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The attack of Hill 192 by the 1st Bn, 38th

Infantry (2nd Jivision), Jul 11, 1944 by
Lt Col . T. Mildren, Inf. Command and
Staff College. 1946-47.

This Document
IS A HOLDING OF THE
ARCHIVES SECTION
LIBRARY SERVICES
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
DOCUMENT NO. N-2253.2 COPY NO. 1

1o rorm
F 160 Army-CGSC-P2-1798-7 Mar 52-5M
13 Mar 51

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 MONO GRAPH

COM1VVMND A'ND STAFF COLLiG

FORT i1VNWORJTH

KANSAS

School of Combined Arms

Regular Course
1946-1947

THE ATTACK OF HILL 192"'.

BY THE (

1st BATTALION, 38th INFANTRY (2nd DIVISION

JULY 11, 1944

(NO ANDY C AMPAIGN)

(Personal Experience of a Battalion Commander)

TYPE OF-OPERATION DESCRIBED: BATTALION IN THlE ATTACK

Lieutenant Colonel Frank T. Mildren, Infantry

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Index - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - 1

Bibliography -- - - - - - - - - - 2

Introduction - - - - - - - 3

Geographical Features - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4

Planning the Attack on Hill 192 and the Rear

Area Rehearsals and Training - - - - - - - - 5,6,7

Artillery Preparations and Initial Setback in

A Company's Sector - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8

Successful Advances by C Company and Commitment

of Reserve Company - -- - - - - - - - - - - - 9

Capture of the Objective -- - - - - - - -- - --- 10

Conclusion - - - - --- - - - - - -- - - - - -11,12,13

Lessons - --- ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14

Page 1
 BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Combat s c of he' 2rd Intfa f~ Division in

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World Wa'r I
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V Corps Operations in the ETO

Field Order No. 10, V Corps, 4 July, 1944

Translation of a letter taken from the body of

Gefr. Helmut Kasiacka, 10 Co, III Bn, 9 Prcht

Regt, German 3rd Prcht Division.

--- translated by V Corps.

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Page 2
 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this monograph is to cover the attack of the

1st Battalion, 38th Infantry (2nd Division) on Hill 192, July 11,

1944, during the Normandy Campaign in Europe. In addition to the

tactical importance of this attack -- the capture of a terrain

feature that dominated the Omaha Beach area and the city of St Lo-

this monograph will emphasize two important factors involved in

the operation. First, it will bring out special training needed

with the Infantry - Tank - Artillery - Engineer team in order to

successfully launch an attack'in hedgerow country against a strong

defensive position. Second, it will bring out the detailed plan-

ning used in this case and its resultant factors.

For orientation purposes a brief resume of events leading up

to the attack of Hill 192 are listed below. (See Map A)

After the 1st and 29th Divisions had stormed ashore at Omaha

Beach on June 6, 1944 in history's largest amphibious operations,

the 2nd Infantry Division, also part of V Corps, landed on June 7,

and took over the central sector of the beachhead area. After ten

days of hard fighting among the hedgerows against elements of three

German Divisions, the V Corps slowly advanced until the forward

line on June 16 was as shown on Map A. At this time the U. S. XIX

Corps took over the area to the West of the 2nd Division. The 29th

Infantry Division passed to the control of the XIS Corps.

During the period 16 June - 1 July large scale attacks were

made by XIX Corps toward St Lo. On the V Corps front portions of

the 2nd Division attempted to take Hill 192, but the German Third

Parachute Division had oeen brought from the Brittany Peninsula

and was firmly entrenched on the hill, so our attack was repulsed.

For the remainder of June only limited objective attacks were made

by V Corps to straighten our lines. Buildup of First Army in the

beachhead continued during this period.

