
powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities
mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws,
changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the
provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original
incorporation.

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category
of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is
exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.

The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v.
Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)

This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.

Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the States to
touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can
 be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from
consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them. (Antieau, Modern
Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)

Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be
undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).

The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed
to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.

(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless
argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:

Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other
charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. (emphasis supplied)

The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law.
Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its
"exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot
therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed.,
1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."

Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine
Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be
an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of
government. (emphasis supplied)

As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy,
which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board,
162 SCRA 539).

What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole
prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.

As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is generally necessary to
empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of power to enact, ordinance
provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-
Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA
480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied)

Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR —
conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).

We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause
"equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment
under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have
to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego,
G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).

The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different
rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion
to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).

Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the
petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983),
sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited,
does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.

If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it
might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)

The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same name must be
treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which
harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made
mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651).
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies and crony
economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If,
indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its
repeal or amendment.

The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should
be.1âwphi1 Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of government
and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).

On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:

Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of
trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)

It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still
decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature
to decide.

On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II;
Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to
state also that these are merely statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law
should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.

In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to
heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate could express their
displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA
734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown
that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds
for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or
parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the
grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome
the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation
considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice,
role of youth and educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.

As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521 —

Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the presumption of
validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken
to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute. This Court, however, is
not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the
Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and
expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to this Court and which this Court may
not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political departments of government: the
President and the Congress.

Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the gambling resorted to is
excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also on his
mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material fortunes, mental
control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable to gambling. Gambling
may have been the antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could have been preceded by an
overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 149848. November 25, 2004]

ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR M. DIMALOTANG, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS SIMEON A. DATUMANONG and THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET and
MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, respondents.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

At stake in the present case is the fate of regional autonomy for Muslim Mindanao which is the epoch-making, Constitution-based
project for achieving national unity in diversity.
Challenged in the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction[1] (Petition) are the constitutionality and validity of Republic Act No. 8999 (R.A. 8999),[2] entitled An Act
Establishing An Engineering District in the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur and Appropriating Funds Therefor,and
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Department Order No. 119 (D.O. 119) [3] on the subject, Creation of Marawi Sub-
District Engineering Office.
The Background
The uncontested legal and factual antecedents of the case follow.
For the first time in its history after three Constitutions, the Philippines ordained the establishment of regional autonomy with the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution. Sections 1[4] and 15, Article X mandate the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordilleras. Section 15 specifically provides that [t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. To effectuate this mandate, the Charter devotes a number
of provisions under Article X.[5]
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A. 6734), entitled An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, was enacted and signed into law on 1 August 1989. The law called for the holding of a
plebiscite in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General
Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga.[6] In the ensuing plebiscite held on 19 November 1989, only four (4)
provinces voted for the creation of an autonomous region, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces
became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).[7] The law contains elaborate provisions on the powers of the Regional
Government and the areas of jurisdiction which are reserved for the National Government. [8]
In accordance with R.A. 6734, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on 12 October 1990, Executive Order No. 426 (E.O. 426),
entitled Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional Government, and for other purposes. Sections 1 to 3[9] of the Executive
Order are its operative provisions.
ARMM was formally organized on 6 November 1990. President Corazon C. Aquino flew to Cotabato, the seat of the Regional
Government, for the inauguration. At that point, she had already signed seven (7) Executive Orders devolving to ARMM the powers of
seven (7) cabinet departments, namely: (1) local government; (2) labor and employment; (3) science and technology; (4) public works
and highways; (5) social welfare and development; (6) tourism; and (7) environment and national resources. [10]
Nearly nine (9) years later, on 20 May 1999, then Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Secretary Gregorio R.
Vigilar issued D.O. 119 which reads, thus:

Subject: Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office

Pursuant to Sections 6 and 25 of Executive Order No. 124 dated 30 January 1987, there is hereby created a DPWH Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the
DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur. The headquarters of the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
shall be at the former quarters of the Marawi City Engineering Office.

Personnel of the above-mentioned Sub-District Engineering Office shall be made up of employees of the National Government
Section of the former Marawi City Engineering Office who are now assigned with the Iligan City Sub-District Engineering Office as
may be determined by the DPWH Region XII Regional Director. (Emphasis supplied)

Almost two (2) years later, on 17 January 2001, then President Joseph E. Estrada approved and signed into law R.A. 8999. The
text of the law reads:

AN ACT ESTABLISHING AN ENGINEERING DISTRICT IN THE FIRST DISTRICT OF THE PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL
SUR AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. The City of Marawi and the municipalities comprising the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur are hereby
constituted into an engineering district to be known as the First Engineering District of the Province of Lanao del Sur.

SEC. 2. The office of the engineering district hereby created shall be established in Marawi City, Province of Lanao del Sur.

SEC. 3. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations Act of
the year following its enactment into law. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the maintenance and continued
operation of the engineering district office shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. (Emphasis supplied)
 Congress later passed Republic Act No. 9054 (R.A. 9054), entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended. Like its forerunner, R.A. 9054 contains detailed provisions on the powers of
the Regional Government and the retained areas of governance of the National Government. [11]
R.A. 9054 lapsed into law[12] on 31 March 2001. It was ratified in a plebiscite held on 14 August 2001. The province of Basilan
and the City of Marawi also voted to join ARMM on the same date. R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM
Organic Acts.
On 23 July 2001, petitioners Arsadi M. Disomangcop (Disomangcop) and Ramir M. Dimalotang (Dimalotang) addressed a petition
to then DPWH Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong, seeking the revocation of D.O. 119 and the non-implementation of R.A. 8999. No
action, however, was taken on the petition.[13]
Consequently, petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang filed the instant petition, in their capacity as Officer-in-Charge and
District Engineer/Engineer II, respectively, of the First Engineering District of the Department of Public Works and Highways,
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (DPWH-ARMM) in Lanao del Sur.
Petitioners seek the following principal reliefs: (1) to annul and set aside D.O. 119; (2) to prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary
from implementing D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999 and releasing funds for public works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City
to the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and other administrative regions of DPWH; and (3) to compel the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to release all funds for public works projects intended for Marawi City and the First
District of Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only; and to compel respondent DPWH
Secretary to let the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur implement all public works projects within its
jurisdictional area.[14]
The petition includes an urgent application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and, after hearing, a writ of
preliminary injunction, to enjoin respondent DBM Secretary from releasing funds for public works projects in Lanao del Sur to entities
other than the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, and also to restrain the DPWH Secretary from allowing
others besides the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur to implement public works projects in Lanao del Sur.[15]
To support their petition, petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion and that it violates the
constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out that the challenged Department Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office with functions that have already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.[16]
Petitioners also contend that R.A. 8999 is a piece of legislation that was not intelligently and thoroughly studied, and that the
explanatory note to House Bill No. 995 (H.B. 995) from which the law originated is questionable. Petitioners assert as well that prior to
the sponsorship of the law, no public hearing nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was made. The House Committee on Public
Works and Highways (Committee) failed to invite a single official from the affected agency. Finally, petitioners argue that the law was
skillfully timed for signature by former President Joseph E. Estrada during the pendency of the impeachment proceedings. [17]
In its resolution of 8 October 2001, the Court required respondents to file their comment. [18] In compliance, respondents DPWH
Secretary and DBM Secretary, through the Solicitor General, filed on 7 January 2002, their Comment.
In their Comment,[19] respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintain the validity of D.O. 119, arguing that it
was issued in accordance with Executive Order No. 124 (E.O. 124). [20] In defense of the constitutionality of R.A. 8999, they submit that
the powers of the autonomous regions did not diminish the legislative power of Congress. [21] Respondents also contend that the
petitioners have no locus standi or legal standing to assail the constitutionality of the law and the department order. They note that
petitioners have no personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. [22]
Asserting their locus standi, petitioners in their Memorandum[23] point out that they will suffer actual injury as a result of the
enactments complained of.[24]
Jurisdictional Considerations
First, the jurisdictional predicates.
The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes the authority of the courts to determine in
an appropriate action the validity of acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty. [25]
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of judicial power: First, there must be before the Court an
actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the
person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised
at the earliest opportunity. Fifth, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[26]
In seeking to nullify acts of the legislature and the executive department on the ground that they contravene the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. As held in Taada v. Angara,[27] where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. But in
deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition questioning acts of the political departments of government, the Court will not review the
wisdom, merits, or propriety thereof, but will strike them down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and
(2) grave abuse of discretion.[28]
For an abuse to be grave, the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.
The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. There is grave abuse of discretion when respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner
in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[29]
The challenge to the legal standing of petitioners cannot succeed. Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from a mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. [30]
 A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. [31]
But following the new trend, this Court is inclined to take cognizance of a suit although it does not satisfy the requirement of legal
standing when paramount interests are involved. In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal stance on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. [32]
In the instant case, petitioner Disomangcop holds the position of Engineer IV. When he filed this petition, he was the Officer-in-
Charge, Office of the District Engineer of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM, Lanao del Sur. On the other hand, petitioner
Dimalotang is an Engineer II and President of the rank and file employees also of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in
Lanao del Sur. Both are charged with the duty and responsibility of supervising and implementing all public works projects to be
undertaken and being undertaken in Lanao del Sur which is the area of their jurisdiction. [33]
It is thus not far-fetched that the creation of the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office under D.O. 119 and the creation of and
appropriation of funds to the First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur as directed under R.A. 8999 will affect the powers, functions
and responsibilities of the petitioners and the DPWH-ARMM. As the two offices have apparently been endowed with functions almost
identical to those of DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that petitioners are in imminent danger of
being eased out of their duties and, not remotely, even their jobs. Their material and substantial interests will definitely be prejudiced
by the enforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is direct and immediate. Thus, they can legitimately challenge the validity
of the enactments subject of the instant case.
Points of Contention
In the petition before us, petitioners contend that R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are unconstitutional and were issued with grave abuse
of discretion.
We agree in part.
Republic Act No. 8999
At the outset, let it be made clear that it is not necessary to declare R.A. No. 8999 unconstitutional for the adjudication of this case.
The accepted rule is that the Court will not resolve a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case, or if the case can be
disposed of or settled on other grounds.[34]
The plain truth is the challenged law never became operative and was superseded or repealed by a subsequent enactment.
The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy scheme. While they are classified as statutes, the Organic
Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. [35] Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended
by an ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999 in this case. The amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.
We quote excerpts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:

FR. BERNAS. Yes, that is the reason I am bringing this up. This thing involves some rather far-reaching consequences also in relation
to the issue raised by Commissioner Romulo with respect to federalism. Are we, in effect, creating new categories of laws? Generally,
we have statutes and constitutional provisions. Is this organic act equivalent to a constitutional provision? If it is going to be
equivalent to a constitutional provision, it would seem to me that the formulation of the provisions of the organic act will have to be
done by the legislature, acting as a constituent assembly, and therefore, subject to the provisions of the Article on Amendments. That
is the point that I am trying to bring up. In effect, if we opt for federalism, it would really involve an act of the National Assembly or
Congress acting as a constituent assembly and present amendments to this Constitution, and the end product itself would be a
constitutional provision which would only be amendable according to the processes indicated in the Constitution.

MR. OPLE. Madam President, may I express my personal opinion in this respect.

I think to require Congress to act as a constituent body before enacting an organic act would be to raise an autonomous region to the
same level as the sovereign people of the whole country. And I think the powers of the Congress should be quite sufficient in enacting
a law, even if it is now exalted to the level of an organic act for the purpose of providing a basic law for an autonomous region without
having to transform itself into a constituent assembly. We are dealing still with one subordinate subdivision of the State even if it is
now vested with certain autonomous powers on which its own legislature can pass laws.

FR. BERNAS. So the questions I have raised so far with respect to this organic act are: What segment of the population will
participate in the plebiscite? In what capacity would the legislature be acting when it passes this? Will it be a constituent assembly or
merely a legislative body? What is the nature, therefore, of this organic act in relation to ordinary statutes and the Constitution?
Finally, if we are going to amend this organic act, what process will be followed?

MR. NOLLEDO. May I answer that, please, in the light of what is now appearing in our report.

First, only the people who are residing in the units composing the regions should be allowed to participate in the plebiscite. Second,
the organic act has the character of a charter passed by the Congress, not as a constituent assembly, but as an ordinary legislature and,
therefore, the organic act will still be subject to amendments in the ordinary legislative process as now constituted, unless the
Gentlemen has another purpose.

FR. BERNAS. But with plebiscite again.