Page 3
 GEOGGAPHJ W L' FEATURE~hS

The terrain immediately north of Hill 192 is typical of the

entire Normandy beachhead area. The fields are crisscrossed with.

hedgerows that mark the boundaries of cultivated areas. Although

the distance between hedgerows varies, the average distance in

the vicinity of Hill 192 is about seventy five yards. From Omaha

Beach to Hill 192 the ground is fairly flat and made up of small

orchards and farmland. The Cerisy Forest, west of Balleroy, pro-

vides the only large sized concealment area but this was captured

by V Corps before .the Germans could utilize it. Two small rivers,

the Aure and the Elle run generally from East to West through the

beachhead area while the large Vire River runs North from St Lo

to Isigny.

Hill 192, the dominating natural terrain feature in the beach-

head area, is two miles East of St Lo on the St - Bayeux highway.

(See Map B). It is about sixteen miles South of Omaha Beach and on

clear days the Beach and interening terrain can be observed from

Hill 192. The hill itself is about 1000 yards wide and about 1200'

yards long, and is completely covered on the North side with hedge-

rows. Most of the South side is completely covered by thick woods

that contain very few trails.

Hedgerows on Hill 192 are about 3-4 feet high with a thickness

of about 2-3 feet at the base. Most are filled with large rocks

and covered with thorny bushes and vines. After the attack of June

16 the 2nd Division was firmly entrenched near the North base of

this hill with the 9th Parachute Regiment of the German 3rd Para-

chute Division holding Hill 192 and the territory on either side.

P'ae 4
 P ,\INING TEL ATTACK (See Map ,

During the period 1-10 July plans were made for-the capture of

Hill 192. Aerial photos showed us that the enemy had certainly

transformed the hill into a major strong point. Deep communication

trenches were observed behind most of the larger hedgerows, but due

to good camouflage and well concealed positions the exact locations

of firing points, machine gun and mortar positions, and anti-tank

positions could not be determined. We found out after the hill's

capture that some german dugouts were as deep as twelve feet with

underground passageways to concealed, firing positions within the

hedgerows. The firing slits from these firing positions were

covered by vines growing out of the hedgerows. Machine guns were

located under hedgerows at junctions in order to cover all possible

approaches.

For the first few days of the ten day period preceding the

attack, my battalion, which was selected to make the frontal attack

on Hill 192, was placed in the line opposite the hill proper in

order to become familiar with the terrain. While there we dug large

holes in the hedgerows at various intervals leaving only a thin shell

on the enemy side. This was done in order to enable our supporting

tanks to easily break through during the attack. Tank units at this

time were having large steel prongs welded to the front of each tank

in order to make the job of breaking through hedgerows much easier.

During this period every patrol sent out to try and find gaps

in the enemy position was badly shot up and the same thing happened

to patrols from other battalions on our flanks. This was not only

due to the fact the enemy was excellent at counter patrolling but

due to our failure to apply the principles of scouting and patrol-

ling.

After the battalion had become familiar with the terrain and

had dug partial holes in the hedgerows it was pulled out of the line

and moved to a rear area where rehearsals were scheduled and final

plans prepared. A complete written order was prepared by the bat-

talion-and each company. The order was unique in that routes of

attack were prescribed for each assault team, and a 1:5000 aerial

photo and photomap issued to each squad leader showidg his par-

ticular direction of attack and the routes of adjacent squads.

Page 5
 The rehearsals emphasized close coordination between the artil-

lery and squad teams composed of one squad, three engineers, and a

medium tank. Some teams also contained light machine gun squads

and each infantry squad contained one BAR and one sub-machine gun.

During these rehearsals a plan was worked out whereby the teams would

advance under cover of our artillery fire with the rifle squad in a

wedge formation protecting the tank while the tank gave close fire

support to the infantry squad. Communication between these two

elements was obtained by a telephone attached on the rear of the

tank. Also on the back of the tank was stored a large quantity of

explosives and satchel charges - - the plan being that when the team

encountered a thick hedgerow that could not be readily breeched by

the prongs on the tank, the engineers would emplace the charges on

the hedgerow, then the entire team would back up a short distance

while the hole was blown. It will be brought out later that this

proved very disastrous to the tanks.