MR. NOLLEDO. Those who will participate in the plebiscite are those who are directly affected, the inhabitants of the units
constitutive of the region. (Emphasis supplied)[36]
 Although R.A. 9054 was enacted later, it reaffirmed the imperativeness of the plebiscite requirement. [37] In fact, R.A. 9054 itself,
being the second or later ARMM Organic Act, was subjected to and ratified in a plebiscite.
The first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6074, as implemented by E.O. 426, devolved the functions of the DPWH in the ARMM which
includes Lanao del Sur (minus Marawi City at the time)[38] to the Regional Government. By creating an office with previously devolved
functions, R.A. 8999, in essence, sought to amend R.A. 6074. The amendatory law should therefore first obtain the approval of the
people of the ARMM before it could validly take effect. Absent compliance with this requirement, R.A. 8999 has not even become
operative.
From another perspective, R.A. 8999 was repealed and superseded by R.A. 9054. Where a statute of later date clearly reveals an
intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.
Of course, the intention to repeal must be clear and manifest.[39] Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when
the two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be
reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.[40]
The Court has also held that statutes should be construed in light of the objective to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief and secure the benefits
intended.[41]
R.A. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the
ARG covering, among others, Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, one of which is its jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning.
R.A. 8999, however, ventures to reestablish the National Governments jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. R.A.
8999 is patently inconsistent with R.A. 9054, and it destroys the latter laws objective.
Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic Acts, R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054. The
kernel of the antagonism and disharmony lies in the regional autonomy which the ARMM Organic Acts ordain pursuant to the
Constitution. On the other hand, R.A. 8999 contravenes true decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy.
Regional Autonomy Under
R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054
The 1987 Constitution mandates regional autonomy to give a bold and unequivocal answer to the cry for a meaningful, effective
and forceful autonomy.[42] According to Commissioner Jose Nolledo, Chairman of the Committee which drafted the provisions, it is an
indictment against the status quo of a unitary system that, to my mind, has ineluctably tied the hands of progress in our country . . . our
varying regional characteristics are factors to capitalize on to attain national strength through decentralization. [43]
The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate development of peoples with
distinctive cultures and traditions.[44] These cultures, as a matter of right, must be allowed to flourish.[45]
Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness of the Philippine society in its ethnolinguistic, cultural, and even
religious diversities. It strives to free Philippine society of the strain and wastage caused by the assimilationist approach.[46] Policies
emanating from the legislature are invariably assimilationist in character despite channels being open for minority representation. As a
result, democracy becomes an irony to the minority group. [47]
Several commissioners echoed the pervasive sentiment in the plenary sessions in their own inimitable way. Thus, Commissioner
Blas Ople referred to the recognition that the Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras do not belong to the dominant national community
as the justification for conferring on them a measure of legal self-sufficiency, meaning self-government, so that they will flourish
politically, economically and culturally, with the hope that after achieving parity with the rest of the country they would give up their
own autonomous region in favor of joining the national mainstream. [48] For his part, the Muslim delegate, Commissioner Ahmad Alonto,
spoke of the diversity of cultures as the framework for nation-building.[49] Finally, excerpts of the poignant plea of Commissioner
Ponciano Bennagen deserve to be quoted verbatim:

. . . They see regional autonomy as the answer to their centuries of struggle against oppression and exploitation. For so long, their
names and identities have been debased. Their ancestral lands have been ransacked for their treasures, for their wealth. Their cultures
have been defiled, their very lives threatened, and worse, extinguished, all in the name of national development; all in the name of
public interest; all in the name of common good; all in the name of the right to property; all in the name of Regalian Doctrine; all in
the name of national security. These phrases have meant nothing to our indigenous communities, except for the violation of their
human rights.

...

Honorable Commissioners, we wish to impress upon you the gravity of the decision to be made by every single one of us in this
Commission. We have the overwhelming support of the Bangsa Moro and the Cordillera Constitution. By this we mean meaningful
and authentic regional autonomy. We propose that we have a separate Article on the autonomous regions for the Bangsa Moro and
Cordillera people clearly spelled out in this Constitution, instead of prolonging the agony of their vigil and their struggle. This, too is a
plea for national peace. Let us not pass the buck to the Congress to decide on this. Let us not wash our hands of our responsibility to
attain national unity and peace and to settle this problem and rectify past injustices, once and for all. [50]

The need for regional autonomy is more pressing in the case of the Filipino Muslims and the Cordillera people who have been
fighting for it. Their political struggle highlights their unique cultures and the unresponsiveness of the unitary system to their
aspirations.[51] The Moros struggle for self-determination dates as far back as the Spanish conquest in the Philippines. Even at present,
the struggle goes on.[52]
Perforce, regional autonomy is also a means towards solving existing serious peace and order problems and secessionist movements.
Parenthetically, autonomy, decentralization and regionalization, in international law, have become politically acceptable answers to
intractable problems of nationalism, separatism, ethnic conflict and threat of secession.[53]
 However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic,
as it can be installed only within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.[54]
Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the local government unit vis--vis the central government.
In international law, the right to self-determination need not be understood as a right to political separation, but rather as a complex
net of legal-political relations between a certain people and the state authorities. It ensures the right of peoples to the necessary level of
autonomy that would guarantee the support of their own cultural identity, the establishment of priorities by the communitys internal
decision-making processes and the management of collective matters by themselves. [55]
If self-determination is viewed as an end in itself reflecting a preference for homogeneous, independent nation-states, it is incapable
of universal application without massive disruption. However, if self-determination is viewed as a means to an endthat end being a
democratic, participatory political and economic system in which the rights of individuals and the identity of minority communities are
protectedits continuing validity is more easily perceived. [56]
Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to the people of a particular area or region with least
control and supervision from the central government. [57]
The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups, with a common tradition and shared social-cultural
characteristics, to develop freely their ways of life and heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge of their own business. This is
achieved through the establishment of a special governance regime for certain member communities who choose their own authorities
from within the community and exercise the jurisdictional authority legally accorded to them to decide internal community affairs. [58]
In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the cultivation of more positive means for national integration. It would
remove the wariness among the Muslims, increase their trust in the government and pave the way for the unhampered implementation
of the development programs in the region.[59] Again, even a glimpse of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission could lend
a sense of the urgency and the inexorable appeal of true decentralization:

MR. OPLE. . . . We are writing a Constitution, of course, for generations to come, not only for the present but for our posterity. There
is no harm in recognizing certain vital pragmatic needs for national peace and solidarity, and the writing of this Constitution just
happens at a time when it is possible for this Commission to help the cause of peace and reconciliation in Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, by taking advantage of a heaven-sent opportunity. . . . [60]

...

MR. ABUBAKAR. . . . So in order to foreclose and convince the rest of the of the Philippines that Mindanao autonomy will be
granted to them as soon as possible, more or less, to dissuade these armed men from going outside while Mindanao will be under the
control of the national government, let us establish an autonomous Mindanao within our effort and capacity to do so within the
shortest possible time. This will be an answer to the Misuari clamor, not only for autonomy but for independence. [61]

...

MR. OPLE. . . . The reason for this abbreviation of the period for the consideration of the Congress of the organic acts and their
passage is that we live in abnormal times. In the case of Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, we know that we deal with questions
of war and peace. These are momentous issues in which the territorial integrity and the solidarity of this country are being put at stake,
in a manner of speaking.

We are writing a peace Constitution. We hope that the Article on Social Justice can contribute to a climate of peace so that any civil
strife in the countryside can be more quickly and more justly resolved. We are providing for autonomous regions so that we give
constitutional permanence to the just demands and grievances of our own fellow countrymen in the Cordilleras and in Mindanao. One
hundred thousand lives were lost in that struggle in Mindanao, and to this day, the Cordilleras is being shaken by an armed struggle as
well as a peaceful and militant struggle.

...

Rather than give opportunity to foreign bodies, no matter how sympathetic to the Philippines, to contribute to the settlement of this
issue, I think the Constitutional Commission ought not to forego the opportunity to put the stamp of this Commission through
definitive action on the settlement of the problems that have nagged us and our forefathers for so long. [62]

A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization. [63]

Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or functionally
defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by subnational units. It is typically a delegated power, wherein
a larger government chooses to delegate certain authority to more local governments. Federalism implies some measure of
decentralization, but unitary systems may also decentralize. Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units
that have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right against the central government. [64]
Decentralization comes in two formsdeconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration is administrative in nature; it involves the
transfer of functions or the delegation of authority and responsibility from the national office to the regional and local offices. This mode
of decentralization is also referred to as administrative decentralization.[65]
Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of powers, responsibilities, and resources for the
performance of certain functions from the central government to local government units. [66] This is a more liberal form of
decentralization since there is an actual transfer of powers and responsibilities.[67] It aims to grant greater autonomy to local government
units in cognizance of their right to self-government, to make them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and technical
capabilities.[68]
This Court elucidated the concept of autonomy in Limbona v. Mangelin,[69] thus:

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power
and in the process to make local governments more responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local government units declared
to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation, since
in that event the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.