V Corps order for the attack provided for artillery support

from the 3rd Armored Division, two battalions of artillery from the

1st Infantry Division, Corps Artillery, two Tank Destroyer battalions,

two companies of 4.2 mortars, and the 741st Tank Battalion. Air sup-

port provided for planned missions in addition to armed reconnaissance

and call missions.

The Division plan of attack called for demonstrations on fronts

adjacent to Hill 192. Part of the 23rd Infantry was to attack on the

left of the hill, the 2nd Battalion 38th Infantry to attack on the

right while my battalion was to attack the hill frontally on a 600

yard front. The objective would not only give us control of Hill

192 but also the St Lo - Berigny highway.

My plan of attack called for Company A on the left with five

tank-infantry-engineer teams in the assault (essentially two platoons

forward, one back). - 0 Company on the right was to attack in a column

of platoons with three tank-infantry-engineer teams in the assault.

I figured the right zone was the enemy's weakest area and I planned

on a breakthrough at this point. On this narrow fron eight tanks

were all that I could use in the assault although the remainder, of

the tank,company was to follow closely and support the action.

The artillery plan divided the area into four zones perpendi-

Page 6
cular to the front - each zone being assigned a color designation.

Lines parallel to the front were drawn on the map each fifty yards

from our lines to the objective and a number assigned each of these

zones. Prominent and distinctive points or areas in the zona of

action were assigned letters. Maps containing this fire plan were

issued down to and including platoon leaders.

The overall plan called for 'the artillery barrage to roll for-

ward in fifty yard increments with certain artillery units firing

on targets of opportunity on call of forward units. With this plan

part of the artillery could be moved back in a colored zone to sup-

port any unit held up, or it could be advanced faster in one zone

than in an adjacent one if the situation so warranted.

One day prior to the attack my battalion was moved back into

position at the base of Hill 192 in preparation for the attack.

After hearing of all the fire support I was to receive I figured

the battalion could almost walk up the hill without too much effort.

I was due for quite a surprise, and found i greatly underestimated

the ability of the German 3rd Parachute Di)vision.

K;

Page 7
 THE ATTACK (See Map B)

At 0430 on the day of attack, July 11, the entire battalion

was carefully and quietly moved out of its forward position and to

the rear about 200 yards. This was for the purpose of allowing the

heavy artillery preparation to cover completely the enemy front--

elements that had been only about 50 yards in front of our own lines.

At 0500, preparatory fires of the artillery battalions, armored ar-

tillery battalions, 4.2 mortars and our own 60 and 81 mm mortars

commenced ahd lasted for one hour, increasing the intensity until

they were placing a terrific pounding on the germans during the

last fifteen minutes.

At 0600 our Infantry-Tank-Engineer teams jumped off in the attack

and instantly received the heaviest german artillery and mortar bar-

rage we had encountered to that date. Our casualties were heavy in

Company A on the left. Nevertheless we managed to overrun their

initial positions which happened to be a covering shell. However

Company A could not gain any ground against the main defensive position.

In spite of all the fire cover we could place in this sector, all move-

ments by our units were met by intense and accurate small arms fire

that came from positions within the hedgerows. We could not locate

those positions and could not see any germans.

Every attempt at a maneuver was met by intense machine gun and

rifle fire plus the constant artillery and mortar fire. Due to the

cleverly concealed german positionswe could not direct artillery

or tank fire on any known emplacements; consequently we were merely

shooting "in the dark" at hedgerows in general. The two tanks on

Company A's extreme right were hit by Panzerfausts and the resultant

explosion of the explosives on the tanks completely blew the turrets

off. Another of Company A's tanks hit a mine and a fourth received

a direct artillery hit leaving only one tank with assault elements

of this company. Other tank crewmen behind the tanks that blew up

suddenly decided that area was no place for them, so we could not

get any tanks up in the area on A Company's right. Several hours

elapsed before we could remove all the explosives from the tanks

and get them back in action.