In the case, the Court reviewed the expulsion of a member from the Sangguniang Pampook, Autonomous Region. It held that the
Court may assume jurisdiction as the local government unit, organized before 1987, enjoys autonomy of the former category. It refused,
though, to resolve whether the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to
decentralize power rather than mere administration.[70]
A year later, in Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit, [71] the Court, with the same composition, ruled without any
dissent that the creation of autonomous regions contemplates the grant of political autonomyan autonomy which is greater than the
administrative autonomy granted to local government units. It held that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution
(Art. X, Sec. 2) refers to administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is
peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these
regions.[72]
And by regional autonomy, the framers intended it to mean meaningful and authentic regional autonomy. [73] As articulated by a
Muslim author, substantial and meaningful autonomy is the kind of local self-government which allows the people of the region or area
the power to determine what is best for their growth and development without undue interference or dictation from the central
government.[74]
To this end, Section 16, Article X[75] limits the power of the President over autonomous regions.[76] In essence, the provision also
curtails the power of Congress over autonomous regions. [77]Consequently, Congress will have to re-examine national laws and make
sure that they reflect the Constitutions adherence to local autonomy. And in case of conflicts, the underlying spirit which should guide
its resolution is the Constitutions desire for genuine local autonomy. [78]
The diminution of Congress powers over autonomous regions was confirmed in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals,[79] wherein this Court
held that the omission (of as may be provided by law) signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments autonomy from
Congress and to break Congress control over local government affairs.
This is true to subjects over which autonomous regions have powers, as specified in Sections 18 and 20, Article X of the 1987
Constitution. Expressly not included therein are powers over certain areas. Worthy of note is that the area of public works is not
excluded and neither is it reserved for the National Government. The key provisions read, thus:

SEC. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional
consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department
and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts
shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the
Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.

SEC. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of general welfare of the people of the region.
(Emphasis supplied)

E.O. 426 officially devolved the powers and functions of the DPWH in ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government (ARG).
Sections 1 and 2 of E.O. 426 provide:

SECTION 1. Transfer of Control and Supervision. The offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) including their functions, powers and responsibilities,
personnel, equipment, properties, budgets and liabilities are hereby placed under the control and supervision of the
Autonomous Regional Government.

In particular, these offices are identified as the four (4) District Engineering Offices (DEO) in each of the four provinces
respectively and the three (3) Area Equipment Services (AES) located in Tawi-Tawi, Sulu and Maguindanao (Municipality of
Sultan Kudarat).

SEC. 2. Functions Transferred. The Autonomous Regional Government shall be responsible for highways, flood control and water
resource development systems, and other public works within the ARMM and shall exercise the following functions:

1. Undertake and evaluate the planning, design, construction and works supervision for the infrastructure projects whose
location and impact are confined within the ARMM;

2. Undertake the maintenance of infrastructure facilities within the ARMM and supervise the maintenance of such local
roads and other infrastructure facilities receiving financial assistance from the National Government;

3. Ensure the implementation of laws, policies, programs, rules and regulations regarding infrastructure projects as well as
all public and private physical structures within the ARMM;

4. Provide technical assistance related to their functions to other agencies within the ARMM, especially the local
government units;

5. Coordinate with other national and regional government departments, agencies, institutions and organizations, especially
the local government units within the ARMM in the planning and implementation of infrastructure projects;

6. Conduct continuing consultations with the local communities, take appropriate measures to make the services of the
Autonomous Regional Government responsive to the needs of the general public and recommend such appropriate actions
as may be necessary; and

7. Perform such other related duties and responsibilities within the ARMM as may be assigned or delegated by the Regional
Governor or as may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

More importantly, Congress itself through R.A. 9054 transferred and devolved the administrative and fiscal management of public
works and funds for public works to the ARG. Section 20, Article VI of R.A. 9054 provides:

ARTICLE VI

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

SEC. 20. Annual Budget and Infrastructure Funds. The annual budget of the Regional Government shall be enacted by Regional
Assembly. Funds for infrastructure in the autonomous region allocated by the central government or national government shall be
appropriated through a Regional Assembly Public Works Act.

Unless approved by the Regional Assembly, no public works funds allocated by the central government or national government for the
Regional Government or allocated by the Regional Government from its own revenues may be disbursed, distributed, realigned, or
used in any manner.

The aim of the Constitution is to extend to the autonomous peoples, the people of Muslim Mindanao in this case, the right to self-
determinationa right to choose their own path of development; the right to determine the political, cultural and economic content of their
development path within the framework of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic. [80] Self-determination
refers to the need for a political structure that will respect the autonomous peoples uniqueness and grant them sufficient room for self-
expression and self-construction.[81]
In treading their chosen path of development, the Muslims in Mindanao are to be given freedom and independence with minimum
interference from the National Government. This necessarily includes the freedom to decide on, build, supervise and maintain the public
works and infrastructure projects within the autonomous region. The devolution of the powers and functions of the DPWH in the ARMM
and transfer of the administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds to the ARG are meant to be true, meaningful and
unfettered. This unassailable conclusion is grounded on a clear consensus, reached at the Constitutional Commission and ratified by the
entire Filipino electorate, on the centrality of decentralization of power as the appropriate vessel of deliverance for Muslim Filipinos
and the ultimate unity of Muslims and Christians in this country.
With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, and the National Government takes control again. The hands, once more,
of the autonomous peoples are reined in and tied up.
The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by virtue of E.O. 426, have been previously devolved to
the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
E.O. 426 clearly ordains the transfer of the control and supervision of the offices of the DPWH within the ARMM, including their
functions, powers and responsibilities, personnel, equipment, properties, and budgets to the ARG. Among its other functions, the
DPWH-ARMM, under the control of the Regional Government shall be responsible for highways, flood control and water resource
development systems, and other public works within the ARMM. Its scope of power includes the planning, design, construction and
supervision of public works. According to R.A. 9054, the reach of the Regional Government enables it to appropriate, manage and
disburse all public work funds allocated for the region by the central government.
The use of the word powers in E.O. 426 manifests an unmistakable case of devolution.
In this regard, it is not amiss to cite Opinion No. 120, S. 1991 [82] of the Secretary of Justice on whether the national departments
or their counterpart departments in the ARG are responsible for implementation of roads, rural water supply, health, education, women
in development, agricultural extension and watershed management. Referring to Section 2, Article V of R.A. 6734 which enumerates
the powers of the ARG, he states:

It is clear from the foregoing provision of law that except for the areas of executive power mentioned therein, all other such areas shall
be exercised by the Autonomous Regional Government (ARG) of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. It is noted that
programs relative to infrastructure facilities, health, education, women in development, agricultural extension and watershed
management do not fall under any of the exempted areas listed in the abovequoted provision of law. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is
that all these spheres of executive responsibility have been transferred to the ARG.

Reinforcing the aboveview (sic) are the various executive orders issued by the President providing for the devolution of the powers
and functions of specified executive departments of the National Government to the ARG. These are E.O. Nos. 425 (Department of
Labor and Employment, Local Government, Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources, Social Welfare and Development and
Science and Technology), 426 (Department of Public Works and Highways), 459 (Department of Education, Culture and Sports) and
460 (Department of Agriculture). The execution of projects on infrastructure, education, women, agricultural extension and watershed
management within the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao normally fall within the responsibility of one of the aforementioned
executive departments of the National Government, but by virtue of the aforestated EOs, such responsibility has been transferred to
the ARG.

E.O. 426 was issued to implement the provisions of the first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6734the validity of which this Court upheld
in the case of Abbas v. Commission on Elections.[83] In Section 4, Article XVIII of said Act, central government or national government
offices and agencies in the autonomous region which are not excluded under Section 3, Article IV [84] of this Organic Act, shall be placed
under the control and supervision of the Regional Government pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the oversight committee.
Evidently, the intention is to cede some, if not most, of the powers of the national government to the autonomous government in
order to effectuate a veritable autonomy. The continued enforcement of R.A. 8999, therefore, runs afoul of the ARMM Organic Acts
and results in the recall of powers which have previously been handed over. This should not be sanctioned, elsewise the Organic Acts
desire for greater autonomy for the ARMM in accordance with the Constitution would be quelled. It bears stressing that national laws
are subject to the Constitution one of whose state policies is to ensure the autonomy of autonomous regions. Section 25, Article II of the
1987 Constitution states:

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

R.A. 8999 has made the DPWH-ARMM effete and rendered regional autonomy illusory with respect to infrastructure projects.
The Congressional Record shows, on the other hand, that the lack of an implementing and monitoring body within the area has hindered
the speedy implementation, of infrastructure projects.[85] Apparently, in the legislatures estimation, the existing DPWH-ARMM
engineering districts failed to measure up to the task. But if it was indeed the case, the problem could not be solved through the simple
legislative creation of an incongruous engineering district for the central government in the ARMM. As it was, House Bill No. 995
which ultimately became R.A. 8999 was passed in record time on second reading (not more than 10 minutes), absolutely without the
usual sponsorship speech and debates.[86] The precipitate speed which characterized the passage of R.A. 8999 is difficult to comprehend
since R.A. 8999 could have resulted in the amendment of the first ARMM Organic Act and, therefore, could not take effect without first
being ratified in a plebiscite. What is more baffling is that in March 2001, or barely two (2) months after it enacted R.A. 8999 in January
2001, Congress passed R.A. 9054, the second ARMM Organic Act, where it reaffirmed the devolution of the DPWH in ARMM,
including Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, to the Regional Government and effectively repealed R.A. 8999.
DPWH Department Order No. 119
Now, the question directly related to D.O. 119.
D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi
City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of E.O. 426. The Executive Order was issued pursuant to R.A. 6734which initiated
the creation of the constitutionally-mandated autonomous region[87] and which defined the basic structure of the autonomous
government.[88] E.O. 426 sought to implement the transfer of the control and supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to the
Autonomous Regional Government. In particular, it identified four (4) District Engineering Offices in each of the four (4) provinces,
namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.[89] Accordingly, the First Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in
Lanao del Sur has jurisdiction over the public works within the province.
 The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering
District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes back powers which have been
previously devolved under the said executive order. D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. The DPWHs order, like spring
water, cannot rise higher than its source of powerthe Executive.
The fact that the department order was issued pursuant to E.O. 124signed and approved by President Aquino in her residual
legislative powersis of no moment. It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails
over a general one.[90] Lex specialis derogant generali. As this Court expressed in the case of Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,[91] another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to special legislation on the
same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable, that specific
statute prevails over a general statute and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed
therefor specially should prevail.
E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing the Ministry of Public Works and Highways while E.O.
426 is a special law transferring the control and supervision of the DPWH offices within ARMM to the Autonomous Regional
Government. The latter statute specifically applies to DPWH-ARMM offices. E.O. 124 should therefore give way to E.O. 426 in the
instant case.
In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a plebiscite in effect superseded E.O. 124. In case of an
irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails because it is the later legislative will.[92]
Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and other issuances or parts
thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. [93] With the repeal of E.O. 124 which
is the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily follows that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
Grave abuse of discretion
Without doubt, respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. They implemented R.A. 8999 despite its inoperativeness and
repeal. They also put in place and maintained the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office in accordance with D.O. 119 which
has been rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
Still, on the issue of grave abuse of discretion, this Court, however, cannot uphold petitioners argument that R.A. 8999 was signed
into law under suspicious circumstances to support the assertion that there was a capricious and whimsical exercise of legislative
authority. Once more, this Court cannot inquire into the wisdom, merits, propriety or expediency of the acts of the legislative branch.
Likewise, the alleged lack of consultation or public hearing with the affected agency during the inception of the law does not render
the law infirm. This Court holds that the Congress did not transgress the Constitution nor any statute or House Rule in failing to invite
a resource person from the DPWH-ARMM during the Committee meeting. Section 27, Rule VII of the Rules of the House [94] only
requires that a written notice be given to all the members of a Committee seven (7) calendar days before a regularly scheduled meeting,
specifying the subject matter of the meeting and the names of the invited resource persons. And it must be emphasized that the questions
of who to invite and whether there is a need to invite resource persons during Committee meetings should be addressed solely to
Congress in its plenary legislative powers.[95]
Conclusion
The repeal of R.A. 8999 and the functus officio state of D.O. 119 provide the necessary basis for the grant of the writs of certiorari
and prohibition sought by the petitioners. However, there is no similar basis for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
DBM Secretary to release funds appropriated for public works projects in Marawi City and Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur and to compel respondent DPWH Secretary to allow the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering
District in Lanao del Sur to implement all public works projects within its jurisdictional area. Section 20, Article VI of R.A. 9054 clearly
provides that (f)unds for infrastructure in the autonomous region allocated by the central government or national government shall only
be appropriated through a Regional Assembly Public Works Act passed by the Regional Assembly. There is no showing that such
Regional Assembly Public Works Act has been enacted.
WHEREFORE, considering that Republic Act No. 9054 repealed Republic Act No. 8999 and rendered DPWH Department Order
No. 119 functus officio, the petition insofar as it seeks the writs of certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Accordingly, let a writ of
prohibition ISSUE commanding respondents to desist from implementing R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119, and maintaining the DPWH Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Office and the First Engineering District of the Province of Lanao del Sur comprising the City of Marawi and
the municipalities within the First District of Lanao del Sur. However, the petition insofar as it seeks a writ of mandamus against
respondents is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.