By 0900 A Company had lost about 75o of its right platoon and

Page 8
about half of its left platoon. The support platoon of this Com-

pany was committed to the left and immediately ran into flanking

fire from its left -- the 23rd Infantry on our left had run into

as much if not more fire than we had, and consequently had not been

able to cross the line of departure for the first four hours. By

0900 A Company was ineffective due to the heavy casualties. How-

ever C Company on the right was more fortunate. It had initially

been held up by flanking fire from the german positions in front

of A Company, so the company commander committed a support platoon

withhtanks to the left while his main attack continued forward.

The support platoon accomplished its mission by diverting the

enemy fire away from the main C Company attack. This support

platoon also managed to overrun several Berman positions, and

by using the tanks with prongs to break through the hedgerows

it managed to bury the Germans in their strongpoints. At 0900

C Company was about 200 yards in advance of A Company.

At this time, 0900, I gave orders to t Company, the reserve,

to move up into the gap between A and C Companies and attack the

German position in front of A Company from the flank.

Up until this time our scheduled air support had been post-

poned due to a heavy fog, but then the sky began to clear so the

planes came over and started their bombing and strafing. A couple

of the first planes to bomb missed their targets -- one bomb des-

troying my aid station and another hitting in B Company area as

they were attempting to move inhto an initial position. This turn

of events plus a lot of other confusion caused B Company to use

up two hours trying to get into attack position.

When B Company finally got into position and started its attack,

it was not in the zone prescribed by me. The company had moved too

far to the left; and was attacking through A Company and against the

same strong points that had caused the latter company so many

casualties. Ordinarily B Company should have been stopped the same

a$A Company, but to our surprise the advance made steady progress.

As we found out much later, the germans 17ad suffered so many casual-

ties and C Company was slowly outlanking the strong points, that
the German commander had ordered the remnants of his units to with-

draw and fight a delaying action. Through B Company s mistake we

lost an opportunity to capture or kill the remaining enemy in this

Page 9
particular zone.

In the meantime C Company's attack was progressing slowly but

favorably and so was the 2nd Battalion on our right. B Company

advanced against scattered resistance. By 1400 both companies had

reached the top of Hill 192 and commenced the difficult move through

the heavy woods on the far side of the hill. Although the enemy

withdrew rapidly and our advance was meeting only artillery and

mortar fire, it took the rest of the afternoon to move down the hill

and cut the St Lo - Berigny highway. This slow advance was due to

the condition of the woods which were reduced to piles of sticks

and rubbish by our artillery and mortar fire. Also, on our right,

C Company had encountered many anti-personnel mines that were

located in the few sunken roads that were available for our covered

approach.

By late afternoon our positions were consolidated and the

digging - in process started. We did not receive an enemy counter-

attack - - the germans being content to fire mortar and artillery

concentrations on our newly won positions. As a'matter of fact,

6 daylight hours we could not move around on the forward slope

during

of Hill 192 because we were easily seen by the enemy, and each of

our visible movements was followed by a mortar barrage from the

germans.

Page 10
 C ONCLUSION

From the foregoing, it can be seen that the battalion took

a very important Corps and Division objective, and in so doing

eliminated the last ground position from which the germans could-

observe our beach operations. Also the terrain dominating St Lo

from the East was now in our hands thus aiding the XIX Corps in its

attack on the city. One hundred twenty-seven prisoners were cap-

tured by the two attacking battalions, and although we had no ac-

curate count of enemy dead due to the fact many were buried in their

dugouts, G-2 estimates placed the German 9th Parachute Regiment as

non-effective due to casualties inflicted by the 2nd Division in July.

The points which are subject to criticism are:

1. The practice of placing satchel charges and other ex-

plosives on the tanks proved to be disastrous. One panzerfaust

blast and the turret of a tank was blown completely off, the tank

caught fire and all crew members were either killed or injured.

P. The battalion and company attack plans were too detailed/

and thus too complicated. Naturally a detailed attack plan will

detract from oflexibility, and that happened very noticeably in this

attack. We had included plans even for rifle squads, and when those

squads suffered heavy casualties - - we had lost 194 men in this

attack - - This lack of flexibility

then the plan disintegrated.
- -the
was probably induced by my overconfidence inxoutcorde of the attack.

I thought with all the fire support I had that the attack would be

an easy advance.

3. Our failure to learn more of the german dispositions

prior to the attack.was due to failure of our patrols to accomplish

their missions. Basically this was simply our failure to apply the

principles of scouting and patrolling, and no doubt reflects on our

training procedures -- however it must be remembered we were green

troops up against a veteran enemy unit.

4. The failure of B Company to attack through the gap be-

tween A and C Companies no doubt enabled the few remaining germans

in °front of A Company to escape to the rear. As the situation

turned out B Company was able to advance but it was ater deter-

mined the germans had decided to withdraw anyway. HaEd this not

been the case, B Company might have been held up by the same units

that had inflicted so many casualties on,A Company. in spite of

Page 11
the confusion caused by enemy shelling and our own air uhits drop-

ping bombs in the B Company assembly ,area, I see no excuse for B

Coimpany's failure to follow instructions.

5. There have been many arguments for and against the

heavy amount of artillery shells fired in this attack. That point

could be argued by both sides, and I'll admit 25,000 artillery shells,

to say nothing of the amount of 4.2, 60, 81 mm mortar shells and the

air bombs used in this small attack, seem excessive. Nevertheless,

I doubt if the infantry elements could have advanced if we had not

used this tremendous amount of artillery ammunition.

The effects of this heavy shelling were brought out in a per-

sonal letter written to a friend by one of the Germans who helped

defend Hill 192. The letter was taken off the body of a German

killed about three weeks after the attack of Hill 192 in a sub-

sequent advance. It was translated by V Corps and copies sent

to us. Here are some of the excerpts from that letter;-

"Dear Struppel,

For the third time I am trying to get in touch with

you by letter. Some time ago when I left.the 6th Group I arrived in

Wittstock where I made my ten jumps. Then my Reg't was stationed

in Brittany near Brest. When the invasion started we moved out and

marched 30-40 kilometers daily, but only at night. During the day

American fighter bombers controlled the area. We were put in the

line East of St Lo. At that time our company strength was 170.

Then the 11 of July arrived and the most terrible day of my

life. At 0500 our Co. sector got such a dense hail of arty and

mortar fire, that we knew a big attack was coming. In addition

to that we could hear the rumblings of tanks. At 0530 the firing

increased and the tanks moved closer. The hedgerows helped us to

hide somewhat from the tanks but they shot right through the rows

as through cake dough. At 1000 the order came to withdraw as the

position could not be held. I tried to carry my wounded comrade

with the help of another soldier but a shell landed a few yards

away and wounded him again and also hit the third fellow.
On our way back We were covered again with terrific arty fire.

We were just lying in an open area. Every moment I expected to get

hit. At that moment I lost my nerves. I chewed up a cigarette,
it into the ground and acted like a madman. The others acted just
Page 12
like me. When one hears for hours the whining, whistling and

bursting of shells and the moaning and groaning of the wounded,

one does not feel too well.

Our company had only 30 men left. In the meantime it was

reorganized to a certain extent. We are expecting a new attack

supported by tanks today or tomorrow.

I hope to hear from you soon

your ftiend,

Helmut"

Page 13
 LESSONS

Some of the lessons to be learned from this attack are:

1. Tanks should not be used as a medium for carrying

explosives when those same tanks are subject to enemy fire.

2. Any battalion attack plan should be flexible and

never detailed to the point whereby squads and platoons are told

what to do from the battalion level. This seems fundamental, but

the attack on Hill 192 demonstrates that it can happen when over-

confidence enters the commanders thoughts and plans.

3. More emphasis in training should be placed on

practical application of present fundamentals in Scouting and

Patrolling.

4. Confusion will generally be found prevalent during

a heavy attack by small units, consequently one should expect

operations not to progress as planned - - plans must be flexible.

Generally confusion will prevail amongst both forces - the at-

tackers and the defenders - and the winner is usually the one

who is least confused.

Page 14
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